S/PV.329 Security Council

The only item on the agenda is the Indonesian question. Are there any proposed àmendments or additit:lns to the agenda?

If 1 have understood the United Kingdom representative correctly, he is not concerned with the raising of the Palestine question itself, since -no reply has as yet been received from the Arab side orthe State of Israel, but with the question of the cablegram sent by Mr. Bernadotte. Is that correct? Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : Yes; Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria) : 1 find that in one of the paragraphs of document S/865, it states that: "The truce, in effect, is based on the resolution of the Security Council of 29 May lQ48.lt was the fighting in Palestine which induced [the Security Council] to adopt that resolution. Unless the parties themselves agree to extend the truce beyond 9 July, it may be assumed that the Security COuncll will again consider the matter and take such action as circumstances may demand." Therefore, 1 ask the President whether he would not agree that the Security Council should cor"Jder this point as a matter of urgency and take it up, perhaps immediately, and, if the Security Council is so disposed, agree upon l'l. short message to be addressed to the two parties in the sense suggested by the Mediator. Here, the suggestion of the Mediator is that the Security Council would not take any step in that matter unIess the Council has the replies of the parties concerned.with regard to accepting or rejecting the extension of the truce. So far, we do not see in this document that the replies of the parties have been received by the Mediator. As long as they are not received, we have no way now to make new recommendations o:r anything else. "In order that the efforts toward Mediation of the dispute may continue ...". Thus, 1 do not think it is necessary ~o take any action today in this matter. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): l would point out, as l think l mentioned in the previous remarks which 1 made, that the Now if the Mediator appeals to the Security Cauneil in this matter to assist him in the effortS which he is making, 1 should have thought the Security Council would have wiShed to give him ,ail possible support with tlle least possible delay. 1. therefore still would urge that the Security Cauncil take immediate action in this matter in arder to give the Mediator that assistance which he requires and that authority which he can derive only from the Seeurity Council itself. Ml'. JESSUP (United States of America): 1 agree that in a case in which the Mediator has addressed a specifie request caliing on the United Nations - which in this .case w'ould mean the Security Councilto appeal urgently to the interested parties, it is incumbent upon the Security Council to give attention to this request of the Mediator and to treat it as he seems to do, as a ,matter of urgency. As is apparent, 1 think, from the President's question and the l'eply given by the representative of the United Kingdom, this is not a question now of the entire Palestine matter, nor is it a question of the terms of the truce, or anything of that kind, but is merely, in the terms of the request, the matter of accepting in principle the prolongation of the truce. For that reason, l, too, believe that we should take this matter under urgent consideration. I Ml'. VAN LANGENHOVE (Be1gium) (translated tram French): 1 note we have begun discussing the Palestine question without first àecid- . ing whether it should be induded in the agenda. Yet that would seemto be the firat point onwhich we should také a decision. For my part, 1 would inc1ude the question in today's agenda, in view. of the m'gency of the issue raised in the Mediator's telegram. Moreover, 1 think it should be the first item on the list. 1must admit 1 do not understand why today's meeting has been called to resume the discussion on the Jindonesian question. This had not been contemplated when we last adjomned. We had merely stated that we would fix the date of our next meeting in due course. It seemed then that the discussion of the question was exhausted, and yet a few hours later, we were informed that the Security Council had been called to resume discussion of this question today. That is why, before 1 reach any decision regarding the There is another point about which 1 should like, ii possible, to.be clearer. A fortnight ago, the Security Council received the first chapter of thè third interim report of the Committee of (jood Offices [documènt 8/8f8J.The communication of this fragment was an unusual procedure. Indeed, how can the importance of a documen.t he assessed ifonly part of it is known? It was reasonable to expect that the remainder of'the report would reach the Council very saon there;. after. 1 should like to know whetherthe Secretariat has any information on the subject and whether it is true, aS 1was told a shor.t while ago, that the report has just reached Lake Success. 1 understand that it contains detailed information on the present state of the negotiations. If thisis the case, common sense would seem to indicate that we should wait until the report has been received aild commumcated to -the rnembers -of the Conncil before resllming our discussiono:n the Indonesian question. The PRESIDENT (translated Irom French): Would the Belgia,n representative agree to my giving answers ccnçerning those twp points of procedure after the discullsion of the United Kingdom representative'll proposaI, or does he wish me to reply immediate1y? - Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated' trom French): 1 lcave that entirely to the President. ' ThePREsIDzNT (translated Irom French): Then 1 shall answer them later. Mr. DE LA TOm.:NELLE (France) (translated from French): 1 think that the Mediator's telegram of5 July, whichwe now have before us, refers to two different questions~ The penultimate para~aph. reminds the Securlty Council that the truce expires on 9 July and that, as ho.stilities may be resumed at that date, the'Security·Cou:nèil will then have to face again its obligations and responsibilities and take such action as it may deern approprlate. In order to' avoid sucha situation, wmch would be most regrettable, the Mediator, in the last paragraph. .of bis cOmT..1lunication, .app:eals to the Security Council to'intervene immediately with the parties concemedso that they should accept an extension of the truce in principle. As the truce expires on 9 July and as today 6 July, 1 think that this is a matte~ of'extreme urgency. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Since the question of prolonging the truce has amen, . We cannot ignore the new plans which are beîng worked out during the tiuce and rderred . to the Jews and Arabs by the Mediator fortheir consideration: Under the flag of truce, new proposais are being .concoèted· and d~',.:ussed, propo.sals w4ich we cannot ignore, as they are contrary 010 the United Nations General Assembly's·resolution on the Palestine question.1 1 am not speaking of this in order to discuss the substance of either of these documents, but to point outthe need to study both of them. Incidentally, the de1egation of the USSR has not yet received the other· document which contains the Mediator's proposal jùst mentioned by me. For some reason this document has already appeared in yesterday's Press, though the member~ of the Security Council have not yet received it. It is essentialthat the Secretariat should let us have it without delay; if ithas it now, we ought to receive it today, so that we might discuss the question of the truce tomorrow, having thoroughly examined the material which the Mediator has submitted or may submit, fol' tomorrow's meeting. 1 therefore think that it would he better.for us to devote tomorrow's meeting, or if necessary, two meetings, to the Palestine question. 1 fear we are not quite ready to discuss it today. Should it be decided, however, to discuss it today, the USSR de1egation will, .of course, speak not orny on the truce question but also on its various aspects, and particularly on the way in which the truce is being med by some in théir own intyrests, which havenothing in common with the General Assembly's decision on the Palestine question. . 1vIr. EL-KHOURI (Syna) : 1have·now had time to read document S/865. When 1fust came here, That means that this document is not addressed ta the Secul'ity Council nor ta the Secretariat, but merely informs them that this document had been submitted ta the parties. Yet when we read this .document, we find that in some places it addresses the Security Council oi the United Nations directIy, and does not consist merely of proposaIs submitted to theparI-Jes on 3 and 5 JuIy. It seems there have been two documents . submitted ta the parties, but 1 do not find them here. 1 do, not understand how this document can be the same document as that submitted to the parties, when it asks the United Nations to appeal to the parties ta tLCcept in principle a prolongation of the truce fer such a period as may be decided upon in consultation with the Mediator. lt seems there are two other documents, the documents containing the proposals submitted to the parties on 3 and 5 JuIy. Where are those two documents? There is also the other document [document 8/863], ta which the representative of the USSR .has referred. In the document we have, 1 find certain contradictions between one part and another. For this reason, 1 do not think it is possible for us to discuss this today. 1 hope that the other documents will be distributed also, and that time will be given for the study of them. • Mr. TSIANG (China) : It seems to me unneces.:. sary ta devote so much time to a discussion ofthe simple suggestion made by the representative of the United Kingdom. Although he did not say 50 in samany wo:rds, 1 understood him ta mean that we should add the Palestine question as item 3 of our agenda, with a sub-titIe referring to the cablegram fromthe Mediator concerning the prolongation of the truce in Palestine. l1hat is a simple, reasonable suggestion. Now wc have other ideas cropping up. We have ~e idea that we make this question the :first item on our agenda, and discuss it first. That seems to me rather inconvenient. The nonmember representatives participating in the discussion on Indonesia are here, whereas the representatives who usually participate in a discussion on the Palestine question have not been notified yet. When we take up this question, we ought ta give these representatives a chance to be present. Thatis one difficulty. Then as to whether or not we are rearly to di,,~uss the Palestine question this afternoon, it is clear that some members are ready and wish ta s,ay somethiug to the Security Council. It is aIso clear that other members are not ready - 1 am one of them - te

Very weIl. The discussÏOii of this question is now dosed, and l wish to submit a proposaI. Vnder the Security Council's rules of procedure, the Council considers those questions which are on it'J agenda. In this connexion 1 should like to give an explanation to the Belgian representative, and tell him why the Indonesian question was put on the agenda. At the end of the last meeting of the Security Council [328th meeting], the Indonesian representative approached the President, told him that he was very anxirJilS to make a statement on thé question of Indonesia~ and asked that a meetillg he called shortly. The President obviously could not refuse such a legitimate request, and that is why the Indonesian question has been placed on the agenda. May 1 also remind the Belgian representative that the Indonesian question is unfortunately not yet closed? I am afraid it may_ not he closed for weeks or even months, and may even retain the attention of the Security Council for years. 1 la tion Je la de qu'elle ni savoir que été nécessaire être seront devrait tion en de As the Indonesian question has been inc1uded in the agenda in accordance with the request 1 have just mentioned, we must now discuss it. . On the other hand, the Secretariat has just informed me that chapters II and III of the report were received orny today and that they are not yet ready for distribution. Assoon as' they are, they will be placed at the disposaI of the members of the Security Council. The President continued in. Russian: 1 presume we shall undoubtedly call a meeting of the Security Council on the Pales~'ine question tomorrow for the following reasons: , First, there is Ml'. Bernadotte's teIegram. Secondly, there is the fact that there are a number of documents which the members of the Security Council have not yet'studied and which the Secretariat shouId circuIate today to the members of the Council for consideration, so that t..his questiqn can be discussed tomorrow. ments n'ont le d'hui tion 1 do notaccept that there is anything in the argument that we cannot discuss the prolongation of the truce without, at the same time, discussing the variousproposals that have been made bythe Mediator. It seems to me they are entirelY separate questions. This question of the prolongation of the truce, ta which our attention has been caUed bythe telegram which is before us, is a perfecdy simple, straightforward one; nobody wishes to study it. 1 maintain that it is not necessary toconsider it in relation to the other proposals. Mter aU, the Sectirity Council originally caUed for a truce, before the Mediator even was sent out. Itmay be that, unfortunately, the proposals he has so far made may turn out ta be unacceptable to either party or to both parties; but itmight be that one party or the other - or ag~l" both - might make counter-proposals which might lead towards a solution. That is unlikely to happen, or it is unlikely to meet with anysucccss, if they are to lapse into hostilities again on Friday morning. 1 .tb.irik ft is perfectly simple to back the Mediator in bis appeal for a prolongation of the truce without studying aU these other documents. Itisa perfectly simple thing to do, and a thing which 1 should have thought that the Council would have ta do. 1 hope the Council will do it quicklyat least tomorrow morning, if the membcrs do not want to do it today - if we do not want hostilities to bé resumed, which 1 should think would bequite disastrqus. MI. JESSUP (United States of America): l shouldIike to support veryurgently the suggestion that has been made by the representative of the United Kingdœn, that tb.is matter must be discussed atthe earliest possible moment. l agree entirely that the simple question of whether the Seçur'ty Council wishes ta recommend to the parties that they .should not resUJ}1e fig1rtîng on Friday morning but should continue 1 therefore wish to urge upon the President, very earnestly, that he give consideration to putting this matter on the agenda of the Security Couneil at the very earliest possible moment. 1 should hope that we could reach it this afternoon. If it is impossible to reach it this afternoon, 1 would urge that we meet tomorrow morning and place this on the agenda as the first item of business. . Mr. DE LA TOURNELLE (France) (translated tram French): l, too, should have preferredthe Security Council to have taken adecision tonight regarding the Mediator's appeal to it to intervene with the parties in Palestine. There can be no doubt that the truce is designed to facilitate, first, the drafting, and then the study; of .peace terms; but it is in a way independent of such study and 1 think we should net confuse the two questions, between which there is üttleconnexion. 1 feel that if we responded to the Mediator's appeal and sent a telegram to the parties, recommending an extension of the truce, we would, in a way, be taking a simple decision oi procedure, whereas the examination of peace conditions is a question of substance. The President has just told us that the debate on Indonesia may go on for years. 1 hope the debate on Palestine Will not last as long. However, it is obvious that before we could agree to examine the conditions for peace, the truce might expire.

1 shopld now like to speak not as President, but as amerober of the delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. 1 think no sensible person would question the need to prolong the truce, but the point is that, under this flag of truce, all kinds of manœuvres and operations are taking place and causing serious concern to sorne members, at any rate, of the Security Council. - The General Assembly has discussed the Palestine question several times, and has taken several decisions, even though sorne States, for reasons best known to themselves, wanted these, decisions to be reconsidered. We are now confronted with the fact that the Mediator has taken it upon himseH to reconsider the General Assembly decision, which he was neither authorized nor entitled to do. Nobody has given Mr. Bf'rnadotte this authority. In view of this, 1 think the question of the truce cannot be considered alone. The Security Couneil has a right to express its concern That i5 why 1 think, as the represcntative of a Statc, that wc should consider the Palestine question as saon as possible. 1 presume, speaking as President, that we can agree ta the wishes of the United Kingdom delegatîon, as weIl as the United States ana USSR delegations, that a meeting should be called for this purpose tomor~ row nt Il a.m. n theœ is no objection and if the mcmbers of the Council agree that tomori'oW,S meeting should be entirely devoted to the discussion of the cable~ gram sent by the Mediator for Palestine, 1 shaH close the discussion on that matter and open discussion on the item on our agenda. Sir ....t\le,...ander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : 1 do not wish to pralong the discussion at all. 1 want ta thank the President for having agreed to my suggestion that the Security Council should meet on the Palestinian question tomorrow morning, but 1 wish ta say one word. 1 do not want this discussion ta end on the note of the speech which the President has justlllade as representative of the Ukrainian SSR. ln that statement, he declared that Count Bernadotte had exceeded his powers. 1 wish only ta say that there may be two or three opinions about that in the Council. 1 cannot, by any siieuce on my part, let it be thought that 1 agree. 1 think it would be vety unfortunate if, in these critical hours, it appeared that Count Bernadotte did not enjoy the support and the authority of the Security Council.

1 declare the discussion on this question closed. At the meeting to be held tomorrow, Wednesday, 7 July" at Il a.m., we shalI fust discuss the Mediator's telegram and then the Palestine question. The agenda was adopted. 157. Continuation of the discussion on the IndoneSian question At the invitation of the President, Mr. Hood, representative of Australia;Mr. Pillai, representative of India; },.{r. Snouck Hurgronje, TJJpresentative of the Netherlands; Mr. Lopez, representative of the Philippines; and Mr. Palar, 'Tepresentative of the Republic of Indonesia, took their places al the Security Council table. Mx. PALAR (Republic of Indonesia): Last week 1 did not intervene during the discussion on the United States-Australian proposals, because 1 did not l'\'ish ta confuse the debate by taking up anotner matter. The mecting ended quite .suddenly, and 1 did not have the opportunity to :say anything about a part of the speech made 1that day [328tk meeting] by the representative of There are definite indications that the political blockade will eventually turn against the Dutch themselves. The Council will remember that West Java, which was intended to become a puppet State, eventually chose a Republican president and a Republican premier. That process is deve10ping inexorably, and time is working for the Republic there. It is another matter in the case of the economic blockade. Here time is not working for us, and the problem becomes more acute with every deadlock in the negotiations. In a previous speech 1 have already proved that it is not the Indonesiar.s who are delaying the negotiations. Each de1ay, each breaking-off of the negotiations, is advantageous for the Dutch blockade. Because of this Dutch blockade, the standstill in the negotiations, caused by the Dutch rejection of the United States-lAustralian proposaIs, ;' provides a strong advantage for the Dutch., . AlI of this, can and is, taking place despite the existence of the truce agreement. Therefore, 1 think the Security Council should give serious consideration to this problem of the blockade. Mr. van Kleffens, in referring to the blockade last ,Thursday [328th meeting], called it a' mere propaganda slogan and, in an attempt to substantiate bis allegation, undertook to supply th~ Cound with what he called the "real facts". How real are the "real facts"presented by the Dutch representative? At best, they gave only part of the picture and are, therefore, quite deceiving. Permit me tà gi"'ethe Security Council a complete and true picture of the situation. Since the end of the war fllthe Pacifie, the Dutch, from the very beginning of their return to Indonesia, have been imposing a blockade on the Republic of Indonesia. Their naval and air forces have been carrying it out re1entlessly.· It will be recalled that on 29 January 1947, the blockade was forma11y codiiied in a decree issu -" unilaterally ;.' Lieutenant Governor-General van Mook. The' world "unilaterally" should beemphasized here, because at that time the Linggadjati ,rappeller~ ~greement which contains the de facto recognitlOn of the Republic, had already been ihitialled. , (a) The transport and export of military and semi-military goods, as well as goods destined for industrial rehabilitation, must be pardy prohibited; the part which is permitted can oruy be carried on with the permission of the competent Dutch military and civil'authorities; (b) The transportation and export of estate produce cannot be permitted in those cases where the interests of the rightful owners are pl'ejudiceà because the latter have no say in the transaction concerned; (c) The importation of' military and semimilitary goods is either' to be prohibited or to he made sùbject to a permit; (d) The transport of scarce native products must be made subject to a system of permits. No close scrutiny of these principles is needed ta come to the conclusion that they are primarily meant to bring Republican trade and commerce under total Dutch contrQI. This becomes even more apparent when the following facts are brought to light. ln the fust place, actual implementation and enforcement of the regulation oh importation of military and semi-military goods, as referred to above, precludes the entry in the Republic of a wide range of goods under the pretext that they are to be considered military or semi-military. The vague definition of these terms has enabled the Dutchauthorities, by arbitrary interpretation, to designate as contraband all kinds of inachinery and equipment and, in fact, the bulk of everyday essentials and non-essentials. For example, khaki textiles, need1es and sometimes even medicines and surgical instruments, are considered contraband. Also regarded as war or semi-war materials, are instruments, transportation and communication equipment such as rolling-stock, tubes and tyres, oxygen, steel, sulphur, and copper wire. It is obvious that the prohibition of the latter ,goods is designed to prevent the reconstruction: and development of Indonesian economy which had suffered so much at the hands of the Japanese. The importation into the Republic of actual war material snch as arms, ammunition, and so forth, i& \'Vithout exception pro4ibited. This cannot be called equitable, since the Dutch Gov-, venance une ceux importants le daid colons. les aux accordée dais, trôle vient des tabac, gènes. miner, sucre 1 gènes. sieurs siennes, ont maintenu leur production jusqu'à ce devant taires les droit naient et With regard to exports from Republican territory, the decree made a distinction between estate and native products. There were still considerable stocks of aIl kinds of products, such as rubber, sugar, and so forth, which were considered by the Dutch as estate-owned. The Dutch claimed that all exports of thesè estate-owned products were subject to a licence from the Dutch Colonial Government, even though the latter had no actual control over them. In this connexion it should be noted that in the first place, the so-called estate products, such as sugar, tea, coffee, tobacco, and so forth, are also grown by native cultivation. At no time is one in a position to specify what part of certain stocks of sugar, for example, is estategrown or native-grown. In this connexion it may he remarked that there are several Indonesian sugar estates and refineries, for example those of the Mangkunegara, which are still maintaining production right up ta the present time. ln the second place, when the Dutch retreated in the face of the Japanese invasion, their Government had instructed civil and military authorities to have all existing supplies completely destroyed. It may therefore be assumed, with a great deal of justification, tJ:1at goods owned by the Dutch in 1942 had either been destroyed or consumed in the course of three and a half years of Japanese occupation. la tion. - A third point is that during the Japanese occupation andafterwards, under the Gçvernment of the Republic of Indonesia - now in existence for almost three years - production was carried on under Indonesian management and operation. Thus, present supplies are almost entirely prod~ced and owned by Indonesians. These cOj1Siderations suggeSt the conclusion, that the distinction between estate and native produce is often unworkable, and that the Dutch cannot possibly be justified in decreeing that the eState-owned products may not be transported and exp~rted. . What is actually possib.le under wh<1t the Du":ch term "legal commerce," that is, cor erce according to. and in compliance with Dutch regulations? At best, it is a cumbersome method of trading. In order to get I!ative':grown products out of Republican territory, one has to send a ship from abroad loaded with manufactured goods with which he may be able to pay for the desired produce. To this end, the merchant must first inform the Dutch authorities of his intentions, and secure from them permission for the barter transaction. Mter a licence has been granted, he reports with bis ship to a Dutch-controlled ~ar- The already negligible volume of trade possible. under such intolerable circumstances was even more reduced when, simultaneously with the socalled "police action," the Netherlands-Indies Colonial Government found suitable reasons to dedare the north coast of Java and the greater part of the east coast of Sumatra temporarily closed to shipping. The word "temporarily" should appropriately be placed between quotation marks because today, almost one year after the "police'action," considerable portions of the aforementioned coasts are still closed. As a matter of fact, new areas have been added when some parts of the south coast of Java were also declared closed. 1 hope that·what 1 have said today is sufficient to show that the Dutch blockade is not a mere ~ropaganda slogan. It is real and existing. It is now more intense than before. 1t is continued with aIl its grave consequences. In this connexion, it is illuminating to read in the report by the Committee of Good Offices on 21 June [document S/848] tlïat the continuation of the blockade - referred to by the Committee as "the failure of the truce to bring about the resumption of normal trade and commerce"- has caùsed severe shortages of impottant commàdities, particularly medical supplies, and ÎI1 some cases,even food. In the opinion of the Committee of Good Offices, the existence of such l think it would be well if the Security Council were informed not only on the actual facts on the blockade itself, but on the blockade with aU its consequences. A most important point which this report should cover is the question of how this blockade can still continue when the truce agreè- ment signed aboard the Renville last January, is in force. Ml'. SNOUCK HURGRONJE (Netherlands): On 10 June [316th meeting] the Netherlands representative informed members of the Security Council that on 7 June an agreement on the regulation of goods traffic had been reached in the Economic and Financial Committee of the Committee of Good Offices. This agreement was reached by the Netherlands and Republican representatives in that sub-coinmittee, which was one of the sub-committees set up' under the auspices of the Committee of Good Offices t{) further the negotiations. l am sorry to say now that apparently a change of heart took place in the Republican delegation, because it was stated in a Press communiqué of the. Committee of Good Offices on 28 June that the Republican delegation has rejected' the maritinie agreement co?cluded earlier at Kaliyrang by this sub-comrmttee. l want ta stress the point that, during negotiations of such a delicate and intricate nature as those taking place in Indonesia, it is only to be expt::cted that suggestions made to the parties are, from time to time, rejected by one party and then by the other, but that this does not warrant ~e conclusion that either party is the villain. As there are people who are only too ready to decry th;; Netherlands as throwing obstacles in the path of the negotiations, it is useful to recall that on this point the Indonesian Republic has seen' fit to change its position, which, of course, has a certain influence on the progress of the negotiations. Meanwhile, l am happy to add that, accord· ,ing to information which l received this moming, Again l must request the Security Council to let the Committee of Good Offices get on with its task and let the parties pursue their negotiations with the Committee, without interrupting it at any moment which might be inopportune in relation to the real progress of the discussions. There is another point which l want to bring otlt. The representative of Indonesia mentioned this afternoon the question of the supply of medicines and surgieal instruments, and tried to sug~est that we, the Netherlands, prevented me<Îical supplies, and so forth, from going to Republican territory. It is qui~e incorrect that the Republican Government has ever applied to the Netb.erlands. East Indies Government for medical supplies and that such a request has not been met. Wl;1en, a few months ago, the Republican Government suggested that, under the intercourse scheme for the Padang area, vegetables and so forth should be supplied to the Netherlands-controlled territory in exchange for quinine tablets, the !esidents of Padang ~e­ diate1y agreed to fuis. When the Internah~nal Red .Cross .thought that Bantam reqwred quinine, the Netherlands East Indies Government immediately placed at the disposal of the International Red Cross a quantity of 500,000 quinine tablets, in spite of the fact that their own stocks were limited. ActùalIy~ those tablets were not delivered because-the Republican Red Cross was unable to arrange for distribution in Bantam. Recently when Chinese quarters proposed to transport textiles and medicine to Bantam by way - of relief, the competent Netherlands authorities agreed immediate1y. No legal provision whatever prohibits the importation of medicine from abroad to Republican territory. Mr. Haon (Australia): Very briefly, l should like to support the suggestion made by the representativ~ of Indonesia, to the effect that the Security Council should request a report from the Committee of Good Offices on the economic aspects of the implementation of the truce. l think that fuis is pre-eminently a case in which the. Security Council is entitled, and ought, to - calIfor a report from its own Committee. We have had before us at two consecutive meetings - statements from the representatives of Indo-- Mr. TSIANG (China): In view of the charges and, counter-charges made by the representatives of the Netherlands and Indonesia in regard to ,the question of economic relations, it seems to me that it would be only wise for the Council to decide on rio course of action; it seems to me' that it is our primary duty to get more information on the suhject. We are not ready to pass judgment; we are not ready to suggest a course of action; we must get the information necessa...-y for an understanding pf the problem. . Thèrefore, it seems most reasonable that the Security pouncil should ask the Committee of Goàd Offices to furnish it with that information. 1t may be that the Committee of Good Offices has already included information of thisnature in the report whichis before us, but if that kind of information is not included, weshould ask the Committee to furnish it. 'l'Indonésie The information we desire, broadly, consists of two kinds. The fust concerns the present state of trade within Indonesia and between Indonesia and the outside world. That is one category, and would include details of re~trictions in the form of direct prohibitions of certain, specified items of trade or classes of trade. That is one type of restriction, and then we require information about import and export controIs, exchange controIs and shipping controIs. What are they? It may be that sorne of these controIs are necessary for the economy of the region; we kriow that not all countries operate on the principle of the complete freerlom of trade, and we. ought to know what are the types of restrictions and controls. Then there is another category of information we should like. The Cominittee realizes thatthere has been il delay in the implementation of article 6 of the truce agreement which relates to the restoration of normal trade and commerce. Weshould 'like the COIllll'.ittee to tell us the reas~)llS for the delay in the implementation of that a,rticle. " : " 'It:appears to my delegation that this request of mine for information is a simple question of procedure, and therefore 1 hl?pe that if the President thinks it advisable to accept my request, Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian) : The opinion expressed by the Indonesian, and, if 1have understood rightly, the Chinese representatives, seems to me to be quite correct. The Security Council shoi.ùd receive more complete and detailed information on the economic blockade to which the Republic of Indonesia is being subjected by the Netherlands. Such information should, in my opinion, be made available to the Council withôut delay, so as to enable it to reopen discussion on this question in the near future - at its next regular meeting devoted to the question. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria) : If 1have understood him correctly, the representative of Indonesia cited many examples and mentioned many articles whichare prohibited or subject to certain fonnalities which would prevent their importation into Indonesia. The representative of Indonesia mentioned such articles as khaki textiles; needles, instruments of ail sorts, and transportation and commumcation equipment such as rolling stock, tubes and tyres, oxygen,' steel, sulphur and copper wire. He also mentioned other fJÎngs, such as sugar, but when the representative of the Netherlands defended bis posi- .tion, he mentioned only medical supplies and denied the prevention of these imports. The representative of the Netherlands mentioned nothing about the other articles, or whether the statement made by the representative of Indonesia that ail these articles are subject to such a prohibition is true or not. Although itis true that the representative _ of Indonesia mentioned medical'-supplies, saying that "sometimes even medicines and surgical instruments are considered contraband", why did the representative of the Netherlands confine himself to mention of only such supplies? With regard to the other matters, if we could hear whal the representative of the Netherlands says about this - whether he admits them or denies them - that might be he1pful. If we heard his reply in connexion with these matters at the same time, the Committee of Good Offices could be asked to give information.on this point if we were,not satisfied with the reply. The PRESIDENT (translated trom Russian): If there are no more speakers, 1 have a proposaI to make. The Indonesian representative, supported by Australia and two members of the Security Council, namely, China and the USSR, has suggested that the President send a telegram to the Committee of Good Offices requesting detailed information on the blockade of the Republic of Indonesia by the Netherlands. A time limitshould be imposed in compliance with this direction so that this matter, so vital to the . Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated tram French): The President mentioned a time limit, but did not set one. The PRESIDENT' (translated tram. French) : Does that interest the representative of Belgium? Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated tram French): It interests me aIl the more, as 1 am opposed to it. • The PRESIDENT (translated tram French): Is the Belgian representative opposed to any time limit? . Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated tram French) : Yes, becaùse 1 feel such a decision would show a lack of confidence in the Committee of Good Officfs which would be completely out of place. The PRESIDENT (translated tram French): Speaking now as a member of the Security Council and not as the President, 1 fail ta grasp the reasons of the Belgian representative. How could it possibly harm the prestige of the Com- Inittee of Good Offices if the Security Council asked this Committee of Good Offices for a report on the Netherlands blockade of the Indonesian Republic? Who would be better fitted to giveus information on this subject thal1 the Council's organ on the spot? Indeed, 1 think it would br showing great confidence in the Committee ot Good Offices if we sent such a cable. .fiance The members of the Council know that 1 myself make every reservation as regards this Committee, but as the request has been made, 1 must, as President of the Council, agreè ta the request. Secondly, why is the Belgian representative. afraid of bringing the blockade question into the' open before public opinion and the Security Counéil? 1 fail to see his reasons. It cannot be gainsaid that the Indonesian people, who are hemmed wi - :1]. a narrow zone caUcd the Indonesian Republic, cannot now receive even pharmaceutical products and medicaments.. There has been a great deal of talk about humanitarianism and humane principles, but no sooner does the Indonesian Republic ask for the blockade to be lifted, than the Belgian representative applies a veto. 1 cannot understand this at all. Is there something to ~1Ïde here? Must the Security Council he kept in the dark about the way in' which the blockade is being applied? Is it not the Security Council's concem to know whether the Indonesian people are being starved? The Security Council must examine this question. Tht: French representative even waxed ironical when 1 said thé Indonesian question might he Consequently, if we wish to settle this question as soon as possible, although 1 am not at all a supporter of the Committee of Good Offices, 1 think we must agree to the request of one of the parties, which is now in a position of legitimate defence against the aggressor. That is why, speaking as representative of the Ukrainian SSR, 1 must say that 1 cannot understand the attitude of the Belgian representative. Speaking as President, 1 think. that a delay of five days would be enough. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated Irom French): The President was good enough to state that he failed to understand my position, a fact which 1 very much regret. 1 think 1 am more fortunate that he in that 1 think 1 Can understand his position. He said that he had no confidence in the Committee of Good Offices. 1 suspected as much. That is why he wishes to make the communication to be sent to that Committee into a kind of ultimatum. That is not what the Chïnese representative proposed; For myself, 1 am opposed to the addition Pt:0- posed by the President. 1 ask that information requested of the Committee of Good Offices should deal with both the facts alleged by the Indonesian representative and those alleged by the Netherlands representative. 1 request a vote on that point. The PRESIDENT (translated Irom French): 1 am going to put this proposal to a vote. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated Irom Russian): It would seem that even the representative of Belgium has no objection to the Security Council's requesting the Committee of Three to furnish the Council with information on the question of the economic blockade. That being the case, 1 think 1 am safe ;'0 saying that the proposaI will meet with no objection within the Security Council as a whole. li everyone agrees in principle that a request for such information should be made to the Committee of Three, then would it not be better if the Committee. provided that information in good time rather than after sorne de1ay? 1 think elementary logic tells us that the sooner the Committee of Three provides that information, the better for the Security Council. Ille PRESIDENT (translated Irom Russian): The President has made a ruling accepting the request of the representative of the Indonesian Republic that a te1egram should be sent to the Committee of Good Offices with a request for a detailed report on the blockaàe. -:ne Belgian represe~tative has made an objection. 1 must now put the President's ruling to the vote. Mr. LAWFORD (United Kingdom): 1 do not wish to delay the Security Council unnecessarily, but 1 am shghtly worried. It seems to me. that an MI'. JESSUP (United States of America): It 'seems to me that the problem before us is one which need not be tied up in this procedural difficulty. 1 agree with the point of view expressed by the representative of the United Kingdom. However, on the essential matter which we are discussing, which is the suggestion of the representative of China, 1 am in agreement with that suggestion and with the President's acquiescence in the suggestion that the Committee of Good Offices should be requested to supply us with information on this question of resumption of trade and maritime commerce. Personally, it would seem to me a little better if the President, in sending this request, would follow what 1 understood to be the suggestion of the representative of the USSR; namely, that the Committee of Good Offices should be asked to send this information as soon as possible, rather than that the President should indicate a set number of days, which may be difficult in the conditions in the field, with which we may not be familiar. 1 would hope that the matter could be handled in the simple way of finding whether there is a general agreement in the Security Council that this request should go forward and, if that is the view of the Council, as ascertained in the normal fashion of dealing with suggestions of this kind, then the request could go forward in the same way as did the request which was sent. by the -tive, President, of the Security Council on, 1 believe, 18 Jùne 1948, when the President, at the request of the Security Council, asked the Committee of Good Offices at its discretion ta supply the Council with information on the suspension of negotiations. This seems to me to be a parallel case, and 1 should hope that it might be handled in the same way as the case reported in the record of the 326th meeting. MI'. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated trom Russian): 1 wish ta reply to the representative of the United States.' . When 1 supported the Chïnese representative's proposaI, 1 said the information must be transrnitted to the Security Counci! by the Committee of Three "immediately", and not "as soon as possible". 1 cannot lmderstand the attitude ofl those who consider that the Security Council cannot set a time llmit for the transmission of blockade~ Such an attitude is difficult to understand. Without any doubt, the Security Council has the right both to demand any document it wishes from the Committee of lrhree and to set a time limit within which the Committee of Three must provide any information. AlI this would seem to be elementary and not to require any discussion. 1 agree to the proposaI that the Committee of Three should furnish such information within a time limit of five days. The proposai could be slightly modified to read something like this: , "The Comnùttee of lrhree shaIl transmit such information within five days if possible", the words "if possible" being added. If, for sorne reason, the Committee of Three should find it difficult t.J furnish full information within the five-day limit~ it could acquaint the Security Council with the reasons for the delay and state when it would be in a position ta supply the information. Otherwise, those who object to the setting of a five-day limit will be doillg so wil10ut knowing whether the Committee of Three is really unable to furnish the information within that period. For all we know, the Committee of Threè may be able to do so without difficulty. 'Possibly, therefore, the proposai for a five-day time limit in the slightly modified form 1 have suggested, may he acceptable to everyone.

r shall sum up the discussion on this matter. The Security Council is agreed that a cablegram of this nature should be sent to the Committee of Good Offices. There is a divergence of views only on the question whether a time limit should or should not be set. lr'Wo texts are before us, and it is those two texts which 1. shall now put to the vote. One text, which 1 proposed myself and to whiêh a softening clause has been added, reads "; . . within five days; if possible". ' The o,ther text reads ;". ; . as soon as possible". :'. . r shall put both texts to the vote. Mr. JESSUP (lJnitep States of America): 1 simply want to say that the formula suggested by the representative of the lJSSR entirely meets the point which 1 raised in regard to considerl'ang1azs): nous qui offices? en Ml'. LAWFORD (United Kingdom) : Could the President enlighten us by letting us know the terms of the request that will be addressed to the Committee of Good Offices? 1 am not quite sure whether the President has given us the exact terms. du de par SUIvante: Ml'. Hoa (.A3sistant Secretary-General in charge of the Department of Trusteeship): This is the text of the telegramthat has been proposed to be sent by the President of the Sç:curity Council to the Chairman of the Committee: indonésienne "1 have honour to inform you that the Security Council discussed the Indonesian question on 6 July and decided to request the Cortlmittee of Good Offices to furnish it, if possible within five days, with full information about economic blockade exercised by Netherlands."

1 shall now put this proposaI to the vote. Will those in favour of ifplease l'aise their hands. - Ml'. lESl3TJP (United States of America): May l 'ask for a point of information on the vote? 1 w:-, to ask whether we are voting on the exact la..guage of the proposaI or on the principle of its transmission, because 1 have a question concerning a change of the language. 1 have aIready declared that 1 am in favour of the principle, but 1 do want to l'aise a question about the language. .

What are the objections of the United States representative? Mr~ JESSUP (United States of America): We have a situation, as the President explained earlier, in which one party has made certain. statements in regard to what he has called a blockadè, and the other party has denied that it is a blockade. It seems to me that in a telegram coming from the President of the Security Council, the language should not be such as to accept mere1y the point of view of one party. 1 think t.~e situation could be phrased in such a way as not to commÏt the President of the Security Council to accepting the position of one side. If the President would agree to take that into account and make sorne slight modification, 1 should be quite content to leave it to him and now proceed with the vote.

1 cannot, unfortunately, share your viewpoint, for we do know thatthere is a blockade in Indonesia. It is an indisputable facto

1 am not very much concerned ,about that, for the United Kingdom representative would have voted even againstthe principle. Mr. LAWFORD (United Kingdom) (translated trom French) : The indication was not in that sense..I couldnot accept the present wording. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America): 1 should like to move an amendment to the text as suggested by inserting the ward' "alleged" - before the word "bloèkade". If 1 had more time, 1 would redraft the proposaI in the manner 1 have suggested, because inserting the word "alleged'" might seem to imply an acceptance of the other point of view. Since the President is unwilling to frame the proposaI in neutraI terms, 1move this amendment to the proposed language. 1 think the members of the Security Council will understand thepurpose of my amendment.

Unfortunately 1 cannot accept your amendment for the simple reasons th'at in French the word prétendu casts doubt on the term to which it applies, and that making use of it would, therefore, in a way disqua.lify the text of the telegram. If - YOll find an appropriate term either in English - a very rich language-, or in French, 1 could accept it, but 1 cannot accept your amendment. Mt. DE LA TOURNELLE (France) (translated trom French): The interpretation of thePresi~ dent ls perfeêtly correct. We might perhaps try to solve this difficulty with the following te~t: "The Security Council requests the Committee of Good Offices, within five days if possible, to inform it whether the Netheriands is exercising a blockade upon Indonesia, and, if so, under what conditions." The PRESIDENT (translated trom French): That is more subtle. Mt. DELA TOURNELLE (France) (translated trom French): 1 think it a perfectly fair text which favours neither side. Mt. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated trom Russian): Can we say that we have decided in principle that information on this question shall be transmitted by the Committee of Three vJÏthin a five-day Iimit, if possible? 1 think we have reached agreement on this point; if 1 am not mistaken, we have even voted on it. AlI we still have to do, therefore, is to formulate the last part of the sentence referring to the economic blockade; but there do not seem to be any written.proposaIs on that point. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): 1 am sorry ta have to point out that no vote has been taken on this and that, up to nqw, the Council does not know whether or not there if; unanimity on this matter. 1 therefore request that a vote be taken on whether or not the cable is to be sent, and that the text of the cable be discussed later, by the procedure deemed most appropriate. But 1 request that à. vote be taken on the question of whether or not the cable shall be sent; and that,'in voting, the affirmative votes, the negative votes and the abstentions be counted; in other words, that we do not proceed on the basis of suppositions, but that we give every member of the Council the opportunity to say what' he deems fit and to vote as he desires. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated trom Russian): It seems that everyone is agreed that.the Security Council should request the Committee of Three to transmit the information within a five-day limit, if that is possible. No one has any objc:;ction to that. As regards the last part of the text proposed by the President, with which 1 am entire1y in agreement, it might be possible to alter it so as to make clear that the information which must be transmitted is "on the question of the economic blockade". 1 Mr. EL-KHoURI (Syria): The truce agreement· which was concluded between the two parties stipulated in article 6 that trade and . commerce and economic relations general1y. would he resumed on a normal basis. The Committee of Good Offices declared in its report dated 21 June, and contained in document 8/848, that the truce had failed to bring about the resumption of normal trade and commerce. This was acknowledged by the Committee of Good Offices when the Committee stateo that the truce agreement had not been'fruitful and that the conditions of article 6 had not been realized. l'think it would be preferable in the cable to quote this statement from the report of the Committee of Good Offices, and ask why, in its report, the Committee had declared that the truce agreement had failed ta bring about a . resumption of normal trade and commerce. We should ask why that was so. The Indonesian delegation clai'llS that the blockade exercised by the Netherlands' Government is the cause~ The 8ecurity Council wishes a full report. on this subject. If the telegram is longer than the one you drafted, it will not do much harm. It will cost us more, but we will not mind that. The PRESIDENT (translated trom French): As the representative of Argentina said that the Security Council had not yet made a decision on the question of the principle of dispatching this te1egram, and as doubts remain on this point, 1 think that we should fust come to a decision and·then discuss the text of the various proposais. Does the Security Council agree to that· procedure? The President then continued in Russian: , ' 1 Will those who are in favour of sending a telegram on behalf .of the Security Council ta the Committée of Good Offices in Indonesiain connexion with the request made by the representative of the .Indonesian Republic, please raise their hands. Mr. URDANérA - ARBELAEZ (Colombia) (translated trom Spanish): The delegation of Colombia will vote 'that the information he requested from the Committee of Good Offices, as it voted in a preceding meeting [259th meeting] that other information be requested froin the same Committee, because the delegatian considersthat it is well f()r the Council ta request aU the information deemed necessary ta form its opinion or to decide upon its action. However, just because it is considered advisable to request inform'atioü in order ta form an opinion, it does' not seem ta me advisable that .the Council express its opinion in advance. 1 am pleased ta vote in favour of requesting infomiation, but am against the Security Council's prejudging the matter or giving its opinion, before .receiving the information, because if ~e Council gives iis opinion or decides upon its .a~tiori beforehand, the information appears useless. Therefore, 1 explciin the vote of the de1egatian of Colombia in favour of requesting the infart;lation, but against the Council's expressing its opinion in advance. ' . The PRÉSIDENT (translated trom .Russian) : Mter the Colotnbian representative's speech, 1 think that we can take a vote on the question in principle, and then· we shall discuss the wording. That is the information we want. Whether we shalliater condemn the Dutch or the Indonesians is a matter for subsequent action. It seems that our quibbling about words is about to prevent us from obtaining information. Therefore, my proposal is that we should cable the Committee of Good Qffices asking for an early report, on tl;1e existing.restrictions of trade in Indonesia, both domestic and international, and the reasons. for the delay in the implementation of article 6 of the truce agreement. '

In accordance with rule 31 of the rules of procedure, 1 must state 1 shall not put to the vote any oral proposaIs, as it is stipulated that proposals should be submitted in writing. Will the members of the Council kindly draft their proposals and submit them to the President for voting? , Mr.LAWFORD (United Kingdom): When 1 first asked to speak, 1 merely wanted to ask the President whether, when he said that he found no desire on the part of members of the Security Council to satisfythe request of the representative of the Indonesian Republic,. he was speaking as General McNAUGHTON (Canada): l think the situation that we have reached is that we should have before us the precise words of the resolution proposèd by the representative of China. It is absolutely necessary that this Security Council should have specific information before it takes any decision, and it is my understanding of the text, as proposed by the representative of China, that, embodied in a cable and answered, it would give us the information. of which we stand in need. Mr. GROMYKO· (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): l have tried to draft what we might call a "suggestion". ne following proposal may be found acceptable: "In view of the fact that, in the course of the discussion of the Indonesian question, the representative of Indonesia and a number of other representatives on the Security Council have raised the question of the economic blockade of the Indonesian Republic by the Netherlands, the Security Council requests the Committee of Three to transmit information on the subject if possible not later than within five days." That does not point an accusing finger directIy at the Netherlands.· It states that the representative of Indonesia, as weIl as sôme representatives on the Security Council, have raised the question of the economic blockade of the Indonesian Republic by the Netherlands. Has that question been raised here in the Security Council? Yes, it has. Has the representative of the Indonesian Republic raised it? Yes, he has, on more than one occasion. Have the representatives of certain States made speeches ta the same effect to the Council? Yes, they have. So this proposal simply records what actually has taken place. Mr. TSIANG (China): In order to facilitate the work of the Council, l formally move, and l request the President to put my motion to the vote, the following text: "That the President of the Security Cauncil cable to the Committee of Good Offices for an early report on the existence of restrictions· on the domestic and international trade of Indonesia and the reasons for the delay in the implementation of article 6 of the tnlce agreement." Mr. GROMYKO (Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics) (translated tram Russian): 1 hadno intention originally of making it a full-dress "resolution". 1 said it was a suggestion, and read it out. It seems to me that anyone wouId be hard put in objecting to it. It states that the Indonesian representative spoke of the economic blockade. Mter all, that is a facto Some representatives on Lltè Security Council spoke of an ~conomicblockade. It is precisely in connexion with those statements on the economic blockade - on the question whether an economic blockade does or does not exist - that the question remains open pending an appropriate decision by the Security Council. It is in connexion with those statements that the Council is asking the Committee of Three to furnish it with detailed information on the matter. 1 do not see that there is here anything unac:' ceptable even for the representative of China. It seems to me that it is difficuIt to object to such a proposaI. 1 do nût even mention the fact that the Chinese proposaI contains no reference to a five.day time limit, about which we have argued for so long. The PRESIDENT (translated tram Russian): Does the representative of the USSR wish to press his resolution? Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated tram Russian): 1 shouId like it to be accepted. The PRESIDENT (translated' tram Russian) : Does that mean it can be put to the vote? Mr: GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (translated tram Russian) :.If there is no objection, yeso GeneraI McNAUGHTON (Canada): A few minutes ago the President made a ruIe, which 1 think was very wise, that he wouId not entertain any further resolutions unless they were in writing. The only resolution in writing before the Security Council at the present moment is the resolution presented by the representative of China. Under the ruIes of procedure, 1 think, and 1 ask, that that resolution shouId now be put to the vote. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated tram Russian): 1 hâve no objection if the Chinese proposaI is put to the , vote frrst.

1must point out to the representative of Canada that, according to the rules of procedure, reso- Mr. Hoo (Assistant Secretary-General in chargé of t~e Department of Trusteeship): The proposal-reads as follows: "1 move. that the President of the Council cable to the Committee of Good Offices for an earlyreport on the existing'restrictions on the domestic and international trade of Indonesia, and the reasons for the delay in the implementation of article 6 of the truce agreement." A vote by show of hands was taken, as follows: In favour: Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, France, Syria, United Kingdom, United States of America. Abstaining: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The resolution was adopted by 9 votes to' none, with 2 abstentions. The PRESIDENT (translated trom French): . The Security Council will meet tomorrow morning l:I.t Il a.m. The meeting rose at 6.30 p.rn. AUSTRALIA-AUSTRAUE H. A. Goddard Pty. Ltd. 255a George Street SYDNEY, N. S. W. FINLANq-F/N~ANDE Akateenii~en.Hirj 2, KeskuSkatu HELSINKI BELGIUM-BELG/QUE Agence et Messageries de la Presse, S. A. 14·22 rue du Persil BRUXELLES fRANCE Edii 'uns A. Pedone 13, rue SoufBot PARIS, Va GREECE-GRECE "Eleftheroudakis" Librairie internationale Place de la Constitution ATHÈNES BOLIVIA-BOLIVIE Libreria Cientifica y Literaria Avenida 16 de Julio, 216 Casilla 972 LA PAZ GUATEMALA José Gouhaud Gouhaud & Ciao Sucesor 5a Av. Sur No. GUATEMALA CANADA The Ryerson Press 299 Queen Street West TORONTO CHILE-C'HIU Edmundo Pizarro Merced 846 SANTIAGO HAITI Max Bouchereau Librairie "A la Boîte postale I11·B PORT·AU-PRINCE CHINA-eHINE The Commercial Press LtcL 211 Honan Road SHANCHAI INDIA-INDE Oxford Book & Scindia House NEWDELm COLOMBIA-COLOMBIE Librerfa Latina Ltda. Apaitado Aéreo 4011 ROGOTA IRAN Bongahe Piaderow 731 Shah Avenue TEHERAN COSTA RICA-eOSTA.RlCA Trejos Hermanos Apartado ·1313 SAN JOSÉ IRAQ-IRAK Mackenzie & Mackenzie The Bookshop BAGHDAD CUBA La Casa Belga René de Smedt O'Reilly 455 LA HABA1U LEBANON-L/BAN Librairie universelle BEYRnUTH tZECHOSLOVAKIAfCHECOSLOVAQUIE F. Topic Narodni Trida 9 PRAm 1 LUXEMBOURG Librairie J. Schummer Plaèe Guillaume LUXEMBOURG DENMARK-OANEMARIC Einar Munskgaard Norregade 6 KJOBENHAVN NETHERLANDS-PAYS·BAS N. -:;, Martinus Lange Voorhout S'GRAVENHAGE DOMINICAN REPUB.IC- REPUBLIQUE DOM/NI~AINE Libreria Dôminicana Calle Mercedes No. 49 Apartado 656 CWDAD TRUJILLO NEW ZEALAND- NOUVELLE.ZELANDE Gordon & Glltch, Waring Taylor Street W~INGTON ECUADOR-EQUATEUR 'Muiioz Hermanoi y Ciao Nueve de Octuhre 703 Casilla 10~24 GUAYAQUIL NICARAGUA RlÎmiro Ramirez Agencia de Puhlicaciones MANAGUA, D. N.