S/PV.304 Security Council

In regard to the first point, the Jammu and Kashmir question, 1 should like to remind you that the Security Cûuncil arrived at a decision and appointed a Commission at its 286th meeting [document S/726]. This Commission is now complete except that the United States representative has not yet been nominated. May 1 ask the United States delegation whether we may shortly e~pect to receive this nOIr.ination? Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): 1 hope to have that information at any moment today.

In that case 1 think that as the nominations to the' Commission will shortly be completed, it should contemplate an early departure for India. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) (translated trom Spanish): As my Government has appointed to serVe on the Commission an Ambassador who resides in Europe, it would be interested to know whether a meeting is to be held here, or whether the Commission is going to meet in some European city belore going> to India. It would be useful if the President or the Secretariat, as the case may be, could give us this information, so that 1 may comply with my Govemment's request for information.

1 have been informeà that those members of the Comniission who are here will hold a first informaI meeting in New York to consider the procedure of its official meetings when they commence. The Commission itself. should take a decision on that point. 1t is quite possible that the Commission may contemplate holding a first official meeting in Europe,' but 1 cannot give the j\rgentine representative any exact information on that point. 1 think that if he keeps in touch with the Secretariat, he will be'informed without delay. You areaware that, apart from the question of Kashmir, three other disputes between India and Pakistan have been brought before the S6curity Council. 1.think that~ .as regards these Mr. AUSTIN (Unit,ed States of America): For the purpose of preliminary arrangements, even though the name of our regular representative should not be decided at this time, the Government of the United States is willing ta appoint a member of the United States delegatian to jaïn with the representatives of those other members of the Commission of the Security Council dealing with the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Mr. GONZALEZ FERNANnEZ (Columbia): 1 just wa."1ted tu make the suggèstion that has been made by t,~e representative of the United States. 1 believe that it would be very useful if the Commission, or representatives of the countries comprisïng it, would meet here as soon as possible in order more or less to decide the programme of activities of the Commission, which could be fully set in motion as saon as the United States representative on the Co:mmis.<Üon· is appointed. . résolution, Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): 1 have previously heard that there are two other obstacles to a solution of this matter. One of them. is the financial aspect, namely, whether arrangements have been made by the Se"retariat for the L'Xpenses and the transportation of the Commission. The second matter involves the nomination of the person who will administer the plebiscite. It is my understanding that no steps have been taken ta that effect, whereas, according to the resolutian, the Administrator is one of thè factors involved in conducting the plebiscite in Kashmir. Has anything been done in that respect? Have there beep. any developments regarding these questions? Are they setded, or are they still pending?

The Secretariat will note the question that has b~en raised, ~nd the Assistant Secretary-General will reply to lt as soon as he arrives. par tan. déclaré positions.de mission Mr. ARCE (Argentina) (translated trom Spanish): 1 think it is hnportant to know how ~e .Commission stands in view of the replies glven by the Governments of India and Pakistan. If 1 remember rightly, these dovernme~ts say that they cannot accept certain provisions in the Council's resolution. There. may thus be a danger. that when the Commission arrives in India, either of the two Governments may make

·It is correct that the communications we have received from the two Governments contain a number of reservations. 1 think, however, that when the Commission is on the spot, it 'will not encounter any obstacles like1y to prevent it from fulfil1ing its mission, and 1 appeal to the two Governments represented here ta do their utmost to facilitate the work of the Commission. Mr. PILLAI (India): The objections of the Government of India ta the resolution on the Kashmir question adopted on 21 April [286th meeting] by the Security Council have been c1early and unequivocally placed before the Council by the leader of the Indian de1egation on several occasions, and more particularly in the statement he made to the Council on 19 April [285th meeting]. It will sure1y not be the wish of the Security Council that 1 should traverse aIl that ground again. In substance, the Government of India finds that it would not be possible for it to implement certain parts of the recommendations contained in the resolution unless they are amendedalong the lines which we have already indicated to the Security Council. 1 may, however, be permitted to refer very briefiy to sorne of our objections. We are asked in sub-paragraph 2(a) ta put into operation, in consultation with the Security Council Commission, a plan for withdrawing our forces from Jammu and Kashmir and "re- ducing them progressive1y ta the minimum strength required for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of law and order"; and thio: plan for withdrawing our forces is ta be put into operation when the Commission is satisfied that the tribesmen are withdrawing and that arrangements for the cessation of the fight- ing have become effective. But the tribesmen are not the only persans who are invading the State. Pakistan soldiers, both regular and irregu- lar, are equally engaged in acts of aggression. It is therefore not possible for us ta withdraw our troops or reduce their strength until all the intruders have actually withdrawn from the State, and even then we shall have to retain the minimum number of troops needed not only for the maintenance of law and order but aIso for the legitimate defence needs of the State. Further, wecannot accept the interpretation of "forward and base areas" referred toin sub- paragraphs 2 (c) (li, iii) as given by the representative of the United Kingdom [286th Paragraph 4 lays down that "personnel re- cruited locally in each district should sa far as .possible be utilized for the re-establishment and maintenance of law and order ..." We cannat accept this paragraph if it has any reference ta our existing troops or police forcesemployed in the re-establishment and maintenance uf law and order locally, but if the paragraph is restr:cted to the recruitment of personnel for additional police required for purposes of pacification, we should be glad to consider that dause as so amended. Another clause, paragraph 5, provides that if the Commission finds the local forces to be in- adequate, it should, subject ta the agreement of India and Pakistan, ". . , arrange fo. the use of such forces of either Dominion as it deems effec- tive for the purpose of pacification". Pakistan until now has oeen quit,~ happy with .its back- door penetration into the State; we have been resisting this; but paragraph 5, as it now stands, would give Pakistan an entrance by the front door. We find ourselves entirely unable to accept the principle that Pakistan's assistance should be soaght to remedy a situation which it has itself created. This would be like making the poacher the game-keeper. We cannot accept this prin- ciple. I!1 the sixth paragraph of the resolution, an attempt is made to impose arbitrarily a coalition government on the State. This is against aIl democratic practice, and we are sorry to state that we cannot accept it. We shall, however, be willing to r.ecommend to the State that it make its·administration as broad-based as possible, but the Prime Minister of the State should have complete liberty to choose his Cabinet 'col-' leagues. Paragraph 8 seeks to mvest the Plebiscite Ad- ~trator with powers of direction and super- VISIOn over the State forces and police, for the purpose of holding a fair plebiscite. There are aIso sorne other paragraphs which refer to such powers. Not only are these powers entirely un- ne.~essary and supererogatory, but the confer- ment of suchpowers, as the leader of my ?eleg~tion has pointed out, would be an admin- IStratiVe enormity. Sub-paragraph 10 (c) .seeks to set up a system of parallel judicial administration within the St:,-t~ judicial system to try cases which, in the 0pmlOn of the Plebiscite Administrator, have a senous bearing on plebiscite mattcrs; and'it This sub-paragraph-unintentionally perhaps -casts an entirely unmerited slur on the in- tegrity of the existing State judiciary with its High Court and its series of subordinate courts,. and its procedure for appeals. Further, the idea that the chief executive of the Plebiscite Admin- istration should nominate the special magistrates, is repugnant to the principle of the independence . of the judiciary. Finally, in sub-paragraph 10 (e), there is an attempt ta empower the Plebiscite Administrator to comm'lnicate with the Government of Pakis- tan and its representative with the Commission. The Plebiscite Administrator is an officer of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and it is against all ideas of politicalsubstance and administrative propriety that such an officer should be given the liberty of communicating -with an outside Gov- eroment on a matter for which bis OW11 Govern- ment is the sole responsible authority. Th~se are sorne of the more impoI1ant points in the resolution to which objection has been taken by my Government; these and other points have been set out in the statements made to the Security Council by the leader of the Indian delegation, statements which are all on record. AlI that 1 have to do now, it appears to me, is to draw your attention to those statements, and ta repeat that India is unable to undertake the obligations piaced on her by the'present resolu- tian unless it is amended in the directions indi- cated. Let me also make it c1ear that, even as thus amended, the obligations placed on India could not begin to be implemented until Pakistan has implemented her obligations under paragraph 1. This paragraph reiers, inter alia? to securing "the withdrawal from the State of the tribesmen and Pakistani nationals . . . who have. entered the State for the purpose of fighting", and to pre- venting "intrusion into the State of such ele- ments and any furnishing of material aid to those fighting in the State". Without the with- drawal of the aggressors, and without the re- e[tablishment of law and order throughout the whole of the State, it is obvious that it will not be possible ta set in motion any machinery that . may be devised for a free and impartial plebis- cite. If, without the resolution being amended as we have asked, the Commission is still sent out td India-this is entirely a matter for the "Security COQ,ncil-the Government of India Mr. ISPAHANI (Pakistan): 1 had not in- tended to make any observations today on behalf of Pakistan, particularly in view of the ex- haustive speeches that have ùeen made covering aH possible aspects of the issues involved. In this final stage of the deliberations, 1 have requested permission ta address the Security Council, which 1 shall do \Tery briefly, orny to draw the Council's attention to sorne important points arising out of the speeches delivered here today. After nearly four months of debate and nego- ~tions, the Security. Council adopted a resolu- tlOn [document .~ /726] on 21 April at its 286th meeting rec()mI~..;nding to the disputing Govern- ments certain lines on which a fair and just setde- ment of the Kashmir issue might be arrived at. This involved, on the one hand, the stoppage of fighting and, on the other, the carrying out of a plebiscite on the issue of accession under conditi.ons which,' in the view of the Security Council, would ensure a fair and impartial plebiscite. . Bath Dominions have objected to certain pa:a~aphs in the resolution. An analysis of these obJectIons, however, shows that, while in the c.ase of Pakistan they arise out of an apprehen- SlOn that the recommendations do not go far enough .to ensure a fair and impartial plebiscite, t?e Indlan cas~ ~ppears to ?e based on opposi- tIOn to. t~e vahdlty of the VICWS of the Security Coullcil ID regard to the conditions themselves. ln other wbr.ds, India does n«;>t accept the yiews of the Secunty Council on what would be fair c?nditions of a plebiscite, as opposed ta her own Vlews on the subject. On that ground India re- fuses to co-operate in the enforcement of these para~aphs which· dç not completely fallin with her vlews, as they have beeI: expressed in the l now refer to the importance of speedy settle- ment of the three charges brought by the Pakis- tan Government against India, namely, those concerning Junagadh, genocide, and non-imple- mentation of certain agreements. The Security Council has heard both sides. While admittedly the Kashmir issue was considered by the Security Council to be the most urgent of all those on which Pakistan and India have differences, these other issues which l have mentioned can- nat, 1 submit, be regarded âs of lesser signifi- canee in the totality of relations between the two Dominions. The Junagadh situation, in par- ticular, is one which heavily involves the prestige of the Government and people of Pakistan and which, but for the uncommon restraint shown by the Pakistan Government, would have led to a head-on collision. In a way, the situation which confronts us in Junagadh is not dissimilar from that with which the Security Council is faced in other parts of the globe, where a Member State, in sheer disregard of the international cone of conduct, has taken possession of another )I,iember State's territory by force and refuses to leave. It will be recalled that at an earlier stage in the deliberations of this Council, an opinion was expressed that the decision in the Kashmir issue might prove to be a model in deciding the Junagadh case as weIl. We have subscribed tbroughout to this view and have, accordingly, put forward in wriring certain concrete sugges- tions on which a settlement might be based. 1 do not wish to repeat these in detail, but would refer the Council ta Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan's speech of 7 May 1948 du.-ing the 289th meeting of the Council. The question of genocide is likewise one which has deep and far-reaching significance in the relations between the two Dominions. Unless, with the help and guidance of the Security Council, the two Dominions can agree to sit harmoniously on this most vital matter con- cerning large minorities on both sides, any at- tempts at securing co-operation in other spheres, whether political or economic, would not bear the fruit they should. We have conceded the fact that sorne acts of inhumarury were committed by the Muslim population of Pakistan in sorne areas-although under provocation-and we have therefore in- vited the Security Council to send a commission a militaire l'Inde, également ment tance un trouvé importants et psychologique refus lui est incontestablement dû importance de tions In regard to the last item, namely that which concerns the delivery of arms and military equip~ ment by India to Pakistan, I have to state that this, too, is an urgent and vital matter, apart from the obvious importance of sucb equipment to a new State such as Pakistan which has been faced with vast problems of law and order which were left ta it. Thus, the psychological effect of withholding unequivocal1y what is clero'ly due to Pakistan ID a factor of considerable importance which is bound ta impede the restoration of normal and neighbourly relations between the two Donûnions. [289ème gères sion tituerait cuter ment qui souscris de ment ou reux Gouvernement. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan, in his speech on 7 May [289th rreeti~g=J made the suggestion that the Commission appointed for Kashmir would be a suitable instrument for carrying out the directions of the Security Coun- cil in regard ta these other remaining matters as weIl. I should endorse that proposaI 'at this stage, but, should the Security Council come to the conclusion that sorne other form of instru- ment would serve the purpose equally weIl or better, I should be glad to convey such a de- cision to my Government. rité ditif blèmes, être rapport l'examen tira On the other hand; I submit that, since the full particulars of the case are now before the Security Council, it would be easier and quicker for the Council to take a firm decision on these issues exactlY in the same manner as has been done for Kashmir. It will only make for delay if the Kashmir Commission were to report on the situation in Junagadh and then the Security Council were to reopen the consideration of the whole matter. On behalf of the Government of Pakistan, I therefore submit that the other matters of dif- ference between Pakistan and India are in our " . , opuuon, Just as urgent and important as the serait sans ~ashmi: dispute. It will therefore be appre- cla!ed If an early decision in this regard is amved at, which decision may be implemented with speed and vigour. Mr. PILLAI (India): I must say that it is rather unfortunate, certainly for me and perhaps for .the Security Council, that aIl of us are destmed to-hear the echoes and reverberation:; seil of the various ancillary charges which have been made here by !he Government of Pakistan, the. charges subordinate ta the main issue which we The question of a new plebiscite in Junagadh has been thoroughly thrf",shed out here. We ob- served at the time this matter was discussed- and 1 wish to repeat it-that with regard to the situation that exists in Junagadh today, we do not know whether there is any provision in the Charter justifying a reference of this question to the Security Council. What is the real situation in Junagadh? In the plebiscite that has already been taken there, the people have expressed thcn;lSelves unequivocally in favour of accession to India. Out of about 200,000 people who voted, there was a bare minority of 91 who voted against accession to India. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan has himseH z:epeatedly stated in the Security Council that, even ü a fresh plebiscite were to be. taken under the fairest auspices that one can think of, the results are likely to be the same. Not only has he conceded dlat it is unlikely that the people of Junagadh would change their mind in regard to the problem of accession, but he has aIso con- ceded that the considerations which he had been urging on the point of Junagadh were somewhat academic. That is the word he used. A little exercise of that rather uncommon gilt, which ~y a strange perversion of language is called common sense, would show that; under the cir- cumstances now prevailing in Junagadh, there is just nothing that the Security Council could usefully do. If Pakistan itseH agrees that the result of whatever fresh plebiscite -may be he1d in Juna- gadh would ratüy and confirm the result of the plebiscite that has already been he1d, what, then, is it that Pakistan wants the Security Council to do? That the highest tribunal that man has so far created for the settlement of disputes be- tween nations should be invoked for this petty purpose is something which passes understand- ing. All that the Security Couneil is now called upon to do, it appears to me, is to settle what Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan has called an academic issue, an issue which 1 claim is a dead issue, an issue whièh is patent to everybody, namely, that the people of the State of Junagadh want accession to India and not to Pakistan. Those people of Junagadh were, until yes- terday, under the yoke of-an unmitigated auto- crat who, placing his own safety above all .considerations of the welfare of bis people, ran The members of the Security Couneil, 1 have no doubt, do not desire that there should be strife and trouble in a place where there now reign peace, happiness and liberty. And yet the stirring up of fresh trouble and the deniaI ot democracy and freedom will be the inevitable results of any attempt, however well intentioned, that may be made by the Security Couneil to interfere in tlùs question. Nobody can aver that the situation in Junagadh today constitutes a threat to international peace and security. 1 'respectfully submit that? in this and other s';1b- , la. sidiary matters that Pakistan has chosen ta brmg up, wisdom, prudence, and justice require the .doption of the policy of "let well aIone". With regard ta genocide, thiS attempt to slan- der the fair name of India has already been deaIt with in detail by Mr. SetaIvad and by Mr. Vellodi. l do not want to cover the same ground again. 1 shall now content myself with pointing out that the communaI disturbances and killings in bath India and PaIr.istan, wlüch the Govem~ ment of India sa deeply deplore, are a direct con- sequence of the unlicensed and unbridled hatred which has been preached from village to village in our vast sub-continent, for many years, by those who are today in authority in Pakistan. 1 weil remember how, at a Conference of the Muslim League held' in India just before India was divided, one of the leaders of the Muslim League exhorted the Muslims in India to carry fire and the sword into every Hindu homestead, even as Ghengis Khan has done in times of yore. This was the kind of exhortation that was ring- ing throughout the country for severaI years from aImost all the leaders of Pakistan, with but a few honourable exceptions. Even after the partition of India, the leaders of the Muslim League have not abated their envenomed and unscrupulous propaganda against the Hindus. When the Muslims started their orgy of killing, it led to the inevitable sequel of reprisaI and retaIiation; and the be- haviour of the Muslim League and its leaders reminds one of the Arab saying: "He thrashed me and then cried aloud; ran away and com- plained." Perhaps an even more appropriate way of describing the situation would be ta com- pare the present behaviour of the Muslim League leaders ta that of Satan rebuking siÎ1. AState founded on hatred has perhaps ta be nurt~rcd and fostere(~ on the same base passion and l~eology: A bloody limb torn out of a living orgamsm, wlthout any share in the past tradi- Our people, with their deep faith in and reverence for humanity, have all along been preaching and working and suffering ta bring about peace and imity between the different classes and creeds. AlI the energies of my Government today are engaged in rooting out the poison of communal hatred. Our leader Mahatma Gandhi has gone down as the greatest martyr ta the ~aU3e of communal harmony, ta which bis enme life was consecrated, and we rejoice that our efforts ta dissipate the evil and malicious propaganda of communal hatred are now bearing fruit. Several thousands of Indian Musiims who, falling victims to the inhuman preaching of the Muslim League, had left for Pakistan, are now returning ta India, the sadder and, we hope, the wiser for their experiences in Pakistan. No more effective ar..swer couid be given ta this base and b~eless charge of genocide than that such large numbers of the co~religionists of Pakistan's preachers of hatred are now return- ing to India to take up their oid peaceful voca- tions. The terrible gash inflicted in India by these communal atrocities is now healing as a result of the steady and unceasing work of pacifi- cation and reconciliation in which the leaders of India have been engaged. Any attempt at this stage to probe into the healihg wound can only lead ta further complications, and surely it would not be the desire of the Security Council ta rekindle the dying, passions, with God knows what consequences. Further, it is by no means dear that a charge of this kind, which refers ta happenings falling entirely within the domestic jurisdiction of the States concerned, could be taken up by this Council. May l, therefore, with deep respect, suggest to the Security Coun- cil that the best it can do in this matter is to remove this item from its agenda. May 1 now take the liberty of giving a few facts about sorne of the allegations regarding India's failure to implement certain agreements made with Paki'Jtan. Since Ml'. Vellodi spoke on this item the other day [290th meeting] 1 have received additianal information which might perhaps be of interest to the Security Council. Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan dëëlared that the 'Reserve Bank of Indi<..:vas trying ta throttle the finances of Pakistan, and that Pakistan was .therefore . compelled immediately ta set up a siderabl~ time. The Reserve Bank of India, the official bank for the Indian Dominion, helped ta start the necessary ùffices in Pakistan to enable the Pakistan Government to take over in due course her complete currency and monetary functions at the earliest date. These included full-fledged offices for dealing with issue, bank- ing, and public debt, in Lahore, Karachi and Dacca. To enable these offices to be run inde- pendently on the establishment of the Pakistan State Bank, the Reserve Bank of India also undertook to give special training ta the Pakis- tan staff. Some of the Reserve Bank staff are continuing ta serve in Pakistan despite the de- teriorated conditions of law and order which were still prevailing there earlier this year. During the interim period, when the Reserve Bank continued to function for Pakistan as well, India agreed to appoint two nominees of Pakis- tan ta two of the four seats reserved for nomi- nated directors on the Central Beard of India's Reserve Bank. India thus did everything that lay in its power to facilitate the smooth and eas)' transition towards an independent and separate monetary and currency system in Pakistan. In fact, India took sorne risk of causing shortage of notes and coins in its own territory, when it placed at Pakistan's disposal practically the entire capacity of its currency press. 1 shall now give the facts regarding another friv.olous charge made by Pakistan about the non-implementation of an India-Pakistan agree- ment ta deliver military stores. These facts are based on the information 1 have received from my Government. The Pakistan representatives continue ta state that 160,000 tons of military stores are due to Pakistan from India. That was based on a rough calculation made sO]ne time towards the end of 1947 by the Partition Coun- cil's Ordnance Stores Sub-Committee on the assumption that the stores would be divisible between India and Pakistan in the ration of two to one. Since ~hen, as a result of detailed dis- cussions which took place last December, a .formula was agreed upon, and in accordance with that formula it has now been calculated that the stores due to Pakistan from India would be in the. neighbourhood qf 68,000 tons plus 1,705 ve~llc1es. As will be appreciated, tOO, like the pre~lOus estimate, is only an approximate figure, ~mce a large v:",riety of stores is not easily susceptlble of converslOn in temlS of tonnage. The Security Council will remember that the leader of the Pakistan delegation, who started the other day ta reel off his list of these petty grievances, had, in the course of the debate, little or nothing definite ta say about them. In most cases he confessed that since these problems were brought to the notice of the Security Coun- cil, they have been more or less settled with, the Government of India. No exposure of the utter frivolity of these complaints can be more com- plete than this admission of the representative of Pakistan. These are matters which are being negotiated from day to day and settled. AState which brings up such trivial questions before a body like the Security Council, shows, if 1 may say sa, scant respect for thi&, Council. Pettifogging ,cases of this nature, which, in any case, are not likely ta cause a threat ta international peace, are, 1 sub~t with respect, best left to be settled by the parties concerned. For these reasons my Government finds itself unable ta agree ta the suggestion of the President of the Security Council that the Commission which has been appointed for the Kashmir issue be asked ta investigate these other charges aIso.

1 shall now call upon the Assistant Secretary- General ta reply ta the questions asked by the Syrian representative a short time aga. Ml'. SOBOLEV (Assistant Secretary-General in charge of Security Council Affairs) :.As 1 understand it, two questions have been asked. The first question is in regard ta the reimbursement by the United Nations of the ex": penses of the representatives of Member Governments on the Commission. The second question is: Has there been any progress in the negotiations between the Secretary-General and the Indian Government on the terms of service of the Plebiscite Administrator? A complete reply to this question may be found in document 8/756, dated 19 May 1948. This document contains two letters. The first is a letter addressed by tlle 8ecretary-General to the representative of India to the United Nations to the effect that the Secretary·General is ready to negotiate with the Government of India on the terms of service of the Plebiscite Administrator, and encloses for the consideration of the Government of India a draft of the terms of service. There is a reply to this letter of the Secretary- General from the representative of India ta the United Nations. The reply states, in part: "2. The Government of ..India have already communicated ta the President of the 'Security Council that it is not possible for them to implement those parts of the resolution against which their objections have been c1early stated by their delegation. The conditions under which a free and fair plebiscite can be taken cannot be established under the resolution in its present form. In particular, the Government of India have taken exception to sorne of the functions which it is proposed ta entrust to the Plebiscite Administrator, for example, the direction and supervision of the State forces and police (paragraph 8 of the resolution); and the appointment of special magistrates nominatedby the Plebiscite Administrator to hear cases which in his opinion have a serious bearing on the preparation for and conduct of a free and impartial plebiscite (sub-paragraph 10 (c) of the resolution). . "3. In view of these considerations, 1 do not think it will be useful for me to discuss with your representatives now the draft agreement on the terms of service of the Plebiscite Administrator, which you have enc10sed in Y0uf letter." Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): 1 raised two points. It appears that the former objections ta the re~olution of the Security Council wmch were rmsed by bath parties still exist. The representatives of bath parties have today stated that there are other terms and provisions of the resolution to which they do. notagree. It was stated that unless certain amendments are made to the resolution, the respective GO\Ternments would perhaps not be able to assist -in the implementation of it. ' 1 had been inclined to agree with the President, but after hearing the statements which have been made today, 1 believe the task of the Commission will be more difficult. The situation is not so easy. If the Commission goes there and meets aIl these difficulties without having an indication of the extent of its authority, on which both parties are agreed and by which both parties will stand, the Commission will find itself in a very difficult position. For this reason 1 think the proposaI that the members of the Commission should meet here and try to have contact with the parties before going to Indiâ is a good one. They will be able to try to find a method of procedure for their work and, if they cannot find a way to facilitate the task before them because of the difficulties which still exist, they will be able to refer the question again to the Security Council for consideration in order to have sorne authority to help them accomplish their task. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) (translated trom Spanish) : If 1 remember rightly, it appears from the Indian representative's statement that there are at least seven or eight points in the Security Council's resoltÎtion to which the Government of India is opposed; and in these circumstances further efforts to settle the questions pending between India and Pakistan seem to me not only inopportune, but likely to produce a result opposite to what we want. The difficulty of the position nas been further increased by the statement made to us by the Assistant Secretary-General on behalf of the Secretariat, and it is evident that there, too, there are matters on which the Indian Government does not agree and which endanger the authority of the Security Council's resolutions. For these reasons 1 must continue to oppose any further proceedings on this matter until opposition to the Council's resolution by both Governments, that of India and that of Pakistan, has somehow been overcome. NaturaIly, 1 shall have to inform the Argentine Government of these difficulties, since 1 do not know to what extent my Government would be prepared to participate in a mediating commission intended to administer the plebiscite and to deal with the other matters assigned to it, when such a commission may presumably fail because the Governments concerned are not in agreement with the Security Council's resolution. 1 see nothing against the' Commission holding a few preliminary meetings in New York, but, as 1 say, it seems evident that it cannot leave for India until it has a concrete programme ,based on the acceptance of the Security Coun- Thirdly, 1 do not think that a resolution of the Security Council can be allowed to remain in abeyance for lack of funds to implement it, and 1 presume that the Secretariat should be prepared to advance the fUllds necessary for such purposes. But-and this is my fourth point -1 aIso consider it necessary.to establish very clearly now, when and by whom those funds will be reimbursed. 1 think that these comments on expenses arising from Security Council resolutions should be submitted to th~ Committee of Experts for an opinion, so that the Council may reach a final decision on the matter. For it is obvious that the work of the Security Council cannot be dependent on the decision of any consultative or advisory committee which might be at the disposaI of the Secretariat, whether that decision is good or bad, right or wrong. Consequently, 1 am making a definite proposal that the Committee of Experts should be consulted. If the President wishes me to do so, 1 shall be glad to submit these suggestions in writing. Finally, with regard to the subject under discussion, 1 repeat that 1 am opposed to further negotiation until the points on which the interested Governments disagree with the Security Council's resolution have been settled. Mr. LAWFORD (United Kingdom): While appreciating the force of the arguments which have j?st been used by the representative of Argentma, my delegation feels that if we wait as long as he suggests, we may be waiting forever ~d the Commission may never go out to KashmIT at aIl. We are strongly in favour of the Co~sion's now proceeding to Inclia at the earliest o~portunity, though we aIso agree with what ~ t?ink was t~e President's suggestion that a preliminary meetrng should be held here for convenience. We also agree with what lunderstand ~~ the President's proposaI' that the CommISSion should deal with' these additional The Commission may have a very difficult task, but if the representative of Argentina will aUow me to say so, its members are eminent, distinguished and efficient men, and we are hopeful, in the United Kingdom, that once the Comuüssion arrives in India, whatever the appearances may be now, it may finally be able to accomplish the just and lasting settlement which we aU-and above aU, 1 think-India and Pakistan-have at heart. Mr. TSIANG (China): During an early part of the Security Council's discussion with regard ta this question-:-back in the month of F-ebruary -my delegation suggested that it might be better for the Security Council to adopt a number of general principles, leaving the details to be worked out on the spot by the Security Council Commission. That suggestion was made because of the consideration that· the members of the Security Council did not have all the local knowledge which the solution of the problem required. In the second place, we had one other consideration, namely, that if the members of the Commission were on the spot, they might achieve more through personal relationships than the Security Council could achieve here, at s~ch a distance. The suggestion of the delegation of China was' not adopted by the Security Council, mainly, 1 think, because we all deferred on that point to the judgment of the delegation of the United Kingdom. Since the delegation of China adopted thàt standpoint early in the debate, it cannot, of course, oQject to the Commission going out at this moment; As 1 listened to the objections put before the Security Council by the representative of India, 1 had the feeling that some of them were not of so serious a nature as to prevent, our Com- However, the representative of India raised anoôer objection, namely, that referring to the coalition Cabinet in Kashmir. 1 felt that this objection was more serious and tJlat it might hamper the activities of our Commission. It is on that ground that 1 hesitate to urge that the Commission should proceed at once to India. Without sorne adjustment oh that particular point, 1 feel that our Commission may not find it possible to do useful work. Again on that point, so far as 1 am concerned, 1 am ready to defer to the judgment of the representative of the United Kingdom. However, if we should agree that the Commission should proceed to India, 1 feel it -,ITould be wise not to refer aIl of the disputes to that Commission at once. We rnight allow the Commission to work for sorne rime on the Kashmir question. If due progress is made on that question, then further matters might be referred to the Commission. If the Commission is overloaded at the very; beginning, its chance of success even with regard to Kashmir may be diminished. Without passing judgment on. these vàrious questions or their relative importance, we must agree that, once we make sorne headway with the question of Kashmir, we shaU find other questions much easier of solution. In case we meet with a deadlock on Kashmir, then 1 am afraid success on the -<-b.er questions will not be ,easy. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): The delegation of the United States supports the proposaI made by the President of th~ Sec~rity Council at the opening of this meeting. This proposaI, if we understand it correctly, is that the Commission should act according to paragraph D of the resolution of 20 January 1948 [document SI654], which reads as follows: . "D. The Commission shaIl perfonn the funchons. des~ribe? in clause C: (1) in regard to the sltuatlOn ln the Jammu 'and Kashmir State set out in the letter, datpt! ~ j"anuary 1948, from the representative of India addressed to the President of the Security· Council, and in the letter, dated 15 January 1948 from the Minister .of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan addressed to the Secretary-General; and (2) in regard to other This would be with the understanding that the Security Council Commission would concentrat(~ its efforts initiaUy on the Kashmir issue, taking up the Junagadh question at its discretion. 1 listened with great interest to the remarks of the representative of Argentina. 1 must say that, for the time being, we feel persuaded that sorne investigation should be made by the Security Council's Committee of Experts with reference to the general situation which has been disclosed by the experience of the Security Council in this India-Pakistan case, and in other cases as well. We have noticed that there is apparently no sense of obligation on the part of the parties ta the case. The parties come to this great United Nations under the very generous spiritual terms . of the Charter. The Charter invites aU the world to bring its difficulties and disputes to this intemational Organization. The parties come here and engage the very expensive machinery of the United Nations and the time of distinguished men from aU over the world, and there does not seem to be much sense of obligation to give respect and due regard to the judgment arrived at. 1 notice that the Charter in Article 35, paragraph 2, mentions an obligation. It is related ta the privilege that is granted to aState not a Member of the United Nations ta: "... bring to the attention of the Security Counci! or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance: for the purpose of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter". It might be very helpful if this Committee of experts would examine what was meant by that. What was the obligation of pacifie settlement provided in tht: present Charter? Neither party that has come beiore the Security Council seems ready to admit that there is any obligation whatever. In fact, the recormnendations of the Security Council in this case were made because the parties came to the Security Council and represented that if this dispute were allowed to continue without the intervention of the United Nations, it might lead ta a threat to the peace and a breach of the peace. That is the foundation on which the Security Council acted. For four months following that, we heard the parties on bath sides and diligently tried ta get them ta arrive at a SOiutiOIl by negotiation, but . sommes they could not do it. They barely yielq,ed from the original trading position that they took at the beginning of these negotiations. Finally, they called upon the Security Council to make recommendations; both parties asked the Security Council ta do that. And the Security Council passed a resolution, to many ·of the most, impOrtant articles of which we are now told they 1 am very intere::.ted in what the representa:' tive of Argentina has proposed here, and 1 shall examine the specific terrns of bis proposaI with great attention because 1 think that we have learned from our three years' experienee here . that there are certain matters relating to the interpretation of Chapter VI that need to be clarified and explained to the world, so that in this benevolent work of ours, in which the whole world is free to air its disputes and grievances, we may have sorne method of effective collaboration under the pacific methods.of dispute. Parties sit at this table with almost unlimited privileges, having aU the privileges of any Member save that of voting; they engage in prolonged representations; they engage in vis-à-vis debate against each other here in the Security Council; they have the opportunity to debate particular specifie provisions of a resolution when we are at work upon an undertaking L~at is peeuliarly up to the Security Council; then when it cornes to the performance or execution of the terms of a resolution, they say they will not consider it. There is something exceedingly wrong about that. It is not only morally wrong, but 1 think that it is not in conforrnity with the spirit of the Charter and that the time has come when the Security Council should get out an interpretation of what are the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter and when it should lay them down, so that in sorne such manner, in recognition of sorne of the cost, the parties will assume an obligation in advance to abide by the decision that is arrived at through this Chapter of the Charter. If parties come here and bath of them caU upon the Security Council to make recommendations for the solution of their dispute, ought they not in advance agree ta abide by it? They are not bound ta ask the Security Council to make such recommendatians, but if they do, 1 ask the Committee of Experts if they have not thereby implied that they will conforrn or try to 'conforrn ta them. This situation is a serious one affecting the foundations of the world and of this great United Nations, and 1 shall consequently examine with great interest the proposaI, when it cornes, of the representative. of Argentina. But, for the time being, the United States delegation favours the proposaI made by the President for reference of aU these matters to the Commission with the understanding that the Kashmir matter has priority and'that the other' matters shall be taken up at its discretion. THREE HUNDRED AND FIFTH MEETING Held at Lake SUCcess, New York, on Wednesday, 26 May 1948, at 3 p.m. President: Mr. A. PAROOI (France). Present: The representatives of the following <:ountries: Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, France, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America. 81. Adoption of the agenda 1

The agenda is the same as for this morning's' meeting. The items to be dealt wlth are: India- Pakistan, Czechoslovakia and Palestine. With.reference to the agenda 1 call upon the representative of Belgium. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated trom French): 1 should like to ask a question. If 1 am not mistaken, the Council must discuss the question of Palestine today. In these circumstances, would it not be advisable to give it priority over that of Czechoslovakia? That would mean reversing the order of item; 3 and 4 of our agenda. .

That question certainly arises. We must discuss the Palestine question today and there are a certain number of documents which 1 must bring to your nàtice..The most important are the replies of the Jewish Agency and the Arab States (at least sorne of them) to the last telegram which was sent to them concerning the cease-fire order. 1 have the Jewish Agency's reply to hand, and 1 am informed that the reply of the Arab States has been reçeived and is now being deciphered. 1 think 1 shall have it in perhaps an hour or two. In tb'.se circumstances, we can either begin . discussing the Palestine question (in which case 1 shall give you the information which 1 have received and then 1 shall suspend the discussion and take up another question, untU the other document is ready) ; or, and this would perhaps be the wiser course, we could continue to discuss the India-Pakistan question which we start:ed this morning, it being understood that 1 shaH haIt the discussion as saon as the document