S/PV.322 Security Council

The first three documents on today's agenda were under discussion at the last meeting on this subject [316th meetingJ, and it was the desire of the members of the Security Council that this discussion should continue, whether or not we received the expected report. We have now received the other report, and it has been distributed. lt is the report of the Committee of Good Offices on the Federal Confere.üce opened in Bandung on 27 May 1948 [document 8/842J. We shall now continue the discussion on the other three reports. The representatives are also at liberty, if they wish, to disClISS this new report. Ml'. TSIANG (China): At the begmning of his statement before the Security Council on Thursday last [316th meetingJ, the representative of the Netherlands expressed the wish that ". . . t1;le negotiating parties mIndonesia be permitted to negotiate it". As 1 understand it, Ml'. van ~{leffens was apprehensive thnt a heated debate at Lake Success might create difficulties for the two parties to the dispute, as weIl as for the Security Council's Committee of Good Offices, in the work that still remains to be done. 1 have every reason to wish to contribute to the success of û'le negotiations in Indonesia. As 1 , stated at the very bcginning of our debates on Indonesia almost a year ago [187th meetingJ, my delegation ardently desire.s that the independence of Indonesia sheuld be followed by orderly progress. The few remarks which 1 \ave to make today will aIl b\': offered in the same constructive spirit. Ml'. van Kleffens attributed the difficulties in Indonesia mainly to two causes. One is the supposed insistence of the Republic of Indonesia on unitarianism as opposed ta federation. Ml'. van Kleffens thought that the natural geographic and ethnic situation in Indonesia called for federation. The leaders of the Republichave subscribed to that federa'tion programme, first at Linggadjati, and later on board the TJSS "Renville" [document 8/649, pages 87 and 111J but, and 1quote Ml'. van Kleffens, "... there still seems to linger unitarian craving in their hearts". The Security Council having he1ped to bring about the "Renville" Agreement, must, of course, continue to give its moral support to the prin- The statement of the representative of the Republic of Indonesia [316th meeting] offered no criticism against federation in Indonesia or union with the Netherlands. His long and well-documented statement concentrated mainly on the way the separatist movements in Madura and Western-Java have been nurtured by the Dutch authorities. The other cause to which Mr. var; Kleffens would like to attribùte the difficulty in indonesia is whàt he calls the "negative attitude" which the Republic of Indonesia is sllpposed to adopt towards the principle of a union with the Netherlànds. That principle forros a part of the "RenviJle" Agreement. If the leaders of the Republic should today oppose union with the Netherlands) we of the Security Council could 'aIso legith'tlately say that the Republic is not living up to that Agreement. In tliis connexion, we find that the reports of our CŒnmittee of Good Offices furnish no proof for Mr. van Kleffens' accusations. If we read the reports of the Committee of Good Offices carefully, we are driven ta the conclusion that there is substantial ground for the objections which Mr. Palar raised before the Security Council a week ago. Our Committee of Good Offices expressly tells us that the calling of the first West Java Confèrence was nnt in response to any wide popular demànd. As 1 read the story of political developments from the first to the second West Java Conference and ~en fr?tn the second to the third, 1 gain the lffipresslOn that the unreprese~tative and undemocratic character of the succession of conferences is an hereditary trait transmitted from generation to generation. , The real coÏ1troveJ;sy in Indonesia today is not between federation and unitarianism. It is cent~red.around the process of federation. The question 18: shall there be an Indonesian federation created through democratic methods or through Dutch control and manipulation? If it is created through. democratic methods, the Republic of Indo~esla can count, on playing an influential mIe mthe federation; if it is created through Since the representative of Indonésia has raised serious objections to the way in wlUch the . new politicalentities in Madura and Western Java have been.created by the J?utch authorities, my deleg~tion wouldsuggest that the Committee of Good Offices should he instructed to promote a realIy fair and impartial plebiscite in Madura and Western Java, unIess, of course, the two parties to the dispute shouldvoluntarily agree to some other mode of ilettlement. In making this suggestion, lam not' proposing any new step, far less any rlew principle.. l am, in fact,only urging that the "Renville" Agreement shalI be faithfully carried out. ' Before 1 close ,my remarks, 1· should like to express the hope that, the "Renville'~ Agrèement will not be followed by what the Dutch authorl,.. ties might calI "police actiou,"as the Linggadjati .Agreement was followcd by "police ac- < tion." 1 should appreciate it greatly if Mr. van Kleffenscould assure us that bis Govemment Will, persist in the pursuit of.a peàceful solution. . Mr. PILLAI .(India): The Security Council has now before it four reports from the Committee, of Good Offices,two·of·wIDch .deal with recent political developments in West Java and Madura. These developmènts,. if. allowed to con.. tinue, ,might'lead to the.fragmentation and dis.. memberment. of the ·.territoriesof the Republic. Under article 19f the Linggadjati Agreement, the Netllerlanils Government recognizedthe Govemmentof the Republic as exercising de facto authority over. Java, Madura and. Sumatra. The 'article {urther stated: "the areas occupiedby ',Alliedor NetherI~nds forces shall be included Sïnce the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement, Dutch military action has wrested considerable areas from Republican control, and the truce settlement has made a present of other con~ siderable areas to the Netherlands Government. But it h;as been m~de clear all along that the truce was only a provisionai measure. It was a politicaI standstill arrangement imply:ng~ necessarily, the agreement that during the period of the politicaI negotiations that were to followthe u"ce, neither of the parties would take any steps which might prejudice the position of the other party. AdditionaI principle 4 [document 8/649, page 97] stated that a plebiscite or, with the agreement of the parties, some other suitable procedure should determine whether the population of thè various territories of Java, Madura and Sumatra should form part of the Republic or of another State within the United States of Indonesia. . This additional principle 4, and indeed aIl the i principles taken as a whole, c1early ruled out the setting up of separatist regimes before the plebiscite contemplated under original prillciple 4 [document 8/649, page 72] was taken. 1t was takèn for granted that any attempts made in the meantime at dismembering the territory of the Republic would be inconsistent with the text and serait the spirit of the· "Renville" settlemênt. .It cromot be said that the plan to set up dissident movements in Indonesia and to break up the vements dissidents en vue Republic ~as conceived and executed in a hurry. AIl the eVldence goes to show that it was part .executes; ~f a premeditated and carefully worked out programme. The first West .Java Conference was held from 12 to 19 C>ctober 1947 that is to say.' before the Securiry- Council adopt~d its reso- .lution of 1 November 1947 [document 8/597]. The second West Java Conference began on 15 December and ended on 20 December 1947 that is just before the Committee of Good Offic~ addressed its Christmas message to the two parties [document 8/649, page 70]. The third des· Conference beganon 23 Februaryand ended on 6 March of this year ~d you Will recall that it was on 28 February)last, when. the third Conferenc~ was still ln session, thr..t the Security Counciladopted a resolution requesting the Com- .mittee of Good Offices to report on polirlcal de developments in West Java and Madura [document 81678]. . de façon sécurité survenaient toujours These dates are not without significance; they show that the various stages of the brelÙ{-up programrne were sa timed that the Security Council's decisions and discussions came just a little tao latc. On 17 February last, the representative of the' Netherlands stated here [?47th meeting] that, i.10W before the Security Council, was there any public demand for the summoning of the second and third Conferences whirh automatically followed the first Conference. '.l'he Netherlands Government contends that, oV'Jing to the lack or incapadty of political organizations in West J;J.va, it felt it had to provide opportunities ta "inteliectual and religious circles" in West Java to discuss their political future. About one-half of those who attended the third Conference were appointed by t.lte Dutch Gov- AlI the delegates to the first Conference were 'appointed by the Netherlands Government, not one was elected, and it is no wOI',der that among ~ group of hand-picked men, the Republican elements were conspicuous by thek·absence. The second Conference likewise consisted of delegates, all of whom were appointed by the Recomba, that is, the Dutch Government's Commissioner, on the recommendation of the Contact Commission set up by the first Conference; that is te say, the Dutch no~ces attending thefirst Conference sèt up a Contact Commission; this Commissionrecommended persons to attend the second Conference, and on these recommendations, the.RecomiJa appointed them. A treble-sieved loyalty test was thus usedin the appointment of the persons who attended the second Conference. The report aIso conta1'lS indkations that u.uder the martial law still in force there, the right of free assembly was denied to those who did not agree with the Netherlands Government's pro= granlffie and policies, and that active intimidation and reprisais were resorted to by the Netherlands Government against those whose political views did not coincide with its own.' It was one .of. these conferences of dubiQus authenticity, the second West Java Conference, which resolved that in the succeeding third Java Conference "a provisiona1 government . . . he established for West Java with the charader of a Nogara (State)" [document 8/729]. This third Conference, in which, in spite of aU the precautions of the Netherlands Government, sorne Indonesian patriots' had managed te find a place, attempted to change the provisional agenda drawn up by the Recomba and his h~nch­ men so as to permit a discussion of the question whether West Java should bea separate State or note It was at first agreed that the status of West Jav.a was to be determined by a plebiscite as referred to ir ,~.h,e "Renville" Agreement, but later, the Chairman, who was one of those who had agreed to the plebiscite, read out a letter from the Recomba stating that the West Java State was already in the process of being created;' thus, even' before the c10sing of the thirci Conferencer the State was already in process of being created. ,The rest of this pitiful story, as .unfolded_ in the report of the Committee of Good Offices~ is that the third Conference was transfomied by the Netherlands Government into a provisional Parliament for the new State of West Java. More or less the same story could be related of the so-caUed Madura plebiscite.. It 'was not possible, in Madura either, to consult the political parties, since the political parties had been rendered inactive in consequence of the military occupation of the area by the Netherlands authorities.· The whole show in Madura seems to have started with' the activities of one single individual, Mr. Tjakraningrat. It was he who, in September 1947, came to certain agreements with the Netherlands Indies authorities in Madura, and tbrough them, with the central G~vernme,nt'or the Dutch.Indies. In January of th!s year, he summoned to bis house sorne fifty tendsand got them to adopt a 'resolution ta set The re~lUlt of this plebiscite was of course a foregone conclusion. And based on this makebelieve,a petition, signed on 29 January, was presented to the Nethcrlands Indies Government. On 20 February the latter recognized the new Madura State by way of an official decree. Contrast with this the attitude of the Dutch toward those who were again'!lt separatism and who :ldvocated an undivided Republic. The New York Times, of 22 May 1948, carried a news itèm to the effect that the provisional Federal Government of ·the Netherlands Indies had barred, by a decree of 21 May, an '!all-Indonesian conference" which had been arranged for Monday 24 May. The decree aI. the Netherlands Indies Government stated that th~, meeting had originated with persans belonging ta, ar c10sely connected with, the Republican Government organization, and, consequently, haspitality granted ta that organization in Batavia, was being used for the purpose of political agitation iIi the territory under Netherlands control. This is a measure of the respect shawn by the Dutch Government for the freedam aI. speech and assembly so c1early enjained by the second of the twelve principles [document 8/649, page 111]. But even though the Netherlands Indies Gavernment refused all opportunities for the holding of an "all-Indonesian conference", it convened, in Bandung, on 27 May Ii.lst, a conference of persons from the Dutch-occupied territory in Indonesia. Document S/842, distributed' late laist night, sh,..ws that this Conference was orgardzed by the Acting Governor-Gêneral, Mr; van M:ook, and that its object was to consi<':er, for consnltative purposes, the federal fotm of the future government of the Indonesian islands. In essence, this Conference was intended to bé a pre-con- The Republic of Indonesia was not nwited ta this important Conferenee, but five representatives of the puppet States aIready created, and eight representatives of puppet States in the embryonic stage, were invited to attend. The main idea, of course, was to confront the Security Council and the Republic with another fait accompli. On page 7 of document S/842, the Committee of Good Offices attempts very cleverly ta parry the question of what its own views are about the Bandung Conference. But, in spite of its manifest reluctance to commit itse1f, in spite of its Sainte Nitouche attitude of aloofness, it is compelled to ,refer to the fact that certain statements of the Netherlands Indies authorities give an impression contrary to that. conveyed in the letter of the Netherlands delegation dated 26 May 1948 [document S/842, page 31]. 1 What is most aIarming in aU these matters is the change in the public attitude of the Netherlands Government as regards these politicaI happenings in West Java and Madura. In his earlier statements, the representative of the Netherlands Government repeatedly and emp1:::-.tica1ly maintained that his Government was not fomenting, and would not foment, any artificial popular movements in Indonesia. 1 am here referring to the statements·made at the 247th, 252nd and 259th meetings of the Council. ln his statement made on 26 February [256th meeting], the representative of the Netherlands Government said: "The West Java Conference which is now being held is the t'hird of a series of what 1 think can best be described as private-in other words, completely inform:t~ and unofficial-political conferences." At a later point he said: "This development-and this is a very important point-has taken place in its entirety outside of any participation and direct or indirect interference or pressure on the part of the Netherlands Indies Government ..." But events showed that, while the voice was the voice of Jacob, the hand was the hand of Esau. Thë reports of the Committee of Good Offices have made it perfectly clear that these conferences were organized and convened by the . Netherlands Indies Governm'ént, and that it was the Government that appointed the so-called representatives. Perhaps in the light of these reports, Mr. van Kleffens has now abandoned his earlier stand. He now franklyadmits [316th meeting]: . Mr. van Kleffens has been at great pains to . explain that the creation of these new States "i:annot but be of a provisional character", because of the fourth and fifth additional principles [document 8/649~ page 97] which provide that, ,lrithin six months to one year after the signing of the proposed settlement, the question of the delineation of any new State could be decided by the people themse1ves. Since he. has hÏn:1..self referred to these principles and to the arrangement for ascertaining the wishes of the population contemplated in them, may 1 inquire what was the urgency in setting up these provisional States? And since he has assured the Security Council that "Any fear or suspicion that the Netherlands Government is trying to confront the Republic with an' accomplished fact, therefore, has no foundation, either in fact or in law" [316th meeting], may 1 respectfully suggest to the Secur~ty Council that the Netherlands Govemmmt may be requested to stay further actions even as regards the provisional setting up of new States? There still remain some other matters which deserve the attention of the Security Council. The first refers to the Interim Federal Governnient for Indonesia, which was installed on 9 March last by the Acting Gov~rnor":General of the Netherlands Indies. It will be remembered that additional principle 1 contemplated tlrat, after a stated interval, the Kingdom of the Netherlands would transfer its sovereignty throughout the Netherlands Indies to the United States of Indonesia. Additional principle 1 further stated: "Prior to the termination of such stated inter.. , val, the Kingdom of the Net.'1erlan~ may confer appropriate rights, duties and responsibilities on a provisional federa! government of the territories of the future 'United States of Indonesia." And it alsCJ provided that: "The status of the Republic of Indonesia will. be that of aState within the United States of Indonesia." Additional principle 2 stated that. all States should be ofIered fair representation in any such provisional federal government. The Interim Federal Government set up by Acting Governor-General van Mook complies with none of the conditions laid' down in these two principles. 'No one hasstated what the interval·should\be between' the reaching of the political settlement and the transferof sovereignty to the, United States of Indonesia, during which the Kingdom of the Netherlands could consl~­ tute an interini federaI government. Early last February, the Republican Government went out . gation In presenting the world with this fait accompli, . the' Dutch have succeeded in so confusing the issue that the feeling has been ereatcd that this "" unilaterally set up interim government is the real ~terim Federal Government contemplated under th~'Renville" setdement, and the Republic is now 'Q.~g accused in certain quarters of nonco-oper~tion in a matter in which it was the .first to oITer co-operation. ' The real objc:ct of the creation of this provisional Interim Government, it is obvious enough, is to further the programme of divide-and-rule in Indonesia. It is being employed as a tactical device to make it appear that the Republic is in opposition, not to the Netherlands Indies Government, but to the local autonomous movements "i":"posedly represented in the puppet States set: up by the Govemment. The difference between the Netherlands Indies Gdvernment and the provisional Interim Government is the difference between substance and shadow. The provisional Interim Government is established and headed by the leaders of the Netherlands Indies Go:vernment; Mr. van Mook ~ the President of th~ Interim Government, and Its Secreta~IY of State is the Chairman of the Netherlands de1egation to the Committee of Good Offices. The Republic's protest against this Interim Government was communicated to the Committee of Good Offices, but 1 understand that the Committee refused to transmit it to the Security Counéil. Another matter which 1 should like to bring to the notice of the Security Council deaIs with the proposed amendments to the Dutch Constitution providing for the formation of a Netherlands-Indonesian Union. The second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament adopted this amendment on 29 Am'il of this year and in . , accordance with Dntch law, theseamendments ~l now have tO!i approved by th.e new Parhament to be eIected next July. Pr~ciples 9, 1O~ 1,2 of the twelve prinl'iples formmg an agreed basis for political discussions But the amendments to the Dutch Constitution have been rushed through without any prior consultation with the' Republic, and that, at a time when the matter was, so to speak, sub judice1 as the negotiations to determiile the status of Indonesia and the Netherlands inter se were then being'carried on under the auspices of the Committee of Good Offices. Further, it is understood that the amendment contain'3 no statement recognizing the United States of Indonesia as an independent sovèreign State, and that there are other clauses in it suggesting that the United States of Indones.;:.l. will have a somewhat lower status. AIl this has; not unnaturally, raised serious misgivings in Republican circles, and it is necessary for the Sècurity Council to reaffirm that the establishment of the United States of Indonesia and its relations with the Netherlands-Indonesian Union can be settled onl)' in co-operation and agreement with the Repubuc, and in accordance with the two sets of political principles already agreed to. A third important point to which l, should like to l'efer deals with the thrpttling.of the economic life of Indonesia by the Dutchair and naval blockade. It was very pleasing to read n::, the New York Herald-Tribune of 9 June 194d that a possible end to thé blockade of the Reput;.,. lic's !oreign trade was indicated by a Dutch- Indonesian agreement "in principle" on regulations governing sea traffic; and it was equally pleasing to listen to what Ml'. van Kleffens said ~)D thispoint on 10 June [316th meeting]. 1 am sure the Security Council would hail this information with great 'satisfaction, but it would be useful if we could have more light shed on this l'ather obscure point. In the seçond interim report [document S/787] the Committee of Good Offices gives an account of the workdoné by its Écononrlc and Financial çommittee,and there are certam pages in it which give rise to a great deal of anxiety. As lpng as the present blockade exists and ~e Indonesian Republic is not perniitted Cree access to overseas markets, acute poverty and suffering will be the fate of the Indonesian population. Ina. series of articleswritten for ·the CincinniztiTimes-Star, its special staff correspondent has exposed the miserable condi· ti0ns induced by the e"i..ting blockade. 1 do not want ta take up the time. of the Security Councllbyreading out extracts from thesearticles, These are some aspects of this case which 1 should Iike tû' bring to the notice of the Security Council in considering the present batch of reports fro~ the Conunittee of Good Offices.

Having consultedsome of the representatives of theSecurity Council, 1 propose, that when speeches are given in official languages other than the two working languages, the mierpretation into F:rench should be given simul- !aneously ~th the speech and that the EngIish mterpretatlOn should follow consecutively. Mr. DE LA TOURNELLE (France) (translated trom ~rench): Thisrequest was submitted to me a few minutes ago by the Assistant Secretary- General in connexion wîth the discussion of the ques~onof atomic energy. 1 agreed to it for that parllcular discussion, in view of the fact that it ~oncerned a' technical matter but 1 reserve the right to ask for r.onsecutive htterpretation when other questions are discussed. Th~. PRESIDENT: It ÏSi natural thàt the J'epresentative of France should teserve that right. Mr. TARASENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist R~pu~li~) (tra-n.slated trom Russian): 1 do nçt think It 15 necessary to decide pr agree. now that, whenever a speaker makes a statement in one of the ,official but non-working languages, there should be a sintultaneous interpretation into MI'. DE LA TOURNELLE (France) (translated French): 1 should like to point out that it is necessary to have not ooly the 'agreement of th~ speakers) but aIso of the llsteners.

1thought the proposed procedure would be agreeable to both speakers and listeners. However, 1 agree with what the representatives of France and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic have' said to the effect that it should not be made a rUle of procedure. Each case will be considered separately. 1 understand that the representative of the USSR now wishes to make a statement on the question before t.he Security Counci1; and we shaIl try for the first time the system of simultro:'-eous interpretatio~into French only. Mr~. MALIK (Unionof Soviet Sccialist Rejmb- ' lies) (translated trom Russian): Three documents on the Indonesian question have been referred to the Security, Council for consideration. These are the second, interimreport [document 8/787] of the Committee of Three, otherwise referred to as the Committee of Good Offices, for the period February-AprilI948; a' report of the Bame Co~ttee on the political sittiation on the island of Madura [documen!8/786].,which ~ould be more aptly described as "a report on the arbitrary organizationby the Netherlands authorities of a plebiscite in Madura"; and: lastly, a report of the Comnrittee on the political events in Western J~va[document,8/729] which could also more aptly be described as a ','reporton the establishment by the ,Netherlands authorities of a puppet State in .Wt;:stern Java". 1 am not dealing with the fourth report [document 8/842] which was received only yesterday and which requiresa special dec:ision, and 1 therefore reserve:the right of the· TISSR delegation to express its Views on this report at a later date. The three repôrts 1 have mentioned above outline the course of political and economic negotiations, during the said period,between the delegations of the Netherlands Goveinment and of the 'Govermnent of the Indonesian Republic, with the participation of the Committee of Three. The. Committee's, rep~~ts display a strange peculiarity: on all questions, they provide a most 'detailed and elaborate exposition of the Netherlands. version only. As regards the views and wishes of the Republicans, the reports only touch upon 'them lightly, withoutgiving either the views or· the conclusions of. the Committee on the substance of. the Indonesi~ Republic'sproposais·and legitimate· daims. ' .. ~ , The second peci.ùiarity of these reports is that the Committeegoes to great length to praise its own work and tries to convey the impression that it has really taken up an unbiased and objective attitude towards the question of the peacefuJ. settlement of political relations between the Nether-lioration lands and the Indonesian Republic. But this is .not so. The USSR delegation has never entertained ari.y illusions regarding the possible results of thisCommittee's work, as it was clear from the very'outset of. it8 activities that the Indçmesians could not expect any help from it, and that it would do its utlllost to tighten the noose around the neck of the Indonesian people and leave them to the tender·mercies of the Netherlands colonial authorities. The documents now before us confirm the worst apprehensions of the USSR delegation aild its previous general appraisal of the Committee of Three. - They show that the Netherlands Governor-General of Indonesia set up a ~'provisional Interim Federal Government for Indonesia" on 9' March, 1948, and that, in doing so, he acted unilaterally and without consulting. the Indonesian Republic. .While preparing for the formation of this Government, which is composed of Netherlands hirelings, the Netherlandsauthorities .did.not de.em it necessary to consult with the Indonesian Republie on this question and, moreover, complete1y disregarded its interests. Not a single representative of th~ Indonesian Republic has been included in this so~ca1led Federal Governmen'i:. This is not surprising, since the very idea of forming such a government, and indeed the idea of creating a federation of States in Indonesia in the form of a so-called United States of Indonesia, originated with the Netherlands colonizers and is beip.g use~ by them to stifle the .!ndonesion people's aspiratiç>ns for freedom and mdependence. How did the Committee of Three react to such aibitrary action by the Neth~rlands Governor- General? Instead of immediately. examining the substance of this matter and taking appropriate measures, and instead of bringing the matter to the notice of the SecurityCouncil withoutde1ay, the Committee took the Government of the Indonesian Republic ta task because it had actually dared to make a vigorbus protest against these illegal actions of thé NetherIands Governor-Gen- ,era! and had, at the same·~e, expressed the hope that the Committee would immediate1y brmg the whole matterto th-e attention of the Security CoundI. . de tenir s~ance of the question. That is how the "objective" activities of the Committee of Three apparentIy work out. In its report, the Coxnmittee has confined itself toan enumeration of controversiâl political questions, without touching on their· substàncè and without givingexpression' to the views of the partiesconceming them. Itis clear, hQwever,that no agreement has yet been reached·between the Indonesian Republic and the Netherlands Government onsulCh important political questions as the taking ofa plebiscite, or on the territories in which a plebiscite is 'to be held to decide whether the population desires ta remain within .the Republicai tosecede froni it. Nor has any agreemmt been reached on the. question of the election ofa peopJe's assembly and of people's representatives,and on other important political questions. The reason·for the failure ta reach agreement onthese questions is clear; it is attributable to the. fact that thé interests of the Nethèrlands Governmentand of itssupporters are diametrically opposed'to the ïnterests of the Indonesian people. The former aie doing their utmost to weakenthe Indonesian Republic, to render its independent. existence impossible and to dragoon it into the above~mentioned"United States of Indonesia". Meanwhilethe Indonesian people are. pursuing other. aiIns:. thesttuggle against foreign colonial domination and the crea- 'tion of their oWIÎ independent State. How was the Madura plebiscite held? Accordmg ta an official admission of the Netherlands Governor-General, the Netherlands authorities and their hirelings took advantage of the fact that the majority of the population of Madura is illiterate-a reflection of the century-old Netherlands domination in Indonesia-t0 carry out the plebiscite on the secession of Madura from the Indonesian Republic by.means of an oral questio,ning of the population. Women werè not allowed to take part in the plebiscite; in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, they.were not given the right to vote. The Republican de1egation has stated that,. in many places, the population asked for an ex.,. plapation of the substance and meaning of the plebiscite, but was toId byllie.Netherlands agents in charge of thf pleb~cite: "there is no need to ask any questions, as the meaning of the proposal is c1ear." Not a single person who couldand wis4ed· to speak against the plebiscite imposed on the population was given an opportunity of expressing his ,views. Moreover, in a number of places where the majority of the population voted against the secession of Madura from the Indonesian Republic, all those who had voteq against were surnmoned to the headquarters of the Neth- ~rlands mpitary police and subjected to severe lDterrogation. Coercive measures of· a similar nature were applied by. the Netherlands military authodHes .against the inhabitants of a series ôf villages in. Madura, such as Kemajoran, Bàng; . kalan and others, which had vbted against.the propqsal for secession from the Republic. They, . too, were summoned to the headquarters of the NetherIands .military police and subjected to stem questioning. Thus It becomes· an establiShed fact that. the Netherlands" authodties carried through· the plebisc~te by "intimïdating the population, using repre~ve measures and engaging in other similarly iIlegal and unjustifiable practices. The question of the separation of Western Java. from the Inâonesiari Republic was decided by sttllpler methods. The Netherlandsauthorities convened three successivè conferences oftheir ~~~, d~clared the third assembly to be the ProVlSlonal ParIiament of Western Java", If it is borne in mind that, as has been stated by the Republican' delegation, the plebiscite in Madura and the,"electioilS" in WesternJava.were he1d.under martiallaw, 'thenany unbiased person will c1eady understand both thecharacter and the results of such a plebiscite and election.\ Thus, it is an indisputable fact that the Netherlands Governor-General· has forcibly snatched the island of Madura and W,esternJava from the Indonesian Republic by m~ans of political and ,military measures, and that he is now trying to bring territories of the Republicunder the political. domination of the ~etherlandsmilitary and colonial authorities. ·Ta achieve 'this end, he is using the hirelings of the Netherlands ac;lministration chosen from among Indonesian. quislings in" the pay' of the Netherlands Governnient. Attention may be called here. to the fact that the decrees issued by the Netherlands Govemor-Genci:'al provide {pr the 'recovery of the expenditure involved in the maintenance of these quislings, the plan of the Netherlandsauthorities being to m~e the Indonesian peopl~ themselves pay for such expenditure at some 'future date. . Obviously, any sane person must see ,that such conduct .onthe part of the Netherlands,authorities in Indônesia will not lead to a settlement of thepoJiticalrelatio~ between the 'Netherlands and the ,Indonesian Republic, but wW, on the contrary, co~plicateandput a severe strain on them. In its'repotts to the Security Council, the Com- Initteeof Three noton1YJ:'efrainS from, condemning ,such arbitrary and illegal actione. oythe ~etherlands authorities'in'Madrtta and Western Java, but it actually encourages them. Itstands to feason.that allsuêh acts by Netherlands'auiliorities,axid the,startd·taken by,theComI11ittee, of Three,not· only cannot,be approved'by the SecurityCouncil,but should be dulyassessed and condemned, whilethe separation,of Madura and Western.Java from. the Indonesiah Republic by ,the.' Netherlànds authorities shouldbe regarded as, an illegal action: Let .us nowexamiIie theoutcome of the eco'- noInic"negotiatÎons between the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republiç.The ,Republic, IlOW as b.eforc".is deprived of 'any possibility of, carrying ontrade witlI.'foreign .coûIltri~. .Its territory is still blockad~4,.at se,a by the Netherlànds NaVy ',and on land by Netherlandsa.rmed forces. The Republic is experiencing great difficulties in As a result of the military operations undertaken'by the Netherl~dstroops againstthe Indonesian Republic in violation of the Linggadjati Agreement, the Netherlands, as is common knowledge, h::s gained control of the economically riclJ.est regions of the Republic~ Not content with that, the Netherlan~ military authorities,' when . tracing the demarcation line after the cessatioIl of . hostilities, added yet another large food prdducing area-the Kemit region-ta the territory snatched by them from the Indonesian Republic. The Committee adroits that during the drawing of boundary lines the Republic lost. this fertile area, wlth a surface ùf many thousands of acres, but, nonetheless, it agrees ta the transfer of this territory to the Netherlands authorities. By cutting' off this rice producing region fromthe Repu1:>lic, the Netherlands authorities, with the connivance of the Coùunittee of Three, nave in fact doomed to hunger the population of the ,neighbouring consuming regions of the Republic. Having approved, to the benefit of the Netherlanfls authorities, .this, patently unjust 'operation, which has caused considerable territorial and economic loss .to the Republic, the Committeeof To/ee is nowproposing that the Republican authorities should buy rice from the Netherlands authorities at an appropriate priee. What, in this' case, isf4e result of the Committee'g "good of.- fices"? It'k that tlIeRepublic hCll:J its rice take~ from it and is then a.: ',cl to buy back îts owU'rice fr~m tho~e who. took it. . This, ~ the language of s~me politicians, is called "justice" and "good offices" for the Indonesians. There can be not the' slightest ;doubt, however, that the Indonesians take a different view of this kindof "goodoffices"and "justjce". Instead of taking inlmediate steps to,enable the Republic 'to establish normal economic artd trade relations with the outside world, the Com~ mittee of Three 'limits itself to finding that "restrictive' regulations on:~1'ade and intercourse across the stlat'iJ,S quo. lin.e and by sea, togetlier with the generallyunsatisfactory conditions" of communications, are tesulting ineconomic and political difficulties in Republican controlled areas and, mparlicular, in acute,shortages of te:Ktiles" --~---_ Moreover, when the Republican delegation raised the question of the Indone5Îan Republic being permitted to purchase essential ll1eans of transport and communication and other materials abroad, this request was refused at the instigation of the Netherlands authoritiés. AlI this 'gües tû showthat the Netherla.'lds authorities, wi1h the connivance of the Committee of Three, are carrying out an economic blo~kade of the Republic. The aim of this policy is, in fact, to force the Republic ta its knees in the econo~c field and, then, taking advantage of its economic difficu1ties, to dictate such political and economic conditions to the Republic as the Netherlands Government considers advantagèous to itself. This conclusion is confirmed by the whole course of events and by the development of the Indone5Îan question. First, there was the colonial war which was waged by the Netherlands against the Indone5Îan Republic; then came the imposition on the Republic of the Linggadjati Agreement in March 1947; then the violation of this agreement by the Netherlands two or three months after it had been signeà and the resumption of military operations agai.'1St the Republic; these led to the conquest by the.Netherlands forces of a considerable part of thè Republic's territory and a number of its richest economic areas, despitethe fact that under the Linggadjati Agreement, the Netherlands had recognized the Indonesian Republic as the existing de facto authority in Ja"d, Madura and Sumatra, and had undertaken to cede gradually to the Republic the regions occupied by the Netherlands and United Kingdom armed forl~es. This new military attack on the Republic was halted only after repeated . dcmands made by the Security Coùncil in August 1947. Subsequently,after protracted political pressure from bath the Netherl~dsand the COIl)- mittee of Three, the Republic was saddled last February with a new agreement, still more grievorlS and one-sided than the Linggadjàti Agreement. The information cont?.Ïned in the Committee's reports sho.ws that in.its attempt to impose its will on the Indonesian Republic,the Netherlands Government is going beyondeven the new so-called "Renville" Agreement.By' unilateral action and in violation.oi this Agreement, .the Netherlands GovernD;lent is establishIDg a"Federal Government of Indonesia:', staging the' The meanîng of this political game of the Netherlands Government in Indonesia is cIear. iThe well-tried imperialist method of "divideand-ruIe" is being put into practice. Parts of the Indonesian Republic are .being shorn off and its territory gradually dismembered; plebiscites are being staged; various regions of the Republic are proclaimed "independent States" by decree of the Netherlands G{)vern.or~General and, under the guise cf creating representative government machinery, Netherlands liirelings are being placed at the head of these puppet States. The objective behind the setting up of t>.lüs chain of puppet States around the Indonesian Republic is to weaken the Republic politically and economically, and then to strangle it complete1y. Through these puppet governments, the Netherlands colonizers are trying to restore the old colonial system and their domination in Indonesia. In so doing, they trample down the righ!S anà interests of the Indonesian Republic and destroy the progress achieved by the Indonesians as a result of' their heroic national liberation struggle and by the creation of their own democratic national State: the Indonesian Republic. This policy of the Netherlands Government contradicts the basic principles of the United Nations Charter. The Security Council cannot fail to pay attention to this situation if it really wishes to justify its high calling and to defend the interests of the Indonesian people who have fallen victims to unprovoked military aggression aimed at stifling its struggle for 'independence. The USSR has always viewed with sympathy the national liberation struggle of the' Indonesian people and its desire for independence and independent national existence. The defence of the interests of the Indonesian people is fully in conformity with the lofty aims of the United Nations Charter. The USSR delegation has already affirmed that the States which are trying ta crush the struggles of 'the Indonesian people are taking a serious responsibility upon themselves as Members of the United Nations. As regards the USSR, it will continue in the future, as it has done in the past, to view .with full understanding and sympathY the aspirations of the Indonesian people to acmeve independence and freedom and to take a worthy place in the community of other independent countries and peoples. Mr. HOOD (Australia): 1 do not intend, at this point, to attempt to add anything to the quite detailed, and circumstantial accounts we have heard this morning, particularly from the rèpresentativè of India, reg'àrding the present real situation in Indonesia. Therè are further details Certainly the concern of my own Government in this situation remains as close and as anxious as it has ever betn in the pasto 1 lI110uld like to say, at this point, that any observations which have been made this morning rcgarding the character and attitude of the Committee of Good Offioes-I refer to the remarks of by the representative of the USSR-certainly do not apply to the Australian mc:;mber of that Committee. The Australian interest in the In~onesianposition is that of a close ndghbour which, in this question, desires to see the attainment of a just and stable settlement. A sectlement that is to be stable, must also be just. That, of course,'is the attitude of the Security Council itself, as it has demonstrated in more than one debate in this ~amber. 1 do not think that the Council·can still satisfy the intentions it eXpressed in· more than one resolution looking to the achievement of a stable settlement in Indonesia, until these intentiOI'IS have been carried out, or appear likely to be carried out, in respect of the way matters are progressing. 1 c&:::mot feel that the Couneil is satisfied in its own mind that the conditions which it desÎIed to see prevail in further processes of settlemeht of the Indonesian question are in fact extant. One thing is at least painfully obvious: the progress of the negotiations arising fJ;om. the "Renville" Agreement has been very slow. It . might well have been expected that, within this period of several months which have elapsed, some tangible and substantial progress coul~ have betm c1aimed, at any rate, in respect of the three outstanding and major"features of the proposed interim settlenient-for example, the .question of plebiscites, the question of the Interim Governnlent and the question of the foreign representation orthe Republi~. On none of those three matters is the Council in possession of any information whatsoever which would snggest that any real advance has been made toward further clarification leading ta agreement. On the contrary, not only has there been, in the opinion of my Government, undue delay in the discussions which have taken place in the last ·few months, but, in our opinion, there18 also At a meeting of the Security Councillast week [316th meeting], the representative of the Nether- 'lands expres&:,:d in very soothing langua~e his reassurances ta the Security Council of the firm and full intention of the Netherlands authorities and the Netherlands representatives in Indonesia ta secure the consummation of the "Renville" Agreement in accordance with the intentions of the Security Couneil. 1 do not know what impression those reassurance~ left on the Security Council. It may be 'that, in the interv,ù, the members of the Council have had an opportunity to read a little further for tÎ1emse1ves exactly what has taken place 'in Indonesia during the. period covered QY the remarks of the representative of the Netherlands; and it may be that, after such perusal, the members of the Council will have· at least formed the iinpression that the facts do not entirely square with the reassurances which have been uttered around this table. 1 will' say no more on this point at the moment. ' 1 now wish to come ta' a more immediate aspect of the question, which has indeed ariscn since the last meeting of the Sec'll'ity Council. 1 have referred before ta the need for continued 1 surveillance and vigilance by the Security Canncil in respect of the nrogress of the discussions in Batavia. 1 have ref:;.,~-ed alsq, on an earlier occ?- sion [316th meeting], ta the lleed cf the Couneil to acquaint itself quite fully with what the Committee of Good Offices is engaged in doing') not necessarily with the idea of issuing directions to the Committee, but to satisfy the minds of the members of the Cauncil that the Committee is in fact working accordïng ta its own procedures, but working fully in conformity with the original intentions of the Security Council. 1 have before me a Press release from the Department of Public Information, Lake ~uccess, dated today,'whith conveys the information thatthe dllicussibns between the Netherlands representati~es ln Batavia and the Republic of Indonesia have been di,scontinued for the time being, that they have been broken off: Accordin.g to this communiqué, the Acting Chairman of the Netherlands delegation convey this conclusion to the Committee of Good Offices in a forma1letter i?- which he .stated that, in view of the pubHcatIon of a stnctly confidential document handed by Ml'. Du Bois ta Ml'. van Mook on 10 June, ~e Netherlands delegation has requested instructlOn~ from the Netherlands Government; pencling recelpt 'of these instructions, the Nethcrl~nds delegation thinks it advisable ta discontinue for the time being the discussions between the tw'o d~legations, with the exception of the discussions concernfug the' implementation of the truce agreement. Mr. VAN KLEFFENS (Netherlands): 1 want to say a word, at once, with regard to the statement just made by the. representative of Australia in which he revealed the impression that negociation had been broken off. 1 wish to give the Security Council, for its part, every' reassurance, because no such incorrect representation of th~ facts should abide in the minds of members. . The. Committee of Good Offices yesterèlay .issued a Press release of which the Australian representative has read only a part and which, withperinission, 1 should like to read in full since it will be seen therefrom that the Security Council and the public in the world at large are fully informed of what has really happened with regard to what 1 shall calI more c017ectly-.• and, in faet,. quite correctly-ccthe suspension of negotiations for the time being and pending new to its dçlegation in Batavia on tlle negotiations instructions from the Netherlands Government "The Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian Question today (16 June) issued the follQwing Press release in Batavia: 'The Netherlands delegation today informed the Security Couneil's Commi~tee of GoQd Offices that it thought it advisable to discontinue, '''for the time ~eingU, the discussions with the Republic of Indonesia in view of the publication of the strictly confidential docu- . ment handed by Mr. Caert Du Bois (United States) to Mr. van Mook on June 10'. "The following is the tex.t of a Netherlands delegation letter signed by Jonkheer H.. L. F. 1<. van Vredenburch, Acting Chairman: '1 have the honour ta inform you that in view of the publication of the Sl"'ictly confidential document handed by Mr. Du Bois ta Mr. van MOQk on 10 June instant, the Netherlands delegation has requested instluctions from the NetherlaÎlds Government. Pending receipt of these instructions, the Netherlands delegation thinks it advisable to discontinue fQr the time being the discussions between bath delegatiQIlS, with the exception of the discussions ctincerning the implementation of the truce agreement.'" The Press release of the Committee of Good Offices,dated }esterday, states: suit: la . sion cette semaine la "The Netherlands letter was addressed ta the Chairman of the Committee of Good Offices ànd wasdelivered this moming immediately befQre the scheduled meeting of the Steering Committee of the Netherlands-Indonrsian Conference. "The Netherlands delegation did not attend trus meeting but the three members of the Committee of GOQd Offices and members· of the Republican delegation were present. In their presence, Mr. Raymond Herremans of Belgium, who is the Committee Chairman for the week, read the text of the Netherlands letter. "Mr. Coert Du BQis (United States) then made the following statement: "1 want to say, fQr the record, that 1 have la 1e~ned from the American Embassy at The Hague that it is repQrted there that an article by Mr. Schorr of Time magazine, of some 4,000 words, is based on anintcryiew with me. . NQt only is there nQ truth in the ~tatement, but at nQ time before Qr sincemy interview with Mr. vanMQok last Thursday have 1 or any member Of my delegation discussed the mattèr ~ith 80y cQrrespondent or anybody else out- SIcle the delegation. 1 have seen the American This statement by Mr. Du Boîs has no direct connexion with the matter raised by the representative of Australia. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness and in order ta do full justice to Mr. Du Bois, who, it appears, has been wrongly accused-I do not know by whom-I was anxious to state this in full with the rest of the Press release, .and 1 shall now proceed to i'ead further. "Mr. Mohammed Roem, head of the Republican deiegation, said he could only express regret that the Netherlands delegation had seen fit to take this action for reasons of which the Republican de1egation had no knewledge. He said he felt that the Netherlands delegation should have given proper notice, as provided in the rules of procedure, of its intention not to attend the present meeting. He said neither he nor his delegation knew anything about the publication of any letter or document. Mr. Raymond Herremans declared"-Mr. Herremans is the Belgian member--"that if the·document referred to has been delivered to the Press, this was an event of eAceptional seriousness w~ich was unexpected a.nd called for urgent procedure so that one could not blame. the Netherlands delegation for not giving twenty-four hours notice. He Çl.d~ed that, in view of the meeting today betwt;en Mr. van Mook and Mr. Hatta, he thought no one would suffer any inconvenience by p!JStponement of the c~rent stage of the negotiations. Mr. Roem asked tobe allowed to ,reserve his position. He said he would immediately inform Mr. Hatta of what had occurred so that he might act accordingly. The meeting WaE adjourned without transacting any business." The publication of this document-which 1 do not have here-and the heat apparently engendered in connexion with this event, seemed tothe Netherlands authorities ta be prejudicial ta the smooth progres8 of the negotiations on ,the politicalagreement' and, not unnaturally, 1 submit to the Council, they wanted instructions from their Government. W~at, in fact, is more normal in thë course of àifficult' and delicate negotiations? They have asked for these instructions and they informed the Committee that in view thereof, "pendingreceipt of these instru.ction~, the Netherlands delegation thinks it advisable to discontinue for the time .being discussion. . ." This .quotation is a part of the· document which 1 read to the Security Council a minute ago.. , What is more calculated to magnify and distort this matter than to say that negotiations have .been broken off? 'There is no 'Such thing. 1 With these remarks, 1 trust that 1 can do no better than reter ta the old saying, "least said, soonest mended". Mr. PALAR (Indonesia): 1 am of the opinion that the discontinuation of the negotiatiops by the Netherlands delegation in Indonesia is a very important matter.· 1 should like to kp.ow for how long it is going to last. 1 am of the opinion that the representative of Australia is right. 1 think it is necessary that the Security Council ask for full information of the Committee of Good Offices, &0 that the Council may discuss fuis matter as saon as possible. Mr. TSIANG (China): 1 wish to ask a simple question. Would the President be good enough to ask our Committee of Good Offices to communicate to us, as soon as possible, that confidential document handed by Mr. Du Bois to Mr. van Mook on 10 June? Mr. PILLAI (India).: 1 just wanted to ask a question. In the document which the representative of the Netherlands justread, there is a reference to the publication of some unknown material carried by Mr. Du Bois to the Netherlands Government at Batavia. Mr. Du Bois said:' "1 want to say for the record that 1 have learned from the American Embassy at The Hague that it is reported there that an article by Mr. Schorr of Time magazine of sorne 4,000 words, is based on an interview with me." 1 have been trying to find out when Time magazine published it, ever since 1 saw this .referred to in the morning newspapc:;r. 1 cannat take an oath that what 1 am going to tell you now is absolutely correct, but 1 have been told th~t Time magazine has published no such thing. That leads me to aIl kip.ds of queries. If, as 1 am assured, my information or authority is not entirely wrong.c.-I have not myself hand1ed the pages of Time magazine~but ifmy information ~right that rime magazine has not so far pub- ~ed anything of the ~d, it wo:uld be very mteresting to know how an article filed for Time magazine in Batavia by the Time correspondent, Mr. Schorr, has pre-nataIlv attained aIl this publicity. . men~ we have heard .is that presented by Mr. van Kleffens. Mr. VAN KLEFFENS (Netherlands) : The statement was released by the Committee of Good Offices itself. 1

Yes, yo;" have it, but it has not yet come to the Security Council or to the Secretariat. Mr. VAN KLEFFENS (Netherlands): It iS a public statement.

However, the Committee of Good Offices has aIso sent us these four reports which have been discussed, without expressing any opinion of its own 'on these points, which makes the task of the Security Council rather difficult. It would have facilitated matters ifthey had given their opinion on these points, and perhaps the matter would have been settled. Now, after two meetings of the Security Council and discussions on these points, no proposaI has been submitted by any representative who has spoken on the subject. This after- .nOon we shalI -ljsten to the represent.ative of Belgium, and i{, after that statement, no proposaI is submitted to the Security Council, we might communicateto the Committee of Good Offices merely that we have reèeived these reports, and we might ask their opinion on these points, in order to help the Security Council to take the proper steps. We shalI now adjoum this meeting until 3 p.m. when we shall finish this matter. If it does not take too long to conclude this matter, we shalI continue with the third item on the agenda, the third report of the Atomic Energy -Commission. THREE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-THIRD "MEETING Reld at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 17 June 1948, at 3 p.m. President: Mr. K EL-KHOUP.I (Syrla). Present: The representatives of the fol1owing countries: Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, . Colombia, France, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet' Socialist Rèpuplic, Union of Soviet ~ocililist Republics, Unitc;d Kingdom, United States of America.