S/PV.334 Security Council

The representative of the Government of I!aq sentant has asked to be permitted ta take part in today's mandé discussion of the Palestine question. 1 presume 1 à that there will bene 0bjections to that request. pense que ln view of the fact that not orny questions and answers are concemed, 1 think we shaIl reestablish the rule previously in force; Le. aIl speeches as weIl as questions and answers will be interpreted cOJ;lSecutive1y into French after' the English interpretation. The old rule will thus remain in effect, but only in respect of members of the Security Council and of the Mediator. Mahmoud Bey FAWZI (Egypt): 1 wish ta ask severa! questions of the Mediator. 1 shaIl ask themaIl at the same time, urness he prefers that 1 should ask them separate1y and stop each time and wait for an answer before asking another question. My first question is in connexion with the incidents of which the Arabs complained and which, in ,their view, went against the conditions of the cease-fire. May 1 ask which of those incidents, besides the Altalena incident, called for the special attention of the Mediator? May 1 aIso ask whether we could have more details in connexion with the Altalena incident? My second question relates ta what the Mediator said in connexion with the number of observers. If 1 remember ~oITectly, he said he considered that the number of observers was by no means sufficient, and he recommended a very great incrcase in that number. May 1 ask whether, in the lig-ht of that statement, the incidents of which the Arabs complained-and which they considered as infringements of the èonditions of the cease-fire-eould reasonably be considereù as the orny ones; in other words, were the observem in Palestine, in view of their smaIl number, able ta detect all the infringements of the conditions of the cease-fire? The third question 1 should like ta submit is this: the Mediator said that he hoped that substantial numbers of Arabs who have left their homes should be enabled ta return ta them. May 1 ask if in his view not aIl the Arabs who were forced ta leave their homes are entitled ta return ta them. The following question concerns the use of force ta settle the question of Palestine. Thir was mentioned bath orally in the M,ediator's statement this morning and in paragraph 35 of his report [8/888J. Ta our view, and 1 consider in fact, the Zionists have attempted and arest~ attempting t? establish their so-caIled Stat~ by force. May 1 ask the Mediator what his view Foi' the time being, these are aIl the questions 1 have ta ask. 1 may have ta ask an additional question, with the President's permission, after 1 have heard the Mediator's answers. Count BERNADOTTE (United Nations Mediator in Palestine): The Egyptian representative's first question was whether all the incidents of which the Arabs have comolained were observed and tabulated by the United Nations observers. 1 suppose that the Egyptian representative is thinking especially of complaints that were brought to my attention by the Prime Minister of Egypt, Nokrashy Pasha. Aside from those, of course, other governments and the Provisional Government of Israel have given my observers many papers in which they complained of incidents. At the last meeting 1 had with the Egyptian Prime Minister, 1 h~nded him the ,reply about the complcints made by the Egyptian Government. This reply was written by my representative among the observers, the Swedish Colonel Buncle. 1 have a copy of that reply heres and 1 should be very happy to !land it over to the representative of Egypt if he wishes it. The second question concerned the Altalena incident. 1 sent the Security Couneil a full report [S/861 and S/861/ Add.l] of the information 1 had about the Altalena incident. 1 think it was a telegram of many pages. 1 do not Jmow any more now than when 1 sent that information to the Sccurity Council. The third question of the Egyptian representative concerned the number of observers. The Egyptian representative referred to my statement concerning the need for more observers. As 1 said this morning, it was, unfortunately, impossible to have enough observers for them to be at aIl fronts and all places where incidents occurred. Therefore, the observers were not able ta take care of aIl the incidents. It might be thought quite natural when 1 say that incidents occurred espeéially where we had no observers. Therefore, 1 think that if, as 1 sm,cl this morning, we get a prolongation of the truce in Palestine, we shall neecl more observers so thatat least we can say we have done our utmost and that all incidents which might occur can be' taken care of by the United Nations' observers in the field. 'points The fourth question which the representative of Egypt asked me concerned the return of Arab refugees to their homes. The Council may know that during hostilities in Palestine, and before they began after 15 May, considerabÎe numbers ,0LArabs left their. homes and are now living in other parts of Palestine or in Arab countries. The figure given to me has been around 250,000 .une The last question was with regard to the use of force in Palestine. The representative of Egypt asked me whether, in my view, if there were such an application, force should be use.:. not only against the Arabs but also against the Jews. May l recall.that in the course of expressing my thoughts this moming [333rd meeting]- they were not proposals nI' suggestions. l suggested that certain paragraphs of the Charter should be used if one or both parties failed ta accept an order which might come from the Security Couneil. My thought then was not'that force might be used from the beginning. There are other methods of sanctions which are known and which can be adopted before military force is used. My opinion is that whichever party rejects a decision of the Security Couneil should he treated in the same way, whether it is the Arabs or the Jews. ' Mahmoud Bey F AWZI ( Egypt): l stated earlier that l should like ta be permitted ta put one more question, but l regret to say that l now have a further question ta ask. This additional question arises from the Mediator's statement in connexion with the return of the A,abs to their homes. May l ask if such return could or should in fairness be subject ta any conditions? The other question which l should like ta submit is this. The Mediator informed the Couneil that he had striven ta carry out the spirit of the truce by ensuring that no military advantage would accrue ta either side as the result of the truce. In his report to the Security Council, as weIl as in his public statements, the Mediator has said that the prolongation of the truce works to the military advantage of one party, and it is most clear, in paragraph 17 of his report, that that party is the Jewish party. May l respectfully ask whether, in the Mediator's view, elements which lead to this one-sided advantage may not be eliminated if the resumption of the cease-fire is ta be considered? While l am speaking l should like, with the President's permission, ta deal for a minute or sa with two points. The first point concerns something ta which l objected very strongly, and ta which sorne other members here present objected, on 7 July [330th meeting], in relation ta the expression used on inviting or referring ta the Jewish representative. I consider tris question still reserved, and l do not at all cl)nsider it a:1 solved by any decision previously taken around this table. l should still like ta he afforded the first possible opportunity ta speak about this matter of the way in which we address the Jewish representative. issu l'Organisati( Qu'il sés Ml'. EBAN (Israel): There is not a single person in this room or outside it who does not know in the depths of bis heart that the Arab States, by resuming their attacks upon Israel, have committed an act of aggression within the meaning of Chapter VII of the Charter. Theil' armed forces are operating beyond their frontiers for purposes which the Charter specifically forbids. They are using force against the territorial integrity and political independence of the State of Israel in a manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Theil' object, which they openly confess, is to secure the violent extinction of the State of Israel, the establishment of which was reco~mended by the General Assembly. They have rejected the solemn appeal of the Security Councü [8/875] ta agree to a prolongation of the truce agreement initiated by the 29 May resolutioll [S/801], with the result that that truce agreement has become void and has no validity at this time. On 5 July the Mediator appointed by the United Nations, appealing to all Governments concerned for a prolongation of the truce, made the following observations: "There can be little doubt that a decision to resume fighting in Palestine will be universally condemned and that the party or parties taking such a decision will be assuming a responsibility wlûch will be viewed by the world with the utmost gravity" [8/865J. sel pareille que The Arab States have taken that decision. They have assumed that responsibility. They have resumed fighting. Their violence is directed against the recommendation of the General Assembly, against the appeal of the Security Council, against the calI of the Mediator, against the principles of world peace, against the people and the State of Israel. The State of Israel, which is the victim of this renewed aggression, now turns to this great organ of the United Nations to ask: is that decision "universally condemned"? Is that responsibility "viewed by the world with the utmost gravity"? Does this Council condemn the decision to resume fighting? Does this Council vi~w it "with the utmost gravity"? If so, what steps does the Council propose ta take in order to vindicate the Charter ag-ainst flagrant aggression; to impose the penalties which aggression imperatively pris combat. taque générale, contre de -d'Israël. renouvelée, vers mander: d'un sabilité de rité les comme est t-il cette tions rative riel son indépendance lUc~rs and to place moral and material support behlu;d the State of Israel, defending its integrity and mdependence against aggressive attack? . It should not be necessary at this stage to pro- VIde el~borate evidence in order to prove the aggresslve character of these warlike movements tuel,. de démontrer Therefore, the principles of the Charter themseives proclaim these operations as acts of aggression. The same result is reached if we apply to these acts thP. commonly accepted criterion of responsibility and initiative. For here we are in the unusual position of not being faced with any conflict of views OIi the question of who began the fighting. When the first official phase of. this aggression began on 15 May, representatives of the Arab States showered documents upon this Council, as they have done again this week, asserting that they had taken the initiative for using armed force outside their frontiers for the purpose of overthrowing the political independence and territorial integrity of a neighbouring State, whose exist~nce they disliked. Under the Charter, they are of course, entitled to dislike the existence of the State of Israel. But under the Charter, they are most emphatically and categorically forbidden to use armed force against the political independence or territorial integrity· of that State, or indeed, to use armed force against anybody in Palestinian territory for any purpose whatever "save in the common interest" of the United Nations, or in defence of their own territories, if these territories had been attacked without provocation. Not one of the conditions which make the use of armed force legitimate under the Charter exists or has ever been claimed to exist in respect of these acts. At the SOlst meeting of the Security Council tb representativeof the Arab States read statements similar in substance and tone to those which now lie before us, asserting the political ambitions whereby they are animated and the violent means which they use in their support. On that occasion, the representative of the' United States said of thes.: declarations: On 28 May, supporting a resolution submitted by the representative. of the USSR [S/794/- Rev.l], the representative of the United States succincdy expressed the purposes of Arab aggression in these words: "We [say the Arabs] are there only for the purpose of overwhelming the Provisional Gov- .ernment of Israel; we are going ta overwhelm the status quo by power, and we are going to determine an international question ourselves." [307th meeting]. Continuing, the representative of the United States said: . "An existing, independent Government cannot be blotted out in that way. It cannat be blotted out by just sitting at the Security Council table and ignoring it. The Arab States are taking the only course that can be taken ta blot it out --and that is mal'ching in with their armies and blotting it out. This is a matter of international concern, a matter of so great importance that we cannot sit here and say: 'Oh, we wash our hands of it. We shall not do anything ahout it that will be effective . . .' We know, of course, that tms is a violation of the Charter." [307th meeting] And finally, th~ representative of the United States, referring to the claim of the Arabs that their operations aimed at the maintenance of peace, said: "This is equivalent in its absurdity to alleging that these five armies are there to maintain peace, while they are conducting a bloody war" [302nd meeting]. During the earlier _episode of tbis conflict· which began in December and took official form on 15 May 1948 the aggressive character of the Arab invasion was sa clear ta many members of the Security Couneil that five of them were already preparedbefore any truce procedure ?r investigation had taken place, without any mtervention by any agent of the United Nations to test the peaceful intentions of thé two parties, to determine, on the basis of existing evidence, even at that eatIy stage, that there existed a threat ta the peace. Those other members of the Security Couneil who were unable ta support that drastic view, at sa early a' stage, were not' p.repared to deny that such a thieat ta the peace or active aggression exîsted. Not one of them, except that member of the Security Council ~hose government has been directly implicated • We attach great significance to paragraph 17 of the Mediator's report [8/888], in which he describes Jewish and Arab inilitary activity iri terms of defence and attack respectively. As a further inducement to the Arab States to refrain from the use of armed force, encroachments upon the sovereignty of Isràel were demanded in that matter wherein its sovereignty is most vital and cherished, the matter of immigration. Unwarranted restrictions r:2aced upon the State of Israel in this regard were extended still further .by the Mediator's assumption of discretion in interpreting the resolution and by the action of certain governments which misinterpreted these immigration provisions beyond the limits of the truCe resolution and of the Mediator's interpretation [8/829]. Of these cases the most striking ·is that of Cyprus, to which the Provisional Government of Israel has drawn the attention of the Security Council in document S/886. Eleven thousand men of military age, rnany of them victims of persecution for over a decade, are held on that island in captivity without elementary human rights. This matter concerns the Security Council becausè its name has been invoked to cover that injustice. It has been 1 shall now read a telegram which reached me from Cyprus a few hours aga, dispatched from Caraolos Camp, dated 12 July, from the Central Committee of Cyprus Refugees: "British Army Caraolos Camp distributed follciwing 9 July: 'Latest outbreak and demonstration will no longer be tolerated and must cease. Henccforth every attempt escape will be dealt with strongest measures if necessary troops will fire with the aim not to wound but to kil!. In addition all privileges as free distribution cigarettes and special supplement of American Joint Distribution Committee will be stopped immediately. No furthér warning will be given, despite Sir Godfrey Collins' assurance to Jewish Distribution Committee today. This a mistake. Army stands firm.' " This will show how a military authority addresses these incidents, and how unoffending people are detained without trial for no offence under any existing law. We are here not only ta register a protest, which we do, but to elicit, if we can, from the United Kîngdom representative whether he now agrees that there is no resolution of the United Nations valid at this time which justifies, if it was ever justified-which we deny-the use of force against these people and their detention in Cyprus against their will. V'!e are here also to inquire as a matter of princlple for what offence, under existing law, these people are being penalized in tms way, and on what authority the Government of Cyprus proposes to influence their movement in any manner'at all. Despite these difficulties, for a period of four 'Yeeks, an uneasy truce has existed, during which tlme the Mediator reports that no military advantage was.gained by either side. It was, of course, the Mediator's duty to preserve the military equilibrium. But, after these events, faced as we are with open aggression, it does not comfort us to realize that the party, which has loy~lly acceptedevery honourable means to aVOId bloodshed, and the party which now stands guilty of breaking forth in aggression in 1 doubt' whether the Security Council is concerned at this moment to investigate the detailed history of.the truce in all the phases of its application. Were it to do so,· 1 doubt whether it would come to endorse the Egyptian account in document S/883 portr-~ying how the Arabs sat patiently by, in splendid 2Uld immaculate virtue amidst an unceasing torrent of Jewish violations. Indeed, if 1 were to give our account of Arab violations, two of which were reported to the Security Council and fifty-five of which were indicated yes~erday by Mr.·Shertok to Mr. Reedman, 1 should detain the Council far beyond the limits of utility or relevance. It is sufficient to say that tlris theme that legitimate Arab interests were adversely affected by ibis truce is exactly the opposite of the truth. Addressing the Security Council five weeks ago [31Oth meeting], 1 took leave to enquire whether any State represented around this table would willingly neglect opportunities of improving its defence for a period of four weeks, if it had complete certainty that at the end of those four weeks, the armies of five neighbouring States would sweep upon it in converging aggression. We further expressed doubts whether any State represented here would willingly submit its immigration policy, based upon its own right of internaI jurisdiction, to the scru..tiny or control of anyone else. Yet the State of Israel did accept these restrictive conditions, which it believes should never have been imposed upon it. It allowed its seanty defensive resources to remain unaugmented during the period which it knew to be merely a prelude for further attacks upon its boundaries and its political integrity. It allowed the hand of external control to reach into the. rights of immigration, which are the very substance of its national purpose and ideal. It was able to accept these limitaq.ons because they were imposed for a specified period of brief duration, and because the Government of Israel, born out of a United Nations judgment and recommendation, has been eager at all times to affirm its fidelity to the pxinciples and the processes of the Charter. In later weeks, the Government, establishing itself in the very tlirmoil of war, revealed its ability to assert its internaI authority and its respect for international obligation, even in the cruellest andmost poignant of circumstances. Therefore, when we rearl documents emanating from the Egyptian Government [S/ 883] and the Arab League [S/885], portraying that periodof truce as one of Jewish advantage, we lose faith in the integrity of those who formulated these documents, knowing, as they must, that the main On the morning of 9 July the period of the four weeks' truce expired. Owing to the Arab refusai to grant a prolongation, it was not renewed. It is therefore no longer in force and no government, either in the United Nations or outside it is bound any longer by any of its provisions or restrictions. ln this connexion, 1 draw attention to docu- -ment S/889 submitted by the Government of Israel on 12 July referring to a passage cin 15 June [320th meeting] when the predecessor of the present President of the Security Goundl informed aU members of the Gouncil and sorne non-member States that a truce with certain terms and condîtions existed and was vaIid. We eonsider that it' is now necessary, by the same procedure, for aU the Governments addressed by the 8ecurity Gouncil on 15 June to be told that the period of the truce has expired and has failed to' he l'enewed. We consider that as a matter of procedure it would he sufficient simpl)' to submit that truthful information without eliciting any consequences on the part of the 8ecurity Council. At any rate, the truce is dead. The apparatus of observance and supervision has disintegrated. The readiness of the Government of Israel to agree to a four-weeks continuation wasmost contemptuously rejected on the Arab side, and in the absence either of continuous validity or of mutuaI acceptance, that Jewish offer aiso belongs to the history of these recent weeks. In an admirable last-minute effort to keep war at bay while the next stage was contemplated, the Mediator turned to bothparties and asked them to agree to an unconditional cease-fire for a period of ten days [S/878]. Here was a searching test of peaceful intention. Here was a request· the refusaI of wI-.ich could be nothing but an avowal of aggressive purpose. For what legitimate political objectives could anybody have which could be threatened by the preservation of peace for ten dayst What are the moral or legal justifications on which such a refusai could bebased? What are the national or political ~mbitions which l'est upon sa flimsy a founda" tlOn that they could not endure ten days and ten nights of.peace? The Government of Israel accepted [S/884] this proposaI. It is for research to determine whether this was the seventh or eight or ninth such acceptance. The Arab Government rejected it. Before the previous truce had even expired, Egyptian forces in the coastal sector of the Negeb launched their assault. Theil' comman.der was found, on capture, to possess operation orders which show conclusively that his Government had planned not merely to " ln these circumstances anybody who will not determine these acts to constitute aggression must be'!lard pressed to demonstrate that the word aggression can have any meaning at all. If Governments which are Mf'lnbers of the United Nations use armed force outside their frontiers, when they have not been attacked, with the avowed aim of overthrowing the political and territorial integrity of aState, established by resolution of the General Assembly; when they do this in defiance of an appeal by the Security Council and its accredited representative; when they rekinclie the flames of war which the whole world passionately wishes to see extinguished; when they decline a respite of ten days during which devices of peace may stiU be consider(;d; when they do aIl this, how can you say that they do not commit aggression, unless you are prepared to erase the word "aggression" from the Charter and from the dictionary and to sign an advance certificate of impunity for any act of aggression that future history may bring? It is oh"ious that those who reject proposais for cease-nre and commit their destiny ta military action must be prepared to take the full military consequences of their acts, and this the Arab States are now doing in the field. But surely, if the Security Council wishes to retain its authority in the eyes of both, parties, it cannot pass over aggression in silence and allow no political consequences ta flow from it. It is for that reason that the Provisional Government of Israel, in its cable to the Secretary-General, document S/871, concludes wi!h the following words: "While its armed forces are ready for the most determined action on dU fronts,. Provisional Government of Israel is most interested learn what Security- Couneil will deeid~ in present emergency." We believe that this interest is most earnestly shared by peace-Ioving peoples throughout the world, who, with aIl respect to other provisions of the Charter, regard it as the central function of the United Nations to suppress threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. 1t is therefore the considered view of the Government of Israel that the only action consonant with the duty of the Securî~y Couneil at this hour would be to determine an act of Arab aggression, arising out of the Arab decision to resume hostilities and, as a provisional measure under Article 40, to order that aggression immediately and unconditionally to cease. The idea that any outbreak of violence after the expiration of the truce would exhaust the methods of paeific settlement is inherent in the very terms of the truce resolution itself [S/ 801J, .the penultimate paragraph of which reads: "Decides that if the present resolution . having been accepted, . . . is subsequently· repudiated or violated, the situation in Palestine will he reconsidered with a view ta action under Chapter VII of the Charter." . Action under Chapter VII cannot be a lnere repetition of measures previously taken under Chapter VI. The resolution of 29 May 1948 was a typical instrument of action under Chapter VI. Now, however, we enter a field where the existence of aggression, the determination of responsibility and initiative and a clear differentiation between aggression and defence must form an organic part of any resolution ta which the Security Council could lend its support. We need no repetition of a truce with invading armies poised in suspended violence upon Israel's frontiers. We need a deterrent from aggression. We need those invading armies ta go home so that the frontiers of Israel become the frontiers of ,< durable peace. A truce, by its very nature, crystallizes aggression at the point which it has reached at the time th~ truce cornes iuta operation. It therefore .'drries with it the seed of possibly renewed war. What we have to ensure 1 is that the whole tide of invasion is ordered back to the territory from which it arose. With the permission of the Council, 1 should like to pass a few reflections on behalfJf the Government of Israel on the nature of the Arab ~eplies to 'the Mediator's proposais, and on the Important and illuminating report which the !'-1ediator has submitted to the Security Couneil III document S/888. . Running through the Arab answers [S/876J, there is a single theme; name1y, that the Arab States harbour certain political ambitions which they regard as legitimate but which cannot be advanced if there is peace. We ask the Council whether this fact is not itself a reflection of those ambitions, and whether political aspirations which can only be fostered by successful On the other hand, there is the desire al a people, sated and replete with an abundance of political and territorial independence, ta wipe this small nation off the face of the earth in repudiation of international jttdgment and will. This is an ambition nurtured in the very spirit of war. Ta establish the Statc of Israel and ta wipe it out by force are not political aims of equallegitimacy-eertainly not under the terms of the Charter. And when the Arab States confess in these documents that their political aspirations cannat be advanced without resumed war, they do not thereby jWjtify their war, they merely invalidate their political aspimtions. It seems weIl for ail parties -ta this dispute and for all who hope ta help bring it ta an end, ta focus t~eir attention aIl the time upon the central issue. That issue is the immovable determinatiOIi of the State of Israel ta exist and survive. This State is the product of the 'most sustained historic tenacity which the ages recall. Somehow this people, in the very climax of its agony, has managed to generate the cohesion, the energy and the confidence to bring the third Jewish commom/ealth into existence. This·Ïs no mean heritage. It 18 nota heritage to be lightly surrendered. It is not to be abandoned at the fust smell of dali,ge~. The Jewish people has not striven towards this goal for twenty cemuries in order that,having once been achieved, with the full endorsemeilt of intern~tional opinior1, lt will now be surrendereJ in response to an illegitimate and unsuccessful campaign, of aggression. Whatever eIse changes, this will not. The State of Israel is an immutable part of the internationallandscape; to plan the future without it is to build delusions on sand. Everything thr.t contributes to an Arab.belief in the stability and the permanence of Israel brings the prospect of' harmony nearer. That is why every act of recog~ nition, every voice uplifted against aggression, every manifestation of international concern for this small republic in its most gallant defencè is a The report of the Mediator to the Security Council reached my delegation late last night, and we should like to reserve our right on a future occasion to comment on what is obviously a most important contribution to a study of this problem. The observations ~f the Government of Israr:l on the suggestions tentatively put forward by the Mediator for 9. peaceful adjustment have already'been submitted to this Council as document S/870. The policy of the Government of Israel is to seek relations of harmony with the neighbouring Arab States on the basis of its own complete freedom and integrity. It was therefore compelled to reject certain proposais which encroached upon its sovereignty in a way that has se\doJU been suggested in respect of any independent State. It affirmed, and it now re-affirms, its inability to agree to any encroachment upon or limi.tation of the free sovereignty of the people of Israel in its independe..'1t state. It must be particularly emphatic in its opposition to any infringement of Israel's independence and sovereignty as regards immigration policy. In its reply to the Mediator's suggestions [8/863), the Government of Israel made it dear that the:'e could be no question of any Israeli ' Government accepting the slightest derogation from Israel's sovereignty as regards control of its immigration policy in favour of any joint or international body. We stress this because, in paragraph 26 of the Mediator's report, we regret to see again the unpromising appearance of a suggestion for encwachment upon Israel in this, the most sensitive point of its interest, principle and conscience. It is simply not accurate to say that "UItrestricted immigration into the Jewish area of Palestine might, over a period of years, give rise to a p'Jpulation pressure" such" as would justify "Arab fears of ultimate Jewish ~xpansion in the Near East". , pression We would not shirk a discussion' of the demographie problems of the Near East. If we were ~o embark upon it, we shouid have to plunge lU~o the worka of Cieland, Warriner,Bonne, H!madeh and Issawi, and would certainly rise ~lth !he conviction tllat the population difficultIes 01 the Near East arise from the pressure of excessive population in Egypt, and the consequences of an inadequate population throughout the entire areaof the fertile crescent. But to portray .the possibilities of Jewish immigration, If the fear is unfounded in practice, it is evell more illegitimate to uphold it in princip~e. We cannot accept that. "Jewish immigration into the Jewish area of Palestine concerns ... the neighbouring Arab world". We declare that immigration into Israel is the business of Israel alone. The Governments .of Egypt, Transjordan and Syria have no more jurisdiction in this question than has the Government of Israel in any of their internal affairs. The suggestion that a neighbouring State might exercise a power of challenge or veto against Isra~rs immigration policy is to us as fantastic as it would be to su.ggest that Canada should be able to influence the immigration policy of the United States on thl': gt'ounds of geographical proximity and a mm:ual continental interest. For this reason, the Government of Israel was compelled to reject the Mediator's immigration proposal which, apart from these questions of principle and practice, seemed to us to constitute a double breach of the Charter. Tt awarded the Economic and Social Council a power of binding decision which it does not possess ullder the Charter and it constituted an undoubted interference in the "domestic jurisdicticm" of aState. We are disappointed also to find that the horror which convulsed the Jewish world at the suggestion that Jerusalem be incorporated in the Arab State has not yet caused any revision of the Mediator's view on the subject. For we find the idea·of an Arab Jerusalem recurring in paragraph 28. Here is a city with sacred associations all derived ultimately from its Jewish origin; with a clear Jewish predominance in its population, its economy, its social and intellectuallife; with the closest ties of national sentiment linking it with the State of Israel and with a status in international law deriving from the universal Christian interests in its destiny. It is suggested to hand over this city to the rule of aState which has contrihuted nothing to it but pillage and destruction. When we read of this proposaI, our minds go back to the deliberations of the second special session of the General Assembly and to the urgent concern which was then expressed by many representatives, perhaps most eloquently by the representative of Sweden," for the maintenance of Jerusalem as a city held in The insistence by the State of Israel upon its unrestricted sovereignty is by no means incompatible with its vision of Arab-Jewish co-operation. Indeed the doctrine of sovereign equality which is the basis of the Charter makes political independence the essential condition of regional co-operation in the modern world. When we speak of an independent sovereign Israel joining with its neighbours in projects of regional development, we set no precedent. We depart from no principle which is based upon the Charter ,and commonly accepted as the most advanced political ideal of the contemporary world. We have previously invited the Security Council to regard this problem in terms of c1:her analogies. We have pointed to the Benelux Union, to the free association of independent nations wit4in the British Commonwealth, ta regional co-operation in Eastern Europe and' South America between States possessed of common principles and ideals, as indicating the typical modern synthesis of full political independence with close regional co-operation. We find the same story nearer home. The Arab League itself~ little as it might have donc in the sphere vL sociai and economic progress on a regional basis, at least has the merit of respecting the sovereignty of lts individual members. Even two countries so akin as Syria and Lebanon, joined together by common economic interests in ,0 many enterprises, cannat envisage their co-operation except on the basis of the free unrestricted politica.1 sovereignty of each one. How far-fetched then it is to imagine that this principle of political independence which cannat be compromised even between peoples of similar social and cultural background, can be obscured in the relations of Israel with its neighbours. 1 deux 1 , politique, qui ne souffre pas We ask the Mediator, we ask the Arab States,. we ask the United Nations to examine with greater care this formula which 1S fundamental to our conception of Arab-Jewish relations, the formula of political independence combined with regional co-operation. Not the statutory unity of an artificial confederation, but the spontaneous contracts of free and s~parate units. !hat is the vision which we uphold. We uphold 1t because it conforms with the essential facts of the Near Eastern situation, the basic truth of separate national aspirations and common economic interests. There is nothing impossible -tion ~bout that solution. There is certainly nothillg Ignoble about it; nobody can possiblydemon- ~trate that its promise is less than that contained I11 the only alternative which is that of an unceasing, fruitless and sterile war. We know that on~e the formula of p"'litical independence with reglOnal co-operation lSaccepted, the objective conditions of harmony will he achieved. The In conclusion 1 would say that these promising visions do not begin to materialize while aggression stalks the land. For this aggression is not merely a blow against the Charter. It is also hostile to the essential truth of Near Eastern harmony. In the replies to the Mediator, by the Egyptian Government [S/883] and the Political Committee of the Arah League [S/885], we find the unusual suggesti:m that, while they proceed with their aggressive onslaught the Mediator can still pursue bis tasks of peaceful adjustment. It is necessary that we entirely rule out that illusion. While aggression is being committed against it, Israel can hardly be expected to listen to Ara.b proposals concerning a peace settlement. The Arab States cannot flout the Security Council, reject the appeal of the Mediator, launch into naked aggression, and simultaneously expett that the organs of the United Nations will deal with them to the satisfaction of their policical aims. You cannot put your faith simultaneously in the arbitrament of war and in the methods of peaceful settlement. You must choose between them. It would be an unprecedented anomaly if both were chosen at the same time. That is not going to happcn. Only when aggression ceases is there a useful prospect of discussing proposais for peaceful relations between Israel and its neighbours. And once aggressiol.l ceases, the only proposais worthy to be discussed will be proposals for relations of peace and amity between an independent Israel with its independent neighbours on thebasis of the closest possible collaboration in all fields. We believe that the'most significant phrase in the Mediator's report is that contained in paragraph 36.. "If armed force is forbidden ID the settlement of the problem and it is made prohibitively unprofitable for the Arab States to employ it, there will he in Palestine a Jewish community with a separate cultural and political existence, a Jewish State, whose strength and prosperity and capacity for economic and social development, by the admission of its own leaders, must The preamble to that sentence determines its conclusion. Only when aggression dies down, only when umed force is forbidden in the settlement of this problem, only when it is made "prohibitively unprofitable" for the Arab States to employ it, only then does the prospect of any peaceful relations emerge upon the horizon, beckoning the initiative and foresight of both parties. We should be wrong to spend time considering a fin:l.1 peace unless we were sure that these obstacles could be surmounted. It is for the Security Council, therefore, to "forbid armed . force in the settlement of this problem". It is for the Security Council to make it "prohibitively unprofitable for the Arab States to employ" armed force. It is for the Security Council, having seen aggression committed, to determine that aggression, to specify its authors, and to dernand its immediate, unconditional and permanent cessation. Ml'. Naji AL-AsIL (Iraq): With direct information now available to the Security Council from the United Nations Mediator, there is, perhaps, little tri be added to t'he actual facts governing the political attitude of the States members of the Arab League, but my object in requesting permission to say a few words before the Security Council concerns the interpretation of the causes leading up to the decision of the Arab League rather than the decision itself. For 1 do not have the slightest doubt that the United Nations Mediator has personally recognized through direct contact with the leaçiers of the Arab world that nothing is dearer to them than the rule of peace. This is not a mere platonic love for peace, but rather a genuine response to their conscientious appreciation of the needs of their owrr people. In fact, the post-war epoch has found the Arab States in a condition in which their most urgent national requirements would lead them to look for a peaceful and constructive achievement rather than to look for causes for conflict and waste C'f national energies. But unfortunately that was not to be. Instead, the Arab world was confronted immediately after the world war with a situation which shook its conscience to its most profound depths, and the reaction to it in the public opinion of aIl f\rab countries was immediate and general. It IS, therefore,. wholly beside the point to assume that Arab resistance to the imposition of an independent Zionist State in Palestine is the result of any reactionary party. On the contrary, it is the eve;-widening, driving power of public opinion which has dominated the pûlitical consciousness of the Arab States in determining their attitude towards Palestine. Great democracies like the United States and the other member States of the Security Council are no doubt in a better position to assign the true force value of public ~tine which, at many enochs in world history, has forced itself upon humanity. The degree of interest varies of course. To the Arab world, it is of supreme national significanee. In defending Palestine, the Arabs are defending their honour, their national existence and their future security. The Arabs feel that there is an honourable place for the Jews in Palestine to .live and prosper in "\ community of interest with the Arabs which will lead to the advantage of aIl concerned. If· the Arabs were n9t in a position to say "yes". to .the calI of the Security Council to extend the truce, it was not because they desired war. The reply of the Arab League to the Mew.ator [S/885] explained the reasons why the truce was'not extended. The fact thatthe Arab .States welcomed the continuation of the endeavours of the United Nati~ns Mediator in searching for an equitable solution indicated that they. were looking for a peaceful solution to materialize intime. It is unnecessary to say that TT' Arab State has any selfish designs in Palestine.When Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, SaudiArabia, Transjordan and Yemen are unanimous in their determination to stand in defence of· the cause of justice in Palestine it is not in the service of the special interests of any Pél:rty, king or State. On the contrary, it is in the highest intere:.t of safeguarding the foundations of the peace of the ·Middle East. For no Arab State is viilJing to ln conclusion, it is to be hoped that lhe Security Council, in its wisdom, will refrain from aggravating an aIready highly dangerous situation, but that through its deep sense of responsibility towards world peace it will empower the United Nations Mediator in Palestine to continue his thankless but noble efforts for a workable, durable and just solution for Palestine. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) : We listened this morning to the report of a man who has been carrying out courageously a most difficult assignment. The United Nations Mediator's report [S/888] speaks for itself. This is not the time for me to attempt to make a flowery speech. It is the time for action by the Security Council. Fighting is now going on· in Palestine. It is going on because one party has not agreed to any suggestion or appeal to avoid fighting, although the other party, the Provisional Government of Israel, declared its readiness to accept each and every suggestion and appeal. The Security Council must face its responsibility. The general, the practically universaToplnion, is that there is a threat to the peace Î1l. Palestine within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter. 1 repeat Article :39, the first Article in Chapter VII. . The Security Council should recognize this facto 1 repeat: fighting is going on in Paiestine. It must stop. The Security Council, in discharge of its dutyunder Article 40, should order it to stop. The Security Council should call attention ta the consequences of a failure to stop fighting. Such a warning would clearly have particular meaning for that party wmch has so far rejected all appeals. United Nations machinery must be available to supervise the truce. It is obviouf' that this machinery should be under the direction of the United Nations Mediator appointed. by the General Assembly, with the assistance of the Truce Comillission appointed by the Security Councit Th~ city of Jerusalem is of special concern to m~nkind. The United Nations has recognized this facto No mechanical difficulty applicable to communication with military forces scattered over .a wide ~ront exists in Jerusalem: The Secunty CouncI1 should o:-der an unconditional cease-fire in Jerusalem to take effect twenty-four hours from the time of the resolution which 1 hope the Security Council will adopt this after- The Security Council, in ordering under Chapter VII of the Charter, the observance of a truce, should make it clear that it insists that the Palestine problem is not to be solved by force. The Security Council should therefore decide that the truce shall remain in effect until the future situation in Palestine is adjusted by peaceful means. The United States has embodied these views in a draft resolution [8/890]. 1 shall now read tne text of that draft r!'solution: "The Securit'y Council, "Taki,i.s into consideration that the Provisional Government of Israel has indicated its acceptance in principle of a prolongation of the truce in Palestine; that the States members of the Arab League have rejected successive appeals of the United Nations Mediator, and of the Security Council in its resolution of 7 July 1948 for the prolongation of the truce in Palestine; and that there has consequently developed a renewal of hostilities in Palestine, "Determines that the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter; "Orders the Governments and authorities concerned, pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations, to d~sist from further military action and to this end ta issue ceasefire orders to their military and para-milita;y forces, to take effect at a time to be determined by the Mediator, but in any event not later than three days from the date of the adoption of tbis resolution; 1' "Declares that failure by any of the Governments or authorities concerned to cornply with the preceding paragraph of this resolution would demonstrate the existence of a breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter requiring immediate consideration by the Security Counci! with a view to such further action under Chapter VII of the Charter as may he decided upon by the Council; ".Calls upon all Governments and authorities 1. concerned, pursuant to Article 40 of the Char- . te~, to co~tinue to co-operate with the Mediator 1 Charte, Wlth ~ VI~W to the ~aintenance of pence in Palestine m conformIty with the resolution 1 conformement adopted by the Security Council on 29 May· 1948; 1 "O~ders ~s a ~atter of special and urgent necesslty an unmedlate and unconditional ceasefire in the city of Jerusalemto take effect 24 hours .fromthe. time of the adoption of this resolution, and mstructs the Truce Commission to take aq.y necessary steps to make this ceasefire effective; "Instructs the Mediator to supervise the observance of the truce and to establish procedures for exainining alleged breaches of the truce, authorizes him to deal with breaches 80 far as it is within bis capacity to do so by appropriate local action and requests him to keep the Security Council currently informed concerning the operation of the truce and when necessary to take appropriate action; "Decides that, subject to further decision by the Security Council or the General Assembly, the truce shall remain in force, in accordance with the present resolution and with that of 29 May 1948, until a peaceful adjustment of th~ future situation of Palestine is reached." The delegation of the United States proposes the adoption of this resolution. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): We have just been informed of this draft resolution prepared by the representative of the United States of America, and l have asked to speak on it and on other matters which are inherent in this resolution and its phraseology. In the fust p~ragraph of the draft resolution the representative of the United States refers to the Jews as though, in accepting a prolongation of the truce, they had submitted and were reconciled to the proposal of the Mediator, and to the Arabs as though they had rejected this prolongation, showing this as blame on the Arabs and shm"ing that they were the cause of the continuation of the war. Yet, had the representative of the United States been just in bis judgments, he would have refrained from making such a stateInent, well knowing that the Arabs did not decline to accept a prolongation of the truce without cause. The Arabs did not decline capriciously. They had presented their reasons in long statements and long documents which were submitted to the Mediator and to the Security Council [8/876,8/883 and 8/88.5]. These have been distributed in several documents. Even the Mediator himself expressed the view that the tru<..e is to the advantage of the Jews and not to the advantage of the Arabs, and that the Arabs, during the period of the truce of four weeks, had sufficient experience to make them understand what the meaning of a continuation of the truce would be, and in what way the Jews would violate the truce, and they knew there would be sufficient methods, clandestine or open, by which the Jews could increase their forces and admit their immigrant $ or fighting Only today, we have had before us a document [8/892] which has been distributed and which contains a list of a series of violations of .the truce by the Jews during the four weeks, and which mentions the different places and the different categories of such violations. In this respect, we find that the Arabs have cause for refusaI to continue the truce, and these cases which' have been submitted ought to be considered as an excuse. It is a j11stification of their refusal. I submit the following question to the Mediator: when he received these representations from the Arab side with regard to thdr declining to accept the prolongation of the truce, and when they set out aU the causes which made them take that decision, what assurances did he give them-.if he ever gave them any-that such possibilities for truce violation would be eliminated in the future, if the truce were prolonged? Did he give th(~m any assurances as to that? He did not mention that, and even in his report [8/888] there is nothing of that nature mentioned, although he admits that the truce .is advantageous to the Je'vs and not to the Arabs, The matter is quite clear. It is no wonder that the Jews would welcome a truce. What do they lose by a truce? They lose' nothing. They have appropriated everything into their hands. It is always ta the advantage and interest of the robber who takes the profit into bis hands for the other side to be quie', with no fighting, no lawsuits, etc. He has nothing t'a lose. But the Arabs have things to lose. Before the truce was established, the Jews expelled-according to the Mediator-a quarter of a willion Arabs from their homes. They are scatt~Ieà here and there. But nobody says that that is a violation of. the truce, or something which may be called invasion or aggression' or an illegal act. Nothing of that sort is mentioned. They talk about "the invasion of the Arabs", "the invasion of the Arabs in Palestine", and they say nathing of the Jews, the invasion of the Jews in Palestine. What a~e the Arabs coming into Palestine ta do? They corne to suppress an invasion, to oppose aggression. These peoples coming from' aIl corners of the world are not Palestinians; they are aIl foreigners, coming.there with weaponsto establish themselves by force and ta proclaim a sovereign State for themse1ves. How ridiculous it is ·to say to theinhabitants of the country, who are defending their homes, that they are aggressors andinvaders. What boldness it is to accuse. them of being invaders and to .forget the grèat invasion of the Jews, comirig frOIn aU the different countries of the world to In this respect, 1 consider that the fust paragraph of the draft resolution [8/890J should not be in the form in which it is. If it is wished to mention that it is the desire to secure peace in Palestine, ta secure a cease-fire, that may be done; but it may be done without accusing one . party and justifying the action of the other, which would not be right and would not be correct. In the second paragraph, it is stated that the Security Council "determines that the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter". 1 have a1ways contended, with regard to this question of international peace and security, that there is nothing international in the Pales·· tine situation. It is a question of a minority in one country assuming for itself authority which it has no right to assume, and going forward to prockim a State for itself in spite of the wishes of the majority of the country, with that majority trying to suppress or to undo suchinjustices and requesting the originally suggested arrangement in which that minority is included, ta help them in establishing peace and in undoing the irregularity which was committed. Palestine is not a country far away from the Arab States. It was always a Syrian province. It was the caprice and the illegalaspirations of the victors of the First World War which separated Palestine from Syria and gave it a special status. They had no right to do so. We always protested it and now we see that our brethren in Palestine have been molested, ill-treated and expelled from their country by the Jewish invasion which was dearly in.tended to extermi,. nate, to annihilate the Arabs within that area, in order to establish in their place the immigrants coming from aIl the corners of the world. This is not the first time the Jews have used such ~ethods for invading countries and occupYing them. Twenty or thirty centuries ago, they did the same tping; tlley are now repeating their own history. How can we satisfy the Arabs and ask then ta establish a truce and make peace? What next? It would be simply giving a chance to the J0WS ta consolidate their position, to establish therr defence und ta receive ammunition and suhsidies from abroad. According ta the statement which we have heard todav: at;..J according ta the expedence of what iw;; ~',:lppened during the last four weeks of truce, immigration will be continued. The Arabs cannat accept the truce. They accepted a truce toinow that they did not wish to oppose the wish of the Security Council, but on condition thnt no advan~age should be given to the Jews and that everything should remain at a standstill; that the status quo should be preserved. They found that that was not done. The illegal acts continued; Even immigration continued, and immigration was 'authorized only under the act of mandate. When the Mandate terminated, no ir: ~gration shocld have continued. It should have been left ta the future government of Palestine to àecide whether or not immigrants were to be admitted. Those wh') advocate the Jewish case consider the situation as a fait accompli; they say that the Jewish State is there and it is co~idered as a State. Well, for what reason is it considered as a State? Because they proclaimed it? We could ask an opinion of any organ as to whether that proclamation of the Jewish Stateis lega1; as to whether it is in conformity with international law or with the Charter of the United Nations to have a minority in one country separating the portion of that country which they cccupy and t>roclaiming themselves independent within that Sta.te. That cannot be done. Who would accept it? In Greece, there were a certain number of COUlmunists in one part of the country who did the same thing; but who recognized them? The United States was the first to oppose this and condemn it as an act which was illegal. Here it should Qe the same thing-o Just people should not. have two attitudes on paraUe! matter:;. In .the third paragraph, "Orders the Governments and authorities concemed ... ". 1 do not know where the representative of the United States found the word "orders". We are "l'~;ing here under the Charter of the Unit:..:d Nations. If we review the Chart~r, we will und that the Security Council may "make recommendations"~ may "call upon", but may not "order". The Charter of the United Nations is an internationàl treaty between several States. If those States are to he addressed by the Security Council, or the General Assembly, or any organ On what authority can we arder a State? Under 'w}'''' ~cle of the Charter have we the 1donner right ta lis? Under what Article of the Charter have we the right ta say, "We arder you"? Are they our subjects? Are they States dependent on us in any way? They are not. We have an international instrument hinding us together on the same footing of soverei~n equality. 1 do not see how an ally-we are aIl allies under the Charter-eould arder his ally ta dq such and such a thing. For this reason, 1 do not see how the representative of the United States, being a profe..<1Sor of international law, could allow himsclf ta take such a position. instrument 1 go further. "Orders the Governments . ta is~,ue cease-fire orders". Then,."Declares that failure by any of the Governments or authorities concerned . . .". AlI this depends upan the second paragraph of the resolution and whether we have the right te consider the status of Palestine as international, which would authorize the Security Council ta consider that the situatIOn in Palestir.e constitutes an international question. question statut seil Palestine was under mandate. The Mandatory Powel was expected by th~ fact of mandate to establish a local government in Palestine durh'lg the Mandate and ta establish local organs which would EtSsume power and authority at the termination of the Mandate, thereby making Palestine a unitary State under the authority of its inhabitants. The United Kingdom did not succeed in performing this duty owing ta the fact that the BalfoUi." Declaration was unworkable and impossible ta act upon. They gave up the Mandate without leaving any organ in the country which was able ta assume authority. établir cette était donné le organisme en mesure What is the status of Palestine from the international point of view? 1 consider that under snch conditions the State of Palestine would automaticaIly belong ta the Ll1habitants of Palestine. It would be the right of the inhabitants of Palestine ta take charge themselves. The right of self-determination is the first thing ta be acted upon and preserved for the people of any country. Thedemocracy which we preach and all OUT Charter is based on the principle of the rule of the majority in any country, that the wishes of the majority shall prevail. Instead of accepting that rule and respecting the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and automatically giving the population of Palestine the right to determine its fate and decide its future government by a piebiscite or sorne other democratic means, we let one minority of the population take a portion of the country and declare itself a sovereign State. -statut conditions, matiquement habitants nistrer poser observer que, l'emporte~ qui son In the United States there was a civil war about eighty years ago. Jt was fought to prevent partition, to prevent any action by one part of the population against the wishes of the majority. What blood was shed in the United States in that affair! Why should we have two different judgments, conti'ary one to the other, in similar cases? That is not correct. It is power politics. If the United States wishes, to have a bridgehead on the gate of Asia in order to dominate the economic and political life of the East, it is V/rong. The United States should not do that. It is not in their interests; it is not in the interest of peace and it is not in the interest of the United Nations. They should act justlY and stand for justice, and tell the Jews that they are guests there, and that they should accept the offer.of the Arabs to live with the Jews peacefully and in a friendly way. In that way, the Jews would have occasion to live a better life than if they were separated all their lives by eninity and ar..imosity from the neighbouring countries, and thulS r,reate, for the world, a centre of animosity, conflict, and war forever. 1 maintain that as a result of the termination of the Mandate, the right of government in Palestine automatically returns to the people of Palestine. Furthermore, no e1ement in Palestine, whether it be the minority or the majority. hat the right to decide the fate of the future of the country without a general consultation with all the population, without a plebiscite or a constituent assembly, or without establishing a constitution by a vote of the majority of the people of the country. In that way, democracy would be respected and all the principles of democracy and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations would form the basis of that constitution, and all the rights of religion, race, colour and minority would be safeguarded. Any action which is taken by one part of the population, without following such a procedure, constitutes an illegal act. It should not be done. If such action is taken, it should be condemned by those who espouse the respect of the Charter and claim that they are working within the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. There !s a question which ought to be asked. When the termination of the Mandate took place on 14 May, the Jews, at the' same time, declared and proclaimed a sovereign State for themselves. Upon what have (ley based such a proclamation? How can they justify it from an international point of view and state that they are now there, and that they are justified and that their status ought to be respected by the whole world? Why should they be respected if their action is not within the framework of international law and the Charter of the United Nations? If one commits such an act, how can one expect to have the world recognize him? It should not he done in that way. However, in spite of that and before the General Assembly had adopted a resolution on the subject, the Jews proclaimed their State politically and asked people to recognize it. They found certain States which, one minute after the proclamatipn, accorded them such recognition. At that very time one of these same States, the United States of America, was advocating a resolution in the GeneraI Assembly which opposed this recognition and the action of the Jews of Palestine. The resolution was adopted in the GeneraI Assembly by a very large majority, and was in fact opposed by only seven votes." 1 see no reason why we should not look at our mistakes in thi::; respect. We may have committed blunders in the past but we should not persist with them in the face of all the nations of the world who are looking to us and watching what we are doing. We should not persist in this action of injustice, thereby making the world despair of our Organization and of the attainment of justice under our jurisdiction. The small nations joined the United Nations with pride. We were all proud to be niembers of the Organization because we th~:>ught it would be established on the principles of justice, equity and democracy-not that it would commit acts of this kind. What do we find now? We find things happeniFlg which are exactly contrary to those principles. We find the big Powers fighting among themse1ves under the power politics prin. ciple, and trying to divide the world into :tones of influence, just as used to be the case in the past when people became tired of the system. They have divided Korea into two zones of influence. They have divided it between two big countries, and we see what is going on there to the detriment of the Korean people. They have also divided Germany, and we 110W see four million people in Berlin starving, but no member of the Security Counci1 would dare to l'aise a finger or to say a word about it. Four million people in Berlin are starving under the regime Are these the children of the spouse and the children of the concubine respectively that we should refer to sorne in different tones and with a different degree of sympathy as opposed to the others? Let us look at what is going on in other parts of the world. A short· while ago the Security CQuncil adopted a resolution calling for a cease-fire in Kashmir [8/726] and a commission was established to go tliere. We now see the Indian GOVl'rnment rejecting the resolution and saying, "we do not accept it and will not èomply with it". Dut what has been done by the Sec:urity Council in view of this attitude on the part. of thf.; Indian Government? Nothing. As President of the Security Council at the time 1 wrote to the head of the Government of India cajoling hiH and asking mm to receive the commission ar,d discuss with it any. measures which were poS'lible. This was done in such a polite and diplomatic way. We did not say that India had rejer.:ted the implementation of the Security Counci!"s resolution calling for a cease-fire and a truce, and that therefore we should have recourse to Chapter VII of the Charter. In fact, we did not issue an order at that time, but used the phrase "calls upon", which is what we should have done in the present case. We did not resort to Chapter VII of the Charter in the case of India. Why not? Because India is a nation of 400 million people and occupies such a large part of the world that the" Securitv Council knows that it is unable to takè any action in regard to India or ta any other countrie.,;, such as the USSR, Which are now going against the Charter and refusing ta listen to the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. No one says anything to the big Powers: they are justified in whatever they do, but it is a very different question when we come to small nations which are just beginners in politicallife and independence. AlI Arab States, as is known, are newcomers "to independence. 1 had intended to ask the Mediator if he could tell the Council what were the forces cngaged in Palestine fighting from both sides. 1 do not know; but he may know, as he was ther~, and he could show the fallacy of the pretention that there were seven armies of the Arabs. One would think that when seven armies are mentioned that it was meant that, for instance, the army of the USSR, the army of the United States, the :i!,rmy cf France, or the army of the United Kingdom was being envisaged. 1 do not see how that can be considered as aggression under Chapter VII of the Charter, when there is an invasion of foreigners from aIl corners of the earth, coming to a country and imposing themselves there by force, and using force to consolidate and establish their pretended State and sovereignty in a country which is not theirs. That is not an invasion, but a few men of Sylia have gone ta help the Palestinians who ar~ molested by that invasion. Look at those people fighting in Palestine. Who are they? Are they citizens of Palestine? MOie than three-quarters of them are not citizens of Palestine and are not Palestinians. Even most of those people who are representing the Jews .are not Palestinians. AIl the nationalities of the world are now taking part in this battle. Sorne of these are sending men, weapons and ammunition and everything necessary. We.read yesterday that a giant plane, which is used for heavy fighting, a great bomber, ftew from the United States and was going to PaJ.estine to the Zbnists. This plane was obhged ta land in Nova Scotia. They say that there is an embargo but tbis embargo is simply on paper. ln actual. fact there is no embargo. They continue sending things. The Zionists know how ta smuggle, how ta send ammunition and men ta Palestine. Vou can ask the United Kingdom, which held the Mandate in Palestine, if they could control the country; never. AlI these war oreparations were made cJuring the Mandate, ~nd the United Kingdom could not do anything at tpat time. The Zionists dug tunnels underground from one village to another, great undertakings built underground, like the Pennsylvania Station . here. This ~vas ione dllring the Mandate, and According ta the reports of the Mediator, the Jews are obstinate in their demands and the Arabs are equally obstinate. We hoped that the Mediator would have such a spiritual capacity in a psychological way as ta induce bath parties to come ta reason and ta au'ept a situation which would be just. The Arabs do not ask for anything cIse except justice, if sorne jusûce can be found ~hich can be app~ed there, instead of taking only the actual position of a fait accompli, as the Mediator says in his report. The Jews are there, and we do not l11ean ta expel them, but let them work with the Arabs just as they are working with the Christians in the United States, as they are working with the French in France, and as they are working in every country of the world. Let themall live together and they will have the means ta use their capacity and their skill in commerce, in trade and in financial matters. They woulà be able ta do many things in Palestine, sa why should they wish ta be separated and thus raise their frontiers and their boundaries of conflict and fight for them? This is not 10 their advantage, nor is it ta the advantage of the Arabs. We have now ta solve a problem, and we should be reasonable and we should think of the future, not only solve the problem tempo- T' "';~y. l say that if the proposaI of the repre- 'lLative of the United States [8/890J ta invoke Chapter VII of the Charter is used, and the forces of the United Nations are applied against the Arabs, you will succeed. The Arabs may be easily suppressed bccause they are not going ta fight you or the great Powers. They do not wish that, but they never thought that you intended really to fight them. If you do, you can succeed, but do you expect that your forces will remain in Palestine forever? As soon as you leave, the disturbances will he renewed. What would be done for the future? One Cannat find a solution for permanent peace in Palestine if it is not based upon justice. As Abraham Lincoln uSI~d ta say, no problem can The Arabs are ready to give full guarantees for that, and they will never take the Old City and the Holy Places as centres for defence or for :fighting or for storing amrnunition. 1 think the Arabs did not say that they rejected the suggestion to leave the Old City of Jerusalem as fully independentand demilitarized. According to the statement which 1 received from the Arabs, and which they gave to the Mediator, they stated that they were ready to confer on the proposaI of the Mediator conce:ming Haïfa and Jerusalem, and then guarantee as far as they are concemed the safety of the Holy Places and the Holy Land. 1 think 1 must now turn back to an old proposal which 1 made to the General Assembly in the past [A/AC.14/25], because the matter now necessitates such a thing. 1 consider that a legal advisory opinion should be sought from the International Court of Justice. This is a thing which ought to be done. Wh)" are we going along in the clark like this? There has been contention, and many members of ~ the Security Co, lcil and the General Assembly have said that we have been hesitating and that we have been right or we have been wrong in what we are doing. Why did we create the International Court of Justice? Why did we take a resolution' in the General Assembly that the International Court of Justice should be used more than before, even in the interpretaûnn of the Charter? The General Assembly has dp-cided to that effect, and now we may do it. 1 am going to submit a draft 'solution to that effect: "Noting that the United Kingdom terminated its Mandate on Palestine on 15 May 1948, with- out having established any governmental organi- zation to assume power of administration, "Requests the International Court of Justice, pursuant to Article 96 of the Charter, to give an advisory legal opinion as ta the international status of Palestine after the termination of the Mandate; Many points rnay be inc1uded in the ques- tions; for instance, we may ask whether the proclamation of the Jewish State on 14 May wàs an action which was internationa11y correct. Did it conform with the provision of the Charter of the United Nations or no;;? We may ask whether the use of force by the Jews to con- solidate the State which they proc1aimed is to be con~:-J~~ed as an aggression or not. We may ask • .tr Arab opposition to this.state of ,things lAJ. r destine is to be considered under the pro- visions of the Charter as an aggression ta be dealt with under Chapte~r VII of the Charter. If the principle is accepted by the Security Council of requesting an advisory legal opinion from the International Court of Justice, perhaps a committee of three coilld be set up to draft the questions... Ifthe International Court of J ..ustice 1 gave justice in reply to snch questions asmay be prepared, 1 assure the Security Council that the Arabs would submit to it and yield very meekly and humbly, but sa long as we consider that these actions are not just but are illegal and constitute aggression against the rights of the Arabs, you ca.'1Ilot blame us if we oppose them. You cannot now prove to us that you are right and we are wrong unless it be by a decision from an organ entitled to give such opinions and judgments. We know that in the past the majority of the Security Council rejected the use of force for the implementation of the Jewish State in Palestine, but now we are being asked ta accept what was previously rejected by the Securit.y Council., Now the Arabs 3.,re bcing asked to accept a decision under which their hands will be tied and the others will be left free to enjoy the profits which they have obtained. The Arabsment ~re to be prevented from defending themselves, fi (jlder to leave their opponents free. As the Mediator said, the others are in a ~tate of defence. 'They are quite satisfied te keep fi their possession what they a1ready have. You 1 ar.~ trying 00. prevent the Arabs from defending the:mse1ves, 'without giving them any assurances as .to what will he done later-not even any Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): At this late hour 1 promise to be as brief as possible, and 1 think 1 shallnot keep the Security Council more than a few minutes." 1 believe it is the highest hope ofall of Us in this hall, and of the vast ma.fority of people through- out the world, that it may prove possible to reach a final, just and durable settlement of 'iliis Palestine problem, but that is not immtdiately before us. What is before the Security Council ai the pres~Ilt moment is the question of en- deavouring ta prevent the resumption of hostili- ties in Palestine. It seems to me that ifwe are to hopeever to reach a final settle~ent we shall :not begin to makè progress" towards that goal until wehave provided for the cessation of . hostilities. 1 do not know whathe thinks, but it would seem to me to be impossible for the Mediator to make progress withthat task so long as warfare. rages in Palestine. For that reason my delegation accepts in gen- eral the draft wmch has been submitted and circulated by' the" delegation' of the United States of America [8/890J. 1 shall have one or twoverbal changes to propose, of, 1 think, rather secondary importan'ce; and 1 sh~ limit myself to circulating"the text of those changes [S/895} which 1 shall ask the United States .delegation to accept. 1 should now likç to addrc::ss myself for a few moments to the very eloquent speech which we have jlIst heard from the represelltative of Syria. He dealt at sorne length with the first para- graph of the preambie of the United States draft resolution, and he made the complaint that it was practically a stigma of aggression cm the. Arab States. 1 do not accept that myself. In the tÎi"st place, to taIre him literally, there is no mention of aggressi'>I.\ atall, and in the sec.ond place what the para.graph says is that the States mc=mbers of the AIab League have re- jected successiveappeals o:f the United Nations' Mediator and of the Security Council in its resolution of 7 July [8/875J, for .the prolonga- tion of the. truce in Palestine. That is a state- ment of fact and r is a true stateinent, because in fact the States members of the Arab League have not agred to prolongthe truce. They have stated their reâ."ùns for not doing so, which may 'he good or bad, and incidentally there have been. reciprocal and mutual recriminations from the other party.' The Arab States have, however, given us their rea$ons bath orally and in writing; .they are' on record and they must adIll1t-they cannot deny-that they have failed to give their . consent to a prolongation of the truce. 1 amfully aware. of the importance which 'they attach to the reasons which they have given, and those are·the main reasons-:-the sole reasons, 1"shoUld hope-for which they ,have found hostilités ment que quelle de un a faire tion tion ne In the existing circumstances, where wc find hostilities being renewed in Palestine, it seems ta· my Government that it wOuld be impossible to do less than what is .now propàsed. What else cOuld the Security Council do? Should it repeat and reiterate a simple appea! which it has made on more than one occasion? 1 think it has to go further than that, and 1 think that action of the kind implied in this draft resolution ca.1J.not come asa surprise ta anyone. viennent probablement paragraphe seille The Security Council will remember that in .its resolution of 29 May 1948 in the penultimate paragrs.ph, it is stated: . 'Decides that if' the present resolution is re- jected by either party or by both, or if, having been accepted, it is subsequently repudiated or violated, the situation in Palestine will be recon- sidered with a view to action under Chapter VII of the Charter." poussée ies est cédé Palestine, vues That, 1 thirik, was a very plain indication of the next step t<;> which the Security Council might have to be forced. That was the decision which ittook six weeks ago. For that reason, my delegation. ~Jl support the draft res.olution ..now submitted. quelle pouvait être contraint de Telle semaines. puiera saisis As 1 said before, there are two changes which ·1 should like ta.propose and 1 shall circulate the next. One change relates to' thé first paragraph of .thedraft resolution. The first paragraph in- cIudes mention .of the "Provisional Government of Israel". My colleagues will remember that on a previous occasfùn, quiterecently [294th· meet- ing]; 1 explained that mention of that kind is apt to expose my Government ta embarrassment, and 1 shallsubmit a formula, in the form of an arnendment, 'which -might spare it that em.. tions distribuer paragraphe paragraphe fait mention visoire certainement [294ème expression embarras soumettre, formule pouvant du barras~ent, if it wOuld be acceptable to others. Ariother point relates ta the penultimate para- graph of this draft resolution, where it says that paragra.phe que le.Conseil "prescrit ler cédure tives t~e Council, "Instructs the Mediator to super- VISe the. observance of the truce and ta ·establish procedures for .examining a1leged breaches of thetruce ..." . There might .be sorne doubt, as ta whether thatrefersonly ta possible future breaches· or :whether it refers aIso.ta past breaches. My Gov- s'il s'il duites. de responsabilité ~l'l1ment feels that it isimportant to investigate- if th~t.ca~ be done-the responsibility for irre- ~anties ln the past,,and 1 shall s~ggest a form