S/PV.318 Security Council

1 have received the report of the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council concernmg the credentials of the representative of Colombia [document 8/835]. 1 will ask the Assistant Secretary- 'General to read the report. The PRESffi1:NT: ! consider that these credentials are in order and conform to our rules of procedure, and the representative of Colombia is we1comed to the Security Council. 125. Application of Ceylon for member- .ship in the United Nations (document 5/820)

According ~o rule 59 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council: "The Secretary-General shall immediately place the application for membership before the representatives on the Security Council. Unless the' Security Council decides otherwise, the application shall be referred by the President to a committee of the Security Council upon which each member of the Security Cpuncil shall be represented ..." . This application, therefore,.shouId be sent ta the Committee on the Admission of New M·embers. As there is no objection, 1 her~by transfer the application to the Committee on the Admission of New Members. 126. Letter date~ 26 May 1948 from the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, addressed to thePresident of the 5ecurity -Council, transmitting the Third Rf'lpoi1 of the Commission (documents 5/812 and AEC/3U

Discussion is now open on the Third Report of the Atomic Energy Commission. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America): The position and views of the· United States on the international control of atômic energy have' beep. c1early stated on many occasions and are wellknown to. the Security Council. ,. . .Atqmic weapons were first' deve10ped during . tl,tewar agaïnst the 1\:xis Powers. How terrible Immediately after the use of this weapon, the United States propùsed international control in order to ensure that this new dîscovery might be used for peaceful purposes only, for tlie welfare of all nations, rather than as an imt.rument of destruction. Toward this end the United States has made, and will continue tomake, every possible effort. Subject to the putting into effect of a system of control, the necessary basis of which has been set forth in the First and Second Reports of the Atomic Energy Commission, the United States is proposing to dispose of its atomic bombs, to give up all its activities in the production of dangerous quantities of atomic materials, and to turn over its knowledge of these processes to an international agency. Two and one half years ago, the General Assembly by urLanimous vote created. the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations and laid ùown its term of reference.1 At the first meeting of the Commission, the United States made certain proposaIs for the control of atomic energy for peaceful purposes omy and the elimination of atomic weapons from national armaments.2 As the negotiations progressed, other de1egations made important contributions, so that before long the search for effective control became a truly co-operative effort on the part of fourteen of the seventeen nations who are or have been members of the Atomic Energy Commi~ion. -i' . .During a period of two years, and in over two hundred meetings, this co-operative effort has resulted in the preparation of a plan which would meet the terms of reference laid down by the General Assembly, by controlling atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use for peaceful purposes only, by eliminating atomic ~e~pons from national armaments, and by pro- V1d~ng safeguards necessary to the security of an nations. This plan provides for an international control agency which would own aIl source material and nuclear fuel, own, operate and manage aIl dangerous facilities, license aIl nondangerous activhies in this field, and conduct inspections to prevent diversions of material or clandestine operations. Further, the plan of thè.majority provides th·at a system of quotas, assigning to each signatorY 1 ~ee Resolutions adopted by the General Assembty durmg the first part of its first session, page 9. . " . the ~oviet Union proposaIs ignore the existing technical knowledgeof the problem of atomic energy control, do not provide an adequate basis for the .effective international control of atomic energy and the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and, therefore, do not conform to the terms of reference of the Atomic Energy Commission." In addition,.the majority has found that the insistenceof the Union of Soviet Socialist . Republics on the prohibition and destruction of .atomic weapons prior ta the establishment of any control system is unrealistic because it does not protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions and does not therefore meet the terms of reference of the Commission laid down by the General Assembly in January of 1946. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Poland .and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist . Republic have rejected the majority proposaIs, . "The majority of the Commission is fully aware of the impact of its plan on traditional prerogatives of national sovereignty. But in the face of the realities of the problem it sees no alternative to the voluntary sharing by nations of their sovereignty in this field to the extent required by its proposals." Sîncere efforts, prolonged study and many debates have not enabled the majority to secure .the agreement of the: Uniqn of Soviet Socialist Republics to-and 1 use the language of the report-"even those elements of effective control considered essential from the technical point of view, let alone their acceptance of the nature and exteut of participation in the world community required of all nationsinthis field by the First and Second Reports of the Atomic Energy Commission". ln view of the nature of the impasse in th.:: Atomic Energy Corrur.ission, it is now prcpased ta transfer these negotiations to· a higher level. It is the hbpe of my Government that the debates in the Security Council and in the General Assembly will enable the nations of the world to assess this situation in the light of the experience of the Atomic Energy Commission, the findings it has made, the lessons it has drawn from the difficulties it has met, and the conclusions which it has reached. My de1egation is of the OpInIOn that the Security Council, in keeping with its responsibility, should state its position clearly. My delegation hopes that in the consideration of these matters in the Security Council and in the General Assembly, the Union of Soviet Socialist ~epubIics, together with .ail other nations, may come to recognize the soundness of the plans so "Approves the 'Report and Recommendations of the Atomic Energy Commission' (Part 1) of the Third Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, and "Directs the Secretary-General to transmit to the General Assembly and to the Member ,nations of the United Nations the First, Second and Third Reports of the United Nations Atoriric Energy Commission, together w:.th the record of the Security Council's approval thereof." [Document 8/886:] Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): The recomm~ndation made'. by the Atomic Energy COnuIDssion in this, its Tb..ird Report, that its work· should be suspended at this time meets withthe approval of my. Government. 1 hopetherefore that the Security Council will endorse this recommendation and convey tD the next regular session. of the General Assembly the views expressed here, inviting that body to debate thisissue as one of special c0D:cern. The Security Council still has before it the First and Second Reports of the Atomic Energy Commission. In àresolution of 10 March 1947, the &ecurity Council referred the First Report back to the Atomic Energy Commission and urged the latter body to continue its inquiry into ail phases of the pi"Oblem and to report further.6 A second report was duly presented under a lettèr from the then Chairman, dated 11 September 1947. Thé Security Councilhas not debatéd this report or passed judgment upon it•. ,My Governm.ent takes this opportunity of endorsing this earlier work of the Atomic Energy ~ .id that, during the past two years, concrete proposals have been formulated wmch are of the most far-reaching significance. Accordingly, the recommendations of the First and Second Reports are ac"'epted by my Government as an invaluable study of the technical problern, wmch should constitute the basis of further studies which we hope aI;ld intend shall take place when conditions are appropriat~. It is not, of course, our view that the proposaIs evolved by the majority of Governments, represented in the United Nations Atomic Ene;:gy Commission represent unalterably the last word in effective control, but we consider that proposaIs on these lines offer the only means of enabling the world to devel0p whatever uses for peace this new force may promise, and at the sarne time praviding for the .elipJ.ination of atomic weapons as instruments·of .national policy. Discussions in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, however, have not foundered on questions of detail rcgarding the majority proposals, but, as stated explicitly in the Third Report, on the failure of one country or group of countries to take into account·eveb. the essential eJcments of any system of international control. It has not taken two years of discussion to determine what these essential e1ements are; two years of discussion have, however, served to c1arify them and ta confirm what intelligent men all the world ·:er had realized from the' day on which it becan1.e lmown that the atomic bomb had been used successfully, namely, that success in this field requires international collaboration on an unprecedented scale. The concept of sovereignty embodied in the system of national States, which has been the domi...'1ant political factor in the last few hundred years of history, is already outdated, and.the lesson of this newest discovery of science is that fresh inroads must be made upon absolute sovereignty if civilization is to survive. . . The fundamental issue, therefore~ .is not whether there shall be management of tbis plant or inspection of that; it is W\b.ethernations will accept sorne supra-national authority in the field of atomic energy. The majority proposals of this Commission sketch the functions that such an authority must exercise. Sorne of these functions might be modified in the light of further studies, sorne abandoned and new ones conceived. My Governmént would be prepared to spend infinite1y more timeand effort than it has Atomic eIiergy is not a problem that is going to beset us for the next three, five, twenty or. fifty years only, but for an the years to come. It is a newly revealed fact of nature with which mankind is desth1.cd ta live for the rest of its civilized existence. If recurring frictions between national COIlli"Ilunities are, in the future as in the past, to be settled in the last resort by force of ,arms, then sooner or later civilization as we know it must destroy itself, because with atomic weapons available for use in such wars there can be no other outcome. More destructive wea;''"Jns . may be deve1oped, but the fact that atomic weapons aIready exist is sufficient to wam us that national rivalries will lead at best to a peace encumbered with the intolerable burden of atomic armaments, or at worst to war, with 'Meard-of destruction to all the nations involved. It is argued that the supra-national approach is unrealistic, that it puts the matter of atomic energy control beyond the bounds of the possible. But who shall say what is possible and what is not? The orders of nature cannot be countermanded and human institutions must adapt themse1ves accordingly, for human institutions can be adapted, even though the price may be the sacrifice of notions based on human convention and even law. W'l1ere nature will not yie1d, human arrangements must yie1d. It is in fact the genius of the human race and ~!'~ condition of its survival that it can 50 adapt itself. It is for these reasons that my Government endorses the majority proposaIs developed in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, subject to the previously declared reservations on points which can only be c1arified as the result of further e1aboration of the existing proposaIs, and it rejects counter-proposaIs which would lead only to faise hopes and the prospect of further failure. Tt iseasy to see that a body such as the Atomic Energy Commission cannot by itself resolve Lhis deadlock, which is fundamentally political, and that it is useless to continue further detailed discussion in the Commission it.self until, at a higher leve1, It has been possible to produce an atmosphere of confidence without which no negotiatians can result ir. agreement. Such discussion can indeed be worse than useless when, for .. t.,. General McNAUGHTON (Canada): The attitude of the Canadian delegation ta the three reports of the Atomic Energy Commission as a whole, as weIl as to their several parts, has been stated from time ta time in the'Atomic Energy Commission, and is dn record. 1 should, howevér, like ta state briefly the views of the Canadian delegation regarding the general situation in which the Atomic Energy Commission finds itself at the present time) and which the Commission now has ta report to the Security Council. It is a matter of profounci disappointment that . the Atomic Energy Commission, after two years of sincere effort ta fulfil the mandate given to it by the General Assembly in its resolution of 24 January 1946, now has ta report that it has reached an impasse. The reason for this state of affairs is set out c1early for all to see in the three reports which are before the Security Council for its consideration, and which we must aIso transmit to the General Assembly, which established the Commission and defined its responsibilities. The situation, h.. the opinion of the Canadian delegation, does not calI for recrimination but for a serious effort ta fac' .Ip ta realities. For no one can fail.ta realize the dangers resulting from international rivalry in the field of atomic energy and, in particular, from competitive efforts ta obtain and develop atomic weapons. This Jangerolls condition will confront the world so long as a universally acceptable and enforceable agreement for the internatio<lal control of atomic· energy does not exist. The divergence of views, which months of patient discussion in the Commission has failed to bridge, as we aIl know, has arisen in consequence of the insistence of the USSR that a convention outlawing atomico weapons and providing for their destruction must precede· any ~greement for the es~ablishmen.t of a system of mternational control. The majority of the Unfortunately, the USSR conception of L'lese controls falls far short of what the majority of the Commission believe to be essential to ensure that atomic energy will not become a matter of international rivalry and a menace to world security. The main condition which the majority regards as essential for the purposes of international security is that aIl dangerous activities in the field of atomic energy should not be operated by national authorities but should, in the interest of common security, be entrusted e,.xclusively to the international agency which has been proposed. Unfortunate1y, it is this essentiai main consideration which is unacceptable to the USSR. Throughout the whole of the efforts of the Commission, 1 can claim that the Canadian de1e~ation has devoted itself to the search for a method of control which would give security to ali nations. We have, 1 hope, shown that we were willing to examine with an.open mind any and all proposaIs put before us, including those which were advanced by the USSR delegation. We had hoped that the scientific and technQlogical facts, as revealed in the discussions in the Scientific and Technical Committee and through the testimony of experts, would point the way ta what was necessary for effective control and thereby provide a basis for agreement. If these efforts have not yet proved successful, 1 would emphasize that this should not be regarded as an acceptance of defeat, or a confession of failure on the part of the United Nations ',,0 achieve an effective system of international control of atomic energy. It is clear that the majority of the members of the Commission have been convinced that the proposaIs evolved in these three reports do provide the essential basis for the establishment of an effective system of international control of atomic energy. It is, 1 believe, appropriate that those who have been associated in the evolution of these proposaIs, through months of hard and patient work, should now submit the results of their efforts to the test of opinion in a wider forum, not only in this Security, CounciJ. but aiso in the General Assembly of the United Nations itself. If the work of the Atomic Energy Commission IS now to be suspended, however, the challenge to the peoples of the world to find a solution to the problem of the control of this force, potentially sa destructive to mankind if uncontrolled, still remains. Indeed, the reports of the Com~ , mission must be a stimulus to further effort, for we have in these reports the fundamental elements required for a plan of èffective control. We have also set out the essential facts of atomic energy, and these facts are obstinate and cannot be validly denied. AlI the nations represented on the Commission, except three, have been able tu draw the same conclusions from these facts. Perhaps those who DOW disagree with us may yet come to share our views. We eamestly hope that this will be so.

Since 1 have no more speakers on my list, it will depend upon the desire of the members of the Security Council whether we continue the deblil.te on this subject at another meeting, or whether, if the members are sé.'.tisfied with what has been said, the resoIution shall now be put to the vote. It may be that sorne members wish to speak, but are not ready to speak today. Mr. GROMYI<:.O (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): 1 should like to make a statement on behalf of the USSR ' delcgation, but if there is no objection 1 should p~efer to make my statement at the next meeting. Mr. PARODI (France) (translated from French): 1 also would Hke to speak at our next meeting.

We could have held a meeting this aftemoon, had we announced it yesterday, but 1 understood that sorne of the members wouid not be ready to speak t'l}is afternoon. If the'mEl'tter is not pressing or urgent, we could hold a meeting sorne day next wèe! The members," the Security Council may need time ta considc thi.l matter now that this draft resolution has been presented by the representative of the United States, and perhaps wermay come to sorne favourable conclusion if the meet-

Wednesday of next week is free, but Thursday is not, since on Thursday aftemoon the Security Council is to meet to consider the Indonesian question. We could hold the meeting on Wednesday aftemoon. Since there is no objection, our next meeting to . consider the Third Report.of the Atomic Energy Commission will be held on Wednesday next at 2.30 p.m. - . The meeting Tose at -11.55 a.m. THREE HUNDRED AND NINETEENTH MEETING Held at Lake SUCCé'SS, New York, on Friday, 11 June 1948, at 12.15 p.m. President: Ml'. F. EL-KHoURI (Syria). Present: The representatives of the following countries: Argentina, Bdgium, Canada, China, Colombia, France, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Repu~lic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America. 127. Official communiqué The following communiqué was issued by the Security Oouncil aiter the meeting: "In a closed meeting, the Security Council considc;.red a request by the Military Staff Committee for information whether it would accompany the Council to Paris. The Council decided, that there was no present need for the MilitaryStaff Committee to proceed to Paris."