S/PV.338 Security Council

The next meeting ,of the Security Council'will he held at 3.30 p.m. . . . ' The meeting rosellt 1.20 p.m. THREE HUNDRED ANDfHIRTY·EIGHTH ME~TING "eld at Lake SUccess~ New York, on Thursday, 15 July 1948,.flt 3.30 l'J.m. President:Mr. D. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic). Present: The representatives of· the following countries: Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, France, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of. Soviet Socialist ~epub1ics, United Kingdom, United States of America.' . Mr. JESSUP .(United States of America): Thete are a number of suggestions wmch have been laid before the Security Council concerning the draft resolution which the delegation .of the United States introduced on 13 July [$/890]. Some of these suggestions and sorne of the amendments which have been formally submitted have particular reference to the wording of individual paragraphs of our draft resolution. In regard to those items, 1 should prefer to discuss· them as we vote on the paragraphs of the resolutian, since it seems to me that the orderliness of . our discussion would be increased by dealing with each problem regarding textual·modifications at the· time we consider the paragraph in question. . At this time 1 should likè to deal with certain observations which have-been made, which seem ta me ta involv~ our resolutionin general, or so many PQints of it as to necessitate a discussion of these éommentsas awhole, rather than in their tèlation to parPcu}ar paragraphs. This is the case, in .my opinion, even ~ough certain_()f.Jhes(: observations do have particullar reference to individpal paragraphs of our draft resolution. Particularly, 1 have in mind the very thorough analysis of.our draft reso~utionmadeby the representative ofthe USSR in the course. of our discussjon yesterday [336th meeting]. His remarks raÏSed a . number of problems with which l 'should like to dèal at thistime. Having studied bis remarks·in the verbatimrecord, in addition to listening to them yesterday, l hope that 1 have in mind the exact nature of the objections which.he raised. Ishould like to comment, fust, upon" those views which·he expressed: con~erning the fifth and eighth paragraphs of. our draft resolutions. These comments referred to the raIe of the Mediator and ta!he question of the sllpervision of the truce., including the question of the personnel necessary for purposes of observation and supervision. 1 -;hould like tosay that we" recognize fully thedifficrilties of the task of the M'ediator and the fact that the Mediator himself in his very lucid comments· to the Security .Council, - has fraIildy ac1mowledged the difficulties which confront him in· the administration of a truce. 1 shouldIike to say that it seems to .me that . ManY of these difficulties are necessarily inherent inthe task ofobserving and. acL"ninistering atrqce, un .. der..an.y. cir.cumsta....nc.es, in an ... y. co.11IJ..try. ih.W.hi·Ch,. a truce.iscalled for. Thereare bound tobe-.-if '1 ~y borrow the eXp~{~sion of the ~ediator- With regard to the staff which the Mediator requires for the performance of his task, we are cognizant of the fact that he has sp9ken of the need for additional personnel. The representative of Argentina, in his remarks this morning [337tk meeting], haS called attention to the need for supplying such staff and assistance as the Mediator requires. B.ut, in this conneXion, 1 should like to recall to theSecurity_Council and to ihe Mediator one method br, which this deficieney maybe supplied. The experience which 1 have ID'mind is ,that in the administration of the truce in Indonesia. 1believe that it has frequently beeri paralleled in similar incidents in the course of history, in which truces or armistices have been carried out. As 1understand it, in the administration of the truce in Indonesia, use has frequently been made of mixed groups, iilc1udillg a representative of the Indonesian republic, a representative of the Netherlanœ, and' one of the neutral observers or neutral staff. I.should hope, therefore~'that the Mediator, in the continuation of the su.pervision of the truc::e which, with confidence, we expect ta see rf:sumed in Palestine, will take into consideration the possibility of using observation teams which woUld inc1ude'liaison officers representing the two parties. . 1 know' that 1 shall be told br somethat this is fantastic,' that the parties are unable to -work together'in this way. Ibelieve, however, that we already have an indication in the City of Jerusalem that it is possiqle for representatives of . the two parties to co-operate in the enforcement of a truce when that truce has been put into operation. 'rhese joint staffs, with some representation of 'the observers or of the United Nations staff which May be made availâble, would seem,to us to help in the solution of the problem of supplymg the neceseary assistance. In regard to the seventh paragraph of our joint resolution, we have before us the text of an amendment submîtted by the representative of the USSR [8/896]. In regard to this sug- ~ gested amendment, I should like to say, in the firSf> place, that the delegationof the United States, has always had in mind'that 'the de- ~tarization of the City of, Jerusalem would mvolve the withdrawal of the armed forces of both parties from Jerusalem. Although it may not be,an âccurate de#nition, one might say that a rou~ eqüivalent of 'the term "demilitariza- So far as the eventual status of the City of Jerusalem is concerned, my Go:vemment favours the intemationaUzation of the ,City. 1 donot be1ieve, however; that 1t is the function of the Security Counci~ to pr.onounce .upon ,the ultimate political status of this City, nor do 1 thi.rik that this is a matter which reqUires consideration in the draft resolution which1 hgpe the Security Couneil is ready> to adopt. One other,matter is putforward, ina sfuillar conn~on, by the amendmentsubmitted br the representative of the ..USSR, narnely,.the .. Buggestionthat " ••• thespecialstatute4 decided .upon by the General A,sSemblyshouldbe put into effect". . 1 wouid suggestto the USSR .rep~esentative that, .asidè .from any ()ther consideration, and. looking atthe practical ~pects othis suggestion, it teally' would notbe feasible t:o put into effect now the.Statùte to whicü·his amendmerit refers. ,AB one looks back upon the .Stat~te •.itself as drafted, and upon thé plan ofwhich it was a part, it appears very'cléarly th.at this Sta.tute, drafted· by the T~teeship. COUncil"was neces'; s~jly, based on the assumptionthat'theentire plan contemplated in the General .·Assembly resolution 'of 29. No\'ember 1947f• would bein effect. The draft Statuteof' Jerusalem ·.is' mtimatèlyconnected withvari.ous' phases of. that plan. As one example,J would lllentionthat·the expenses of the administration cf Jerusalemwere ,to be coveredby receipts draWn from the plan: of econoJW.c uniQn.The plan ofeconomic union is îlot in effectat the moment. and the sort of revenue contemplated Jor theoperatic)D of the Statute .. is, ..'therefore, .not .available. ... 1 . ' , _. , . rieurement , Furthermore, under'artic1e2, . paragraph·2, of thedraft Statute,th~ precîse boundaries of the City of Jerusalemare to be delimitedJater br the Palest~eConunission.But under itsreso- 1 sh~ll flot detain the Council· by going over the oth\~r details of the Statute which involve .some aspects cl a plan which is not now in operation and which -- 1 submit to the representative of the USSR - 'wouid not make it· practicable, or would make it impracticable, to apply this Statute, ta the City ôf Jerusalem ~\t this timè. ln view of what 1 have just stated, the withdrawal of the forces of both parties·from Jerusalem' wouldseem. to be implicit in the provision for demilitarization. Sinct' r assume that that would be contemplated by the Mediator in. his efforts té bring ~l)out the .demilitarization, 1 shouldhope ·thattb,e explanation which 1 have given would satisfy thedoubts in regard to this paragraph, expressed by the representative of the USSR. However, in a spirit of accommoda- .tion and agre~g.withthe point :made by Mr. Gromykoyesterdaynamely, that it would be most desi,l'able that the CouncU.should, as Jlearly as possible, be unanimous in making ,a recommendation,or takinga decision; orgiving orders of a character contemplated in this cIrait resolution. 1 think it would be possible to adjust the language of this paragraph, if such adj"!1Stment would give satisfaction to the representative of the USSR. If he considered that it would meet bis point, and if it wouldthen enl:lble him to support thegeneral idea wltich we have in mind, sucb a re-phrasing might runsomething like iliis: c~P'oposes to both parties the withdra,wal of their anned forces from. the City of Jerusalem as part of a plan of demilitarization which the Mediatoris instrueted to· arrange-with the parties, which plan shaH aIso indude adequate pro- ~ionforthe maintenance of orderand the protection of and access ta .the Holy Places, ieIigious buik-"-~I and sites in Pale$tine." .des .saire· IIlunicipal 1 would re;.emphasize the fact that this business ofwithdrawal of the forces, of demilitarizatian, of providing for a regime wmch is to continue, is a matter which involves a great deal of detail which must be arranged by someone. ln view of theappointment. of the_Mediator, in accordance with the decision. of the .General Assembly, it would seem that he.should function inothis capacity. 1 be1ieve, however, that it might be wellinthis satne connexion to take account of anotheraction of the General Assembly,nalllely, the resolution of 6 May,? which provided for the a;ppointmentof a Special ,MunicipalCommis~ SlOner. The representative of the USSR aIso commented upon the ninth paragraph of the draft resolution of the United States. As 1 understand it, he objected. there to the reference to,the General Assembly. He indicated that perhaps the General Assemblyhad been mentioned here ~th some ulterior purpose in·mind. 1 can assure mn.1. that this was not the case. Mr. Gromyko seemed to he concerned also lest the reference to the GeneralAssembly ID thiS paragraph DÙghtsuggest a disrespect for a decision already reached by the Generai Assémbly. Iwelcome very heartily the conversion of the representative of the USSR to this cause of full support for the General Assembly's resolutions, and Ihope that conversion will be global in its application. But in regard to the . particulê:(t" matter which is before us, 1 sh?u1d like to say that the United States, always nundful of the resolutions of the General Assembly, has ni mind the fact that the General Assembly adopted a resolution on ~e subject of Palestine, not oruy on 29 Noveinber 1947, but on subsequent occasions, and thatthe latest expression of the will of the General Assembly on Palestine is to be found in the resolutions of 6 May and 14 May. l have already referred to the resolution of 6 May which provides for the appointment of the Speci41 Municipal Commissioner. 1 have suggestetd that, in a· possible· modification of. the seventh paragraph of our draft resolution, if it were considered desirable, a refereilcecould be made to the functions of thisofficial. The ninth paragraph of the draft resolution as introduced bythe United States took account of the resolutian of the General Assembly which waS,adopted ort 14 May 1948, ànd a consciousness of this resolution isalso to· be found in various other, 'paragraphs.Wecannot over1àok thefactthat the General Assembly did, on 14 May, proviçle • for' the a:ppointment of a United Nations Mediator. On 22 ,May,the Security Council adoptcd a resolution [SI773], the Iast paragraph' of which calJed upon~'all parties con' -neC::, to facilitatè by al! means in their power the task. of the United Nations Mediator ..•". In oUr resolution of 29 May [81801], ID accordance .with the provision of $e.GeneralAsscmblythat th~ Mediator should. be. subject'tothe fustructions of the Sè"urity .Council, we undertook .to issue some instritctions to him. It therefore,seemed appropriate to indicate in the final p~agraph of the draft resolution the fact that either the Security Council or the Gen- èral Assembly, in further consideration of the question of Palestine, might adopt sorne new resolution which wouId cnange the face of the situation. Therefore, we sw.te in that paragraph that the truce would remain in force "subject to furth~ decision by the Security Council or the_General Assembly". The essence of this paragraph is that until there is some' other decision by the United Nations, the truce is to remain in force until a peaceful adjustment of the future situation in Palestine is reached. 1 am afraid, from some of the remarks which bave been made in the course ofthis debate, that that essential point of the draft resolution of the United States iS not fully appreciated. 1feel that it needs to be understood, when the vote is taken on the adoption of this dtaft resolution,. that this truce is not to be considered an interlude in the fighting; it must be understood that -the adoption of this resolution, with the ninth paragraph, is symbolic df the fact that the Security Council decîdes that the situation in Palestine is not to he settIed by force, .but is to be,settled br' pèaceful mean8. 1 .hope very much that, with.these·explana- , tions which 1 have given and .perhaps' with the suggestion for the modificatioIl' of the text ofthe seventhparagraph to which l have pointed, the objections voiced bythe.representative of the . ~ .USSR ~ght be met, and that it may. therefore be .pOSSible for him ttlsupport the resolution in the light' of such explanations. - . Mr. EBAN (Israel): If we accept the proced!ll'e advocatedhythè representative of the Umted States and reserve specifie coniment on ~endmen~ untiltheycome up for decision, it will he possible' for me to restrict to very brief 1 We heard.~ morning [337th ~eeting] two lengthy and mteresting speeches from the representatives of Egypt and Syria, ànd 1 shaIl ask their indulgence, and that of the Security Council, il, in discussillg them, 1 deal only with those , aspec'ts of their remarks which directIy affect the draft resolution which lies before us. In any case, many of the generai consideratiôns which arose in those speeches nppear to us to have lest their relevance., ln pardcular, the idea of the Egyptian Aimy operatîng in Pa:lestine in the role of an unselfish fireman has f~r many plonths .been an international joke. The bombs which faIl on Tel Aviv and the shells which descend upon Negba are not filled with chemiëal solutions for the extinction of Hames. They are :filled with high explosive; they are filled with incendiary materiais;and their effect is not to r~tore law and order, but to destroy human life and human property. Indeed, the destruction of human lüe and human property has been the only contribution of the Egyptian Government to a solution of this problem; and the theory put forward by the representative of Egypt,and the representative of Syria, and the theory implied, 1 fear, mthe amendment submitted by the representative of China [S/897], that this contribu.. tian entitIes the author of those acts to some political reward aS an inducement to refrain ftom further violence, does not conimend itself to us and should, not commend itself tQ a body, the members of, which are chargedwith ,primary responsibiliti .for. the maintenance of international peace ,and security.' Our approach to this draft resolution is.governedby .the fundamental belief that the obligation to refrain from the use of armed force in ihternatiomû relations is an absolute and unconditional obligation. The representative of Ègypt, va âlluding to the first paragraph of the United States <h~ rescr . lution, raises questions of accuracy and precision bi the record. He doubted whether,it'was legitimate ta say that the Arab League,States "have rejected successive appeals ofthe United Nations Mediator and of the Security Council,••." and , invited us rather to believe that the only instance Qf Arab rejection was that whicli had the nature of a request for the poStponement of acease-fire'" arder some weeks aga. The.se considerations apply with great re1evance to the fust paragraph of thè United States , draft resolution. That paragraph is a true, accurate and precise text as it &tands. In our view, it.is a vital and an integral part of the resolution and is not in need of al~Y· further ameildment. . In the course of further reflections, th~ representative 'f Egypt returned tothe problem of immigration. It was our duty to eJi:plain yesterday that the p()licyof the Provisional Govern- . ment oflsrae1 is ta àccept no derogation whatever to" the principle of free immigration. As a matter of accuracy, the number of men of military age arriving from Cyprus. recendy is not 9,000~ "as the representljl.tive of Egypt estimates; it is exacdy nil. In any case, it is our view that this whole question of jmmigration is entire1y irrelev:mt to any question of aggression or of threat ta the peace. The immigration policy of·Israel is its exclusiveconcern, and there is no provision of the Charter and no international law whereby a nation is entitled to attack a "neighbour because it dislikes its immigration a~angen:'-ents or policy.· \. whiIe maint~g the principle ol IsraeIi sovereignty in the matter of detemüning immi,;. gration .poliey, the Government of Israel did voluntarily acçept, as a sovereign act of consent, . certain tegulations with respect to categories of immigration, on the ground of the brief duration of the arra.igement. But, as we said yesterday, it is obvious. both ongrounds ofp~ciple alld on grounds of persona! hardship, that there can be 110 question of the Provisional Government of Israel accepting such limitations 011 the entry oI men of militaryage for a,period of indefinite duratioll. Before the Security Council passes to a detailed discussion of the draft resolution and its amcndments, it may he appropriate for me to say a few words onthe Jerusalemproblcm, which . has been the subject of an interesting address.by the representative of the United States. We not~ with great interest the asslJIance of the Govemment of'the United States that it still favours an international regime in Jerusalem, and we attach special importance and significance to iliat assurance in· the Iight of other proposaIs willchhave recentIy been put forward and of which the very mention has had, in our opinion, an embittering effect. We continue tobelieve that the Statute of Jerusalem recommended by the General Asseinbly and workcd out in elaborate detaiI bythe Trusteeship Council, remains the authentic· and· authoritative view of the United Nations about the form which that international regime shaIl take. ' 'l'heprinciples of that arrangement endeav-, ouredtorecollcile the internationalcharacter of JeruSalem,with the national sentiments of the 'population. It expressed its citizens' international characterby the establishment ofa special international r...gime; itaclmO\vledged the validity of ~~ ,pational sentiments·of the population.by a large degreeof civic autonomy arid by measures pi'oviding lor the possibllity that an, the residentsof 'Jerusalem, should have ,the'choice ?fopting forthecitizenship of the State. with which' their' sentiments, theii culture and'their .alIegiânce.were···bound .up. In~previQusco1lltllunicatiQnstothe Mediator and to the. Security Councll, theProvisional Governnient of Israel has indicated its,willing- Dc"'ss tonegotiate ascheme for the demllitarlzation of ~~ pity.And, if 1.11nderstandcorrectly the final textin 'the mind of therepresentative of ~eUnitedStates,this Council would not go , .ffluch,further tttan.,to lay ,down ,the·principle of demilitarizatio~t,leaving the exact nature of the regimewhichwQ~d.folIowtltat demilitarization ~o he determined iaterbythe processes of dis- . cussi()n and agreement. . Weunderstandand it isas' weU that the understanding sh()uld herebe· repeated __ that any .~uch .arrangement for. the demilltarization of Jerusalemwill>be withoutprejudice to the question ofits futurestatus; We therefo~ewonder . With these words 15hall terminate my remarks in the generai debate, and ask leave, if the opportunity arises, ta present the views of the Government of Israel on the amendments which have been suggested to the draIt r~oluclon.

l shall now speak, not as the President of the Security Council, but as the representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, in order to outline my Government's attitude towards the question under discussion. , The Security Council h2lS examined the report [S/888] and heard the Uediator's statement on Palestine. Strictly speaking, the Mediator has not told us anything which wc did not already know from the Press. On the whole, members of'the Council used to receive earlier and fuller news of the Mediator's activities' from the Press than from hisreports to the United Nations. It should be stressed that from the very outsl':t, the Mediator's trip ta Palestine was the subject of a Press hullabaloo and of unhealthy speculations which contributed more ta misleading public opinion than to reporting truthfully what was really taking place in Palestine, and particularly aroundPalestine. The Mediator is now àsking, the Security' Council forinstructions because military operations have been resumed in Palestine. Does this represent apersonal diplomatie fallure of the Mediator, or the fiasco of the policy based on the revision of t!te General Assembly decisi~n of 29 November 1947 on the Palestine question? CIearly it'represents a defeat for those-political circles whjch were bent at allcosts on discarding the above-mentioned decision. G?ing beyond'the powers granted hïtn, by' the speCIal session of the General Assembly; the Mediator put forward his own plan (S/863] for the settlemen.t of the Palestine question, a plan differing radically from the earlier. decisions. ' . \, Neither the State of Israel nor the hab States have accepted'this plan which only obscured the clear question of creating two States " -:-.~ .tkab.Stateand a Jewish State -'" in Pales- Me. The plan'still further inflamed nationa'listic pasSions and hastenedthe collapse of the truce. ,By taking thiswrong and inadmissible step,the Mediiator •createdthe conviction among ,the Ar~bs that h~had come to Palestine ~o~ to help m unplementing the General As$embly decision, but to bargain over thedeviations from it that 'might be madè ,tothe beneRt of 'one party and the prejudice of,the, other. . The M'ediator began by sugg,~stinga plebiscite, for Jerusalem only; but then, in a surge of creative improvisation, he proposed extendingit to ·the whole of Palestine. Thus, by putting forward as bis own the old Pakistan proposal' supporting the Arabs, Mr. Bernadotte' has brought us back to the fust stage of the discussion on Palestine. He cannot but be aware that the adoption of such a proposai would meal!' thè . liquidation of die State of Israel, to wbich, naturally, the Govemment of Israel would not agree. At our meeting of 7 July [330th meeting] the representative of the United Kip,gdom zeal- Qusly defended the arbitrary actions of the Mediator.. Itcan he infeiTed that this proposal, too, apparendy conforms to the plans of the United Kingdom Government wbich, has constandy sabotaged the decision on the partition of .Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish State.We know that the Commission empowered by the General Assembly to help in implementing thedecision . of 29 November 1947 was not allowed bythe United Kingdoin Govel'I1II!-ent te enter Palestine. We aIso know that the arms :used by .Arab troops against the State of Israel are of British urigin; that Arab troops have beentrained by British officers; and that Glubb Pasha ,and General Clayton, who play a very,important part in tlle Near East, are not Arabs but real Engliahmen. , The'United States Press describes these activities of the United Kingdom every day. If Sir Alexander Cadogan wishes to deny these facts,. 1 suggest that he, should sue the U'uted States Press for libel. It is enough to refer to the, 13 Juiy 1948 issue of the New York Hertild-Tribune, whose correspondent' cabled from Palestine that when Israeli troops captured Lyd,da, the Arab forces there were under the 'command of British officers. Consequendy this mf.:clns that the Security Council's demand for immediate cessation of . hostilities .should he .binclli~g not only on the . Arabs and the Jews, but aIso on the GOvemment of the United Kingdom. Relying on the support ofthat GOvernment, the Arabparty has rejected the tnice-extension proposaI, and has begun ~itary'operations in. the conviction·that it' will ·Bee 0tlicial Rtcords of tht second Stssion of thé General It follows that Ml'. Bernadotte, too, shares the responsibility for the resumption 'ofmilita,ry operations in Palestine. Thanks to his mediatory activities' we have slipped back not merely to. the original position existing in Palestine when he was sent there as Mediator, but to an even worse position. Why?Because Ml'. hernadotte's plan is helping to spread the coriviction that in the final rcsort the General Assembly resolution on the partition of Palestine will. he wrecked by oil companies interested in solving the Palestine question in their own sweet way, without regard to tpe interests.of either the Jewish or the Arab peoples. Thus, by hampering the implementation of the General Assembly decision, the Mediator , is promoting' the interests of those ccmpanies and allowing them to spreadthe legend that the Genèral Assembly decision isin fact impracti- \ cable because of the stubbomness of the parties concerned. Although' the United'Kingdom kept an army of 100,000 men in Palestine, it was, unabie to fulfil the Mandate, it hadreceivéd from the League. of. Nations te administer Palestine. De- .spite the termination of the Mandate, however, it does, not wish to lose Palestine. It wishes to maintain its domination over, thatcountry through Arab' instrumentality, through puppets ' - either the, Transjordanian King Abdullah or . any other similar candidate. \. The Arabs have,experienceâ United Kingdom domiilation in the Near East for rn- '> decad~ and eanÎlOt fail to see the me~ t thiS "British friendship". The ~overm Jfthe Arab States' are .mistaken if th that United Kingdom daims to domÎl.. Jyer the Arab world havebecome less dallgerous widi the. withdrawal of British troops from Palestine. ft must not be forgotten that the United Kingdom has an· extensive organization for achieving its plans in the Near East; thcix local agents are past masters in· the'methodsofcolonial corrup'" liÎon;. they know not onlyhow to kindle. nàtional strife betwe~n Jews and Arabs,. but·aIso how to crcate conflicts 'among the ArabStates them- Some Arab statesmen, disregarding facts, accuse the. Soviet delegations of supporting one side in the Arah·Jewish dhpute. The Soviet people are people of principle;: they always stand for what· is right. Iri. JanuaIJ 1946 the USSR delegation supported Syria, and I,ebanon in the Security Coundl when they demanded the withdrawal of .foreign troops ~rom their terrltories. The USSR deIegation was on ~e Egyptian side at the time when the Egyptian Goverilm€:Ilt was . stubbornly .trying to secure the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt. Public opinion in the USSR warmly' supported the struggle of the Iraqi people against interferenlce in its internal affairs. Can the same b~ said of those who àre now a~cusing us ofbias in our . position on the' Palestine question? We know that to please the United Kingdom 'Govemment many of these p~ople w~hed their hands like Pontius Pilate, whenthe struggl,e of theArab péople indirectly iIijured the interests of the United Kingdont. It is precisely because the Soviet de1egations ar,e standing·Qnal?olicy of principle regarding the Palestine question that they oppose those who try to l\'UIl with the' hare and hunt with·· the hounds. The Soviet de1egations cannot fail, theref~rè, to criticize the P~estinepolicy of United States political circles, for that policy is full-oIambiguities, contradictiQns and hesitations. 'niere are two tendencies.m that palicy, one, of them deriving fro~ domestic considerations. We know that the United States contains a compact Jewish population, a group which warmly supports the establishment' of a State of Israel in Palestine. This group piays a certain, part in 'the domestic political life of the United States, and United States politicalcircles cannot disregard it. On the other hand, these c,ircles are under pressurefrom'the great oil companies which, are trying to secure concessions to exploit the oil resources to be found ID Arab States. This fact determines the sêcondpolitical tendency,whiçh is directed at wrecking the General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947. If necessary, l can quote prominent statesmen, 'U-nited States SÇJ;lators, etc.,~ wIï~ s~qwte opentyortliar~ra1S aspect of tlie matter. ' It is doubtful, too, what the Arab States would gain if two ail groups of different national origin 'came to an agreeme."1t behind their backs on the.division of spheres of interestin the Near . East. The Arab States would not participate in such a secret. agreement, but would be the victims of it. It is .aIso doubtfui to what exterit suth an agreement would promote the strength- . ening of the national sovereignty of the hab States.. It would only help'those official circles in the United Kingdomwhich are prepared to makea'few concesSions to. their partners in suth agreements in order to strengthen their positions in the Near East. . There is no doubt that ,the thteat of suth a bargain at,the expenseof the Jews and the Arabs does exÏst. No less a person than MI'. Bernadotte himse1f told us with very laudable frankness of the beginnings of that bargain. Replying to â question asked by the Ukiainian dclegationregarding the reasons for', the measure' of internationalization he had suggested, he said: "1 .received' from the Governments of the United Kingdom,France and the Umted States· a request that 1 should try, ta do something .50· that the refineries and terminaIs in Haïfa could start to work. AIl the three Governments said that it Wa8 their opinion - whith .1 sh;u:edthat it was of great importance to the whole world that we should get crudeor refined' oil to the different·countries of t4e world, .because there is, as you aU know, a. shortage of qi! in the world" [333rd meeting]. What conclusions 'are we to draw from this· statement by Mt. Bernadotte? The first is that the argument developed by Sir Alexander Cadogan at the meetiÎ1g of ,7 July [330th meeting] that .the Mediator acted in complete independence, would not survive the sIightest criticism. The second is that the Mediator received instructionsnot from the United Nations, not from the Security. Council, but - unknown tothe SecurityCouncil and to the Truce Cominission which comprises representatives of the United States, Belgium and Francefrom another body consisting .of thtee. great Powers: the United Kingdom •(the former Mandatory Power ~g c!1flJ;.ca,'memberof the Commission),:France and the United States. Belgium was completely ignored.If thisis democracy, then it is anoil democracy having nothing in commonwiththe At our meeting of 7 July [331st meeting], Sir Alexander Cadogan asked. the Ukrainian dele~ation for facts. Let Sir MeXand~r Cadogan n.,ùwtry to deny this fact whic1l is based on Mr. Bemadotte's own statement. It cannat be expooged from the record. We have a. Russia."l proverb which says that "what is. written, with the'pen cannot be struck out, even with an aXe". 1 And now.let me draw.some ~urther cQnclusions. Three States - th~ United King40m, the United States and France -determined the mternationalization of Haïfa; disregardmg the Truce Commission there and the Security Coun- ~il. The questio;n, therefore,is whether it isnot on instructionslrom these threeStates that proposals. are DOW b.emg advanced.which, under the guise of the demilitarization of Jerusàlem, amount to nothing but the occupation of Jerusalem by the armed forées' of possibly the same three States acting under the pro~ection of the Security Coundlflag. Tomonow, under L.'le. pretext of establishing a truce, these same three Powers will"put forward, through the Mediator, new proposais designc;dto wreck· the· General Assembly decision. Meanwhile, the Chïnese representative is pràpc;>smg anainendment [8/897] to the resolution, or a .new resolution, which wo.uld directIy empower the Mediator to , take steps,. on J:ris' own .. initiative, <:\esigned to wreck the Oen.eral Assembly resolution. .~e Security Council ,cannot accept such a method of dea!ÏIJ.g with the trucequestion-a method that contradicts the Charter of the United Nations aJid c:kcisions, qf the General AssemWy. ' The delegation .of the Uhainiàn Soviet Socialist Republic advocates the immedia~e cessa-i tion' ~f military operationsm Palestine, .but it . cannot supportthoseparm of the'United States draft resolution ~hich .open the .door to a further underminillg oftb.e a7.1thority ofthe Umted Na'tions and itsdecisiollS. , NOf,m view of theseconsiderations, canthe delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet'Socialist Re-' publicagree to the Syrian delegation's draft resolution [8/894lwhich attempts to withdraw the Pal~stinequéstion from' the. jurisdiction of the United Nations and to rëferit to the International Court of Justice for.a new decisio;n. 'nouvelle Iam .prepared to forego the French .mter.,. pretation of my statement. It would bedesirable for other members of the Seêurity CCilUlcil to follow my exainple in order ta.save time. ~sembly,. wor.ds wouldbe said to me which indicated that 1 was more or leSsresponsible for the fighting whiçhbas now started' iri, ~alestine. 1 think if ~ô~I~?e'rathér easy f~r, .me 00. answer th~ representative of the Ukraunan SSR that bis critical; remarks, if 1, mayùse a rather mild expression, àie somewhat unjustified. 1 am not, however, going ta defend myself ai aIl; and the reason .for.",~ is .that .1 :believe that it is of greater, very much greateritnportance,that tl,lis CouncilshouId.get results from this meeting and reaçh a decision. . , , . i~very hour that weif 1may include myself in tH~ body~ which ,~ am notentiiIed ta do .,- discuss ,tllese matters, hundreds of Arab and Jewishlivê..8 are lost: Tosave theselives, to try ta get'a sdlutibIÏ ~nd ta hope for a cease-fire in PalèStfue, ls much more important for me than to' defe;lld m~elf.. . • '; ~ : 0.

We now come ta the vote on thê resolution. 1 shocld 'Iikè ta. ask theChinese representative .. whether'he.regards his resolution as~ amendment o~ as':a sèparate res«;>lution. , . Mr.·Hsu, (China): We c6~ider our proposaI an amendtrient: ...;.:

. 1 caU upon the Assistant Secretary-General, ta read two points ta be inc1uded in the resolution. "Mr. .Hoo (Ass~i:ant Secretary-General, in C1.largè of the Department ofTrusteeship) ~ The Secretary':'Generalhas asked me to suggest the addition of' two paragraphs at·the end of the draft resolution. These.;paragraphs.would facilitate the work of the'Secretary-General in connexion with the carrying' eut of the res6lution. The paragraphsread as foHows: "Requests the Secretary-General to. p~ovide "the Mediator with,the necessary staff and·facili· ties tt> assist in carrying out the functions assigned to him under: the resolution of the General Assembly of 14 May,. and. under thisresolution; and " --~----_ The text of .ese two paragraphs is being circulated.

We have two draft resolutions before us. In accordanc~with rule 32 of the provisional mIes of procedure of thè Security Council, resolutions will be voted on in the order of their submission. .The first resolution received was the United States resolution and the second, the Syrian resolution. Moreover,the representative of Argentina has propased that we should vote separately on each point of the United States resolution. . . Rule 36 states that ':when an amendment adds to or deletes from the text of a motion or"draft resolution, that amendment shaIl be voted on' tirst".·In 'accordance willi this ruie, we shall now proceed to vote on the resolution. pression, mettant 1 think. there will be no dîsPllte as to whicl\ amendment should be voted on first, because .under rule 36 of the' rIDes of. procédure, we must vote firston the amendment furthest re;. moved from the original proposal. Weliliall vote. paragraph by paragraph. If .there are any amendments to the :fust paragraph, for example, they will be voted on first. 1 presume" there will he no obj/;:ctions ta this procedure. rité sont tous de priorité des amendements; 'ment Consei; dementqui originale. graphe. paragraphe. pour ment personne certain tation l'interprétation tation interprètes, .vaillent sident tion Mr. ,PARODI (France) (tranilated Irom Fi'ench): There· seéms .to lJe some confusion as far as interpretationsofspeeches are cpilcemed. 1 ~ lavishly prov1:ded fu:st with a simultanèous and·. thetl with. a consecutive interpretation. 1 should not like our'interpreters, whose task is. a ll1~t t;1ifficult one,. to work to no purpose. 1 shoUld likethe. President to make it clear tbat the .inœrpretàtion ·will .be· conseèutive for the remainderof this .meeting• . - .';' . .'. .~ . ". ,r_ séan<:e~ Ïh~'I!RESIDENT(tratislàted Irom .Qrench):: lagree~ . J'accepte Président,mais voix .Mr.TsIAN(} .(China):: 1 accept thevoting procedure 'suggested by.. thePresident~ .but 1 reqùest .·that, ·afterth~··ParaZ1lPhs .. ..nil.the . amendments toJ~e paragraphs have beenvoted upan, there shouId he a vote on the rèsolution as a'Y,hol~. <....... ... '. . qu'ort'aur~vot~ ments 'The,PRE:SiDE1~,ï'Jtr4nslated tram French) : i'hatisth~~ua1proced\U'e. . .As therear~ no .objections. to the .procedure.1 haveproposed, weshalltake upfirstth,e drait reso1utioll prop~edbythedelegation of the UIPted.StatesofAmêfÏca.Thi$draft resolution que projet Ce.prQjet.4erésolution 8/890 doncqu'il isse~.fQ1'th,ùi•• document~/890now,~efor~ you! T dOQ1Pt think, therefo~, tha,tlneed re~dthe ·firSt . parà&r~ph. But the point which'1 should like to emphasizé te the members of the Security Council is that the inclusion of a label, if you like, whichis familiarly w:ed and which is weIl understooc) by every~ne, hasnothing to-do with the proN,em of reç~gni.. tion~ 1 would recall that the~,curlty-eotmcil constantly refers to the. "Govenpnent of ,the Republic of Indonesia'~. Wc bave. adopted many resolutions referrinl!'to the Govemment of the' Rept'lblic of Indon~a;.•and no member, of the Secmity Council bas thougbt that, byvoting for :suc.n•il resolution, he wag dealingwith the prohlem of recognition of the Govermnent of tTJC Republic of Indonesia. '. , c fue.· designation, "·ProvisionalGovernment.of .Israel'\, in the first Similarly,.the iric1usion-of par~graph oIthe draft resolution wbich ~e have 'Proposed, Burety doesnotinany way involve the question of recognitio.n. AvoteJor this paragraph ,çould not possibly be iderpret~d'by an.yonèas Mr. EBAN (Israel): 1 malte these remarks on the assumption thst the United Kingdom repré- sentative. has not accepted the p€:rfectlyadmir:- able and factual statement of the ,representative of the United States. 1 am. myself reluctant to enter this discussion. 1 think it is mi unnecessary·' one which should not have been pr6vôked. It seems to us thàt the only point at issue is whether or not it is a fact, in the worcls of the draft resolution, that "the· Provisional Government .of ! Israel has indicated its acceptance in principle of a prolongation of the truce in Palestine"• Is that à fact, or isit not? Or is.thefactso ~elevant tha:t it Oug.ht to be obsc~ed.?'r,he....fac.t l· IScouveyed m document S/872,m which the Mediator indicated. to the Security Councilthe " fact that the· Piovisional. Government o~ Israel ,had accepted in prin~iple'a prolongation. of the truce, In offering its acceptance, the Provisional Government '(j~ Israel did not intrude upona discussion to which it wàs not· invited, because the 'answer conveyed in document S/872 came in reply to a letter which was disp~tched fromTel Aviv on 5 JuIy. This letter,addressed to "Mr. M:oshe Shertok, Minister for Foreign MIairs, Provisional Government of·Israel",reads: . . . "1 have the honourto transmit to you the accompanying messagefrom. the .:Mediator for The Sccurity Council will notice that this communication, to which document 8/872 is a reply, was addressed specifically to the "Minister for Foreign Affairs, (in the) Provisional Government of Israel." It was addressed to him in that ~apa­ city for reasons of courtesy which cif themselves, l should have thought, would have been compelling, but aIso for a, practical reason, namely, that what t..'1e Mediator requested "!...'a,S not the personal views and philosophies of Mr. 8hertok on history and on life, but a commitment from a body in a position to give that commitment to order a ceasefire. The message had to be addressed in that way because no othe.! Jewish hody exists which could indicate acceptance of such proppsals or commit anybody.to honour them. 8urely no Government or person with a senSe of self-respect would ever consider itself or himseif under any obligation to respond to any communication' not addressed to it or to him in the rightful ca.pacity. In the fust days of its existence it might have been possible for some people not to kIiow of the existence of the'Provisional Government of· Israel, and therefore on 18 May the Security Council addressed a rmestionnaire to what it called the $'Jewish authorities in Palestine" rSI766]. The reply to that. questionnaire came from the Provisional Government of Israel. It .was recoi"ded as such in the :records of t.i.e Security COUHcil. It,was . acted upon by the Seèurity Cor.ncil, and thereafter'there began a sustained and uninterrupted practice of direct negotiation between the 8ecurity Council and thePromonal Government of Israel. Thus, it was the'Provisional ·Governmentof Israel which specifica11y and explicitly replied to the 8ecurityCounci1's cease-fire proposal of 22 .May [SI773]~ to the resolution on a truce in Palestine adopted on 29 May [SI801], to the interpl'etations of that reso:o lution offered by the Mediator; and actually con-' cluded an agreement fol' a ceaseJire.The Media,:" tor'~ messages, reproducedas documents 8/830 a~d38/831, were addre.ssed tothe Govemments ccipéerned, including the Provisional Govenunent of Israel., The reply to the Security Counci1 rega,rding that cease-fireresolution was similarly conveyed [SI834], and on 16 June 1948 anagreement was signed. betWeen the Mediator of the United Nations and the Provisional Government of Israel, and Count Bernadotte and Mr. Shertok appended ,their signatures to that resolution. in thosecapacities. The agreement is reproduced as document 8/846. ' In other'words, there existsan establiShed practiceand tradition ofsuch negotiations. But the record . J. the '. Provisionà:l Government of lsr.aelin relation to· thé Security Council is not merely one of negotiation~ itis·alsoone of dose A few weeks ago, the Security Cauncil addressed itseif to the Govemment of Transjordan, which 1 believe only two members of the Security Council recognized. The Council received a thoroughly rude and insolent reply and has never repeated the offer since; but surely that event is sufficient to prove that no question of recognition can be claimed to have relevance in the text of this amendment. .', "~ . biologiques. After this practice has .continued for several weeks, proved its efficacy and its complete lack of harm, along cornes this amendment. This aml'.l1dment does not avoid an innovation; it turnsthe clock back. It evades the truth; it mes ta conceal it. Everybody" Imows what the truth is; and everybody in this raom Imows that, as a matter of fact, the Provisional Government of Israel.indicated its acèeptance of that truce resolution, and, indeed,. that no other body exists which. can indicate such acceptance.Therefore, thé only motive ofthis resolutian is to evade a f;lct by not.calling it by itsname~ In the nincteenth century, a similar attitude was eurrent toward the biologieal·facts of life. But here tbe position is more serious, for we deal with no abstractions,· but.with a practical question in whiChthe matter ofspecific responsibility isvital, as is alsothe necessity tocall'uponspecific bodiesforspecifie commitmentS. . lfanybodyisin any doubt as to the ~tence oi the Provisional Govemment of Israel, or of its.competencetohonoUTçertain commitments, he has aneasy alternative,which is notto address the Pro'fÎSional Government·of Israel, notto give, orders to it, notlo .communicate appeais ta it, n()t. . ~d .solicit .its .ass~tanceor governmental authority in theexercise.ofonerous international o1)ligations.. If.anybody. doubtSits .existence,. th.en ," ..,' ".. -, .. : .-,',' '. . i"ina1ly, the adoption of this amendment would raise very complicated considerations in respect of the tilird. fourth and fifth paragraphs, for apparently we would no longer be able to define what is meant by "aIl Goveinments and authorities concerned". The question would arise whether the Provisional Government of Israel is affect~d by the obligations of tlùs resolution, since its existence is not a matter which the proposer of the amendmen.t is prepared to affirm. In view of that doubt a.lld the inost important nature of the ,order in the third paragraph, and since, if the amendmen c is ?rlopted, the preamble may not define wh'J are the parties, we must ask: Who is the Jew..sh side which is supposed to obe}' this order and answer this appeal? For, as the matter would stand after the adoption of this amendment, every Government or authority would he free to decide, by its own spontaneous logic, whether or not it is a party cOllcemed. Some of these paragraphs refer to military orders. Surely, when such an order is involved, a specifie indication of responsibility is necessary. Many representatives here have had great military experience. 1 wonder if any of them can recaIlan order saying thataIl people who feel themselves to he concemed will attack that objective tomorrow at noon. , Wè reaIly descend to absurdities and an unworthy levelif we follow through all the implications of an evaSion of this kind. The matter becomes the more painful because of the context ln which this factual statement oecurs. For what isthe sentence to which Sir Alexander Cadogan obJects? It is simply a sentence recording an act ofassistanc~, an act of compliance,. an act of international co-operatio.n,'an aet of loyalty to the Charter. The name of the body responsible for this act is associated with thatact by the United States draft resoluticn. Why, can people not endure to have the name of Israel appear in this virtuous light? The only reason that we have been given, apar.t froman irrelevàn.Çe on the matter of recognition, is the fear· that. it might embarrass Sir Alexander Cadogan's Govermnent. It may he a principle of diplomacy that truth may only he .tolcl if it. i~ not .embarrassing, but surely the consideration, of embarr~sment is triyial against the consideration of truth. The truth may he unpalàtableto some people, but that the existence of this Provisional Govemment of Israelis a faet can bededuced on the basisof an opinion which 1 thinkthe represèntative o{ the . United Kingdom,'would respect. It occurs in ln paragraph 17, it becomes clear that this is a defensive war. The Mediator goes on, in paragraph 34: "This Provisional Government and the State it represents were established under the cloak of authorit'I given by the 29 November r.esolution of the General Asseembly .•• It is td~ de façto situation which the Arab States are fighting to eliminate, but the plain fact remains that· it is there." AlI we ~k of the S,ecurity Council is that,-fu order to retain its moral authority, its dignityand its prestige, it should face that lact as it isand not obliterate it. If the proposer of this amendment could honesdy say it, is not true that the Provisional Government of Israel indicated its 'acceptance of the truce resolution, there would he a moral justification for the amendment. We thinkthat, as a matter of bistory, the name of the Provisional Government of Israel deserves to be linked with its acceptance of the cease-fire appeal. ~ut if anybody does not think so, then let him not mention it at all; let him cut it out. The Provisional Govemment of Israel is willing to . surrender its honourable mention rather than be referre.4 ta contemptuously as "the other party" or by any othçr circumlocution. Âfter a,ll, it is .not the fact of the acceptance by the Provisional Govemment of Israel which creates thisthreat to the peac~, and we would ask the Security Council, if it cannot tell ~e 'Ylloletruth, to omit the reference. entirely. 'rh~ onllsMon of thatmention \Vould, of courSe, be a falseh'OlJ!!j but it would at least he a falsehood. complete and admirable in its integrity. MahmoudBey FAWZI (Egypt).: 1 shall he as brief as possible, e$pecially j~l view of the late hour. . " 1 do ~ot deny the eloq~ence of the Jewish representative. It is only tha.t rteither' eloquence, by itself, nor repeated assertions,by themselvès, suffice te constitute rights. . 1can aIso easily see; mafI say, the embarr~ ing position in which the representative of the Urtited States fihds himselt 1also realiZe the great value.of his customary persuasiveness, but it does not really suffice to persuade me of bis point'of view. It merdy..happens that thistime it is not Of course, this is for the Security Council and its members to decide. As for the assertion that this terminology was·sometimes used by the Mediator, 1 have repeatedly objected to the Mediator's use of such terminology; it cannot, in international parlance, mean much, or even little. in any case, the Mediator was speaking for him- . .self. This time it is the Security Council which is asked to speak. On the other hand - so it seems at least - it is mosdy to the Arabs ànd the Arab . States that the Council' ~ recommendation will be addressed. How can the 'Jouncilsend a document of such a nature to them and expect, at th~ SaIlle time, to achieve the aIrea.:iy very difficult task of persuading, under certain well-known circumstances, the Arah~ and the Arab States to resume a very onerous ceé.\Se-fire? How can we persuade them te accept it il we continue to malœ such an acceptance more and more difficult? . 1 therefore want to go on record as expressing to theSecurity Council thestrongest possible èlbjection to the retention of such a term as is proposed in the draft resolution. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syrïa): The United Kingdom amendÏnent [8/895] is composed of two parts. One does not coincide with the other,in any way a.Jid with regard to my vote, 1 cannot cast the same·vote for both parts. The fust suggésted change. îs. theJ deletion of the words "the Provisional Govèrnment of Israel". 'As 1·have aIready indicated several times~ .1 certainly agree ta that. With regard to'the other part, l cannot agree with it, because it places the blame on the Arabs. àÏ1d states that they bave done suchand such. l made 'à suggestion to the United States delegation this morning [337th meeting]: Iasked them if they would accept the wording, ~'Takinginto consideration the Mediator'sreport." That wordmg would' cover aIl-these difficUlties and would not create ariy other opposition 'or cause any remarks from any source. It would beacceptable if it.is put in thatform, "Taking into considerationthe Mediator'sreport of 12 July". The Security Council would then .decide what the rest. of the wording woülcl be. At the'sametïtne, 1 am not convinced by the explanatory statèmehtmade by the representatïve of the United Stateswhenhe makesa comparison with.the Indonesian case..There is agreat differ-' çnce between. the two .cases. Indonesia was oneoi the posSès'sions of the Netherlànds, and the Netherlands has the full right to give to its possessions Therefore, 1 do not know how \he representative of the United, States,after having made this remarkbeforethis meeting, and after, 1 have given this reply, ,can now touch upon the same analogywithoùt giving anY rep~y to the con.tentions which 1 made to the same effect in the,last [337th] Jl1eeting. For thiS reason, 1 suggest that thisshould bevoted intwo separate parts, 50 that I,mayvote in fav0U!'ofthe first'recommended change andin 'opposition to the second, because they are two different things. ThePR:EsIDENT (translated fro~Russian): l, caU upon-the representativeof Colombia.' ' Mr.URDANETA-ARB:ELAEzï(Colombia): '1 renoUncemyrightto spe~k. Mr. MAIJlt.,(Union of Soviet.SocialistRepubli~) "(trarulated,, from Russian): The USSR. delegationbases i~ position in this qu~on on the fact thattheState' of Israel and the Provisional Govemment of Israel.were,established,and con- $tÏtutedin accordancewith the tenÏtS ofthe, Generali\,ssembly resolutionof 29 November 1947 whichprovided for thepartition<of Palestiueinto a, Jewim and an 'Arab Stateand the forînation,' of .nvo,., independent, States. "ThiS, strictly~peaking, resolvesthe .leg~.laspeetof ,th.e qt1estion oftheoriginofthe StateofIsrael and,of th~ setting up of apr()viSit'l1algoV~ènt.- ' Furthennore, the State ofIs*ael~ditS Provisional Govenunenthave beellI'ecognizedbya 'mimber of Stat~ \mder that name and no other. The 'internationd '. Ptess, 'tlîeradio, andfinally the meetings of the Secutity Cct@dlhavebl'ought 'sion' "Gouvernement th~name, t1lati~~the "Provisional 'Government of, ~rael",Jn.to c1f)uunon.,use;.,.and they continue to pse it. ln this Wàythetitle has acquiredgeneral acceptance.DoesthisDleanthatthose.who,bave used•this ,name' ~aye .*eadyrecognized.de jure aiuide facto theProvisiQnal qovemment ,of Israel?: Of course' not. It w.otild therefore be The USSR delegation will, therefore, vote for the fust paragraph as submitted in the United States t~ and isunable ta support the United Kingdom amendment.

We shall now proceed ta the votç. 1 should like to put a question to the SYrian representative. J 'have before me the United Kingdom representative's amenchnent ,and it seems ta me thatfrom the point of viewof style it cannot he divided. Hhe wishes me to put it before the Council in parts, 1 must ask him to 'Submit hi$ proposaI in writing~ 1 personally am unable tohreak up this amendment. If,.however, it is not submitted in parts in writing, 1 shaIl put it to the vote as itstands. . Sir Alexander ~OGAN (United Kingd()m): 1 think there is â. slight InisUl"'1derstanding. It is truethat the representative of Syriasaid-that there were two points, in, my a.'llendment, one the removal of the title"the Provisional Govemment of Israel" and the other !he,phrase concerning th~ Statesmembers of the Arab League havi.,g rejècted suècessive appeaIs by the United .sentant N~tions Mediator. 1 wish to point out that thel'e was only one. ' point in my amendment, and that is the brmer one,the temoval of· the expression "Ure Provi- ,sionlÙGovernment of Israel". The restof.the text of,myamendment is takenliteranyfromthe United States .proposal.· Therefo~ there is only one pointJnmy amendmeJ;lt.Itmay benecessary torearrap,ge the paragraph inorder ta giveeffect to it, ,but that is -the only point. " Mr. TSIANG.(China): Thisparagraph, whether iD. the ,original form 'or' the 'amended form, does not add totheop'erative eHect ofthe resolutio.d. It is weIl known thatthe inclusion ofthis paragraph will make, the 'resolution ,less acceptable.ta the Arab States.,It is· the. opinion 'of, my ,. 'delegation that thls wholeparagraph, whether in the original form or the.amended f0;fut~ wouldbe better. omitted. My' deleg~tion willabstainfrom voting ?ll either form.. " The PUSIDENT (translated [rom French): 1 wish to consult the'm,embers of the COUIlcil. My own bitter experience.tells me that weshall not :finish today. We have considered only one amendment and. we have already lost more than ~ hour. There are still many points t() be covered in the United States draft resolution;there are still so ManY amendments,not to mention; the Syrian draft resolution, that,1 do' not think we could:finish today. As far as 1am concemed, 1 am ready to remain in thiSroom"until tomorrow if necessary. But 1 should like the other menibérs of the Council to show the same capacity ~d enthusiasm for work; Mr. J:ESSUP (United States of America): lamM.JEssuP glad to·:find myself in thoroughagreementwith yoù. We should stay here and wind up ouracticin on,this resolution. It.always takes a.little longer to'begin. There ar~ many paragraphs to which .no amendment') ha:ve been submitied. 1 thirlk we .can carry tlu'.,ugh. 1 thirik weshould vote on . lesquels this entireresolution tonight." The. PRESIDENT (translated fromRussian): Under I1Ùe" 36 oi our ruIes of.procedure 1 mûst firstput thé Ghineseproposal to. thti.vote. Rule 36 states that" .•. whenanamendment addsto or dcletes from thetext of à. motion .ordtaftres()- lution • . .$', etc. Ag'the Chïnese amendment. involv~·a deletion, 1 attlobliged toput it to the' vote. The proposal is to deletethe.Urst paragraph of thè United States,reselution" . . '.Mr..TSIANG (Chin~):Thâvea poÏJlt of orde~. 1made no motion; 1submitted noamendment~ .1simply dec1aredthat,in IllY opinion, ~ p~a" grapbis unnecessary and IShâll ab~tainfJ:'omthe vote. ' ,/'fheiRE~IDE~T(tran$!ate~trom Russianr:I malItberefore WlthdrawtheChinese.amenclment. In the future, in .order to save ~e,. J:I1.ay.lask that..all .. amenclments·}je' submitted •.in" wrlting; otherwise 1. sh~ not put tb:em ta.. tb.e,vote,a$, when they are first madeora11y'and are then withdtawn or changed, our· work is merely .delayëd~ The President' then c(mtt'n.ued t.·n. 'Fre.n.ch: . . .'.... . .. '. - . ..' . There iSalso a Syrianamendn1~il.t (8/901] to replace the firstparagraph of theUirlted Sfates draft resolution by the followingtext:, . , i . . " -. "Takinginto conSideration7 the report of thê U1Ûted Nations Mediator dated12 July 194~~T', Abstainingi' Canada, Colombia, Franèe, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, .UniOJ;l of SovietSocialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America. The result of the vote was4 in favour, with 7 abstentions. The amendment was not adopted, having failed to abtain the alfirmative votes of seveil. members. ' The PRESIDENT (translated {rom Rus3Ï.an): We shalI now proc~ed to a vote on the United Kingdom amendinent. 'The Assist~t Secretary- General will read it. . Mr.Hoo(Assistant Secretary-General in ~harge of the Department of Trusteeship}: This amendment is' reproducèd in document'8/895 and reads as follows: "In the firstparagraph, dele~e the wordS 'the Provisional Government of Isra.el has indicated its 'acceptance in principle, of a prolonga~on'of the truce' in 'Palestine that' and msert after 'Pal,estine' in the penultimàte line the words 'whereas the other party has'complied with thes~ appeals'. The paragraph will accordingly read: , "'Takingint'o considerriJion that, .the States members of the Arab League hâve rejected successive appeals of the United Nations Mediator and of the Security Council inits tesolution of 7.JuIy 1948, fQr't~e prolongation of the tr1:(ce in Palestine, whereastheotherparty hascomplied "(ith these.appeals;and that there hasconsequ~ntIy .âeveloped àrenewal ofhostilities in PàIestine'/" , . . . A vote wastak~n by show of htlnds~ as followf: bt favour : Belgium3 ,Colombia, United,Kingdom. -:"Against: Syria. A'bst;nning: .,-Argentina, Canada, China, France, Ukrainian Soviet Sociiilist Republic~ Union of Sov}et Socialist Republics, United 'd'Ukraine; States of Amenca. The result'of the votewas3in favour, Illy against, and7.abstentions. The tlmendment WtlS not{ldopted,having tailed tOobtainthe,;ffirma- . tive votes ofseve#' rnem,bers., . The PRESIDE~T (translo,ted, from Rus$ÎtuÜ: The,éUIlendment isrejectedand thetextremains M()riginalIy submittedhy the Urrlted Statesdele- . gation. " . , A vote will now he t~ken onthe firstparawaph .Qf .the United.States proposal. . ,Avotewastaken by sh~w'ofhands, as follows: Jn , !av()ur:, Belgium" Canada~ Colombia, France" Ukrain~.::m ,~~oViet Socialist', Repuhlic, ' Umon of Soviet 8üc~;:ilistRf.:pu1:llics,,United Kingdom, United States' of Amenca. . Mr.' UlIDANETA-ARliELAEZ (Colombia): 1 voted for the paragraph,making the same resei"- ' vation tlîat· the representative of the. United Kingdommade: . General McNAUGHTON. (Canada) : . l make the same reservation tfultthe repr~tative of the UIÙtedKIDgdom hasmade. . ' The PRESIDENT (translated trom French): The Security eouncil takes. note of the thre~ "TCSerVations wliicb have 'heen made. Ml. Ho (Assistant Secretary-Generalin 'charge ofthe Department of Tmsteeship) ~ The second 'paiagraph reads as follows: "Determines th?J: the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to peace within'the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter".. A vDfewastaken.by show of hands, as follows: In. fàvour: . Be1gium, Canada, Colombia, .soviétiques" Fram~e, Ukrainian . Soviet ,SociaIist Republic. l1nion'ofSoviet' SociaUst· R~publics, United Kùigdom, United States of America. Agt#nst: Syria. Abstaining:'Argentiria, China. Theparllgraphwas adopiedby,8pote~to 1 witA. 2 abstentior.$. " Thé PuSIDÈNT (translatedjtDmRuss,aIl1: Wc shalI ,now vote 011 the t1ilidparagrap}'.t. ..Q(mçralM:cNAP'G~N(Canada) : TshouId ~e,lYiththePEesjden.t'spermiSsi~n, '.'to ..ask a qu~oh..Df'the Mediator. I see thatm·the1aSt 'lineof .tbis' thirdparagraph,the wording. is: C\ •• butmanyeventnot laterthaIl. three days ftom~~ ..dateof.th.e~~option of thisresolution". "-"BefQr~~p~gr~ph1SPllttothevote,1 should "AVaIltque . J~ketobe a&mred~titis, inal1r~(g;, in tJte opinïoQ.ofthe Mediator, a practicable pro- \l'ÎsÎon~ . " '. Count lJERNADOT1'E(Vnited Na~()nsMedia-Leç()mte, OOï" in Pai~tfue):..~f.saidy~~day,.~f~Ji·k+~at;0nJ? that !lJ1Y respo~"bility, if~we.geta truce, ~tt:'. ~,''!f'.i ihal wehavean,orgaIllZationto supervIs~M<esl~QU$o1?tenonsune truce. 1·donotthink thàt th~re•.are anylècÎ1.;1ÎC~ andpracticalpossibilities,ofgetting •.tlûS l'looy bWîtùpJn tnree days. 'fherefore,ttlyopimoIlqu'il isthatffiJs lVordirlgshouldbem()re.fIexibl~as 'ment, BUcJ:\an organizat,kln W'()11ld,))e,AAS9tp,te1y:neces- . G~eral MoNAUGHTON (Canada): In view the statement just made by the Mediator, 1 wouId ask the representative of the United States whether he would agree to delete the words '~ut in any event not later than three days from the date of the adoption of this resolution", and substitute the following: ceto take effect at sucb œrly date as the Mediator, taking futo account bis responsibilities for supervising th.: observation of the truce, muy determine and notify to the respective parties". Mr. JESSUP (United States of America): 'While 1 should hope that no more tiine than is absolutely necessary would pass between the time of passage of this resolution and the actual observance of the truce, 1 yièld to the point of view expressed by the Medi~.tor out of bis experience inbringing the first truce into effect. 1 suggest to the representative of Canada, however, that perhaps he made a mistake in his8uggested wording, since, on comparing bis text with. our original one, itis evident that it is necessary to begin the substitution after the word "forces" in the fourth line instead of after the words cebut , ID any event" as fudicated by hini in bis oral explanation. On that understanding, the Unite~ States dcl.egation accepts the substitution as inc1icated. . . Mr. MALIK (Union ofSoviet Socialist Repubtics) (translated trom R·Lt-rian) : The USSR deIegation considers that th.e Security Council res\? tutionon this question should, afterall, set a d.efinite date for .the<:essation of hostilities and the 6eginning of the trucc"" Most of the speakers he~ehave ~~essedth~ fact that blQodis at present beh"1g shen m Palestine: Arabs arekilling Jews and Jews Arabs. The Mediator made a moving speech calling upon the Security Councilto come ta a definite decision at the earlie.c;;t possible .moment. In the preceding paragraph Of thisresolution. which. we-have &.ÎI"èady voted on and adopted,,_ theSecurityCouncil states that thè situation in :palestine constitutes a ilireat to peace. In these <eircwnstancesthe SecinîtyCouncil should fixa defuri.te date for.the cease-1Ïre. . ' '. The delegation of theUSSR,. therefore,thinks that thisparagraph should.be 'mlendedQydelet- ;l1g the words "at a limeto be detern:rlnedby the Mediator, .but in any ~vent not later. than. • .on The paragraphwould. th~retain its original wordingwith the exception ofthe above passage, and the time-Iimit for the cessation of hostilities wouldbeset for nodater than thrèeda~from the date of.the adoption of this resolution; 0 1have unfortuna.tèly not prepared Ill} amend- ~~.tin.writing but 1 shal,l do so atonce. Speaking for my delegation, 1 must say that l was ready to vote for this resolution; but now that the United States representative has accepted the Canadian proposal, 1 dumot vote for it any longer, as 1 see that the matter is being' uselessly delayed. ~ Mr. JESSUP (United StéJ,tes of America): ,1 think there is a slight confusion, at least .in my mind, regarding the suggestion of,the representative of the UssR. 1 understood that he desired precision as to the time when t.he truce would take effect. The language, however, would not fit his meaning,.as 1 understood his amendment, since it wouldmere1y order the Governments to 1 cease :fire, et cetera, in, any event not.later than three days ...". That leaves the thinP' very uncertain, 1suggest. The parties would not know when it was that they were supposed to stop. 1 think our experience'in all these cases has bcen that, as a practical matter, one must tell them that it is' at 10.65 o'dock, or 10 o'clock, or 12 o'dock, or at 9 o'dock iD. the eveÎ1ing that theymust cease fire. Somebody is needed, it seems. tonie, to:fix that. 1 am very anxious to get this resolution into effect as soon aS. possible, and, rather than risk that the paragraph itself, which is the core of' our resolution, should not meet with the approval of the Security Council, 1 woUld ,suggLSt that we might first éonsider the ame~1(lment suggested by the representative of Canada. 1 admitted iliat 1 would accept it, but if it is not acceptable ta the USSR, then 1 should like to ask if the USSR represcntative would agree to the original text which the USSR repre'lentatïve a~eed was accèptable to him yesterday [336th meeting], and allowthe text to stand as originally presented. 1 ask the President and the' liSSR represep,tative if we might follaw that course.

There are thus two amendments before. me: first, the Canadian atnendm~nt; and seconà;the onè submitted by the represent~tive of the US8'R. 1 shall put them to the vote in' the order in wlùch !bey were submitted. ' The Canadian' ;).meDd1.:!~nt, which was sub~ mitted first, reads 3;;; folloW5 = The result of the vote was 5 in favour, UJith 67~stentions. The amendment was not adopted, having failed to obtaz'n the affirmative votes of seven members. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) ,(translated jrom Russian) :, 1 wïthdraw my amendment, provided the third paragraph of the resolution submitted by the representative of the United States retains its original wording. Mr. EL-KHoUR! (Syria): 1 wish to explain my vote on the' Canadian amendment. 1 do not believe that any referehce in this cIraft resolution . to Chapter VII of the Charter, or to any action under Chaptèr VU of the Charter, would be correct. It is for thai reason that 1 shalI not vote in favour of any reference ta Chapter VII. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) (translated from Spanish) : 1 asked that the document he voted upon in parts and, as 1 said before, this morning Isubmitted to the Secretariat a, wrltten indication of . the various parts. ln accordance with ruIe 32 of the rules of procedure, the method of voting 1have asked fol;" must be. followed if even one member' of the Council requests it. 1 sub!IJ.Ïtted· roy r~quest in writing in order to facilitate the work of the Secret~at. . 1 ask that the words "'pursuant to Article .:1:0 of 1 the Charter of the United Nations" he voted upon sep'arately. . ,The PRESIDE~ (translated from·French):l Qraw the Security Council's attention to the Argentine representative's proposal to delete the wo'rds "pursuant to Article 40 of the .Charter of the United Nations", in the third paragraph of, the United Statès resolution. 'graphe . Mi'.. ARCE (Argentina) (translated from French ),: l did. notrequest .that. . ..·The PRESIDENT (translated ·from French): W~at did yoù request? ,de . Mr. ARCE (Argentirta) (translated from French) : 'What lrequested was very clear; there was noneed to interpret it as the Presidentdid. l have,.asked for the vote to betaken in accor~ ance Wlth rule3·2 of therules of procedure whk,·~ sta~es that parts ofamotion or of a draft resolution·shall be'voted on separately at the request oL.anyre.p~esent.ative. J ~illn.ot bedictateàt~l by anyone and 1 d(:lmand a separate vote.

The, text which 1 have beforeme proposes thatthe ward "orders"be replaced'• The reprcsentative of Argentina now says that he does not P~essthe point.1 take note of tàat. However, in the,futürej proposa1s must he submittèd,ta me in writing in .accordance ,with, the rules Qf procedme, because 1 cannot. follow aU the, whims contained in these proposals.ltis a very diffic.ult ~k. - The Argentine representative preposes a separatev()te. 1 shall firstput to the vote the phrase Upursuant, to Article, 40'of the Charter of th.e United Nations". Is that whatthe Argentine representative' wanted?, - ,Mr. - AROE (Argentina)_ (translated ~ Irom ,Frent:h): Yes,Mr~<President;it is vell' clear.. ,CA-vote ~llSttlk~1/, byshow oflzafl;ds, as follows: - In javour:Belgium,Canada, Colambia, France, UhaiIû,an SovietSodalist RePt!.bIic~ Union ofSovietSociaIist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of Amerlca. Agai1JSt: Byria.' Abstaining:' ArgeIltÏBa, China. The phiasewasadopied: by-8votes.to Vwitit 2 abstentions. ',', __ The PREsmE~T (translated [rom Russian): 1 12-- malI put ta ~evote the paragraph as a wholey as it is worded in the ·resolution submitt.ed by the _ United States delegation. . "Orders the Governments and authorities concemed, pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations, to desist from further milltary action and, to :his end, to issue cease-tire orders to their military and para-military forces, to take effect at a time to be determined by the Mediator, but in any event not later tilan three days from the date of the adoption cf this resolution." A vote was taken by show of hands, as follows: ..::0--- --"" In favour: Be1gium, Canada, Colombia, China, France, Ukrainian Soviet SodclistRepublie, Union'of Soviet Soqalîst 1?.Gpublics, United Kingdom, United States' d America. Against: SyrA. AbstaininH= Argentina. 'The paragrapli was adopted by 9 votes to 1, with 1 abstention. Mr. JES-SUP (United States of America:): 1 think it is nece..'i8ary, in viewof the discussion on this pl:U'agraph, that we should takenote of the fact thattheMediator has warned us that there may he difficulty in putting this into effect. with full observatio~, in the time which we havé specified. Ithink thaï; we must,count on the, parties to co-operate fully in meeting the deficiencies of the machin~ryin ~atshoIt space of time. The PRESIDJENT (tra.nslated trom Russian): We shall now proceed tothe fourth paragraph. You all have. the text before you. 1 think· we i:an simply put it tG the vote. ' ' . A vote was taken by show of hands, as follows: In favour:Belgium, Canada,Colombia, Frarlce, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republk, Union of SovietSocialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America. Against: ·Syria~ Abstainin~: Argenilila, ".China. The parag'l'aph .'lilas adoptedby 8 votes to'l ï with 2 abst~ntions. The PRESIDENT. (t,ranslated from Russian): TheSeturity Counol WÏ;ll ilow vote on tne fifth paragraph.· . Mr. kCE. (Argentina): Sameobservation. .The PRESIDENT (translated from .. Russian) : The Argentine repI'esentative,'asks that.the paragJ'aph 1>e voted. in parts.. He proposes takîn6 a vote firIlto~ tl,le following phrase: . Agtinst: Syria. Abstaining: Argentina, China, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The result of the vote was 6 in fav<Jur, 1 againstl and 4 abstentions The phrase wasnot adoptedl havirtg failed to ' btain the affirmative votes of seven members. The PRESIDENT (translated trom Russian): l shall now read the paragraph wiiliout the phrase: "Calls upon all Governments'and authorities concerned to continue' tQ co-operate with the Mecliator.with a view to the maintenance of peace in .Palestine; in conformity with the resolution adopted by the Sœurity Council on '29 May IM8~ . : 1put the paragraphin that fonu ~o the vote. A vote was taken by show of hattdsl as follows: In favour: .Argentina, . Belgium, Canada, China, polombi~, France, Syrla, United Kingdom, United States (If America. Absiaining: Ukrainian Sov.t:et Sociàlist Republie".Union of Soviet Socialist Republks. The paragrap.4 was adopted in that form by 9 votes to nonel uith 2 abstentions. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republîcs'(translated from Russian): 1~ to explain briefly why the delegation of the USSR abstained , from voting on the words which.were'put to the vote beforethe vote was taken on. the paragraph as awhole. ' The USSR delegation abstained from voting on the paragraph as Il whole because it contains a reference tothe'resolution of 29 May 1948. The USSR delegatiou, as you know, abstained from . voting on that resolution because it contamed provisions favouring one of the parties in Palestine and creating clifficulties for.the other. There . was thel'efore no point invoting on ,an isolated ph.ase taken from the paragrap~. . The PRESIDENT (translated frornRussian): We noW' proceed to the sixth paragraph. l'here 18 no need, 1 presume, to read it as you. have it before you. . A vote was taken by show of hands, as follows: The paragraph was adopted unanimously. The PREI3IDENT (translated. from Russian): We shall proceed to the seventh raragraph. Thereis a USSR amendment to thispara: " graph, and 1 suggest we put it tothe vôtefirst, in accordance with the rulesof procedure. He proposed replacing the seventh paragraph by two paragraphs, which he caUs the seventh and eighth paragraphs. 1have studied the United l States representative's new proposai and conside: 1 it unacceptable. The hasic prt.)visions contained. 1 in the former ciraft of the proposai on the demilitarization of Jerusalem are extended still further i,n the new version. This new text propose..<; extending the Mediator's duties and entrusting mm, in practice, with the functions of administrator of the city of Jerusalem, chief of police and com- . mander of the JevJish.-Arab detachments referred to here by the United States representative. It must be added that·he himse1f described the creation of such joint Jewish-Arab detachments as nothiiig more than aflight of fancy.lendorse that. description 3.Ild do notthink that the proposal can be regarded as realistic. .'Furthermore, the Statute of Jerusalem has been determined by a resolution of the General Assembly, arid the USSR delegation considers tha.t we should be guided by that resolution, sinccany new decision will net help matters but will simply complicate the situation. It is not the Security Council's business. to draw up new plans for the . Statute of Jerusalem, as envisaged by the United States representil.:tive's proposal. 1 repeat that the adoption of such a resolution would merely corn,.. plkate the situation sinet there already exists a General Asseml1ly resolution, adopted by a majority of the Assembly's members, on this question. To continue: the United States resolution pro': vides for the demilitarization Qf Jerusalem. As far , as we know, never at any time during the United Kingdom Mandate in Palestine was the city of Jerusalem a military base, and no military objectives requiringspecial demilitarization were, 1 be1ieve, ever set up there. Moreover, the adoption of the demilitariza.;. tion proposaI in the form suggested bythe United Statesrepresentative would involve the creation of some kind of special international armed force. AlI that, 1 again emphasize, would complicate the situation. In view of these fads, theUSSR delegation proposes that the seventh paragraph should be replaced by a new paragraph, the text of which has been. submitted ta 'Üle members of the Secur~ ity Council. It reads: ' ..The PRESIDENT (translat~d [rom French): For reasons wmch 1shall indicate, the Ukrainian de1egation support,,:,the propàsal of the USSR delegatioÎl.. The }11leaning' of ·the~ptession udemilitarization {ÎfJerusalem~' is not veryclear to us. The term "d61ùlitarization" has a petfectly clear connotation in French, in English àtid in Russian: it means "to 'withdraw troops", troo~ which are on the spot, under arms and in~Œosi­ (ion at any moment to provoke ,incidents. This is entirely unambiguous; and this is what the USSR , molution proposes. From the explanations which we have received here from· the Mediator, it is apparentnot only tbat troops would be with&awn,but that new detachments would take their place. Thisimme- : diately raises the question of. t.~e composition of these. new detachment~ and the countries fro~ which they·would he dr,awn. We are well aware that questions have .sometimes beensettled by three great Powers without reference to· the.Security ·Counçü. 1 inentioned to you,as an eXample, the case ofthe so-èalled internationalization of Haïfa. Now you Can understandour concem to 'b.ea~13q1,latêiy ÏDformed. 0 . Weare toldthatilie force to,be organizedwill beintemationalin character. We mew very .w~n iliatoucha force should exist under the terms of Article 4:3 of the. Charter. YP ,ta the present, however, no suchforce has be.encreated.NQw, onthepretextoffomlinganintemationalbcidy oftroops .und~r. the authority of ..the '. Security .•Council and,the United Nations, ar,e thesame armies tobe represented as~e there now? Would the. presenc«;of suchnew detachments give.usany guê1rant(;~ tb.at,no incidentswouldprésence OCClJI'?'I'hc.Medi~tor is a solqier,and 1 am sure thathe'would,never give us such,agu~.antee, becare<} he, knows the situation. Wc should.thus ---~"";;;:='-:l.,l'::'.ac·ed. 'Withthe •pbssib~f---inGid.mtWllld-I-J.a-si·~Lti·ioILJlj·ès-Lors,-tI.OtWhammu~Em-:seUle1l1ten1;- clashes arisïngllot..,n1ybetween .A1'abs'and Jews, but"alsobet\Veen the United Nations forces,. and the local population. This would stilLfurther aggravatethe.situation, ~'d·thariS""hy.we consi4er that thetroops shouldsiroplybe withdtawn. Once the troopsare withdrawn, the local civil __34ministration will take ovet,and there .will . he Iloclashes~Why'creatc;the impression, even if ît,is onlYan itnpression,' thatjeru..'lalemis t(r he oc<:upied anew? ThilseareoûrrEcisons iorptderringtheUSSP, proposal, ari.dtbl:i:t is.why 1shall votefodt. gùarant~e for both the Jews and the Arabs that the opposing party would not come into the city and take the part of the city.that they, perhaps, .had held before. , . . 1 sI:tould not be surprisedif both the Jews and. the .Arabs, should they accept the principle.of demilitarization, would aIso agree 'LO this•. That is the only reason why 1 have spoken aboutan international force which ought to go to Jerusalem to give an.assUF!illce to ,both parties ,that no new troops from either party ;would enter the City or .its .sUrroundings. ,la Mr. EBAN (Israel): On the question of the : :ailitarizatiori of .]erusalem, 1 would endoï'se theprinciple laid down by the Mediator, that the Withdr.aw~ o~troops fromJêrusalem cannot md' should notbe sucéeeded by a vacuum in so far as security is concerned. Therefore we should think not merelyin ,negative terms of withdrawing. troops, butin positive terms of what provision is to be made thereafter for th.e preservation of order. One principle which 1 believe has been put to the Mediator ID this connexion is that,after the Withdrawal of.troops, . ,·la the .fàsk will be· a 'police task'and not a military' .non task; .and as far as possible the recruitment of Jewishand hab police, respectively, in.the different areé!Swould to a large degree. take care of that vacuum.' The PRESIDEN'î' (translated from Russian): . 1 liave ,no more names on my list of speakers on this question. We shall proceed to the vote on the USSR amendment which is before you. .. " , . \Conseil , . A vote was taken by si':'":1 iÎ kands, as follows: IT.n~7.fa;;;vour:···Ùkralnian Soviet Socialist :Republie, Union of~oviet Socialist Republics. . "soviétl Against: Syria~ . .' Abstaining: 'Argentina, Belgiwn, Canada, China, Colombia,· Franœ~ United Kingdom, United States' of America. The result of the'v~te·was 2 in favour; 1 against, and 8 abstentions. The amendmentiliiiS Mtadopte,d, having failed to obtaintE.e affirmative votes of seven ,merribers.' , , .'!'hePREsIDENT (tianslated,. from Russian): We shallnowproceed tovote on thesev'enth Paragril.ph as ,worded:in the.United Statçs.reso-. Iution.... ,

We h,avebefore us an official text and also an unofficial text submitted in the forro of a suggestion. i shalI therefore put tothe vote the official text which has been distributed today and which is embodied in documer' 8/890. A vote was taken by show of hands, as follows: In favour: ArgeiJ.tina, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, France, United Kingdom,. Unitted States of America. Abstaini.rtg: Syna, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist,Republics. The paragraph. was ildopted by8 ,!otes to none, with 3 absterttions. 1 The PRESIDENT (tramlated [rom Russian): Let us proceed to the eig1;lth pm-agraph. 1 should like the United Kingdomamendment to be . read out. . Sir Alexander CADoGAN (United ~gdom): 1 should like to say a few worm with regard ta the amendment which my Government has instructed me to propose to this paragraph. This amendment would consist ofadding, fi the seconâ line, after th~ words·"breaches of the truce" the words "siIu~e 11 June 1948". As Iindiéated at a previons meeting[334th meeting], when 1 mentioned that 1 should move this amendment, its intention is tomake clear that a:Ileged breaches of the truce, both in the past ~d anynotre thatunfoitunately mightoccurinthefuture" should be examined. My Government wishes to amplif) 'bis paragraph in this manner because it feels tl iull weight should begiven to the Arab cOlnplaint that the truce has, not been fairly observed'and that it opcrates to the dis~ - advantage_ of the Arabs. Un1es:~ thiscQinplaint is·fiillyinvestigated, colom may be given to the belief that there is an atmosphere of hostilîtyto ,the Arab cause. The United Nations owes it to itself, therefore,roensure full investigation. 1 kqow· '::iat the Mediator has emphas~ed ,the difficulty nf s'Jch a procedure, but myGovema ment atta:hes considerable importanf:e. to it, and h"pes that it may be provi~~d fOI'., In this connexion, my GÔverrament. conside1'll that if the tfUceis renewed, "a more effective macHnery for supervising itsobservance' will be necessary.. The Mediator himself .has already emphasized that,and 1 eamestly trustthat,adéquate arrangements may bë made. ' My Government's only object in supporting the resolution is tosecure .an extension of the .truce during which negotiationsfor apeace~ul settlementcan proceed, as it has a:Iways advocated. 'In working for the suspension of hostili- Il. ties, myGovemment fully reserves its views on It would be 1;\ mng tn infer, from His Majesty's Government's'cl~eto help to bri..'lg the fighting to a stop, that ~:: r.ommits itself to any set propOsaIs for a final solution. It emphatically rejects the suggestion thRt the United NatilJns has . no' power ta modify previous recommendations if it wishes, or to adopt, as' it m."';t, whatever recommenda:tions seem to it, best anà mo.<;t impartial. In voting for the r~olution, P.is :F..~~jesty's Govcrnment doesnot endorse an)' sugge.sti~nthat the Arabs are the aggressors or that justice in the disputei:; all on one side. , . Mr. JESSUP (United States of AmerlCl1): 1 am willing to accept the .amendment suggested by the representative of the United Kingdom. .Naturally~ 1 do not· accept or associatemyself with a;n of the remarks WhiCh h~ has just made in proposing bis amendment, bût! donot intend to engage in any c01].troversy over'v&io.us mat~ ters raised in the explanations of votes or amendments. The reason the U~ted·.Statesdelegation is' willing to accept the amendment is this: our orig4lal text provides {or the examination of alleged breaches .of the tiuce. There aJ:'e alleged breaches of the truce.emanating from both parties. There will. undoubteclly .continue tQ he aIlegations 9f breaches of the truccemanating (rom both parties. 1 have no doubt~ as 1 have' said before, that sorne of those allegations will he true, that neither side wm he found to be blameless. We think there should be a procedure. If ând when that procedure is established, 1 see no reason why the recordssince Il June should not beexamined, in accordance wiili the suggestion . of the United Kingdom. 1 thirefore accept that amendment. ' .. . . .' Mr. EBAN (IsraeÎ): 1 sin'lply wish to endorse theamendment proposed 1?Y the representative of the United Kingdom, referring to facilities for. investigating.pastbreaches of.the truce.. . If the amendm~nt is adopted, the Governlllent of Israel will submit a recOi.'d of p~cy-five Arab·violations and breaches of the truce, and a . further record ofbreaches of the truce by certain ap!hori~es' which have, misinterpreted its pro- VlSl?nS l'Y applying. restrictions beyond those whicl1 the. truce authorized, and by refusing to In particular, we should ask the body constituted under this amendment to investigate the detention of men of military age in CyP,rus~ ~ detention which rests upon no authority, decision or disc~tion of the Mediator. With reference to the speech with which the amendment was introduced, 1 would only refer to one sentence, which reads: "Th~e is a danger that the'Arabs, rightly or ~ngly, feel that the Security Council is not a forum in which t.."tey can count on proper conaideration of their views.:: TI Council can defend itself agai."lSt this charge of partiality. 1 do not know whether the' reference is to the fact that the Arabs never have more than five representatives at tlûs ·table ta reiterate their views, or whet\1er it is a reference, to spectacular victories wmch the Jewish cause has won in this room. Count BERNADOTTE (United Nations Mediator in Palestine): 1 orAy want to repeat what 1 said yesterday with regard to the possibilities of our investigating violations which took place in connexion with the truce which has just ended. 1 WaIl.t to have it on record that 1 cannot- 1 repeat, 1 ca.-w,ot - promise tbat inyestigations of that kind can give any resült, and 1 do hope that thisdistinguished body, ü it adopts this resolution, 'will give me a big enoughorganization to try to investigate the old violations of the truce, as wel1 as to supervise the new truce for which we all hope. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syrïa): 1 endorse the amendment suggested by the representative of the United Kingdom in thatit calls, for an investigation of previous breaches of the truce, and 1 wish to call the attention of the Mediator to certain documents which have been published by the Irgun leaders with reg~d to the contents and the cargo of one shîp only, the Altalena~ which was smuggled in. This information was published as an advertisement ,in yesterday's New York Post~ and there is an explanation about large quantities of military supplies,quantities which perhaps aU the Arabs do notpossess. , Mahmoud Bey FAWZI (Egypt): 1 have only a few words to add to what the representative of Syria has' just s~d. A.t long last, 1 findonce more that 1 agree with the distinguished spokesman for the Jews. 1 agree with hitn in supporting the amendment prpented by the delegation of the United. Kingdom, but our reasons for this support vary. 1 tl:ünk that the Council should we1come this addition, as' "'ans of supplying the Security Council ani Tnited Nations with as compl.de ~orm<. oS poSsible, "and with as complete a picture 4S possible of what has been happening·Bince the first cease-fire began..

We shaIl proceed tO.vote on the United Kingdom amendment. • .i.V:... JESSUP (Unitèd States): 1 wish to raise a point of order. My understanding is that when an ame~dment -is accepted, it is embodied in the original text, so that we are spared one extra vote on the text as amended. . The PRESIDENT: Does the United States representati"le accept it? . 'présentant Mr. JESSUP (United States) : Yes, 1 acc~pt it.

We shaIl now 1vote on the e1ghth paragraph, with. the United Kingdom amendment which has been accepted by the represcntative of the United States. . A vote was taken by show ofhands, as follows: ln favour: Argentina, Beigium; Canada, China, ColoIIibia, France, Syria, United Kingdom, United States of America. Abstaining:' Ukrahuan S~viet .S~cialist Repubûc, Union of Soviet SociaIist Republics. .. Theparagraph was adopted by 9 votes to none, with 2 abstentions. .ThePR.ESIDENT (translated. trom -Russian) : We shaIl proceed tu the ninth paragraph, which you have before you. 1 presume there is no need to have it read ou:t. . . '. Mr. MAux. (Union of Soviet Socialist Republic;.» (translated trom Russian): At yester- 4ay's meeting of .the Security Council [336th meeting], the USSR delegation drew attention to the provisions 'contained in the ninth paragra,ph of the United States draft resolution, and ~ pârticular to the. passage envisaging the possibility of further decisio~ by the General Assembly on the Palestine question. The USSR delegation asked the representative'of the United States yesterday to cIarify the sense of that provi- ------------ The representative of the Unitèd stàtes in bis speech today noted the consistèncy of the USSR Government and the USSR delegation in their attitude t9ward the lalestine qu~tion and in their support of the provisions thereon adopted by the General Assembly on 29 November 1947. 1 am grateful to the United States representative for bis remarks, but unfortunately 1 am unable to return the compliment, because the United States is continuing to pursue its ambiguous and zigzag policy on the Palestine ques- . tion, despite the defeat which the Unit~d States delegation stiffered at the second speèial session of the General Assembly in its attempt to secure a revision. of the previous Assembly's. resolution on that question. The United States delegation pays lip-service to the resolution of 29 November 1947 and iœ implementation, and the resolution is even supported in the speeches of statesmen and the offiCial progranttnes of political parties. In actual fact, however, the United States dele- . gation is putting forward propQsaIs the effect of which, in substance, would· be the nQnimplementatiQn or even the direct violation. of the resolution. . The United States representative hasreferred to the fact that other resolutiejfis have beell ~dopted since the General Assembly resQlutiQn of 29 November. That is correct. Such resolutiorts have been adopted, but they have not in any way altered the substance of the basic provisions of the General Assembly resolution Qf 29 November 1947. Therefore, .to include proposais fol' new decisions on the Palestine question in a Securiti CQuncil resolution at this stage amQunts to proposing in advance a revision of the original resolution.·· . The USSR delegation holds that the adoption of such d~cisions by'the Security Council would . pot cQntribute to aspeedy solutiQn of the Palestine problem, but would, on thc.contrary, complicate and confound it still further. It would also create harmful ,illUsions among those who are violating the General Asse.mbly's decision, illusions that they Can violate it with impunity. The USSR delegation cannot acee.~tthis situation and , The PRESIDENT (tfanslat~d from Russian): We shalI now proceed to vote on the nintÎl paragraph. A vote was taken by show of hands, as follows: In favour: Argentina, ,'Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, France, United Kingdom, United States of America. Against: Syria. Abstaining: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Repub. lic, UrJon of Soviet Socialist Republics. The paragraph was adopted by 8, votes to 1, with 2 abstentions. The PRESTJ)ENT (translated from Russian): We shalI ploceed' ,to the Chinese amendment [8/897], which you have before you and which ît is therefore unnecessary to read out. Mr. TSIANG (China): 1 would reserve the right to speak a little' later, since the represf"Jltarive of the United States raised hîs hand before 1 dîd. Mr. JESSUP (Ùnited States of America}: ! wish to say a word about thîs amendment submitted by the representative of China. When the representative of China made hîs first address yesterday morning [335th meeting], 1confess that 1shared the concein whîch was later expressed byth,e representativeof France, and 1 was very glad to hemthe later explanaûon, whîch seemed to me to c!arify mymind and to he fully in accord witbthelong ~'l.d distînguished record of thehead of the Chinese delegation and with the po§ition' of hîs Gvvernment in regard to the Charter from the tinte of Dumbarto~ Oaks to the present. 1 havecarefu1lystudied, in connexion with the text whîch he hassuggested, the remarks which he made yesterday, and 1 believè that bis purpose is a praper one. As 1 understand it from 'bis remarks, he desires ta amplify thç resolutionby holding oUt a goal, in the sense of a series of principles whîch should guide the parties in carrying out the truce and in co·operath.g with . the Mediator in ordeI'to bring about the su.ccess- fuI 2ccomplishment of the task whîch the General Assembly has imposed upon him. .fait However, theamendment submitted by the representative ofChina does not seem to me to be drafted in the most acceptable form., The text of the.amendment singles out two àmong,the.issues .. in the :Palestine question, and states that the parties should make concessions on these two points. Nowthere may be many other pointS on which the partieswill need to make mutJlalcon- Moreover; it seems to me that in view of the Security Council's function in this whole matter~ it should not attempt to intrude itself into a èlis- cassian of the particular political solutions which may be arrived at, in any way, in accordanëe\~th the resolution of the General Assembly, Whlch hac; instructed the Mediator to work to bring about a peaceful settlement. In view of these points 'which 1 have brought out, 1would appeal to the representative of China to consider a' variation in 'ms phrasing - and copies of my suggestion are no,\" being distributed to the members-, wmch 1 hope' would .carry out bis idea and still,meet the objections whiçh have occurred to my.mind, so that 1 may be able to acceptthe amendment which he proposes. What 1 would suggest is that, in this connexion, we l'ecall the fact that, on 22 May, in the resolu- , tion [8/773] adopted by the Security Councü, we did~a11 upon the parties toco-operate with the Mediator. We might, therefore; at this time ,use the folIcwing language: "Reiterdtes thP, appeal to the parties coIltained ÏJ:J. the last paragrapho! the'resoll,ltiml of 22 May and urges upon the· partiés that they. continue conversations with the Mediator in a spirit of conciliation and mutual concesSion,'in order that aU points widerdispute maybe settled peace- fully.'~. Mt. TSIANG (China): At this late hour 1 shan not involve the Counc,il in a lengthydiscussion on this point. Ishall simply state that, in: the fust place, 1 prefer my own phraseology. 1 regardit as simpl~ and more to the point. But in order te promôte agreement in the Council, 1 accept, although. reluctanùy, the phraseology suggested by the delegation of the United States. Therefore, 1 accept fuis phrasing to take the place of my oogiiIal amendment., ' . . . The PRESIDENT (translated' tram, Russian):· Speaking as the representative.of the· Ukrainîan Soviet Socialist·Republic, 1 consider the tcxt sub- mitted by the United States delegation tobe rather the better one. It formulates the idea in rather more subtIe. terms than the amendment sû~mittedby the representative ofChina. Never- theless 1 believe that the United States a111end- ment is fraught' with d~gerouspossibilities. .. We must b~e ourselves on past' experience. . What has been our experience of Mr. Berna- dotte's work? This is not a personal attack{)uhim. Experience has shown us that Mr. Bernadotte, obviously inspired by somebody pr other, has ~embly resolution. ~'spirit of conciliation" refer? If th~ point at isRue is, say, a question connectedwitli tEe truce, a Question of .whether soine detachment can be moved ta one place or another,. theu there -can be no argument; agreement can be -reached, for military çonsiderations prevail.lf the question is, say, the watér needed by Jerusalem, there again '1 . there canbe,no argument and certain concessions' -can be made. " . But there are essential points of difference. There is the General Assembly resolution an the creation of tWo separate States. Is there to obe a Jewish State, Qr. not? The proposal refe~ing to "conciliation" does not solve that question; 6:" the contrary, it remains.ambiguous. 1 am very glad-andI·wantittobeputonrecord-· that the representativeof the.UnitedStateshas sub- mitted this resolution, precisely because it shows the crude fashion in which the Mediator has,been given car-te blanche. 1 wantthat"to be put on ( a3surer i'ecQrd. , .At' the,same tvae 1i;elieve that there is a.great danger that the resql\!tion may be violated~ Let me say openly that the danger is iri improvisation on the grand' scale, .creative improvisations as if certain decisions could be made today and differ- ent ones tomorrow. Letme address myself te;> the representativç of the UIi!ed States. We were all present when Mr. Eemadotte came here and made hisproposal that a. plebiscite should be carried out in Jerusalem {333rd meeting]. The USSR representative, asked,."What do you-mean, il1'Jerusalem?Havelanderstoodyoucorrectly?"; whereupon Mr. Bernadotte promptly changed· bis-tune and started todevelop a whole compli- cated them,,! ta the _effect that. strictly speaking . autre. the plebiscite need not be carried out ID Jem- salem alone, but in tÎle'whole of Palestine. 1 COIl- fessf~ankly that it is precisely such flights of creative faney which 1 fear. very greatly iri poli- tics. Politicsis a complicated affair. It demands agreat deal of thought and',of provision for the possible consequences ofparticular events~ , Thatis whyI thiWt thatthê delegation orthe Ukrainian Soviet Sccialist Republic will regret- fully havé·to abstainfrom voting on this ·amend- ment. even jn.its present form, despite the fact that Mr. Jessuphas appliedhis considerablelegâl knowledge to 'the attempt tofind a suitable It is tmiversally knovm that the question of the pélitical structure'and organization of 'Pales- tine was long aga determined by the General As&embly, and no additional decisions on that question are required of the Security Council. It would appear peculiar, to say theleast of it, if the Council adopted any such decisîon. No such decis5.on on the political organization of Palestine would be binding upon anyone. The ;;econd qu~tion r('ferred to in the Chinesb amendment - the question of immigration - is a domestic matter of the countries concerned. The Chinese representative's decision to wîthdraw bis amendment should therefore he welcomed. . As regards the amèndmentsubmitted by the represéntative of tlle United States, thereseems to he liO reason to 'object to its phraseology; but its deeper significance essentiaIly constitutes a repetition in' veiled form of the Chînese amend- ment. What' is, in actu~ fact, the scope of the "mutual' conc.essîons"? In the PfOposals,he made tcthe Stateof Israel and ·theArab States,for example" the Mediatorsuggestèd a' territorial rearrcillgementof the whole of Palestine, wmch would have constituted a violation 'and evasion of the General Assembly decisions. How a.re we to understand this idea of "mutual'concessions"?If one of the partiesdoes not accept this propDsal, if; for instance, the State ofIsrael shouId dec1are that the Mediator's proposal for à territorial re-' arrangement ,of Palestineis unacceptable, woùld thatbe regarc!ed as a refusai bythe Stateof Israel , ta make"mutual concessions"? L~t Us tak~ an- other example: if any proposai made by the State of Israel should proveunaccep'/:able tothe Arab States and they \vere not prepared to make con- cessions, would the State of Israel have grounds for cornplaint and would·it be justified'in accus- ing, theArab States of 'refusing to make con- cessions? . , , Thus~ the vagueness ofthis idea of <Smutual ,:oncessions" mayencourage: some. people to attempt a fresh settlement of the Palestine ques- tion in violation or in circumventionof existing rèsolutions .onthe,matter. An ip.definite expression such as "mutual concessions" on, "aIl pôints" can leadto further complication of Arab-Jewish rela- tions and toendless diSput~regardingthé scope of such concessions. _concessions ~endment. 'TI!e PRESIDEh r (tran.slc,ted tram Russian): We now proceed to voté on the United States proposal, which has been,accepted by the repre- .ilentative of China. Mt. Hoo (Assistant Secretary-Gen~ral in charge of the Department of TruSteeship): The amendment reads as follows: , ~'Reiterates the appeal to the parties contain~d in the last Mragraphof the resolution of 22 May and urges upon the parties that 'theycontinue conversations with the Mediator in a spirit of conciliation and, mutual concession, in order that aIl points under' clisputemay he settled peacefully.'" . . A vote was taken by show ot hands~as follows: In tavour~, Argentina, Belgiunl, Canada,. Ohina, Colombia, France2 Syria, United King- doin, United States of Arnerica~ , Abstaining. Ukrainian Soviet. Socialist Re- public, Union. of SovietSocialis~ Republics. , The amendment was adopted by9 votes to none,wîth 2 abstentz'ons. The PRESIDENT (translated trom R;ussian) ~ Next we have· before us a proposaI submittèd asanaddendum by the Secretary-General. Mt.MÂLIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Re- publics) (tT{ .~ ,latiJd from· Russian) : ,1 should like to' ask me Assistant Secretary-General to cI~rify one point: what category of wOlkers is meant by the word "staff"? ' ,'.'IpePREsIDENT (translated from Russian): 1 shot.Ùd like to add the question: of wha.tna- tionality are they tobe? . , Mr. Hoo(Assistant. Secretary-General .iI\ charge of the Depal'tment' of Trustee~hip): The other day [331st meeting], aftera question raised by the USSR representative, l'read out a state-. ~ent on behalf of the Secretary-General explain- mg the sendingoutof the fifty Unit~dNaqons guards. In that s,tateme1;lt, ,1 said that, 'accord'ng to. the opinion ·of ,the Secretariat, those 'IDIa'rds ' could be considered as staff necessary to facilitate the performance of the duties of the Mediator. 'Therefore, ,1 tbink thatin,. this'case, ,also,·.the st,aft' c()uld inc1ude. guards, automobile drivers,' pilots and aIl people Ilecess;lry ta help the Media- tor to perform his ftinc.tioils. As regards nationality,in'the rectUÎtinent .of staff in theSecretariat, as is known, aIl nationali- ties are admitted. If,.with regard to th.epersonne\ .of Iower rank,in New York, the greater' numbet of ,thé members of that' personnel are of However~ aside from this l'eason, the Secretariat is following as closely as possible the principle of geographical distribution. There is no limitation with regard ta the nationality of the staff men- tioned in the proposais. .. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Re- publics) (translated from Russian): The ex- planatioIl offered by the Assistant Secretary- Generai shows that the Secretariat intends to persist in the practice of sending members of the Secretariat to carry out duties outside the competence of the Secretariat organization. His remarks show that the Secretariat intends to continue the practiceof sending guards, i.e., of entrusting members of the Secretariat with mili- tary duties, the duties of an armed gue-d responsible. for the protection of food depots, communications, governm~t offices and possibly even military objectives. The que'ition might arise whether those men, if they are ta guard llomething, ought not themselves to be armed and in a po.sition ta protect themselves in the r.rst place, before protecting the objectives they are ~tructed ta guard. ! This seems ludicI:"Ous; and it is ludicrous be- cause the Secretariat is proposing ta assume dutics for which it is not fitted. The Charter says nothing about entrusting the Secretafiat or any part of its organization with military duties. and, in particular, with armed guard duties - for one has to have some kind of arms in order to guard something. If the guards are armed with nothing more than penknives and Parker pens, they will be of no use whatever; they will merely he fair game for criminai e1ements and a target for snipers. There will be new incidents and the Securifv Council will again hear sad announce- ments, as we have heard today, of the death of members of the Secretariat. . Thè USSR delegation-stated its views mi this matter at a previous meeting of the Council [331st meeting], and described the practice of sending Secretariat members for armed guard duties irregularand devoidof legaI foundation.. The USSR de1egation continues to maintain that view, and if the Secretariat intends ta include a guard force numbering50, 100 or 500 men unèler thegeneral heading of "staff", used in the proposai before us, the USSR delegation will be unable to support that proposaI. Suçh a proposai would not merdy fail to conform to the Charter, bût would in fact directIy contravene it. The wnstitution of an anned force for the maintenance of international peace and security • anà the execution of all duties connected with that task are the prêrogative of the Security Council under Article 43 of the Charter. As we Furthermore, the United Nations Charter pro~ vides for situations arising before Article 43 is implemented and a Security Council force is establiilied. Such provisionis made in Articl~106 which reads: "Pending the coming into force of such special agreement.s referred ta· in Article 43 as in the opinion of the Secutity Council enable it ta begin the exerCÏ5e of its responsibilities under Article 42, the parties ta the Four-Nations Declaration, signed at Moscow, 30 October 1943, and France, shall, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of that Declaration, consult with one another and as oècasion requires with other Members of the Vnited Nations with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization as may be necess~""Y for the pur- pose of maintaining international peace and' aecurity." The functions it is, proposed to lay upon the Secretariat guards are essentially duties con- nected with the maintenance of international peace and security. No su~h duries are envisaged for the Secretariat under th~ Charter, and, ta impose them on the Secretariat woUId be irregu- lar and legally unfounded. It would, moreover, involve àdditional expense for the Secretariat- a factor that must not be overlooked. Ali these facts taken together fully justify the' USSR delegation's contention that this pro- posal is unacceptable, and tha:t, in accordance with established practice and thr; General Assem- bly's previous decisions in such cases, the Secre- tariat should confine itseH to the dispatch of clerical, technical and subsidiary staff, but not of sentries or armed guat<Ù;. " Accordingly, the US~R delegation is unable to support the Secretariat's proposal as inter- preted for us br the Assistant Secretar}'-General" who said that the term "staff". is to be under- stood to inc1ude guards intended to provide armed protection. , ' . comprend

We shaH nôw proceed to the vote on the proposal 8ubmitted by the Secretariat. 1 presume there is no need to have the proposal read âloud since you have it before'you. Mr. PARO~I (France) (trans,!ated [rom French): May 1 point out that two members of the Council are absent from the Council. chamber.

Aiter aIl, we,are here to dischargethe functions etltrusted to us, and it seems to me that members Mr. PARODI (France) (translated from French) ,: 1 ventured ta cali the President's attention to the fact that two members of the Council were momentarily absent. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America.): 1 am. not clear as to whether or not the President is going to give the two members who came in , jtiSt as we were voting an opportunity to vote. 1 would assume that it would be appropriate to allow them to vote on the motion which has just been before us. ' Mr. EL-KHOURI. (Syriaj: 1 think that accordmg to our rules of procedure eleven members mould be present for a vote. 1 do not think there can be a vote when some ;members are absent. The PRESIDl]:NT (translated fr.Dm French>': 1am faced with a difficult probleni of procedure; to solve il, if there is no objection - and as, in the absence ofthe Argentine representative, per- (ect calm prevails in the Council- 1 suggest we proceed once again ta the vote. ' The Presi:dent then continued in Russian: 1 draw your attention to the PI'Qposal submitted by the Secl.'etary-General as an addendum to the resolution. You have that' additional proposaI before you. .

As representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, 1 must say that 1 cannot agree either with the represeIitative of Syria or the representative of Egypt when they say that it is possible at one and the same time to abide by the General Assembly's' decision and to refer the matter tothe International Court (.f Justice. The International· Court of Justice cannot be regarded as a kind of court of appealfrom the decisions of the Assembly and the Security Council. That is impossible; it Îiagainst the Charter. Such procedure therefore~ ~ to me inadmissible. . \ It is quite clear that up to the present, t-wv existing organs - the G:eneral Assembly and, at this moment, the Security Councilhave been dealing with the Palestine qu!.'stion. The intention· of the Syrian representa~ve's proposal .is, in essence, to take the question out pl the ·handsof the General Assembly and, theSecurity Council and refer it to the International Court fora new decision, that is, for a revision of the existing resolution. We cannot accept such a sugges..tion, and 1 am convinced that if the question.arises lateras it will, in aIl probability, at the General Assembly-. the General Assembly will reject it this autumn, just as, in April and May of thiS yeat, it rejected aIl attempts. directed in·substance at .a revillion of existing resolutions. Those are the reasons why 1 shaIl vott against the proposal submitted'by the representative of Syria. Mr. MALIK (Union of SovietSocialist Rep1,Jblies). (translated trom Russian): 1 wish tomake just one·additional remark•.As weknow from the General Assembly. resolution of 29 November 1947 on the Pa1estinian question, the United Kingdom was not caIled upon to establish a.govemmental orgamzation in Palestine.•Therefore, .the Syrian. representativ.e'spropo~al is·based,in mbstance, on false p~~'lnises, since'it states that the United Kingdom· terminated ·its Mandate On 14 November 194'7,11 thè' <h-aft resolution 1 [A/459] recommending that all Governments have recourse more often to the International Court of Justice was disctlSsed. On that occasion the representative of Egypt said that, although he was not opposed to the recommendation" he ,could not vote in favour ,of it, in' order not to ,tion, prejudice the attitude of his Government as . regards 'the Anglo-Egyptian dîspute before the Security Cooocil, since that was a 'political ~pute. The same attitude was taken by all the Arab representatives when the motion [A/C.1I267] to refer the question of the treatment qf Indians ïn the Union of Soùth Mrica to the International Court of Justice was discussed.1I Therefore, we~ are somewhat startled by the new-found en~usiasm of these representatives for the submission of political problems to the International Court of Justice. We think it no coïncidence that this motion emanates from a representative who, only a few minutes ago, was voting agaÎI}st the establishment of a cease-fite and a truce in the territory concerned. 1 would only add that we consider that aIl the potentialities of discord and dissension, of added confusion and uncertainty, to which attention has been drawn by the representatives of. the Ukrainian 'Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics, seems to us to reside inevitably in the adoption of such a ~swution. . . The PRESIDENT (translated trom Russian): There are more speakers on my list and 1 am •cette v~ry ~uc~ afraid mat the discussion of this ques~ ~on 18 gomg to take some time. 1 wonder whether lt,would not he wise to adopt the Syrian representative's ,suggestion·that the discussion he postponed untilour next meeting. The question is not one that caI1s for an immediate decision and wc can carry it over ta one of our next meetings. i1.~em.bly, lUth plenary meeting. .Ibld., I09th, UOth. lUth and ll2th meetings' of the FU'StCoJiunittee. -The PRESIDENT (translated Irom Rrusmn): .Members will he notified Iater of the date the:: next meeting and the time when the Syrian representative'~ proposai will come under discussion. Th, meering rose at 10 P.11I.