S/PV.305 Security Council

The agenda is the same as for this morning's' meeting. The items to be dealt wlth are: India- Pakistan, Czechoslovakia and Palestine. With.reference to the agenda 1 call upon the representative of Belgium. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated trom French): 1 should like to ask a question. If 1 am not mistaken, the Council must discuss the question of Palestine today. In these circumstances, would it not be advisable to give it priority over that of Czechoslovakia? That would mean reversing the order of item; 3 and 4 of our agenda. .

That question certainly arises. We must discuss the Palestine question today and there are a certain number of documents which 1 must bring to your nàtice..The most important are the replies of the Jewish Agency and the Arab States (at least sorne of them) to the last telegram which was sent to them concerning the cease-fire order. 1 have the Jewish Agency's reply to hand, and 1 am informed that the reply of the Arab States has been reçeived and is now being deciphered. 1 think 1 shall have it in perhaps an hour or two. In tb'.se circumstances, we can either begin . discussing the Palestine question (in which case 1 shall give you the information which 1 have received and then 1 shall suspend the discussion and take up another question, untU the other document is ready) ; or, and this would perhaps be the wiser course, we could continue to discuss the India-Pakistan question which we start:ed this morning, it being understood that 1 shaH haIt the discussion as saon as the document Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated from French): The arder of work which you suggest, Mr. President, is entirely satisfactory ta me. Besides, my query did not concern the subject of India-Pakistan, but the respective arder of the Czechoslovak and Palestine questions.

, If there is no opposition 1 shall take it that the agenda as submitted ta us has bcen adopted, it being understood that as regards the arder of the items, we shall first take up item 2 and then, if necessary' item 4 before item 3. 1 shall haIt the discussion on item 2 (the India-Pakistan question) when 1 consider that there will be sufficient time ta discuss the 'Palestine question at the necessary Iength. 82. Continuation of the discussion of the India-Pakistan question On the invitation of the President, Mr. Pillai, representative of l ndia, and M r. ISpahani, repre- sentative of Péistan, took their places at the Council table. Mr. IGNATIEFF (Canada): 1 shall be very brief, particularly having in mind the very im- portant pressing rn,atters on our agenda this afternoon. 1 wish to support the proposal which the President made this morning [304th meet- ing]. The reason for this is that the Canadian delegation has in mind that the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 21 April 1948 [document 8/726], in relation to the India- Pakistan dispute, was quite specific in regard to instructions to the Commission. In dealing; with the question of Kashmir, the resolution ~es: . "Instructs the Commission ta proceed at once ta the Indian sub-çontinent and there place its good offices and mediation at the disposaI of the Governments of India and Pakistan with a view to facilitating the taking of the necessary measures, both with' respect to the restoration of peace and order and to the holding of a plebiscite by the two Govennnents ..." 1 understand the proposaI made by the Presi- dent as meaning that it would be within the discretion of the Commission to take into ac- count such other matters as are in dispute be- tween the two Governments, and to apply therr. good offices and mediation to these matters. In that sense, the Canadian delegation is pleased to support the proposaI made by the President. It is in this spirit, Mr. President, that the Belgian delegation supports the proposaI whil.~l you have made. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) (translated trom 8,panish): ln accordance with the President's suggestion, 1 have formulated the views 1 main- tained in my first statement during this discus- sion [304th meeting] in two draft resolutions [documents 8/790 and 8/791J. 1 should like ta emphasize, in particular, that 1 do not wish these two drafts ta be discussed immediately; on the contrary, 1 wish them to be sent to the Committee of Experts, so that we can discuss these questions after hearing that Committee's opinion. So far is it· from my intention to impede or hinder consideration of the Kashmir question that 1 think the PreSIdent might ask the Secre- tary-General ta convene a prêliminary meeting of the member States, to be held, say, tomorrow, sa that they may have a brief exchange of views and inform their respective Governments when the specially appointed representatives are ta begin their work. Those are the two matters 1 wished to put before the Council.

The Argentine representative has put forward the same suggestion as J, myself, would have made l'lmi it would appear ta be the logical conclusion to this morning's debate [304th meeting]. Sorne of the members of the Council have expressed approval of the idea J proposed and, personally, still favour putting the Commission to work without too much delay. But J do not think that this point of view is inconsistent with first convening-if not tomorrow, at least before the end of this week-either the Commission itself, or at least those members of it who have 1 think that this would be a wise course to follow. Besides, if 1 remember correctly, it was suggested this morning by the Syrian representative. Perhaps we should be able to recons,der the question, if the members of the Corlmission come and tell us that they foresee gr':at difficulties in the work we have instructed them to carry out. 1 do not think, however, that this will be the case. If the Council is in agreement, we can provisionally conclude this discussion and ask the Secretariat to convene, not all the members who will finally compose the Commission, because, for one, the Argentine representative is not here, but those representatives who can be brought together. This would give them an opportunity of exchanging views, the results of which would be made known to the Cou:pcil at an early date. We should then take a final decision on the dispatch of the Commission to the spot. Ml'. GONZALEZ FERNANDEZ (Colombia): 1 should like to obtain a further clarification from the President. If 1 understand correctly, should the delegations represented on the Commission decide that the Commission is to proceed to India, or to Europe with the view of establishing the Commission, a new decision by the Security Council would not be needed because the taking of a new decision would represent a discussion of the resolution already approved by the Security Council. If, on the other hand, the members of the Oommission should decide that the present situation does not guarantee the exercise of their functions, in that case, a new decision by the Security Council would be needed. But if the members of the Commission decide that they can go to India ta fulfil their task, 1 wonder whether there would be any need for the Security Council to take a new decision on the matter, in view of the fact that the decision has already been taken. Ml'. EL-KHOURI (Syria): 1 agree with what the President has said with reference to a meeting of the delegations representing the States on the Commission going to Kashmir and India. 1 must say a word regarding the two draft resolutions submitted by the representative of Argentina. 1 agree that the matter might be studied by the Committee of Experts, but on !he condition that this procedure would not lffipede or defer the work of the Commission. The Commission is to meet here, and it would seem that it· is a private matter for them to decide when they shall proceed to the East, whether they shall by-pass Europe, whether they shaH stop there, or whether they shall go on to the spot where they shall be carrying out their task. That is their own prerogative and if the delegations meet, they can simply arrange that Mr. ARCE (Argentina) (translated trom Spanish): 1 though 1 had been sufficiently clear in my previous remarks. But, in view of the Syrian representative's words, it seems that 1 was not. Members of the Council can see for themselves that there is no reference to the Kashmir question in my two draft resolutions. They are two resolutions of a general nature, by which the Security Council would take measures for the future, wmch may or may not be applied to the question now under discussion. Thus these two resolutions are in no way connected with the Kashmir question, and they should not delay its consideration. They will go to the Committee of Experts in order that a committee of the Security Council may study thismatter and give us its opinion. But proceedings on the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir will continue. 1 do not know what eIse 1 could say to make it quite clear that these two resolutions can in no way obstruct, delay or prejudice proceedings on the Kashmir question. Ml". LAWFORD (Uplted Kingdom): As far as the United Kingdom is concerned, my delegation has no objection to the two draft resolutions submitted by the representative of Argentina. There is however a slight textual amendment which might be made in the draft resolution that appears in document S/790. Ithink the first line of the draft resolution ought to read, if the representative of Argentilla agrees: "Decides to instruct its Committee of Experts to study the foI1owing queStions and to report ... " In my view, the Commission's meeting will be unoffieial and preparatory to the commencement of its work, and natutaIly, will not affect the decisions already taken by the Security Council. It therefore seems normal to me that we should receive an infonnative report on the views which have been exchanged and, if necessary, on its conclusions and on points to which it would like to draw the Security Council's attention. There .are two further points. In regard to the resolutions submitted by the Argentine representative, 1 understood earlier that he did not want them to be either discussed or put to the vote now. If 1 am mistaken, 1 would like him to make his position clear on this point. Mr. ARCE (Argentina): That is right.

In that case, theexamination of these two draft resolutions shaIl be postponed to a later date. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) (translated tram Spanish): . . . after hearing the opinion of the Committee, which must have sorne reason for existence. However, if the Council wishes to discuss the matter ïrnmediately, 1 have no objection. 1 hope there will be no need to vote. Let the draft be sent to the Committee if there is no objection. '

1 do not want there to be any misunderstanding about' this. Before these two questions can be submitted to the Committee of Experts, we must adopt the resolutions which are being submitted to them. 1 think, therefore, that 1 had misunderstood the Argentine representative apd if he does not object to the Security Council taking a decision now, so that these resolutions might be referred to the Committee of Experts, 1 shall ask the Couneil if it agrees. If there is no objection, the two resolutions will be considerd approved, unless certain members request more time in which to study them. Mr. ARCE (Argentina)" (translated tram Spanish): Unless the procedure of this Couneil is different from parliamentary procedure aIl over the world, 1 do not see why we should discuss this before hearing the,opinion of the Committee of Experts. 1 wish the Committee of Experts to. give us its opinion on the mattèr, aild we will. discuss it afterwards. It seems unnecessary that we should adopt. two resolutions which· 1 do not ask the Council to adopt until.they have been duly discussed. 1 draw your attention to document S/791, in which it is stated: "The Security Council decides to instruct its Committee of Experts to study th~ following questions and to report." Is the Counci! in agreement with this decision. The second resolution (document S/790) is drafted along similar lines. Before the Committee of Experts can carry out this study, we must instruct it to do so. Is the Council decided so to instruct the Committee? Mr. TARASENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Repùblic) (translated trom Russian): Would it not be better ta give the members of the Security Council an opportunity to study the contents of these two resolutions and resume the discussion of them afterwards? Mr. ARCE (Argentina) (translated tram Spanish): The two draft resolutions are in the form of a decision or resolution, but obviously 1 am not asking the Council to take a decision on them today. 1 ask that they should be sent to the Committee of Experts for study, and by the time we have the Committee's opinion, the Ukrainian representative and all the other representatives will have had a fortnight, three weeks, a month or even three months ta consider them. They 'will come to the Council table and only then will the Council make its decision. What it decides now. is to send these documents to the .Committee ~nd nothing more. Either the matter is very complicated, or 1 do not understand it, in which case 1 ,should prefer the President to decide, as he sees fit.

If you wish, 1 shall ask the Security Council whether it agrees to the adoption of the two draft resolutions you have submitted, as Argentine represeD.tative, the object of which is to instruct the Committee of Experts to carry out two studies. It is understood that when the results of these studies are transmitted to the Council, it can again examine the substance of the questions with which they deal. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated trom Russian): 1 wish to say a few words in connexion with these Argentine resolutions. But first 1 wish to make a reservation: 1 do not intend to touch upon the substance of the India-Pakistan question either directly or indirectly. 1 am interested in the following point. The Committee of Experts was established for the purpose of examining matters of procedure. What is now contemplated in the Argentine resolutions is outside the limits of procedural matters. The USSR delegation is particularly interested to know whether, in the event of the a<;loption of one or both of the Argentine resolutions, the Committee of Experts will engage to 1 felt it necessary to make this statement in order to make clear the USSR delegation's position with regard to the matter. r repeat that my statement has no bearing on the substance of the India-Pakistan dispute.

1 think that the Council ought at any rate to examine one of the points raised in the state- .ments that have just been made. 1 wonder whether the Committee of Experts is the most competent body, at Ieast for the examination of such questions as the payment of exp~nses. It is true that it has been set up to examine questions of procedure, but its terms of reference have fiot been clearly defined. Other questions may, therefore, be referred io the Committee and 1 find it reasonable to do so in the case of legal matters. But when it cornes to United Nations financial matters, 1 wonder whether sorne other body may not be more competent to deal with them. If the representative of Argentina agrees, we might ponder over this matter until our next meeting. We would then discuss the India- Pakistan question. We could ask the Secl'etanat ta check this point and ascertain whether the part of the study concerning expenses should not be referred to other bodies. Mr. TSIANG (China): As 1 understand the draft resolutions presented by the representative of Argentma, it seems that the purpose is to obtain certain information from various legal instructions or from those resolutions which have been adopted by the Security Council up to the present time. It seems to me that we could achieve the purposes which the draft resolutions have in view if, i.ï both cases, the Security Council requested the Secretariat to prepare papers relating to these questions. With regard to the legal effect of resolutions adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VI of the Charter, 1 think it would be fitting to have a paper prepared by the Legal Department of the Secretariat. . ln connexion with the draft resolution concerning the financial aspect, it seems to me that the Secretariat could at least prepare a preliminary paper for the Security Council after which the Cauncil might weIl decide whether it should r.reate a new instrument to study the question or entrust it to the Committeeof Experts. 1 am surprised, especia1ly as the representatives of the USSR and the Ukraine 1rnGW every- -thing, that he should state that the Committee of Experts was set up exclusively for p:,')cedural matters, when that Committee has already dealt with questions of substance. ln. fact, if 1 remember rightly, that body dealt with everything connected with the trusteeship system rdating specifica1ly to strategic areas. Moreover~ this is a9Committee which the Security Council can call upon to study any matter and on which aIl the States members of the Security Council are represented, 50 that each of them, individua1ly, may ask for the information it considers necessary in order to give us an opinion. Besides, although 1 maintain that the admission of new Members is mere1y a question of procedure as far as the Security Council is concerned, it must be pointed out that the Council,has another committee exactly similar to the Committee of Experts-the Committee on the Admission of New Members; and the representative of the SoViet Union considers that this Committee was appointed to deal with questions of substance. AlI this is beating about the bush in order, as 1 said, to defend himself before he is attacked, in preparation for the time when the Council' has to consider my draft resolution on Czechoslovakia. What 1 have proposed is very simple: to refer the matter to the Committee of Experts, because there is no other committee better fitted ta deal with it. Why? So that this Committee can finally decide what it considers ad~..sable? Obviously not. We areonly referring this to the Committee so that it may collect information' from the Secretariat, from the Legal Department, or from wherever it can, &nd refer the matter back to us so that we, the Security Council, can take the final decision. But 1 wish to repeat that 1 have made these remarks especially ta point out the motives of the representative of the Soviet Union. As gards the fate of the two draft resolutions, Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet SocialiSt Republics) (translated from Russian): 1 wish to say that 1 spoke ten rimes less than the representative of Argentina. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) (translated from French): It is indeed the urst rime, for everyone knows full weIl that the representative of the Soviet Union can speak for two, three or fûur hours. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): 1 cannot remember such an occasion.

Both remarks are correct, but 1 suggest we now return to the subject under discussion. The draft resolutions submitted by the representative of Argentina have encountered sorne objections, and a rather different suggestion has been made by the Chïnese representative. In these circumstances, if you agree, 1 feel that we should think the matter over for a few days longer. 1 suggest that we stop the discussion for today at this point and take up the resolution again when we receive the report of the Commission of which we spoke a few moments aga. It is thus agreed that the Secretariat will calI a meeting of the Commission on the India- Pakistan question in the near future, and that this Commission will communicate its observations ta us. We <:hall now deal with the next item on the agenda. 1 express my thanks ta the representatives of India and Pakistan. Mr. Pillai, representative of India, and Mr. lspahani, representative af Pakistan, withdrew trom the Council table. SOt Discussion on the next item to be considered

1 should IL1(e to ask the Syrian representative whether there is any chance of hearing now the telegram he is to communicate ta the Conncil? 1 am asking this question :ta find out whether we should take up the Palestine question immediately, or discuss the Czechoslovak question for a while. .' . Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): 1 believe it would be more convenient ta pass on to the question of Czechoslovakia.

We must examine at least part of the Palestine qUf,stion tonight. Consequently, if we take up the question of Czechoslovakia, we must do so on the understanding that we shall discuss the Palestine .quest~on afterwards, and we must fix Ml'. EL-KHOURI (SyriaJ: The papers which are to he submitted to the Security Council are now being translated from Arabic; that process has just begun, and 1 believe it will take about one hour to translate and then type out the papers.

1 should like to ask the members of the Council for their opinion on the order of business. Ml'. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated tram Russian): 1 think il: would be desirable to deal with the Palestinè question. 1 have no objection to the question of Czechoslovakia being considered at any time, but it seems to me that the Palestine question is more urgent. Ml'. TARASENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (translated tram Russian): As far as 1 remember, it was decided to grant a delay of forty-eight hours. That time limit has already . expired. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : The Security Council has heard that the principal document with which it will have to deal in connexion with the Palestin~ question is not to be expected for an hour or so. Have we e':lough other material to discuss in connexion with that subject, or should we perhaps use the time to get on with the question of Czechoslovakia? The President may have other documents that he wishes the Securit"j CounciI to consider in connexion with Palestine. If that would take up the hour dmillg which we have to wait for the principal document it might be satisfactory to consider those other documents now. Ml'. EL-KHOURI (~yria): 1 wish to make a statement in <:annexion with the remark just made regarding the delay of forty-eight hours. 1 received cablegrams, today, from Amman and Damascus, informing me that the replies were ca~led from Amman at 9 a.m. tnday, Amman time. That would be 2 a.m. New YorK time, which is weil before the expiration of the time limit. They were delivered here at Il a.m. today. They were sent in code, and since then the time has been used in deciphering them and translating them from Arabic into English. Thus 1 it is not a matter of delay, it is simply that difficult circumstances have intervened.

We shall then deal with the-Czechoslovak question for one hour. On. the invitation of the President, Mr. Santa Cruz, representative of Chile, took his place at the Security Counczl table. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): . I have oruy a short comment ta make on the proceedings at our last meeting [SOSrd meeting], at which we dealt with this question, when, by exercising his dQuble veto, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics obstructed the desire of the rest of the Security Council ta examine the evidence that is avail- ,able on this subject. I am rather surprised that he did sa. I should have thought that it would have been better and more appropriate for any such evidence ta be examined methodically in a small subcommittee, rather than that we should have ta discuss it all here in the Security Council itself. , But, doubtless, he has his reasons for his preference. l ,cannat refrain from saying that I am shocked at bis misuse of the double veto. I repeat, my Govemment stands by the San Francisco Declaration, although I do not know how it will be aftected .by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics representative's use of one of its paragraphs ta nullify another paragraph of the same document. He has clearly made nonsense of chapter I, paragraph 2, where it is quite plain ta me that what the Security Council wished to do-that is ta say, ta appoint a small sub-committee of three of its members-is comprised under "the establishment of such bodies or agencies as it may be necessary for the performance of its functions", which is listed as one of the steps which the Security Council can take by a procedural vote. This is the actual text of the San Francisco Declaration: ". . . to establish such bodies or agencies as it may be necessary for the performance f its functions." It seems to me that paragraph 4 of the same chapter can hardly come into play. There is no question here of an investigation leading ta what is there called ':'a chain of events". The Se~urity Cauncil wa!l only planning to organize its own work in a way that it fe1t would be suitable and effective, and that could not be he1d ta lead to a "chain of events" any. more than the Security Council's own investigation of the matter. ' 1 should like to refer to one other matter. It may be remember~d that at our meeting on this subject which took place on 29 April [288th meeting], 1 reserved the right to revert to certain statements of alleged historical facts made by the representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. 1 shall not detain the Security Couneil with a criticism of the arguments of the representative of the Ukrainian SSR, which seemed to me to be irrelevant. But he made-- and placed on record-eertain allegations which 1 felt it my dutYto investigate. He said that on 21 September 1938, a joint ultimatum was presentecl to the Czechoslovak Govemment by the French and British Govemments. His words, at that time, were: ce: : • in this ultimatum, Czechoslovakia was forbidden with brutal frankness to accept help from the USSR'" [288th meeting]. According to him, this ultimatum contained the following passage, which is the alleged quotation from that note: ". . . the war might assume the character of a crusade against Bolshevism, and it would be very difficult for the Governments of the United Kingdom and France ta stand aside." [Ibid.] To anyone who had any knowledge of our official documents and phraseology, that would seem a most improbable passage. 1 made inquiries, and 1 have verified that there is no document of any kind in the possession of my Govemment which gives any colour to this allegation. In the document to whieh the representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socia,list Republic referred, there is no phrase even remotely ff".sembling that which is purported in the quotation, nor did such an idea form any part of British policy at that time. It is clear, 1 am afraid, that the representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic has been the victim of an impudent andrather clumsy forgery which should not be allowed to stand uncon"ected in the record. My Government possesses, and in fact it has transmitted to me certain swom statements by Czechoslovak personalities; which 1 shall be prepared to make available to the Security CouDcil in due course.

1 have no more speakers on my list. 1 should like to make a brief statement as the representative of FRANCE. . The United States representative has recently suggested that his Government could collect evidence on the Prague coup d'Etat fraD;! Czech statesmen in the United States and the United States occupation zone in Germany, and then forward it to the Security Cou_.~il for its information. 1 wish to state that 1 agree with this procedure which will prevent a prolongation of the debate. On the basis of such documents, the Council will then' decide whether it should resume the present debate. Ml'. ARCE (Argentina) (translated tram Spanish): 1 most respectfully remind the President that at the last meeting on this question [303rd meeting] a draft resolution was submitted [document S/782], which representatives must certainly have by them, and which instructs the Committee of Experts to collect aU the information submitted in order ta report on it to the Security Council as saon as possible. 1 think that by this means we should prevent the Council from wasting time by dealing with the matter itself. The Council can finally considel' the subject as saon as the Committee of Experts has l'eported. 1 do not wish to give any further arguments for the draft l ,have submitt~d; 1 think that its actual contents provide sufficient explanation and l'easons. As we have been unable to entrust this task of collecting information to a body specially cl'eated for the pul'pose, 1 hope we can entrust it ta an aJl'eady e:xisting body which, as representatives have just heard, deals exclusively wlth procedural rnatters. The question is whether there is any difference between the Chilean proposaI, which was supported by Argentina at the time of its submission, and the Argentine proposaI which is now under consideration. The difference is only in regard to the numerical composition of the subcommittee proposed by the Chilean resolution and that of the Committee of Experts to which the Argentinian resolution proposes to entrust the task of carrying out the investigation. In all other respects the resolutions are similar. Theil' purpose is the same, namely, investigation, investigation and investigation. It is said that "appetite cornes with eating". The same could be said of sorne of our colleagues sitting at the Council table, including the represent;,:tive of Argentina. It is not important that the task of investigation is to be entrusted to the Committee of Experts under the new Argentine resolution. The important fact is that the Committee of Experts is to be entrusted with an investigation and not with any other task. It would make no difference ta the situation if the ~rgentine resolution or any other resolution stipulated that the matter of investigation should be referred to sorne other committee composed, shall we say, of five or seven members. That would make no difference. The important point is that aIl these resolutions provide for the carrying out of an investigation. That is the gist of the matter. ï.'~e USSR delegation can in no case agree to an)' proposaIs of that kind. They constitute attempts to interfere in the internaI affairs of the sovereign State of Czechoslovakia, even though they are wrapped in a thick fog of demagogy and slander. They are none the less attempts to intedere in the internaI afi'airs of Czechoslovakia. 2281st, 288th and 300th meetings. • At this point during the interpretation into English, Mr. Gromyko requested that the interpretation be given more slowly (see page 41). It must however be pointed out once again that we witness the definite line taken by the United States Government with the object of interfering in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia. Until the recent changes in the composition of the Czechoslovak Government, that line was being carried out rather audaciously, and in sorne respects quite openly. 1 have already referred to the statements made by Mr. Steinhard, the United States Ambassador to Czechoslovakia [281st meeti1?'g]. This matter is common knowledge. These attempts at interference continue even now, after the failur~ of the plans of certain United States cides to frustrate the independent policy of the Czechoslovak Government. But everyone knows that this is now being done to save face if anything, because the Czechoslovak people is solving its internal problems as it sees fit. During the discussion ,of the Chîlean resolution, the delegation of the Soviet UnIon availed itself of its right in order to prevent the adoption of decisions which would have constituted an interference in the. internal affairs of Czechoslovakia, and which we were profoundly convinced would have dealt a blow to the prestige and authority of the United Nations. This may not now be evident to everyone, but we are convinced that it will in time become more evident even to those who do not at present realize or are incapable of realizing the situation, including the situation within the Security Council in connexion with the so-called Czechoslovak question. The representative of the United Kingdom says that he is shocked at the use of the "double veto" by the representative of the Soviet Union. 1 can reassure the representative of the United Kingdom. He has no reason to be shocked. The USSR is acting in accordance with its right under the United Nations Charter and the agreement reached by the five Powers at San Francisco. - In his statements the United Kingdom representative distorts the meaning of that agreement and tries to ignore the obligations assumed by the United Kingdom, together with the other great Powers, when it signed the agreement. But now that the Chilean resolution has not been adopted, we are presented with another resolu- What is important is not the form or the phraseology of the resolution but the fundamental aim pursued by certain States in connexion with the discussion of the Czechoslovak question. As 1 have already pointed out, the fundamental aim is to intedere in Czechoslovakia's internal affairs and to bring political and psychological pressure to bear on the Czechoslovak Republic and the Czechoslovak people. But these attempts are doomed to fail. The people of Czechoslovakia have shown that they do not yield to intimidation and blackmail to which certain Govemments resort. People who yield ta intimidation and blackmail may perhaps be found in Italy, but that is not the case in Czechoslovakia. 1 have already pointed out why the United States representative submitted a proposaI at the last meeting [303rd meeting], and even appealed ta the representatives of other States, to obtain the testimony ai aIl sorts of political adventurers and refugees who have left their country, Czechoslovakia, and have found shelter in Western Germany, London; New York and other cities in the United States and the United Kingdom. Here again the object is' to get a further dose of slander towards the USSR. The United States Govemment apparently needs these politicalprostitutes to swell the flood of lies and slander directed against the Soviet Union. Of course these people will afterwards he thtown overboard, as people of that sort always are. But in the meantime eager efforts are being made ta pick them up in political dens in New YQrk, W;:lShington, London and th~ towns 'of Western Germany where United States military authorities ~re in control. The people and Government of the USSR and the people and the Government of Czechoslovakia are convinced that this corresponds not only with the interests of the USSR and of Czechoslovakia, but with the interests of international peace and security, because the USSR and the countries of the new democracy are the consistent champions of the cause of peace and of the strengthening of co-operation among nations. The PRESIDENT (translated trom French): in view of the lateness of the hour, 1 think the illterpretation of Mr. Gromyko's speech should be postponcd to another meeting. We shall proceed with the Palestine question. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated trom Russian): 1 request the interpretation o~ my speech into English. The French interpretation may be omitted, if you have no objection.

1 am afraid even the English interpretation would take tao long. It is imperative that we examine the Palestine question now. Mr. TARÀSENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (translated trom Russian): 1 disagree with such a procedure of not interpreting a speech made in Russian into one of the working languages. 1 must insist on fuï interpretation being given into English, and we can then turn to the Palestine question. 1 am also in favour of considering thePalestine question. As a matter of fact, 1 spoke about that today. But in the present case, such a procedure as interrupting a speech is unacceptable. The PRESIDENT (translated trom French): It is true that the procedure uphe1d by the Ukrainian representative is in fact the most usual. What we have to decide is whether we should use it tonight. Another solution would be to have English and French translations prepared and distributed to members of the Council tomorrQw morning. 1 think that would be the most expedient solution; may 1 ask the reprcsentative of the Soviet Union whether he agrees •'?

I have made anothet' suggestion to the representative of the Soviet Union, on which he has . not yet cornmented. My proposal was to have both translations circulated tomorrow morning. Ml'. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated [rom Russian): Ml'. President, 1 do not agree with your suggestion. My reply was quite clear. If you insist on your suggestion, 1 shall request that the Security Council decide by a vote that my speech should not be interpreted into English. Only in that case will there be no interpretation.

Before taking a decision on this point, 1 should like to ask the Syrian representative what stage has been reached in the translation of the document in Arabie. Ml'. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated [rom Russian): 1 object to such a procedure. I have made a proposaI that my speech should be interpreted into English. The proposal is quite clear. The President cannot decide as he pleases; if the President insists on his proposal that there should be no English interpretation of my speech, then 1 must ask the Security Council either ta confirm the .decision of the President, in which case I· would have no alternative but to bow ta the decision of the Council, or eIse to reject the President's decision.

I call upon the representative of ... Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated [rom Russian): 1 request that my speech be interpreted. You are infringing the rules of procedure.

I had understood the representative of the Soviet Union perfectIy, but beforc deciding one way or. another, 1 wished ta find out how lorlg we should have to, wait for the translation of the Arabie text, because my decision might depend on that. That was why I put that question to the Syrian representative, and 1 would like him to answer it now. Mr. EL1.KHOURI (Syria): 1 think there will be time to hear the interpretation into English of the speech of the USSR representative be": cause·the translation is finished, and it is now rea,dy to be typed. Typing has just started, and 1 think it will take less than haU an hour. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): 1 request that the interpretation should be given more slowly; it would be difficult ta understand otherwise.

The interpretation into French will be given at sorne later meeting. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) (translated fram Spanish): 1 think the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has mistaken our intentions. He has now associated me, in a lengthy diatribe, with Great Britain and the United States, whereas on this matter 1 am much closer ta the USSR t1}an ta those two countries. .Today 1 will oruy draw. attention ta that point, but on sorne other occasion 1 shall reply ta the speech of the representative of the Soviet Union. 1 should also like ta comment on the proverb quoted: "Appetite cornes with eating" (in French: (Cl'appétit vient en mangeant"). There is not the slightest doubt that on this subject the representative of the Soviet Union could give lessons ta the oiP-er fifty-seven Members of the United Nations. Estonia, Latvia, Lithua:nia, Bessarabia, etc., aIl bear witness ta the fact that the USSR knows a great deal about it and that appetite really does come with eating ...

Contrary to what 1 have said before, we shall now have a French interpretation of the speech of the representative of the Soviet Union, as everything is not yet ready for discussion of the Palestine question. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Sotialist Republics) (translated from Russian): If Ml'. Parodi is in a hurry, 1 am prepared ta forego the Frençh interpretation.

We shall now adjoum the discussion on the Czechoslovak question and resume the discussion on the Palestine question. 85. Contimmtion of the discussion on the Palestine question You have before YOll a cablegram dated 24 May 1948 from the Chairman of the Security Council Truce Commission [document 8/785J. 1 shall read it as 1 think it is important: "Jerusalem, 24 May 1948 at 6 p.m. GMT, that is to say two hours after the ltXPiry of the time limit given to both contestants for ceasing firè . . ." (that was the'first time limit, which was later extended) ". . . we note a definite slQwing down in the firing but not a complete stoppage. Bursts of machine gun fire are heard from time to time; the last mortar fire took place two hours ago. In view of the factthat a certain calm usually occurs at this hour-pos- sibly however less pronounced than today-we shall not be able to' inform the Council until tomorrow morning. We do not know what is happ~g in the rest of the country. "AIready yesterday evening the Jewish Agency informed us that it agreed to give the cease-fire order; the content of this message was confirmed to us this afternoon by telegrams from Tel Aviv issued after a meeting of the Provisional Govern- ment of the State of Israel. "8igned: Jean NIEUWENHUYS, Chairman t?"f the 8ecurity Council Truce Commission zn Palestine. "NEUVILLE" A second cablegram from the Truce Commis- sion, dated 25 May [document 8/793J, reads as follows: "The slackening of the firing reported in my telegram of 24 May was succeeded at midnight by a violent attack on the Jewish quarter of the üld City. In addition, the Jewish Agency re- ported at about 12.30 a severe bombardment of Rama-Rachel and Notre-Dame-de-France, heavy firing from automatic weapons on the University from the direction\of Augusta-Victori at the same time, and the landing of about ten mortar shells on Civat-Shaul at approximately 10.30. The Jewish Agency protested against these acts and added that it would be difficult to pre- vent the Jewish forces from taking reprisaIs. This morning the radio announced the Security Coun- cil's. decision to grant the Arabs a 48-hour ex- tension of the time-limit previously fixed. With regard to the remainder of Palestine, it is very difficult for us to give you any information as the irregularity of the e1ectric services makes radio reception very eITatic." This was the information 1 had on the pres- ent situation. As regards the cablegrams" sent by us, 1 despatched one on Saturday, if 1 remember weIl, asking the various parties to help the Truce Commission more than they had done so far and, first of all, to appoint liaison agents with the Commission. The only reply 1 have received was from the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It reads: "In reply to Y0uf cable of the 22nd instant, we have appointed Ahmed Farag Tayeh, Egyp- tian Consul-General in Jerusalem, as liaison officer with the Truce Commission.'" 1 wish to thank the Egyptian representative and to urge the other representatives here to see that liaison officers are appointed as saon as possible. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): Is it intended that each of the Arab States should be represented, or could one person represent them aIl? If it is necessary, 1 think the Syrian Government would be ready to designate the Syrian Consul-General in Jerusalem as liaison officer for the Truce Commission.

1 think that one liaison officer could act on behaU of several States. You should examine with the Truce Commission, on the spot, what arrangements you want to make. If it is agreed that the Egyptian representative is qualified to serve as an Arab liaison officer, ahd if the liaison is carried out, 1 think the Commission would be satisfied. As regards the appeal sent out by the S~­ curity Council, we have received two telegrams from the Jewish Agency. They are now before you-documents S/788 and S/789. The first te1egram protested against the extension of the time limi: and said that ~lte Jewish Agency would have to reconsider its agreement. The second telegram [document 8/789] reads: "In my previous letter 1 had the honor to convey a telegrâm from Mr. Moshe Shertok, Foreign Minister in the Provisional Govemment of Israel, in which he intimated that the Provisional Govemment would 'in due course inform the Security Cound I)f its decision' with respect to a cease fire orde" to be revised in the .·light of the forty-eight hour exten~~on granted "1 have now received a cablegra..m from Ml'. Shertok in which he conveys the decision of the Provisional Government of Israel in the followmg terms: "'By new decision the Provisional Government's order for a cease fire on aIl fronts topight twenty hours Israel summer time (1 p.m. New York time) has been reÏS8li.ed to aIl commanders to be carried out if other side acts likewise. Please communicate Security Council.' "Signed: Aubrey S. EBAN" 1 shall now calI on the representative of Egypt to give us the Arab reply. . Mahmoud Bey FAWZI (Egypt): The Egyptian Government has taken note of the decision of the Security Council of 22 May 1948 [document S/773], inviting '1 Governme:qts and all authorities, without prejudice to the rights, daims or positions of the parties concerned, to abstain from all hostile military operations in Palestine. In this connexion 1 would like, on béhili of His Excellency th~ Uinister of Foreign AfIair.. of Egypt, to state the following: The Egyptian Government greets the initiativeof the Secuzity Council in proposing a ceasefire. in Palestine. The Egyptian Government has, from the very beginning of the United Nations' existence, suppùrted its principles and its purposes and is as desirous as any other Government in the world to see those purposes realized. Nothing can be more gratifying to Egypt than the restoration of peace throughoutPalestine and to see its inhabitar~ts, Arabs and Jews alike, ,live side by side in complete harmony and understanding. The favourable reception given to the Security Council's initiative presupposes, am6ng other thiP,';S, that no measures will be taken by the Security Council, or by any Member of the Uni~ed Nations, wmch would foreclose a solution of the Palestine situation in accordance with the wishes of an overwhelming majority of the people ~f Palestine. TheEgyptian forces. have entered Palestine only ta put an end to the massacres perpetrated there against the 1\.rabs (who forro the majority of the population) as weIl as against humanity, and to restoie security and order in that countr;r, as repeatedly declared by the Egyptian - crimeS Government. Egypt would not, merefore, have hesitated Lor a··single moment· in accepting the invitation of the Security Council to cease-fire in Palestine, shol1ld this invitation, have realized thelofty and noble 'aim& ouilined above. But this invitatioll, 1 regret to say, will, under the present circumstances, fulfil none of those aims. The cease-fire to which the Arab States are invited by the Security Council will enable these bands to receive military equipment from abroad, a fact which would lead to further spreading of havoc and fomenting of fresh uurest and trouble. The Egyptian Government is not speaking at· random. Ships laden with ammunitian and arms have of late been observed discharging their cargo in Palestinian ports under Zionist influence or control. Other similar ships are on their way ta these ports. The cease-fire to which the Security Council invites the Arab States will not destroy the fortifications and strŒlgly armed pillboxes which the Zionists have built around their settlements scattered throughout Palestine, and which they have used, and are still using~ as a springboard to sweep down upon the neighbouring Arab viTI.':1j..;s and their peaceful inhabitants. The cease-fire in Palestine would not allow the Arab armies now present thère to feel secure and safe from Zionist treachery, should the Zionists decide to come back to this measure, once having completed their preparations, with all the reinforcements of men and equipment which they would receive duiing that period by way of immigration and smuggling of weapons. It is cIear that Arab armies in Palestine are not fighting against regular armies such as their own, but against terronst bands whose word or promises cannot possibly be trusted or relied upon. This is evidenced by their recent attitude in connexion with the Jerusalem truce. The cease-fire in the form recommended by the Security Council, following the proclamation of the alleged State of Israel, on 15 May 1948, will onIy prejudice the situation of Palestine as a political entity, and will jeopardize the position of the Arabs' who have repeatedly announced that the only equitable solution to the problem of Palestine is the creation of a united Palestinian State. This attitude has been supported by all the Arab States and has been fully maintaiucd by them. .It would be seen clearly from what 1 have saId that the cease-fire to which the Arab States are being invite-:! by the Security Council, will, underéhe present circumstances, only give advant:Jge to those terrorist bands. It will result in grave consequences for Palestinian Arabs who have been forced to resort to arms in order to repulse Zionist aggression agains~. them. The Egyptian Government regrets that it cannot abide by a recommendation of the Security Council to cease-fire in Palestine which does not take into account these equitable and reasonable factors. Without such considerations, any cease-fire recommendation would bring no more than a temporary respite which would oruy give rise to greater strife and urnest, and enge.tl.der fiercer and more bitter terrorisni. The Egyptian Government and, 1 think, the other Arab States, would readily welcome a cease-fire which would pave the way for an equitable solution of the situation in Palestine. If the Security Comlcil were to prohibit the importation of arms by Zionist terrorists into Palestine, the influx of reinf9rcements from abroad and the support of Zionist terrorists from other countries, the Egyptian Govemment would be oruy too willing ta consider the Security Council's cali for a eease-fire. We merely request that the Seeurity Council should not prejudice a solution of the Palestine question in accordance with the wishes of the vast majority of the inhabitants. This is aIl 1 wish to sayat present, especially as 1 understand that the representative of Iraq might ask permission to speak, in order to make a statement on a communication just received from the Arab League. . Ml'. AL-AsIL (Iraq): 1 have two documents from the Secretary-General of the Arab League which 1 have thehonour to submit to the Security Council. The first deals with contact with the Truce Commission, on the subject of which 1 understand you have communicated with the Secretary-General of the Arab League. This is· the reply: "Considering that a liaison group lJ.as been appointed on the part of the Arabs ta work with the Trùce Commission in Jerusalem, that Commission had previously requested contact with representatives of the Arab States on 2 May and that this request had been granted and the. above-mentioned liaison gro·up was accordingly appointed. "On 5 May this [.-")up m':t with the Truce Commission and discu&seè, the qnes~i('r~ of truce for· Jerusalem. The outcon.e of this meeting was ! "The Arab League, meeting in Jericho a short time ago, appointed a permanent liaison committee to maintain contact with the Truce Commis8Ïon. This ComIDittee is npw prepared to resume contact with the Truce Commission at any time and therefore contacts and discussions conc~rning the resolution of the Security Council of 23 May ought to be undertaken directly between the two groups, in Jerusalem." l have the honour to submit to. the Security Council the reply of the Arab League to the cease-fire resoluiÎon of the Security Council, as communicated by the Secretary-General of the League on behalf of all the Arab States. "On 17 April, the Security Council passed a resolution concerning a truce in Palestine which was .aecepted by the 'representative of Syria on the Security Council and later by all the Arab States. Since that date the Zionists have done their best to evade the implications of that resolution by crating a fait accompli which changed the situation radically to the detriment of the Arab population of Palestine. In accordance with that policy, the Zionists attacked the unarmed Arab civilian population by taking advantage of the ]ast days of the Mandate. They domi-. nated the Arab towns which they could take by force, whether '~hey were totally or partIy Arab in population, such as Jaffa, Haifa, Tiberias, Safad, and Acre. Massacres of unparalled savagery followed i.e. the massacre of Deir .Yasin, and the massacre of Na.siriddin, near Tiberias. Moreover, one quarter of a million of the Arab civilian population left their homes and took refuge in the neighbouring Ar1.o States. . "Upon the termination of,the Mandate, the Zionists attacked Jerusalem, ignoring the ceasefire order previously agreed upon by both sides, as weIl as the truce agreement presented by the Mandatory Power with the concurrence of the Truce Commission and the Arabs themselves, on .12 May. On 14 May the Zionistsproclaimed thelr State in disregar~ of the Security Council's "Now, after the Jews have taken the utmost advantage in charging the political and military status before 15 May, in utter disregard of the Security ·Council's resolution of 17 April, the Arab States are being asked to stop their measures aimed at protecting themselves and restoring peace and order. AlI the Arab peoples are anxious to see peace restored to Palestine and there is nothing they would like better than to abide by the requests of the Security Council. There is, however, one fundamental consideration namely, that the Arabs are dealing with terrorist gangs who do not abide by any standards. Had it not been for that, and had the Arabs not been convinced that a cease-fire, now, would lead to other attacks and military advantages on the part of the Zionists, the position of.the Arabs would have been different. "The important questions to be asked in this respect are these: Is the cease-fire likely to put a stop to the flow of Jewish immigrants into Palest;ne to fight the Arabs, as weIl as the importation of arms? Is the cease-fire likely to stop the terrorists undertaking acts of violence and guarantee the safety of the Arab civilian population? • "The Arab armies themselves are not convinced that at al1Y moment the Jewish forces would not suddenly break a truce without provocation and attack them. What guarantee is there? For it must no\: be forgotten that the Arab forces are not fighting a regular army, but terrorist gangs trained ID certain parts of Europe and other regions under the expert hands of forces which, for a long time, have inflicted upon the world the worst of evils. It is surprising that the regular Arab armies are being treated on an equal footing with terrorist bands of a minority intending to impose their will on the majority by force. "In conclusion, 1 am directed to state,in the name of aIl the Arab States that thJse States, being anxious to restore peace to Palestine and willing to co-operate with the Security Coul1cil for such an endeavour, are'of the opinion that the resolution of the Council of April 17 should he o1:>served, in order that the cease-fire should notbe a lull ta prepare for more bitter fighting. Thé cease-fire, at present, does not guarantee, either to the Arabs of Palestme or to the neighb9uring Arab States, the safety they are seeking. Mr. EBAN (Jewish Agency): The answers received from the representatives of the Arab States seem to us more significa;nt for what th~y omit than for what they contam. They contam a remarkable array of mis-statements, of which the most remarkable is the invention of an alleged truce, allegedly broken by the Jews on 14 May. But they o:nit any sign of willingness to stop making war. T~ey merely define the po~itical objectives for WhlCh those States are making war, and those objectives are defined in terms of the solution rejected by the General Assembly" alld they now involve the surrender by the St;te of Israel of the very purposes for which it has arisen, culminating, indeed, in a demand for the surrender of its integrity and independence. It seems to us that the resolution passed by the Security Council [do'cument 8/773J has had a salutory effect in defining the exact merits of this problem. AlI ambiguity now falls away. Both sides are asked, "Will you unconditionally stop fighting, both in Jerusalem and in other parts of the territory of Palestine?" The State of Israel answers, "Yes." This is the fifth offer of an unconditional cease-fire, from the Jewish side, before, during and after the establishment of the Jewish State. The Arab States answer, "No." This is a fiat and defiant rejection of the cease-fire resolution, and its substitution by an irrelevant proposaI for satisfying certain Arab ambitions at the expense of the State of Israel. The lesson of the two telegrams appears to ~ to be clear. If the Arab States want peace wlth the State of Israel, then they can have it. If they want war, they can have that too. But t?e Arab States mmunderstand their own positlon .most profoundly if they imagine that, having failed to defeat Israel in war, they can persuade it to commit suicide for the sake of peace. It is sufficient for aIiy peace-Ioving State, r~presented around this table, to envisage what hlS reply would be if,'invaded by aggressors from every side, it were asked to surrender its sover~ignty or its interests to those aggressors; that 18 exactly what the State of Israel will now undoubtedly reply. -- The forty-eight hours respite, so lenïently granted by the Security Council, was not used exclusively for purposes of consultation. It was used for the further prosecution by the Egyptian forces and the forces of. the Arab Legion, of a violent attack around and upon the Old and the New City of Jerusalem. That HolyCity for which the United Nations accepted a direct and intimate responsibility is now threatened with destruction, and the situation is so chaotic that the emissaries of mediation dispatched by organs of the United Nations may hardly find a means of entry or of orderly work there. The State of Israel does not shrink from its own defence, and now that its offer of cease-fire has been rejected, it sees its dutYshining c1early before it. But it did yield Jerusalem to the international community, upon which now devolves the responsibility for protecting that City. However, until the United Nations takes control of Jerusalem, the Jewish citizens of that City will see to it that no rights in Jerusalem are acknowledged for King Abdullah. History never forgets anything which happens to Jerusalem, and it will have an unenviable place in its gaUery for this modem destroyer of Jerusalem's buildings and shrines, and for aU who are associated with him in any way in that sacrilegious adventure. We cannot forbear to ask ourselves again whether the United Nations, ev.~n at this late hour, will not take cognizance of the effects on its own authority and prestige if within the next forty-eight hours, or thereafter, the Arab Legion manages to complete the devastation which it hoped to achieve in the last forty-eight hours. The Provisional Govemment of Israel has twice within the past four days demonstrated in the most solemn and formal way its wil1Î:ngness to pass immediately ~d without condition from war topeace. There has been no response. The opportunity has been wilfullly cast away, and we have ÏP..stead a proposai to continue the war and todiscuss Arab terms for surrender. As regards 'those terms~ and with respect to immigration, immigration mto Israel is no business of Egypt, or Iraq, or the Arab League, and .can form no pa···· of any discussions with them, just as Israel cla1-m no right to influence the

The Couneil has heard two statements, one of which was satisfactory and the other l~ so, and which confront the Council with a serious situation. 1 should like to consult you on the method of work. After hearing these statements, my view would be that we should adjourn the meeting. 1 think it would be wise for us to think matters over. 1 intend to adjoum the meeting until tomorrow, either morning or afternoon. 1 thought of proposing adjournment until tomorrow morning, but then 1 feel that the morning could be userl by de1egations for various conversations and for receiving instructions from their Governments. In view of the urgency and seriousness of the situation, however, 1 cannat take it upon myself to adjourn the meeting till . later than 10.30 a.m. tomorrow, and 1 should like tA have the Couneil's views on this point. Ml'. AUSTIN (United Statesof America): 1 favour· the idea of taking a recess until the aftemoon. This situation is sa serious that 1 cel'- !ainly would not feél at liberty to take a position lU this situation without careful consideration of !he situation by my Government and receiving Its advice. It is possible that others may feel the s~e way. 1 do not think thll,t we can proceed tomght. It would take tomorrow morning to explore the situation and its possibilities. Therefore, 1 favour recessing until tomorrow afternoon. M.r, GROMYKO· (Union of Soviet Soeialist Repubhcs) (translated trom Rus.fÏan) : 1 think that t?e Security Council should examine this situation tomorrow. 1 would rather we met in the The only point to which 1 would cali the attention of the various delegations here is that when they consider this matter and think it over, they should take iuto consideration the diffcrence between the two sides in this matter. The Jews would not have anything to lose if the cease-fire and peace prevailed just now because that is their abject. It is like the case between a demandeur and a defendeur. The Arabs have everything to lose. They cannat agree ta the cea5e-fire and peace because they have nothing in hand, while the others have ail their trophies and robberies in their hands. They would prefer to have peace, as it would.be in their interest to have peace. Therefore, do not judge both sides with the same yard-stick! One side has its excuses and the other has aIso its pretensions. If you take.that into consideration, you will not find that one reply is very satsifactory while the other reply is less satisfactory. The PRESID~NT (translated. from French): Weshall meet tomorro~ at 2.30 p.m. and not at 3 p.m. Mr. LOPEZ (Colombia): Beforè we adjourn, 1 should like to know if it would be pertinent to ask what the position of the United Kingdom Government is with respect to its treaty obligations with sorne of the Arab countries vïs-à-vis tb~ éease..fire order. In other words, 1 should lik..: ta know whether those treaty obligations commit the United Kingdom Government to help the Arab Governments even if they do not faIl in line with the cease-fire order. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : 1 am afraid that 1 cannot at the moment answer the question which the representative of Colombia' has put to me. Similar questions are being addressed to the Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs in the British Parliament. We , are not quite sure whether he has answered them yet, or whether he will tomorrow. But tomorrow, at the latest, 1 shquld be prepared to make a statement. The meetïng rose at 7.12 p.m.