S/PV.311 Security Council

Before proceeding with this meeting, 1 should like to pay tribute and express my appreciation to my predecessor as President of the Security Council, Mr. Parodi, the representative of France, for. the able way in which he conducted the work of the Council during the month of May. . ~. . 99. Adoption of the agenda 100. Continuation of the discussion on the Palestine ques~ion 100. At the invitation of the Presidènt, M ahmoud Bey Faw,û, representative of Egypt; Mr. Malik, representative of Lebanon; Jamal Bey Husseini, representative of the Arab Higher CQmmittee; and Mr. Eban, representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, took their places at the Security Council table. . The PRESIDENT: On 29 May 1948, the Se- curityCouncil adopted a resolution [document mai 1 may inform the members of the Seeurity Couneil that the resolution was favourably re- ceived by the parties coneemed, and satisfaetory arulwers have now been communicated from the~ to the Security Couneil. 1 shaIl read these important answers whieh were reeeived yesterday. One is a letter from the repr ~entative of the Jewish Agency, whieh was reeeived yesterday. It reads as follows: "On Saturday 29 May 1 transmitted to the Provisional Government of Israel the text of the resolution ~dopted by the Seeurity Couneil with reference to a cease-fire in Palestine for a period of four weeks. 1 now have the honour to convey the following reply from Mr. M. Shertok, Foreign Minister in th~ Provisional Government of Israel: " 'The Provisional Governrrient of Israel has given full consideration to the resolution of the Security Council adopted on 29 May 1948 calling upon all Governments and authorities to order the cessation of aIl acts of armed force for a period of four weeks. " 'The Provisional Government of Israel has decided to respond to this call and to instruct the High Com:q:land of the Defenee Army of Israel to issue a cease-fire order to Israeli forces on all fronts ta be observed as from Wednesday, 2 June, 3 a.m. Israeli cime (corresponding to 7 p.m. New York day-light time) if the other side acts likewise. The Provisional Govemment of Israel will also comply with aIl the injunctions and obligations imposed by the resolution, pro- vided that a similar undertaking is entered into by the other Governments and authorities con- cemed. "'The readiness of the Provisional Govern- ment of Israel to co-operate in the ex~ution of the cease-fire as laid down in the Secuf;ity Coun- cil's resolution is based on the followin~ assump- tions which, in the opinion of the Provisional Government, are clearly implied in the terms of the resolution: " '( 1) That the ban on the import of arms into the territory of the Arab States enumerated in the resolution shou!d apply also to the de- liveries of arms from stocks owned or controlled by foreign Powers within those territories. " '(2) That during the cease-fire, the armed forces of neither side will seek to advance beyond " '(3) That fieedom of access to Jerusalem will be ensured for the supply of food and other essentiais, as well as for normal civilian entry and exit. rée et les rieur à l'extérieur et vice versa. " '(4) That any attempt by the parties con- cerned to stop or impede the normal transport of goods assigned to Israel and other States con- cemed will he regarder'. as an act of armed force. des traver tinées considérée · " '(5) That while the Provisional Govem- ment of Israel is ready to comply with the in- visoire junction that persons of ~ilitary age admitted invitant during the cease-~re peno~. should . ~ot ?e mobilized or sU~l~tte~ to military trammg, lts 1 armes freedom to admit ummgrants, rega.cdless of age, sous leur contrôle pendant will not be impaired,' à aucun teinte sans disti..ïction d'âge.' "Although all these consequences seem to fiow naturaIly from the text and spirit of the cease- fire resolution, which the Provisional Govern- ment of Israel accepts without reservation, it seems important for the avoidance of misunder- standing that they should be placed on the record at this stage," [Document 8/804.] la que sans tout malentendu, tenant," Mter 1 have conveyed to the Security Coun- cil aIl the information received, I shall give the representative of both parties an opportunity to make the comments they may wish to make on this subject. sécurité rai pour On 1 June 1948, at 4 p.m., I received a cable- gram from the Government of Syria. The cable- gram reads as follows: "You are requested to inform the Secretaty- General that the Political Committee of the Foreign Ministers of the StateS members in the Arab League, convening in Amman, accepted the calI of the Security Council to cease fire during the period fixed by the Council as soon~ . cesser as the Security Council detennines the time of . Conseil, start of that period. This resolution shall be communicated to the Council through the Secre- tary-General. "The acceptance of the Arab States to these proposals is intended to supply another proof of their sincere desire for the restoration of order and achieving a just solution for the problem of Palestine. "We !"equest that the interval accorded for cease-fire will be long enough so that the Arab Governments may be able to contact their forces on aIl fronts," [Document 8/815.] Secretary-Gene~ and to the Presid~nt of the Security Council. ' 't "1 am now informing you of their accept~ce lest their communication to you he delayed in transmission beyond the six 0'dock New York standard time limit. "The acceptance by the Arab Governments of these proposais proves once more thcir genuine desire to see peace restored llî the Holy Land and a just solution of the Palestine prob- lem ~rrived at." [Document S/805.] There are communications received from the Minister for Foreign Âffairs of Syria, the Foreign Minister of Iraq and the Foreign Min- ister of Saudi Arabia, which state the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt will communicate to the Security Council the reply of the mem- ber States of the Arab League. The rèply of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, which reply speaks for all Arab States, reads: "1 have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's telegram of 29 May 1948 in which you kindly give me the text of the reso- lution adopted on that day by the'Security Council with a view to ceasing hostilities in Palestine for a period of four weeks. The Gov- ernments of the States members of the Arab League, to which you communicated the said resolution, have considered it, and have taken the following decision' w~ich they have m- structed me to transmit to you. 1 hereby transmit the following communication to you from the Arab League: " 'The Govermnents of the Arab States stated in their replies to the first invitation to the same effect that the Security Council addressed to them on 22 May lase that they greatly wished peace to be re-established ID Palestine and both the Arab and Jewish people of that country to live side by side in perlect harmony :lnd mutual understanding. The Arab States also gave the reasons why they would not accept that invita- tion and drew attention to 'the guarantees with- out which the suspension of the hostilities taking place in Palestine would only constitute a tem- porary respite givïng rise to disorder on a greater scale and more serious act<J of terrorism. It is pleasant to note that the.Security Council has taken these considerations into account. The suspension of hostilities is merely a meallS of finding the just solution of the Palestine problem which would be so welcome. "'Finally, the Governmentt. of the Arab States consider it necessary that a body should be set up ulll~tr all the necessary safeguards, charged with the most careful supervision of the provisions and conditions of the Security Council resolution on the cessation of hostilities and· capable of perfonning this delicate function. The Governments of the Arab States consider that in this regard the Security Council resolution does not give them full assurance that the other party will respect the provisions and conditions of the armistice. Therefore, as members of a regional organization responsible for maintaining security in their zone, they are bound to collaborate wholeheartedly with the United Nations Media- tor and the members of the Truce Commission for Palestine in order to supervise the cariying out of the aforesaid provisions and conditions. .Palestine " 'In the light of the' above explanation, the Arab States which are anxious ta see peace re- . les established in Palestine and the way p!"epared for a just and fair solution of the Palestine prob- lem, accept the Security Council's invitation ta 1 tent cease fire for a period of four weeks from' the We have received sorne other communications which have already been distributed. They are as follows: A communication from the Chairman of the Security Council Truce Commission which was distributed as document S/808; a communica- tion from the Czechoslovak representative to the United Nations. complainillg that the Czecho- slovak Consulate in Jerusalem was fired at and that by this firing sorne injury was inflicted; this communication was circula.ted as document S/803; there is another communication from the Chairman of the Secl1rity Council Truce Com- mission which was circulated as document S/802, this document requires further discussion by the Security Council; there is a cablegram from the United Nations Mediator which wc will examine when we discuss the delay to be granted in regard to the acceptance of thecease- fire [document S/ 814J. Certain suggestions are being put forward by the Mediator. Ther':: is another communication from the representative of the Jewish Agency ~yhich was circulated as document SI 809. Ml'. PARODI (France) (transiated from French): Before we discuss our most important item at this meeting, namely, the acceptance of the truce, 1 should like to make a correction following the communications which we have just noted. It has come to my knowledge tha~ a BBC report, quoted by the United States radIO, stated tha.t 1 had read out to the Security C.ouncil a telegram, from the French Consul III Jem- salem, announcing the destruction by the Arab Legion of the Great Synagogue in the Old City. 1 must point ou~ that the telegram in question originated, not from the French Consul, but from the Truce Commission, and that 1 dulyde passed the information on to the Security Coun- cil [308th meetingJ. l regret thatthis slight in- accuracy in the report should have exposed the French Gonsul to attacks. Ml'. EBAN (Jewish Agency for .Palestine) : The Security Council has heard the text of document S/804 containing the reply of the Provisional Government of Israel to the resolu- tion adopted on 29 May calling for a cease-fir~ in Palestine during a period of four weeks. In' that reply the ProVisionalGovernment of Israel conveys its decision to respond to the call of the Therefore, while welcoming the acceptance by the Arab States of L~e Security Council's resolution, we nott:; with concem that no steps appear ta have been taken ta fulfil that accept- ance by the issuance of a cease-fire order. Mili- tary operations by invading Arab armies continue. For L.~e third time, a definite and spe- cifie Jewish cease-fire arder has been allowed to go by default. Without wi"hing te under-estimate the im- portance of any paragraph of the resolli~.lOI1 of 29 May, 1 would suggest that the provision which must be deemed ta have the highest priority is that which calls for the actual cease- fire order. Everything else is surely an.-.::illary to this. The importance of these reflections is em- phasized by what happened during the night. The Provisional Government of Israel, having nived word that the Arab States had accepted the Security Council's resolution, and having already published its own acceptance, had every reason ta assume that military operations would saon cease. For, what meaning is there in con- tinued loss of life beyond the moment when both belligerents have accepted the principle.~: of a cease:-fire arrangement? Accordingly, an urgent consultation took place with the Israeli High Command at 2.30 a.m.-half an hour before the time set for acceptance to be notified-with the personal participation of the .Foreign Min- ister of the Provisional Government. The deci- sion taken at this consultation was that the cease-fire order had to be maintained, even at the risk of lives being lost and the safety of vil- lages being impaired, rather than that any viola- tion of the SecurityCouncil's order should take place for one minute beyond the. time laid down .for acceptance. Operations which were in full swing were cut short. New operations which were planned were countermanded, and at that time, the forces of Israel were everywhere on the offensive--except in the pages of Cairoand Amman com- muniqués. 1 wonder if it is fully realized that O a loss to understand how accept-I 8.lïCe of the resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire can be followed by a single act of 1 armed force, once it is known that acceptance is mutual. Obviously, unless Arab forces cease- fire completely, the forces of Israel are bound ta resume not merely defensive operations, but the major strategic initiative which they were exercising throughout. Therefore, it seems ta us that the first task of the Security Council is ta fix an immediate deadline for the operatiqn of the cease-fire. 1 am aIso charged to request that the deadIine should not be fixed for an hour during the night, ,as it is inadmissible to rack the nerves of our people and expose them to incalculable dangers for the third time. The Provisional Government of Israel, in the light of its experience-. hM further decided that it will not again issue a cease-fire ürder until it has been officially notified that such an order has been issued by the other side. It is in the light of tliese reflections that 1 . read document S/814, containing a message from the Mediator. We are forced to wonder whether tbis message does not show, perhaps, too great an interest in technical pedection, and not a sufficiently app:ropriate interest in the great urgency of human life. In a.ccepting the text of the Security Council's resolution, and in offering ta comply with aIl the injunctions and obligations wbich it imposed, the Provisional Government of Israel is testifying once again to its sense of loyalty to the United Nations. We have never concealed our senti- ment that many of these injunctions and obliga- tions should have been omitted from the cease- :flre resolution. It ïs widely-I think universally -recognized that they were,only inserted in an effort to provide the Arab States with an in- ducement ta suspend their invasion. In agreeing to observe an embargo on its armaments for four weeks, the State of Israel . is consciously accepting a serious disadvantage. Its opponents have had ample opportunity, through long years of statehood and facilities re- su!ting from an alliance with a great Power, to accumulate stocks of arms within their frontiers. For Israel, on the other hand, the possibility of making adequate provision for defence only be- gan to work out a few weekS ago. Indeed, for more than a decade an anomaly of the arms position has arisen in the Near East from the simultaneous functioning of the United King- dom as the ally of Arab States and as the Mandatory Power for Palestine. In the former capacity, that Government was responsible for ensuring that Arab armies were well and ade- quately equipped. In the latte::' capacity, it was responsible for cnsuring that the Jews of Pales- tine should bé deprived of arms as far as the vigilance of a blockade could ensure that result. 1 am not passing any judgment Oft this epi- sode at this stage; 1 am merely recording it because it illustrates the situation which until two weeks ago made the official arming of the Arab States and the official blockade oi P~ec;:­ tine Jewry the simultaneous concem of British policy. If we crystallize. the position today, we crystallize an ïnequality, to the detriment of that party which has not had the freedom, let alone the official authority, to build up its resources for defence. . . It is true <.lat in accepting certain amend- ments to the original draft resolution, the Secu- ~ty Council did eliminate an even greater mequality than that which remains in the text of the resolutioll; for we recall that the resolution, as originally drafted, imposed a unilateral em- bargo upon the State of Israel, while allowing the free acquisition of arms by all the invading Arab States. By amending that partial proposaI, the Security Council did reduce the margin of ?ur disadvantage to an extent which has made It possible for the Provisional Government of Israel to accept the resolution of 29 May. It ~_ c!\~ar, however, that wbat the Security Counçu intended was a complete standstill in the.flow of arms into the possession of either We believe that there can be no two opinions; that if this embargo, the justice of which we seriously question, is nevertheless to be applied, then the maximal conditions of equity must be met. Therefore, we wonder whether the United Kingdom representative would give the assur- ance that bis Government interprets this resolu- tion as preventing any new deliveries of war material to Arab States or to Israel in their own territory, by whatever means, for a period of four weeks. I should now like to deal with the fifth matter of interpretation which we have raîsed because, in our view, it is the simplest and tht; clearest. The. Security Council resolution, in its final amt:nded form, achieved very great clarityin matters connected with the movement of troops and personnel. The principle finally reached was that troop movements, whether of units or of individuals, were to be suspended, but that ordinary processes of civilian immigration should not be affected. The resolution says that "fight- ing personnel" should not be introduced into any of these territories, or from one of these territories to another. We accept this provision. The resolution says further that men of miJi- tary age admitted into these territories shall not be mobilized or trained. We also accept this pro- vision, despite the 'fact that it impedes the Therefore, it seems superfluous for the Egyp- tian reoly to contend that it was inconceivable for the- Security Council to decide what it did . decide, namely, to make a clear and specific dis- tinction between "fighting personnel", who can- not be admitted, and "men of military age", who can and will be admitted for civilian pur- suits. The resolution must be taken as it is, and presumably each party must accept all its pro- visions whether or not they gi.ve full satisfaction to its own claims and demands. Israel's acceptance of tms proposal and its readineSE to issue a: cease-fire arder are based upon this text. The text before u'), whatever ad- vantage or disadvantage it confers upon either side-and everyone knows that its .major dis- advantage falls upon us-should not at this stage be subjected to changes of principle. The other three matters of interpretation, in our view, aIso flow from the very meaning of this resolution; nevertheless, for the avoidance of doubt and misunderstanding; they may perhaps require sorne elucidation from the Security Council or from the Mediator. Even though practical measures may not be easy to devise at this distance, 1 would draw most urgent atten- tion to what we feel are the implications of this resolution for the city of Jerusalem. If there Ïs a cease-fire, then it is illegitimate to use armed force or obstruction against the pursuit of any normal civilian, peaceful occupation. In particu- lar, it would be anomalous, during a period of cease-fire, ta apply force or obstruction for the purpose of starving the population of a city and • denying it the necessities of life. Ta put it more concretely, if we travel along the road from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem with a truck containing foodstuffs and medical supplies, and we are pre- vented by armed force from introducing those foodstuffs and medical supplies into Jerusalem, then the letter and spirit of the (' 'l8e-fire has be,; violated, not by us, but by whoever ob- .strULts t::S. This seems so elementary that it o~ght to go without saying, but we do feel bound to draw a'j:ention to it because of special circum- stances which have surrounded this question in the past.· A cease-fire within a given area must And Ü we are establishing a respite of four weeks during wlùch military acp.vities are to sub- side and hostile feelings be abated, we ,.;annot possibly he thinking of Jerusalem being starved and deprived of water in the summer heat. Per- haps the use of armed force against food and medical supplies should he regarded as the most militant and virulent form of military action, and 1 doubt whether anybody in this room, whatever bis views, would venture to assert that such action can be reconciled with the position that this resolution se$ ta produce. pendant il Jérusalem privée l'été. à des se sont • A further implication of the idea that a cease- .fire within an area involves free movement within that area for peaceful purposes is to be found in our comment on blockades and the passage of goods. Then document S/804 contains a fourth point of interpretation. To illustrate this with one concrete example: ships containing goods destined for Israel have been detained in Egyptiml ports and prevented from compieting their journey. Quite apart from any cease-fire resolution, this is an illegal act. It is, in fact, of the same illegal character as the arrest by the Lebanese Government of passengers sailing·in the United States vessel Marine Carp. But, with the acceptance of this resolution, these blockade practices become a specific violation of the Secu- rity Council resolution within the framework of a wider illegality. To prevent by force a vessel from reaching its destination on a peaceful pur- suit is undoubtedly an act of armed force for- bidden under the terms of this resolutiù:l. lequel mentaires chandises. interprétation exemple tion: destination égyptiens voyage. ordonnant est illégale. d'm;galité ment du l'adoption de rité, tion d'une pêcher sont titue interdit Our second comment relating to the position of military forces and the limitations of their movement is merely a statement of normal inter- national practice in arrangements for a cease- fire. The principle to be followed is that the forces of the belligerents are free to move about along the fines of communication within areas they already control, but that they must avoid any overall change in .the dispositions existing when the cease-fire goes into effect. nous armées de une tions prises appliquer armées les régions éviter troupes le feu 1 do not wish to comment in detail, at tbis stage, on the supervision of this cease-fire agree- ment which is ~,J't to the control of the Mediator. At the present moment the Mediator has ob- servers in Palestinian territory. Under the terms sur s'assurer contrôle A whatev~ in supervising the execution of the pro- visions in this resolution falling upon the State of Israel. In conveying our acceptance of this resolution, we have scrupulously avoided any critical allu- sion ta anybody and any reference ta the political activity which may take place within the next four w~e;ks, should the Arab States agree ta issue a cèase-fire order. Unfortunately, however, the Egyptian reply contains an unnecessary re- mark about some necessity to "ensure the polit- ical unity for Palestine" as one of the aims of thîs four weeks period. It would, 1 think, he deeply disturbing ta the prm\pec~ of this agree- ment if one party were ta enter upon it with the avowed end of undermininp, the political and territorial integrity of the other party and of imposing a settlement based on the unitary prin- ciple which has proved itself incapable of corn- mending itself to any impartial judgment. This redundant passage in the Egyptian reply forces us in the interests of darity and good under- standing to reaffirm the spirit in which we enter this agreement. We enter it on the assumption that the political and territorial integrity of the State of Israel is an immutable fact on the same level as the political and territorial integrity of Egypt, of Lebanon, of Syria, and of Trans- jordan. The State of Israel daims nothing from any of thtse. It daims not an inch of their territory. It daims not the slightest derogation of their independence and sovereignty. Making no daims upon those States, Israel admits no_ daims which those States can lawfully make upon n. We must face the fact of established political units; con- firmed and secure in their national rights. The task is not to undermine the integrity ")f any of them at the expense of another. The 3k is to teconcile each to the existence of the other to the end that the State of Israel, in the complete- ness of its political and territorial integrity, may establish relations of peace and of harmony with its neighbours, with the immediate world in which it lives. The essential conditions for such a relationship are- equality and mntual respect. The international comm"miL" ha~ come to be convinced thtt onre YOll fs~ablish Israel as a political entity on an equal level with all its neighbours, you have defined the objective con- ditions of Arab-Jewish co-operation. Undoubt- But these considerations, though they are highly relevant to the course of events in the weeks to come,. must, 1 suggèst at this moment, yield to the immediate priority which is the de- termination of an immediate hour at which the cease-fire may come into effect. JamaI Bey HUSSEINI (Arab Higher Commit- tee): 1 have not much to sayat the present stage; but just for the sake of clarification 1 submit that the Arab Higher Committee is a member of the Arab League and the message that the President has iust read in the name of' the Arab League and ~which was acldressed to him by the Egyptian Foreign Minister covers our views with regard to the truce proposaI. nous certaines à les la présenterai-je hypothèses eu Haut d'insistance politique, que Arabes ticiper tique juif en Palestine. We have heard from the Jewish spokesman certain assumptions and interpretations of their views with regard to the truœ which have, in my opinion, not been clearly stated in either the provisions of the truce resolution or of the Arab message. Therefore, 1 am not going to express any thought with regard to these assumptions and interpretations until 1 am able to communi- cate with my people on the other side. But, as he opened the fundamental and the most impor- tant political question in Palestine so forcibly, 1 think it is my duty to say that the Arabs of Palestine cannat enter any politieal discussion on the basis of any' Jewish State in Palestine. Le Gouvernements parvenir Conseil lution Gouvernement en servi:' marJère qu'il ne soit pas à irresponsable rompre à Mr. AL-AsIL (Iraq): The reply of the Iraq Government to the Security Council concerning its resolution for the cessation of hostilities has, in agreement with the other Arab States, been communicated to the Secretary-General. The Iraq Government is fully. prepared, in co-opera- tion with the Security Council, to serve the cause of peace in Palestine in such a way as. not to allow the truce to be broken by any irresponsible group which might break it whenever it suits them - as it has already occurred, in Jerusalem. ln order to take an the neceSsary measures to safeguard the great issues of restoring peac~ and order in Palestine and in order to prevent any unforeseen misadventures· from upsetting the efforts of aIl concerned for the realization of such an objective, the Iraq Government thinks that sente en temps ceux ment The Security Council, sitting thousands of mile.s away from the scene of conflict, may, in the highest. interests of peace, deem it fitting to calI upon the good offices of the United Nations Mediator, to establish direct contact with the Arab Governments and the authorities con- ,cerned, so as to work out a concrete basis on which a lasting cease-fire might be ussured dur- ing the iour weeks. 1 beg to calI to the attention of the SecUrity Council that the time-limit set in the resolution of 29 May concerned the reply of the Arab Gov- ernments and not the actual cease-fire. The rele- vant paragraph of the resolution of 29 May reads as follows: Hlnvites the States members of the Arab Lea~e and the Jewish and Arab authorities in Palestine to communicate their acceptance of this resolution to the Security Council not later than 6 p.m. New York standardtime on 1 June 1948." [Document 8/801.] We were alI the more confirmed in this con- viction in that we were aware that many points on both sides would have to be resolved one way or the other by the Security Council before a general agreement could be attained. In addi- tion, it will readily be realized that sorne time will be needed to inform alI military units in the field of the cease-fire; the Jewish terrorist bands especialIy, not being a regular army, may com- promise'such an effort by non-conforming action., It is our understanding of the paragraph quoted that, when both sides have made their repl;es to the Security Council and have stated their views, and when the Security Council has taken stock of such views, theSecurity Council will then decide on the hour of the truce, giving enough time ta alIow such an order to be com- municated to aU ünits in the field.

If no other representative wishes to speak, the Security 'Council will oe , sonne called upon to take a decision on certain points 1 which are important in connexion with today's 1 ~~. " One which 1 consider to be of paramount importance is.that of the time at which the four weeks' truce should start and in that connexion, a cablegram, dated 2 June 1948, from the- United Nations Mediator in Pa,lestine, has been "In event Security Council resolution 29 May be accepted by both parties, assumption is that a date would have to be set for trace coming into effect. 1 talked to Tel-Aviv and Amman and my preliminary study problem of controIs convinced me that a limited time must be allowed betweenthe date accept~uceof resolution and date its application. From standpoint application of controls this.might he some days. "For practical reasons hope Security Council, in event acceptance by both parties, would not set effective date so early that the controIs would not he operative, thus inducing immediate charges of violation both sides~ My suggestions for procedure is that the Mediator be authorized fixeffective date in consultation with two parties andTruce Commission. 1 assume the four week period computed fl'Om this effective date." [Document S/814.] As far as 1 understand the documents which have already been read concerning the acceptance of the Security Council resolution by the parties,-that acceptance is unconditional. The comments which both sides have made are not to be considered as setting certain conditions. As 1 understand them, they are simply insisting on the application of certain safeguards to ensure ~hat the implementation of the resolution is strictly controlled. For this reason, 1 consider that the resolution of the Security Council has be--.;fi accepted unconditionally by aIl parties. . tions It p.ow remains for the resolution to be implemented and we have here beforeus, the sugges-. tion of the United Nations Mediator. 1 should like to hear the views of representatives on the Security Council on the Mediator's suggestion that it should be left to him to fix the delay between the acceptance and the application of the resolution, after having studied the matter with both parties with a view to aIlowing sufficient tllne. 1 should like to hear the views of representatives, their suggestions or their comments on the Mediator's suggestion, and· if no one has anything to say 1 may consider that the Secwity Council is in agreement with the Mediator's suggestion and 1 shall communicate such agreèment to him. Mr. ARCE (Argentina). (translated from Spanish): ln the first place 1 should like to congratulate the parties, as they are called here, on having accepted the truce proposed by the Secu- For these reasons, 1 strongly support the proposaI made hy the Mediator appointed by the General Assembly. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): . 1 entirely agree with what the President has sug~ gested in regard to this point of date for the application of the cease-fire. 1 hope the Pr~i­ dent will immediately communicate with _the Mediator and authorize him to fix the effective date, in COnsultatiOl) with the parties and the Truce Commission. 1 hope the President will also think it right to ask him to fix that dateno doubt, he will have the necessity for that in mind--with the least possible delay. \à 1 am not quite sure wliether the President àeaIt with the last sentence of the Mediator's message, document S/814, in wmch he says: "1 assume the four week period computed from tbis effective date." That seems to me to he a very im\lortant point and 1 hope the Security Council will agree to authoriz.e the President to confirm that ~umption_on the part of the Mediator.

Yes. 1 believe the point raised by the representative of the United King- àom is quite correct. The four week truce should be a truce of four weeks, and not one of two, three or five days less. If two or three days elapse . before the truce comes into force, such a period should not be deducted from the four weeks. That is quite natural, as the Mediator stated in _the last paragraph of bis cable. Mr. PARODI (France) (translated trom French): 1 am somewhat perturbed at the thought that the date when the truce will come into effect may be postponed -too long. 1 feel, however, that we must ~ust the Mediator in this matter, firstly hecause he is on the spot, and secondly because, judging by the reports we have received from him, he is in closer contact with both parties than we ourselves can be. Moreover, now that we have appointed the Mediator, we must do everything in our power to vest him with thegreatest possible authority. 1 believe that we shall thus be showing our confidence in him; 1 believe also that by allowing him freedom of judgment, we shall enhance bis authority with the two parties which he must tri '10 conciliate. We recognize that the present situation involves the obligations - whatever they are - arising out of the resolution. of the General Assemblyof 14 May, document A/554, as weIl as the resoiution of the Security Council of 29 May, document S/801; and we realize that nothïng we say in our speeches can change, in any manner, the obligations contained in those resolutions. The spirit 01 the resolutions, however, is exceedingly important~ As 1 have said on several occasions, 1 am very anxious that the pressure should· be taken off the political qu~stions, to sorne mItent, if that can be done. If the Mediator and the Truce Commission cau lay sorne stress upon that part of the General Assembly resolutionof 14 May 1948, which empowers the Mediator "to invite, as seems to him advisable, with a view to the promotion of the welfare of the·inhabitants of Palestine, the assistance and . co-operation of appropriate specialized agencies of the United Nations such as the World Health Organization, of the International Red Cross, and ofother govemmental or non-governmental organizations of a humanitarian and non-political character''; in order to set in motion the resources whichthe U'lÎted Nations can deliver to the peoples of the Middle East, 1 am sure that something would result of it which would aid fUrther in bringing together all the peoples residing in the "Middle East. These peoples have a common interest. Many references have been made here to the re1ationship of Jews and Arabs to each other on a racial basis, and their need for collaborating with each other and .living together in peace has been emphasized on both sides. 1 think that this movement may perhaps not be started in this period of four weeks. However, it can certainly be envisaged or contemplated in the negotiations which are about to take place. 1 should like the Mediator to {eel that the Security Council is greatlyinterested in that e1ement of the situation. Of course, the parties know that; they have sat with us at this table, and they are aware of .our interest. Furthermore, beingin the United States, they are aware of the efforts put forth in the United States-which is a Member nation-to proILlote these activities of the United Nations through its various specialized agencies, and great interest has been shown in the particular location here under consiqeration. In bis communication, the Mediator speaks of "controIs" and sta1es: "For practical reasons hope 8ecurity Council, in event acceptance by both parties, would not set effective date 50 early that the controls would not be operative, thusrnducing immediate charges of violation both sides." My delegation thinks that this should be interpreted liberally and reasonably, 50 that we should not reach an impractical con..truction of the situation. If the deadline has to wait· until co ,trol'l covering all ~..spects of these ·two resolutions nave been set up and until they are in operation, that will probably be a long time. Under the General Assembly resolution," the Mediator is empowere.d to " (i) Arrange for the operation of common services necessary to the safety and well-being of the population of Palestine; " (ii) Assure the protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Palestine." These two matters if the Mediator regards them as fallillg within-the meaning of "controls", might .~\e up the entire four weeks-and we cannot allow the fighting to continue. It seems to me reasonable to suggest that a limit of three days might be sufficient to determine the exact time, the exact hour and minute, of the cessation of hostilities. 1 offer this suggestion not as a modification of the.President's ruling. 1 offer it merely asa point of view which might· be communicated to the Mediator by the President of the 8ecurity Council. Certainly, if no one objects, it would be suitable to convey that idea to the Mediator and thus expedite the cease-fire. 1 think that aIl parties are now satisfied tb~t there is nothing. to gain from contïnuing hostilities. Whatever temporary advances might be made means nothing. Mter the loss of lives, nothing would have been 1 conclude by saying that 1 wish to encourage the Mediator, the Truce Commission and the parties, and to have them feel that the United Nations will continue to help in every way it can toward a solution that will be just and acceptable. Mr. IONATIEFF (Canada): On behalf of the Canadian delegation, 1 should like to express our satisfaction with the favourable and unconditional response from the parties concerned which has been received by the Security Council to the resolution adopted on 29 May 1948. .droit The implementation of the resolution now rests upon the good-will of the parties engaged in this conflict and upon the initiative of the Mediator, who has been appointed by the United Nations and should be given aIl the support, encouragement and confidence which he has a right to expect from this Organization, and from the Security Council in particular. For these reasons, 1 suggest that the proposal made by the President tn accede to the suggestions of the. Mediator should be ac.cepted. However, 1 should like to associate myself with the view just expressed by Mr. Austin, that the delay before the cease-fire cornes into effect should be as short as possible. Mr. L6PEZ (Colombia): 1 share the general satisfaction of the members of ,the Security Council with the acceptance of the resolution of 29 May 1948 by the Arabs and the Jews. 1 also share the views tbat have been expressed regardmg the confidence and support that the Security Council $hould give to the Mediator under the drcumstances. A~ to the two points that h2~'" Deen brought up this afternoon, 1 believe, in the first place, that as the representative of the Jewish Agency has presented no objection to anythin.g, the Security Council could be well-advised in accepting the suggestions made by the President, against which no conflicting remark has been made in the course of the debate. 1 believe it would be useful to do something along the lines suggested by Mr. Austin, to ensure that no unnecessary delay occurs in fixing the operative date of this truce and, getting the cease-fire order given. With that aim in ~d, 1 would venture to make this suggestion: That we advise the Media-- tor that we shall be meeting, let us say within two or thr~e days, with a view to receiving his reports'on this situation, in the expe.::tation that by that tir...'de we shall have the satisfaction of knowing that the problem of controIs has been Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): There are only one or two things 1 wish to say. In the first place, the representative of the Jewish Agency, in the statement which he made this afternoon ta the Security Council, drew attention to the first assumption. contained in the letter from the Jewish Agency, dated 1 June 1948, which was to the effect: "That the ban on the import of arms into the tcrritory of the Ar::i.i:> States enumerated in the resolution should apply also to the deliveries of arms from stocks owried or controlled by 10reign Powers within those territories." 1 am able to inform you that 1 have been authorized by my Government to state ta the Security Council that they put exactly the same interpretation upon those provisions of the resolution as the Jewish Agency. 1 should like to add one or n'fO further remarks. Obviously, the most important thing at which the Coundl can now aim is to bring a cease-fire actually into effect. And 1 am glad to think that that may be done within a very short rime following the message which the President has undertaken to send to the Mediator. On reading the comments of both the Jewish Agency and of the Arab Governments, v" e see that although the acceptance, on each side, of the resolution is unconditional, they each expressed certain views or assumptions which reveal some divergence of opinion. 1 should think that in nearly all these cases we could rely on the Mediator to use his good offices to try to reconcile what may be divergent views on tire part of the two parties concerned. Perhaps the most important difference appears to relate to paragraplis 3 and 4, the meaning of which and the intention of which may not be entirely clear, as those paragraphs are drafted now. ln the first place, in paragraph 3 there is the expression "tighting personnel", which is not an accepted"4:echnical expression. But 1 have little doubt t,hat with good-will on bath sides, the Mediator will he able to establish sorne more .trouvons Paragraph 7 of the resolution reads: "Instructs the United Nations Mediator for Palestine in concert with the Truce Commission te supervise the observance of the above provi- . " SIOns ... 1 would therefore suggest that we might ask the Mediator to report within the shortest possible period on the system which he proposes to establish for the supervision of the observance of the condition in paragraph 4. If he can quickly suggest sorne effective method of checking and control, that would, 1 think, give added confidence. Mr. MALIK (Lebanon) : Doubts, if not actual fears, have been expressed in diverse quarters concerning the conditions of Jewish nationals in Arab countries. This is a very important topie, transcending in its larger bearings, the iInmedi- ate question of Palestine. Therefore, 1 wish to inform the Security Council that, on 15 May, the Arab Governments made the following appt':al to theirown peop~es: "Hundreds of thousands of Jews live actually in Arab countries where they enjoy all the privi- leges and rights enjoyed by Arabs themselves. They are perhaps even better treated than in any civilized country. Despite all the atrocities committed by the Zionists, the Arab States pro- claim their determination to safeguard the rights of the Jews in their respective countries, and invite the peoples to respect and protect the ri.ghts of their Jewish compatriots. By the same token, -they ask these Jewish compatriots them- selves, in order not to be subject to the sanctions imposed by the law of their own countries, to abstain from every forbidden contact v,ith the Zionists." In the circumstances, however, 1 wish to state that it is perfectly natural for the Arab States to tell thei.r Jewish nationals that they cannot have any contact with the Zionists of Palestine. So long as these nationals remain loyal to their own motherland, and so long as they scrupulously refrain from entering into any relations with the Zionists of Palestine, they need feel no fear what- soev~r from their own Govemments. They will alwa~3 enjoy every protection and right enjoyed by any other national, Christian or Moslem.

If no other member wishes to speak on the subject, we may consider that the Security Council agrees to the proposal sub. mitted by the Mediator, as stated by the representatives of the United States and Colombia, concerning the terms and time-limit to be given to the Mediator for fixing the time at which the truce should start. This time-limit should be as short as possible and should not afford any unnecessary delay toward the fulfilment of the objectives mentioned in the cable. 1 shall send a cable to this effect t::> the Mediator. At the same time the Member States and the parties concerned-the Jewish Agen~y for Palestine, the Arab Higher Committee and the Arab States-will be sent a copy of this cable and it will state that the time-limit is to be fixed by the Mediator and that they are called upon to comply with his instructions in that respect. In that connexion there is another matter to be discussed, the matter of control and supervision. However, it is a delicate matter which, 1 believe, cannot be decided at the present meeting. A special meeting should be called to con~ sider supervision and control, and how the We shall discuss the subject of'control and supervision tomorrow afternoon. The members of the Security Council are requested to submit suggestions or proposaIs at that meeting as to the manner in which this question should be dealt with, as stipulated in the resolution of the Security Council. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): 1 onIy wish to say that 1 abstain from approving the proposaI made by the Mediator. Mr. TARASENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (translated from Russian): 1 also abstain from approving this proposal. 101. Communication regarding the Commission on the India-Pakistan question

1 have received a letter from the Secretary-General which states that the Commission of the Security Council on the India- Pakistan question met on :friday and decided to hold its fust meeting in Geneva on 15 June and to then proceed to the spot where it is expected to accomplish its work. Since the parties have asked that a meeting be held by the Security Council in order that instructions or information in final form might be given to that Commission before it pror.:ecds, 1 suggest that we meet tomorrow moming at 10.30 a.m. to consider the India-PaJè,tan question, put our instructions in theirfinal form, and thus allow the Commission to proceed without delay with their. work. 1 might say. that it is not the members of the CommissiO~l themselves which met here but the representatives of the States members of the Commission, because three of the members of the Commission are in Europe. The meeting rose at 5 p.m. 1AUSTRALIA-AUSTRALIE FINLAND-FINLANDE i H. A. Goddard Pty. Ltd. Akateeminen Kirjakauppa 255a George Street 2, Keskuskatu SYDNEY, N. S. W. HELSINKI BEI.GIUM-BELGIQUE FRANCE Agence et Messageries de la .Editions A. Pedone Presse, S. A. 13, rue Soufilot 14·22 rue du Persil PARIS, V· BRUXELLES BOLIVIA-BOUVIE GREECE-GRECE Lihreria Cientifica y Literaria "Eleftheroudakis" Avenida 16 de Julio, 216 Librairie internationale Casilla 972 Place de la Constitution LA PAZ ATHÈNES CANADA GUATEMALA The Ryerson Press José Gouhaud 299 Queen Street West Gouhaud & Ciao Ltda. TORONTO Sucesor 5a Av. Sur No. 6 CHILE-CHIU . GUATEMALA Edmundo Pizarro Merced 846 HAITI SANTIAGO Max Bouchereau Librairie "A la Caravelle" CHINA-CHINE Boîte postale IlI·B The CommerCial Press Ltd. PORT-AU·PRINCE 211 Honan Road SHANGHAI INDIA~NDE i COLOMBIA-eOLOMBIE Oxford Book & Scindia House Libreria Latina Ltda. NEW DELHI Apartado Aéreo 40n BOGOTA. . IRAN 1 Bongahe Piaderow !COSTA RICA-eOSTA-RICA Trejos Hermanos 731 Shah Avenue Apartado 1313 TEHERAN SAN JOSÉ IRAQ-IRAK . CUBA Mackenzie & Macke'llzie La Casa Belga The Bookshop René de Smedt BAGHDAD O'ReiIly 455 LA HABANA LEBANON-LIBAN Librairie universelle CZECHOSLOVAKIA- BEYROUTH TCHECOSLOVAQUIE F. Topic LUXEMBOURG Narodni Trida 9 Librairie J. Schummer PRAHA 1 Place Guillaume DENMARK-DANEMARK LUXEMBOURG Einar Munskgaard Norregade 6 NETHERLANDS-PAYS-BAS KJOBENIIAVN N. V. Martinus Nijhoff Lange VGorhout 9 DOMINICAN REPUBLlC- S'GRAVENIIAGE REPUBLIQUE DOMINICAINE . NEW ZEALAND- Libreria Dominicana Calle Mercedes No. 49 NOUVELLE-ZELANDE Apartado 656 Gordon & Gotch, CIUDAD TRUJILLO Waring Taylor Street WELLINGTON ECUADOR--EQUATEUR Mufioz Hermanos y Cia. NiCARAGUA Nueve de Octubre 703 Ramiro Ramirez V. Casilla 10·24 Agencia de Publicaciones GUAYAQUIL MANAGUA, D. N.