S/PV.331 Security Council

1 am also prepared tG go on with this meeting for some time. tinuer 1 just want to make a remark about the time of the meeting. 1 suggest we should meet at 3 p.m. au notre Sir Ale..xander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : If the President calls the meeting for 3 p.m., 1 hope he will appeal to all of our colleagues to he prompt. As the President himse1f has said, this is going to take a long time and if we do not actually get to work before 3.30, we shaH he here rather late. Therefore, if the meeting is going to be he1d at 3 p.m., we should aIl try to be punctual. la demandera Comme débat à jusqu'à river tion

1 have noted the United Kingdom representative's staœment. The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m. TROIS-CENT-TRENTE THREE HUNDRED AND TH;RTY-FIRST MEETING Held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, 7 ]uly 1948, at 3 p.m. Preside.nt: Mr. D. MANUILSKY (Ykrainian Soviet Socialist Republic). Argentine, France, d'Ukraine, soviétiques, rique. Present: Th~ representatives of the following countries: Argentina, Be1gium, Canada, China, . Colombia, France, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Social.ist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America. The agenda was that of the 330th meeting (document S/ Agenda 330). 161. Continuation of the discussion on th~ Pal.estine question listes nant Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (trarislated from Russian):· When discussing the possibility of extending the truce Basing himself on his false premise, the Mediator is now ignoring this decision of the Assembly, and this has been fully reflected in his latest proposaIs on the Palestine question. An examination of these proposaIs shows that they . are contrary to the 'General Assembly's decision. What is more, their ahn is the recon- sideration of that decision, although the Media- tor has received no power for any such action from the United Nations. When the General Assembly held a special session t.his year, it left the previous decision on Palestine in force, and did not grant to anyone the right either to re- consider or to weaken that decision. AU this would seem to be clear. It should have been clear both tothe Mediator and to those hiding behind his back, who are putting forward various.kinds of unacceptable schemes for the settlement of relations between Jews and Arabs, and in doing sa not only not helping to achieve a peaceful settlement of those relations,' but fanning the Hames and inciting those who aim at wrecking, or at any rate, impeding the implementation of the resolution creating the two States in Palestine. Here are sorne facts to confirm what 1 have just said. The Mediator proposes the creation of a union comprising the Jewish State and Trans- jordan. Is it not obvious that this proposal is incompatible with the United Nations decision on Palestine? He is ready to annul that decision at one stroke of the pen; instead of the forma- tion of two independent States he proposes the creation of sorne kind of-dual State comprising Transjordan and the present Jewish State, and represents this as a union between those two States. In doing sa, the Mediator visualizes a different kind of Transjordan from that which exists in facto According to his scheme, territory No fairly objective person who understands the situation and respects the United Narions could submit that kind of proposaI, because it compromises the United NatioIld and in the first place the General Assembly, which took the appropriate decision on Palestine. Nevertheless, acting on the orC:ers of those behind him, the Mediator is completely disregarding the decision of the Assembly, although he himself was appointed by that As::;embly. We know that the plan adopted by the Gen- eral Assembly on 29 November 1947 provides for an economic union betwee~ the Jewish' and the Arab States. But, the plan deals with States which were to be created in accordance with the resolution and one of which:"'---the State of Israel -is aIready in existence. The decision on eco- nomic union was adopted in arder to ensure economic collaboration between the two States in the interests of-both. What is proposed by the Mediator has nothing in common with the General Asstmbly's decision on economic union. The Mediator's proposaI [document S/863} is based on the negation of tlIe establishment not only of an independent Arab State in Palestine but also of a Jewish State. This is confirmed in particular by para- graph 3 of the Mediator's suggestions, which speaks of the need "to co-ordinateforeign polic}' and measures for common defence" between the Jewish State and Transjordan. These two pointsalone-the creation of a union comprising Transjordan and the Jewish State and the co-ordination of the foreign policy and defence of those States-suffice to show the real aim of •. 'authors of these proposaIs. That aim is clearly to complicate as far as possible the implementation of the decision of 29 Novem- ber 1947. Ido not think that these people expected to succeed in wrecking completely the implementa- tion of the partition decision, sinee one of the States provided for, by that decision noton1y exists but is carrying out definite political and economic measures. as a sovereign State. But apparently they wish to do their utmost to hinder the implementation of the partition de- cision. By so doing, they help to fan the hostility between Jews and Arabs, apparently hoping to weaken both parties, while they themselves con- tinue to warm their hands by the fire they have kindled in Palestine, and encourage certain . aggressive Arab elements in their attempts World public opinion has already condemned the action of certain Arab circles who attacked the Jewish State and occupied the territory allotted to the Arab State in Palestine. lt has aIso condemned the actions of the United King- dom Government, whose hypocritical policy on the Pal_estin~questionis known to all. We know that, acting mainly through the so-called Trans- jordan Legion, which is paid for by the United Kingdom and led by British officers, the United Kingdom is encouraging the military adventure of the Arabs in Palestine, naturally not without the support of influentiaI circles of sorne other western powers, includihg the Uriited Sta.tes. What the United Kingdom and its puppet-the King of Transjordan-are trying to achieve by means of armed aggression and military opera- tions directed against the Jewish State and against the interests of the Arab population in Palestine, is now ta be achieved, for the benefit of Transjordan, by means of the transactions proposed by the Mediator. The authom of these proposaIs do not seem very embarrassed by the fact that their actions reveal still better their true aims and schemes' in Palestine. But those' who are in favour of implementing the decision adopted by the Gen- elal Assembly on Palestine, those who value the authority of the United Nations, must expose these new machinations. The USSR delegation thinks it opportune to draw attention ta them now, for theexposure of such actions is in the interest of the United Nation,; as a whole, and of peace and tran- quilIity in the Near East. . The full extent of the aims pursued by the instigators of suchplans can be seen particularly weU from the Mediator's proposaIs on territorial questions.These proposaIs provid,-l.· f,)r in- stance, for the inclusion of the whole or part of the Negev in Arab territory, i.e. Transjordan; the inclusion of the wholeor part· of Western Galilee in Jewish territory; the' inclusion of the City of Jerusalem in Arab territory, Le. Trans- jordan; the rp.vision of the status of the City of AlI the aforesaid proposaIs show that their authors are disregarding completely the General Assembly decision on Palestine. In the circum- stances, it is natural that the opinion should become more and more prevalent that such proposaIs must have originated in the British Foreign Office. The proposals are harmful and undermine the authority of the United Nations, particu- lady as they are introduced by a person ap- pointed by the General Assembly to help with . the implementation of its decision. échiquier The USSR_ de1egation had never reposed much hope in the activities of a Mediator, re- gardless of the personal qualities of such a person. It had already become clear earlier that he would be used by those States which have grown a.ccustomed to look upon Palestine as a pawn that can be freely moved about in the political game carried on by those States in the Nèar East for the purpose of strengthening their economic and strategic positions there, at the expense of the interests of the peoples of the Near East and to the prejudice of international peace. We know that various means are used to carry out that poliey, namely: 1. Direct pressure on sorne States for the purpose of obtaining military bases despite the wishes of the populations concerned; an exam- pIe is Iraq, whose people have already admin- .istered a rebuff to British politicians, who for sorne reason or other try to look upon the Near East as their own heritage. 2. Inciting by their actions the Arabs against the Jews and continuing to playon the national feelings of both-a game that has aIready led to tragic and bloody events in Palestine, with heavy sacrifices for both Arabs and Jews. .des 3. Lastly, direct re"ision of the United Nations decision on Palestine, in the form of a re-dernarcation of the boundaries of the Arab and the Jewish States in Palestine, and an in- crease in the territory' of Transjordan-the United Kingdom military base in the Near East -at the expense of the territories of the two States in Palestine. . Pursuing its consistent policy in support of the decision adopted on the creation of two independent States in Pa1e.~tine, the USSR cannot pass over in silence these latest machina- tions which find their expression in the Media- to:'s proposal. They mmt be judged in·connexion \vith the discussion on the truce, for itis no The persistence of such an agreement behind the back of the United Nations in the future if the truce were prolonged, for instance, could do still greater harm because it would, as in the past, complicate the implementation of the decision adopted and hinder the return ta a normal state of affairs in Palestine. This applies, particularly, ta the Arab State, which, unlike the Jewish State, has not even been created yet. As regards the proposaI for a prolongation of the truce, the attitude of the USSR delegation is the same as its attitude towards the previous Council decision on the truce. The USSR dele- gation has supported and continues ta support the idea of a truce. However, it cannat agree with the conditions which were put forward during the discussion of the original truce pro- posaIs and which were reflected in the previous decisions of the Security Council, particularly that of 29 May 1948 [document S/801]. These conditions hinder the implementation of measures for the formation of the Jewish and Arab States in Palestine, and thus damage' the inte.~ests ofthose who are loyally carrying out the decision of United Nations, at the same time encouraging those who want ta wreck that decision or mnder its implementation. Should these conditions remain in force, the attitude of the USSR delegation during the dis- cussion and vote on prolongation of the truce will he the same as it was when the original proposaIs for a truce were discussed and when the Security Council took its decision on 29 May. Ml'. Van UNGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated Irom French): The question raised by the Mediator's telegram of 5 July is in my opinion quite simple. The Mediator requests the Security Council urgent1y to appeal ta the interested parties ta -accept in principle the prolongation of the truce for snch period as may be decided upon in con- sultation with the Mediator. Moreover, in my opinion we must not con- sider at this time whether the proposaIs sub· mitted by the Mediator to the parties in Prder to reach a friendly settlement are or are not weIl advised. l repeat once more that this is not the question which arises at the moment. We are faced with the fact that the truce is to expire in less than forty-eight hours. The alternative before us, as it has been said this morning, is simple: either the truce will be prolonged or hostilities will be resumed in forty-eight hours. In view of such an alternative, public opinion would not understand if the Security Council seemed to hesitate or engaged in long debates. l refuse to believe that there are members of the Security Couneil who think that a resump- tion of hostilities is preferable to a prolongation of the truce. Mr. EL~KHOURI (Syria): l do not intend now to approve or disapprove the suggestions made by the Mediator. It is for the parties on the spot to express their attitude in that respect. However, certain views have been expressed at this meeting by the representative of the USSR, which l consider should not pass without com- ment. In the first plaœ, the representative of the USSR considers that the Mediator exceeded his authoiity and acted in contradiction to his posi- tion and the authority given to him by the General Assembly and the Security Council. In that respect, l should like to state that the Mediator was selected by a committee of the five permanent members of the Security Couneil in order to exercise mf:diation between the parties. lt is weIl understood that mediation means an effort tofind a solution which both parties can accept. The Mediator is not there in the capacity of a dictator or an arbiter, in order to implement the partition plan, to whkh the USSR representativ~ always refers as being in force and still standing. The Mediator was not nominated in order to implement the partition plan; otherwise, he would not be called a "mediator". . . tions The United Nations Palestine Commission, composed of the representatives of five States, was selected by the President of the General Assembly, on 29 November, in order to imple- ment the partition plan. That same Palestine .For thîs reason, I feel that this accusation that the Mediator has exceeded his authority and overstepped his functions is not correct. However, thiscertainly does not mean that I approve of what the Mediator has done, but I say that he has the right·to do it, and it is for the parties concerned to decide whether or not they will. accept. the recbn:unendations. The partition plan, which was adopted on 29 November last, has been referred to several times by the representatives of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR; as if they haveforgotten !hat, in the tirst place, the Security Council declined to acceptthe requests of the General Assemblyfor the implementation of the partition plan, and that the Security Council convoked a special session of the General Assembly to consider further the future government of Pales- tine. This means that the Security Council did not approve of that scheme which was devised for the future government of Palestine, and the General Assembly met for four weeks, from 16 April to 14 May. The General Assembly examined the matter and reconsidered its posi- tion and a proposal was adopted on 14 May, at the end of the session, in the form of a resolution of the General Assembly concerning the future government of Palestine. I should re~nd the representatives of aIl the States who supported -the partition plan vigor- ously-among them, the USSR, and the other bloc on the Communist side-that they re- peatedly stated, both in the ad hoc Committee and il} the General Assembly, that if this resolu- tion of 14 May should be accepted, it would mean killing the partition plan. They repeated that statement several times. They understood it to mean that the adoption of this resolution would kill the partition plan. In the first place, that tesolution of 14 May states clearly, in its tirst paragraph, that the General Assembly sup- ports the decisions and the resolution 'of the Security Council concerning the truce. They supported that vehemently, and that resolution of the Security- Council, which was supported by the General Assembly, was issued on 17 April' [document S/723]. In paragraph (à) it stated that aIl political activities which We therefore consider that the resolution of the General Assembly of 14 May has superseded the resolution of 29 November, and we hope that that resolution of 29 November on the partition plan will not be quoted any more or held up as being still in force, so that anything done against it would be a violation of the reso- lution. Even if that resolution were still in force, as we have said several times, it would simply be a recommendation and its implementation would depend on its acceptance by the parties concemed. As it was not accepted by the parties cancemed, it no longer stands and has no force or application. We are now faced with a situation in which we have to find sorne other solution for a peace- fuI adjustment of the future situation in Pales- tine, and if anybody is able to find that peace- fui solution, certainly it will be appreciated not- only .by the people of Palestine but by aIl the world-if such a thing could be found which would be acceptable to the parties concemed and which would not need to be put into effect by force; We now have before us the question of the prolongation of the truce, and the Security Council has to consider whether to prolong the truce with a view ta finding a solution for Pales- tine which would be' acceptable to the parties and which would be based on justice. Is such a solution to be found? There is an argument for a prolongation of the truce if sO,but if there is no hope of any such solution it will be useless to Wscuss it frQm that angle. We cannat consider that the resolution of 29 November -or the resolution of 14 May is For these reasons 1 consider that in the sug- gestions which he made the Mediator did not surpass his authority. He was entitled to make suggestions, but it remains for the parties con- cerned. to accept or reject them. Ml'. TSIANG (China): In previous discussions on the Palestine question the members of the Security Council have frequently differedj but on the question of the truce we have so far acted unanimously. It is my hope that the simple resolution for the prolongation of the truce will be voted unanimously by this Council. It is true that there have been accusations and counter-accusations about the violation of the truce. It might be true that the truce could be inlproved. 1 should be glad to consider any proposais for the inlprovement of the truce, but 1 think it would be unfortunate indeed if we should, in trying to improve the tTuce, sacrifice the truce entircly. That would be a very un- statesmanlike act on the part of tms Council. 1 think that this is not the time for a long discussion on the substantial proposals of Count Folke Bernadotte. People naturally can entertain a variety of opinions on t:.:.ose proposals. 1 should, however, like to take advantage of the present occasion to say simply that in the opinion of the Chinese delegation our Mediator has pro- ceeded along the right lines. My delegation would be glad to vote confidence in him. The Palestine question has been before the General Assembly and the Security Council for more than a year; it has been in the hands of our Mediator for a month, and that a very critical month. So far as the record shows, he certainly deswJes our -confidence. lvIT. MuNoz (Argentina) (translated trom Spanish) : My delegation desires peace in Pales- tine and will consequently vote for the prolonga- tion of the truce. General McNAUGHTON (Canada): 1 speak at this point merely to say that 1 fully support

Before putting the resolution to the vote, l shaH permit myself, as the representative of the UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC, to explain the position of my Government. First l should like ta make a few remarks about the arguments which have been put forward. The representatives of Belgium and China are trying to scare us by saying that we must adopt a resolution quickly, otherwise fighting will break out anew in Palestine. Let us first of aIl look at tlle facts. Without asking for our opinion, the person known as the Mediator put forward on 3 and 5 July a proposal [document 8/865] for a tmce. He has acted in this way more than once, confronting the Security Council with faits accomplis. Consequently, as the representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, l consider it incorrect ta dramatize the situation and to demand that we should immediately break off discussion on the substance of the question and put it to the vote. My second remark l would like to address to the representative of Syria. He says that the Security Council has not approved the partition plan. First of all, that is incorrect. When the United States delegation in the Security Council attempted to change the resolution of 29 November 1947, not aIl but a majority of the members supported its point of view and decided to calI a special session of the General Assembly in April and May of this year [documen~ 8/714]. Secondly, the representative of Syria asserts that the special session of April and May revoked the resolution of 29 November 1947. We must work on the basis of facts and documents, not of bare allegations. l should like to ask the representative of Syria to place on the table before us any resolution of 14 May 1948 revoking the resolution of 29 November 1947. He will not do so for the simple reason that there was no snch resolution. How can he voice such an aHegation without quoting facts or documents? Mter aH, we are resolving questions of the first importance in the field of international politics and relations, and it is our dutYin the first place to work on the basis of documents and facts. No rational person can, of course, be against the truce as such. When two armed groups- 1 will not calI them armies-eonfront each other, a situation is apt to arise in which, as they say .. in military parlance, "the guns begin to go off by themselves". But it is not enough merely to talk of a truce; we, the members of the Security Council, have the right and duty to know who is responsible for the truce. Why has a situation come about in whjch the representative of the United Kingdom is in favour of the truce, while the Arab States and the Statè of Israel do not l'aise the question at aIl? Why has the United Kingdom become such a fervent champion of the truce? We must know not ouly who it is who wants the truce, but aIso what is the purpose of achieving that truce, and what are its political objectives. In principle, we shaIl aIl naturaIly support the truce. It is the question which has been raised by the representative of the USSR that needs further elucidation. The reason why we view the question of the truce with sorne suspicion is that ·under caver of the truce certain manipulations are taking place which have nothing in common with the interests of peace in Palestine and the Near East or with the interests of the Arabs and the Jews. Let us take fust of aIl the proposais made by Ml'. Bernadotte. They were addressed to the Arab and Jewish sides and then transmitted ta the Security Council through the Secretariat of the United Nations. They cannat serve as a basis for discussion and must be condemned by the Security Council as obviously inconsistent with the General Assembly's resolution of 29 November 1947. 1 maintain that you could calI a meeting of aIl the lawyers in the world, any conference of experts you like, and still you would not find anyone daring ta say that Ml'. Bernadotte's proposaI is consiStent with the resolution of 29 November 1947. We know also that even before Ml'. Bernadotte quite a few people had been anxious ta revoke the General Assembly resolution on the partition of Palestine. The United States Govemment tried ta do sa by demanding last March a special session of .the General Assembly with the intention of having that resolution revoked and placing Palestine under trusteeship. We know that the .. One would have thought that the failure of the United States delegation's attempt should have been enough to prevent the so-called Mediator from embarking on projects inconsistent with the resolutions. of the General Assembly. The General Assembly's resolutlOn provided for the creation of two independent States in Palestine-a Jewish and an Arab State-and the formation of an economic union between them. Mr. Bernadotte annulled this decision and suggested to the Jews and Arabs that they should in fact create one State on a federal basis and hand over foreign policy and military defence to a central government camouflaged as a Council of the Union. Is this in accord with the General Assembly resolution? Thus, we have here the Dutch variant for the settlement of the Indonesian question. Its application to Palestine would deprive the State of Israel of the right to establish diplomatie relations with other States and to' have its own national armed forces fot the defence of its o'Wn frontiers. Furthermo;re, the General Assembly decided to place Jerusalem under international control. Mr. Bernadotte, however, is inclÏ..'1ed to dismiss that Assembly decision as well. He promises Jerusalem to the Arabs, ignoring both the decision and the reasons for its adoption. 1 shall not go into the question of what the Vatican's reaction, for instance, might be to such a proposal-I am not in the least interested-but is this decision compatible with the General Assembly resolution? Committees and sub-committees of the General Assembly were at work for a long time delimiting the frontiers of both the Jewish and the Arab States. But Mr. Bernadotte is incIined to reconsider this decision of the Assembly as well. He takes Western Galilee away from the Arabs, promises them the Negev Province. in fact, he deals with Palestine terri- Therecan be no doubt whatever that Mr. Bernadotte has not understood correctIy either hiS' role or the task entrusted to him by the United Nations. He has c1early exceeded his powers, No one granted him, in fact, no one could grant himpowers ta annul a General Assembly decision. Mr. Bemadotte's proposais contained yet another point d.eserving attention-the point that Transjord1ll must become a component part of Palestine. That is a surprise, indeed. Not so long ago--at last year's' General Assemblythe United Kingdom delegation proposed that Transjordan should be accepted into the United Nations' [document A/C.I/253J as an inde.. pendent sovereign State. T1?-at sucha proposaI was made is an indiSputable facto Now, Mr. Bernadotte's plan, which has the approval (if notmore) of the United Kingdom Govemment, recommends that thisindependent sovereign State should be regarded as a component part of a mandated territory. ApparentIy, therewas need for this somewhat unexpected transmogrification of a sovereign and independent State into a mandated territory so as to appoint the Transjordan King Abdullah head of the new Stâte in Palestine; it would seem that sorne are trying to make him the head of the dual Jewish-Arab State. What this portends for the State of Israel is crystal clear. Abdullah is known not only as an upholder of feudal reactionary systems which are supported by the United Kingdom, but also as a persecutor of the Jewish population, seeking the complete destruction of the Jewish.State in .Palestine. However laughable may be his provocative statements about war, with which he threatens not only the State of Israel but aIso in part the Security Council, they are none the less symptomatic of the policy of those official circ1esthat stand behind Abdl:"llah's back and pull the strings that actuate his gesticulating arms andhis unbridled tangue. AlI this shows that if anyone were ta take Mr. Bernadotte's plan seriously and to begin implementing it, Abqullah's res!Jlting domination would mean for the Jewishpopulation thesame kind of mass butchery as the Turks used to provoke against the Armenians. However, Mr. Bernadotte's plan for the unification of Palestine under Abdullah's domination is dangerous also for the Arabs themselves. It is é!Jl old plan, for in 1936 it was inflicted in the famons report·of the Peel Commission, which Mr. Bernadotte has now dragged out this arch-reactionary plan as a means of achieving peace between Jews and Arabs. 1 do not know whether it is true, but there have been rumours in the Press ta the effect that Abdullah was not oruy a puppet king but was aIso on the payroll of the United Kingdom. Perhaps this is not true, and if sa the United Kingdom representative 1'\'ill deny it. He is said ta receive a salary of about two million pounds from the United Kingdom. And now someone has suggested with consummate duplitity ta Mr. Bernadotte that if he were ta camouflage this' Palestine-Transjordan Union under Abdullah's domination with a socalled Council of the Union or a Central Council, he rnight find sorne simpletons who would believe that that was a democratic way of organizing two States: a Jewish State and an Arab State. 1 ask the members of the Securitv Council whether Mr. Bernadotte could have treated the General Assembly decisions in sa cavalier a fashion if he had not felt behind him the support of sorne dark, hidden forces. Certainly not. It is even possible that Mr. Bernadotte's plans are not lUs own creation and that he is doing exactly what these forces prompted him ta do. We do not know what these forces are. We do not know whether the interests of powerful ail companiesare at work behind the scenes, trying ta wreck the General Assembly decision and replace it by sorne new plan for the settlement of the Palestine problem, or whether Mr. Bernadotte is acting in contact, not on1y with the Swedish, but also with sorne other Gov\~rn­ ment which disagrees with the United Nations majority opinions on the creation of a Jewish State ID Palestine and which tries to impose its own viewpoint witlt the "1\1ediator's" assistance. Or again Mr. Bernadotte's initia~ive may be the result of sorne secret agreement already concluded between several large States for the apportionment of spheres of influence in Palestine. Whichever of these three assumptions is right -not to mention that all three of them may be right-it is c1ear that the Security Council cannat unwittingly allow a revised General Assembly decisio'n. ta he smuggled through, behind the hack of the Unfted Nations, and ln view cf this, the Ukrainian de1egation much regreu: "1}(),t it will not be able to vote for the truce pl~posal; it will abstain because it believes that the Security Council should reject the Bernadotte plan, not just because it is utterly inadequate, but chiefly because Mf. Bernadotte has violated the General Assembly decision. The Security Council should recommend to Ml'. Bernadotte not to exceed the powers granted him, but to abide by the decisions of the General Assembly. Ml'. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Repùblics) (translated {rom Russian): 1 must refer to one point that has not been mentioned during the discussion of the Palestine question, simply because it is re1ative1y new. 1 mean the dispatch to Palestine of a group of fifty membtrs of the United Nations Secretariat to a.ct as guards with special duties. As you know, this decision was taken by the Sœretary-General. As far as we know, the reason for this decision was the alleged need for such a group in connexion with the imolementation of the truce in Palestine. Incidentillys we learned about these motives from the Press. The question was neither cfu;cussed in the Security Council nor raised by any member. The decision to dispatch that group was apparently regarded as a continuation of the practice of dispatching sorne tens of observers from two or three countries. 1 am referring ta the United States, France and, to a lesser extent, Be1gium. We have already had the opportunity to state our attitude to the question of' dispatching observers from these countries; we ..beIieve -the decision taken·by the Mediator was incorrect, as it mere1y meant that observers were dispatched from two or three countries in spite of the fact that there were not legal g.round'l for such a decision. Now, 1 shol"1d Iike to point out to the Security Ccuncil that the continuation of that practice, as evidenced by the dispatch of a group of fifty members of thé security personnel of the United Nations Secr;.tariatl :s also u.correct and "\\'Îthout legal basis. There are no provisions in the Charter or în any General Assembly or Security Council document to justify the dispatch of that group to Palestine. The USSR delegation therefore considers such actions as having no legal force. As it turned out, the group was composed mainly of United States citizens. Weare not against United States citizens acting as observers in Conseil ment Palestine, Médiateur, pagnés l'Organisation nous absolument 1 have thought it necessary to draw the Council's attention to the utterly abnonmal situ~tioi1 which has resulted from the dispatch to Palestine both of observers at the request of the Mediator and of the group of fifty persons from the United Nations Secretariat. We must protest against that practice as being quite illegal. représentant une

The representative of the Secretariat, Mr. Hoo, wishes to make a statement. Département l'anglais): du de tant Mr. Hoa- (Assistant Secretary-General in charge of the Department of Trusteeship) : May 1 read a statement on behalf of the Secretary- GenF.ral on the question which has just been raised by the representative of the USSR? Unies général The Secretary-General was requestcd by the United Nations Mediator in Palestine to supply him with fifty guards to assist the Mediator in checking shipments over the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv l'oad and to exercise other control functions in connexion with the Palestine truce. Tl'1e Secretary-General responded to this request by calling for volunteers from among th~ United Nations guards stationed at Lake Success and among other personnel in the Secretariat. Fifty men were dispatched to Palestine on 20 June. Side arms were shipped with the men, but they were given no authorization to bear them 'except on instructions from the Mediator. Before responding to the request from the Mediator, the Secretary-General had asked the Legal Department to consider the legal questions involved. The Legal Department came to the following conclusion: Resolution 186 (S-2) of the C'ueral Assembly empowers the Mediator to exercise the following functions: "1. (a) To use his good àffices with the local and community authol'ities in Palestine to: " (i) Arrange for the operation of common services necessary to the safety and well-heing of the population of Palestine; "(ü) Assure the protection of the· Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Palestine; "(iii) Promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine". Finally, the resolution authorizes the Secretary.General to "provide the Mediator with the necessary staff to assist in carrying out the functions assigned to the Mediator by the General Assembly". By its resolution of 29 May [document 8/801J the Security Council instructed the Mediator, in concel't with the Truce Commission, to super· vise the observance of the truce provisions pro· vided for in the resolution, and also instructed him to make contact with all parties as saon as the cease-fire is in force with a view to carryùlg out his functions as determined by the General Assembly. This resolution of the Security Council was adopted under Chàpter VI of the Charter and presumably in the exercise of Article 36, which provides that the SecurityCouncil may at any stage of a dispute or a situation recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment. The truce provisions of the Security Council Resolution of May 29, and of certain further recommendations by the Mediator to implement the Truce, were agreed to by the parties to the dispute. It is clear from the resolution of the General Assembly that the Secretary-General is authorized to provide the Mediator with the necessary staff to assist him in carrying out his official functions. These functions include the functions approved in the Assembly resalution and such other functions as may dEvolve on hiin in consequence of inStructions from the Security Council. The checking ahd controlling of the observance of the truce terms agrced ta by the .parties to the dispute are unquestionably lawful functions of the Mediator. _.' .______ _ _ ..... ". Article 97 of the Charter provides, that the Secretariat shalI comprise "such staff as the Organization may require" and that the Secretary-General shalI "be the chief administrative officer of the Organization". If, in the judgment of the Mediator, he requires guards as part of his staff ;n the fulfilment of bis functions; these guards are c1early part of such staff as the Organization may require within the meaning of Article 97 of the Charter. The Secretary- General, therefore, is authorized both under the Charter and under the resolution of the General Assembly to furnish such guards to the Mediator to perform the functions previously described. The PRESIDEN'E (translated trom Russian): 1 have no other speakers on my list. We have before us one draft resolution (document 8/867) submittedby the United Kingdom representative. The text has been distributed. The Assistant Secretary-General will now read the resolution. Then 1 shall put it to the vote. "Taking into consideration the telegram from the United Nations Mediator dated 5 July 1948, Médiateur 1948, "Addresses an urgent appeal to the interested parties to accept in principle the prolongation of the truce for such period as may be decided upon in consultation with the Mediator." urgent prolongnr la être A vote by show of hands was taken, as fol- lows: ln favour: Argentina, Je1gium, Canada, China, Colombia, France, United Kingdom, United States of America. Chine, Unis Abstained: Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Sodalist Republics. viétique socialistes The resolution was adopted by 8 votes, with 3 abstentions. Ml'. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet 30cialist Republics) (translated from Russian): 1 have already explained at today's meeting the atti- tude of the USSR regarding the truce. listes déclaration de question The fact. that 1 abstaineü from voting for that resolution does not mean that the USSR delega- . tion is against the truce. We have always said that the USSR was in favour of it and that it has support~ and continues to support it. We support the decision but we cannot agree to the conditions which accompany the establishment of the truce. ce s'oppose jours indiqué idée. sion accepter pagner JllI..c::se..--CCmdlitil:llliL...a~_.kLhe found, in Pê-!" ticulaJ;', in. the Security Cauncil resolution of 29 May 1948 [document S/801]. They prejudice the legitimate rights of those who are loyally fulfilling the General Assembly decision of 29 November 1947 and, on the other hand, encourage those who are trying either to wreck the implementrttion of that decision or else to hinder it as much as possible. dans du tent appliquent par et saboter la résolution. dique mulées en gueur, lution subsiste l'URSS The United Kingdom resolution does not state openly that the previous conditions, de- scribed in the Security Conncil resolution of 29 May 1948, remain in force, but this is evi- dent both from the resolutioll and from the statements made in the Security Council by the supporters of that resolution. 1 havè deemed it essential to make this state- ment so that there should remain no doubt re- garding the attitude of the USSR towards the truce. 1 do not want ta cite many of the incidents which have taken place during the truce, but 1 would call attention ta one of them. This con- cems· the ship Altalena, which embarked from Europe-from the country of one of the great Powers, a permanent member of the Security Council. In spite of the fact that the attention of that Government was called to the fact that that ship, loaded with war ammunition and with fighting personnel, should not be permitted to go, it went. The United Nations observers failed ta stop the unloading of its cargo and men or even ta know what happened. The Security Uouncil has before it the report of the Mediator on this subject. After a long descrip- tion of the situation, the Mediator, in this report, says: "1 am still unable tl) estimate the number of men who actually got ashore from the ship, the number of men wounded and· taken to the hos- pital, the quantity of war material unloaded and the whereabouts of aIl this" [document 8/861]. The Mediator was unable to stop the unload~ ing or to establish what was done, because his observers were not permitted to do their duty. For this reason, we consider that such a trucc should be more faithfully respected, and even when we are deciding on the prolongation of the truce, we see that even the President of the Security Couneil gives the Jewish Agency a new titIe, a titIe by which it desires to be recognized by all the other nations. This shows his partiality and bias towards one party against the other. ln such a situation, 1 am afraid that there are good reasons to lose confidence in the principle of justice. For this reason, l did not vote on the resolution, leaving it to the discretion of the interested parties on the spot. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : Will the President allow me just to put one question to him? 1 think that earliet in the after-

As ,President of the Security Council 1 have received a document which 1 have asked the Secretariat to distribute to all the members of the Council. It is a letter sent by Ml'. Bernadotte, which contains two parts and which you know [document 8/863]. The first part explains his position and the other is a suggestion fOl"mU- Iating nine points with certain annexes. This is the document on which we base our criticism that Ml'. Bernadotte has over-stepped his authority. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : 1 am sarry if 1 did not make myself clear. What 1said was that 1 had thought 1 heard the President say in the course of the debate, that my' Government, the Government of the United Kingdom, had approved and had even instigated or inspired those proposals of Count Bernadotte for the settlement of the Palestine question. 1 ask the President if he would be good enough to indicate the document from which he had obtained the information to the efIect that my Government had approved those proposaIs. (traduit m'être avoir débats, ment positions règlement était propositions. avoir ment desquels propositions.

It was a supposition. 1 said that Count Berna- J'ai ,;~-...g~s-propesals---probably-b.ad_at_least_tl..r.c_~,J=_l_Ue_M. port of. the Government of the United Kingdom. vernement Therefore it was a supposition, and you may s'agissait consult the verbatim record on the subject. .à graphique. (traduit je qu'il sied de insinuations? ment sentant de Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : That is exactly what l complain of. Does the President really think it i8 right that representatives around this table shciuld make suppositions and insinuations? That is what 1 thought the President was rebuking the representative of Syria for doing. The President said that it was very wrong and very irresponsible-I do not know what the e..'{act words were-for any representative to sit at this table and mal{e statements that were not based on facts and documents. That is why 1 raisedthe point. There seems to be sorne conflict between the President's original ruling and his explanation now 'of a passage in his speech. mal sérieux ses Conseil fondées, C'est tÎ0~. le tion

1 wish to add something to what has just been said by the representative of the USSR. l did not indulge in any insinuations but based myself on certain facts. If Sir Alexander Cadogan so desiies, 1 can open a discussion on that ques- -tion. Is it not a fact that the United Kingdom delegation supported, at the 1947 Assembly, the Transjordan application for United Nations membership as an application from a sovereign and independent State? Why is it then that this sovereign and Îi1.dependent State-which, by the way, the' Unitèd Kingdom Government had already proclaimed an independent State three times before-is now described in Mr. Bernadotte's proposaI as a mandated State? It would seem that there was sorne purpose and sorne politicallogic in thiS. That is a fact and we can draw certain conclusions from it. If Sir Alexander Cadogan wishes to prolong the discussion further 1 can adduce some other facts. During the discussion of the Palestine question, the Ukrainian representative, my fIiend, Mr. Tarasenko, cited facts regarding United Kingdom support of. the Arab Legion. The whole world knows who Glubb Pasha is. He is certainly not a real Egyptian. If Sir Alexander Cadogan wishes to discuss these facts, we can do so. MacrniF'T'rio:'p"'o~mTiFtro"'ui+t+th1'i.-;;;a'FtÎllhrva:;-;v~e;--bh:e;:;;e;;;n~sp~e;;;aking as the representative of the Ukrainian SSR and not as the President. As President, it is my duty to conduct the meeting of the Security Council, but as the representative of the Ukrainian SSR, l may say unpleasant things to the United Kingdom representative. This does not mean, however, that as President 1 shall always act so as to be pleasant to the United Kingdom representative. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria) : So long as the question of justificati«?n byneans of official documents is open, when the President accused me of making a statement which was not supported by official documents 1 thought that, as he was speaking as representative of the Ukrainian SSR and not as President, it was not necessary for me to defend myseH. The President said that 1 could not quote official documents on which to rely, 1 believe it was on the question of the abandonment of the resolution of 29 November by the General Asserrïbly. At that time 1 quoted resolution No. 186 (S-2)' of the General Assembly ~hich was charged with implementing the partition plan. In the same resolution there is another paragraph which says that the General Assembly recommends the Mediator to promote a peaceful . adjustment of the future situation of Palestine. résolution mot, qui se There is nothing in all this resolution about the resolution of 29 November, not a word; but there is a reference to the Commission appointed under it, and that Commission is relieved of its responsibility. sait exposé seil Further, 1 said that the Mediator was acting under his teJiIIls of reference. The tenns of reference given to the Mediator were contained in this resolution of the General Assembly and in the Security Council's resolution about the truce [document S/801], and nothing else. We cannot ask him why he has not implemented the resolution of 29 November, because it does not· appear among his terms of reference. He was elected by the Assembly and charged by the United Nations with exercising certain functioJ1S; he could not go outside his terrns of refer~ ence, which 1 havè stated. There is nothing here ta say that he should implement th~ partition plan. He is not asked to do it, and it is not given to him as a basis for his work. For these reaSGns, 1 think that everything 1 said was based on official documents. 1 also said that the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of other su orters and advocates of the partition plan said-in the General Assembly and in the Committee that this resolution would mean killing the partition plan. Do they not admit that they said so? Everybody heard the statement in the Committee and in the General Assembly. That was before the adoption of the resolution. Mter its adoption they say the plan still stands and is still in force. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : 1 do not wish ta prolong the debate. 1 do not think that that would be very profitable. With regard to the last remarks made, of course, it is perfectly true that my Government supported the application of Transjordan for admission ta the United Nations. lt will do so again. How that is supposed to prove that my Gûvernment approved and inspired the .proposaIs of the Mediator for a settlement in Palestine, 1 cannot see.

To close the discussion on this point, l wish' to say that the ardour with which Sir Alexander Cadogan has defended the Mediator shows the extent of the latter's independence. Before adjourning the meeting l would like to draw the attention of the members of the Security Council to thè last telegram received from the Mediator. l would like toread you the text because l do not know whether the Israe1i party and the Arab party know it. Ml'. Hoo (Assistant Secretary-General in charge of the Department of Trusteeship): Everyone has received this tekgram, which appe'ars in document S/869.

Do the interested parties have any suggestions to offer the Security Council concerning this text? Ml'. EBAN (Israel): The document to which the President has referred describes the action of the Arab authorities in preventing the flow into Jerusalem during the period of the truce of water supplies for the inhabitants of the city. The Mediator goes on ta say that he has informed the Prime Minister of Transjordan "that this situation is in clear violation of the temlS of the truce" [document S/869]. The Provisional Government of Israel shares that view. In the concluding· passage of bis letter, thè Mediator goes on ta say that any Security Coun- -----&l·i:l-a€tÏen 'with Fe • , truce should be on the c1ear understanding that food, water and other essential non-military supplies will flow into Jerusalem, under United Nations control and regulation. That, too, is the understanding of the ProviSional Government of Israel-namely, that it is the essential condition of any truce proposal that there should be free passage of food, water and non-military supplies, under -proper supervision and control, into the City of Jerusalem. The Security Council has now passed a resolu:" tion approving in principle the prolongation of the truce, and itwould thereforebe our understanding that the Security Council has 'approved the principle contained in. the concluding. paragraph of the Mediator's cablegram. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from? Russian): Should we not infortn the Mediator that he must take measures in this connexion? Perhaps a cablegram should be sent to him. tendu.

Very weIl. The meeting rose at 6.13 p.m. m:-lr---~------------------~-~--~---