S/PV.321 Security Council

At the last meeting of the Security Council on thissubject [318th meeting], three of the permanent membersof the Atomic Energy Commission expressed their views. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics expressed a desire to be the first speaker at the meeting today, and 1 therefore recognize him. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of· Soviet Socialist Republiês) (translated tram Russian): The Security Co1.mcil has before it the Second and It should be noted that even after its First Report had been considered in the Security Couneil, the work of the Atomic Energy Corn. .rité, mission did not make much progress. This is shown by the continued existence of serious divergence of vi~ws on the most important questions of international control. These divergent sont vie'ws are reflected in the Commission's Second trouvé and. Third Reports. Troisième The USSR delegation is of the opinion that the Security Couneil should carefully consider the situation which has now been brought about 1 in the Atomic Energy. Commission and that it l'énergie should endeavour ta find a means of overcoming the existing disagreements, at least on the most important questions. It is to be hoped that tantes. the delegations of other countries share this view because, if it were merely a matter of nous noting disagreements) little would be gained from the consideration of the Atomic Energy Commission's reports in the Security Council. The delegation of the Soviet Union considers it essential to dwell upon the main points of disagreement and to expose the real reasons for the fallure to reach agreement. The task entrusted to the Atomic Energy Commission was to prepare proposais for the Security Council in accordance with the General . Assembly resQlution [VIII-1] of 24 January and [41 (I)] of 14 December 1946 providing for the prohibition of atomic weapons and for the establishment of international control of atomic energy with a view to preventing its use for militar}' purposes. qu'il l'énergie l'Assemblée This task is a component part of the United Nations general plan adopted on 14 December 1946 by the General Assembly in New York in regard to the general reduction of armaments and anned forces. This fact emphasizes still more the significance of the task, because the aforementioned -resolution is of great significance for the strengthening of inte1'I!-ational peace and security. AImost two years have passed since the Atomic Energy Commission hegan its work. It bas had quitesufficient time to prepare proposaIs for the Secu..1'ity C Juncil with a view to implementing the General Assembly resolutions or, at any rate, to conclude a convention prohibiting atomic weapons, thus solving the most important and urgent problém confronting the United Nations. It is well known that the task of international· control of atomic energy is to eliminate atomic weapons from national armaments, that is to .say, to prohibit their production and use, and to ensure that atomic energy shaU be used only for peaceful purposes. Of course, the prohibition of atomic weapons can and must be supplemented by other measures, including inspection of plants engaged in the production of atomic energy. These supplementary measures, however, must be s'Jbordinated to the fundamental task, whkn is the prohibition of atomic weapons. This is selfevident, because international control of atomic energy would be meaningless and futile if it failed to provide in the first imtance for the prohibition of atomic weapons. Only if there is a decision to prohibit atomic weapons, will .~"ere be any sense in establishing international cOiitl'ol to guarantee the effective implementation of that decision. The whole sense of establishing international control is to have an organ that would supervise the implementation by aU the States subscribing to the convention of their obligation not to permit atomic energy to be used for military purposes. Hence it is clear that it would be wrong to shunt the whole matter on to the question of so-called international control as the United States Government is doing. Before you control anything you must decide for what purpose you are going to control. There can be on1y one ",l'Organisation ~urpose, name1y, the prohibition of the productlOn and use of atomic weapons. That is the task which the United Nations has set itself. Control must be subordinated to that task. Unless this !ask is fulfilled in the first place, there is no sense m talking about the establishment of international control, because the latter would be futile in such circumstances. The prohibition of atornic weapons and the establishment of effective inter- ~~tional. control as a means of ensuring the t~It~ful Implementation of the decision to prohibIt the production and use of such arms, is the task ~f the Atomic Energy Commission and the Secunty Council which are to take practical measures to that end. Ali this, it would seem, should be clear to everyone because it corresponds to the decisions taken by the United Nations. "(a) not ta use atomic weapons in any cil'- cumstances whatsoever; atomiques; "(b) to prohibit the production and storing of weapons based on the use of atomic energy; d'armes " (c) to destroy within a period of three months from the day of the entry inta force of the present convention all stocks of atomic energy weapons whether in a finished or unfinished condition." à présente miques, The draft lays down that any violation of the above obligations is a most serious international crime against humanity. It also provides that the Righ Contracting Parties shall, within a period of six months from the day of the entry into force of the convention, pass legislation providing severe penalties for violators of the statutes of the convention. engagements comme gravité également devaient, du promulguer infraction How WF"s the proposaI of the Soviet Union to prohibit atomic wcapons received? It is well known that certain countries, particularly the United States, received it unfavourably. From the very beginning the United States representatives in the Atomic Energy Commission adopted an attitude wmch underestimated the significance of' the question of prohibiting atomic weapons and ignored the aforementioned General Assembly resolution of 14 December 1946, which required such a measure to be taken. de des et attitude tion. mission de semblée semblée It was clear from the earliest meetings of the . Atomic Energy CO,mmission that the United States Government was attempting to submerge the question of the prohibition of atomic weapons in all kinds of other questions of lesser importance. It has tried, and is still persistently trying to divert the AtoDÙc Energy COmllÙSsion's attention from the solution of this important problem to the discussion of questions which often have no bearing on control, and to the discussion of various proposals contrary to the General Assembly resolution and to other fundamental principles of the United Nations. The Commission's attention is being diverted to the discussion of the notonous Baruch Plan Subsequently 1 shaU have a few words to say about the way in which these OOt United States proposais, which were made in the Atomic Energy Commission in June 1946, were developed in the course of discussion. 1 mention them at this stage in order to show that the United States representatives on the Atomic Energy . Commission and the Security Council have done, and are still doing their utmost to sidetrack and ignore the main task, naJllely, the conclusion of a convention to prohibit atomic weapons. What does the Government of the USSR base itself upon in submitting its, proposal for the conclusion, in the first place, of a convention to prohibit ato.mic weapons, and in insisting on the adoption of a decision to that effect? 1t bases itself on the obvious fact that such weapons are weapons of aggression. They are designed to exterminate peaceful populations, mainly in the great cities. That is why opposition to the prohibition of atomic weapons cannot be justified by claims that they are of a defensive character. These assertions which are made by those opposed to the prohibition of atomic weapons and which are put forward to justify their own aggressive attitude are clearly intended to mislead public opinion and to conceal from it the real purpose of such weapons and the real plans with which these people connect them. Those opposed to the prohibition of atomic weapons usually point out that their prohibition, by itself, does not remove the danger of atomic energy being produced and used for warlike purposes, or of ato,mic weapons being produced. In other words, they admit the possibility of a violation by some countries of the convention for the prohibition of atomic weapons. . But this argument is not at all convincing, as It could be used against any international agreement and against any international convention. Nevertheless, we aU know of the existence of international agreements and conventions. Without ~uch conventions and agreements, normal relatIOns between countries would be altogether impossible. Furthermore, the delegation of the USSR in the Atomic Energy Commission and the Security Council has never asserted that a convention to prohibit atomic weapons should not be supplemented by other measures in connexion with the establishment of ato,mic control. 1t has always stressed the point that the conclusion of The task is to stress the importance of and necessity for the convention for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the significance of the obligations assumed by the States subscribing to it. For that very reason the Government of the Soviet Union has proposed that it should be distinctly stated in the convention that any viola-' tion of the obligations assumed under the convention should be treated as a most serious international crime. It is already unrlerstood that in the event of a violation of the convention, appropriate measures would have to he taken against offenders to ensure that the situation would be remedied in the interests of peace and security. These measures should be of a sufficient nature to compel everyone to respect and fulfil the convention and the obligations assumed thereunder. Obviously, the question of the prohibition of atomic weapons cannot be separated from that of the destruction of existing stocks of such weapons, because it is impossible to envisage a situation in which the prohibition of atomic weapons would be accomplished while stocks of weapons continued to exist. It would seem that if you agree to the necessity of prohibiting atomic weapons, it is impossible to abject to the following thesis which was discussed in the Atomic Energy Commission: ". . . The convention or conventions should provide for the destruction of stocks of manufactured atomic weapons and of unfinished atomic weapons and for the use of the nuclear fuel contained therein for peaceful purposes only."2 This proposaI was submitted by the Soviet Union in the course of the discussion. The majority of the Commission agreed to this proposal but subsequently yielded to pressure by the United States delegation and evaded' any decision on the matter. We may well ask how the problem of establishing international control of atomic energy can be seriously discussed when at the same rime objections are raised against proposaIs providing for the utilization for peaceful purposes of the nuclear fuel contained in atomic weapons. Is it not clear that sueh a position can only be taken by those who pay lip service to the' necessity of establishing control of atomic energy, but, in practice, frustrate the solution of this ;.mportant question. We are usuaIly. told by the United States representatives that the proposaI to prohibit At the same time, the fact is being ddiberate1y obscured that the Soviet Union, far from objecting to control and inspection, considers them . essential, presuming, of course, that these measures-inspection in particular-would be based on the decisions adopted by the United Nations, would be subordinated to the fulfilment of the terms of the convention for che prohibition of atomic weapons and would be in accordance with the principles of the United Nations, and, in particular, with the principle of the sovereignty and independence of the States parti€s to the convention. The de1egation of the Soviet Union considers it essential to draw the Security Council's attention once again to the'fact that the position of those who oppose the conclusion of a convention to prohibit atomic weapons and who make the conclusion of such a convention dependent upon the acceptance of the United States plan, cannot .be justified. Such a position testifies to the reluctance of sorne countries to carry out the General Assembly decision on the control of atomic energy. Undoubtedly, the responsibility for this rests on the United States, whose ruling circles have their own schemes which depend for their execution on the absence of any international control of atomic energy and on the unlimited production of atomie weapons. The statements of sorne eminent United States leaders who are or were connected with the shar;ng of United States foreign poliey in the field of atomic control such as Senator McMahon and Ml', Bymes, former Secretary of State, as weIl as the stat~me1'lts of the official United States representatives· in the Atomic Energy Commission, leave no doubt as to the goal of the leading United States circles. They are attempting to frustrate the establishment of international control of atomic energy, to increase production of atomic weapons, to increase app:opriations of funds for that purpose, to intensify fear and instàbilLv in international relao E '. tlO11S and to J.oster a war psychosis, which has c:lready ~eriously affected many people, partlcularly ID the United States. These circles intend to continue to brandish their atomic weapon, regarding it as a means of politica! pressure on other States, above all on the Soviet Union, although it would seem to In arder tô conceal their true plans and intentions, they continue ta talk, of course, of the necessity of establishing international control. This is done, however, in arder ta hoodwink public opinion, ta confuse the whole question cif control, ta drag out the discussion for years in the United Nations, and ta endeavour to shift the blame from the guilty to the innocent by making out that it is not the United States of America but the USSR which is hindering the establishment of ccntrol. This is how the matter now stands with regard to the prohibition of atomic weapons and the conclusion of a convention ta that end. This is the essence of the disagreements. From what l have said it is quite clear who is really responsible for frustrating the fulfument of the task of prohibiting atomic weapoIlcl and establishing effective international control. There are also a number of other important questions on which it has sa far been impossible ta reach agreement on account of the obstructive attitude of the United States of America. l shall now dwell briefly on the most important of these questions. During the debates in the Atomic Energy Commission, the question was repeatedly raised of the date for the establishment of international control and inspection of plants engaged in the production of atomic energy as a means of ensuring the implementation of the convention for the prohibition of atomic weapons. This question, however, was usually raised by the USSR delegation in spite of the ~ttitude adopted by the United States repres,entatives. From the very beginning of the work of the Atomic Energy Commission, itbecame clear that the United States Government did not wish to consider the question of the date for the introduction of control and inspection of plants producing final atomic materials (nuc1ear fuel). No mention of this subject was made in the Baruch Plan, although it contained a detaiIed programme for the establishment of control and inspection of sources of raw' materials and an elaborate scheme for making the United States of America-or, to be more exact-the United States monopolistic combines the masters of the atomic industry 'of the whole world. üwing to this attitude of the United States of America, the discussion in the Atomic Energy Commission has been to a large extent of an academic nature. The represent2,tives of the United States and of those countrieB that support the United States plan, deliberately side-tracked the question of time limits for the establishment of control and inspection of atomic plant facilities. They tried to strip the question of time limits o{ its real content and switched the discussion to abstraCt discussion of control and inspection, devoid of aIl prachcal meaning. It is, therefore, not in the least surprising that neither in the First Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, nor even in the Second and Third Reports, ls there any reference to the question of time limits for the establishment of control and inspection. It was precisely. in order to put the debates in the Atomic Energy Commission on a more practical level, tha.t the USSR, as far back as 1947, when the First Report y,ras under discussion, submitted a proposal (in the form of an amendment to that Report) calling for L"le simultaneous establishment of control and inspection of all plants producing atomic materials. This proposaI read as follows: "Control and inspection on the part 6f an international organ are applied in regard to aIl existing plants for the production of final atomic IJ6aterials (nuclear fuel) immediately after an appropriate convention or conventions are put ü~to effect." During the discussion of this USSR proposal, the representatives of certain States submitted a further amendment, which amounted to saying that the establishment of an international control agency should precede control and inspection. This amendment was accepted by the USSR ?elegation, as was another amendment proposmg that control and inspection shoüld be established simultaneously over plants producing final atomic materials and over the sources of faw materials, although it must be obvious to aIl that the most urgent problem is the controi and inspection of plants actually producing final atomic materials that can be used for the manufacture of atomic weapons. When the USSR amendment ta the First Report of the Atomic Energy Commission was considered, it already became clear that the United States Government was opposed ta the introduction of control and inspection {lf plants producing atomic materials. Thereby;, ckarly revealed its real position in respect not only of the prohibition of atomic weapons, but also· of control and inspection. 1t is utterly absurd to maintain that control and inspection should only apply to raw materials. 1t would be equally absurd to try ta enforce the convention on control if no· control or inspection had been established. If control and inspection of all plants are not established simultaneously as soon as a convention is concluded, then what remains ta he done? Here again the United States attitude towards this question is a denial of the very basis of international control. We may weil ask what this is all about and what real goal the United States is striving for by taking such an attitude. During the discussion of the USSR proposal and of a number of other questions, it became quite evident that the United States Government would Iike the establishment of control ta be limited to the sources of raw materials. This idea is made clear in aIl the statements made by the United States representatives. 1t is not diflicult ta realize that acceptance of this point of view would mean ':hat the United States industrial and financial magnates would lay their hands on the raw materials in other countries, thereby restricting the freedom of action of those other countries while fully safeguarding their own position and reserving freedom of action in the future. 1t is quite impossible, hûwever, to accept such a point of view. It would be entirely unjustified to demand the establishment of control over raw materials without the simultaneous establishment of control over plants and facilities for the production of final atomic materiaIs. Are raw materials more dangerous than, for example, the atomic bomb? Certainly not. R".w materiaIs by themselves do not constitute a danger. Therefore, if control is to be established, undoubtedly it must be established at one and the same time over the sources of raw .material and plants producing nuclear fuel. évident produisent temps tières As is well known, the USSR delcgation, on instructions from its Government, submitted detailed proposals concerning inspection on 11 June 1947. These proposalsprovided for the carrying out, by an international control agency, of periodic inspections of facilities engaged in the mining of atomic raw materials and in the production of atomic materials and energy.' It also provided for special investigations by the control agency whenever there was reason to suspect violations of the convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons. These proposaIs included a detailed definition of the functions and rights of the international control commission in the field of inspection. In particular, it was tf,' investigate the activities of facilities for mining atomic raw materiaIs and for the production of atomic energy; to check existing stocks of atomic raw materials, atomic materials, and unfinished products, and to study production operations to the e:1l:tent necessary for l' ~ control of the use of atomic materials and ~ ',mie e~ergy; etc. The rights to be assigned to the international c.ontrol commission inc1uded access to any facilitles ~or mining, production and stockpilirlg of atoffilC raw materiaIs and atomic ;.aaterials; acquaintance with the production operations of the atonuc er-ergy facilities, to the extent necessary for the control of the use of atomic materials and atomic energy; requesting from the Government of any nation, and checking, various data and reports on the activities of atomic energy facilities; etc. 1. Establishment of ownership by the international control agency of facilities for the production of atomic materiaIs and atomic energy; 2. Transfer of the management of facilities for the production of atomic materials and atomic energy to the international control agency; 3. Vesting the international cdntrol agency with the right to permit or forbid countries to build plants or factories for the production of atomic energy (the so-called liceHsing system). In submitting its proposaIs of 11 June 1947, the USSR Government had no intention of adapting them to the United States control plan, which must be rejected as being utterly unacceptable. The USSR propol'1~ls were put forward in the hope that they might form a basis . ~or agreement, since they stem from the United Nations decision of 14 December 19t6. Combined with the convention on the prohibition of âtomic weapons, the USSR proposaIs ensure the establishment of effective control without, however, infringing on the sovereignty and independence of the States parties to the control system. The United Staées proposaIs, on the other hand, are incompa;':ble with national sovereignty, as the USSR delegation has already had occasion to point 01:t during the Security Council's discussions on the First Report of the Atumic Energy Commission. The adoption of the United States proposaIs would mean in practice that the United States would te given a new opportunity to interfere in the economic affairs of other States through the instrumentality of international control cf atonllc energy. The adoption of these proposaIs would mean that atomic production facilities would come under the control of the American monopolists, who are ready to ride roughshod over the sovereignty and independence of any country if it suits their selfish interests. The USSR Government has no intention of permitting a situation, whereby the nationaI economy of the Soviet Union or particular branches of that el;Ol~omywould be placed under foreign control. Tll' Governments of sorne other countries may look at this question in a different light; that is their affair. 1 might add that the United States proposaIs are unacceptable for the further reason that they are incompatible with the principle of unanimity of the perma,'1ent members of the Security Council. As far back as 1946, the United States representative submitteù a proposaI on the subject of t..h.e veto in connexion with the question of sanctions. Although that matter was never discussed in detail either in the Atomic Energy Commission or in the Security Council, neverthe1ess~ the position of the United States Government in that regard is clear enough. It is attempting to limit the application of the mIe of unanimity in sa far as sanctions are concerned, However, the question of sanctions is perfectIy clear. Only the Security Council can apply sanctions. Yet the representatives of the United States are trying to push through proposaIs which would also empower the international control agency to impose sanctions. The meaning of the United States proposaIs is not hard to grasp. Their acceptance would mean that decisions on sanctions would be adopted by a simple majority at the dictation of the United States representatives. If we recall what happened ta a good many decisions taken in the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and other organs of the United Nations, it is easy ta realize what this would lead ta in practice. Ta hope that the USSR would accept such proposaIs is indeed to lose aIl sense of reality. The USSR has repeatedly pointed out that the sternest measures, including sanctions, must be provided in cases of violation of the convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons. 1 have already pointed out that the USSF iraft convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons c~>otains a speciaI clause l),ccording to which any vlOlation of the convention is to be regal'ded as a most serious crime against humanity. . Furthermore, the USSR delegation submitted simultaneously with the draft convention a proposaI 'providing for the creation of a special committee for the prevention of the utilization of atomic energy ta the detriment of mankind. It was to be one of the tasks of that committee ta elabo.rate. ~ system of sanctions against the unlawful utillzatlOn of atomic energy. In tbis Guly exceedingly naïve minds can regard the United States propos~s as a possible basis for agreement. Actually, they are not even intended to foster such agreement. Past experience in the Atomic Energy Commission shows that these proposals are merely designed to frustrate the establishment of international cont!"ol over atomic energy. As a result of this attitude of the United States Government, the Atomic Energy Commission has been unable to reach agreement on any important questions. It would seem that the situation which has arisen should compel us to seek agreement on proposaIs which could serve as an effective basis for such agreement. That would be a logical way out of the present situation if aIl the States representea on the Atomic Energy Commission, which are also represented on the Security Council. were guided primarily by the common interests of the United Nations and by the desire for the maintenance of peace. Instead of seeking agreement, the representatives of the United Kingdom, France and the United States have proposed that the work of the Atomic Energy Commission should be suspended altogether and that the whole '-luestion of atomic control should be laid bdore the General Assembly at its next regular session. What l'easons were given by these delegations for their proposaI? Their reasons were rather odd. They said that since no agreement had been reached in the Atomic Energy Commission, we should let the General Assembly try i18 luck. At the same time, of course, they did not stint themselves in unfounded accusations against the USSR, whose position was said to be an obstacle ta the establishment of international control. The USSR delegation objected to tms proposaI ort the grounds that the point at issue was not which organ of the United Nations should consider the question of international control, but what proposaIs should be submitted for con,sideration and what would be the positions Neither that resolution nor the report of the Working Committee states the reasons why the USSR proposaIs cannot serve a: a basis for agreement. The authors of these documents confine thernselves to incidental remarks to the effect that prohibition of atomi.c weapons does not have the importance which the USSR attaches to it, that that country's proposaIs regarding inspection do not ensure the creation of effective control, and that the USSR proposaIs concerning the prevention of clandestine activitics in the field of atomic energy production do not constitute adequate safeguards. In this connexion, it must be pointed out that the position of the USSR in these matters, as in a number of other questions, is often distorted Thus, for instance, the authors of those documents aIlege that the USSR underestimates the importance of prevention and suppression of clandestine activities in the field of atomic energy production. SpecificaIly, they point out that it is one of the defects of the USSR proposais that although, besides inspection they make provision for special investigations, such investigations are to be carried out only when a State is suspected of violating the convention. It is true that the USSR proposaIs provide for special investigations when there are reasons to' suspect a State of having violated the convention. But that is the only correct. way to state the question. Indeed, special investigations cannot be carried out in the absence of any grounds or valid reason for them. 1 fail to see why these proposaIs should be unacceptable. Can there really be anybody who pictures special investigations as a sort of gallivanting about the territory of a foreign State without any reason or justification? 1 think that if the authors of those documents pursue such an idea further, they will put themse1ves in a rather ridiculous situation. It must be noted that the Second and Third Reports of the Atomic Energy Commission, approved by a majoùy of that Commission 1 c0!ltain no original ideas whatsoever. Both re~ '\ The Sec:md Report of the Atomic Energy Commission is largely devoted to the operational functions of the international agency. It contains a detailed description of those functions i '1 the field of scientific research activities, location and mining of ores, purification and processing of source materials, stockpiling and distribution of nuclear fuels, and the rights of, and limitations on, the international agency in relation to inspections, surveys and explorations. Yet a1l the conclusions reached on these questions are formulated as a rule in a very vague and indefinite form, and merely develop or repeat aIl the basic provisions of the First Report with somewhat greater precision in the sense that the United States plan to vest the international agency with extensive rights, including the right to interfere in the economic life of any State, has been expressed even more crudely in the Second Report. What 1 have said regarding the Second Report applies even to a greater extent to the Third Report, in so far as the latter contains documents approved by the majority of the Atomic Energy Commission. The Third Report contains a repetition in concise form of the basic provisions of the United States propo".als, slightly diluted, it is true, by the use of technical termiI1ology. It reiterates the Ur:.ited States proposals regarding the functions and' powers of the control agency, clandestine activities, scientific research work in the field of atomic energy, measures of prevention and repression, stages, etc. AIl this shows that the United States, the United Kingdom and France, which took the initiative in raising the question of suspending the. Atomic Energy Commission's work, have decided to go "all out" as the saying goes, knowing perfectly weIl tliat they are merely complicating the problem of future negotiations. In conclusion, 1 should like to touch upon one or two other matters which need to be clarified in the Security Council. Tl,e ,epresentatives of the United States often assett ti.at their proposaIs with regard to atomic control are preferable to the USSR proposaIs because they are supported by scientific and technical data. In this connexion, they refer to the well-known report of the Scientific and scientifique Te~hnical Committee, prepared in 1946 and dealing with the scientific and tcchnical aspects of international control. The Committee did not discuss either the United States or the USSR proposaIs. Its task was strictIy limited, which is perfectIy understandable in view of the fact that it possessed no factual data for detailed analysis or detailed .conclusions. Indeed, no such data were placed at its disposal, so that jts conclusions are of a hypothetical nature, since the Committee worked on abstract data and examples. Having no concrete scientific or technical data on atomic production at its disposal, the Committee could not, obviously, dete~'mine wh€ther any of the proposals did or did not ensure the establishment of effective control. Hence, in reply to the assertions that the report of the Scientific and Technical Committee justifies the United States proposaIs, the USSR delegation can assert with equal justification that it confirms the validity of their proposaI.s, since the latter acknowledge not ooly the necessity but also the feasibility from the scientific and technical standpoint, of establishing international control over atomic energy. AlI this shows how artificial and unfounded are the attempts to prove that the scientific and technical data bear out the United States proposaIs. 1 cannot refrain from mentioning another fact which sheds further light on the United States attitude. It cannot be denied that the representatives of the United States have firmly refused td discuss questions on which there was any sign of a reconciliation of views. 1 refer, for instance, to the question of scientific research on which the USSR delegation submitted certain proposaIs. These proposaIs did not encounter any objections with regard to their substance. They contained nothing unacceptable even to the United States representatives, if we may judge fr~m the fact that the United States delegation raIsed no objections in regard to their substance. Nevertheless, the United States representatives did not agree to the USSR proposals. They 1 fe~red .,a compromise of views more than anything. els~. Whenever agreement on any question was ID slght, the United States delegation did ev:erything in its power to avoid it and to maintam or even deepen the cleavage. ~nergy, ~though the establislL."llent of such control is in the interests of the peoples of aIl the countries of the world. The only ones who are not interested in it are the warmongers who are still carrying on their' criminal activities with impunity especially in the United States, in contravention of the General Assembly resolu~ tion of 3 Novembet 1947' condemning war propaganda. The USSR and its Government have always advocated the establishment of strict and effective international control over atomic energy. Generalissimo Stalin has repeatedly stressed the need to establish 'such control, and Mr. Molotov, Minister of Foreign Mairs of the USSR, also spoke of it at the New York session of the General Assembly in 1946 during the discussion on the general reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons. . The representatives of the USSR on the Atomic Energy Commission and the Security Council are constantly stressing the need for such control, hl the hope that the United States Governmem wiii at last realize that the United States, no less than the Soviet Union, has a stakc in the establishment of international control over atomic energy to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes and for the good of mankind. At the Council's meeting' of 11 June' [318th meeting] we heard statements by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom. They repeated their usual arguments in favour of majority conclusions and recommendations, that is to say, in favour of the United States proposaIs embodied in aIl three reports of the Atomic Energy Commission. At the same time, they did not fail to assert, as usual, without .any foundation, that the USSR attitude was the cause of all breakdowns in the negotiations on atcmic control. This was done in order to justify the demand for suspension of the Atomic Energy Commission's work and to conc,'~l the real reasons for that demand. The United States ïepresentative VIent even further. He submitted a draft resolution which . provides for approval by the Security Council of the majority conclusions and recommenda,. St~tes. It is apparently dictated only by the desire to elicit a USSR veto. It cannot be explained in any other way. Of course, the U'iSR delegation categorically reiects the Unite,::. States resolution and the d~msy tactics ni: the United States representatives who have submitted. this resolution. If it is not withdrawn by the United States delegation the resol~tion must be rejected. Ml'. PARODI (France) ttranslated tram French): It is now almost exactly two years since the Atomic Eneli;Y C;:,mmission first met.' It undertook the study entrusted to it, fully aware of its exceptional character, of the upheaval caused by the discovery of nuclear fission, .and of the dangers, unprecedented in the history of the world, to which the use of atomic weapons would expose mankind. The Cùmmission's work was carried on owing ta the steady co-operation-both in the Commission and within each of the responsible delegations-between experts in diplomatic and political relations and men trained in the rigorous discipline of science. The report" in which the results of this prolonged work are now presented to the Security Council is certainly most remarkable from the technical point of view and, more broadly speaking, from the point of view of reason. Nevertheless, the Commission has finally been forced to recognize that it was confronted with difficulties beyond the scope of its competence, and it recommends, in conclusion, that its work· should be suspended and that the three successive reports' prepared by it should be transmitt~d to the General Assembly for consideration at its next session.' The presentation of these reports seerns to us to lead to a certain number of conclusions which exceed thescope of the use of atomic weapons. The intrc:duction of atomic weapons and the constant rncrease in the range of bomber aircraft has utterly upset our traditional concepts o~ security. Military power as it has been hitherto understood ceases ta be a dominating factor in the security of States. At the same time that industriai potentiaï is becoming increasingly At the same time, we note the disappearance of geographical ad-:.rantages which until now have safeguarded certain countries from attack and have made others invincible. We also foresee the time when, even before the breach of peace, preparations for a future war will place upon the few nations still capable of such an effort burdens so great that the political, economic and social institutions which they have set up and wlùch have hitherto stood firm against the ravages of time and war will be undermined and shaken to their very foundations. A new concept of security is needed to fit so new a situation. The Third Report of the Atomic Energy Commission,in its first chapter, brings out certain elements which in our opinion have become essential for the establishment of a real peace. This report, like those which have preceded it, suggests a solution of the problem of atomic energy control. It is no more than a partial solution oi the whole problem of general security; but the specifie problem is of such a nature that even a partial solution must aid in resolving the difficulties arising in other fields. For the first time, in connexion with this limited but vital problem, we are beginning to see a way to put an end to all danger of war. The Commission has been unable to achieve unanimity, and it notes that, in tHe atmosphere of rivalry which surrounds international relations, it cannot isolate a zone of calm for the developme It of atomic energy for purely peacefuI PUrpOSI :s. This does not mean that the Commission's 1 ustained effort has been useless; on the ccntrary, we hope that the necessity for these recommend.ations will uItimately be recognized. The unleashing of nuclear force, which raises the greatest peril our civilization has yet faced, forces us to give very close attention to the problem of normalizing and regulatillg international relations. . The control plan proposed by the majority of the Commission represents a wedge driven deep into the structure of tradii:ional concepts ')f international relations. Th~s plan, which may seem bold today, is inspired by the true wisdom which circumstances demand on the part of Governments. Speaking in the name of a country which has frequently in the course of long history, sacrificed its security to its ideals, the French delegation considers that the. time ha." come to say frankly to the nations which will convene for the My Government, therefore, supports the proposaI to transmit the three reports to the General Assembly. Ml'. TSIANG (China): My delegation is profoundly disturbed by the fact that the Atomic Energy Commission has failed to reach agree. ment on the tasks for which it was created by the General Assembly. The minority of the Commission has persistently opposed the majority plan of control on the ground-among othersthat it involves serious violations of national sovereignty. The ideas which my Government holds in regard to the control of atomic energy have been :r;epeatedly stated in the course of the deliberations of the Commission. It is unnecessary for me to repeat all the reasons for which my delegation adheres to the views of the majority of the Commission. In the discussion here, 1 wish only to emphasize two points which seem to me to be fundamental. The whole world is agreed on the revolutionary nature of atomic energy. Its control cannot be effected by any of the traditional methods. Unless controlled, atomic energy threatens the very existence of life on this planet. Many progressive scientists who know the terror that lies in atomic weapons advOGê,te the creation of a world government. In their view, traditional national sovereignty is incompatible with the existence of atomic energy. They plead with mankind that, for their very existence, aIl peoples must sacrifice national sovereignty. The proposals of the majority of the CommIssion, while limiting the exercise of national. sovereignty in certain respects, hardly go so far as those of the advocates of world government. What the majority has proposed is really a timid step in the limitation of national sovereignty. When it finds that timid step rejected by the minority, the world will doubtless pronounce the minority to be reactionary. The second point which seems to me to be fundamental is this. While the majority has proposed ~ertain mild limitations upon the exercise of ~atlOnal sovereignty, such limitations are to be lIDposed on ail the Governments of the wcdd o~ the 1;>asis of strict equality. The agency which ~lll be lU c~arge of.the control of atomic energy 1S to b~ an 1;UternatlOnal agency operating in all countnes w1th the same rights and und,er the same regulations. There cannot be any. criticism on the ground that the scheme is discriminatory. 1 consider the proposition of the United States a very fair one. My Government is eager to accept it. Any country whieh is responsible for the rejeetion of the United States proposal ineurs the gravest responsibility before the whole of mankind. Ml'. VAN LANGENHOVE (Be1gium) (translated trom French): The draft resolution [document 8/836] now before the Security Couneil leads us to reca11 hriefly the attitude of the Be1gian delegation towards the work of the Atomie Energy CommissZon. Since it was set up, the Commission has submitted threè reports to the Securlty, Couneil. The last of these reports, after surveying the work of the Commission, unfortunate1y concluded with an admission of failure. So far, only the First Report has been the subject of a full debate in the Security Council and that debate took place over a year aga." But from that moment, the main obstacles confronting the Atomie Energy Commission had become evident, and now, in its Third Report, the Corrunission states that those obstacles appear to be insurm(luntable in present circumstances. The amendments to the First Repmt submitted by the USSR delegation in February 1947" dissociated the prohibition of manufaeturing, possessing or utilizing atomic· weapons from the control guarantees which, according to the General Assembly resolutions/o such prohibition implies. "Ibid., Second Year, Supplement No. 7. 10 See Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during the first part of its first session,. pagè 9, and Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during the s,econd part of its firstsession, 'page 65. Moreover, as the work of the Atomic Energy Commission proceeded, the majority of its inembers became more and more convinced that the aim of the General Assembly resolution of 24 January 1946," namely to assure the "control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes" could not be attained unless a certain number of fundamental conditions ~ere fulfilled. These conditions, without which securlty guarantees would be merely illusory, have been outlined in the first two reports of the Commission. In essence, they require that the production àn~ utilization of atomic energy should be made independent of national sovereignty and brought under sorne kind of international socialization. To that end, an international authority would have a monopoly over uranium and thorium, which are the only sources of atomic energy, and authority over all industrial facilities capable of producing nuclear fuel and which must therefore be regarded as dangerous for security. Such a systen..: would not only make it pcssible to eliminate the terrible threat inherent in atomic energy, but would also be beneficial in that aIl nations would share in the blessings which this energy can bring to the world. The disagreement, therefore, does not relate to technical details but bears on the fundamental principles underlying the solution of the whole problell1. The prolonged discussions to which these two reports and the USSR amendments and proposaIs gave rise showed that the disagreement had to be regarded as irremediable in present circumstances. The USSR delegation fought against these conclusions by means of amendments submitted in February 1947 and proposaIs put forward in June of the same year.'" 1t refused to recognize the need to re:strict the prerogatives of national sovereignty in connexion with ~he necessary extension of inspection rights as weU as the systematic éontroJ of atomic energy production and utilization. . 1,.See .Resolutions adopted :il :he General Assembly durmg the first part of its firs: Je'.1ion resolution 1 (1) page 9.. ' , It is equally true. that the majority proposals bear witness to a highly developed spirit of international co-operaJ.on. But is that not the spirit from which the Chart~r draws its inspiration? Is it not the very condition of the existence of the United Nations and, in any case, the avowed aim of all our efforts? It must be admitted, unf\)rtunately, that that spirit of international co-operation has not been demonstrated and has not developed as anticipated by the authors of the Charter. While, among sorne nations, this spirit has grown and thrived, among others it has yielded to increasing dÏstrust. Similar circumstances and a similar state of mind have :. far paralyzed the Milital'Y Staff Committee anll. prevented it from working out-despite two years of discussion-the general principles which should govern the organization of the armed forces ta be placed at the disposal of the Security Council under Article 43 of the Charter. The same causes would undoubtedly prevent the effective 'implementation of the ccercive measures provided in Chapter VII of the Charter. In such an atmosphere, it is impossible to visualÏ?:e any effective system of control of atomic energy. No Joubt, this is a disappointing and painful acknowledgement to make, but after long months of patient and vain endeavours to find a common graund for agreement the memb~rs of the Conunbsion weœ left with no other choice. ! This is the situ~tion described by the Commission in its Thirà Report to the Council which is submitted today. The Belgian delegation confirms its approval of the conclusions of the Third Report and of the previous reports. The delegatian entertains the hope that the work accomplished by the Commission "Vill not have been in vain. This work has resulted in a clear definition of the problem itself and of the conditions necessary foi its satisfactory solution. It has shown that thi'l solution was within our reach if only we could have riaen to the level of the demands of the atomic era which we have entered. The nations represented on the competent organs of the United Nations must now decide whether, in order to guarantee their security and improve their living conditions, they are pre·· pared to overcome their preconceived notions and tG broaden their habituaI outlook. It is for ihem to say whethcr they are resolved ta bring The Belgian delegation refuses to believe that 1 if people' y "1"C enlightened they would really peuples, prefer tht JCI'S entailed by an unbridled dement velopment ot atomic energy ta the fair prospects leur now open before them. serverait l'énergie The Government 1 represent has made its choice. The PRESIDENT: There are no other speakers on the list for today. The representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic wishes to speak at the next meeting. If the members of the Security Council have no objection, the next meeting will be held tomorrow. sa part, a représentant tique lors jection, The Indonesian questicn is scheduled to be discussed tomorrow morning. As stated at the last meeting on that subject [316th meeting], we were waiting for the report but did not know whether it would be forthcoming in rime or not. The report was received today and copies have been prepared and distributed by the Secretariat. That report will be talcen up at 10.30 a.m. la il discuté port, l'avons reproduire We will put the contmuation of the discussion of the Report of the Atomic Energy Commission on the agenda as the second item. If we can finish the discussioil on the first item in the morning, we shall proceed to discuss the second. We may tentatively plan to cantinue our meeting tomorrow afternoon, if there is no objecticn. mission finir aborderons pourrions