S/PV.308 Security Council

The only member of the Council remaining on my list of speakers for this morning is the representative of Argentina. He will be a few minutes late. If no other member of the Council wishes to speak, l shall h~ve to proceed ta the vote. l think it would be preferable, however, ta wait for the Argentinian representative. Mr. ARCE (Argentinu) (translated {rom Spanish): l apologize to the Council for being late; l ~as working on the Kashmir question. l asked ta speak in arder to announce that l have received a long telegram from the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs, addressed ta me in my capacity as President of the General Assembly. This telegram is similar ta, if not idenncal with, the one already distributed; but l felt that in any case l should communicate it to :"e President of the Security Council so that an app!Opriate decision may be taken and that receipt mây be acknowledged to the Egyptian Foreign Minister.

If ho other member wishes to speak, l shall give a brief ouiline of my delegation's attitude towards the first of the resolutions before us. The resolution submitted by the representative qf the USSR [document S/794] is largely a repetition of the United States representative's resolution of a week ago. The motives which led us ta vote in favour of th~t !"t'..8olution are as strong, if not stronger, in the case of the new proposal. The principal factor which determined the French delegation's vote last week was that we did not feel we had the right to ignore a breach of the peace and a threat to the peace, in a case where it was evident that such a breach had alreacly occurred and that the threat of a further and more serious breach existed. The events of the past week have naturally only strengthened that conviction. Instead of the Unite'd States resolution of last week, the Security Council adopted a far less forceful resolution, which was merely an appeal to the two parties, with a time-limit attached to it. This time-limit was later extended by fortyeight hours in circumstances which l, need .not .. AIl the considerations of tell days ago are therefore as valid, indeed more so, in the eyes of my delegation today. That is why, as the representative of France, 1 shall vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by the USSR delegation. l may also have something to sayon the United Kingdom resolution [document 81795] and 1 reserve the right to do so at a later time. Mr. LÔPEZ (Colombia): 1 should like to ask the President how this matter is to be taken up and which of the t.wo proposals is to be considered fut, since 1 notice that they are entirely different. In the previous cas/" the United Kingdom proposai was submitted as an amendment to "the United States draft resolutioJl, but the present texts have been submitted by the USSR and the United Kingdom as separate proposals. . The PRESIDENT (translated trom French): ,As 'the two proposals are, in fact, different, 1 shall put them to the vote in the order in which they were submitted, i.e. first the USSR draft resolution and then the United Kingdom resolution. Mi. LÔPEZ (Colombia): First, 1 should like to ,express my thanks to the representative of the Uwted Kingdom for the explanations he gave at my request, concerning the attitude of his Government in connexion with the Palestine situation. If 1 remember rightly, thf" representative of the United Kingdom was not clear as to the meaning or the intention of some of my remarks. Article 103 of the Charter states: "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under 'the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail." " 1.wanted to have it clearly understood that in our opinion it, did not appear quite proper to support a resolution asking the parties in Palestine to stop military operations-as they have been called upon to d() several times-and, at the same time, give assiStance to one of the parties ta carry on those military operations. It seems ta become all the more clear when we compare the text of the original proposaI concerning the truce in Palestine, which was adopted by the Security CO\illcil on 16 April [283rd meeting], with the ciraft resolution submitted yesterday by the representative of the United Kingdom. For the sake of illustration, 1 wish to call the'attention of .the Security Council to the text of, let us say, paragraphs 1 (b) and (c) of the resolution .' 'adopted 16 April, 'which reads: cc (b) Refrain from bringing and from assisting and encouraging the entry into Palestine of armed bands and fighting personnel, groups and individuals, whatever their origin; " (c) Refrain from importing or acquiring or assisting or encouraging the importation or acquisition of weapo~ and war materials:' That was from the original truce proposal that was adopted by the Security Council. In the new draft proposaI, we read: ccCalIs upon both parties and upon all Govern- .ments to refrain from importing war materials into Palestine during the cease-fire:' Whereas in the first instance the requirement of the Security Council was that all the parties should refrain from either doing, assisting or encouraging that act, it is IlOW restricted to the act of importing war material into Palestine. Now, coming back to the two draft proposals under consideration, 1 ;"'elieve 1 can say from the start that in principle we shall support the draft resolution submitted by the representative of the USSR for very much the same reason that we s~pported the Uniteù States draft proposallast week. In fact, the two CIraft proposals are substantially the same. However, as in the previous case, we shall not do so without suggesting or submitting sorne amendments. 1 should like to point out one thing that has given me great encouragement, and that is the fact that in the present case the United States delegation was prompt to offer its support to the draft resolution of the USSR. That seems to me to be a very significant and important development. And, if 1 am not mistaken, we are justified in believing that this implies that, whatever implementation may be necessary with respect to this proposal, we can reasonably assume that the two Governments intend at least tocooperate. The resolution of 29 November 19473 wàs adopted by the General Assembly with the understanding that it had the support of those two Governments. Not only the members of the General Assembly who voted for that resolution, but also the world at large was entitled to expect that the t\\.J:O Governments would support the resolution to its logical conclusion. That did not turn out to be the case. Sorne of us feel that it is as a result of that fact thatwe are now confronting the present difficulties. However, 1 believe it bodes weIl for the Organization. and for the peac.e of thé world that there is now this be- With regard to the truce and the' provisions under which the Security Council should act, 1 believe it is pertinent to say this, on behalf of the Colombian delegation: Assuming that the United Kingdom proposal were adopted, there would be a fundamental change in the positions that the two parties have adopted vis-a-vis the truce propÇ>sals. The Jewish Agency has repeatedly said that it would accept the truceproposals unconditionaIly, whereas the Arab States have laid down certain reservations to an acceptance of the truce proposaIs. The positions of the two parties could be reversed; but, in my opinion, the situation from the point of View Of the Security Council would remain fundamentally the same. It is not so much a question of whether or not the two parties want to accept the truce. 1believe that in principle both parties would like to agree to a truce. But they want to know what will happen after they accept the truce, how they are going to move out of the present situation into the position in which they will find themselves after the cease-fire order is given. That is very much the position taken, very intelligently, by the repre~entativeof Canada with regard to the attitude of the permanent members of the Security Council. 1 am wholeheartedly in agreement with what the representative of Canada said in that respect. It seems to me that if the Security Council is going to move into Chapter "il - as 1 believe it will have to do if it does not succeed in stopping the fighting - it would be advisable for the perma- . nent members of the Security Council to consult with one another, in accordance with the provisions of Article 106 of the Charter, so that we may have some reasonably clearideaas to whether they are prepared to take the next step, if necessary. Otherwise, we shall be facing the same difficulty that we have faced from the beginning. ,The resolution of the General Asembly did not provide for implementation. The .problem of implementation was passed to the Security Council. The Security Council did not take a decision to implement the resolution, and the problem went , back to the General Assembly. The General Assembly decided to do nothing about the 29 November resolution, and the problem has now come back to the Security Council. If we do not take into account the suggestion made by the 'representative of Canada; we may easily move . forward into Chapter VII without knowing Time and again the representati"~ of the Jewish Agency has claimed here that they have set up the State of Israel in compliance with the 1 therefore suggest that it would be desirable to go back to the idea of reopenh'1g negotiations wit.l]. the two parties witha view to ascertaining the possibility of a peaceful s~ttlement, and to consider the advisability of confirming the ceasefire recommendations, along with the· establishment of a new commission, whose task would be to discuss with the Governments and authorities concerned the possibility of negotiating a pèaceful settlement. As we see the matter, we might suggest a draft resolution - though we are not going to propose it - reading more or less like this: "The 8ecurity Council, "Desiring to bring about an immediate cessation of military operations in Palestine; "Considering that the Governments and authorities concerned have not complied with the previous resolutions of the Security Council callmg upon them to abstain from any military action, as a contribution to the well-being and the permanent interests of the Arab and Jewish communities of Palestine; "Considering furthermore that the Council may have to take action under Chapter VII of the Charter to give prompt and full effect to those resolutions, if within thirty-six hours either of the opposing parties or both of them persist in carrying on military operations; . "1. Invites the permanent members of the Council to consult with one another with a view to such joint action on behalf of the· United Nations as may.be necessary to ensure compliance with the relevant provisions of the resolutions adopted By the Council on 16 April [document 8/723] and 22 May 1948 [document 8/773], for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security; . "2. Decides to establish a commission of five members, three of which shall be desiguaced by Committee and another· by the Jewish Agency. If the membership of the commission has not been coinpleted within three days from the date of this resolution, the President of the Council shall designate such other member or members as may be required to complete the membership of five. "The priinary task of this commission shall be to discuss with the representatives of the Governments and the authorities concerned the possibility of negotiating a peaceful settlement of the question of the future government of Palestine; "3. Invite the Governments and communities directly interested in this question to make representatives available to the commission of the Council for the purpose of discussing such peacefli settlement; It seems to me that in view of the fact that the truce resolution already provides that the truce will take effect without prejudice to the riuhts, claims or positions of the parties, and that the task assigned to the Mediator is restricted, in sa far as this matter is concerned, to promoting a peaceful adjustment of the future situation in Palestine, there would be no duplication of work in providing for a subsidiary organ of the Security Council to ascertain the possibilities of àrriving at such a peaceful settlement. l realize that both the Arab States and the State of Israel will hesitate very much to accept such a recommendation as l have suggested. However, l respectfully submit that ,there are ouly two possible ways out of this situation. Either the parties can continue to arrive at a solution by fighting - which l understand the Security Council will not allow them to do - or the Security Council should provide the parties with the opportunity to negotiate a peaceful solution. That is the procedure which all members of the Security Council desire, and it is the procedure that is in accordance with the principles and purposes of,the Charter; and, more especiaIly, that is the responsibility and duty of the five permanent members of the Security Council. In matters such as these, the representatives . of smaJl nations really have very little to do, besides expressing their willingness to co-operate in aIl efforts ta bring about peace - whether it . is in Palestine or e1sewhere - once it is threat- , ened or broken, and incidentally, as we say in my native language, to "landscape," t') help the landscape of the international scene. After aU, Ilothing is done in any of these very important matters except what the five permanent members of the Security Council decide to do. mandation. observer qu'il cette que, ou bien le Conseil de sécurité donnera aux parties la est sentants pas - More specifically, if the three nations that have come forward with proposals in the present instance - the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet SociaJist Republics - aIl desire peace, as l believe we all', earnestly do, and if they are willing to co-operate to that end, it is very difficult to understand how the Security Council could very weIl continue for days and days, and weeks and weeks going back over the same historical and legal arguments when all the members know that they have ceased to, have any relevance to -the present situation. Once the situation ha; approached the stage where these parties not only are fighting, but where there is a real threat to international peace, the members of the Security Council cannat spend weeks and weeks, as they have already done in the Security Council and in the General 1 respectfully submit these suggestioris to the Security Council in the hope that ü they are not acceptable, they, will at least pave the way ta a compromise, because 1 am very much afraid that this week we shall "- perhaps we s4all not have a meeting this evening or this week - have the· 'same performa..."lce we had lâst week, on Saturdày. We began the discussion of the United Kingdom proposal on Friday [299thmeeting], and aIso the discussion of the United States proposal. We ended by adopting the' United Kingdom proposal, after the United States proposal had been rejected. Those of us who voted for the United Kingdom proposal with a very deep sense of futility - as 1 was frank enough to state -' have found -abundant reasôn for that feeling, . because we have'accomplished noth;,ilg, abso.. lutely nothing, during the week. ! am very much afraid now that we may repeat the performance. If we vote. on the United Kingdom proposal first, we are likdy ta find that it does not command enough votes to be adopted. Last week we did not adopt the United States proposaI, and it is most likely that we shall not now adopt the United F.Jngdom proposal. Then we shall have another week of discussion, with very little prospect of doing something useful, but con-' siderable numbers of men, women and children will have been needlessly sacrificed in Palestine. 1 believe this situation cannat continue without an expression ofdissatisfaction bythe Security Council. We have only to recall that these discussions began in January, if my memory does not fail me. At first we drifted· into war; now W~ are in the midst ofwar; but.we do not seem to be any nearer taking the necessary action ta stop it and ta restore peace or taking some active and coilstructive steps ta find a satisfactory salu- . tian· to the Palestine problem. . ' 1 believe, of course, that this frame of reference within whichthe question is being debated, has its proper validity, which 1 respect. But this political and legalistic validity has also its own liÏnitations. It cannot be over-stretched, for if it is, the 'wider, larger, deeper bearings of the question will be lost. 1 propose in my bri~f intervention to put aside aIl legalism and deverness. 1 propose to focus on the simple realities of the situation. A fresh immersiOn in the utterly simple, the really true, the unchanging and abiding, might yield sorne useful insight. It is true that the Security Council,has the respnnsibility under the Charter of maintaining and restoring international peace and, security. But everything depends. on the way in which this is done. It is possible that with the best intentions in the world, and with the sincerest legalistic correctness and fulfilment of one's obligations, the way in which a thing is done spoils the end in view. My first simple submission is that it is not the way of.peace to keep pointing the finger of accusation at the Arab world, to keep spiting that world in the Council's decisions, to keep disregarding its deepest feelings. If the Arabs completely despair of international justice, and if the Council succeeds in putting them in the mood of what l might term an international pe13ecution complex, do the members think that real peace will ever be established in the Near East. 1 am not entering now into the question of whether we can properly speak, in this instance, of a disturbance of international peace. This is apolitical, juridical question and 1putaside th::!.t type of approach. 1 am saying that this august Council, which is charged with the supreme task of watching over the peace and security of the world, is actually seized of this problem and that it is trying its best to do something about it. 1 am also making a distinction between. an improvised, patched-up solution, and the solution of real statesmanship; between a forced and un- , natural .peace and an abiding peace of nature and truth. A dictated peace-I repeat, a dictated peace - held by international pressure and by fo~ce of arms, and leaving the Arabs of the MIddle East - and behind them~ in varying d~grees, the entire Moslem world-permanently disaffected, is obviously not a real peace, but The representative of Colombia, not long ago, spoke of what he called hard and stubborn facts. It \Vas the great American philosopher, William James, who described facts as being stubborn and irreducible. 1 be1ieve the Security Council must face this stubborn and irreducible fact, namdy, that it is not condlcive to l'cal peace for the outside world - the non-Near Eastern world, the non-Arab world; and the non- Moslem world - to keep on always taking decisions apart from and in opposition to the Near Eastern and. the Arab and Moslem worlds. Always to take decisions against those worlds is, from a long-range point of view, not calculated ta produce real, enduring peace. The Security Council might recognize, or, with sufficient force, even establish a Jewish State in Palestine. 1 assure the Council that nDthing is' easier than for the United States and the USSR, if they agree between themselves, to surround and support the Jewish State through tbeir force of arms. The Arabs, obviously, could not withstand this combined military might. But is. that a l'cal solution of the problem of Palestine? Would the United States and the USSR then be really serving the Jews? In my. Cflinion, the real task of world statesmanship at the present time is not ta do just tbat - a very easy thing indeed - but ta help the Jews and the Arabs not ta be permanently alienated from one another., The Jews must come ta terms with Arabs sooneror later. They must do so before they come to terms with the Americans, or the Russians, or the Guatemalans. They canot keep on estranging the Arab world indefinitely, and rejoicing in the comfortable feeling that they have gained, in return, the blessing of the outside warld. Sucha stage of affairs is wholly unnatural, unreal and unstable. It must follow from this that the function of this Council is not only the mere mechanical restoration of peace anu security in Palestine - that is a relatively easy matter - but the more difficult task, the statesman -.·:œ task of creating the nt.cessary objective and psychologicalconditions of trust and intercoursebetween Jew and Arab in Palestine whereby this Uih'1atural estrangement of the Jewish community from its immediate world is cancelled and overcome. The Arabs constitute the immediate world of the Jews, and it is with them that they are going to live for the next ten, fifty or one hundred years. Arab friendship is more important to them than all the friendship of the l'est of the world. 1 affirm, then, a second simple, because stubbarn and irreducible, fact: The l'eal task of those who would establish real peace in Palestine and the Near East is to refrain from giving the Jews a false sense of international security, and therefore from encouraging them to defy and flout the Arab world. Nothing is easier for an international body than to generate this faIse sense of distant security when the real task, the hard task, is to face the Jews with courage and .love and ta tell them that their duty, their permanent inierest, does not consist in the exaggerated manipulation of international machinery, but in the exertion of supl'eme efforts by everybody to come to a reasonable, workable, just, abiding understanding with the Arabs. One victory of real understanding with the Arabs - no matter haw modest, no matter how rudimentary - is worth a hundred hollow international engagements. Every victory won by t..lle Jews in the international :field at the expense of unclerstanding and concord with the Arabs is profoundly illusory, for real victories are always victorious of understanding. l believe that Jew and Arab must, sooner ar later, live together in peace in Palestine. This is another inescapable, another stubbom and irreducible facto You who sit on the Security Council can either he1p them to do that in peace .and justice soon, or you can empk-.- high political procedures as to delay that day and to litter the path leading thereto with much blood and suffering and bitterness. This leads me t? another inescapable fact: There can be absolutely no peace in this situation if the'Security Council approaches its task, first, ina punitive spirit, and, second, on the 1 shall doubtless be told: "But the Mediator has been appointed for just that purpose. What you are asking us ta do is something we have already done." Bc.t the answer to this somewhat complacent position is this: What can the Mediator really do? What conditions can he single-handedly bring about which will help in this fundamental task of peace? His helplessness has not escaped the members of the Security Council, who have, on various recent occasions, refused to expect of him magical powers. Nor, indeed, has it escaped the Mediator himself. Did not he himself say a few days ago that his chance ai success wasabout one per cent? No" the respor-sibility is cJearly not the Mediator's. The responsibility rests upon our sovereign Governments. The will to conciliation and peace must :!irst be generated in our respective capitals. The other day, the representative "of the United States submitted a proposaI which was swiftly supported br the USSR. Today, the raIes are reversed: the USSR submits a proposal which is swiftly secouded by the United States. This rapid alternation of roles betweenleader and follower ;n t.l:üs problem is intere.:."tÏJ.ïg. It raises far-reaching. problems which,if only 1 had the time, 1 should e1aborate in full. The fundamental theme of aU these-problems, however, isthe destînyof the Arab world. How is it going to form itse1f? Wh~t are going to be the eIements of jts new strength? Where Will it .tum for friends in the international field?· What will he the character and structuré of its d~velopment? What role.is it going to play in the economy of peace? As'I have, said, this altemation of roles be.. tween the United States and the USSR is inn teresting, but 1 shall not now dwell on its deeper significance. 1.do not know enough about the USSR. Iknow more about the United States, so.1 must now aSk:"What have we done td the . Um . ·te.d. S.ta.tt~ to deserve this Itl.ode of.treatment? 1 , Have we not always been their friends?" 1t is 'true .that thé United States is also the friend of ~'-\.rab world? Has not America enjoyed, until lately, the finest reputation in Arab hearts as a land of justice, nobility, freedom, faimess, real concern for the people, real sympathy with the weak and he1pless, real respect for the dignity and worth of the individual, and a largeness of heart embracing the .entire world? Has not the name of America, by comparison with those Œ the European countries with whom we have had our serious differen~es, occupied the highest rank in our esteem? Mr. L6PEz (Colombia): l shouid like to weI- come the address which we have just heard from the representative of Lebanon as a very con- s!I'uctive movein what the Colombian delega- tian considers to be$e right direction·in our approach to the solution of this problem.· It is bêcause we feel that, rather than have a dictated peace ir. ,posed hy the force of arms, we should have a natural,·binding an.d enduring peace, th~t we have tespec~fully suggested thatt...he Security Council should return to the\ idea of appointing 1 have said before - although 1 do not know whether 1 succeeded in making it c1ear - that . we are trying to make a compromise recom- mendation which has regard to the advisability of ~voiding a further de1ay in bringing about peace in the Middle East and the cease-fire which we have been calling for consistently but without success, with a very clear understanding that the parties, with·the he1p 'of the Security Council, are to have a fresh opportunitv of dis- cussing a permanent settlement. That is why, when 1 presented our sugges- tions, 1 stated that the primary task of the sug- gested commission should be to discuss, with the representatives of the Governments and autho- rities concerned, the possibility of negotiating a peaceful settlement of the question. We believe that it is not necessary for the Security Council 0' to give assurances ta the parties involved, and that to undertakeany action in a punitive frame of mind is furthest from our intent. . It may appear otherwise, but 1 know that from the conversations that 1 had with other member of the Security Council, when 1 had the honour of being its President during the month of April, that every one of the members of the Security CoUÎlcil has sincerely been trying to find a satisfactory solution for this situation. This situation is not only complex, but is made even more difIicult because both parties to the dispute feel that they are being treated unjustly, and that in one.way or another they are being made the victims, at least in principle, of a gross injustice, whichis aIso, 1 am sure, far from the minds of themembers of the Security Council. . Before making these remarks, 1 shouldhave liked to have heard the opinions of the repre- sentativeof the Jewish Agency. 1 say this be- cause, if 1 am not mistaken, l should expect that he may see bis way clear to approach this mat- ter in a similar spirit, even if we do not reach a solution today or tQmorrow. 1 believe we can spend several hours fruitfully in listening to such intelligent remarks as may he made with respect to the need for a more permanent and éomprehensive settlement of the problemin the Middle East. 1 repeat, we sr.aIl aIl he glad ta do· so in the understanding that -we shall be paving the way for a satisfactory solution or, at least, that we shall' he co~g nearer to the solu- tion of this problem. Of course, 1 have a little more. confidence now than 1 had before with respect to this matter, and 1 once again respect,,:, fUlly request thatthe parties again read the sug- Therefore, it seems to me that the cease-fire conception is not quite so irrel~vant to the pros- pects which the representative of Lebanon has portrayed. When invasion and war are some- how stopped, then the inevitable day of Arab- Jewish understanding must to that extent be brought nearer.

At this stage in the discussion, 1 wish to ask your permission to interrupt the general debate for a moment ta" read to, you a telegram 1 have just received from the Truce Commission. As a result of this telegram 1 shall make a statement, speaking as the rep:resentative of my country, and shall submit a proposaI which 1 should not otherwise have submitted at the present stage. The telegram, which will shortly be distributed in document form [document 8/797/ Corr.1], reads as follows: "The Chairman of the Truce Commission of the Security Copncil asks me to communicate the following message" (the communication is transmitted by the French Consul) : "Jerusalem, 28 May 1948" (that is today). "The period from the 19th to the 25th day of the battle for Jerusalem has seen a slackenîng of the bombardment of the city, due presumably to the despatch of large reinforcements of the Arab Legion to Latrun, where the battle of the T?ads hasresumed full violence. It is not yet pos- SIble to obtain precise information on the outcome of this battle, in which considerable forces appear to have been tlirown in on both sides. "The dfect ~f the bombardmen~ of .:he suburbs of the, city, which has been going on for several days, has been the evacuation of the population (women and children) to the south "Jean NIE:UWENHUYS Chairman of the Security Council Truce Commission" (Signed) NEUVILLE French Consul 1 shall speak now as the representative of my country. 1 should like first of all to go over the events which have taken place here in the last few days. Last week, we were confronted by an increasingly serious situation, and were seized of two draft resolutions, one of them ïnvoking Chapter VII of the Charter, the other of a less forceful character. In the end, the Council adopted the weaker resolution which was simply an appeal to the two parties to issue a cease-fire order, allowing them - if 1 remember correctiy - a timeiimit of thirty-six hours to replt.· At the request of the Arab representatives, the time-limit was extended by a further forty-eight hours, at the end of ~which we received an entirely negative reply accompanied by conditions which to a11 intents and purposes amounted to a rejection. .Which we pursue our discussions, what is the . situation in Palestine? A particularly painful aspect is the situation in Jerusalem, in which my delegation has always displayed especial interest. A fewdays ago - it may have been yesterday - therepresentative of Syria tald us thatthe Arabs had always respected the Holy Places, a statement which 1 should certainly be the last to contest. But the Syrian representative was speaking of peace-tinle conditions, whereas we are now confronted with a state of war. AlI the telegrams we receive show that destruction within Jerusalem iS increasing in volume and intensity. Looking at the telegram Ihave received, and with 'which you are in part acquainted - 1 say "in part" because the te1egrams in question were sent by the French Consul -- 1 note since 14 As the representative of my de1egation and, to some extent ~ùso as the President of the Security Council, 1 wish to draw your attention to this special situation; not merely because it is extremely grave from the point of view of àll that is valuable in the ,City of Jerusalem; net merely - as the Assembly has been told time and time again - because Jerusalem contaips the most treasured traditions of three great religions; but because it is in very truth one of the places which form part of the common historical and cultural heritage of mankind. Moreover, if we could bring· about a..tfBsa,i:iolll of hostilities in Jerusalem itself, wc shovJd hl."'I"e made, the authority of the United Nationf.'. }il.'l::" vail in one place in Palestine; vith th~.t :',5 a starting point, the Truce Commission; and' ater the Mediator, would, 1 hope, beable t.a e:.tend their field of action more easily untU it Cff vt'red the whole of Palestinè. 1 think that in view of the facts, fi l'J'ped,ù ~uce for Jerusalem woi.ùd, as far as l c:~ l judgel ID no 'way expose us to the reproachefî ,jf Olle or the ?therof the parties involved; l de< /1CJlt think anyone could say that by putting ? û end to As far as l can judge, therefore, l believe that in working for a cease-fire in Jerusalem in par- . tîcular we shaU be acting in all fairness .and be fJ'ee from any reproach of favouring either side. It is for these reasons, and in particular because of the very disturbing telegram which we have just received, that l have made this statement tonight instcad of later as l had intended. l have prepared a ciraft resolutîon which l should like, in my turn, to submit to the Council. Its text is as follows: uThe Security Council, uConsidering that the appeal issued by the Security Council on .22 May 1948 with a view to terminating hostilities in Palestine has not been: complied with; "'That that appeal caUed upon the Truce Commission and all parties concernedto give the highest priority to the negotiation and maintenance of a truce in the City of Jerusalem; CThat the atack on and bombardment of Jerusalem have been going on·since 15 May; that they, have alre~dy caused terrible destruction which Th increasing ever'J day; that places of priceless value for three of the greatest religions of the world, representing an important part of the spiritual and cultural hc::ritage of humanitr,are thereby endangered, if they have not already been stricken; uOrders the Governments and authorities to cease hostilities in the City of Jerusalem within a time-limit expiring -at noon 29 May (New York Standard Time); ~'Decides that if the present resolution is rejected by either party, or both, or if, after having been.accepted, it is not implemented, the present situation in Palestine will be reconsidered with a view to taking the measures provided for under Chapter VII of the Charter." This draft is based on' Chapter VII of the Charter. It contains an order, but it provides for action by. the Council, of the kind which has caused some of its Ihembers to hesitate, only on a restricted and specified scale, for the city of Jerus.alem alone, ànd without prejudice to the other aspects of the question. 1would ask this of the United Kingdom representative who, in the draft resolution adopted by the Council on 22 May, caused a paragraph ta be inserted dealing specially with Jerusalem and drawing attention ta the gravity of the position there. 1 would ask this aIso of the representatives of Argentina} Be1gium and Canada, as weIl as of the other members of the Council. The text of tile ciraft resolution submitted by the French delegation will be distributed at once among the members. 1 must infàrm YI)U of the receipt of yet another telegram from the French Consul which has just reachèd me, and to which 1 must call the full attention of the represéntative of 'the Jewish Agency. It reads as follows: "The Jéwish Military Comma..'ld in Jérusalem has informed the Doyen of the Corum!ar Corps that if the. Arabs continued the bombardment Qf Synagogues situated in the üld City, it would be tàmpelled to take reprisal measures against the Holy Places. The Truce Comrr1ÏSsioIi reported this fact to the Security CouiIèil this morning:' The Truce èonnnission's telegram has not yet reathed me, When 1 bégan my statement, no other name àppèared on the list of speakers for today. 1 wîsh therefore to consult the members of the douncil on our procedure. The fust draft resolution before us is that of the USSR de1egation. 1 intend toput it to the vote fust, sinee if it is accepted it will covér the special question of Jerusalem which 1 have just dealt with. If it is not adopted, 1 shàll consult you on thé arder in which you wish to vote on '"the United Kingdom resolution, which properly -speaking comes first, and on the resolution which 1 have jùst submitted. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Soèialist Re'publics) (translated tram Russian): 1 should like to ask whether we are going to vote on the resolutions today, in view of the fatt that you, . Mr. President, as the represéntative of France, and also the representative of Colombia have subniitted nèw draft resolutions to the Security Coul1cil. If we are to vote on these resolutions today, 1 shol.lld like to make a few comments, particularly in connection with the resolution submitted to

Would the USSR tepresentativeconsentto hav-' ing his resolution pùt, to the vote fust, as 1 intended, and reserve his remarks until such time as the United Kingdom proposaI comes under discussion? Or does he wish to makr;'a statement immediately? Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): 1 think it would be better to finish the generaI discussion before a vote is taken on any of the resolutions, including the proposaI submitted by the USSR delegation.

The situation is as follows: There are at present two resolutions before the Council, dealing with Palestine as a whole, as well as the proposaIs submitted bythe Colombian representative, which have not yet been framed in the forro of a resolution, but which are neverthe1ess befo.re us. 1 imagine that the examination of these resolutions will take some time, and 1 think that they could actually be discussed more or less together. The resolution 1 have submitted is more limited in scope and more urgent, but it aIso is a new appmach, and some' de1egations may feel they cannot pronounce on it at once. 1 should like to hear, too, the reactioDs of the Arab States and of the Jewish Agency. . .In these circumstances, 1 cannot, as President of the Security ~ouncil, take any decision which mîght not seem quite regular and normaI to anyone. That is why 1 am asking the Council's advice regarding the best way to proceed. Would the members of the Council be so good as to state their views on the matter? Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): 1 think no oile is more concemed 'than my Government at what has been happening and what, 1 am. afraid, .is still happening in Jerusalem. The President has referred to the factthat the Unite.p Kingdom draft resolution makes specifie reference to·Jerusalem, and we are ~eeply impressed by the gravity of the situation there and. the urgency of dealing with it. .In ~egard to' the draft resolutionsubmitted by the repr(;Sentative of France, which 1 have just seen, 1 should have some observations to make; but all 1 want tc? sayat the moment is tha,t as far as 1 am concemed, recognizing the urg:ei~v of thé matter, 1 should be quite content t:.n .\'<: a certain priority to the draft resolution ::rù~." . mitted by the representative of Françe. EIJtv~ . ever, 1 do ask that 1 should not be called upon Ml'. AUSTIN (United States of America): It seems to me that by foHowing the regular order we shall express our views better. Moreover we rnight save time if v:e dispose of aH o!her draft resolutions by foHowll1g that order, whlch would be to put to the vote first the draft resolution of the representative of the USSR. After listening to these telegrams that the Security Council has received today, 1 think that all the members of the Security Council ought to be persuaded that it is time to take definite action, action that will reaUy count. There is no one present here before the Security Council, who believes we shaH have any cessation of hostilities unless the Security Council asserts its rights and dutY under Chapter VII of the Charter. Therefore, 1 very much favour the idea of voting upon the USSR draft resolution, because it would cover the whole situation. It would include not only Jerusalem, but access to Jerusalem and the necessary communications. Therefore, it seems altogether preferable to have the Security Council consider the USSR draft resolution first; that is the regular order. Ml'. EL-KHOURI (Syria) : The President asked for the reaction of the representatives of the Arab States to the proposaI which he submitted today in regard to Jerusalem. 1 wish to give sorne information on that point. 1 can again assure the members of the Security Council that the Arabs would not attack or bombard the Holy Places. That is not their intention. The places mentioned in the telegrams which have been read are religious places or buildings devoted to charitable purposes. As can be understood from the telegrams them~ selves, however, and from other sources of information, those were places in which one party or ~he other took refuge and which they converted lnto fortresses from which to fight. That is why some of those places devoted to charity have been, attacked. If the armed forces of both sides would refrain from taking refuge in those places, nobody would touch those buildings; neither side would have any desire to bombard those places or to ~tt.ack them in any way. As 1 have said, however, lt lS weH known that those buildings have been used as fortresses. That is a mistake which both ~ides make from time to time. They should be mduced to stop doing it. Nobody desires more than the Arabs that peace ~nd sectirity be eâtablished in Jerusalem, as proposed by thë President. However, 1 do n{' think that we can discuss this matter or vote Upt>~l it this everting, We should sfudy the present situation and the pos3ible.result of any action thaï may betaken. if the question is put before the Security Council at its next meeting, we shall ;oerhaps Dé in a better position to discuss it. As regardS the ather resôlutidnS whiëh have hem submittéd, 1 shàll not speak on thém until ea:ch one is put befôre the Security Council for diScllSSion. If thé Président wishes ta close thé général discussion on all the resblutions, then 1 certainly would have something to say before the close of discussion. Mr. LOPEz tColotnbia): It isàgreeable to me to follow whithever course thé Security COUÎlcil may wish to ül.ke; but as the situation standS Iiow, it seems to me that unless the President proposes ta keep the Security Council.:onvened for a long meeting, the position is cleàrlyas follows. Some representatives may wish· priority to be given to the proposaI submitted by the President on behalf of the French delegatiôu, and in addition to that discussion thete· would ha've to he a certain amount of {urther debate on the other proposals. The represent.ttive of the United Kingdomhas already made a statemcht to the efIect that he would liketo have until tomorrow to considerthe matter before vC'ting. On th.e other hand, wc have two definite indications from the repre-. sentàtives of the USSR and Syria that before the general debate is c10sed th'~1 wish ta discuss ·the .proposaIs" The reprQ;entativé of tlv~ ~."-S~~l sa1d thac hewould préfcr to do sa to;"-'~:.!1:Y;:'fIl, '~ut the representative of Syria implied th,t;; h<:: would like ta speak now if the President ültended to close. the·general discussion right away. It seefus·.to ·me clear, therefdre, that it wc are tû proceed in an Ol"derly manner, olS suggested by the representative of the United States, what

1 agree with what the Colombian repr~entative has said on our procedure, except on the question whether the USSR representative Dl' the Syrian representative should speak fust, since 1 have not .clearly understood whether the USSR representative was the fust to ask. to speak. Apart from that point, 1 am in agreement with the Colombian representative and shall proceed on the lines pe indicated. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (iranslated [rom Russian): 1 said !hat if we do not vote on the resolutions 'Loday, 1 should prefer to make my statement tomorrow, if there are no objections. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): 1 have the same preference. The PRESlUENT (translated [rom French): Th ~ representative of the Jewish Agency has asked to speak. Does he wish to make a long statement? Mr. EBAN (Jewish Agency for Palestine): 1 sîmply wanœd ta say one thing about the resolurion presented by the repiesentative of France: that is, that·we have not had the OPPortlL.'1Ïty of studying its text. We are in full agreement with its spirit and its purpose, and wt~out wishing to make any suggestions on prcCt:uure, 1 may say that we are also fully aware of its urgency. ..

We can now adjourn this evening's debate until tomorrow at 10.30 a.m. Mr. NrsoT (Belgium) (translated [rom French): 1 should like sorne clarification of the. meanïng of the draft resolution proposed by.the President. Does his resolution come wholly under Chapter VII, sa that the order it contains would cl)nstitute the fust step in the application of the Chapter? That is the point which 1 should Iike c1arified.

1 am grateful to the ,Belgian representative for asking this question which gives me a welcome . opportunity to correct a mistake. In the penultimate paragraph in the text of mY'I'e3,olution there is indeed a contradiction between the word "o:cders", whicb is possible only <...1 the basis of Chapter VII, ~md the last paragraph which f:tates that if,the r ,~solution is not implemented, the situation will be reconsidered with a view to taking the measures provided for under Chapter VII. The' meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.