S/PV.323 Security Council

Yes, yo;" have it, but it has not yet come to the Security Council or to the Secretariat. Mr. VAN KLEFFENS (Netherlands): It iS a public statement.

However, the Committee of Good Offices has aIso sent us these four reports which have been discussed, without expressing any opinion of its own 'on these points, which makes the task of the Security Council rather difficult. It would have facilitated matters ifthey had given their opinion on these points, and perhaps the matter would have been settled. Now, after two meetings of the Security Council and discussions on these points, no proposaI has been submitted by any representative who has spoken on the subject. This after- .nOon we shalI -ljsten to the represent.ative of Belgium, and i{, after that statement, no proposaI is submitted to the Security Council, we might communicateto the Committee of Good Offices merely that we have reèeived these reports, and we might ask their opinion on these points, in order to help the Security Council to take the proper steps. We shalI now adjoum this meeting until 3 p.m. when we shall finish this matter. If it does not take too long to conclude this matter, we shalI continue with the third item on the agenda, the third report of the Atomic Energy -Commission. THREE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-THIRD "MEETING Reld at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 17 June 1948, at 3 p.m. President: Mr. K EL-KHOUP.I (Syrla). Present: The representatives of the fol1owing countries: Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, . Colombia, France, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet' Socialist Rèpuplic, Union of Soviet ~ocililist Republics, Unitc;d Kingdom, United States of America. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated trom French):, During this morning's meeting [322nd meeting] a reference was made to an incident which occurred during the last few'days in the course of the work of the Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian Question, and 'which led to an interruption of the negotiatio.ns for a politicaI settlement. The representative of the Netherlands has. affirmed that negonations have been suspended' merely in order to allow the Netherlands dele- gation to request'instructions from its Govern- ment. In this connexion, the repres~ntativeof China has suggested that,the President shouid ask the ,Committee to forward to the Security Council the text of the official memoranduni which Mr. Du Bois has handed to Mr. van !Vlook. Now, we have no information at our disposai which might lead, us to believe that. the memo- randum had been endorsed by the Committee of Good Offices, or that it ever was part of the Committee's official papers.· On what grounc!s, therefore, should the Security Council request the. transmission of üm document and thus confer on it Jn authorita1ive character which it Jacks? The Committee of Good Offices is composed of responsibk and exp\~fâenced pe~ons. If inci- dents Iikely to affect the mission entrusted to it have oc;curreti, i1: will not fail to submit a report on them. The mast recent resolutions adopted by the Security Council requested the Committee of Good Offices to keep the Council direc:tIy infQrmed of the progress of the poIiticaI settle-, ment in Indonesia [document S/678] and to report frequently ta the Council on the situation in Western Java and in Madura [document S/689]. In these circumstances, 1 can see no valid reason to issue any further instructions to the Committee. The Committee is on the spot and is in daily contact with bath parties. It is much better placed than we to appreciate wha.t should be done and what, on the other hand, is likely to complicate the difficult mission entrustecl tl'> it. Having made this point, 1 shall confi."ie my statement ta the facts mentioned in the reports now before us and, in doing sa; 1 will endeavour' ta place these facts in their correct perspective. The last tim~ the Security Council considered the question of Indonesia[316th meeting], it had before it t1'le fust interim report of the Committee of Good Offices [document S/649].This report bo~ parties of a number of principles designed ~o serve as a basis .of an agreement for the con:- clusion of ~ political settlement in Indonesia [document S/649, pages 105 and 111]. The Security Council noted with satisfaction t4~se two achievementswhich coincided 'exactly withrépondaient 'the twofold aim of .the original resolution of 1 August [document S/459], namely, the cessa- tion of hostili,ties and the peaceful settlement of the dispute. TheCommittee of Good Offices was then.· requested, in a resolution of 18 February [document S/678] to which 1 have just alluded, to keep the ,Council informed of the progress of the political settlement. It wasin such conditions that the Committee submitted, on 19 May, a second interim rep6rt [document 8/787] which .covers the progress made up to 30 April. The first point which, in my opinion, warrants our attention, bears on the implementation of the truce agreemeI)t because the basic concem of the Council since its inception has always been to put a stop to· bloodshed and violence. Quite special attention was given to this 'point by the Security Committee appointedby the parties concerned' with the lie1p of ,the Committeeof Good Offices. Chapter V of the report which dea1swith this matter shows how the Committee of 'Good Offices called in the help of the Con- sular Commission and its military advisers,'ri1.im- bering fifty-five (sinee reduced to forty~seven). 1 shan not dwell on the procedure which was followed or on the difficulties which had to be overcome. 1 shall confine myself ta recordfugthe resultsachieved. The Committee's military advisers announced that, generally speaking, the appeal for a cease- fire had met with complian.ce. The establishment \ and the demarcation of the boundaries of the demilitarlzed zones were the, subject of agree- ments in accordance with the teims of the truce agreement. Paragraphs. 8 and 9 of the truce agreement 1'tipulated that units of Republican forces which were offering resistance behind the then advanced positions of the Netherlands forces should withdraw with their arms and war materials towards territory held by the Republi- câns.. This withdrawal was effected without let or hindrance from beginning te end. ' At the third meeting of the Security Commit- tee on 26 ]anuary,both parties were in agree- ment in. aIlnouncing that the withdrawal of Republican forces, as arranged under the truce agreement had beensuccessfully completed. On 2~ April, the Security Committée was informed that an agreement had been concluded ,-for the ielease of prlsoners of war" and that The two parties, however, have notified the. Committee of Good Offices of cases of violation of the truce agreement. Most of these violations - re1ated to sub-paragraphs 7 (a) and 7 (b) of the truce agreement, where!:?y -bath parties under-: took to avoid "sabotage, intimidation and reprisaIs" .and to "refrain from broadcasts or any other fOTm of propaganda ai)ned at· provok- mg or disturbing troops and civilians". The Committeehas dealt with these complaints in accordance with its adopted procedure. The Committee deemed it unnecessary to sub- mit detailed comments on these accusations or to try ta apportion the relative responsibility of the parties concerned.In my opinion, the main conclusion to be drawn from this brief analysis is that, according ta the' report of the Committee of Good Offices, the appeal for a cease-fire was complied ~th on the -whole ànd that the main diffici.ùties affecting the application of the truce agreement have so far been settled by mean.'S of agreements concluded between the parties. This,assUred1y, is anachievement of which - the significanc.e should not be under-estimated, for nothing comparable is to 'be found in similar cases with which the •Council has had.ta deal, and we can only express the hope that the Med].- ator and the Truce Commission will be as suc- cessful in. Pal~tine. This result is .a great credit to bot! parties, as weIl as to the Committee of Good l,ffices and its staff. Despite _the importance of this resu1t, a tend..; ency has been shown to consider it as aIready belonging topast history. It q.oes not form the p~incipal subject of th~ second interim report of the Committeeof Gooù Offices which is devoted, abov~ aU, to the pr~gressachieved in the political negotiations. - This is a matter of great'scope and complexity. In .order to realize this, it is only necessary tQ cast aglance at the guiding principles of the future federation and the future union the study of. which has been undertaken by a' sub-com- nuttee of the Political ComnlÏttee. Thèse princi- pIes have to do with the framework of the federaI organization of the United States of IndonèSia the articles of its constitution, the status of i~ autonoL10US States, the organization of thê wer~ submitted by the two parties. Prelim.Ù1ary œpoI1S were drawn up on the questions of public works, road systems, irrigation, highways ànd bridges, and raiIroads. fu summing up ~hat has been done, it has to be recogrnzed that in less than three months-I say ,three months, for the report takes us only to 30 April-a huge programme has been drawn up and the necessary machinery for its imple.men- .tation has been created. This work is still in progress. .On certain points agreements have been reached and on others studies and negotia- tiom are being continued. On still other points, disagreement has arisen, and it is naturaIly on these tliat attention tends to he centred. 1 should like to éxainine briefly the nature of these disagreements and the way in which they. afIeci: the Security Council. Basically, they are all the outcome of divergen(.Q in the interpreta- tien of certain basic principles adopted by both parties on bûard the USS "Renville". They concern mafuly the constitution of the provisional Federal Government· of Indonesia-a matter ta which chapter VI of the second interimreport of the Committee of Good Offices is devoted-. the conference of Bandtmg and the decisions taken in connexion with the autonomy of West Java and of MaC;ura. These three Q71estiOns fomi the subjeet of special reports, sin;-~ the Security Council; in its / resolution .of 28 February [document 8/689], requested the Corunittee of Good Offices to pay special attention to . the .. development jf the political situation in the two •regions to which 1 have referred. - The Committee of·.Oood Offices relates the facts. in the reports, but -refrains" as it should, from drawing any conclusions. Having read these repor.s, it is· of course the ulldemable right of eaçh and every number of the Counci! toform bis own· persona! opinion. Some tJ$k thatthe steps taken by either the Netherlands authoritiesor by· the Republica.n authoritiesin -Indonesia are-or arenot....... appropriate and inconformitywiththe principles adopted on 17 June dn board the "Renville". Others may feel that the consultationswiththe Agre~el.ltiS [document 8/649. pages 105 and les 111],~at least untù a politica1 se~Jement was an la aecomplished facto However that may be, the en question of competenœ was not solved; it été élucidée, demeura réservée rem~ed in suspense and it is still in suspense. It was in such circumstances that ~n 25 August the Security Couneil decided [document 8/525~ .. Conseil to.offer its good offices to the parties so as ta 'con:- 1d'offrir tf.ibute towards the peaceful 8ettlement of their contribuer differences, in accordance with the resolution of rend, suivant le vœu 1 August [document 8;459]. The l'esolution of ~5 August conc1ud~d: "The Council expresses les ~ts readiness, if the parties so request, to assist Conseil ln the se~emeJ'1.t through a small committee of ce the Conncil consisting of three members...". Conseil.:' T!te Council's offer was' accepted by both parties, which requested the appointment ofthe acceptée proposed committee. In this.way, the Comriüttee la of Good Offices came into being. It was, tliere- Commission fore, not the outcome ofa decision of the Security ne Conneil. imposed on the parties, but of a request de In this way,.the negotiations are being carried out under thescrutiny and with the collabl1\"a- tion of the representatives of AtrJtralia, Belgium, and the United States of America, acting on behalf of the Security Councll. . Of èourse, the common ties of unity linking Belgium and the Netherlands are weIl known, but they in no way prevent Belgium·from being sympathetic toward the·aspirations of the Indo.. nesian peoples. In any case, despite the opposite view expressed this morning by the representa- tive of the USSR, it would, in my opinion, be paradoxical to maintain that Australia :md the United States of Amedea are indifferent ta the rights, claiins and position of the Indonesian peoples. The methods which have been adopted by the Committee of Good Offices offer strong guaran.. tees for the realization of·the principles of inde- pendence and co-operation, on which the parties have reached agreement. . \ By way of comparison, the members of the Council cari,. moreover, consider other situations and other disputes brought ta the notice of the Council. 1 am convinced that they will find no cases whère the quest of a peacefulsettlement has bèen pursued in such abroad spiritof inter- national agreemènt: Mr. Hsu (China): 1 want ta clarify a point. This morning Mr. Tsiang suggested thal: the President should request the United Nations Committee <!lf Good Offices ta forward to the Council a confidential document sent by Mr. Du Bois to M:r. van Mook. When he made that suggestion, he did not have in mind the incident in which that document was involved. As far as that incident is concez:ned, our delegation is quite prepared to accept the assurance of the repre- sentative of the Netherlands that the interruption in the negotiations is only temporary. When Mr. Tsiang made the suggestion, 1 believe. he was thinking of the complaint which has been made by the Indonesian Republic con- cernil1g what is taking place in Western Java and Madura. 1 think his suspicion that the document may have a ,connexion with the complaint is justified by the Press release which has just been distributed. This Prt:Ss release reprmts a communiqué issued by the Committee of Good ~ffices on the Indonesian Question. The follow- mg passage i8 from that communiql.).e: :'The Australian and United States represen- tatives have naturally been disappointea to learn t~at the working paper COI.· :aining their sugges- ,tIons, which seem to havebeen in line with what both parties are seeking to achieve, cannot be Therefore, it can readily be sœn that the document has some bearing upon the question under discussion and that the suggestion made by Mr. Tsiang to have it communicated to the Security Couneil-perhaps in a confidential way for it~ information-is justified. However, 1 do not think that Mr. Tsiang bas any intention of. insisting that the document be ,• transmitted immediately, because, as is known, the Council is not contemplating taking any action right away. Evidently, therefore, there is no ~ecessity for insisting upon the securing of ,this document immediately. Our delegation, however, wishes to reserve its right to raise the question again when .1t considers that the situa- tion makes it necessary. Mr. TARASENKO (Ukr~ian Soviet Socialist Republic) (tTanslated trom Russian): 1 should like to ask whether the document under discus- sion, mentioned by the representative of India h..u; 'been published in the American Press' including Time magazine? '

We do not ka"1û-N whether the document has been published. The mem.hers of the Security Couneil would not be able to give a reply to the question. Perhaps sbmeone present - here could give us some correct information on the subject. If.the Indian representative knows anything about the matter, he may inform' us. However, 1 would ask him only to give a "vesu "u . th • fth • or no answer to e qutstion 0 e representative of the Ukrainian.Soviet Socialist Republic. Mr. PILLAI (India): 1 shaH do that. However, per'haps the President will aIIow me ta read an excerpt' from an·article which appeared in this morning's New YOTk Herald Tribune, on page 16, under the headia,g "Indonesia Talks Halted, Dutcl1 Angry at 'Leak' u. '"!t was understood that the American-AusnaHan· formula p;rovided: "1. Election within three months of a constituent ~embly. . . , "2. This assembly ta have dual status as a provisional parliament. "3. Any final agreeIl1ent must provide an IndonesianUnion in which the Netherlands and the United, StateS ofIndonesia,would have equal parmership as sovereign States. •

1 do not think it is necessary ta undertake a discussion of newspaper articles in Je the'Security Counci1. We shalI request informaau tian on these matters from official sources and cles discuss the matters l~ter. source tions Commission d'une débats au de offices sujet ces situation tion Si cela signifie également politique. The Security Council has ~-eceived reports from the C-nmmittee of Good O!Hçes and has to reply to the Committee in sorne way. On the bF.sÎs of the discussion that has taken pb·.ce at these lasf few mee~ngs on the Indonesian questiôn, 1 think it may be concluded that the Security Council wishes, in the fust place, to leam from the Committee of Good Offices about the suspension of negotiations. On those negotiations depends the development of political activities in conne...o.on \Vith the fulfilment of the existing agI't~ements between the two parties. If the negotiations are suspended now, that means that such a development will aIso be suspended. It is important for the Security Council to know whether it is true that there has been such a suspension of negotiations and ü so, to know its causes, justification and duration. In arder to èxpress the attitude of the Security Council, 1 think we might first put to the Committee of &>ad Offices this question about the suspemùon of negotiations and its causes, justification and duration. The Committee of Good Offices would have an opportunity to offer an explanation which might Perhaps prove satisfactory to the Security Council. est exact s'est duite, la sécurité, poser tions sion des bons offices une explication que, rité la ville" non revanche, sur' At the same time, we might ask the Committee ta continue tendering its good offices''with a view to achieving a correct and peaceful fulfilment of the provisions of the "Renville" Agreement and .other ~isting agreements. We might aIso ask the Committee to advise the Security Council as ta the compliance or non-:compliance, by each side, with the provisions of the existing agreements. During the discussions in the Security Council, certain ~embers attributed non-compliance to one party or the other, while each of the part\es charged the other with non-compliance. The Security Couneil has no means of establishing the faets. The Committee of Good Offices, which is oÏl the scene, has the means of estabHsh,· ing the factsand informing the Security Councü of eaclr party's compliance or non-compliance withthe provisions of the agreements. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America): 1 am in general agreement with the line of· action which the President has suggested in terms of a request which he might address to the Chairman of the Committee of Good Offices with a view to securing certain additional·information for the SecufÏty Couneil. 1 believe that the last paragraph of the resolution of the Security Council dated 18 Februa.ry [document 8/678], .ta which the representative of Belgium referred earlier, would probably suffice. That paragraph stated: ttRequests . .. The Co:mr.:nttee of Good Offices ta keep the Council clirectly informed about the political settlement in Indouesia." 1 have rio doubt that the Committee of Good Offices woUld inform the Security Council con- , c~ming th~e ev~ts which have been t1le subject of much discussIOn today. However, 1 would see no objection to bringing ta the special attention of the Committee the concern which the Council has felt regarding this matter. But 1 believe that there is a particular frame of reference in which any communication moule! be addressed to the Chairman of the Committee. Ii seems to me that the Security Couneil is, happily, still operating in this matter in the general realm of agreement of the parties. We are not dealing with .a situation in whicl1 failure· has resultèd from the efforts of the Security Council and the Committee of Good Offices. We are not sitting in judgment on a case in which one or the other party has brought about a failure of negù- tiations. We are not, it seems ta me eDgaged in a post-mortem. What we are interested in, is the continuance of the negotiations and their succcssfuI outcome. My delegation we1comed very heartily the statement of the representative of the Netherlands this moming to the effectthat the original impression created by. the Press communiqué conceming the suspension of the negotiations was notwholly accurate. He pointeel out that there hadmerely been a discontinuance of certain parts of the discussion pendingthe receipt of instruc- Nothing, it seems tome, could be mort injurious tothe continuing conduct of the, mediatory f?nction th~ to compel the person in the position of the mediator to make public declarations as to the justification of t.'le position of this or that side at various stages of the· proceedings. Moreover, it sèems to me tl].at it may very weli be true-I hope it will he true-that by the time a communication from the President of the 1 Security Conncil could reach tI-.e Chairman of the Committee of Good Offices, by the time the rec~rd of o~r proceedings in this and the precedmg meetmgs could he transmitted to them, the occasion. for sending.the inquiry may very well be past in terms of the discontinuance, for the time being; of the discussions. 1 believe that we should leave it to thediscretiori of the Committee .of Hood Offices to furnish the Securîty Council with the informatiot.'. which is pertinent and necessary for the purposes of the . ThU$~ in my op4tion~ we should not attempt to press Ï1~ Committee'of Good Offices to ~egister jù'dgrnent on the merits of the positions take..Jl by the parties~ and we should not attempt toelicit positions taken by the Committee on questions of the justification or nan-justification of those positions. That type of request to the Committee~ that type of information~ would perhaps be of great importance and of necessity to the Security Couneil if we were unhappily in the position of dealing with a situation in which the negotiations had broken down. That not being the case according to our information at the present time~ it seems to me that we should be very careful to do nothing wl>ich might in any way hinder the resumption of the negotiations and their continuance to' a successful conclusion. Mr. TARASENKO (Ukrainian Soviet SociaIist Republic) (translated trom Russian):. 1 should first like to say' a few words about the report. The Committee of Good Offic~ is endeavpuring to demonstrate neutrality~ to present the events unfolding before its eyes as a neutral and objective observer. Its report consequently contains a catalogue of dry facts presented, on the one hand, by the Netherlands Government and, on the other, by the Republican Govemment. But where can we find its own opinion of these events, its own point of view on any important question affecting the life of a whole people? No one mows. How can this seeming neutraIity and objectivitybe explained? 1 think the explanation is that the Committee is simply at'raid of giving an objective and correct opinion on events, for that would mean 'condemning the Netherlands Government. J1irst of aIl, it would mean admitting and focussing before the eyes of the whole world certain facts which are disagreeable ta the Committee, particularly the burning desire of the peoples of Indonesia to rid themselves of their l"';!l.vited "authorities" which are really enslavers~ Second1y, it would mean recognizing that evén now the Netherlands are continuing calmIy and cynically to stifle the freedom of the Iildonesian people, and that they will not renounce this policy'"in the future; that cvery possible expedient is being used to crush the attempts of the Indonesian people to huild their own State independentIy, without. the help of "well-wishers" in' the. form of Dutch colonists, owners ofrubber pTantation.s and oil-fields. The Committee of Good Offices could not condone this. and that , ~ The speech made by the Australian representative who stated that the remar-ks made by the representative of the USSR could not apply to the Australian member of the Committee of Good Offices, orny goes to confirm what 1 have just said. The fact is that the Australian representative wishes to dissociate himself from the general position taken by the Committee of Good Offices, of which he does not approve. True, 1 am some.what disturbed at the fact that l cannot see in these reports any point of view peculiar to the Australian member of the Committee of Good Offices, any opinion which would reflect what the Australian representative has just said. AlI his statementS confirm that the Committee of Good Offices has taken up 'a position for which he does not wish to be responsible. Whether 'this Ïg really the case or not is another question. The speech made by the Belgian œpresentative at the present meeting, and Belgium's gerieral attitude to the colonial question, do not permit us to expect an objective attitude with respect to the events in Indonesia on the part of the Belgian 'Government, and of its representative on t}1e Committee of Good Offices. It is c1ear that the interests of other colonial ccuntries, in addition to those of the Netherlands, are affècted, inc1uding those of Be1gium. We cannot therefore expect from the Be1gian Government a fait, objective and sympathetic attitude to the movement of national liberation of the Indonesian people. ,Puissances .1 should also like to refer ta,the position of the United States in this matter, a position which is cIear to a11 of us and has been revealed at so many sessions 'of the Security Council devoted' to the Indonesian question that i need not dwell on it here. 1 wish only to reca11 once again what is behind thé position' taken up. bythe United States on the Indonesian question. Why does the United States so stubborn1y refuse to take up an objective attitude ÎQ. the matter? Why has it, for the space of a whole year during which the question was examined by the Security Council, persistentIy followed the policy of supporting the Netherlands, the Dutch aggressors? At the last meèting [322nd' meetitzg], the repr~entative of India fu~nishedsorne interesting facts about the'loan, concerning which conversations are now taking place with the United ·States. It was also recentIy announced in the Press that a number of American oil companies Secondly, in spite of the ostentatious "neutrality" displayed by the Committee of Good Offices in its preparation of these documentsthe first, second, and third reports-in spite of the wishes of the authors of the documents, 1 .think it is possible to discern in them the real state of affqirs in Indonesia. Even these tendentious docurp.ents make it possible to jud:ge the attitude of the Netherlands Government towards its own obligations, an attitude which may be described as a complete disregard of those obligatio~. They are recognized when they are useful, butas soon as they cease to heuseful, they are trampled underfoot and cast aside. At the cost of but litde effort ID. rl without reading between the fines, it is possible to realize, even from this so-called neutral.report, that the people of Indonesïa have not become reconciled ta the present state of affairS ànd that they are continuing thtrir attempts ta rid themselves of the Dutch. ..l .should: iike tQsay a few words àbout the so-calléd ''Renville' Agreement. As we know, the IIidonesian Repûblic was forced, under the circumstances, to acèept the enslavîng conditions of that Agreement.. 1 spoke about this question a~ the rime' the Agreemen~ was made, and showed why the Indonesian Republic was forced to accept its exceptionally oppressive terms. The reason was,· it will be remembered, that.British, Japanese and Netherlands troops imposed a war of. attrition on the IÎ1donesian Republic and people.. 1 wi...sh to emphasize that that war was imposed by Japanese troops in alliance with British; and Netherlan,ds troops. To make this absolutely c1ear, let me be specific once again. After the defea~ of Japan, after the.surl'ender of. that country, Japanese traops togetherwith Bri~h and: Netherlands troops,continued the war against thepeoples of Indonesia. The econorilic blockade stifled theeconomy of Indonesia and dà.ily aggravated .the situation of the Republic. At the same. time, sorne interna- . tional organizations whiçh had close and direct relations with the United Nations, hastened ta come 'totheaid of the Netherlands in thestruggle against t~e Indonesian p~op!e. 1 have in mind the.grant ofa.loan l?f 195 million dollars to ~he Netherlands by the International Bank in August J947. There was, it is tI1;1e, a hypotritical reserva- Clear1y, under such conditions the Indonesian Republic was obliged to accept the enslaving terms of the "Renville" Agreement. 'fhere was no alternatiVl~. And now even this agreement, oppressive against the Indonesian Republic and favouring the Netherlands, is ~eing ruthlessly violated and trampled upon by the Netherlands Government. Why is this? Because the Netherlands Governmenthas come to the conclusion that it can try to grasp ev.en more, to do awayentirely with the Indonesian Republic, and tonip in the bucl the struggle of the Indonesian people for their national and economic liberatinn. ' 1 may be told I am mistaken. If so, 1 can point to the creation of puppet States; to the division of Indonesia into a number of small States, which, as the representative of the USSR hasalready pointed out today [322nd .meeting], are ruled by quislings ready to serve the' Dutch for money; to the proclamation of the "United States of In.donesia" for the· purpose of doing away with the Indonesi~,Republic; 1 can point to these and many other facts which show how flagrantly the Netherlands has disregarded its obligations. Now the Netherlands is endeavouring to gain still more, to deprive the Indonesian Republic of its sovereign rights. During a recent meeting [316th meeting], the Netherland's representative even expressed surprise that there could be any doubt about the legality of the Netherlands' sovereign rights over the whole ,of Indonesian territory. In face of such a situation, .the normal condi~ tions-indeed, any conditions--necessary for the existence of the Indonesian Republic, cease to exist, even within the framework of the "Renville" Agreement.. A number of speakers, including.the representative of the .Netherkads, have emphasized. that the Netherlands isthe upholder of democratic tladitions, .which it is introducmg in Indonesia, but the whole report is an indication of the opposite, for it shows how the Netherlanè:B Go'vernmeIit, through its officials, tramples on 'democratic principles and democratic order in !hose territo:i:iesof Indonesia where they were mtt:0duced by the Republican Government and WhlCh the Dutch have now se!7.ed again. . . , , 1 .An analysis of ilie fact,6 set forth in Jle report will show that. the thir,ù ~nd. last West Java 1 think the people of Indonesia 'Would prefer not to have such samples of "dei'llocracy". They woulG certainly be better off without them. The representativ~ of the Netherlands cornplained at the last meeting [316th meeting] that the Indonesian population and the Republican leaders were still clinging to their old aspirations, that is, aspirations to obtain thdr independence and the right freely to decide their own fate. He stated the conditions for a successful solution of the Indonesian problem, name1y that the Republic should undergo a change of mind and heart. The behaviolU of the Netherlands Govermnent in Indonesia, the actiom ana, tnetho& used ta achieve its ends, show very clearly what is meant by this change. The .Idonesian people are faced with the demand to return to the positit>~ they occupied before the war, a position of complete colonial dependence upon the Netherlands. Clearly such an approach cannot lead to a solution cf the problem which would, in the least, satisfy the Indonesian people. The Netherlands Govemment's.attitude being what it is, it is obviously futile to expec~ that the Netherlands and Indonesia can achieve any positive results through conversations, the more so if one takes into account the role played by i:he Committee of Good -Offices; for the aims of ilie two sicies are different: on one side there 1.:; the wish com- -, p:etely to restore theold ord(er, and, on the other, the reluctance of the Indonenan people to return to tbat arder. In ,\>';.ew of the favourable attitude of the Cornmittee of Good Offices ta. the aims and desires of the .Netherlands Government,Iittle can be expected from such.conversations. Nevertheless, the conversations were arbitrarily broken off on the NI~therlands side. Ta èothis, rècourse was had to forgery..After the statement of ~e representative of fuma, there can remain no doubt that it.was indeeà forgery.. With the.aid.of such forgeries, it is hoped to justifY,the prepara.tion of .new violence against the Indonesian people. At present the NetherlandS Governmentmpreparing to. use its military or economic superiority te deprive the Indonesian p~ople of the fruits of victory which they wonafter years of stubbom fighting. " At a receilt meeting [316th. meeting], the Netherlands. represçntativeinyoked the. history .aI\d traditionsolhis country. 1 donotquiJe see Sorne episcdes in the history of the ~etherlands are certainly worth examining on this occasion, and 1would like to ti'We1l on them for a moment. There was a time when the King of Spain and bis grandees were filled with indignation because the people of the Netherlands were endeavouring to put an end to Spanish nùe and win their freedom, and because of the stubbornness with which they fought. Yet in the end the struggle of the people, the bravery and obstinacy of the Gueux, was crowned with &uccess. ls it to those traditions that the Netherlands representative was rd'erring? More vivid in our memory is the Hitlerite occupation of the Netherlands. The Dutch people remember the "blessings" they enjoyed under the fordgn aggressor. Why, then~ cannot the NetherlanC:'S Government vislialize the positioJ} of the Indonesian people? Wha: grounds can there be to think ihat this people looks upon the Netherlands occupation differently irom the ' way in whir,h the people o~ the Netherlands viewed the Hitlerite occupation? Thus, 1 think the lessom of history ~~ld tradition in this case are twvfold. If the Netherlands goveming circles have dtawn on the lessons of history, then what they have learned has been d dubious value, as the statements of the Netherlands representative have confirmed. -l'intention The Netherlanrll representativè has in effect presented the Security Council with an ultima- ° mm, declaring that the Netherlands Govemment doed not intend to appear at the Council meetings in future, that the Conncil must not intervene between the NetherlanQ.'<) and Indonesia, and that the Netherlands Govemment has displayed altogether too mu('h patience and good will in attending the meetings of the Cauncil and listening to the criticismS of its actions. The Netherlands repres~îlt~tive stated, clearly and unequivocally, that his GovernmentJ does not intend to tolerate this state of affairs in the future, that it will boycott the Security Council. If we look back at the history, of the 'thirties of this century, we rnay discoyer a number of actions performed by cenain States whÏch closely re'5emble the action ta which the Netherlands Go'Vemme~t is abeut to have °recourse. Examples may' be infectious, but we should !10~ lose sight of what the consequences may be. 1 think the Secùrity Councl1 should play a more active part in the Indonesian question and should lend legitimate assistance to the In&onesian people, even though this may not be to the liking of sorne countries represented on the Council and may to sorne ,extent affect the colonial interests of sorne represented on the Council. The·Council must rise above these considerations, and on the finn basis of the United Nations Charter and of the aims of the United Nations, it must consider the solution of this question fairly and objectively. It cannat remain aloof and, like Pontius Pilate, wash its hands of the matter. It cannot stand aside otl the pretext that there exists the Committee of Good Offices. We can all see that the Committee is incapable of solving this problem, t}lat it cannot influence the course of events, the more so as its composition prevents it from seeking a just solution. One last remark. 1see no need at the momev.c to interrupt the' examination of the IndoneSLm question. We still have one document [document 8/842] a fourth report submitte& yesterdaywhich may serv,e as a basis of discussion by the Council. It would be wrong to deferthe consideration' of the question indéfinitely. Such a delay would serve only to aggravate the position in Inc1lonesia.' Mr. Hoon (Australia): There·are two points arising out of the President's suggestionto the Security CounçiLwhlc!t~I should like tohave made clear to me. First, 1think that the Soonrity Council will findthat in the contemplatedreport from the Committee of Good Offices, there will he no lack of material or substance to consider and to debate.Moreover, it w;li he material which willcarrywith It its ovm sense Cif urgency. 1 trust, with alleal'1v'..stne&il, that it ~il1 become . possible to fix a defÏ1:ul:e date for th,1I': next me~t­ ing of the Security COU.'·lclJ. ,,~! f~~ qu,~nonpf

The situation has not changed since 1 spoke previously. Like the representative of the Ukrainian SSR, 1 am unwilling to adjourn this meeting without any concrete result, but since there is 110 concrete proposai before us, we shall have to sati"fy ourselves by sending a cable to the Chairman of the Committee of Good Offices asking for information on the points 1 have mentioned, points which' will bè modified in accordance with the remarks of the representative of the United States, and await his reply. As saon as the reply is received, it will be ~istributed to the members as a document and another meeting will be convoked, either at the request of any member of the Security Council or on the initiative of the President, in accordance wièh the rules of procedure. At present, 1 do not see any use in fixing a meeting to he held within a limited timetomorrow, say, or next week-if there is nothing to discuss. The members of the Security Council have made their statements, and none of them supported ai~y concrete proposal, nor was any discussed or voted upon. Should any member bring forward a proposai and call for a meeting, a meeting will be convoked irnmediately. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated trom Russian): We are exarnining four dOCiuments receive~ from the Committee of Three. One of them, dated 16 June [document S/~42], came yesterday. It was difficult ta read this somewhat lengthy document in the time available; consequentIy it is only natural that speakers today have not referred ta it at all, aIthough it deals with a matter of considerable importance, namely, the Federal Conference, which opened on 27. May and would seem to be still in progress. A number of representatives on the Security Council are not cIear as to the nature, aims and tasks of the Conference, and as to the attitude of the Indonesian Government to'",ard it. Various other quest\ons aIso have to be cleare~ up, and apart from this report~ we havereceived no official information whatever, We do not even know the official opinions of the parties concerned about this Conferenèe. Consequently, it would certainly be premature to continue discussing tIle Indonesian question at this meeting. ~ h~ve no;obj~ction to the Cow.r.llÏttee of Three , belng asked for additionaI information, if it can " . No proposaI has been made today; however. Perhaps one will be made at the next session,.and we shalI then examine the adtÜtional documents and information received from the Committee of Three, including theCommittee's report of which 1 have already spoken and whicll w~ have not yet discussed.

That is what 1said: as soon aS a proposal is ready, the date of the meeting will be' :fi.xed. 1 have no objection if we :fix a meeting for' next week, on either T!lesday or Wednesday. li there is no objection, we shalI have it on Wednesday at 2.30 p.m. General McNAUGHTON (Canada): 1 asked for permission to speak only in ord~r·to express a little anxiety about the procedure which the Presi~ent has indicated would he adopted in communicating with the Committee of Good Offices in Indonesia. 1 should like to draw attention to the fact that the charter under which that Committee is operating is our resolution of -28 February 1948 [document 8/689]. 1 should like to make it clear that any communications to the Committee, other than such further resolutions a'.:t the Secùrity Couneil may adopt, cannot, of course, affect in any way the functions of that Committee, which is one of good' offices only. 1 thinkthat is something about which we have to he very, very careful. Another matter about which we should be careful, as the representanve of the United States has pointed out, is that no communications from this Security·douncil must affèct the proper initiative on the spot of 'i,hatCommittee ta discharge the' duties .with whieh it has been entrusted.. It sèems to me that the best way to put the Committee in min,:! of what we are thinking about in the Security Couneil and what we wish, is that we should transmit ta it copies of our proceedings, as ! think was suggested earlier in the day. As 1 saiG, 1 do hqpe that we will bring tothe mincIs of 'L'te members of,the Corrnriittee the facts that theSecurity Council does not wîsn in any way what<.::ver to have,them departfrom the mandate wmch they have already been given, and that we hope theywill keep us informed, as indeed the resolution of 28 February r~quires,but that we do not'wish,them ta feel that their initiative has heen restrieted in any way, shap~, or form. Mr. PALAR (Indonesian Republic): The situation seems to me to have become confused. We began this discussion with three. reports, after which a fourth was introduced, which 1 have not yet studied carefully since 1 receivecl it on1y late last night. 1 reserve the right ta discuss this fourth report at the next meeting, but 1 should like to do something more, since 1 feel the need to say something àbout the speech made by the representative of the Netherlands las1l' Thursday [316th meeting]. 1 think 1 aIso have the right to do that at the next meeting.

1 would remind the Security Council that tomorrow morning at 10.30 we are scheduled to meet to discuss the report of the Committee of Experts with regard to the trusteeship system as applied to the stra~egic Pacifie islands. As for the remaining item on today's agenda, that dealing with the report /Of the Atomic Energy Commission, the zoepresentative of ~e Ukrainian SSR is the on1y representative who has asked permission to speak, and as it is not a pressing matter, 1 think it might be postponed until next week. We shalI meet on Toesday next at 2.30 p.rn. to discuss that question. On Wednesday, at the same hour, we shall continue our examination af the Indonesian question.