S/PV.306 Security Council

1 have only one document to communicate to the Security Council this afternoon. It is a letter signed by t~e representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, and is addressed to the President of the Security Council. It reads as follows: "1 have the honour to refer to the 'cablegram w~ch was sent on your behalf on 22 May conveymg the request of the Security Council. that "1 duly transmitted this cablegram to Ml'. Shertok, Foreign Minister in the Provisional GOvernment of Israel, from whom 1 have now received a reply. It is clear from this reply that a certain misunderstanding may have arisen which we are happily able to dispel. "The following are the main extracts of Ml'. Shertok:s cablegram: " 'The Jewish Agency maintained throughout the closest liaison with the Commission despite the personal perils involved. For example, on 15 May, at $e behest of the Truce Commission, }iII"ajor Vivian Herzog, the Jewish liaison officer, l'aited for twenty-four hours at the French Consulate, which was the Commission's headquarters, for the Arab liaison officer, with a view to discussing a cease-fire in Jerusalem. The Arab representative failed to present himsèlf. On that .occasion, the Consulate was heavily shelled by the Arabs, and three members of Major Herzog's party, including bis driver, were wounded. At the end of the fruitless watch, Ml'. Herzog had to crawl to safety. In these circumstances, 1 must respectfully suggest that any reproach against us in this matter would be undeserved. " 'Major Herzog has now been detailed for urgent military duties, but Dr. Leo Kohn and Ml'. Walter Eytan are now maintaining constant liaison with the Truce Commission regarding Jerusalem. Jerusalem, however, ceased to pe the country's capital on 15 May and is physically isolated by Arab bombardment 'from aU sides. The Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road is under our military control, but as it is continually attacked by Arabs,. it is used only by military personnel for operational purposes. " 'The seat of the Provisional Governttlent of Israel is nü~'Y' in Tel Aviv where the governmental authorities will be happy ta maintain liaison with the Truce Commission or with any other organ of the United Nations.' "1 should be grateful if these assurances were brought to the attention of the Security Council. (Signed) "Aubrey S. EBAN, CCActing Representative, Provisional Government of Israel." 1 would add that a short report received from the. French Consul in Jerusalem says that the Arabs are still shelling the new city and attacking the Jewish quarter in the Old City. In other parts of Jerusalem, positions seem to be unchanged. Mr. AL-AsIL (Iraq): In my opmlOn the statement which l presented is quite clear, unless possibly the last paragraph may require a ward or two of explanation. With the permission of the President, l shall read it: . lire. '''In conclusion, l am directed to state in the name of all the Arab States that those States, being anxious ta restore peace to Palestine and willing to co-operate with the Security Council for such an endeavour, are of the opinion that the resolution of the Council of April 17 should be observed in order that the cèase-fire should not be a lull working for more bitter fighting. The cease-fire at the present does not guarantee either to the Arabs of Palestine or to the neighbouring Arab States the.safety they are seeking. And yet, being anxious to realize the purpose of the efforts of the Security Council, namely, the arrival at a just solution and a lasting peace, l am authorized to inform you that the Political Committee of the Arab League is ready ta study within a rime limit of forty-eight hours any suggestion which the Security Council may make to them along the line of a solution of the Palestine problem." [305th meeting] 1 à My understanding of this is that the Political Committee of the Arab League is usually composed of the Foreign Ministers of the Arab States, and l understand that the rime limit of forty-eight hours indicates that the Foreign Ministers would éontinue to sit at Amman. waiting for any suggestions to b~ made by the Security Council. l believe l am not in a position ta add anything eIse, except to say that l think this explanation makes the position quite clear. . explication Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): l shall be glad to comply with the President's request for sorne clarification of the statement made yesterday on behalf of the Arab States_ Before doing so, howe~er, l should like to read to the Security CouncIl a cablegrain which l received yesterday from the Prinle Minister of Egypt, Nokrashy Pasha: "Two Zionists were arrested in the vicinity of microbes th~ Egyptian army encampment at Gaza. On be1:r:g mterrogated they stated that they have ~ecelved orders from Mosche, officer commandmg Dorot settlement, ta throw typhoid and dysen~ery microbes into drinking water usedby Egyptlan troops. They made a written statement to this effect. They stated that they threw the A few days aga 1 received a lett~r which 1 dismissed as nonsense. However, as it has a certain connexion with this cablegram, 1 am going ta quote a few passages from it now. The letter is signed bya Jew named Frank I. Hogan. MI'. Hogan in this letter claims that the predictions of the Bible confirm the statements which he makes. He says: "lt (the Bible) also predicts that the Egyptians shall die from a plague. Why not use modern bacterial warfare and spew from aeroplanes this deadly gernl over Egypt and the surrounding Arab countries and thus dedmate these people before they get started?" In another paragraph, MI'. Hogan says: "It .is also predicted in the Bible that the heathen king oLthe stranger shall be kiUed. This is probably Abdullah Ben-Hashmonea, descendant of the infamous Herod, conqueror of the family of Judas Maccabeas." . This is 210t true; the Bible does not predict any such thing. Here is another statement contained in the letter: "The 'heathen', which means the modern Arabs (Christian or Moslem or both) shall he utterly smashed by the right arm of Judah of Israel, which is the princely name of Jacob, son of Isaac . . . . "lt is also predicted that the Syrians and Egyptians will be taken as 'captives' or slaves. The Bible also predicts the invasion of Palestine through Gaza and through Jericho." 1 believe it would be useful for the Security Council to take note of the teIegram which 1 quoted regarding the bacterial warfare and to obtain sorne information about it. Now 1 should like to give sorne explanations of the statement made yesterday by the representative of Iraq. It may be helpful for the Security Council to know what was intended by certain paragraphs of that statement. In the first place, it can be seen from the statement that the Arabs did not reject the ceasefire order for Palestine. On the contrary, they expressed their readiness to enter into negotiations with regard to a .Just solution of the matter. The Arab States affirmed that they were ready ta cease fire on the basis of the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 17 April 1948 [document 8/723]. They were ready to accept the truce under the conditions set forth by the Security Council. Communications from the Arab States arid from the Arab Higher Com- Inittee were sent to the Security Council by the ln its resolution, the Security Council imposed certain conditions for a truce upon the Arabs and the Jews. The Arabs accepted all of the conditions. One of the most important conditions was that ail political activity should be stopped. That was the rF-ason, as was said yesterday in the statement submitted by the Arab States, why the Arabs refrained, at the termination of the Mandate, from proclaiming ~n Arab State or a Palestinian State in Palestine. The Arabs refrained from takiug that step in conformity with the trtlce r~oïution adopted by the Security Council, but the Jews took that step and proclaimed their State one minute after the termination of the Mandate. As was stated yesterday by the representative of Iraq, on behalf of the Arab States, the Arabs respected the Security Council resolution which stated that they should refrain from any poli~"''Ù aetivity. This condition of the Security Council reso]ution was confirmed by the General Assembly in the resolution adopted on 14 May 1948: Part 1 of this resolution states: «The General Assembly ... Strongly affirms its support of the efforts of the Security Council to secure a truce in Palestine and calls upon ail Governments, organizations and persons to cooperate in making effective such a truce." That is the truce proposed by the Security Couneil, which orders that no political activity should be undertaken. There was also an agreement, and certain articles werè prepared and sponsored by the delegation of the United States, to the effect that no proclamation of aState, either in a part of Palestine or in the whole of Palestine, should be made, and that no demand or request for the recognition of any such State should be accepted. This was submitted to the :\rabs, who accepted it and refrained from takmg any step against it. Why did not the Jews do the same? This is one point ta which 1 would draw the attention. of the Security Council; it was contained in the reply given by the Arab States yesterday. . A third point to whieh 1 would calI attention 1S that the Holy Places in Palestine are not in danger. The Holy Places of Palestine are holy to the Arabs, ta the Jews, ta Moslems and Christians alike, and they care for them more than anybody else in the world. If there is any attack 18~ r;_'2ral Assembly, Supplement No. 2, resolution If the new resolution of the General Assembly in regard to the cease-fire order is meant to imply an unconditional cease-fire, certainly the Arabs could not accept it, but they accept the conditional cease-fire order of the Security Council adopted on 17 April last and they still stick tû that. They request the Security Council to take measures along the Iiues of a conditional cease-fire which, according to their statement, they would be ready to accept. Mr. EBAN (Jewish Agency for Palestine): l am reIuctantly impelled to make a comment on the remarkable pronouncement of the representative of Syria on the matter of well-poisoning. The Egyptian Government and the Syrian Government have now chosen to assoeiate themselves with the most depraved tr~dition of medieval anti-Semitic incitement. The Security Council, we are convinced, will .not wish to become a tribunal for reeitations from the Protoco{s of the Elders of Zion offéred from the words of Di'". Goebbels. We hope that the Security Council will be interested not in this contemptible ineitement, but in the reaIity of bombs and sheJls falling on Jerusalem and Tel Aviv at this moment. In the second part of his remarks, the representative of Syria referred to a truce resolution passed by the Security Council on 17 April. The representative of Syria misquoted that truce resolution of 17 April by suppressing its most essential and operative provision, for no resolution has ever been adopted by the Security Council calling for abstention from political activity. There has been a resolution adopted by . the Security Couneil calling for abstention from political activity untiI such time, and only untiI such time, as the General Assembly had ceased to deliberate the question of the future government of Palestine. It was a fitting conclusion to that unusual utterance that it ended with the statement that the Holy Places are not in danger at a time when bombs and shells are falling thick and fast. about those very places. termine laquelle au dru sur What we have had, therefore, is, first, an anti- Semitic IibeI; sec'lIldly, a misquotation of the Security Council's resolution; and thirclly, a statement that the Holy Places are safe, a statement which, in the light of ~JI our infomIation, surely discredits itself. 1 paroles tisme, cieuse .de et, les comparée d'elle-même. Mr. TARA8ENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (translated from Russian): A rather peeuliar situation has arisen. On 17 May, the United Stgtes representative submitt~d a ret Jlution [docu~;lent 8/749] providing, among other things, for the cessation of military operations within thirty-six hours. This resolution as amended [document 81773] was n::Jt adopted until 22 May [302nd meeting]. It took many days to discuss the resolution and to take a decision caIIing for the cessation of military operations witpJn thirty-six hours. tique avons 17 duit voyait les amendements t.;e nous avant de cessation The thirty-six hours elapsed, and there was no cease-fire. Another time Iimit was set, this time forty-eight hours} and the same thing happened again. Today is 27 May; ten days have passed and the Security Council faces the same situation as it did on 17 May. opérations alors quarante-huit identique. Dix Conseil même What can the Security Council do today? It can onIy note the same situation as it did on 17 May, namely, that an amIed struggle is taking place in Palestine as a result of the unlawful invasion by a number of States of the territory of Palestine, which does not fOmI part of the territory of any of the States whose amIed forces have invaded it. The situation is the same today as it was on 17 May, the onIy difference being that the number of casualties and the amount of destruction are greater toda1 than they were then. . Yie are faced with a very peculiar sitl:ation: l! 18 not the Security Cauncil which dictates a lme of conduct to the States which have unlawfully invaded the territory of another State with rité? qu'il en tions d'Etats le n'appartient vrai seule augmenté, tions. situation sécurité les toire la contraire pénétré ditions adopter. délai t~err amIed forces, nor is it the Security Coune.il which dictates the terms with regard to the tlm.e of !he cease-fire, but it is the invading States whleh nnpose that line of conduct and those terms upon us. First they demanded a time-llmit of forty-eight hours. Yesterday we received another note· asking for another forty-eight hours. Obviously there is agame going on. Concealed behind this striving for delays, which are invariably obtained with success, there are military and political schemes which are using the time factor as a screen in arder ta achieve certain military and political aims. Meanwhile, Arabs and Jews are destroying one another. Every day of the conflict more and more Jews and Arabs are being wiped out. 1 should like ta point out that this reveals the fatal character of the policy of certain circles in a number of Arab States, which are not really defending the national interests of the Arab people but the imperialistic interests of the British Empire, which interests, of course, have nothing in common with those of the peoples of the Near East. The Government of the United Kingdom dec1ares that it can end its participation in the military operations--I stress the word "participation", because the United Kingdom is practical1y taking part in the military operations against the Jewish State-that it can discontinue the supply of money, arms, officers et cetera, ta the Arabs whose armed forces are now invading the territory of Palestine, only if a decision to that effect is adopted by the United Nations. This means, presumably, if there is a decision by the Security Council condemning the action of the Arabs. However, the role of the United Kingdom in the Security Council is not a passiye one; the rep:resentative of the Government of the United Kingdom on the Security Council is no outside observer. On the contrary, he is exceptionally active in trying to prevent the Council from adopting such a resolutiori, and he has ample opportunity to hold up a decision when this question lS ?bout to be settled, or at least ta exercise an influence in further de1aying or even frustrating the solution of this problem. It is diffi~ult ta understand the policy of the Government of the United Kingdom. On one hand, it is doing its utmost ta prevent the Security Council from adopting a decision condemning the operation of the armed forces invading the territory of Palestine, whüe on the other, we are told that if such a decision were adopted,. the United Kingdom would cease ta give its aid to the armed forces of the invaders. It is a strange policy indeed. We hear it stated that we should await the.results of the talks on the Palestine question which are now said to be taking place between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States. But aIl this bas been going on for sorne time. We have no assurance that these talks will saon be crowned with success, let alone with what kind of success. The ouly thing that is certain is that Jcws and A.abs are slaughtering one another at the present tirne. It is quite possible that. attempts are being made to reach a new agreement at the expen3e of the Jewish and Arab peoples. But Janlal Bey HUSSEINI (Arab Higher Committee): For over thirteen centuries, with but short interruptions, the seven Arab States of the Arab League have been connected with Palestine by ties of race, nationality, language and tradition. During these centuries, the present Arab States and Palestine have been comprised within one boundary line, have existed under one Government ancl have had one common interest. During that long period of time, Arab homogeneity shared the same vicissitudes of fortune and broke the same loaf of bread. Travellers came from Egypt through Palestine ta Iraq in the east, and from Syria through Palestine to Yemen in the south, without being hampered by customs houses; and no passport posts obstructed their progress. Palestine and the seven States of the Arab League were indeed bound together by all the ties that go to make one people of one nation. .Thirty years ago, imperialist ambitions intervened to segregate the one country into several territorie< md thus to divide the members of one fanùly nom one another within different fictitious boundaries where there exist no rcal boundaries, and ta make of one nation several nations where there exist no racial, social or physical distinctions. This geographical, ethnie and traditional unity of so many countries, which has outlived several historie reverses, will not and cannot be obliterated by a declaration of political expediency or by any adverse movement of a quarter of a century. Neither logic and common sense nor political expediencies and exigencies can make of a Syrian, a Transjordanian or a Yemenite Arab, when he cornes over to what is known today as Palestine, an intruder, an aggressor, an invader. ~ Iraqior a Lebanese or an ~gyptian in Palestrue is there by right, acquired during sa many centuries of unity in residence, in government, .territoires, But it is mockery itself to claim that Jews, differing in everything but faith, may migrate to Palestine, as by right, from different countdes thousands of miles away. If we accept the Jewish spokesman's verdict of yesterday, that a Russian or a Roumanian or a Pole or a Frenchman of the Jewish faith may migrate by rig-ht from countries thousands of miles away, dnd that Arabs who cross a fictitious bounc1ary after travelling a few miles are invaders and aggressors, then 1 think we shaIl he accepting a verdict which would be more appropriate in a comic opera than in the proceedings of an august and soleron body such as the Security Council. During the last thirty years, immigrant Jews of diverse nationalities were imposed upon the Arabs of Palestine by the force of British arms and have thus built up a rebel'Jous minority that daim, now, a right of cession to establish a Jewish State in our country by force of arms. In that case, we do not see any reason why, under any moral or legal obligation, the Arab indigenous population of Palestine should not stop this strident aggression by force of arms borrowed not from a self-imposed government, but from their brethren in blood, their neighbours in locality, their partners in common interest. As early as 1921, the smallJewish minority of Palestine started to build a Jewish underground fu"1I1Y called Haganah, under the aegis of the British Government, which gave it its implicit blessing. During the last quarter of a century, while Arabs were engaged in their struggle for freedom from British domination, this army was gaining in strength and waxing in size behind British bayonets. Haganah armouries were aIlowed to be established in all Jewish colonies with the knowledge and encouragement of the Mandatory Power. AccidentaI disclosures revealed, on several occasions since that year, that huge quantities of arms and ammunition were being imported for the Haganah force. The Jewish Agency took good care to see that the greater number of Jewish immigrants were young men highly trained in regular military and commando wadare, ready ta enlist in the Haganah underground force. The Jewish educational system in Palestine, which was left in the independent hands of the Jewish Agency, made it obligatory for students of both sexes, before procuring their certificates, to serve one year in military preparation. Jews in Europe and America, under the .eyes of their different Governments, and in many instances, by their encouragement and support, trained young Jews and acquired huge quantities of arms and col- On the other hand, tl:J.e Mandatory Power enforced stringent and drastic measures ta stifle Arab public opinion and ta prevent the Arabs from preparing themselves for any self-defence. The notorious ordinances of collective responsibility and prevention of crimes were extensively applied in Arab villages for the purpose of imposing :fines in the shape of arms and ammunition. Emergency regulations were promulgated, whereby many an Arab was sent ta prison for life or even executed for the possession of a rifle, or even of a bullet. During the last war, while Jews were trained and armed ta the teeth by the Mandatory Power, Arab towns and villages were subjected by it to a house-to-ho~se search for an'ns and ammunitian. The educational system of the Arabs was seized from the beginning and remained until the end in the tightened grip of the Mandatory Power; national expression was dimmed and discouraged, and military training was out of the question. During the last twelve years which have seen the Haganah force brought to its maturity of 70,000 strong, according ta Jewish and British estimates, nearly aIl Arab leaders were kept out of Palestin~ in exile or detained in internment camps and prisons in Palestine. The Arab rank and file were thus left armless, leaderless and cowed down, in the face of a Jewish Agency that was described by the Mandatory Power itse1f as aState within aState, backed by a wellequipped, well-trained army. 1t was under these cond.itions that the Zionist· movement for the first time started clamouring for a Jewish State, a step that was categorically denied by previous Zionist leadeI'S as having ever been a part of the Zionist programme. Confronted with such an obviously dangerous situation, in which the Jewish minority, assisted by world Jewry of many millions of people and backed by an underground army, set itself ta impose its will on the majority, Palestine's one million indigenous Arab population could have no CO'lrse ta take other th2 to seek assistance from their compatriots Of the surrounding Arab territories. It was oruy natural that their brethren in blood, nationality and interest shQuld respond 1:0 their call for assistance against a growing danger that threatened ta enve10p their own territories. As a preliminary step, the United States delegation proposed a truce for P.alestine, pending discussions of the problem. The truce terms, as proposed by the United States delegation, were adopted with little changes, in the Security Council's meeting of 17 April [283rd meeting]. The Arab States and the Arab Higher Committee accepted the truce terms generally. The Jewish Agency rejected them and declared its determination to impose its will of establishing its Jewish State upon the termination of the Mandate, a step that was expressly precluded in the truce terms. The United States, the sponsor of the truce, did not then invoke the provisions of Article 39 of the Charter against States encouraging the Agency to reject the truce. When the Jewish forces later started ousting the indigenous Arab population, under terrible pressure of extermination and massacre, from areas claimed by the Jews, the United States did not consider the application of either Chapter VIol' VII of the Charter aga~t the Jews, as they now propose ta apply them against the Arabs, who have been invited by a majority of the people of Palestine to remove the gross injustice. Without revoking the t~ce resolution of 17 April, the United States Government proceeded subsequently to submit to the second speci~l session of the General Assembly one proposal after another based on the same truce terms, all of which were flatly rejected by the Jewish Agency because they did not support their determination to establish their Jewish State upon the termination of the Mandate. Just as the Assembly was about to vote in favour of the United States proposal of the truce, and for peaceful mediation for the realization of a lasting settlement, the United States Government, with a baffiing suddenness that struck the United States delegates themselves more than everybody eIse, blasted away th.e accepted proposaIs of mediation and truce by their recognition of the Jewish State. • Here, again, there was no invocation of Article 25 of the Charter. The United States poliey was thus reversed and had turned toward th~ application of the most stringent provisions of ùe Charter for the suppression of the Arabs ..in their efforts to defend themselves. Failing to The Zionist organization, having proclaimed its State in Palestine and having occupied nearly all the territory claimed, could want no better proposal for consolidation of its gains and for llly~g the foundations of the State which it has proclaimed. As a matter of fact, the ce<1.Se-fire would be the oruy step it need take in order to get away with alI that it asks fOf; and, on the other hand, what would have been the position of the Arabs in an unconditional cease-fire proposed and sponsored by the very Government which first recognized the Jewish State and is ,now trying to set it on its feet by the granting of big loans for the purchase of arms? They would have allowed a great number of Jewish trained men, who have been waiting to pounce on Pales· tine from different ports of Europe and America, to realize the Jewish dream not oruy in Palestine, but also within areas beyond its boundaries. They would have made it possible for great amounts of arms and arnmunition to be imported through Jewish-controlled ports for the extirpation of the Arabs of Palestine. They would have accepted the present frightful condition of a quarter of a million Arabs, mostly women and children, who have been driven out of their homes which were looted or destroyed by Jewish terrorist gangs. This discrepancy in the position of the two sides under the cease-fire makes it mere nonsense for any Arab to accept it unconditionalIy. ln this proposal of unconditional cease-fire, there is an obviously strident injustice that makes its recommendation, no less than its acceptance, a betrayal of the cause of justice. The Arabs would not betray themselves, and sa they re7 fused to accept it. Or,. position, finally, is defensive and not aggressive. Our demands are lawful and not arbitrary. We are for democracy, which is the rule of the majority. We stand for that, and we are prepared ta die for it. In our determination, however, we will not deny the minority in Palestine its full rights under the 'Charter of the United Nations, under the principles of democracy.

1 do not wish to interrupt the discussion, but before we proceed any further 1 should like to ask the members of the Council to allow me a moment to refer again to the telegram from the Truce Commission which had been distributed as document S/778. In that telegram the Truce Commission ex· pressed its desire' to consider my request for a daily report to us. It informed the Security Council that it would need military advisers, able to co-ordinate and, above all, so far as It would seem essential that these officers should have sorne experience of the Arab world. Three officers should be sufficient for the time being. As to their rank, one lieutenant-colonel and two majors seem to be indicated. In view of the state of public opinion, it would be better to avoid choosing Bdtish officers. Needless to say, the Secretariat is not in a position to supply officers and obviously could do so only with previous consent of the respective Governments of such officers. ln view of the importance of the Truce Commission-our agent on the spot and the only one with which we can achieve anything until the Mediator arrives-being informed and keeping us informed, 1 think that the simplest course would be to meet the request of the Commission on this point. 1 think the quickest way of doing this would be for the Council to instruct me to ask the three countries represented on the Truce ComIllission if each of them could appoint an officer to carry out the task which thtp Truce Commission has in mind. 1 do not know what the reply of my Government will be, and 1 am not quaiified now to enter into any commitment on its behalf. 1 am speaking as the President of the Secudty Council. 1 shall urge my Government: to adopt this solution, however, and if my Belgian and United States colleagues deemed it usêful to intervene in the same way with their own Governments, 1 think that would be the only way of meeting the Commission's request rapidly. 1 submit this question to you. Ml'. AUSTIN (United States of America): The attitude of the United States is the same today as it was on 17 May when it offered a draft resolution [document S/749] which contained a finding by the Secudty Council that there existed a threat ta the peace and a breach of the peace. It is true that the United States went along with the amendment of that resolution which invoked Chapter VI of the Charter. It did this in the hope that it would bring about a cease-fire, because there was inherent ev\~n in the amendment the indispensable prerequisite to any successful attempt at a final solution c.f the political problem, namely, peace. We went along with the amendment invoking Chapter VI, and it failed. Fightingcontinues although ·the time-limit has expired. Not only that, but the effect of the combat by the belligerents is such as to give no hope of willing and voluntary effort towards peace, but on the contrary, 1 make no criticism of the members of the Security Conncil with respect to the United States draft resolution. Who can be right all the time? Who can hope to have the support of his fellows around this table aIl the time? We may have been wrong in our position. We do not think so. We thought that, on the basis of the experience of the General Assembly and of the Security Conncil in their efforts to find a pacifie solution of the problem in Palestine, we had arrived at a place where blood was being shed, where sacred altars were being defiled, and where our responsibility demanded of us that we take other action-action that would bring to bear all the resources of the United Nations toward the re-establishment of peace, and would do so without prejudicing the rights, daims or position of any palty. But this effort, resulting, as it did, in a resolution under Chapter VI, pro~ duced no definite result except the clarification of the real cause of the fighting, the real purpose of the belligerents. As 1 say, 1 make no criticism at all of the decision that was reached. The Ulütt'd. States finally subscribed to it, but the decision failed to produce a cease-fire. Theref~re, the position of the United States at the present moment is that we shall be glad to hear the views of other members of the Security Council as to how the Cauncil should proceed in this situation. We think that not only is it fair to take that position, but also it may perhaps be more effective. If the initiative is now taken by some other member of the Security Council, perhaps the effort will be more successful than it would be if the proposai came from the United States. ln any event, our objective is peace. Our 0!Jjective is the performance of the duty of the United Nations, the primary duty of the Security Council. 1 ask this question: To what avail is it to talk about justice here when we are trying to deaI with the subject of a cease-fire in order to obtain justice? Can justice be done by men surrounded by the smell of brimstone, by letting the blood of women and children flow and by desecrating the aitars sacred to all the world? ln that atmosphere, can peace be negotiated? ln what way does the continuation of this fighting promote the cause of peace? What good can be done by the intrusion into our efforts of the subject of negotiating a political solution? We seek a cessation of hostilities so that the atmosphere may .be fit for the efforts of the Mediatorappointed by the five permanent mem- The continuation of the firing will not promote the good feelings which are so absolutely necessary in order that the opposing parties in a great issue may get together, through a Mediator and through the good offices of the United Nations, cm a peaceful solution. We all knowin advance that a solution of continuing the warfare until one side is complete1y wiped out, will not be a solution at all. 1t is so much against . morality and the conscience of the world that it cannot survive. The solution of the Palestine question does not lie in the direction of the destruction of Jerusalem and of the Holy Places and in the attempt by one side or the other to become the victor in the battlefield. Does anyone suppose that, if the fighting terminated in a stalemate and not in a victory, thebelligerents would be in the proper state of mind for negotiating a political solution? The question needs only to be asked for it ta become obvious that the immediate nùessity is for the parties upon whom the responsibility falls to comply with the recommendation of the Security Council for a cease-fire. Only then, in an atmosphere conducive ta a pacific solution, can the second part of the Security Council resolution of 22 May 1948 [document S/773] be carried out, name1y, the negotiation of a pacifie settlemem. ' The vital thing now is ta stop the slaughter, and ta stop the demolition of the temples, the synagogues, the shrines and the altars of Jerusalem. The United States delegation, therefore, hopes. that other members of the Security Council are now ready tO come forward with a suggestion fitting the occasion. The PRESIDENT (translated trom French): 1 have no more speakers on my list for the time . being. However, 1 should like to ask the CouDcil ta take a decision on the question of officers which 1 raised a few minutes aga. If there is no objection; 1 propose to forward that suggestion ta the Governments of Belgium, France and the United States. Unlessthere is sorne objection, it will be sa done. '

Speaking immediately before the United States representative, 1 had recalled that a telegram from the Truce Commission had asked for three officers to be attached to the Commission to enable it to check reports, and so to keep us informed day by day as to the military situation in Jerusalem. 1 had pointed out that the simplest and quickest solution would be for each of the three countries represented on the Truce Commission to detail an officer for duty with the Commission. That was the proposal 1 made. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated trom Russian): The attitude of the USSR delegation with regard to the Truce Commission is weIl, known. We never placed great hopes on that Commission. Experience has shown that the Commission has failed to cope with its task, since it has been unable to take anY practical steps to implement the Security Council's repeated resolutions calling for the cessation of hostilities in Palestine. Since the majority of the Security Council deemed it necessary to create the Commission, which has now become a mere shadow, the question whether it is considered that the Commission should continue to exist and deal with some matter or another, is one for that majority to decide. 1 wish, however, to draw the attention of the Security Council to the need for' a definite decision in connexion with the present situation in Palestine. If, after receiving the latest reports on the events in Palestine, the Security Council fails not only to adopt a decision but even to consider any proposaIs designed to remedy the situation in Palestine, who could sanction such a position? The USSR de1egation thinks that public opinion would find it difficult to understand such a deve1opment. We think that the situation in Palestine must not be allowed to continue, and that it is rime the Security Cauncil took definite steps to terminate militaryoperations in Palestine and to restore peace and security. With that purpose in mind, the USSR delegations deems it necessary to submit to the Security Council's attention the foJl0wing draft resolution [document S/794/ Rev.l] : "Considering that the Security Council's reso· lution of 22 May [document S/773] on the cessation of military operations in Palestine has not yet been complied with, . uConsidering that.military operations in Palestine are increasing in intensity and that the number of casualties is growing; and "Orders the Governments of the States in- volved in 1:he present conflict in Palestine to secure t.qe cessation of military operations within thirty-six hours after the adoption by the Security Council of this resolution." 1 should like to asIr the Security Council to consider fuis proposal. The USSR delegation is of the opinion that, if ~dopted, it might help greatly to normalize the situation in Palestine. Mahmoud Bey FAWZI (Egypt): During the last few hours, especially, 1 have heard the Arabs called all sorts of things. This has been done, fortunately, îlot by aIl; fortunately, it has not been done by most; fortunately, not by many; but it has been done by sorne who are sitting at this table. The provocation for me to speak at great length in answer to what we might calI accusations and invective, is rather great, but the hour is late enough, and perhaps 1 am tired enough to consider it advisable not to yield to such temptation or to such provocation. At the same time, and while admitting that human memory is not always reliable, it strikes me that sorne people could not .-emember-I do not wish to say that they did not want to re- member-some very clear things that we have said yesterday and today. 1 do not want to weary the Council by reading. once more the statement 1 had the privilege of making before it yesterday [30Sth meeting]. However, 1 feel impelled to repeat part of that statement. On behalf of my Government, 1 said as follows: . "The Egyptian Government has taken note of the decision of the Security Council of 22 May • 1948, inviting all Governments and aIl authori- ties-without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties concemed-to abstain from aIl hostile military operations in Palestine." 1 then added the following: "The Egyptian Government and, 1 think, the other Arab States, would readily we1come a cease-fire which would pave the way for an equitable solution of the situation in Palestine. If the Security Council were to prohibit the im- portation of anns by Zionist terrorists into Pales- tine, the influx of reinforcements from abroad and the support of Zionist terrorists from other countries, the Egyptian Government would be only too willing to consider the Security Coun- cil's calI for a cease-fire." Our stand-and, if 1 am not mistaken, the stand of the Security Council-was for avoid- ing anything which would jeopardize anyone's rights or daims in connexion with Palestine. Curiously enough, sorne representatives spoke here as if the position were ql,lite the contrary. 1 am now looking at the resolution adopted by the Security Council. on 17 April 1948, document S/723, and 1 am struck by the darity .of its terms .and the way in which those terms have heen ignored by sorne of the speakers, especially today. In that resolution, which 1 consider to be still in effect, mention is made, in the second paragraph of the preamble, of "cessa- tion of acts of violence . . . to establish condi- tions of peace and order in that coùntry". It did not speak of the mere cessation of acts of violence, but it also spoke of "establishing con- ditions of peace and order in that country". Paragraph .1 of this resolution most dearly states ". . . withoUL prejudice to their rights, clairr...s, or positions, and as a contriL'.1tion to the well-beingand permanent interests of Pales- tine ...". In sub-paragraph 1 (b) we note: "Refrain from bringing and from assisting and ericouraging the entry iuto Palestine of armed bands and fighting personnel ...". In sub-paragraph 1 (c) we note: "Refrain from importing or acquiring· or assisting or encouraging the importation or acquisition of weapons and war materials;". In sub-paragraph 1 (d) we note: "Refrain,- pending further consideration of the future government of Palestine"-and Lre- peat: "pending further consideration of the future government of Palestine"-"by the Gen- eral Assembly, from any political activity •..". 1 do not see the word "any" omitted here, and 1 remember in thi" connexion the fondness of the representative of the United States for the word "any". 1 am almost as fond of that word as he is. To continue, sub-paragraph 1 (d) ends with the following wor~s: ':... from any political activity which might prejudice the rights, daims, or positions of .either community;". ln actual fact, this chain of events has not been interrupted, but it has moved forward con- tinuously. Only yesterday 1 \Vas notified by the Secretariat that the Mediator was actually leav- ing, and by my Government that it was happy ta accord all possible facilities ta him and ta his party, incluqmg the plane on which they are travelling. AlI this shows how the resolution' of the Security Council of 17 April still stands. It shows another very important parallel thing when it speaks of the "cessation of acts of violence"; of establishing "conditions of peace and arder in that country"; of refraining "from bringing and from assisting and encouraging"-I repeat, "from assisting and encouraging"-"the entry into Palestine of armed bands and fighting per- sonnel"; and of "aI?-Y political activity which might prejudice the rights, claims or positions of either community". When we remember this-if we want to re- member it, and 1 think we shCl/lld want to--we certainly cannot afford ta ignore the position taken by Egypt and the other Ara,b States when they say that we must not jeopardize the rights, claims or positions of either community, and that the continuance of entry into Palestine of armed bands and fighting personnel ta help the Zionists would definitely jeopardize the posi- tion of the Arabs and their rights. This was true on 17 April; it was true before 17 April and, for a much greater reason, it is true right now. At this moment, the so-called Zionist State, or Zionist Government, or the Government of Israel-'-they can calI it by any name they wish, of course-has, with the help of world Zionism, and having exerted themselves deliberately in arder ta gain a position, in some way and in some manner spread out over a good deal of what they daim to be the territory of the so-called State of Israel. While that spreading out was going on, nothïn,~ was done to ask them ta stop. They carried on, aI.d they killed people, ruined homes, and drave hundreds of thousands of innocent Arabs away from their own lands. 1 shall not continue further on this matter. 1 shall sinlply repeat that our position is one of peace; it has been such in the past, and it is still such at this moment. In my statement yes- terday, 1 we1comed the Security Council's initia- tive for peace, and 1 trust and hope that the Council will want its initiative ta be a fair one and not a jeopardizing initiative. We cannot .afford here to look calmIy upon any action by the Council which would mere1y be an affirma- tion of an act of subversion of the independence of the rightful people of Palestine. 1 should now like to speak· on another point which has been expJoited a great deal, especially yesterday and today. Ta begin with, 1 shaP tell the story of an incident which happened a long time aga. The first Caliph of Islam, who was called Osman, was murdered. In order to obtain the maxim~m amount of support by playing upon people's emetions, his followers cal'lied around his blood-stained shirt. For arguments of that nature, for arguments which do not appeal ta reason, we usually employ the ex- pression "The shirt of Osman." Jerusalem is being used as a "shirt of Osman"" It is a very shameful thing, if 1 may be permitted ta say so, ta use a sacred place like Jerusalem as a pretext for attaining political objectives. Long. ago--or sa, at least, it seems-in the First Committee, during the last session of the General Assembly, Arab representatives repeat- eelly asserted that the Arab side had accepted the truce for Jerusalem. 1 was even impelled to ask for testimony from the Mandatory Power, _ The Jewish spokesman persisted in denying that his side knèw anything about that truce for Jerusalem. But these facts are sa palpable, sa concrete--and now they have become historic- that they can no longer be denied. There was a truce for Jerusalem which was accepted by the Arabs, and supposedly also by the Jews. 1 shall even omit the ward "supposedly"; 1 shall say that it was actually accepted alse by the Jews. What happened ta that truce? Who broke it? Why? The Arabs have always proved themsdves. to he worthy of the trust that the world has placed in thern as people living right next ta the Holy Places in Jerusalem. The Arabs have accom- plished practically the ïmpossible 1..."1 order to avoid any molestation, even any scratching, of thase Holy Places. That is in our own interest. But Zionist terrorism is very determined in- deed, 1 am willing ta admit, and quite reckless- infinitely so-and the Zionists simply broke the truce, Holy Places or no Holy Places. ln arder not ta offer testimony simply from one side, 1 should like ta read a statement that appeared in the Press yesterday and today. ln the House of Commons, it was reported yesterday that Ml'. Bevin was reported to have said two days ago-and this is not an official report which 1 have before me, but if it is not substantiated, 1 am always willing to be cor- rected-: "A cease-fire in Jerusalem was broken by Jewish forces, thus leading to the present fighting there." When debate continued in the House of Commons yesterday, Mr. Bevin said: "One of the difficulties in Jerusalem was the breaking of the truce by a section of the Jewish forces. 1 regret that, and 1 think it would have been preferable if Jerusalem could have been kept out of this." Incidentally, the same paper reports that Mr. Bevin received cheers from the House of Commons with respect ta that state- ment. Nobody objected or argued about this facto 1 trust that none of the members of the Security Council will really be able ta argue about it. 1 wish, therefore, and hope that this cry of "Save Jerusalem from the Arabs" will be trans- lated into its proper language, name1y, "Save it from the Zionists; save it from terrorists." . It is mostly our homes that are being de- molished, our children who are being killed, our lands that Zionism is devastating; and that strife and bloodshed is ruinous. We would be fooIs, indeed, if we did not want peace. We are much more interested in peace than anyone eIse in the world. There is no reason why we should not' want peace. If we are forced to fight, we have ta fight; if we shall be forced to fight, we shaH fight. We are natura! people with natural l'eac- tions, and we are not abnormal people, or sub- normal people. Therefore, when somebody tries ta drive us away from our own home and kilIs our children and women, what eIse can we do but fight back in their defence? This love of peace, that we have and that we have had for sa We are not molesting the Jews in those Arab lands in spite of the very exceptional situation which has existed for quite sorne time. They are still treated quite equally with everyone e1se there. No care at all is spared in order to safe- guard them, ta give them every possible pro- tection, and to allow them ta live as equal, hard-working and free human beings. Our countrles have been practically the greatest haven for world Jewry throughout the ages; our countries have been the kind and wel- coming home and bosom to which Jewry came for haven, for refuge, for help, ~d for con- solation. AIl of the Arab world, not only Pales- tine-the Jews have no special daim on Palestine or on any other Arab land-has opened its lands to them. We opened our hearts to them. I shall not become sentimental here and speak of a thing which we find in dictionaries, called "gratitude". I shall not deal with that. This is neither the time nor the place for it. But I shall say simply that, even if the Jews did not owe the Arab world, including Palestine, any grati- tude at all, that does not give them. the right ta come and invade our lands, nor does it impose upon us the duty to sit supinely by while they do it.' l want to reassure the Securlty Council that our purpose is peacc. We are ready to co-operate practically, without any hesitation, in any effort which the Security Council might possibly make in the direction of re-establishing peace in Pales- tine.. Yesterday, the Security Council heard from the representative of Iraq that the Political Committee of the Arab League, which îs com- posed of the Foreign Ministers of the Arab States and of the representatives of the Pales- tinian Arabs, was ready ta consider, within forty-eight hours, any suggestion that would be offered towards the re-establishment of peace in Palestine without prejudice to anybody's claims or Iights. That offer was made in aU good faith, in aU sinceIity, and it still stands. During countless ages, and up to the present time, our salutation in the Arab werld has been, "Peace unto you." We do not merely have this salutation on the tips of our tangues; we have it deep in our hearts; we practice it in our actual lives as long as others let us live peacefully in oU'r own homes. .

I still have tWo speakers on my list, and 1 propose to caU now on the representative of the The question put to me yesterday by the . representative of Colombia related to the treaty relations between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, on the one hand, and the Governments of Egypt, Iraq and Transjordan, on the other. Among the obligations imposed upon my Government by these Treaties is the supply of military matt.rial to the three Arab States concerned. This obligation is of long standing and, in fact, each of the' three Arab States has equipped its security forces with British material throughout its -existence as an independent State. An interruption of British supplies would consequently have a serious effect on the ability of these States to insure their internal security and their readiness for selfdefence. It will, thercfore, be seen that the responsibility which rests upon my Government to maintam the flow of material constitutes an international obligation of major importance. The Treaties of which 1 am speaking are not intended to limit in any way the sovereign independence of our allies, and do not, in fact, limit that independence. So far as Egypt and Iraq are concerned, this is, 1 think, generally recognized. It is not many months since the Security Council listened to a protracted debate between ~yself and the Egyptian representative which, if it proved nothing eIse, certainly proved that Egypt does not regard itself as a vassal of the United Kingdom. But statements have been made, notably by the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, to the efIect that the foreign policy of King Abdullah of Transjordan is controlled by my Government. 1 entirely repudiate this misconception. Transjordan is a sovereign State. It is not the case, as has been asserted by Mr. Shertok on behalf of the Jewish Agency, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Transjordan Army is appointed by the United 'Kingdom Government, nor that that Anny cannot be employed outside Transjordan without British permission. Those statements are not exact. Finally, let me say, no British officer in any category in taking part in the present military operations in Jerusalem. 1 am instructed to inform the Security Council that the United Kingdom Government is making immediate arrangements to insure that the twenty-one seconded officers shall not serve with the Arab Legion in Palestine. The remaining officers of British nationality are, of course, not subject to any British instructions. 1 am also instructed to inform the Security Council that the next instalment of the subsidy -of which much has been said-which is payable to the Government of Transjordan in accordance with the Treaty, falls due for payment on 12 July, and that this financial obligation will be reviewed before that date in the light of decisions taken by the United Nations. With reference to the supply of military material to the three Governments of Egypt, Iraq and Transjordan, 1 am instructed to state that if the Security Council should decide upon a general embargo which effectively would prevent the supply of arms to Arabs and Jews alike in Palestine, my Government would bewilling to participate in such action by suspending the deliverles which it is at present making to Egypt, Iraq and Transjordan in completion of existing contracts. Subject to the three decisions 1 have just announced, my Government will continue to honour its obligations under these Treaties. Let me point out that these Treaties are drafted in such a way as to insure their conformity with other international obligations. Thus, article 4 of the Treaty with Transjordan reads as follows: "Nothing in the present Treaty is intended to or shall in any way prejudice the rights and obligations which devolve or may devolve upon either of the high cOlJ.tracting parties under the Charter of the United Nations or under any other existing international agreements, convention 'or treaties." There appeared to be an implication in the question addressed to me last night that the reply sent by the Poiitical Committee of the Arab League to the Security Council's resolution of 22 May [document 8/773] created a conflict of the kind envisaged in Article 103, a conflict, that is to say, between the obligations of my Government as a Member of the United Nations and its responsibilities under the Treaties with the three Arab States. The representative of Colombia stated: "In other words, 1 should like to know whether those treaty obligations commit the United Kingdom Government to help the Arab Governments even if they do Qot fall in line with the cease-fire order." [30Sth meeting] If 1 am right in thinking that there was this implication, then 1 feel bound to say that, in my view, the situation is rather more complex. If the Security Council were to engage in an effort to allocate responsibility for the conflict which is now proceeding in Palestine, 1 think it would have to take more factors into account than the immediate response to its latest resolution. There were ear1ier resolutions of the Security Council which aimed at a truce of a political, as well as a military, character. The essential' fact that articles of truce drawn up on the basis of the resolution of 17 April [document 8/723] were under consideration when the Mandate came to an end, and that the basis for a truce of that character was removed by the proclamation of a Jewish State on 14 May, must be borne in mind if we are seekin·,. to understand and assess the Arab reaction to -our later proposaI for an exclusively military cease-fire. My Government, considering that the truce terms which were still under discussion on 14 May were just and reasonable, made every effort to persuade the Arab Governments to accept them. In the changed circumstances of the last few days, my Government has also endeavoured to persuade the Arab Governments to agree to the cease-fire; but, contrary to what sorne representatives seem to believe, my Government's influence with those Governments is not unlimited. My Government is disappointed at the failure of this latest effort of die Security Council, but it could not associate itself with a judgment of the situation based upon the results of that effort alone. The tacit abandonment by the·Security Council of political terms which the Arabs consider just and reasonable, must be A suggestion has been made in the course of our discussion that the Security Council should now concentrate its attention upon the fighting in Jerusalem, and endeavour in the first place to restore peace there. The resolution adopted on 22 May [document 8/773] contains a clause - which 1 had the honour of introducing-ealling upon the parties to give the highest priority to the cessation of fighting in Jerusalem. Therefore, 1 agree entirely that that should perhaps be .one of the first steps that we should take. In this connexion, 1 should like to recapitulate a certain amount of recent history. Before he left Palestine on the termination of the Mandate, the British Hjgh Commissioner did his best to negotiate a truce for Jerusal~!1l. He presented to the Arab and Jewish leaders terrns of truce which 1 think would be generally regarded as reasonable. In general outline they were as follo~IS: 1. Cessation of all hostilities. 2. No arrns or war-like stores to enter Jerusalem. 3. Supplies essential for the civil life of the popt.lation to be brought into the City subject to a check by an impartial body. 4. This neutral control to operate on all the principal roads entering the City. 5. No movemènt of population calculated to increase Arab or Jewish military strength in Jerusalem. 6. Access to the Wailing Wall for the Jewish population. 7. Evacuation by the Jews of an Arab quarter which they had occupied in the new city. These terms were accepted by the Arab League. No reply was given to the High Commissioner by the Jewish authorities, and so far as 1 am aware, they have never yet stated their attitud.e towards these truce proposais for Jerusalem. In addition to the negotiations for a truce, a cease-fire was in fact established in Jerusalem during the last days of the Mandate. According to information which we obtained from the International Red Cross, the responsibility for the breakdown of this cease-fire after the termination of the Mandate rests with the Stern group. No doubt this dissident group is not, or was not at that time, under the full control of the Jewish authorities.But if so, this very tact is an The nature of the difficulties which have hitherto prevented the termination of the fighting in Jerusalem is further illustrated by an incident which has just been brought to my .. notice. 1 am informed that on 21 May, Mr. Azcarate, with the support of the President of the Truce Commission, appealed to King Abdullah to agree that the Arab forces, before launching an attack upon the Hadassah Hospital-which, together with the n~ghbouring Hebrew University, was and still is occupied by Jewish military forces-should permit the evacuation by the Red Cross of the medical staff and of the twenty-seven remaining patients. The King agreed to this proposai, and also stated that if the Jewish forces were withdrawn under the supervision of the Red Cross, he would undertake to safeguard the buildings and their contents. He undertook that the buildings would not be attacked pending consideration of this offer. The officer commanding the Arab Legion consequently ordered a cease-fire on 22 May, which he extended to 23 _May at the tequest of the Truce Commission. The Truce Commission however was unable to obtain any reply from the Jewish authorities. 1 understand that the members of the Truce Commission consider that this incident has injured· their reputation for Îi"ltegrity with the Arab command, and that they have so informed the Secretary-General. . 1 am not attempting, by 15ringing these facts to the attention of the Council, to prove the guilt of one party or the innocence of theother. What 1 am seeking to suggest is that the situation is one of great complexity, and that the Council should ensure that its information is sufficiently comprehensive before it takes further action to deal with this problem in which the feelings of two peoples are so deeply and so sincerely engaged. 1 come now to perhaps the more important, and certainly, 1 think it will be agreed, the more constructive, part of what 1 have to say to the Council. 1 share the disappointment felt by other members of the Security Council that the Arab States have not accepted the cease-fire resolution of 22 May. It appears to me, neverthe1ess, that their reply is couched in conciliatory language and merits careful consideration. The conc1uding passage in the Arab reply constitutes a request to the Security Council to recommend terms of settlement for the dispute. 1 do not think the Council can disregard this request. On the other hand, it is obviously impossible for the Council to put forward proposals within twentyfour or forty-eight hoursat a time when the fighting in Palestine is continuing. Our immediate objective should be to bring the fighting to With these considerations in mind, the United Kingdom Government has instructed me to submit a resolution designed, in the first instance, to initiate a fresh attempt to obtain a cease-fire, but going beyond the resolution of 22 May by incorporating certain additional conditions and undertakings, and leading more directly to the search for a final settlement. My Government recogmzes, ID view of the failure of previous recommendations under Chapter VI, that if the proposaIs which 1 am about to submit do not prove effective, it will be necessary to invoke Chapter VII. ln conclusion, 1 shall read to the Security Council a preliminary draft of the resolution which 1 am instructed to propose [document S/795J. 1 am communicating it to the Secretariat in order that it may be distributed without delay, thus enabling the members of the Security Council to have copies of it before they resume their discussion at our next meeting on this subject. 1 admit that the resolution, as 1 am about to read it, is rather roughly drafted. However, it will be discussed, 1 hope, in any case, and therefore perfection can be brought to it later. It reads as follows: ((Desiring .to bring about a cessation of hos- tilities in Palestine without prejudice ta the rights, claims and position of either Arabs or Jews, ((CaUs upon both parties to order a cessation of all acts of armeë force for a period of fom: weeks; aCaUs upon both parties to undertake that they will not introduce fighting personnel or men of military age into Palestine during the cease- fire; ((Calls upon both parties and upon aIl Governments to refrain from importing war material into Palestine during the cease-fire; "Urges both parties to take every possible pre- caution for the protection of the Holy Places and of the City of Jerusalem; "Instructs the United Nations Mediator for Palestine in concert with the Truce Comrnission to supervise the observance of the above provi- sions, and decides that they shall be provided with a sufficient "number of military observers; CCCalls upon all concemed to give the greatest possible assistance to the United Nations Media- tor; . ccInstructs the United Nations Mediator to make a, weeklyreport to the Security Council during the cease-fire; CCInvites the States members of the Arab League and the Jewish and Arab authorities in Palestine to communicate their acceptance of this resolution to the Security C01.'r1.cil within .........................."-which will be a short period; ccDecides that, if the present resolution is re':' jected by either party or by bath, the present situation in Palestine will be reconsidered with a view to action under Chapter VII of the Charter."

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