S/PV.344 Security Council

In accordance with the roles of procedure, representatives of Member States of the United Nations who have brought a matter ta the notice of the Security Council are invited to participate in the discussion of that matter by the Security Council. 1 call for a. vote to determine whether the Yugoslav representative to the United Nations should be invited to the Council table to pars'il auprès Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (translated fram Russian): According to established practice in the Security Council and on the basis of rules 37 and 38 of the rules of procedure, representatives of States which have lodged a complaint with the Security Cauncil are invited to the Council table. In view of this 1 think it unnecessary toput the question to the vote. . The PRESIDENT (translated fram Russian): In view of what the representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic has said, 1 shall . put the matter in the following form: in the absence ofany objections, the representative of Yugoslavia is invited to the Council table to participate in the discussion of the matter. Since dlere are no objections, the representative of Yugoslavia is invited to take his place at the Security Council table. . At the invitation of the President, Mr. Vilfan, repre:entative of Yugoslavia, took his place at the Council table. Mr. VILFAN (Yugoslavia): The note of 28 July [S/927], with which the Yugoslav Government initiated these proceedings, is not the first it has submitted to the Security Council on the question of the independence and integrity of the Free Territory of Trieste; and it has a history. The Yugoslav Government has already transmitted to the Security Council the notes of 1 and 6 November 1947 which it handed to the Belgrade Embassies of the United States and the U:p.ited Kingdom;these notes were incorporated in Security Council documents S/598 and S/600, respectively. In the letter of 5 November which 1 addressed to the President of the Security Council, enc10sing the note of 1 November, 1 had the honour to draw attention explieitly to the fact that infringements of, thç Peace Treaty with Italy were occurring in respect of certain provisions of the Permanent Statute of the Free Territory of Trieste and of the Instrument for the Provisional Regime. The Yugoslav Government also transmitted to the Security Council the note dated 12 April 1948 [S/944] which it handed to the' above mentioned Embassies. This note, which was distributed to the members of the,Council, constitutes the fullest explanation of the attitude of . the Yugoslav Government in regard to the problem of the Free Territory of Trieste and the danger threatening the independence and integrity of the Free Territory of Trieste. The latest note, i.e. the note of 28 July, direcdy concerns the agreements which were recendy concluded between the administration of the British-United States Zone of the Free Territory of Trieste and the Italian Republic, particülarly the agreements of 9 March and 6 May of this year. However, as the above-mentioned document· plain!y shows, these are onIy con- The Yugoslav Govemment has no reason to consider the solution of the Trieste question as ideaI. The Yugoslav Government regarded its acceptance of the solution of the Trieste question, along with sorne other decisions of the Peace Treaty with Italy, as a great sacrifice for the Yugoslav peoples. Upüi1 signing the treaty, the Yugoslav Government stressed that it did so "only because the Yugoslav peoples at the present moment do not wish to place on themselves responsibility for not contributing to the establishment of peace between nations". At the Peace Conference in Paris, the Yugoslav delegation persistently pointed out the historie, ethnographie, economic and political reasons which make of Trieste a component part of Yugoslav territory. Its arguments have nev~r been repudiated. When the principle of internationalization was accepted, the Yugoslav Government emphasized that in the interests of the prosperity of Trieste itself, due account must be taken of its close reliance on its Yugoslav hinterland. The Yugoslav Government based its position upon this fact which, not long ago--on 24 March 1948 to be exact-was given great emphasis by the representative of tlle State Department, Mr. Willard Thorp. In the hearings on foreign aid before the Senate Comrrr.ttee on Appropriations, he stated: "Its (Trieste's) normal hinterland is Yugoslavia ... its normal trade is with Yugoslavia." In the final draft of provisions for the Free Territory of Trieste, however, this obstinate truth was ignored thanks to the insistence of the same State Department. It is therefore understandable that the Yugoslav Government could not consider the solution of the Trieste question as ideaI. However, when it agreed to accept the solution provided in the Peace Treaty, it accepted the consequences as weIl. On this question, its policy was strongly moulded by the desire to see the provisions for the Free Territory of Trieste executed as quickly and as completely as possible, thus contributing to the quick and complete fulfilment of the Peace Treaty which was designed to terminate the war against Mussolini's Italy. The same position was taken by the majority of the inhabitants of Trieste. They can best judge the interests of their own city and, in their opinion, the basic interests of the population and of the general peace require a quick and complete fulfilment of the Peace Treaty. They believe that by carrying out the Peace Treaty, it is pOi"sible to preserve the basic achievement of the anti-fascist strùggle in this part of t.he world, namely, collaboration between Yugoslavs and Italians among broad sections of the Trieste It appears, however, that tendencies ""hieh emerged in sorne circles of the United States and the United Kingdom ùumediately after the war and whieh were already prominently displayed at the Peace Conference--tendencies, that is, to forget the aims of the anti-fascist war-continue to exist and are permitted to Hourish unhindered. The poliey of the British-United States administration, from the very beginning of 1945 to the coming into force of the Peace Treaty, was at first to ignore and thereafter to eliminate the forces which fought against Fascism, to obliterate their gains under the prete:{t of upholding the Hague Convention. This policy is now attempting to destroy the Peace Treaty in order to eliminate those sections which were introduced into it as a resuJ.t of the anti-fascist struggle and the victory of the liberation forces. The Free Territory of Trieste itself appears to the Eritish-United States administration as one of those conces."ions which should be revoked. Moreover, the administration uses the occasion to sow dissension between the two neighbouring States and to bolster the reactionary forces in Italy, the same reactionary forces which ignore the true interests of the Italian people on other questions and try ta parade as their representatives on this question. Let us consider the obligations which the British-United States administration has contracted toward the Free Territory of TriŒte under the provisions of the Peace Treaty, and let us see how they are being carried out. Under article 21 of the Peace Treaty with Italy, the Free Territory of Trieste, recognized by the Allied and Associated Powers and by Italy, is to attain ta sovereignty upon the coming into force of the Peace Treaty. Paragraph 2 of article 21 provides that Italian sovereignty shall be terminated upon the coming into force of the Peace Treaty. Paragraph 3 of the same article continues: "On the termination of Italian sovereignty, the Free Territory of Trieste shall be governed in accordance with an instmment for a provisional regùue drafted by the Council of Foreign Ministers and approved by the Security Council." This Instrument constitutes Annex VII of the Peace Treaty and establishes in its prearrible, with no limitations, that its "provisions shaH apply to the administration of the Free Territory of. Trieste pending the coming into force of the Përmanent Statute". According to the interpretation given in the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers of 22 April 1947, one of the It is clear that the minimum obligations of the military administration, obligations based on the fact that the Free Territory of Trieste exists as an international uuity and on a ge:-uine recognition of that existence, would be: first, to re1y on those forces which aclmowledge the Free Territory of Trieste as an international unity and are ready to collaborate toward its full establishment; secondly, to promote the closest possible association between the two zones, that is, the British-United States and the Yugoslav zones, in crder to achieve maximum unity for the entire territory; thirdly, ta provide for the maximum development of independent economic activity; fourthly, to make an international declaration of the independence of the Free Territory of Trieste; and, fifthly to ensure equal treatment for the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and for Italy with regard to all'questions, especially questions concerning foreign trade. . de et connue, devoir: qui comme à ment, deux et grande toire; une trièmement, l'indépendance cinquièm rative populaire lité ment Regardless of the duration of the military administration, these are their minimum task. The raison d'être of the military administration, as provided in the first article of Annex VII, is that it should prepare and facilitate the work cf the Governor without prejudice to his futu:e activities and the full validity of the Statute. militaire, d'être est est verneur, validité The policy of the British-United States administration of the zone is completely at variance with those natural postulates which arise from the existence of the Free Territory of Trieste as an independent international unity. Its policy is as follows: first, to assist organizations with irredentist aims and to refuse to collaborate with groups which stand for observance of the Peace Treaty; secondly to segregate the two zones completely and to refuse to create common organs; thirdly, to limit the economic activities of the zone under the pretext of "prevention of disease and unrest", thereby reducing the zone to a level of parasitism and complete dependency on American subsidies; fourthly, to conclude agreements which, under the terms of the Peace Treaty, should be made only for the Territory as a whole and not for one zone alone (for exampIe, the agree~ent referred to in article 11 of Annex VII) and which to a great extent '.. .prejudice the future of Trieste, its economic and general policy, as for instance, its accession to «aine avec Territoire libre internationale cette accorder dentiste groupes paix; deux communs les principe ce parasite caines; qui, être et accords conclure en We ShOl j consider, in the light of this policy, the sincerity of the arguments put forth directly or in the form of insinuations in the two reports [8/679 and 8/781] of the British-United States administration of the Fre~ Territory of Trieste concerning the alleged impossibility of the independent existence of the Free Territory of Trieste. We should consider, in tht': light of this policy ùf denying the most e1ementary requirements deriving from the independence of the Free Terrltory of Trieste, the stalemate on the question of the appointment of a Governor and the pruposals for revising the Peace Treaty, which are designed only to camouflage the fait accompli. Finally we should consider, in the light of this policy of presenting the world with a fait accompli, the agreements to which the Yugoslav Government in its latest note [8/927] has called the attention of the Security Couneil. The Yugoslav note constitutes a detailed analysis of the aforesaid agreements and it is not my intention to elaborate on it. I wish only to àirect your attention to sorne of the most outstanding consequences. In respect of foreign trade, these agreements explicitly transform the British-United States zone of the Free Territory of Trieste into a component part of Italy. AlI Italian trade agreements are automatically e:.:ended to the British-United States zone of the Free Territory of Trieste, which is given no possibility' to conclude independent agreements with any other. State, for instance, with the countries of its hinterland. As a consequence, Trieste can import and export only within the framework of the Italian trade agreements, that is to say, within the framework of the quotas allotted by Italy, specifically by the Ministry of Foreign Trade in Rome. This automatically implies that the basic economic activity of the British-United States zone of the Free Territory of Trieste is directed by Italy. Renc\.;, in respect ta economy, the British- UniteC: States zone of the Free Territory of Trieste has become in effect a province of the Republic of ~taly. At the .'lame time the above-mentioned agreements completely del:;troy the f, lncial independence of the Br~:...Œh-Un':'ced States zone of the Free Territory of Trieste, rendering completely impossible the independent conduct of its fiscal affairs and an independent balance of payment. These agreements automatically link the circulation Of currency of the Free Territory of Trieste with the Italian flow of currency; th~y create an obligation for budget control by the Roman administration; they deprive Trieste of a!l incorne from foreign trade. Hence, in respect to finance, too, the British-United States zone of the Free Territory of Trieste has become in effect a province of the Republic of Italy. Unquestionably, similar acts and similar measures signify the denial of the independence and mesures signifient qu'on integrity of the Free Territory of Trieste, which de were sa solemnly recognized in the Peace Treaty avaient by the Allied and Associated Powers, among them the United States and the United Kinget dom, and which are to be assured by the Security Coundl of the United Nations. Ac:;surance by intégrité the Security Council is explicitly provided for in paragraph 1 of article 21 of the Peace Tl'eaty Cette with Italy and article 2 of the Permanent Statute. The Security Council rcsolution cf la January 1947' approved these doèuments and accepted the responsibilities devolving therefrom. It is now up to the Security Council to fulfil its task. In expressing the hope that the Security Council, in acting upon the obligations it accepted, will agree to the requests of the Yugoslav Government, 1 should like to end with a historic reminiscence. After the first world war, too, there was a general tendency ta thwart the right of the Yugoslav peoples to their national territory; and so another free territory was created, the Free Territory of Fiume. Then, too, before the lt'ree Territory began to live, tendencies for its liquidation appeared. And at that time, too, these tendencies did not come from Yugoslavia. At that time, those tendencies were victorious. But we all know that the victory of those tendencies, epitomized by d'Annunzio, eonstituted, at the same time, the first important international success of Fascism. Ml'. JESSUP (United States of America): My. Government has read the note of the Yugoslav representative, dated 28 July, which is before us today and in which j .•. 15 charged that the United States Government .md the United Kingdom Government have violated the provisions of the Treàty of Peace with Italy pertaining to the Free Territory of Trieste. There are charges of fallure to fulfil international obligatiOlls, of having conspired to IDcorporate into Italy that zone of the Free Territory of Tries"'~ which is administered by the Commander of the British and the United States forces in the Free Tenitory and charges of hàving concluded, through the Allied Military Governmem of the British-United' States zone, agreements with the We might have sl'pposed' that in his oral argument before the Security Cauneil, the repre~ sentative of Yugoslavia would have endeavoured to supplement his Government's flimsy docu~ ment, but he has not done so in the statement which we have justheard. Perhaps he could find nothing substantial to add. His remarks, to which 1 have listened, were confined to a general propaganda statement of a familial' type. We are frankly surprised that any Govern~ ment should present to the Security Couneil charges which are so utterly devoid of substance and also that the charges should be made by a Government which, in the administration of its own zone, has paid no heed to its international obligations and wmch has kept its own administration shrouded in secrecy. As the members of the Council are all aware, the history of the administration of the British~United States zone of the Free Territory of Trieste is a matter of record, contained in regular reports by General Airey, the Commander of the British-United States zone. These reports have been presented to the Security Councilby the United States and the United Kingdom Governments in recognition of the Security Council's responsibilities in connexion with the assurance of the integrity and independence of the Free Territory. Representatives will find these report.s in documents S/679 and S/781. The reports, covenng th'e entire period of the .history of the Territory from its, coming into being on 15 September 1947, contain a factual account of all substantive acts of the Allied Military Government as well as the Com~ mander's views concerning the progress of bis Government in its endeavours to preserve and protect the rights, interests and freedom of the residents of -the zone, in the face of the gravest politic,,] and economic difficulties. In strict accord with bis instructions from the United States and United Kingdom Governments, General Airey has administered the zone accorm.'1g ta the letter a..'1d spirit of the pertin.ent provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Italy and in compliance with internationallaw concerning the conduct of military govemment in occupied territory. The Treaty itself requires that the Territory continue to be administered under military government pending the assumption of office by a Governor. The Government of the United States is proud of the record of the administration of the British- United States zone of the Free Territory of Trieste. Under the most difficult circumstances , and des.pite the attempts at open sabotage by subversive e1ements, the British and American military commands have been able to establish a responsible local govemment which gives the With regard to the specifie charges of the Yugoslav Gavernment, 1 can say immediately and categorically that they are completely without any justification whatsoever. Although, as the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France have declared in their joint statement of 20 March, which they transmitted for the information of the Security Council as document S/707, my Government is convinced of the unworkability of the Trieste settlement envisaged in the Treaty of Peace with Italy, 1 can assure the Council that, pending a new solution of th$ vexing problem the Allied Military Command in Trieste is continuing to administer the zone under its charge in the strictest accord with the letter and spirit of the pertinent provisions of the Treaty. Any honest comparison of the agreements concluded between the British-United States administering authorities and the Government of Italy -which form the subject of certain comments by the Yugoslav Government-with the text of the Treaty itself, will demonstrate this facto 1 shall not at this time comment on the administration of the zone of the Free Territory which is under Yugoslav military administration. 1 shall mere1y stress again that while the record of administration in the British-United States zone has, at every stage, been made public, and has been formally submitted ta the Seeurity Couneil for its examination, 1 know of no reports or other data which the Yugoslav Government has transmitted for the information of the Seeurity Council eoncerning its administration in its zone. In case the members of the Security Council should desire any further information beyond that which exists in the records already' available ta them, my Govemmcnt has requested General Airey to submit any comments or observations which he mav wish to make. In the meantime 1 should like' to inform the Council of the fact that the latest report of General Airey, co':ering the p1triod from 1 April to 30 June 1948, is in the course of completion and will shortIy be transmitted to the President of the Security Council in order that it may be distributed to the members in the form of a document. When the members have had an opporttinity to examine this latest report, and if my Government receives any observations from General Airey which would be peliinent to the matter, 1 shaH be glad to deal in any necessary detail with the allegations of the Yugoslav Government, should any detailed refutation appealto be required. We shall be prepared to Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingaom): The represcntative of the United States has already dealt broadIy with the rather astonishing document [8/927J submitted to the Seeurity Couneil by the representative of Yugoslavia, and 1 can endorse aIl that Mr. Jessup has just said. Perhaps 1 can add, even at this stage) certain particular points bearing on the arguments which the Yugoslav representative has used. Before doing that) 1 should like to make one general comment and onereservation. My comment is that the situation is peculiar. Those who drafted the Treaty of Peace contemplated three 'Jtages. First) Trieste) on the termination of Italian sovereignty) was to be administered by the AIlied Military Commands within their respective zones under an Instrument for the Provisional R~gime of the Free Trerritory of Trieste. Vnder this latter Instrument, it was provided that the Governor should assume office in the Free Territory at the earliest possible moment after the coming into force of the Treaty. He was entrusted with certain functions and the carrying out of certain obligations. That was the second stage. The third stage would arrive when the Security Cauncil itself shoul.d fix the date of the coming into force of the Permanent Statute. We have not been able to proceed beyond the first stage, and the point that l wish to make is that those who drafted the Treaty cannot have foreseen the lamentable deIay which has taken place and which has undoubtedly intensified the difficulties. There may be doubts and anomalies in the settlement which might, in the short run, have presented sorne difficulty. Ail these difficulties have been magnified by delay to such an extent that they now present problems sa different in degree as to be almost different in kind. The reservation that 1 wish ta make is that this somewhat involved case has been submittea' and placed on the Security Council agenda at very short notice. 1 have no expert from Trieste present here, and 1 do not know whether or when 1 can have that advantage. 1 have, of course, a certain amount of documentary material, but not sufficient to reply categorically ta every detailed allegation made by the Yugoslav representative. 1 therefore reserve the right ta speak again at a later date, when 1 have had tune ta inform myself completely and in det~il on à:ll the points raised. Having said that, 1 might address myself to one or two points arising out of the communieation from the Yugoslav Government. In the first . place, there might weIl be sorne doubt as ta the immediate competence of the Security Council· in this matter. Article 36 of the Permanent Statute provides that disputes reIating to the inter- . pretation or execution of the Statute shall be referred to a commission. 1 do not wish ta insist on that or ta deny the competence of the Security Council, but it is true that the competence. of the Council is limited ta ensuring the integrity and independence of the Free Territory under . article 21 of the Peace Treaty. Although the. Yugoslav note complains that certain actions of: the Allied Military Government jeopardize the' independence of the Free Territory, it does not: touch at ~T}y point on the specifie functions of the Council in relation to Tdeste as they are' laid down in the annexes. Accordingly the: Council could, strictly speaking, consider only whether the economic and financial measures, taken by the Allied Military Government imperil: the integrity or independence of the Free Terri-; tory or, as part of its responsibilities under the; Charter, as opposed to the Peace Treaty, , whether these measures constitute a -threat to i international peace and security. ' Although the Yugoslav. note asks the Security . Council to find that the measures do constitute • such a threat, it does not put forward any serious : argument; to th~ effect. i At this stage 1 should like ta make sorne com- ! ments on certain particular points which were: raised in the Yugoslav note. One of these is that ' the Allied Military Government has violated the ' Peace Treaty by concluding certain agreements: with the Italian Government. However, these currency and foreign exchange agreements flow : directly fr~ and, in fact, specifically refer to artiCle 11 of Annex VII of the Treaty. The text ' of article 11 is as follows: "PendiT:lg the establishment·of a separate curnincy regime for the Free Territory, the Italian lira shaH continue to be the legal tender within . the Free Territory. The Italian Government shaH· .supply the foreign exchange and currency needs . of the Free Territory under conditions no less, favourable than those applying in Italy. Then again, the Yugoslav note charges that the monetary frontier has been wiped out by our implementation of article 11 and that as a result of our action Italy's exchange control and other currency regulations apply ta our zone. But having regard ta articles 10 and 11 of the Instrument for the Provisional Regime, it is obvious that if Italian currency is to remain legal tender in the Free Tcrritory, existing currency regulations must apply and new currency control regulations may be necessary. Th'~re is no suggestion that the regulations laid down in the agreement to which the Yugoslav Government objects do in fact encroach upon the independence of the Free Territory. Such are the preliminary replies that 1 venture to make ta one or two of the principal charges made in the Yugoslav note. 1 reserve my right, as 1 said before, to make a fuller statement when 1 have had time to obtain aIl the information relevant ta the detailed argumentation in that note, or such of it as still retains any semblance of validity. ln conclusion 1 would only indulge in one reflection, which is that it is surely strange that the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, if they had intended to violate the provisions of the Peace Treaty as suggested in the Yugoslav note, should have given sa much publicity to their action by submitting reports on thd.:- administration of thdr zone to the Security Cot:ncil at regular intervals. Their behaviour in thk: respect has been in marke.d contrast with that of the Yugoslav Government, whose activities in its zone have not been the subject of a single report to the Security Council, let alone of a regular series of quarterly reports. That does not, of courr,o, mean that we are not aware of what has been nappening in the Yugoslav zone. Far from it; and in subsequent debate IshaIl probably have to calI attention to sorne of the more unpleasant features of the Yugoslav administration. Mr. PARODI (France) (translated fram French) : The comments just made by the l'epresentatives, of bath the United States and the United Kingdom indicate that there will be necd for a certain delay before the Yugoslav complaint can be fully investigated by the United States and United Kingdom. Their representa- 1 should like to ask, therefore,.that the delay suggested ta enable the United States and United Kingdom authorities ta supply aIl necessary information, should also be used by the Yugoslav authorities to supply' the Security Ccuncil with a report similar to that of the United Kingdom and United States military authorities. 1 think that if this information were forthcoming from Yugoslavia, the Council would undoubtedly be in a better position to assess the situation referred ta in the Yugoslav complaint. Ml'. VILFAN (Yugoslavia): For the moment, 1 should like to limit myself only ta a few remarks. 1do not understand why a de1ay should be necessary. Our demand-our accusation, in fact -consists of objections to certain agreements concluded between the administration of the British-United States zone and the Republic of Italy; and we contend that the content of these agreements is essentially in contradiction ta the obligations to respect the independence and integrity of the Free Territory of Trieste. 1 cannat see any reason ta collect facts and data if the only accusation is that these agreements are in contradiction to the independence and integrity of the Free Territory of Trieste. 1 therefore suggest that we should not delay beyond the necessary limits the discussion requested by the Yugoslav Government. 1 listened with the greatest attention ta the representative of the United States, but 1 was unable ta find any arguments in his. statements except that the Yugoslav Government had not submitted any reports ta the Security Council regarding its administration of the Free Territory of Trieste. This is the first time that such a demand has been put forth in the Security Council. Why have we not sllbmitted any report to the Security Council regarding the administration of our zone? The reason is quite simple. By reason of the Peace Treaty with Italy, we were expecting the nomination of the Governor. 1 shall not enter any further into the discussion because 1 believe that in our note and in our statement there were contained aIl the arguments in support of our thesis.,1will make just one more remark, however; it seems that there is a thesis that we have only a military administration with no obligations under the Peace Treaty with Italy. 1 consider this thesis quite incorrect. The text of the Peace Treaty with Italy is clear and the provisions of the Instrument for the Provisional Regime obligates also the military administration. It is now up to the military admiIùstra~ tion to prove that the agreements concluded between the administration of the British-United States zone and the Italian Republic are not in contradiction to the explicit provision of the Peace Treaty with Italy that "e~onomic union or associations of an exclusive character with any State" are prohibited. That is the point which is under discussion. Ml'. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Républic) (translated {rom Russian): First of all 1 wish ta .~mphasize that the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR reserves the right to speak its mind more fully and explicitly later on the substance of the matter raised by the representative of Yugoslavia. At the moment 1 wish to speak only on the procedural aspect oi the matter. As the representative of a Slav State, l am astonished by the fact that an attempt is being made here ta side-track the Yugoslav Government's complaint concerning the violation of the Treaty which bears the signature of the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, by the introduction of a number of secondaxy considerations. What are we being offered in place of an examination of the legitimate comptnint addressed by the Government of Yugoslavia to the Security Council, the organ whose duty it is to watch over peace and security and the observance of aIl treaty provisions concerning Trieste? We are being prèsented with a number of incidental considerations, of the kind put forward by the representative of France, for example, who suggests we The Yugoslav Government is accusing the military authorities of the United Kingdom and the United States of having violated the Treaty. But the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom are not formulating any charges of violation of the Treaty against Yugoslavia. Why does the representative of France, in raising this question now, not make such charges? The Yugoslav Government has a right to protest if the Treaty is violated and the Security Council is under obligation to take note of the protest and to examine it, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations by which we are bound. The preamble to that Charter contains one point which is as binding as its Articles, namely: ". . . to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties . . . can be maintained . . ." There can be treaties of different kinds, conventions and peace treaties. The representative of Yugoslavia is therefore making a perfectly legitimate and justified appeal ta the Security Council on ilie basis of ilie Charter and ilie Peace Treaty which establishes the Council's competence in respect of the Territory of Trieste; but an attempt is being made to side-track us by saying that a further report is needed from ilie Yugoslav Government on the administration of the zone under its control. Further, anoilier attempt of a preliminary lci.nd is being made here ta bypass ilie accusation mad~ by the Yugoslav authorities concerning the . violation of the Treaty by the military auiliorities who, on 9 March and 6 May, concluded agreements with the Italian Government for the virtual inclusion of the Territory of Trieste within the frontiers of the Italian State. artt~~e~rtsofa::-!1;:~~lI'f~~ett:r~r~~J;ef~h~~ ~s~~~l~::~ni lorI:e~a::i: ~~~;~n:~~~:~~ ~~~ the Free Te.ritory, the Italian lira shall continue to be the legal tender witbin the Free Territory ..." In oilier words the linl. will have the right to circulate in the Territory. What is the accusation levelled at the United Kingdom and the United States military authorities by the Yugoslav Government? It is that by their measures they have for aU practical purposes concluded an agreement of the kind envisaged in article 2 of Annex VI, which prohibits any attempt at a union placing the Free Territory of Trieste within the. bounds of the State of Italy and puts an end to Italian sover- .::::<::~:"::~~:~::~~nc ln these circumstances 1 think it is absolute1y wrong to extend the scope of these debates to cover the examination of what is taking place generally in the Yugoslav-controlled zone of Trieste. Before us is the concrete issue of the Yugoslav complaint. 1 do not protest if sorne time is allowed for the study of documents, but 1 do object to the atternpt made, under aU kinds of irrelevant pretexts; to avoid dealing with the basic accusation made by the Yugoslav Government concerning the violation of the Treaty by the United Kingdom and United States authorities. Treaties which bear the signatures of States are binding not oruy upon the Governments of those States but also upon their military authorities. Following the English interpretation of the above, Mr. M anuilsky continued (translated trom Russian) : . ln view of the fact t,hat my speech was interpreted simultaneously into French, 1 do not insist on another interpretation. At the same time 1 should like to' have sorne definite mIes fixed independently of the technical aspects of interpretation. For instance, we often have speeches in Spanish which are interpreted consecutively into English andinto French. If such a mIe is establîshed, 1 shall insist on having consecutive interpretation into the two languages also in the case of speeches made in Russian. However, in the present case 1 do not insist on having my speech interpreted into French. Ml'. PARODI (France) (translated trom French): The mIe is that speeches made in any language other than French and J~nglish must be interpreted into French and English; in prineiple this means that the two interpretations must be given in the same way. In order to facilitate the work of the Security Council l agree to the French interpretation being given simultaneously. 1 reserve the right -;;0 withdraw my consent if 1 deem it necessary in view of the nature of the discussion. However, in the present c.ase, 1 shall not ask for a French interpretatith since we. hav~ already heard a .simultaneouo;; in-l' terpretatlOn lllto French. With regard ta speeches made by representatives of States invited ta participate in the discussion of any matter in the Security Council, these are interpreted simultaneously into bath working languages and into an other official languages. Recently, in special cases, it hasbeen the pri..ctice ta makr exceptions owing ta lack of time or other reasons. Such exceptions may be made in the future, tao. But the firm rule of procedure that speeches by members of the Security Council must be interpreted into bath working languages, remains in full force. 1 take it we are agreed on that. In view of the fact that the speech of the representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was not taken down by the interpreter and that it was interpreted simultaneously, we shall not insist on having a consecutive interpretation in French. But in the future we shall keep ta the basic rule t.h.at speeches by members of the Security Council are translated into bath working languages. Ml'. JESSUP (United States of America): The representative of France made a very worthwhile and important suggestion, namely, that the Yugoslav Government might submit ta the Security Council a report on the administration of its zone in Trieste. The representative of Yugoslavia, 1 was very glad ta note, said that if the Security Council desired such a report, his Government would be very glad to produce it. As I understood mm, he explained that the reason why his Government had not submitted a report was that it did not realize that the period covered by the military occupation was going to be so long. One WG'lld have thought that after a year had elapsed, the Yugoslav administration would have realized that sorne time had passed and that a report might have been filed covering that period; or that now, as we approach practiçally..the end of a second year, it might have been appropriate te file a report on what has been going on. Now 1 understand that it is willing to do so. , parce qu'il yougoslave sur 1 think such a report would be very interesting ta the Security Council. One notes, in looking through this paper which the Government of Yugoslavia h~,> introduced with its note of 28 July~ tha~ ln connexion with a good many of its allegations abollt the terms of the agreements, t.ne'tè are broad conclusions about the economic and. f;nancial effects of the acts of the administration on the zone of Trieste and on But as 1 understood the Ukrainian SSR representative when he spoke, he first demolished with bis skilful rapier the strawman of opposition ta any discussion of these charges in the lJoullcil. 1 have not. heard anybody object to a discussion of them in the Council. 1 assumed that we had all agreed on that. But he skilfully demolished that figure which he created. Then, as 1 understood him-and 1 should like to be very clear on this-he began to oppose very violently the idea that the Yugoslav Government should let us know anything about what has happened in its zone. It seemed to me that he felt that it was very u'1-lesirable that the cloak of secrecy over the Yu Islav zone should be lifted and that he was th'ërefore opposed to the suggestion that such a report should be filed. Sînce the statement of the Yugoslav x:epresentative was contingent upon the Council's welcoming such a report, 1 think it is important to knaw whether one member of the Council is voicing opposition to the idea that the Yugoslav Government shou!d 'provide us with the report suggested by the representative .,of France, If 'we might have a little clarification of the position of the representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic ail that point, 1 for one should be very grateful. Ml'. MANUILSKY (Ukrainia.n Soviet Socialist Repu}:>lic) (translated tram Russian): 1 want ta reply ta Ml'.. Jessup's question. It is for the Yugoslav Government ta accept or not to accept the suggestion made by the representative of France. But from the legal point of view 1 cannot agree that extraneons clements with no direct bearing on the Yugoslav Government's complaint shoûld he 1tltroduced here in connexion with that complaint..That is my point. -1 disagreed with the United StateJ representative's statement that is was essential first: to reteive a report from General Airey. As we: know, General Air<ey's report C"JvefS the perîod from 1 Apôl t030 June, :so that the m0~t "e*r~-' hensibie feai:ure of the agreement of 9 M" ~(;h between the Anglo-American military al,Lhcri-,' ties and the Government of ïtaly does nût heure in ît. This means that from the legal point· of view there is no reason ta postpone di'Scussionof; -that question undl such time as General .Ah-ey's And now, let me say in conclusion that 1 recognize the Yugoslav representative's full right ta accept or not to accept the proposaI. Mr. VILFAN (Yugoslavia): My brief statement was inspired by the desire to c1arify two points. First, 1 could note immediately that the reprer:;entatives of the United States and the United Kingdom were developing a manœuvre. Not having any argument against the accusations of the Yugoslav Government, they tried to place sL8picion upon it. They insinuated that we did not want to submit reports ta the Security Cou.Ll.cil, and 1 said that only people who did not sincerely respect the provisions ('lf the Peace Treaty 'with Italy concerning the appointment of a Govemor could have a reason for submitting reports regularly to the Security Council. Since from the very beginni.."1g we expected that the provisions of the Peace Treaty would be implemented as early as possible and that they would be carried out, we did not have any reason to submit any such reports. My intention was to reject the insinuations contained in the .statements of the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom who, 1 repeat, not having any argument against the accusation made by the Yugoslav Government, tried ta place suspicion upon our Government by putting forward this question of reports. That is one point. The second poiÏ1t is the fact that 1 objected to any dela, in disc'.lssing this question. 1 said that the problem· is very dear. The whole contention of the Yugoslav Govemment is that certain agreements-and weknow "'.he texts, which are before us-are in apparent and actual contradiction ta the provisions of the Peace Treaty with Italy. Isaid that it is extr.emely easy for the Security Council ta take note of that contradiction and ta undertake the measures which it may consider necessary. When ~he independence and integrity of the Free Territory of Trieste are vÏ;olatedby such agreements, the defenee of this independence and integrity èan and must consist in establishing that those agreements 1 am in complete agreement with the rcpresentative of the Ukrainian SSR and 1 am very thankful to him for putting this question so clearly: that the only problem bdore us is the accusation made by the Yugoslav Government, and that any attempts to connect it with the Yugosl?v zone are only manœuvres to direct attention to another point which has no connexion with the note of the Yugoslav Government. 1 wish to conclude in this way. 1 said that if the Security Council wah~S to have a report from the Yugoslav territory it is up to the Council ta ask for it. But 1 object here and now to the attempt, to the manœuvr.e, to conn~ct the question of the report from the Yugoslav territory with the problem put before the Security Council on the basis of the Yugoslav note. Ml'. JESSUP (United States of America): 1 merely want to refer briefly to the item. mentioned by the representative of the Ukraine, namely, the expected report from General Airey, to which 1 referred in my opening remarks. He thought that per4aps it was not relevant and therefore we need not wait to examine it. 1 should like to call his attention to the document containing the Yugoslav representations, document S/927, and to note that beginning about the middle of page 5 of that document there is a discussion of various events which fall wit~:n the period from 1 April to 30 June, which is the period to be ·:overed by the forthcoming report. One will find in the middle of the page a reference to 6 May and a discussion of the events of 6 May, repeated at the bottom of that page, the top and the middle of page 6 and near the top of page 7. On page 7 there is a discussion of the events of May and June, all events fall. ing within the period covered by this last report. Whether or not the rerresentative of the Ukrainian SSR, as 1 understood from the translation of his statement, thinks that other parts of this document are more odious than this part, it still seems ta me that since two and a haU pa.ges are devoted to events within this period, other representatives on the Security Council might very well wi'lh ta have a report dealing with the period in questiO!;. Ml'. '1?,r ·KHJUrù (Hyria): 1 am sorry that 1 do not hale th,,: P~ace 'l'r~,",.ty before me in order

We shall instruct the Secretariat to study ~he matter more carefully and give the appropriate reply. So far as we know, the Peace Treaty with Italy does not contain any provisions for the submission of reports on the military administration of the Free Territory of Trieste. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America): 1 think it may be hdpful to the represer-tative of Syria in the consideration of his problem if he makes a note of document S/604, which 1<'; a letter from the representative of the United States addressed to the Secretary-General and dated 15 November 1947. That communication contains the first proclamation issued by the commander in the :"1ritish-United States zone, in which he sets forth the considerations which had led him tQ feel it was appropriate for the commanders of the zones in the Free Territory of Trie.'5te to report regularly to the Security' Council as to how they were discharging their responsibilities. As time passed and the military occupation continued, it seemed only reasonable that sinee there was no Governor to make a report, those who actually had the responsibility should st2lte what was being done, if they had no .reason to hide what they had been doing. The PRESIDn-'l' (translated from Russian): Those who have heard the pieee of information profIered by the representative of the United States of America can express nothing but surprise. What has a statement of the British-United States Command of Trieste to do with it? How jp it connected with the Government of Yu - slavia? Is the Governm~nt of Yugoslavia UI~~t: obligation to observe the provisions of any statement or declaration made liy the British-United States Command in the British-United States zone of Triester Ml'. PARODI (France) (translated trom French): 1 should like to avoid any misunderstanding regarding the comments 1 made a short while ago. It was not my intention to blame the Yugoslav Government in any way for not presenting a report and 1 do not think 1 said anything which could have conveyed that impression. Nor did 1 say that the Yugoslav Government was under the obligation to submit a report. 1 merely noted that since the question relates to a territory over which the Security Council has certain supervisory rights, since a matter conceming the administration of that territory has been referred to the Couneil, it would be useful if the Yugoslav military authorities supplied us with a report similar to that which the military authorities of the other zone have submitted. 1 put Lhis in the form of a request and 1 must say that 1 was very glad to see that the Yugoslav representative seemed to agree with it when he made bis first statement. 1 am afraid that when he spoke again after the Ukrainian SSR representative's intervention he seemed to reopen the question. 1 have no intention'of delaying the examination of t.~e question in any way; rather the contrary. But f do think that in .order to examine the Yugoslav complaint thoroughly the Security CauDcil should grant the delay requested by the United Kingdom and United States representatives for obtaining all necessary information. If this delay is granted, as it cannot fail to be in the interest of a full invf'-stigation of t!te complaint, 1 think it would be extremcly usefuland that was the purport of my previous request -if it wcre used by the Yugoslav authorities to supply us with the information 1 had requested. 1 therefore urge the Yugos!av representative to stand by his first reply. 1 am sure that this could only result in the Security Council receiving useful information.

On behaH of the delegation of the Union d Soviet Socialist Republics to the Security Coun· cils 1 should like to make sorne comments m: the question under consideration. The USSR delegation reserves the right to express its view regarding the YugoslavGovernment's appeal to the Security Cauncil about the flagrant violation of the Treaty by the British- United States authorities in the British-United The USSR delegation cannot fail to note that the representatives of the United States and of the United Kingdom have not discussed the substance of the accu~ations contained in the Yugoslav Government's note to the Security Council, that they have not submitted information and arguments which would give the Security Council a fuller picture of the matter, but have had recourse to the method frequentIy used by At,glo- Am~rican delegations at international conferences and discussions. They have taken the course of distracting the Security Council's attention from the fundamental question raised in the Yugoslav Government's note. The substance of that note amounts to a direct and unambiguous accusation against the Governments of the United States and the United 'Kingdom of violating the Peace Treaty with Italy. 1 think this is quite obvious to all those present here. But instead of dealing with the question directIy, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom are trying to divert the Security Council's attention to two side issues which have not the least connexion ' with the accusations made before the Security , Council by the representative of the Yugoslav : Government to the United Nations. The representative of the United States and the United. Kingdom have divided their task: each has' raised one question aimed at distracting the ,: Securitv Council's attention from the funda- 1 mental'matter of substance submitted to it. The United Kingdom representative has, hinted, without the slightest legal justification, that the question should not be discussed in the Security Council. But he has made this insinuation in order to sow doubts as to whether the , Security Council was competent to c.,'Camine the question referred to it by the Yugoslav Government, namely, the violation of the provisions of the Peace Treaty with Italy concerning the Free . Territory of Trieste by the Governments and the military authorities of the United States and of the United Kingdom. The USSR delegation believes that the United Kil1gdom representative not only has no juridical , . grounds, but in fact has no grounds whatsoever, • lOI' making such insinuations and sowing such doubt, Everyone knows-and the United Kingdom representative knows perfectIy weil toothat the basis in international law and juris- . prudence on which the Security Council may ; deal with questions connected with or relatecl to the situation in the Free Territory of Trieste is to be found in the relevant provisions ~f the Peace Treaty with Italy, relating to the creation of the Free Territory of Trieste, the recognition of the Territory by the Allied and Associated 1 have in mind article 21 of the Peace Treaty with Italy and in particular paragraph 1 of that article. Paragraph 2 of the article provides that Italian sovereignty over the areas constituting the Free Territory of Trieste shaH be terminated upon the coming into force of the Treaty. As we know, the Treaty with Italy came into force in September 1947, when Italian sover~ eignty over the Free Territory of Trieste came to an end. Flom then onwards any attempt to impose Italian sovereignty over the Free Terri,;, tory of Trieste and any attempt to infringe upon the independence or integrity of the Territory ranks as a direct and open violation of the Treaty. This must be our point of departure. What is more, article 2 of Annex VI of the above-mentioned Peace Treaty provides that the integrity and independence of the Free Territory shaH be assured by the Security Couneil of the United Nations and that the Council shall be responsible for ensuring the observance of the Statute of the Free Territory of Trieste. According to the provisions of the s~id articles of the Treaty, the question of the Free Territory of Trieste is fully within the competence of the Security Council. The Security Cauncil is not competent to discuss the Statute of the Free Territory of Trieste. That is the prerogative of the Council of Foreign Ministers and of the Peace Conference of twenty-one nations which prepared, adopted and signed the Peace Treaty in question. The Security Council. has no right to change the Statute of the Free Territory of Trieste but it has the right, and is competent and bound by the provisions of the Peace Treaty with Italy, to show interest in, examine and form an opinion on the situation in the Free Territory of Trieste. ln accordance with the V nited Nations Charter and the provisions of the Pea~e Treaty with Italy, the Yugoslav representat:ve has approached the organ which is empowered ta deal with matters pertaining to the territorial integrity and independence of the Territory. The VSSR delegation considers that the Yugoslav Government has "approached the right organ and that it should receive a reply showing that the Security Couneil has carefully examined the Yugoslav Govcrnment's complaint and the matters raised by that Government. The Couneil cannot refuse to examine the question. " ln view of what has been said, all insinuations to the dfect that the Council has not the right to cc lsider that question are devoid of aIl ioundation. The USSR delegation believes that to embark upon this path would mean complicating and confusing the clear-cut questton referred to the Security Council by the Yugoslav Government. We have no grounds either for complicating or postponing the discussion of that question. The Security Council has sufficient information at its disposal bath in the document submitted by the Yugoslav representative and in the report of the British-United States Command in the r,'ree Territory of Trieste, which is at the disposaI of the members of the Council. During the discussion, the representative of the United States and the representative of the United Kingdom will have every opportunity for putting forward any additional information they may deem necessary. 1 think, therefore, that we have no good reason ta postpone for a long time the di"cussion of the question referred ta the Security Council by the Yugoslav Government. 1 think that aIl those who sincerely wish ta discuss the substance of that question and not ta distract the Council's attention by ouside questions, will have an opportunity of preparing themselves for the discussion by the time of the next meeting, which 1 suggest we hold on Tuesday, 10 August, at 11 a.Ir. As we have little time left i: shall not request a French interpretation of my speech, that is, an interpretation into the other working language, unlesS-the French representative wishes it. Mr. PARODI (France) (tmnslated fmm French): 1 am prepared to agree not to have a French interpretation of the President's statement ulltil the next meeting. However, 1 should like ta make a reservation now regarding the way in which the President has understood-or sa 1 gathered from the English interpretation 1 have just heard-the comments 1 had made. Perhaps it is 1 who am wrong and 1 would then be sorry 1 agreed ta the postponement of the French interpretation until the next meeting of the CouncJ.

1 should like to point out to the French representative that 1 said it was the United States representative and not the French representative who first raised the question. That is a facto The United States representative was the first ta raise the question of obtaining information from the Yugoslav Government. It is now 1.55 p.m. Are we going to continue the discussion of the qùestion or postpone it until the next meeting? Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : 1 wish to raise a point of order. In the first place, when would the President propose ta have our next meeting: this aftemoon? ln the second place$ has the President a long list of speakers? It is truc that 1 have asked permission ta speak, but that was for only a moment or two in arder ta make one or two comments on the statement which the President has just made. If there is a prospect of our being able to finish in ten minutes or so, might that not he the best procedure? If not, cau we adjoum for an hour and finish early this aftemoon?

1 think there is no pUlpose in our meeting again today for a ten-minute statement by the United Kingdom representative. Consequently the next ~eeting of the Security Council on this question will be held on Tuesday at 11 a.m. However, to enable the Urûted Kingdom representative to make his statement, 1 shall now call upon him ta speak for ten minutes in accordance with his requcst. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : 1 do not want to take ten minutes. 1 only wish to say that in the course of the President's remarks, he said that 1 challenged the competence of the Council in this matter. 1 did not. 1 referred to the fact that there is another procedure foreseen in a perfectIy good article of the permanent Statute, but that 1 would not invoke it and that 1 recogriized and would not deny the competence of the Council. It is quite true, as the President· said, that it is undesirable to postpone the examination of this question for a long time, and 1. do not want to do that. 1 have already asked for full informatio' to enable me to deal with tms document which has been submitted bv the representa<::i.ve of Yugoslavia. 1 am unable to' deal with it at the moment for lack of flJll information, but l shall get that information, and you lt seems to me that that is allowing a reasonable delay. What is the tremendous hurry about this particular case which CQnce.:n3, in the main, two agreements made in March and the beginning of last May? Why has it suddenly become sa terribly urgent? What 1 want ta do is ta be able ta d.eal properly and faithfully with the Yugoslav document. For that 1 shall probably need about a week. The,re is a difficulty: not ouIy shall 1 have to refer ta London, but London in turn, may have to refer ta Trieste on many points, thereby making sorne material difficulty in obtaining full documentation.

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