S/PV.333 Security Council

Daes the Mediator's reply satisfy the representative of the USSR? Ml'. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Soeialist Republics) (translated trom Russian): 1 do nat think that the answer was sufficiently clear. Count BERNADOTTE (United Nations Mediator in Palestine): Might 1 ask the representative of the USSR if he could explain what he means, because bis last statement was not quite clear to me? Ml'. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated trom Russian): May 1 ask a second question? The Mediator has suggested that it might be advisable to hold a plebiscite in Jerusalem. As we know, however, the status of Jerusalem was decided by an appropriate resr •..tion of the General Assembly on 29 November 1947.' Does tbis mean that the Mediator is suggesting sorne decision not in conformity with the United Nations decision? Count BERNADOTTE (United Nations Media-, tar in Palestine): 1 am afraid that the representative of the USSR misunderstood me when 1 spoke Just now. Since 1 wa~ reading from a paper, may 1 repeat what l said about a plebiscite? 1 shall read again the whole of paragraph 5 above, which is as follows: . "One might hope that the cease-fire in Palestine and the demilitarization of Jerusalem would eventually lead ta an armistice, thus ensuring 1 have never talked about or thought about a plebiscite for Jerusalem only.

1 must say that after this clarification 1 find the question even more confused. The President then continued in French: 1 must a,-1mit that, as far as 1 am concemed) the situation has become even less clear after hearing the Mediator's reply. 1 am afraid the confusion may be greater than ever. Count BERNADOTTE (United Nations Mediator in Palestine): 1 thought that the represelltative of the USSR asked me this question: "Does it mean, when you suggest a plebiscite for the City of Jerusalem, that you do not follow the resolution taken by the General Assembly on 29 November 1947 regarding the status of Jerusalem?)' My reply was that when 1 spoke about a plebiscite) 1 had not thought or talked about Jerusalelll, but meant the whole country of Palestine. In other words, 1 roeant that the Arabs should have a plebiscite, if that should prove practicable, in order that they rnight say how they would like certain arrangements to be made; and, if necessary, that the Jewish people should have a plebiscite also, although 1 do not know about this, as it depends upon the results of further negotiations. 1 inserted these words in the paragraph only in order to indicate that 1 shoùld think that we rnight come to a stage of negotiations where a plebiscite would be a practical and a democratic instrument to be used to clear up the future of Palestine. Have 1 described my position on this subject more satisfactorily now?

This is as clear as the new proposals made by the Mediator in the document dated 27 June [8/863J, which conflicted with General Assembly decisions, dud particularly with the resolution of 29 November. As far as 1 am concemed, the question is now clear. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): Smce we are asking questions now, 1 should like to ask the Mediator one question. As a result of bis experience during the four-week truce-before and aftercan he give us any idea of which side would benefit by the truce and the prolongation of the truce? Which side has the advantage, from the military point of view, from the pomt of view of increasing their forces, and other arrangements? Is the truce equally advantageous to both sides or does one side have more advantage than the other as a resultof the truce? 1 think "1 am convinced that no substantial military advantage was gained by either side as a result of the operation of the truce supervision. It is not denied that relatively minaI' advantage may haye been gained by one side or the other in particular localities through the inability of the observers to cover the fronts completely at all times, and the tendency of sorne local commanders on bath sides to take unfair advantage of this facto A great many complaints about local situations were received from each side. From a purely military standpoint, there may have been an ad;::::..'ltage for the Jews which would be inherent in any truce involving them. Their position is essentially a defensive one, and time l'uns in their favour in the sense that it increases the possibilities for consolidating their defensive positions and impr:)Ving their military organizatian. At the same rime, the truce stopped the momentum of the Arab attack. Moreover, in view of the fact that the Jewish political structure is quite new, time affords the Jewish Goveroment opportunity to strengthen their political organization and also fortifies their political position paychologically. The Arabs, of course, are acutely aware of these possibilities, and this, no doubt, accounted in part at least, for their negative attitude toward a prolongation of the truce." contrôle militaire parties. condaires ou lières, se cacement dance commandants locaux de adressé sujet de ment ~e trêve tien leur est favorable possibilités sives D'autre arabe. tion donne forcer son organisation politique, ner tion vivement pas moins, prolongation Ml'. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated tram Russian): 1 assume the Mediator realizes 'that his proposaI for a plebiscite for the whole of P'-41estine conflicts with the General Assembly decision on Palestine. Is my assumption correct? listes pose proposition la par est-il Count BERNADOTTE (United Nations Mediator in Palestine): The proposition which l have made, with regard to a plebiscite, is not one that the Council need decide upon now. As 1 said, that depends upon the development of future negotiations. 1 have never believed that my thoughts about a plebiscite would be contrary to and against the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 29 °November 1947, and 1 tions Le dès que que négociations. sur ros uate tâche qu'elle est dis ture rep~at once more that my responsibility as Uruted Nations M.liator, as it is stressed in the resolution of 14 May, is to "promote aO peaceful adjustment"-I repeat, "adjustment"-"of the future situation of Palestine". The question which 1 wish to ask is precisely in relation to this paragraph 17 of ms report, wmch the Mediator has read to the Council, on the subject of the effect of the truce on the military prospects of both parties. 1 have read that paragraph very carefully. What 1 deduce from it is that the Mediator, in this paragraph, is dealing with what 1 might caIl the situation in the field, the local' military situation. What 1 wanted to know was whether he could possibly give us any estimate as ta the possible effect on the ultimate potential of the two parties wmch observance of the truce may have had. 1 think that the Arab parties have already complained that owing to the truce, their Jewish opponents have been able to build up their forces by the introduction into their territory of both men and material. 1know that the Mediator made certain plans for checking and observing, as best he could with the facilities at bis disposal, the entry of men and material into that part of the territory; and 1 wonder whether he could give us any estimate of what has, in fact, happened and whether that has materiaIly affected the relative strengths and prospects of the two parties. 1 shOlùd like also to say one ward in connexion with the short discussion wmch has been taking place between the representative of the USSR,the President and the Mediator on the ~ubject of the Mediator's activities in the matter of searcmng for and suggesting certain possible Elles of solution. Both the Prel?ident and the r~Fesentative of the USSR spoke as if we hal selected and appointed the Mediator ta go out to Palestine and enforce the resolution of 29 November last. That 1 never took to be the M~diator's duties, and 1 think that aIl those who have followed, as 1 have followed and aIl my colleagues have followed, the proceedings both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council, realize that when the Mediator was appointed, that action was an attempt to get away from the impossibility-as it had been found to be an impossibility--:ûf enforcing that solution. If 1 had been the Mediator-I am very glad 1 was not-I certainly should have interpreted that charge we gave him "to promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation in Palestine" in the way in which he seems to have interpreted it. CountBERNADOTTE (United Nations Mediator in Palestine): 1 want to try to answer the question put to me by the representative of the United Kingdom. Sir Alexander Cadogan referred to sorne statep.::·.i~S made by the Arab countries; 1 think therefore it is right to answer de du pas de Vous late l'incident pour fois, militaire, rent armes quantité déchargée, cident ment bien tain n'est taire. 1 suppose that when one talks about war material, one thinks about the incident of the AltalenaJ when a ship was landed at Tel Aviv. l' cannat tell you exactly how much war material and how many men were landed there. The reasons why 1 cannat tell you will be found in my cabled report on the incident [8/861 and S/861/Add.1J. But if one sees the whole picture of the military situation, even if one considers the rumours about how .many Jews of military age were landed by the Altalena and how much war material could have been landed, my firm opinion is that a real change in the military situation from the Altalena incident has not occurred in favour of the Jews, although of course there has been sorne advantage. But nothing, ône can say, has reaIly changed the military situation. étant je d'exercer tous étendues. observateurs les frontières trôle ln this connexion, 1 want ta point out that it was of course easier ta control Palestine than ta control all the Arab countries, with their enormous borders, with the small number of observers that were placed at my disposal, though we tried ta send them out ta aIl the places and aIso ta the Arab countries. But, as 1 have said, the borders are very long and the control there could not be as effective as in Palestine. May 1 once more just say a ward about the remark made by Sir Alexander Cadogan about my suggestion. If 1 should, as Mediator, have been one hundred pel' cent bound by the decision taken by the General Assembly on 29 November 1947, 1 think that the Security Council should not have had a Mediator, because then no mediation would have been necessary. vation .pos Médiateur, la 29 sécurité parce Ml'. EBAN (Israel): Arising out uf the previous question, may 1 ask whether the detention of aIl men of military age on, the island of Cyprus rests upùn the ruling or decision, or the exercise of any discretion, of the Mediator? ce l'îL porter du laissée?

1 ~sk the Secretariat ta ensure adequate interpre- Secrétariat puissions entend ~atlon. We ~an hear nothing; the interpretation lS very faint. Count BERNADOTTE (United Nations Mediator in Palestine) : In one of my talks with Ml'. Shertok, the Foreign Minister of the Provisional cions Au 1 suggested tû Ml'. Shertok that the Jewish' representatives in London should get in contact with the United Kingdom Government on this subject. 1 said that the representatives could be allowed to quote me and to tell the United Kingdom Government of my opinion. 1 do not remember the exact date-1 believe it was about 28 June, but 1 do not want to commit myself to that date-but 1 received a telegram from the United Kingdom Government asking my opinion with regard to immigrants in Cyprus, men of military age, and so forth. 1 then repeated, in a telegram to the United Kingdom Government, my statement to Ml'. Shertok. A couple of days after that, 1 got information, through the British Consulate in Rhodes, that the United Kingdom Government had decided that all immigrants above and below military age, and all women, should be allowed to leave Cyprus and go to Palestine, but that, during thetruce, no men of military age should be allowed ta leave Cyprus. At the same time, l 'was informed that, in Cyprus at that very moment, there were a total number of 25,000 Jewish immigrants, of whom Il,000 were men of military age.

May 1 ask one question? The' Mediator has mentioned the demilitarization of Haifa. 1 should like to know which States have accepted this proposal of the' Mediator or have prompted him to put forward such a proposaI. Count BERNADOTTE (United Nations Mediator in Palestine): First of all, 1 want to give the background of the whole story about Haïfa. 1 received from the Governments of the United Kingdom, France and the United States a request that 1 should try to do something so that the refineries and terminals in Haifa could start to work. AlI the three Governments said that it was their opinion-which ~ shared-that it was of great importance to the ""hole world that we should get crude or refined oil to the 1 tht:refore talked to the Jewish representatives and to the Arab representatives who were acting as consultants, as experts, in Rhodes, and 1said: "perhaps it might be interesting for both parties to see that we get these oil refineries working again". That was the reason why 1 made the proposaI regarding certain parts of Haifa. 1 can quote the replies received from bath parties. The Jewish reply was given ta me on 7 July. It said: "The Provisional Government of Israel does not favour the demilitarization of the Haifa refineries" [8/872]. The Arab reply was contained in a telegram 1 received from Ml'. Azcarate, our representative in Cairo, reading as follows: • "As regards Haïfa, following are the essential paragraphs of the note: " 'Political Committee se<.::s no objection Haifa area being demilitarized and considered fl'ee zone where no fighting for fortifications should take place, nor should it be attacked or used as offensive base and it be not used as base for entry of immigrants or arms, ammunition or supplies. Strict and effective supervision in wmch Arabs take part must be instituted sa as ta ensure realization of these aims.' " Tms reply from the Arab League was in the form of a te1egram and is thel'efore in shortened form. l hope that the members have understood the content.

1 should like ta thank' the Mediator; the first part of his explanation is particularly dear ta me. .cie Ml'. EL-KHOURI (Syria): 1 should like ta ask another question of the Mediator. , He referred in ms report tu certain communications hetween the President of the Security Council and the Mediator. l l'emember that the Mediator asked to be given authority ta make an interpretation in the way in wmch he stated it. 1 at that time, as President of the Security Council, confirmed ms request and, at the same time, called his attention ta the first paragraph of the resolution of 29 May 1948 adopted by the Security Council, in wmch it is stated that the truce should be without prejudice to the rights, daims and position of either Arabs or Jews. The other point is this: did he take into consideration the fact iliat immigration ta any country is certainly subject ta the local legislation of that country? The immigration of Jews into Palestine was allowed only under the Mandate. Did hefind any legislation in Palestine which was in effect even after the termination of the Mandate? Did he find any legislation allowing immigration tG continue? ln the resolution of 14 May which gave the Mediator bis terms of reference and from which bis authority is drawn, there is nothing saying that immigration is to be allowed. 1 consider that neither the General Assembly nor the Security Council has the right ta legislate for Palestine. It would be the duty and the right of the future government of Palestine ta make the regulations covering immigration. Did the Mediator consider this point in exe- .cutL'lg paragraph 4 of the resolution [S/801] of the Security Council which begins: "Calls upon all Governments . . . concerned, should men of military age be introduced ..."? Did he consider that this paragraph. gave authority· for immigration, and that if it happened that certain people of military age entered, they were ta be treated insuch and such a way? The resolution does not mean that immigration should be allowed, that Jbreigners should be allowed ta come into the country ta participate in any way that wc'Uld prejudice the position of the parties. 1 should like sorne clarification from the Mediator on this point of permitting the admission of immigrants and the basis on which that decision was taken. Count BERNADOTTE (United Nations Mediator in Palestine): It was just those questions which have been raised by the representative of Syria chat were my big-if 1 may use a slang expression-headache when 1 made my suggestians. for a truce. Therefore, 1 sent· a telegram [S/823] on 4 June to the President of the Security Council, wbo happened to be the Syrian represeritative at that time. May 1 quote this telegram: "Q~estion Jewish immigration into Palestine d'Uration truce alone obstructing agreement two parties on effective dat~ truce. Difficulty arises concerning precise interpretation ta be gi.ven ta phrases 'fighting personnel' and 'men of military. age' in fust. two action clauses Security Council resolution 29 May. Basic question is: does tesolution envISage. that men of nillitary age .:may be brought in Jewish· area Palestine .- ln a moment 1 shall have the text of the reply that 1 received from the President of the Security Council in the month of June. 1 do not have it here in my files,. but it will be down in a moment. As 1 said in my report, the reply was to the effect that no military advantage should be given to either party during the truce. As an old .soldier 1 think, and my experience tells me, that there is no military advantage if people above or below the age of military men are introduced into a country. que rité mais dans avantage trêve. qu'un à pas armes. combattaient cette armes en décision Conseil qui porter la le d'Arabes vertu été sion. ce l'une à: ne questions ter moi-même bonne les les d'i:mniigrer des arrivait ou je hommes donnerait 1 know that the Arabs have said to me that there are women fighting in the Jewish forèes, and therefore women of military age should not be allowed to go into Palestine. 1 had to base my decision, however, on the resolution taken by thé Security Councilon 29 May, which spoke only about "men of military age". 1 can assure the Security Council that it was a very hard decision that 1 had to take. 1 did not think that 1 had the right ta stop all immigration by Jews or Arabs to Palestine; 1 did not think that it was in my power or h, my mission to take such a decision. The only power 1 had was to try to see that no military advantage was given to either party. Then, when, 1 am sorry to say, 1 did· not get a clear and definite answer from the Security Council about ,the questions which 1 had raised, Ihad to make my own interpretatian and 1 did it to the best of my knowledge and conscience. Immigration, as far as 1 was concemed, would be fl'ee for people above military age and for all women, but in the case of men of military age 1 should have the right, if an enormous number of men of military age came into Palestine-and 1 am thinking of both Jews and Arabs-to say "stop, you are not allowed to bring in more men because that. will he a military advantage to YOUT party". My decision could have been that no man of military age would·be·allowed to enter Palestine, but 1 do not think that would have heen a fair or pleasant decision on my part. 1 wm1ted the baslE of my whole mission to obtain peace .in de en n'aurait yeux, ln answer to the second question by the representative of Syria in regard to immigration, before the truce the Jews could,bring into Palestine all the immigrants they pleased, of aIl ages and sexes, subject only to war risks; therefore 1 made,the limitation which 1 have just now described regarding immigration. Mr. EBAN (Israel): My understanding of the Mediator's response to a previons question about Cypnis is that the whol~ale detention of these men in Cyprus has never been recommended or requcsted by the Mediator as essential for the observance of the truce. It is therefore an act of the United IGngdom authorities on the island of Cyprus, and of them alone. Is that a correct understanding of the answer which we heard? Count BERNADOTTE (United Nations Mediator in PaIestine): If 1 may an5iwer that, the . interpretation given by Mr. Eban is absolutely correct. 1 did not make any suggestions or requests to the United Kingdom Government. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America): My question has rather to do with t~e future course of our proceedings today. 1 assume that the President will be asking the Security Council to meet again after lunch to continue its consideration of the Palestine question, and 1 should like to reserve the right to make a brief statement at that time, when 1 shall he concerned to deal with the responsibilities of the Security Council in the light of the present situation. If there are no further questions which anyone wishes to address to the Mediator at tbis moment, 1 should like to ask whether the President would feel it might be'helpful to us _aU, bèfore adjourning for lunch, to hear any brief statement which the representatives of the parties around tbis table might care to make in regard to the report which we have heard from the Mediator this morning. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) (translated trom Spanish): Even at the risk of 'taking more of the Mediator's time, as. he has advised or referred to the desir.ability of demilitarizing the entire city of Jerusalern) 1 should like to ask hiin if, in the light of the expérience he has . Count BERNADOTTE (United Nations Mediator in Palestine): The minimum personnel which would have to be available to control the Jerusalem area if it were demilitarized would be 1,000 men. That is the absolute minimum. To be quite sure that we could· guarantee to both Arabs and Jews that their areas, if demilitarjzed, couId be effectively kept under control by the representatives of the United Nations, 1 should prefer to have, if possible, 2,000 or 2,500 men. However, when we discussed the subject in the primary stage, we talked about 1,000. In view of rny experience, it was my opini<..n after that discussion that this· number was a little too small, and 1 should prefer to have up to 2,000 men for the purpose. J'estime salem militarisées, leurs régions respectives trôlées des possible, au il l'expérience peu pour . The PRESIDENT (translated trom Russian): It is now one o'dock, and 1 suggest the following plan of work. We shall now adjourn until 3 p.rn. Any representative whe wishes to ask a question when we resume our meeting, will be given the opportunity to do so. If there are no questions but representatives wish to speak 011 the substance of the matter, we shall then open the general discussion. 1 think that aU membérs of the Security Council will agree with that procedure. tenant suivre séance à quelqu'un faire. mais pronom'er p2'JSseroIi3 tous veront THREE HUNDRED ANDTHIRTY~FOURTH MEETING TROIS-CENT Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 13 July 1948, at 3 p.rn. President: Ml". D. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic). Present: The representatives of the following countries: Argentina, Relgium, Canada, China, Colornbia, France, &}.~a, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America. 'Argentine, France, soviétique socialistes d'Amérique. 168. Continuation of the discussion on thé Palestine question .

The representative of the Government of I!aq sentant has asked to be permitted ta take part in today's mandé discussion of the Palestine question. 1 presume 1 à that there will bene 0bjections to that request. pense que