S/PV.303 Security Council

Monday, May 24, 1948 — Session 3, Meeting 303 — New York — UN Document ↗ OCR ✓ 18 unattributed speechs
This meeting at a glance
18
Speeches
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Resolutions
Topics
General statements and positions UN membership and Cold War General debate rhetoric Security Council deliberations War and military aggression UN procedural rules

The agenda was adopted.

76. Continuati~n of the discussion of the letter from the permanent represen- tative of Chile relative to the events in Czechoslovakia 76.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Santa Cruz, representative of Chile, took his place at the Council table.
The President unattributed #142750
Twà more members of the Counci1 have asked to speak. 1 tbfu.k they will be very brief. Mter they have spoken, 1 propose that we consider the discussion closed, and pass to the vote. Mr. TARASENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (translated from Russian): 1 wish to stress once again that without agreement between the Great Powers, the creation of the United Nations would have been impossible, and that the Five Power, Declaration is only the reflection and crystallization of that agreement. Thereis· nothing strange or surprising about that, for without that agreement we should have been unable not only ta set up the ';United Nations, but also to conquer our common enemy,hitlerite Germany. The representative of Argentina has also raised a question of substance conceI:'ning membership in the United Nations and in the Security Council. 1 think thàt the question is irrelevant an_d has no bearing on th~ substance of the matter under discussion. 1 can understand and even,share the point ofview of the representative ôf Argentina, who may not like the presence of this or that State in the Security COI'mcil; but thatis bis persona!· affair. l, too, have certain opinions on that inatter, but 1 do not think that this is the.time or place to vent them. That is alllwished to say. \ Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syrîa): 1 am sorry that 1 am obliged to intervene again in order to alleviate the doubts which appear to be in the mind of the representative of the USSR regarding my intervention in this matter. He stated he does 'not know the reasons for it. 1 am surprised to hear that, because every repreSentative on the Security Council is requîred to discuss matters which are under discussion by the Colmcil. Each representative deals with these matters in accordance with his understanding of the situation. 1 did not inter- Vene without presenting motives for such intervention. However, the representative of the USSR stated that my intervention was based on motiveswhich are unknown. How can my motives be unknown in view of the fact that they were presentedvery c1early? ln the fust pla~e, 1 intervened in this matter -. and 1 said this from. the beginning - for the reasonthat the identity, the integrity, and the freedom of small nations are impaired when they are exposed to fallingunder the pressure of big nations, when thesebig nations can interefere with thesmal1 nations, in the matter of establishing The second point is one which l have previously mentioned, namely, that l supported the idea of referring this matter to a sub-committee. l did so in the absence of authentic information which the Security Council ought ta have before formulating any opinion on the subject, especially since the Govemment of Czechoslovakia had declined ta send a representative to the Sècurity Council for the' purpose of presenting information. l found no other way to collect information on this subject, except by referring it to a sub-committee. It was stated that the Security Council could not obtain such information in a plenary meeting, and that it was better to refer the matter to a sub-committee. That was my reason for it. The other thing that l said was that l considered this question a matter of procedure and not of substance, and l gave my reasons for that. l referred to a rule from the provisional rules of procedure and l referred to the Charter of the United Nations, which was sufficient. That is the reason why l considered it in tha't way. l then suggested that the vote on. the proposaI should precede the other vote, for a reason which l mentionedl very clearly at that time, namely, that if such a precedent wo.::re to be accepted-that before.v9W1g on any. proposal we should know whether it is one of substance or procedure-then on any other proposal anyone may intervene and say: "Let us vote first as to whether it is a matter of substance or of procedure." l was in the Security Council last year and 1. have been in the Security Couneil this year, and we never had any precedent ta that effect. We have always voted on the proposal itself. Then afterward~, if there was opposition by a permanent member, the matter would be discUssed, but we did not take such an attitude or adopt the procedure of first voting whether any proposaI was procedural or substantive. In the third place, when l said that 'the. Declaration of San Francisco was not binding on the non-permanent members, .r said that we knew nothing,of the way it was drafted in San Francisco, which is true; We heard of it then, but it was never discussed iD. San Francico either in any of the main Committees or in the plenary meeting of the Conferenee. Therefore, it Wa8 a special document ta he binding on the Big Five thernselves. l consider that this matter should be 1 shouId certainly welcome it if the permanent mqnbers of the Security Council wouId agree to inc1ude the Declaration of San Francisco in the rules of procedure of the Security Council. Then we wouId be able ta glve our opinicn on the validity of this Declaration and on its applicability to certain resolutions. If they so suggest, and the Security Council decides to include the Declaration in th~ruIes of procedure, then we shouId be qualified·to discuss it, to give our judgm~t and formuIate our opinion on each point when it cornes under discussion. But undèr the present circumstances, 1think that my statement was correct, and 1 adhere to it. 1 think that the representative of the USSR is not justified in saying that the reason for my intervention was unknown, since it was clear aJ:1d well known. Mr.ARCE (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): The representative of the Ukraine ref~rredto the question of ignorance when affirming the sovereignty of that Soviet province. 1 made it quite clear that.1:am ignorant of the Constitution of bis country an,d 1 hope that he will be good eriough to give me a copy so that .. 1. can learn about it. For niy part 1 admit .to only one form of wisdom: that of knowing that 1 am ignorant of many things; and 1 note with particuIar p~easure the omniscience of the Ukrainian representative, who knows everything, including things that do not exist, sucb as the statements he attributes to me· regarding the composition of the CounciI, which 1 did not· make.
The President unattributed #142751
1 think we can nowp~ to the vote. 1 have severa! questions to put before thé Council in succession. 1 shall endeavour ta submit them for your decision as clearly as possible. The :first questionarose from .the,observations made by the Ukrainian representative. You have beforeyou a draft resolution submitted by the Chilean and Argentine delegations [281st and 288th meetings], which proposes ta set up a . committee to hear theevidence and to report to the Security Council. The vote to be taken on this drdt ~esolution ;r:aises the question of procedure we, have just beendiscussing. As 1 pointed out ai the last meeting which wc de~ votedtothis matter [300th meeting],th~re are two Illethods .of. proçeeding. 1 couId.ask you JO voteimmediately on the resolution. and interpret the vote '.dterwards,and you wouI~ have té> decide on the question of procedureat the same 1 favour this second method. because the ruling l might have to give as President wouldnot be in acordance with the views held by the majority of the Counèil's members. In these circumstances, 1 would prefer the question to be settled beforehand, rather than toannounce the reosult of the vote on the resolution and then to have to reconsider my. ruling if it were not accepted by the Council. . Umess the Syrian representative maintains his view, 1 should prefer to follow the procedure l proposed at our previoltS meeting. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): 1 do not object to the President's method, but 1 thought that it might aIso be correct to do. it, the other way. However, since the President prefers bis way, 1 . . have no objection to the procedure which he has proposed.
The President unattributed #142753
1thank the Syrian representative and accordingly shall proceed in thé following manueL. 1.shall 1};OW};!ut tp, tbe yote theq~es!!~~~t!!~~Qte to-be taken 'On the êlfâ!t resôÎution shall be con- ~.,a:pÎÔê~n:vôfe·t·J!(~rt[~~Bt€r2!~! . the. x:e~t of this vot!az !ID' mteŒretation, whiCli fSliâTI explam briefly, may be conteste(h)n that ~ we.~~. ~me tô aeèiiIe tliè·ques~~n. of procedure. . -- .. - . '"""'TSlÏan then calI for a vote on the resolution .and shalI interpret the results of it," according to the ruling given in your fust decision. 1 now put ta the vote the following question: Should the vote to be taken on the draft resolution he considered a procedural vote? A vote was taken by show of hands, as follows: In favour: Argéntin'l. Belgium, Canada,· China, Colombia, Sym.., United Kingdom, United States of America. Against: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Abstaining: France. lhe PRESIDENT: (translated trom French): 1 shall now interpret the vote which has taken place, taking as my basis the following considerations. In the first place, the President, as a representative of a permanent.member of the Security Council, canriot ignoœ +h~ ~d.n .Francisco Declaration. This is confirmed by some precedents. The' President in those cases was not necessarily a representative of the pçrmânent members. On one occasion at least, the President was a representative of a rion-permanent member, yet the o With regard to the other parts of the Declaration which could' be applied to the case now before the Council, paragraph 2 of part 1 states that a procedural vote will govern the establishment of "such bodies or agencies as it"-that is, the Council-"may cieem necessary for the performance of its functions"., ParagrMW, 4....wrrt..l,.. ~~+ th~""o~e~~~P!Qyjg~;c,fu~t.çqtain deci- "SIons, wh1'ffi'"m ~~.cly~.mJg1;J.t ...p~cRmced:ural, ~ust be consiêlë~e~.~u.Q§t.m~,~Ç.,~~..pC th,e "ii!iiïi$~ :çns~!!~~~" whiclt.th~t ~er~qjtJ~ ..!~~~_sRÇ,Ç..~=~~t ~Thjs"Sl:ta.ÎI1. ~f ev~:nts .begins"-for,#"insLaD-~-"~h~I?:~the. <:!ounçjt, d~frcres<'to make an..investig3:tioi.-:·'·~'''~:· f1lid wôiiaeréd"wliétIier,~mtliiS''paragraph, the word "investigation" could not be interpreted as applying to the sending of a commission to conduct an inquiry on the spot, and whether, therefore, a distinction llÙght not be drawn between that and an investigation to be carried out directly by a subsidiary organ of the Security Council. However, if wc:: refer to paragraph 5 of part 1 of the Declaration, we find the following: "To illustrate: inordering an investigation, the Council has to consider whether the· investiga- .tion-which may involve calling for reports, hearing witnesses, dispatching a commission of inquiry, .or other means-llÙght not further aggravate the situation". In those circumstances, 1 consider that the word "investigation" which appears in the first line of that paragraph, is used in its widest meaning, and 1 think it applies to the situation now before us. Therefore, whatever the interpretation of paragraph 5, part I, it seems in any case that the question may appear doubtful and that,'in the circumstances, the final prlJvision of the Declaration, according to which·the concurring vote .EQr,.!hs,sJ~SAriQ!lSre~on.s,J.i~!~rp.tSit!hi:1~c; which has jU.~t,~~!':~!UJll:!ç$;,~s~;cc,les~j,gn,,-tQ~~ ,sider the vote,,,9,n ,th~ "t~,$tl.\H?r-" .a~~.. ~!te• .Q,f substance. 1 would add that 1 have interpreted the last paragraph in accordance with the practice which has become established here, namely, that the abstention of a member does not prevent a decision being taken by the Council. It was because a permanent member had cast a negative vote that 1 have given this ruling. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) (translated trom Spanish): 1 am very sorry, but 1 must object to the ruling the President has just given. Morever, 1 wish to point out that various Presidents of this body have frequently stated that when determining a questi0I1 like this, the Council's decision did not set a precedent. This is a very wise statement, since the interpretation of the Charter cannot be dependent on the composition of the Council at any given time. 1 object to the President's decision because the Charter, the only document to which 1 must adhere, without taking account of the President's arguments based on the~ Flve Power Declaration, provides, in Article 27, paragraph 2, that decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members, and does not specify that the five permanent members shaU be included. And later in this same Charter, in the section on "Procedure", Article 29 provides that the Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions. 1 only wish ta add one remark, and 1 do so to lighten the task of the Council, not because 1 think that any legal objection can be raised. against the view 1maintain. There is no question i..î. this case of making an inquiry, but oruy of colletting information, and the proof of that is that if the occasion arises, l shall ask for the adoption of sorne other measure to collect the necessary information. Mr. IGNATIEFF (Canada): 1 understand the effect of the remarks Just made bY the President to be that, if the draft resolution submitted by the representative of Chile fails to receive the affirmative votes of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members, it will fail of adoption by the Security Council. 1 take that ruling to mean that the President accepts the validity or the applicability of the Four Power Declaration to this situation, including the application of what is known as the double veto. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): 1 wish ta say a ward or two ta make my PQsition clear. In the circumstances in wldch we find ourselves, and in which the Presideïlt finds himself, 1 dQ not think the President's l uling Qn the main point is wrQng, because there is a di{- ference as to whether this questiQn is one of procedure or Qne of substance. My Government hôld by the last paragraph Qf the San Francisco Declaration, which directs that that preliminary question must be decided by a VQte of seven members incluàing the votes of the five permanent members. 1 fe~ very strongly, howevér, that the difference. is Qne which ought not ta have arisen. The question ought never ta have been raised because, ta my mind, it is perfectIy clear that this is a qur.stion of procedure, under the Charter, in accordance with our ruIes of prQcedure, and in accordance with th.e Declaration of San Francisco itself. The President himseIf, Iike severaI representatives Qn the Security Council; has referred to the rule. in the San Francisco DeclaratiQn ta the effect that a proceduraI vote will be employed ta establish such bodies or agencies as may be deemed necessary for the performance of the functions of the Security CQuncil. What is proposed here is merely that we should caII upon three of our members ta study iurther a matter which is aIready subject ta investigatiQn by the Security Council, and 1 cannot conceive that that is a question of substance. There have been several occasions-I: ,can TecaIl one or two-when the Security Council as a whole has asked the five permanent members ta get together and examine sorne question further. There has never been any question as ta whether that was a matter of substance or not, and therefore my complaint is thnt this question should nev~r have been raised. There should be no difference on a matter which, ta me, is sa absolutely clear. 1 agree that, taking the Declaration as a whole and·pushing it ta the last degree, there is that last paragraph on which the representatives Qf t11eUSSR and the Ukrainian SSR. wholly deperid, ignQfing the Qther parts which seem te me ta point in a·differentdirectÎQn. 1 think mat Ml'. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated trom French): The interpretation of the vote the President has just given is based on the De'c1aration of the five sponsoring Powers at the San Francisco Conference. That Declaration is not binding upon my country, and 1 regret 1 cannot in these circumstances accept the validity of the President's interpretation. Mr. GoNZÂLEZ FE~NA:'NDEz (Columbia): 1 regret that 1 have to oppose the President's' ruling. My delegation holds that the only rules which bind the Security Council as a whole, and the Colombian delegation, are the Charter and the rules of procedure. We feel. that the question under discussion is a question of procedure, as defined in the Charter.
The President unattributed #142756
1 shall p'tlt my ruling to the vote of the Council. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated trom French): Might 1 ask the President whllt voting procedure will be followed in the coming vote?
The President unattributed #142757
(translated trom French): The question sh9uld certainly be put, since it is probable that the Security Council ,itself will have ta decide it. R.:.le 30 of our rules of procedure reads as follows: uIf a representative l'aises a point of order, the President shaH immediately state his ruling. If it is challenged, the President shall submit bis ruling to the Security Council for immediate decision and it shall stand unless overruled." If my interpretation of this text is correct, what 1 should put to the vote is the annulment of the ruling 1 have given. Ml'. GROMYKO (Uni~n of Soviet Socialist· Republics) (translated trom Russian): 1 should like to cIear up the question raised half-humorously by the Belgian representative. The Presi- - dent's ruling is, of course, correct. That ruling was made in accordance with the San Francisco Declaration. But if, instead of having the French representative as Presid<;lnt, we had another President, say, the Sy~ian representative, who disagreed with the Five Power Dedaration-though 1 do not know how he would act if he were President -and if that President made a ruling inconsistent with the Five Power Declaration, that ruling would not be.legally valid. If the representativeof any country were presiding over the Security Council and, in spite of the fact that one of the permanent mem,bers of the Council had voted against the proposal to consider the How ·else could it be? The alternative would be that the question as to whether the resolution was procedural or non-procedural would, by the process of voting, by various stages be reduced to a point of order, which would be 'an absurdity. 1 should like to add that no vote which the Security Council can now take, even if, shall we say, the representative of Argentina insists on a vote on the President's ruling, can weaken or annul the presidential ruling. Dtherwise, the question as to whether the Chilean resolution was substantive or procedural would be reduced tG a point of order. Is it not clear that such a situation would make no sense from the point of view of fact,logic or anything else?
The President unattributed #142758
(translated trom French): When 1 replied to the representative of Belgi--m a moment aga, 1 considered that rule 30 of the rules of procedure was applicable, as 1 think we are dealing here with a point of order. If the Council thinks oth~rwise, 1 should at once put to the vote the interpretation which 1 have given. But if we are dealing with a point of order, -as. 1 think we are-I feel 1 must, as 1 said before, put to the vote the annulment of my ruling, in conformity with rule 30. Nevertheless, 1 should point out that in certain other cases of disagreement, it wa':i the President's ruling which was put directly to the vote. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): 1 âgree with the President's last interpretation, that is, to put bis ruling to the vote, and ta have it either sustained . or rejected. Mr. AROE (Argentina) (translated trom Spanish) : Rule 30 of our rules of procedure makes no distinction, and it cannot be conceded that the President's ruling may be challenged on sorne occasions and not on others. 1·thereforè maintain that four members of the Council challenge the President's ruling, and consequently my objection should be put to the vote. If. the position becomes ridiculous, it will not be our fault, but the resUlt of the attitude of certain de1egation&; or eIse of the obscurity. of the Charter or of our rules of procedure.
The President unattributed #142759
Wc. must solve this difficulty. 1 shallfirst of all ask for your opinions on the following: ln applying rule 30 of ourrules of procedure, if the ruling given by the· President is to be overruled, must this be doneby means of a positive vote against it andinfavour of the annulment? Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated trom Russian): 1 think that we are wasting our time on sucb verbal tightrope-walking, and my remark is directed more particularly at the representatives of Syria and Argentina. Was the representative of Syria born yesterday? Does he not know that whenever a presidential ruling \Îs challenged in the Security Council, the question is put in such a way as to establish who is against the ruling, and not who is for it? We should perhaps ask the Sfcretary-General to refresh our memories on the point by producing a few dozen records containing the appropriate rules for the guidance of Presidents in questions of dispute. It might he1p the representatives of Syria and Argentina, and perhaps some others, to see the matter more clearly. If it were thought useful, it might be as wellto ask the Secretary-General ta bring with him a whole collection of documents and records. 1 should like to draw the President's attention to 'the last clause of rule 30, which reads: ,". . .' it shall stand unless overruled".
The President unattributed #142760
(translated from French): In reply to what the representative of Syria has just said, 1 would point out that the French text of rule 30 differn from the English. The translation is not a literai one. The English text says: cc••• the President shall submit his ruling to the Security Council for immediate decision and it shall stand unless overruled". This appears somewhat self-contradictory, unlike the French text, which states, not !hat the President submits bis decision to the Security Council,.but that he refers his ruling to the Security Council for immediate decision. 1 admit 1 prefer the French text since it avoids the contradiction in the English. To enable the Security Council to give its verdict, 1 shall put the question to the vote in the following form: Is it agreed that 1 should put to the vote the proposal that my ruling should be annulled? Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated trom Russian): If seems ta me that il we go on in this way, each pro- Mr. ARCE (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): We have already spoken of the ignorance of representatives, but 1 have just dis· covered a further piece of wisdom: when the person opposing the view one maintains is right, one should admit it. 1think that the representative of the USSR is right in this case, and consequently 1 shall vote in accordance with the President's decision. ..
The President unattributed #142761
ln my opinion we are in a far worse predicament than Achilles, for after all, Achilles did succeed in catching up with the tortoise, whereas there is a danger that we shall nev~r finish if every time 1 wish to put a. question, a decision must first of all be taken on the way in which 1 must put it. . The question' submitted to .the Council is essentially one connected with the application of the San Francisco Declaration. My interpretation was made in accordance with the Declaration which the permanent members adOl.1ted at San Francisco. 1 shaIl put the question to the vote' in the following form, for 1 consider it the only way out of our difficulty:.....W.ilLtb..9.§.e who object to my interpretation raisètliéir hands? .. ......".It"._...... _,1 _....• _..•.. ~-",..._.:'il'I""II"'~~ A vote was taken by show of hands, as follows: In favottr of rejecting the President's ruling: Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, S~a. Against rejecting the Presidenfs ruling: Ukrainiari Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. f Abstaining: France, United Kingdom, United States of America. The result of the vote was 6 votes in favour of rejec#ng the President's ruling, 2 against, and 3 àbstentionS. Ml'. Hsu (China): l wish ta explain why 1 voted against the President's ruling. 1 did sa because 1 felt that the ruling was not correct, not because 1 do not consider China to be bound by the Declaration. .des . Ml'. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): 1 wish ta say a few words in connexion with the Chinese representative's last statement. It is my opinion that the Chinese representative is, beyond any doubt, ac$g inconsistently with the obligations assumed by the Chinese Government at the San Francisco Conference. The Chïnese Government has no right-I repeat, has no right-to act contrary ta the Five Power Declaration. The obligations assumed by the five Great Powers form part of their obligations under the Charter. Only irresponsible persons ·can 'act in such a way. What grounds can China have for renouncing her obligations at a time when all other permanent members of the Security Council are abiding by them? To say that the Chinese representative, if you please, does not like the President's ruling, is not sufficientl reason to vote against it. To vote against the presidentià:l ruling is ta vote against the Declaration which bears the signature of the Chinese delegation at San Francisco. Ml'. Hsu (China): 1 think it is very unfortunate that this question which has already been decided, has again been raised. It is especially unfortunate since, if it is ta be discussed, the ruling of the President must again be involved. 1 have such a great respect for the President that 1 do not like to have to repeat again and again that 1 do not agree with him. It is cleat that 1 have not said that China does not want ta abide by the Declaration of San Francisco. However, can the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics see this point: that in the interpretation of the Declaration, we may have different views? That does not mean that, if one member has a wrong interpretation, another member has to work on that basis. ' 1 voted against the President's ruling simply because 1 considered that the interpretation given by the President was not correct.. The essential point on which the President based his ruling was that what has been called for is an investigation. ln any case, 1 think Mr. Gromyko can admit that there may be differences of opinion. 1 voted "against the President's ruling entirely for the reason 1 have stated.
The President unattributed #142764
i call on the representative of Argentina to speak, and must ask him to be brief. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): 1 only wish to put on record that the Security Council has just violated the Charter. Fortunately it is not the first time. . .
The President unattributed #142766
As President, 1 think 1 must state that l disagree with the representative ofArgentina. 1 shaU put to the. vote the draft resolution submitted by the delegations of Chile and Argentina, and shall then interpret the vote in accordance with the decision arrived at as a result of our. discussion. Mr. SOBOLEV (Assistant Secretary-General in Charge of Security Council Affairs) : The cIraft resolution reads as follows: "Whereas the attention of the Security Council has been drawn by a Member of the United Nations, in accordance with Articles 34 and 35 of the Charter, to the situation in Czechoslovakia which may endanger international peace and security; and the Security Council has been asked to investigate this situation; and "Whereas during the debate which took place in the Council the existence of further testimonial and documentary evidence with regard to this situation has bèen announced; "Whereas the Security Council r.onsiders it. advisable that such further testimonial and docu- ~entary evidence should be heard; - "Therefore ta this end, and withbütprejudice of any decisions whi.ch may be taken in accordance with Article 34 of the Charter, . "The Security Council "Resolves to appoint a sub-committee of three members and instructs this sub-committee to receive or'to hear such evidence, statements and testimonies and to report to the Security Council at the earliest possible time." Ml'. AUSTIN (United States of America): 1 realize that the hour is late, and 1 apologize for taking the time ofthe Security Council at the end of a hard day, but this matter is of such import- ance that 1 feel bound to make a statelpent for the record with respect to the position of my .Government regarding the last instance of the use of th~ veto in this Security Council. For one thing, 1 should like to clarify what 1 regard as a misunderstanding. The representa- tive of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in his last remarks before we began to vote, referred ta my remarks as if he had misunder- stood them. 1 want to clarify that sa that the record will be accurate. 1 did not say that the United States considered itself bound by the statement made in San Francisco-whether it is called astatèment or an agreement-but 1 said exactly the opposit.e. 1 did not say that we would not change our attitude towards the veto as set· forth in the San Francisco statement. 1 said that we had not changed our attitude. We fed. free, however, to do so. We feel free to change our attitude, and 1 reserve the right of my GO'vern- ment ta do so whenever that course seexns advisable. As 1 stated in the last meeting on the Czecho- slovak question [300th meeting], the United StateS is convinced that the resolution which has just been voted upon is clearly of a procedural nature under the Charter. This view is based both on the normal meaning of the word "pro- cedural" and on the fact that the proposed establishment of the sub-committee was in accord- ance with Article 29. The establishment of such a sub-committee under Article 29 is iri accordance with the Charter and is clearly a procedural matter. Nevertheless, the Security Council was prevented from reaching a conclusion that the decision on this resolution was procedural by an inappropriate resort to part II, paragraph 2 of the Four Power Declaration. When the President' was called upon, however, to make his parliamen- tary ruling, he was confronted with' exactly the situation that is spoken of in part II, para- graph 1. 1 read from it as follows: "1. In the opÏ1:1ion of the delegations of the sponsoring Governments, the draft Charter itself contains an indication of the application of the voting procedures to the various functions of the Council." The United Stafes is not prepared to admit that the use of the so-called double veto canin any way change the Charter, change the law of Article 29. While the double veto might prevent-.-as it has done in this case-the Security COUJ;1cil from acting'at the time when it !s used, if. cannot transform the character of any ques- 'lion treated in the Charter as procedure, that is, , it cannot change it into one having a substantive character. Consequently, 1 wish, in the name of my Gov- ernment, to declare that the United States does nç't recognize this act as a precedent. 1 claim that what we have done is not a: precedent which goes beyond the point of the ruling of the Presi- dent, that it does not constitute a transformation of the true. character of this type of resolution, and that if such a situation shouId arise again, we .wouId.feel free, notwithstanding the decision taken today, to claim that a procedural matter under the Charter is involved, and to take exactly , the same course we have taken today. From the beginning of this case, the United States has stressed the necessity of a full 'presen- tation to the world of the issues confronting the .SecUrity,Council. It is for this reason that the .United States proposed a formaI resolution, adopted at the 278th meeting of the Security Council, requesting the representative of Czecho- slovakia to appear before the Council [document 8/711J. It is for this reasonthat we supported the draft resolution submitted by the repre- . sentative of Chile on 12 April atthe 281st meet;. ing and requested to beacted upon by Argentina, and actedupon today, because it would have pro:- vided, under Article 29, for the establishment of a sub~comrt:üttee ta hear further testimony relat~ ing to the charges presented to the Security Coun- cil, and thus to fàcilitate the elucidation of the fàcts. 1 do not believe that the Security Council should let this matter rest in the present status of the record. The Council is informed that there is evidence available which relates to the facts of this case. A number of politically prominent persons, who were generally respected in their country, have now escaped from Czechoslovakia. There are among them former members of the Govem- ment, secretaries-general of non-Communist parties and members of the Parliament. Those who held an elective office were voted into that office by the Czechoslovak people in the last free . election held in Czechoslovakia. These people now seek refuge outside their country. It is a weIl established custom among civilized nations ta gr~t asylum to worthy people perse- cuted because of their political beliefs. These refugees from Czechoslovakia have now been granted asylum in other countries, among them my .own country. These CzechoslÇ>vak refugees w~re ~"'t their country at the time of the February even\. They undoubtedly had access to sources of information. The information which is avail- ",ble from these refugees should become a part of. the Security Council records. 1 suggest that this can be done by the action of the members of the Security Council. For our part, we'are prepared to obtain state- ments. from t~ese Czechoslovak refugees who have mformatlOn relevant. to this case and who are.now enjoying the right of asylum either in the Umted States zone of Germany or in this country. We are prepared to makethese statements avail- able to the Security Council. It isour hope that ~th~r me~bers of the Security Council will take ,similar action with regard to Czechoslovak refu- g~es. who may be in territory wîthin their juris- diction. The' PRESIDENT (translated trom French): There are still speakers on the list, including the representative of the USSR. But we must also deal with tlle Palestine question, concerning wmch 1 have several urgent matters to communi- cate to you. 1 will therefore ask the representa- tive of the USSR if he would be so gaod as to postpone his speech until our next meeting on Wednesday. Ml'. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): 1 have a statement to make in con- nexion with the statement of the representative oi the United States.
The resolution was not adopted, one of the votes against being that of a permanent member of the Council.
The President unattributed #142768
Could you speak very briefly? Ml'. GROMYKO (lInion of Soviet Socialist Republics) '(translated trom Russian): As far as possible, 1 shall do 50.
The President unattributed #142769
1 should me a definite undertaking. Ml'. GROMYKO (Unioll.'Of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated trom Russian): 1 shall speak for only a few minutes.
The President unattributed #142772
There is the question of knowing "Vhat order we shall give to our work. Ml'. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet ~ocialist Re- . publics) (translated trom Russian): 1 have the right to speak for at least as long as the representative of the United States, though 1 do not intend to do so. Ml'. ARCE (Argentina) (translated trom French): 1 also have the same right. MI. GR.O}iYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated trom. Russian): 1"shall not refer ta all thequestiuns raised by the United States representative, sîdce that would lead us back ta earIier discussions we had in the course of the examination oi the qu.estion of Czechoslovakia. 1 only wish to draw the United States representative's attention to the fact tha": the U-lted States cannot sa lighdy ev~_de the obligations assumed by its Government UIi.der the San Francisco Declaration. .These obligations ~ere assumed by the State itself. Governments can c,bange, the composition of Governments can change, foreign ministers. and represèntatives of the United States on the Security Council iJan changé(:, but the State'which has assumed certain . obligations. under the Declaration cannot renourlce·those obligations so lightlyas the United Sta;tes repi'esentative itnagill.es. Those obligations form.·anintegral Part of th~obligationsassumed' .aussi faci!lement The United States representative says that his Government and the United States authoritics in Germany are prepared to supply the Security Council with certain statements and evidence obtained from political refugees from Czechoslovakia, which would he used in its consideration of the Czechoslovak question. 'We never doubted that the United· States Government and certain other Governments who support the United States in this matter were ready ta make use of various political ad"enturers now hiding out in the dt".ns of Western Germany, London and New York. We never had any doubts on that count. One thing, however, must be clear-that the attempts of certain United States circles to break down the independent poliey of the Czechoslovak Government have met with complete failure. Whether one, two, three; five or ten statements are' presented makes no dîfference. The United States and an those who carried out its orders by bringing the matter up in the Security Council, have suffered a political fiasco. You must recognize that yourselves. You have been unable to submit any resolution other than 'the one proposing that certain politicaI refugees, expelled by the people of Czechoslovakia itself, should be summoned for hearing by the Security Council. You have been unable to submit any concrete resolution accusing the Governments of Czechoslovakia or the USSR, because Y0l,! possess no facts to support such a resolution. 1 am, of course, addressing 'those who have engineered the discussion of the whole question of Czechoslovakia-that whole shady adventure, as 1have often described it before-in the Sec '. ,ity Council. The Pr<.ESIDENT (translated trom French): The Chilean representative has particularly requested to be ~lowed to make a short statement ta the Couneil this evening. 1 calI upon him to speak. M~. SANTA CRUZ (Chne) (translated trom Spanzsh): Ever since we allowed the serious charge made by the representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Papanek, to be brought before the Secu:-ity Council, for reasons which 1 gave at the time and ~hich have been recognized here, It nevertheless appears that this expression of the will of nine of theeleven members of the Couneil wJ! have no positive results, because one of the representatives of the country accused-the represe~tativecf the country against which there is serious evidence that it has made Czechos1ovakia the victim of indirect aggression by helping to overthrow the legitimate Government and replacing it by the leaders of the party it controls-does not wish this .evidence and this information to be received. It seems to me that this fact will go down in the annals of 'the United Nations as the greatest scandal since its work began. 1 protest on behalf of my Government against the indescribable abuse practised by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The representative of the USSR told us during one of the first meetings at which this subjeet was discussed that the country which brought the Czechoslovakian question before the United Nations, and those that supported its views, were attacIdng the prestige and the very prindples of the Organization, and fo&tering a violation of the Charter. And now those members who lose îlO opportunity-here or in other Councils or commissions-to present themselves as the guardians of purity and rigoU!' in the interpretation of the Charter, have not hesitated to violate it most flagrantly. It is in vain that they have been: shown with complete cIarity that this is merely a resolution in application of Article 29; it is in vain that it hasbeeti definitely established that there is no question of·setting up an investigating committee, .but cnly a sub-committee of the Couneil, which would do with six or seven witne~ses what the full Council didwith Mr. Pakanek, that is, hear them; it has been useless to invoke the law, therules of procedure and even common sense, to prove that if this resolution is not a procedural matter, it would be difficult ta find one thÇlt is. The representative of the USSR has 1 must also point out that the representative of the USSR has committed a further grave violation of the Charter. Article 27, paragraph 3, provides that "•.. in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting". There seems to me no doubt that in the present case the USSR is a party to a di.spute, for it must be assumed that there is a dispute not only when there is a direct conflict of interests between two Member States, but also wheri any difference arising from conflicting attitudes of one nation in respect of another nation is brought ta the attention .of the Security Council by any country. This is certainly the CdSe when aState exercises its right under Article 35, and accuses another of violating the Charter, whether it has any direct interest in the .matter or not. Paragraph 3 of Article 27 is mere1y illtended to prevent a member of the Council from acting as judge in its own case and participating in the decision that may be taken against it. This is what the USSR has just done. 1 must say that 1 am rathel," glad the representative of the USSR has followed +his course, in the first place, because he will not achieve his purpose, which was that the witnesses' statements should not appear in the records of the Security Council or of sorne other organ of the United Nations. He cannot achieve that, even with ten more vetoes, as is shown by the statement wc have heard from the United States representative; and, on th,:,: other hand he has made it quite clear that the Union of Soviet Socialist ~epublics is afraid of even the slightest investigati~n of the Czechos1ovakian question. In doing ~hlS "he has supplied another piece of evidence ln support of the accusation. Moreover, he has ~lear1y shown that for aIl its professions of faith m the Charter, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is ready to violateit whenever that suits its purpose. And he has also shown that in sim~~r cases it c~n adopt entit'e1y contradictory posItIons and arguments. . FinaIly, the USSR representative has done the greatest service to those who helieve that it is time at least to regulate the use of the so-called veto, SI) that the discharge of one of the most fundamental duties of the Sef'urity Council may no longer be preventt:d by the mere will of one Member of the United Nations.' . s'opposer ses
The President unattributed #142774
1 have a certain number of documents to communicate to the Security Council on the Palestine question. First, you have already heard the sad news of the death of Mr. Wasson, United States representative with the Truce Commission. Mr. Wasson died in the execution of the duties he wa.'l carrying out on the instructions of the Security Council. .I am sure that 1 shall express your feelings when 1 now pay tribute to bis memory. In your name, 1 have sent bis family the following telegram of sympathy: "The Security Council, deeply moved by the death of·Mr. Thomas Wasson, who was killed in Jerusalem in the defence of peace while working With the Truce Commission, begs you to accept jts deep sympathy and its gratitude for the collaboration which he gave to it, even to the sacrifice of bis life." During the meeting .thïs afternoon 1 received a reply thanking us for this telegram. 1 have a second communication to trans~t to you, not in my capacity as Pre~ident of the Security Council, but in the name of my delegation and by order of my Gcvernment, which has instructed me to read the followiÎ1g statement: "In view of the scale which the fighting in Jerusalem has now assumed, the French Government considers it its dutY to address to the Security Council an urgent· appeal for the protection of the Holy Places, which are at present the scene of a merciless battle, and are threatened with complete destruction. "HospitaJs, convents, museums, and. institutions of ail kinds are being' occupied by both sides in turn, and some, which have come under artillery and mortar fire, are threatened with. total destruction. The world cannot look on unmoved at this annihilation of spiritual treasures, the fruits of the patient efforts of the centuries, and of a work of civilization to which Franc<f isir..-.·:.·':! to have made a considerable contribution. . "The Fr~nch Government deeply regrets that its proposaI for the setting ùp of a special regime in Jerusalem, ta ensure protection of the Hply Places, was not adopted by the United Nations. Itearnestly hopes that the resolution adoptèd by the Security Council on 22 May [document S/773J inviting both parties to abstai.n from ail military action in Palestine and ta "The French Government declares that it is ready to support any proposaI having the same purpose as that which it had the honour ta sub· mit ta the United Nations and ta associate itse1f with any measure which would lead ta the restoration of tranquillity and the maintenance of peace in Jerusalem." Amongst the documents which have .been dis.tributed ta you, the most important is the reply [document S/779.] of the Jewish Agency to the Security Council's appeaI of last Saturday. That telegram was followed by a second one [document S/780] informing the Council that at 9.30 p.m. Lebanese artillery had opened fire across the frontier at Ramat Naftali. 1 have aIso received severaI replies from the Arab States. The following telegrams were then read: (a) Telegram from Beirut, addressed to the Secretary-General ICI have the honour ta acknowledge receipt of your telegram No. 58 after the beginning of the allotted time limit. This time is insufficient for an exchange of views between the Arab Govern· ments. O'ur decision will be transmitted ta you at once by our representative. "Hamid FRANGffi UMinister of Foreign Affairs of Lebanon/' (b) Telegram from Damascus, addressed to the President of the Security Couneil ' ICThe Syrian Government's reply to your te1egram on Palestine will be communicated ta you by .Faris EI·Khouri, our representative ta the United Nations. "Djamilp MARoAM BEY UMinister of Foreign Affairs of Syria." (c) Telegram from the Iraqi delegation to the United Natio'/1-s, addressed to the Secretary- General "1 have the honour' ta inform you that, in accoidance with the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 22 May 1948, conceming the cease-fire in Palestine, 1 have been instructed py my Government ta inform you that your t~legram on this resolution was delayed on recep'- tIon at Baghdad through force majeure. The time left is unfortunately teo short for my Government ta be able ta reach a decision on 's~ch an important question, and 1 am sure you will understand that we must consult with 'the Governments of the other Arab States. My Government is giving its full attention ta these questions and 1 hope to be able.tocommunicate the result ta you as saon as it reaches me. Here is another cable which came from the S,ecretary-General of the Arab League: "1 haveconvoked a meeting of the Political Committee of the Arab League consisting of the Foreign Ministers of the States to consider the cease-fire resolution of the Security Couneil. Please inform Security Council that there will not be time for a meeting and reasonable consideration within the time limit, and that they are requesting the Security Council to give them a delay sufficient for the States to consult and exchange views at a meeting which will be held tomorrow mornïng at Amman." 1 do not think, therefore,that we can have any definite reply before Wednesday noon or sometime in the afternoon, that is to say, about forty-eight hours more at least. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : My Government has instructed me to support the request just made by the representative of Syria for a further extension of the time limit. There are difficulties for the Arab States, 1 understand, in consulting together, due to difficulties of communication and so on, and therefore it <J:ppears that they should be given more tim ~. The original time limit was indeed short, and 1 hope that the Security Council will now agree to extend it by forty-eig~t hours. Mahmoud Bey FAWZI (Egypt): 1 am authorized to state that, if the extension of time requested is granted, the Egyptian Government 'will be in a position to give its answer in the allotted time. ' Mr. TARASENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Soda- Iist Republic) (translated /rom Russian): 1 should like to put a question through the President to the representative of Syria: Does he think that military operations will ~a'.œ place during those' forty-eight hours, or not? Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): 1 have no informationon this point; 1 do not know anything about it. 1 have read to the Security Council the information which 1 have received. . Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated /rom Russian): 1 wish ta put one more question to the representatives of Syria and Egypt: \Would the Arab States 'perhaps first issue a cease-fire order to tbeir Mr. EBAN (Jewish Agency for Palestine): 1 simply wish to put on record the view of the Provisional Government of Israel that the request to .have thirty-six hours for further sIaughter in Jerusalem and the rest of Palestine is tot.illy unreasonable. If forty-eight hours or more are required for deliberations, there seems no reason why those deliberations should not proceed without shells falling in Jerusalem or aircraft bombing Tel Aviv. We agree that communications in the Near East may be paal', but there seems no reason why people should pay with their lives for the poomess'of those communications. Jamal Bey HUSSEINI (Arab Higher Committee): 1 want to express my deep regrets and the regrets of my people for the lossès that have befallen the United States Consulate in Jerusalem, including the loss of the life of the Consul. I must make the remark that certain Jewish . sources have already intimated in the Press here and eIsewhere that the bullets that bit the Consul and the other members of the Constilate came from the Arab side. As a matter of fact, everyone who knows the building in which the Consul and his subordinates weœ shot knows that all the buildings surrounding the place, except those in the back, which it is impossible ta penetrate, are occupied by the Jewish forces. Therefore, it would have been physically impossible for the bullets to have come from the Arab side. As a matter of fact, it was also stated that one of those persons killed was standing between the YMCA and the United States Consulate. It is probably weIl known now that aIl those who occupied the buildings of the YMCA were Arabs or Europeans who had taken refuge there several days aga, and it is inconceivable that. these people, who had been taken there as refugees, could have had any arms with which to shoot ~t peoplewh<:> were coming toward them or gomg away from them. With regard to the shelling of Jerusalem, 1 must remind the Security Council that on, approximateIy, 10 May the representative of Syria received an intimation from the Secretary- General of the Arab League to the effect that the Arabs had finally accepted a truce for Jerusalem under the conditions laid down and previously accepted by the Jewish Agency for Palestine. But'later on·we heard that the"Jewish Agency . ew nothing about this question. Our position with regard to the truce in Jerusalem was ~ade quite clear in the telegram of the Secretary-General of the Arab League, and we should not be blamed for the present conditions in Jerusalem. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): The United States greatly appreciates the prompt assent of the Provisional Government of Israel and its expression of willingness to put into effect, as quickly as possible, a cease-fire request in compliance with the resolution of the . Security Council. But we believe that the representations made here today on the insurmountable difficulty of communications provide adequate gtound for the request of an extension on time made on behalf of the Arab States. Therefore, we favour the suggested extension.
The President unattributed #142776
1 should like to associate myself with what has just been said regarding the Jewish Agency. l, too, think it only just tO' recognize the fact that the Arab States are hampered by their communications, so that it is far more difficult for them to send a reply. Underthese conditions, 1 support' the request for, an extension of the time-limit which has been submitted to the Security Council. 1 think we might perhaps fix the time-limit at Wednesday midday. Does that seem too long to you? 1 think Wednesday midday is about the lengthof time the Syrian representative was asking for just now. Mr. TARASENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (transl.:zted trom Russian): May we assume that those forty-eight hours will be the final time limit and that there will be no more extensions on the grounds of circumstances of one kiD.d or another. Mr. Er.-KHouRI (Syria): ln accordance with the information 1 have received, the meeting among the Arab States will be held tomorrow, Tuesday, in Anunan. They dia not ask for any special delay, but they f.aid that this was the situation. It is my opinion mat they may arrive at a decision and theIl communicate it to us. 'Perhaps it may come in tomorrow night or about noon on Wednesday, or sometime later. This is merely a supposition on my part, but 1 think it , is a correct one. Since there are no comments, 1 take it that the members of the Council agree. We must avoid any misunderstanding on the Jewish side. That is why 1 am asking the representative of the Jewish Agency ta inform bis principals immediately, sa that they may understand the situation. 1 should also like ta ask the representatives of the Arab Stàtes ta pass on this communication themselves. Ml'. EI-K.HOURI (Syria): As saon as the meeting is over, we shall cable-them.
The President unattributed #142778
1 would ask the representative' of the Jewish Agency ta do tne same. Ml'. EBAN (Jewish Agency for Palestine): Very weIl.
The President unattributed #142780
The ,position must be made c1ear, sa that there is no impression on the Jewish side that the Arabs have rejected this suggestion; this is oruy a postponement. If there are no objections, the Security Council will meet again on Wednesday, 26 Mayat 10.30 a.m., to discuss the questions of India and Pakistan, Czechoslovakia, and Palestine; it will, if necessary, hold a second meeting in the afternoon. The meeting rose at 8.25 p.m. AUSTRALIA-AUSTRALIE H. A. Goddard Pty. Ltd. 255a George Street SYDNEY, N. S. W. FINLAND-FINLANDE Akateeminen Kirjakauppa 2, Keskuskatu HELSINKI BELGIUM-SELGIQUE Agence et Messageries de la Presse, S. A. 14-22 rue du Persil BRUXELLES FRANCE Editions A. Pedone 13, rue Soumot PARIS, Va GREECE-GRECE "Eleftheroudakis" Librairie internationale Place de la Constitution ATHÈNES BOLIVIA-SOLIVIE Libreria Cientifica y Literaria Avenida 16 de Julio, 216 Casilla 972 LA PAZ GUATEMALA José Goubaud Goubaud & Ciao Sucesor 5a Av. Sur No. GUATEMALA CANADA The Ryerson Press 299 Queen Street West TORONTO CHILE-CHILI Edmundo Pizarro Merced 846 SANTIAGO HAITI Max Bouchereau Librairie "A la Boîte postale 111·B PORT·AU·PRINCE CHINA-CHINE The Commercial Press Ltd. 211 Honan Road SHANGHAI INDIA-INDE Oxford Book & Scindia House NEW DELHI COLOMBIA-COLOM8IE Libreria Latina Ltda. Apartado Aéreo 4011 BOGOTA. IRAN Bongahe Piaderow 731 Shah Avenue TEHERAN COiTA RICA-COSTAeRICA Trejos Hermanos . Apartado 1313 ~N JosÉ IRAQ-IRAK Mackenzie & Mackenzie The Bookshop BAGHDAD CUBA La Casa Belga René de Smei/t O'Reilly 455 LA HABANA LEBANON-L18AN Librairie universelle BEYROUTH CZECHOSLOVAKIA.- TCHECOSLOVAQUIE F. Topic Narodni Trida 9 PRAHA 1 LUXEMBOURG Librairie J. Schummer. Place Guillaume LUXEMBOURG DENMARK-DANEMARK Einar Munskgaard Norregade 6 KJOBENHAVN NETHERLAND5-PAY5-SAS- N. V. Martinus Lange Voorhout S'GRAVENHAGE DOMINICAN REPUBLlC- REPU8L1QUE DOMINICAINE Libreria Dominicana Calle Mercedes No. 49 Apartado 656 CIUDAD TRUJILLO NEW ZEALAND-:- NOUVELLE·ZELANDE Gordon & Cotch, Waring Taylor WELLINGTON ECUADOR--EQUATEUR Munoz Hermanos y Ciao Nueve de Octubre 703 Casilla 10·24 GUAYAQUIL . NICARAGUA Ramiro Ramirez Agencia de Publicaciones MANAGUA, D. N.
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UN Project. “S/PV.303.” UN Project, https://un-project.org/meeting/S-PV-303/. Accessed .