S/PV.316 Security Council

1 think it would be fair to give a chance to the representative of the Neth~ erlands to say what he has to say now that the representative of the fndonesian Republic has spoken. Mter that, 1 should be inclil1ed to give effect to the suggestion made by the representative of Be1gium. Mr. VAN KLEFFENS (Netherlands): 1 shali' gladly respond to the wish of the President. We are all aware that a controversy still exists in Indonesia, and that is why there are negotiatioilS going on there now between my Government and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia. That is aIso why the Committee of Good Offices is sitting there. May 1 suggest that the negotiating parties in Indonesia be permitted to negotiate, with the able assistance of the Committee of Good Offices, and that we not throw obstacles in their path by an exchange of recriminations here at Lake Success. The representative of the Republic of Indonesia has drawn attention to a number of points on which agreement has not yet been,reached. In doing this, he sometimes is not quite in keeping with the marën of events. For instance, he said something to this effect: that to date no regulations whatsoever have been established on what 1shall allow myself to resume briefly .as trade and economic intercourse between Republican territory and the rest of Indonesia. Apparently Mr. Palar has not yet received the good news which 1 received only on 8 June, to wit: that agreement was reached on 7 June in the Netherlands Republican Economic and Financial Committee on tegulations of goo~ traffic. In so far as coastal traffic is concerned there already was an agreed settlement. Now insular traffic and international seagoing traffic are also a matter of agreement. It is a condition that within one month air traffic will follow suit. It goes without saying that, if there is a leak by way of the air,. that leak clearly must be closed. The main points are rules for port control and routing of seagoing tr~ffic. Also-àhd here 1 refer to what 1 think 1 have said previously-there exists the need for Indonesia's ecoIiomy to receive its full due'in goods or 1ù foreign currency. Imports in the Republic Recriminations "have beeil made here against my Government, and only for the sake of keeping the record clear, 1sha1l reply briefiy to them. 1 shall attempt to confine myself only ta main points, so as nof to contribute to hampering the activities of the Committee of Good Offices and of the negotiating parties. 1 propose to leave aside all petty argument and try to adhere to main lines. wbat is the position in Indonesia? There was, and is, a widespread movement there towards freedom. This freedom, fully granted as a mat:.. - ter'of principle, is now in" progress of implementation. It will culminate in _the sovereign and - independent United States of Indonesia, which is ta become a Mèmber of the United Nations-we hope next year. This new State, it is agreed, will be a federation of such units as will emerge through suitablè democratic process, as prescribed in the Renville principles with which the members ofthe Security Council are familiar. It is }T.·~re that the real dif~ ficulties begiil. The Republic of Indonesia has begun its existence ana marked1y unitarian basis-its Constitution says that explicitly-and it was headed on that bàsis by the same men who have continued ta head the Republic sinceEast Indonesi;! and ~ther areas showed that they, on their part, adopted, for such a diversified agglomeration of peoples, federation and not unitarianism as the self-evident,·natural solution. " Twice the Repul,>lic has subscribed to thât fed- -erationprogramme: first at Linggadjati, and later on board the Renville. But on close observation, one inèvitably gains the impression that every :p.ow and then the men of theRepubli~arestill being actuated by their original dream of establishing a unitarian State wWch they~ouldrule." The rejection of unitariaIlisin by other Indonesians roused them 1 do not charge-and 1 want to say this expressIy-that the Republic, in signing the Linggadjati or the Renville Agreements, acted in bad faith-i.· t at all. But it is the old story: A government or a delegation of the Republic accepts a proposition, only to find that it cannot live up to its acceptance because of opposition at home on the part of people who cling to their old dream of dominating the l'est of the archipelago, consisting of other ethnic units where, normally, the peT capita income is higher in many cases than in the Republic. That-and that alone-is the real obstacle in the way of reaching full agreement with the Republic. But, as 1 have said, there are Many signs that this agreement is coming nearer and nearer. 1 am sorry to see that, ta cloak this basic difficulty, the Republic has recourse in presenting as reprehensible and imputable to us certain developments which have taken place in strict accordance with the Renville principles. '!> There is, in the first place, the question of West Java and Madura. 1 have listened with attention to the speech made by the representative of the Republic on these points. 1 must say that 1 am not greatly irnpressed witll the criticism that has been levelled by him against my Government. His remarks seem to me ta pounce upon certain passages from the report of the Committee of If democratic ways of life are to take root in a country wbich has no tradition of democracy, as we of the West understand it, it is clear that somebody has to introduce them. We noticed that there was a very strong craving for regional autonomy in Western Java and Madura. Small wonder, when the trouble is taken to discover that both these areas differ from the point of view of race and language and customs from the rest of Java. We did not instil these differences in the population; they were just there, and they were trying to assert themselves. In the settled pre-war days, such powerful currents oi opinion could obtain a hearing in the provincial assemblies which formerly functioned there at that time. But, in the situation we found when the Republie had· ceased to exercise authority in those regions and was urgjng its officials not to co-operate with us, the Netherlands administration was the only agency available for giving an opportunity to the people to express their needs and wishes. Somewhere, somehow, a start had to be made. Well, we made that start, and far from bdng ashamed of it, we still think it was the right thing to do. The population did thereby obtain a medium ta make its needs and wishes known along lines which, as they developed and broadened, were more democratic, as we understand this term, than anything those people had known theretofore under the Republican adrrJnistr?:i:ion. That may be sin in the eyes of the Republic. It 'may be sin in the eyes of others who, blinded by clichés, mottoes or slogans, pay little heed to the aspirations of the people. But we pride <.urselves on having taken this action, and we should not feel satisfied had we refrained from taking it. These people, once freed from coercion and arbitrary authority, show that they want autonorny and not an exchange of mild Dutch control for stringent Republican rule. But 1 confidently submit to the Security Council's judgment the question: What should prevail, the preferences of the authorities in Djokjakarta-far. from Westtem Java and its people-or the legitimate aspirations of that same people enabled by us to express its will? Ris easy enough to whip up opposition to anything especially when one does not shrink from widespreadintimidation. In·the case of the Third West Java Conference, intimidation on the part of the Republic made itself felt in the very room where the Conference was held. But 1 submit To me this whole matter of the Third West Java Conferencecan be divided into three questions: First, can or cannot the West Java·Conference be considered as the best possible representative body of the population of Western Java, taking into account present circumstances prevailing in Western Java and the traditional and customary rnethods of assembling representative bodies in Java? Secondly, has or has not the Third West Java Conference reached its decisions through democratic procedures and free from restraint? Thirdly, was or was not the Netherlands Indies Government justified in recognizing the delegates to the Third West Java Conference as the provisional representatives of the population of Western Java having the task of drawing up a provisional constitution and, on this basis, appointing a provisional govèrnment for that area? . tout It is my contention that on the whole, the report of the Committee shows, to an unprejudiced reader, that the manner in which the members of this Conference were assembled came as nearly as circumstances permitted to a democratic procedure, as we know it, and that the Conference itself, although largely composed of representatives inexperienced in parliamentary affairs, reached its decisions after free discussions, free in particular from any restraint on the part of the Netherlands Government. 1 firmly believe that it cannot be denied that the decisions of the Conference were a reasonably fair expression of the opinion of the population of Western Java, the more so if one takes into account how recently this ar~a was a victim of political and economic disturbances. Th,at also was the opinion of Mr. Soejoso, the leader of the Republican Party at the Conference: who stated publicly, on 24 February, that the representatîves of the Conference had been as democratically assembled as was possible under the circumstances. What more can YOll want? Mr. Soejoso added, "We, therefore, represent the people, contrary. to the Second West Java Conference the majority of which was not democratically arrived at." ln this connexion, and by way of contrast, 1 waIlt to bring to the notice of members of the Security Council the fact that the Republ'ican Minister of Justice, Mr. Soesanto,on 8 Marchthat is, after the Third West Java Conference had taken place-declared publidythat circumstances 'Surely, this could not have happened if democratic freedoms hadbeen suppressed. I may add that no political meeting has been prohibited by the Netherlands Indies Government which had any connexion with the West Java Conference. It may be, perhaps, of sorne intereSt to the Security Council to know that Mr. Wiranata Koesoema, the new head of the State-a Republican--said recentIy in his installation speech-that he considered that the West Java Parliameni: wa'S a democratically elected body. To finish with this subject, 1 oruy want to say this: Point 2 of the twelve Renville principles, which were accepted 'by the parties on 17 January 1948, reads as follows: "It is understood that neither party has the right to prevent the free expression of popular movements looking toward political organiza.- tions which are in accord with the principles of· the Linggadjati Agreement" [document 8/649, page 111]. One of the four principles taken from the Linggadjati Agreement into the Renville principles for political discussions, reads as follows: "A sovereign State on a federal basis under a constitution which will be arriveG at by democratic processes" [document 8/649, page 112]. l submit that by virtue of these principles, the Netherlands Indies Government was perfectIy justified in recognizing the Third West,]ava Conference as the representative body of West Java. We know for a fact, moreover, that it was precisely because the organization of new States was not to be prohibited that tht~ Committee of Good Offices, in the six additional principles which it presented to the parties, included points ,4 and 5-[document 8/649, page 97]-which provide for the free expression of the will of the people in any of the various territories in Java, Madu~a In order to avoid any misunderstanding, and to alleviate any possible misgivings, 1 may add -and this is very important-that the creation of a West Java and Madura State cannot be but of a provisional character, because the fourth and fifth of the six additional Renville principles provide that, in the event of political agreement being reached with the Republic, the de1ineation of States will be determined by means of a decision taken by the populations of the.territories of Java, Madura and Sumatra, within a period of not less than six months and not more. than one year from the signing of the poli~cal agreement. Conseqtiently, a plebiscite or-as principle 4 of the six adchtional principles puts it-another method for ascertaining the will of the populations agreed upon by both partieshasto determine later whether "he populations of the. various territories just mentioned, wish the territory to form part of the Indonesian Republic or of another State within trie United States of Indonesia. Any fear or SUspiCion that the Netherlands Government is trying to confront the Republic with an accomplished fact, therefore, has no foundation, either in fact or: in law. 1 have discu..-:sed these points only for the purpose of making it cIear that we have nothing to hide, and that we are prepared to bring issues out into the open, in order ta facilitate agreement and c1arify our position. But when memberS consider this point on its true merits, 1 am sure that they will ask themselves. this question: "On what grounds is the Republic jUstified in questioning the manner of administration of territories, which under the Truce Agreement and the Renville principles are areas for which the Netherlanàs Indies' Govemment is responsible?" And another question can be put·: "If the Republic feeIs j1J.stified to interfere with the Netherlands administration of these areas, is then not the Netherlands Govemment at least equally justified to call the Republic to account for the administration of the Republican territories?" The Netherlands sovereignty over the Netherlands East Indies has never been questioned, and it has been confirmed by Mr. Soekarno in his letter to the United States Government on 10 Jüli 1947, which 1 quoted on 12 August [181st meeting). It has been recognized again in point 1 of the six additional Renville principles; moreover, the Tnlce Agreement provides for a demarcatiqn line which implies that-apart from the que~tio.n.of ~overeignty-thede façto administration of the territories on both sides of this line is in the hands of the N~therlands îndies Govern- The Security Council has sent a committee of Good Offices ta Indonesia, a committee which, 1 may add, has been given a1l facilities by the parties and which is working patiently towards a political agreement. Has the Committee of Good Offices requested the Security Council ta discuss West Java or Madura? No. Has the Commit~ tee of Good Offices suggested ta the Security Council that it would he he1pful for the negotiations ta have this debate?, Again no. Why aU this? 1 be1ieve t'hui; fcr sorne people, these nego~ tiations are only meant to be used in an attempt ta apply some sort of pressure on us. The Neth- ~ . d erlands are not by nature a nanan prepare ta yield to pressure, as our history and tradition abundantly prove. Ta tdI the truth with due,respect, my Govem~ ment is beginning ta get a little tired of the pro~ cedure which, sa fat' from keeping to the main lines ,of the fuü.onesian Republic problem, re- :gects a tendency towards discussing incidental questions of subordinate importance. Is it for that purpose that th~ Security Council was estab~ lished? We particularly do not want t.o see the promising atmosphere which surrounds the negotiations in Java being charged· with electricity by more and more speeches here on incidental questions, speeches sorne of which seem calculated ta provoke estrangement ratherthan conciliation. It seems to us that there is the less Jllstification for thes(; meet~gs because, thanks ta the tfuce which by al~J large now reigns in and around Republican territory, there is practica1ly no more bloodshed. there &.t alI. That, and this has been repeatedly said on hehalf of Aust-alia and other de1egations, is what the Seéurity Council wanted, just as it was our own desire aIse. WeIl, we have obtained that. The Security Council should let the Committee of Good Offices work ]n its effec~ tive, useful, although unostentatious and unspectacular way without holding these periodical debates here which, as 1 said, estrange the parties rather than conciliate them. It is quite evident that the situation in Indonesia, which never presented any real danger to würld peace, is now farther from presenting any In any case, my Government hopes that this Council has taken due note of 'the fact that in the territory of Western Java under Nethell:mds control it was possible for the population to elect, in unhampered freedom, an eminent Republican as head of the new Sundanese State, and that, again in unhampered freedom, a Republican was designated to form a cabinet, and that in this cabinet Republicans were given important portfolios. Now, contrast with this the Republic. Has any free parliamentary election taken place in the Republic? Is there any freedom of expression in the Republic? 1 feel sure that in their heart and conscience even those members of the Security Council who have consistently or occasionally voted or spoken against us cannot but be struck by this vivid contrast. Before concluding, let me refer to what 1 said in the beginnmg. If the negotiations with the Republic are to lead to results on the basis of the Renville Agreement, a change of hem on the part of the Republic is indispensable. Paying lip service to the principles of federation in Indonesia' and of union with the Netherlands in the form· of signing documents is not enough. A positive attitude toward their implementation is necessary. I know full well that, for reasons of their own,- there have been-and perhaps there still are-- people inclined to doubt the sincerity of our intentions. We h::ve sometimes fdt a little hurt by this distrust, fcr we know that our intentions are sincere, and we have translateù them conscientiousl'l' for the. record Lllto the working oanelS we have 'placed on the cor~ference table. JI hope it ...ill saon }Je possible or necessary to publish these papers. Everyone who is still suspicious will then have to admit that there is no ground for his suspicions as all insiders know. It is far from us ta promise one thing and give another. 1 ask you to recognize that the It seems, moreover, ta be the solution best calculated ta serve the true interests of all concemed in the conditions in which they find themselves. I hope that it will be these agreed main lines,. and nC't petty bickering, in which neither my Government' nor l, myse1f, wish to take part, that will he in the mind of the Security Council. We have not lost all hope, in spite of many disappointments, that with the assistance of the Committee of Gaad Offices a solution on 'the ~asis of the Renville Agreements may yet be found. I would beg leave to leave it at this. Mr. Palar, in his remarks, talked about other questions. He said we were guilty of causing unnecessary delays, and hé talked abont this provisional government and said something ,about changes in our Constitution which have not been completed. 1 coulcl, of course, refer to all these points separ~tely, but 1 do not think that would help us very much. I shall certaînly do so if necessary, but I would again suggest, as 1 did earlier,ta leave these negotiations alone. It is in Ja'Ja that these matters can best be dealt with. It is there, and not here, that the full information is available which is so absolutely reqùir~à if a gooà working solution is to be fOUl\d.

As the statements we have heard, today, contain very valuable remarks and comments which should be considered and examined by the members of the Security Council, together with the report' which is expected to be issued shortly by the Committee of Good Offices, if there is no objection to the suggestion made by the representative of Belgium, I consider this suggestion approved by the Security Council. The next meeting'of the Security Council to discuss this question will be held sometime next week. Mr. PALAR (Indonesian Republic): Mydele-' gation woùld like to know when the meeting can he held next week.

I was thinking of fixing a special time for the next meeting, but I find this difficult because it is no use convoking a meeting for a time when the report is not available. For this reason, I believe that we should adjourn without fixing a special day for the next meeting. As soon as thé report is available, we will notify the membersof the Security Council and the , parties concerned. 1 am not without recollection that on one or two occasions in the past the Security Council has awaited receipt of reports from the Committee of Good Offices before resuming or initiating discussion on the Indonesian question. Unfortunàte1y, for various reasons, it has been the experience of the Security Council that such reports have nat always arrived even approximately at the rime they were expected. In this particular case, as 1 understand from the representative of the Secretariat, there is no assurance at aU that the reports can he df'ected within a few dilys, or even within a period of a week or two. In that case, 1 would submit for the consideration of the President that at least a minimum period should be fixed, at the end of ''Yhich the Security Council could meet for further consideration of the Indonesian question, whether or not the report arrives in the meanrime. If the arrival of the report is a,:tually imminent at that time, then, of course, it will be open tu the Sectrrity Council to decide whether it wishes to wait for it; but 1 Llink it would be preferable for the Security Council at least to fix a date for the resumption of the discussion. _l'examen

It is expected that the report will be here by Monday or Tuesdayof next week; it can then be sent at once to themembers of the Security Council. This being the case, we could fix a meeting of the Security Council for next Thursday-one week from today-at 10.30 a.m. Mr. TARASENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated trom Russian): It seems . to me that it would he wrong to postpone the consideration of this question until we have received the report of the (;ümmittee of Godd Offices. In your first statement, Mr. President, you even said that it was difficult to fix a definite time for the next meeting of the Council on this question and you sùggested that it should be 1>ostponed indefinitely. 1 am afraid it may turn out that we shall not receive the report within the appointed rime. This report may be delay'ed for an indefinite length of time, even fdr several weeks,. before we receive it. It is not unlikely, therefore, that we shall have to postpone the consideration of this matter, for several weeks.. But ID there any justification for linking the consideration of this matter with the receipt of the report? 1 do )'Qt think so. Sufficient facts are available ...1 regar -1 to this matter to enable the Security Council 1:0 consider and discuss it. The additional data which we expect to receive in the It seems to me therefore that the date of the Security Council's next meeting on this question should not be made dependent on whether or not the report of the Committee of Good Offices is received. 1 think that it would be more appropriate to :fix the date of the next meeting on this question for tomorrow, Saturday or Monday at the latest. Mr. PILLAI (India): My delegation would Iike to'associate itself with the remarks made by the representatives of Australia and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic with regard to the undesirability of any long postponement of this debate. The facts that have DOW been presented in the reports from the Committee of Good Offices are sufficiently grave to warrant a con-, tinuatiof! of the discussion which has started today. . From these reports-and it is not my purpose or intention to go into them-the s~Jientfacts appear that a process hasaIready been started for the dismemberment of the territories of the Indonesian Republic. If it is the intention of the President to put off the debate to the Greek calendas, this process of attrition might continue indefinitely 'until, at last, aIl the limbs have been chopped off and the life of the Republic made éxtinct. Sure1y, it is not the desire of the Security COlmcil that, when events of this magnitude are taking place, it should remain silent. Therefore, 1 suggest 'that there is a very, very serious case for the continuation of the discussion. Yet 1 see the point in the remarks made by the representative of Belgium, that, since sorne additional information Wlexpected, weemight weIl wait for that, if that infomtation is expected in a reasonable tîme. We aIso have the· assurance of the representative of the Secreta:.iat that this information might possibly be expected early next week, so that, as the President suggested, a meeting on Thursday might be possible. 1 suggest that there should be a certain dissociation between the idea of the receptiOn of the new report and the date of the next meeting on ~ subject. 1 suggest that the President should :fix the date for Thursday" whether or not the additional report has been r~ceived.

1 suggest that the next meeting on this subject should be on Thursday, 17 June 1948, at 10.30 a.m., whether or not the report has been received. As there is no objection, that suggestion is adopted.