S/PV.352 Security Council

· The question of the Free Territory of Trieste is .on the agenda for this afternoon's meeting. As we know, two items were on our agenda this moming [351st meeting], the Palestine question and the admission of Ceylon. ta the United Nations. At the suggestion 'of several ' delegations, the second item was consideteq first,' and the discussion of that question was conduded. We did not discuss the Palestine q~estion. It has now been proposed that the .. dIscussion· of the· Palesthïequestion should be ln line with that, 1 would formal1y move that the present agenda be modIDed by including the Palestine question as the second item, and making the present item 2 appear as item 3 mi the agenda.' . Mr. PARODI (France) (translated trom, French) : '1 aiso feel it wo'uld be advisable for us to deal with the Palestine question .first this afternoon. 1 think it is the more urgent question, and the question on which discussion and, if necessary" a recommendation by the Council, are more. immediately nece~ary. 1 therefore support the proposal just made by the representativ~ of the United States. The PRESIDENT (translated trom Russian): The proposal ma:de by the United States representative, . if 1. understand it corree.tIy, is as follows: the Palestine question shouldappear as the second item on today's agenda and the question of the Free Territory of Trieste as the third item. If we donot have time to finish the consideration of both these questions today; we should continue the discussion at our meeting tomorrow morning. 1 :shal1 now .put ta the vote theproposal that the Palestine question should be listed as item .2 on today's agenda and the" question of· the Free Territory of Trieste, as item 3, it being understood that the Palestine question will be considered first, and thatll the discussion of these questions is not conclùded toda.y, it will be'continued tomo:T0W morIÛng. A vote was takenby show of hands. The mQtion was adopted by 9 votes in favour, with 2 abstentions. The agenda, as amended, was adopted. de tion sécurité temps séance du durer. plus sujet. Conseil qu'il a Aucun d'Etats Je faite le séance], tion le déclaration cite: Ml'. JESSUP (United States of America): 1 wish to make a bri~f statement in regard to Palestine. The Security \'Jouncil contemplatel", that a certain interval may elapse before it halds its next meeting on this subject. Recently one has heard suggestions to the effect that the truce in Palestine may not continue. 1 should like to state in the clearest possible terms the view of the United States on this question. 1t is the view of the United States that the truce can be terminated only by the Security Cauneil which on ~5 July ordered the pa.rties to observe the truce [S/902]. No one of the States concerned, no group of the States concerned, can termin8tè the truce. 1 shalI take . the liberty of recalling the st.ateïIu;nt made on behalf of L'le United States on 13 July [334th meeting] when we introduced the resolution [S/890] which was n'le ·basis of the order adopted by the Security Councll ,:m 15 July. That statement contained the following sentences which 1 shalI quote: "The Security Council, inordering, under . Chapter VII of the Charter, the observance of a truce, should make it clear that it insists that the Palestine problem is not to be solved . bv force. . "The Security Council should therefore de- • cide that the truce shalI remain in effect until . en the future situation in Palestine is adjusted· la by peaceful means." fiques." Further, on 15 Ju1y [338th meeting], before : the vote was taken, 1 màde the folloWing ; qu'on statement on behalf of my Government: suivante "1 feel that it needs ta be understood, when . the vote is taken on the adoption of this draft .projet .resolution, that this truce is not to be consi- '. comprendre dered an interlude in the fighting; it mustbe·. dérée Chapitre trêve, palestinienne un.derstood that the adoption of. this resolution, :1 l'adoption with the ninth paragraph, is symbolic of the . paragraphe, fact that the Security Council decides that the lique situation in Palestine is not to be settledby : situation existant etl Palestine soit force, but is to be settled by peaceful means." , par .1 believe the members of the Security Coun- . cIl will agree withme that these are the views rité seront d'accord we had in mind in adopting that resolution point of 15 July. 1 am not aware of any CirClillis~ances·which would incline the Security Councirconstance ~il to revoke or modify. that tesolution, unless sécurité It should be necessary to order measures under ~hapter VII againstany party which repudes dlates the truce and resorts to war. à 1 shouldalso like to calI attention to the . fact that the Tesolution of 15 Jlùycontained two' paragraphs dealing especialIy with the city of Jerusalem. and ordering an immediate and .membres . ~nconditional tease-fire inthat city. Itfurther irlstruct,,(1 the Mediator to continue his efforts General McNAUGHTON (Canada): l'have listened ta the i'epresentative of the U~ited States and l,find myself in the closest a .;ord with the opinions and the views which he has expressed. The statement released to the Press by Mr. Ebanas coming from Mr. Sher~ok on Friday last, 13 August,cannot, in the opinion of the . Canadian delegation, pass unnoticed by the Security CtJuncil, because it is evident that no public statements bypersons holding positions of responsibility can be regarded ÏJ::1 .isolation from the whole existing situation in Palèstine. Ml'. Shertok's statement, as reported, contains the suggestion that the trnce in Palestine may not be continued. The dangeroussituation which exists there was brought tQ the .attention of the Security Council by the Mediator in his . r~cent report cpntained in document 8/955 of 7 .4.ugust. In paragraph 1 of this report the Mediator refers ta the "fear that. hostilities May shortly be resumed d~pite truce ordered by Security Council". Itwillbe notedthathe goes on to say in tbis report' that "there. seems moreover to he somemisundetstanding on the character of tbis truce. P1,lblic statements by statesmen on' both sides have lately indicated that thdr Governments might, as a consequence of aIleged violations by the other PartY, take such military action ~.s theythought fit.". . . In the circumstances. the '. Medi~.torissued specific instructions tohis obser'Vers;these are am1exed .to bis report of 7 August. 1'wish to take this oppoÎ'tunity to st~te, on hehalf of thê ,Ganadian .delegation, our, .•complete ...•agreement withthe' interpreta.tion of the Couneil's" ,resolution .of . 15 JuIy given. by'the .Medi~tor in· these instructions .tega.rdilig .the' observance of the truce~ ,Most specifica1Jy we support the interpretation givèli in thê::following -propositions: .'.' ..'.".'. '. ... , ,... .• "Subject, to .furt:ber" dëqi$iori9Y Ale S~curity doundlorthe Gellëral ~embly, th.e truce shall r:~main.in lorce ..•. untilà peacefuI 3djustment of' the future situation' of Palestine. is reached [8/902]." . ,. , ~ Conseil · Conseil de · prétendue · puisse le faire De ; teur ; conséquent : lui The Mediator, acting on the spot on beklf of the Security Council, in supervising the observance of the truce, has 1;>een instructed to déal with alleged breaches of the truce so far as it is within bis capacity to do so by appropriate local action. In the view of the Canadian delegation, the Mediator commands the confidence of the Council and it is tÏ1erefore the duty of the Security Council to give him its full support. " ,For my part, 1 am instructed to state that i ! instructions de , Canada , accordé len , en · deVrait efforts · de ,d'accords durable de .sécurité Médiateur, teur générale, extraordinaire, ajustement Pale.stine ·d'un par vue sécurité'devrait thl~ Government of Canada adheres to.the supp'Jrt which it has given consistently to the Seçurity Council's resolution of 15 JuIy, and to the Mediator's efforts to implement it. We believe '-I1so that the Mediator shouId be given aIl necessary assistance in bis efforts, "not only to assure the observance of the truce, but also to effect a"· lasting settlement in Palestine by agreement and through negotiation. In maintaining that it is the duty of the Security Council ·to give its full support to .the Mediator, it is appropriate' to recall that it was bythe .. decision of the General Assembly at its second special session iliat. ,the Mediator was appointed in order especially "to promote a.peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine".l .' . . It stands to reason that no unilateral action b~ one party or another, which is inconsistent Wlth this objective, should be permitted by th'e Security Council. Indeed~ in the view of the Can~dian delegation, the Security Council should take this occasion to remind both parties session ment Mr.E{rKIiOURI (Syria):. At the beginning of .this meeli."!& when the representative of the United States proposed·that the Palestine questionshoulci, be included in the agenda of this meçting and given priority over item 2, 1 thought that he was ready to discuss a matter which' is of real urgency: that of the Arab refugees who are. in a very critic~ù condition at' the present time. 1 thought that he would , suggest sorne a.rrangement for them and propose that the Security· Council shouId render its help and inte:rvene intheir behalf. Howevec, when 1 heard the réason for this priority, l 'found that he simply repeated the warnings which he had pronounced before, ~d which were not very necessary, because ihev are induded in the resolution [S/902] of the Secll.rity Council. There is nothing new in these wariùngs. 1 do not know why such , â ,matter shouId have priority and why we should, neglect the very important question of 'E . the T.~J.ugees. . l have been receiving information, sI:~cific­ allythe latest information froin the Director of Public Health in Syria, that these refugees have now been attacked by epidemics and diseasci of.a dangerous nature, and it is' very possible that in the near future they will be experiéncing .,very serious suffering. , 1 had,thoitght .that the Security Council, the organ which ordered.this permanent truce, ,wouIdfindsQme way.to repatriate these people, and' not leave them, dispersed in the deserts and fields. 1 do, notsee Why. this ,matter shouId' be neglectc::d and: why the Security Council should pre~e4t .the'· Arabs ftom. taking measures to repatriate these.people to 'their homes. It orders theIll· to. stand still and not make any mov.e..tO'~~l'ds that.. end, .and says that the Security,CpUIJ.cil itself will take charge of repatriation 'which is humanitarian, just and legaI., The. Council is preventing the proper people . from. doing so •.without doing anytbing itseH. This' isnot a correct procedure and it is. nothuman. . SÎllce this. will .perhaps be the last· meeting , <J.t1rÏJ:)i t9-c swnme,r and· no other meeting on the~ubjeç:~ may. ~e held until we are in Paris or until sorne ~leduring the autUllUl, 1 wish tb. à!Jk th.~ representative of the United States whether he intends to have hundreds of thousands,o.f displaced' persons. rema.in out of their homes until the .next wiitter?· ls that bis intention,· and does his G()vernment wish them to cett~ justilier Arabes et famine gens et n'ont citoyens. times des domiciles sont-ils ment, pourquoi ont-ils ou faire. donner le que des faire lè pas pas. des sympathie chez au hiver. les·Arabes D"', to make a 1l10ve and leaves the l'efugees .Jcatt~red in the desert without saying a word in their favour, even a word of sympathJ. Nothing at all is said. 1 never heard a word from the representatives of the United States and the USSR to that effect, nevera·word of sympathy for those poor people who have been expelled from their homes. and are now homeless. They bake in the sun .during the summer andsuffer the cold of winter. How can one expectthe . 'abs and the people of the Near East to iie confidence ii1. the justice and good faith ùf the Security Council and United Nations when they see that they are dealing with them and treating them in such a way? These peoples are considered as invaders and aggressors. Why? Because theycame in to repatriate their own people who were unjustly expelled. TheCouncil and the United Nations do not consider as invaders those immigrants who. are coming in from all parts of the world to a country which is not theirs, invàding the land and expelling the people from their homes in order that they may· settle there. de de . comme quoi? chez sés. dèrent qui .·un nent le . ner Thos~ people who are coming in from aIl parts of the world are not considcred invaders, and yet the owner of the house, if he wishes t6return and be repatriated to bis own house, is considered an invader. We are fdr the truce and the continuati.on of the· trucc; we. do not· object to that. The Arabs haveacccpted the truce butthey wanted, in the fust place, to have the truce well ob· served.. ·It seems, aœording to the :cepbrts of the Médiator himself, that the observers arenot able to .perform that job. They arénot able to compel the observance of the truce and the . Jewish dissidents are not 9bedient even totheir The Mediator himself said the following [8/961J: "Reports rèceived from United Nations observers concerning last night's fighting support this appreciatioll, since firing began from the Jewish side." It 'Would appear that the Jews are seizing upon. any occasion ta provoke the Arabs, in arder ta open fire again. It seems that they are relying upon certain arms and ammunition which they received during the first truce and aIso during the second truce, and that they will try ta use these arms. This truce is in their favour, They have' set up certain organiza.. tions; but 1 do not think the Arabs would establish new forces now, other than thase they have t.~ere; and, as a matter of fact, thcy do not wish ta go a,gainst the wishes of the Security Council. Yesterday 1 receîved a telegram from my Government saying that the Zionists have attacked the Syrian Consulate in Haifa for the second time. They have looted everything there which was left over from the first attack. We know t..ltat a Consulate in any country has certain immunities. The first time the Zionists atta.cked the place they carried off a great deal of loot, and now, whatever was left has been taken by them this week. l received a telegram yesterday ta that efIect. Such provocation continues to be a matter of general occurrence. The members of the .Council will remember that the, other day we received information from the Secretary-General of the Arab League [8/958J to the effect that the Jewish forces have arrested 28 persons from the village of Eitera, near Haïfa, and set fire to them. They Juifs, ment restent nous trêve Conseil de n;' de l'histoire, vis-à-vis nuons nous jourd'hui toute être constituer que entendons Etats-Uni" tiques, l'Etat millions Est-ce Ce à accordé clamé les .résolution Unies missions la par teur ces partie gent créé générale raIe abandonnée. tion • See Official "records of the second special session of the General Assembly, Supplement No. 2, resolution If the Seeurity Couneil is here ta proteet the peaee and safeguard the SCCt'lrity of the worM, that i& not the way ta do it. Fresh flames are being added ta this fire in the Near East, and as the Seeurity' Couneil is warning the Arabs, 1 think that the Arabs in turn should warn the Seeurity Couneil that the t'esult of its actions will not bring security or safety, either ta Palestine or ta the world as a whole. 1 hope that the Seeurity Council will try ta find sorne means of repatriating these pOOl' people who have been expelled from thdr homes. That is the urgent poÙit ta which no one pays any atention. Ml'. EBAN (Israel): 1 believe that the views of the Provisional Government of Israel have been expressed on aIl the specifie issues before the Security Couneil, except on that of the Arab refugee problem. 1 should like ta offer a few .comments on t.h.at problem and then ta discuss the general situation of the truce and· the problem of peace in the light of the interpretation given by the representative of Canada to recent statements by the Provisional Government of Israel. It is clearL~at the flight of 300,000 Arabs from the territory of Israel has created a poli- ticàl and humanitarian problem of the greatest dimensions. In discussing a possible solution of that problem, it is highly relevant ta consider how it arase. The Prbvisional Govern- ment of Israel neither organized nor sought nor encouraged that ftight. Indeed, the Secur- ity CouDcil would do well ta fix its attention on a most remarkable circumstance, to which the represrlIDtative of Syria has drawn attention, but which has been lost from view in most public discussion of this event: that the over- whelming majority ofthef; Arab refugees fled from Palestine before the Government of Israel was even constituted. They streamed out of Haïfa, Tiberias,. Safad and the villages of the coastal plain during the days when the Mandate was still in force and when the United King- dom administration was claiming and exercising undivided responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and for the security and wei· {are of the entire population. This exodus is therefore part of the chaos and anarchy of those days, when the country was falling into disruption through the gradual withdrawal of govemmental control and a simultaneous in-' ability ta allow a progressive transfer of authority. But although this fact might answer the question of formal responsibility for those events) the substantive responsibility undoubtedly rests with the Arab States, which filled the ~ont brutale en opération migration Arabes Le encore séance] informé gnre attaques déclaré vait je, ont à que l'effectif qu'une est terrain compte, que qu'on A significant example is that of Haifa, from which sorne 40,000 Arabs fled late in April. The Security Council may still recall how, at its meeting of April 23 [287th meeting], the rep- resentative of the United Kingdcm reported that that exodus was preceded by military operations on a limited §cale and of limited duration, pro- voked by Arab attacks, and that nothing in the nature of a massacre or an attack on the civilian population took place. It can perhaps now be revealed that no more than 200 Jewish troops, lightIy armed, ever took part in any military operations at Haifa. ' Clearly then, we must look for reasons other than those of military pressure to account for this flight. It happened partIy in response to panic-stricken propaganda; largely tP..rough the justified feeling of these people that having submitted them to a war, their leaders had fled the country before them, since no member of the Arab Higher Committee was to be found on Palestinian soil; and above all, in response to a sentiment that the imminent war proclaimed by the Arab leaders would bring nothing to the Arab popula~-ion but hardship and suffering and the postponement of that considerable measure of political independence which was peacefully available to them under the 29 November resolution before the Arab invasions began. • . It is significant that this exodus' took\ place before the Government of Israel had consoli- dated any process of government within that area. It is equally significant that now that this territory is under the control of an ordered governmental machine, the representatives of Egypt and Syria are both anxious that these Arab refugees should find their security under that Government and confident that they will do so. . The view that we have repeatedly expressed lS that this war was in no way in accordance with the interests of the Palestinian Arab masses; and that view.is tragically illustrated here. Look at them now in pathetic 'exile on the heal'th of those very Stat~s which '~antonly created their plight. Contrast that sltuation with what it would have been if th 29 November ..ësolution had been allowed to take peacefv.l ~,:'ect:. for then there would have been a new unit of independent Arab life; a State with 900,000 Arabs living underArab fuIe, and the remainder, wherever they were, But these refugees, by their exodus, have testified to their profound lack of sympathy or concern with all these warlike objectives for which this still unfinished war was launched. Vnfortunately, while their leaders retain their present attitude, it seems clear that if they returned they would again be exploited for the overthrow of the State. Therefore, the attitude of the Government of Israel is dp.cisively affec- ted by one consideration. Are wc now in a state of w~r, interrupted war, or are ~e in a, state of peace, sa that such a vast movement of population can be envisaged without refer- ence ta questions of military advantage? The Mediator himself in his message [8/948] l'ecognizes what he calls "the misgivings which the Provisional Government might have with regard to the return of large numbers of these l'efugees during the war. For there is all the difference in the worldbetween receiving peacea ful people into a State and introducing thou- sand~ of people who will be exploited for that State's destruction. We must ask ourselves which of those two effects· would be created by the mass return of Arab refugees at. this time. Unfortunately, all the evidence shows - that we are as yet in no position to regard this problem as divorced from its military context and as an element of permanent peace-making. The Arab Higher Committee, which is recog~ nized as the representative of these returning refugees, has just announced its ï.'1tention to resume the warat an early convenient date. The Secretary-General .of the Arab League in Cairo has just declared that this truce, in bis eves, is preparation for a renewed onslaught, a~d not a prelude to a peaceful adjustment of the situation. Nt'~ a day passes when an Arab leader does not threaten t.lJ.e forcible elimina- ln thosc circumstances, by the very defini~ tion which the Mediator and the Security Coun- cil have given ta objects of the truce, any far- reaching measure of repatriation must be weighed in terms of military advantage. If anyone is prepared to' advocate the immediate return of these masses, he must commit him- self to the view that these retrtrning Arab refugees will be coming back as peaceful citi- zeus of the State of Israel, willing to uphold and defend its institutions, ready to co-operate in the peaceful functions of the State and determined not to lend themselves to any move for destroying the State of Israel from within or from withou~. To understand this view it is sufficient to ask ourselves 'what, for example, would have be(',u the answer of the Government of the United Kingdom if the entry into the British Isles of several million Germans had been sug- gested in 1940, or what would the answer of the United St"ates Govemment have been if, two months after Pearl Harbour, the mass re~ turn or influx of men of Japanese nationality had been suggested as an immediate measure. Royaume~Uni de plusieurs été si deux ou nationalité évidemment possibilités Surely the criterion oÎ military advantage ,must apply so long as there is war or the pros- pect of war. In the light of every precedent and of its own vital security, the. answer which the Government of Israel must now give cannot fail to be dictated by circumstances beyond its control. But if the circumstances of war, which Israel did not seek and would gladly see vanish, compel a consideration of this problem on a basis of military security, we are not unaware that, in the long-term view of eventual peace, dose attention must be given to questions affecting repatriation and. resettlement, the movement and distribution of populations. The Government of Israel, as 1 have said, is ready ta negotiate the replacement of the truce by a permanent peace settlement. den~, ble, peut qui l'état serait examiner le problème rité l'esprit .la p..iticulière ment qu'aux population. répète, en pacifique à de lation . In such peace talks it would he willing to mclude an urgent discussion of the question of population'movements, repatriation and re· settlement. The Goverpment of Israel believes ln view of aIl these diifficulties and problems and of the limited reSGurces of international agencies in proportion to the scope of this problem, it is, 1 think, only wise to take a realistic tîew. According to that view it be- comes daily more apparent that there is only one hope for a radical solution, andthat is the immediate initiation of peace talks with the question of resettlement high on the agenda. In discussing this question as an integral part of an eventual peace settlement, the Provi- sional Government of Israel proposes to submit the following as some of the relevant considera- tions. First, the need for immediate alleviation of distress; then the best long-term demographic conditions for good relations between Jews and, Arabs; the willingness of the returning people to carry out the duties of peaceful citizenship in the particular area to which they wish to return; the possibility of agreed measures of population distribution; and the need for fair and liberal treatment both of Arab minorities in Jewish terri~ory and Jewish minorities in .Arab States as· instanced by the guarantee in the Israeli draft Constitution of equal rights of aIl citizens and re;sidents of the State. These considerations, amongst others, lead us to invite the Security Council's attention to the general question of truce and peac~. '.... Members of the' Council will recall that on numerous occasions severa! delegations here represented ,have cOllsistently stated their view that the parties to this dispute must eventually resolve their diffei'ences by peaceful negotiation: Th~re is no s!.lbstitute for an Arab-Jewish understanding reached by processes of direct contact and c.mdid exchange of views. The· organs and representatives of the United Na- tions may by the use of their good offices for mediation do much ,to lessen the hardship of conflict. But agreement cannot be imposed or projected from outside. It must come from within as a genuine reflection of the sense of mutual inter'est calling both parties towards a partnership in peaceful settlement. 1 do not wish ta weary the Council. with quotations, but 1 believe tnat it is accurate to say that the great majorityof the members of this Côuncil have at one time or another given expression ta their interest in negotiation ;,tnd agreement. The Government of Israel, accordingly, believes that its action in dec1aring its readiness to meet with the other side for direct negotiations for permanent peace res- ponds to the sentiments which members of this Cauncil have frequently expressed. The nego- tiations which we envisage v'ould not be tram- melled by any fixed basis. They would not be conditioned by any prior comtnitment of any . sort. These two p'lrties, which will have to live together in the Middle East, er.ch in its own sphere of identity and independence, must surely at sorne stage adjust their differences by peaceful means. What we a3k is, whv not, then, at this stage? . The reports of the Mediator and daily events indicate that the truce, valuable as it is, can only be regarded as a precarious and unœrtain basis for a relationship between the two parties. There are many acute and g~ave problems which by their very nature cannot be success- {ully solved in an intermediate stage of war. The mobilization ofarmies, the tension of these daily incidents, the indefinite postponement.of beneficent sociaI and economic projecu" this p~rmanent sword hanging over the neck of peace, aIl this does not produce the atmosphere which can long be a substitute for apeaceful settlement. ,The Security Council and the Mediator would surely see the opening of It is no .satisfactory or convincing reason for Arab representatives to abstain from such talks on the grounds that recognition of the Govern- ment of Israel is implied. In the legaI sense 110 such formai diplomatic question arises by !he ~ere act of discussion, unless that question 18 discussed at the peace conference itse1f. In the politicaI sense, for Arabs to withhold con- sent to peace talks with Jews is to declare a permanent unwillingness ta discuss peace. For with whom else but with the Provisionai Gov- ernment of Israel can they ever hope to discuss peace, with whom else except the only compe- tent authority governing the life, the defence and the internationaI commitments of that area and its population? T'.ae Security Council may weil be aware that' fuis is no new problem, that .ao matter what the body representing the Jews has ever beencalled from time to time, the Arab leaders have aIways' refused to sit round ~ table ,vith them. _ The position is aIl the more unconvincing tecause the Arab League has aIready, practic- ally, whether it Iikes it or not, been in negotia- tion withthe Provisionai Government of Israel, since it has dealt with the Mediator who, on the Jewish side, has deaIt exclusively.and e.x- plicitly with the Provisionai Government of Israel cand has carried proposais and views to and fro between the Provisionai Government of Israel and the Governments of the Arab States. It should be c1ear, first, that no other body but the Provisionai Government of Israel can or ever will' he available for discussions of truce or peace. In refusing these negotiations, arenotthe Arab Governments sacrificing the welfare and future of 300,000 victims of the war to an insignificant issue of formai' prestige? That is a heavy responsibility. For the Arab States to refuse peace talks, whatever vaIuable work is done 'CO alleviatethe refugee situation, is to'perpetuate an acute problem which they have created and which, without peace nego- tiations, they can neithel' alleviate nor soive. It is against this background that the Provi- sionaI Government. of Israel pointed out, in a statement the other day [334th meeting], that the duration of a truce, with. large hostile armies facing each other in growing tension across a few hundredyards, should not be rega,rded as indefinite. .It was' never. intended .that it should. The whdle purpose of the t.mce, as the Media.tor said in this room on 13 July [333rd meeting], wasthat atan early stage the.parties might becoI)fronted'with each other These events took place when the ink was scarcely dry on an entirely vague and unsub- stantiated report containirlg a generalization about greater Jcwish aggressiveness in the Jeru- salem sector [8/961}. Although these subse- quent events may by themselves be deemed to have refuted that judgment, we consider that it was not valid even when it was made. But since the question of responsibili{y has been raised, we consider that recent events in Latrun and Jerusalem should be immediately and meticulously investigated. Howeyer, there is something that takes precedence over investigation, and that is, to restore the cease-fire in Jerusalem. The reports reachirlp; us here indicatc that the situation has now got too far out of hand and that there should take place the same process as is usually involved in establishing a cease-fire from scratch after hostilities have been in progress. Exactly the same technical procedure appears to be requiredhere. That the truce is not a substi- tute for permanent peace is further illustrated by burdensome international controls, restrictive interpretations giving rise to conflicting views 'as to the meaning of the truce, and the fact that the prison camps of Cyprus are now entering their second anniversary this morning. But even if allthese differences of interpretation are somehow put right, we still insist that the status quo cannot be considered as a substitute for a lasting peace~ In order to avoid misunderstandings arising from certain Press reports, it may be helpful if 1 say this: while for the reasons which l have stated, the Provisional Government of Israel advocates the early replacement of the truce by peace negotiations, so long as the truce is in force the Proivisional Government of, Israel will observe it in strict accordance with the resolution of 15 Ju1y [8/902J, on the obvious condition, of' course, that it is observed and' not repudiated by the other side. The reoper.îngof .the question of the truce, with a viewto a dc6.:.uite time limit and an interme- diate effort at a peace settlement, was a policy 1 woulù say that. in reply, and 1 hope in reassurance, to the representative of Canada: while the resolution stands, it stands. But while giving this undertaking, the Provisional Govemmt"..nt of Israel would still urge the Coun- cil to investigate the merit of fixing an early time limit, at the end of which the whole situation of the truce may again be reconsi- dered, and before which every influence should be b:rought.to bear to open direct and peacdul negotiations. It seems to me that it is perfectly legitimate fol' the Provisional Govemment of Israel, which has alway> co-operated and wishes to continue to co-operate with fche Security Council in pursuit of its objectives, to ask the Council to refleet· and to decide how much longer it should be asked to endure the menace of having avowed1y hostile armies on its doorstep and, the unwarranted burden ofintemational control, with· no definite peace in sight and, therefore, withno prospect of reaching a stable adjust- ment. This is a legitimate and a pertinent question for a people to ask which fînds itself at arms and absorbing all its energies in what appears ta be a useless military performance. And we ask ourselves: "If there is· a general under- standing that the \Var is not going to be re- sumed, then why should we have these heavily 1l10bilized armies sitting in their established posi- tions?· If there is .general agreement that war is to be renounced, why should not both parties beasked to indicate that renunciation in the most formaI way by meeting with each other for the consideration of apeaceful adjustment?" That is. the line of thought. the very discussion· of which we felt might lead ta the exploration ofa more stable set of circumstances, and it seems to us that weshall have done a ,Service -' if we can. focus public. attention on tne fact that this horizon of a precarious truce is not satisfactory, and that we should noW' be looking beyond' it. As tirhe gces on, each of these incidents appears to assume graver dimensions. It is quite obvious that if major violations of the truee continue, such as those at Latrun and in· Jerus~em, .therewiJ.1 be reactions ta those' violations. The sooner we get on 'to a more stable ground ofpeace negotiation the better. représentant l'interprétation vient immédiatement, le personne décider invités ne français. règle partie acceptions donnée procèdUl"e installations Paris Mr. PARODI (France) (trallslated irom French): We had agreed to make it a ruIe that when statements were made by persons not members of the Càuncil, 'the French trans- .lation should be given sirilUltanèou~ly. At the present moment this procedure cannot be fol- low~d, since the necessary equipment has already been despatched to Paris in preparation for the GeneraI Assembly. In these circumstances, and considering the situation as exceptional, 1 accept the suggestion Just made by the President. '!'he PRESIDENT (translated tram Russian): That procedure will be adopted. Speaking as the representati'/e of the Union of Soviet Sacialist Republics, 1 wish to make the followingremarks. The USSR delegation has always favoured a settlement of the Palestine question by peace- fui means, .in strict accordance with the Gen- eral A.ssemblydecision of 29 November 1947. This delegation has repeatedly expressed its situation que méth . ~1ews on this matter and has pl'esented draft resolutions advocating the immediate cessation ofhostilities and the solution of the Palestine problem by peaceful means in accordance with the. Jiecision of'the General Assembly. The;e proposaIs did n()t then meet with the support of a munber of ddegations in the Secur- ityCouneil. Some delegations, including ,in par- tiçular that of the United Kingdom, tried to, have theproposals for, an immediate cessation ofhostilities and a peacefuI settlement, of the Palestine problem set aside and replaced by other proposaIs advocating a i"truçe pf a few, 'gener- ally four, 'weeks' duration. The .. USSR delegation, for reasons of. princi- pIe, considered such short-:-term truce proposaIs to be inadequate. A number of other delegations took a different view. Events, however, have s~own that the attitude of the USSR delega- tion .was right".and that.those who sought to solve the Palestine problemby means of various kinds of teniporary truces were wrong. ,Thç ~ttempts to substitutea tempprary truce' fora The representative of the United Kingdom thereby rccognized that the General Assembly, in reaching a decision on the Palestine question in November 1947, had hoped that the impIe. mentation of that plan would he1p to solve· the problem of Jewish displaced persons in Europe. That admission deserves attention. It should be added, however, that when deciding to set up in Palestine two independent States, an Atab State and a Jewish St~te, the General Assembly hoped above all that its decision would lead. to a pp.aceful and happy solution of the Palestine problem as a whole, without any violation of the peace and without resort to force. Events have shown, however, that this was not the Casl':'. These were States which disregarded the deci- sion .of the General Assembly and strove to wreck· that decision, thereby making the Pale- stine prQblem more complicated and moreacute. Without proposing any definite solution of the problem of displaced persons in Europe, the representative of the United Kingdom raised that issue for the sole purpos~ of empha- sizing that ·a still greater problem ~as now developed in the Near East, namely that of the Arab refugees. According to the repre- sentative of the United Kingdom, there are no IesS' than 25C,000 Arab refugees in Palestine and the neighhouring countries. According to the represent?+ive of Syria, who spoke on the question nous avant et qui des tains complaire Unis, tion 1947 bilité. que formément partage pendants, intelligence, générale, il ne restait As we know, that decision embomed a plan for the settlement of the Palestine problem; it was a definite plan for the creation of two independent States in Palestine, an Arab State and a Jewish State; it was a plan for their peaceful existence side by ai.de, and for their economic co-operation. This plan was approved by the General Assembly. It only remained to take steps to p~t it into effect. But interna- tional forces, under the greedy urge of their economic, military and political interests, got to work. This plan was not to the taste of United Kingdom strategists, striving to increase the number of their military basefj in the Near East, and oit was equally displeasing to the Anglo-American oil companies in control of oil- bearing territories in the Near East. Prepara-" tions were begun to secure the revision of the Assembly decision and the collapse of the plan for a settlement of the Palestine problem. A special session of the General Assembly was called to revise the decision previously taken on Palestine. As you will remember, that scheme failed. The General Assembly in special session did not reverse its prt~vious decision. The very fact, however, that an attempt had been made to revise that decision led certain Arab feudal lords, such as King Abdullah of Transjordan, to hope that the General Assembly decision ?n Palestine could be infringed and that, hav- lUI{ converted it into a mere scrap~of paper, tuey could put their plans for aggression into effect. This attitude was encouraged and stimu- lated by United Kingdom policy in the Near East and by those rèsponsible for the application of that policy. The United States Press has repeatedly pub- lished detailed information showing that 90 per cent of the arms used by Arab forces in military operations in Palestine were supplied by the Government of the United Kingdom, and that the Arab Legion is Bl'itish-trained, British- armed and British-Ied. This has aIso been con- firmed by official statements. The New York Herald Tribune of 19 Febru- ary 1948 reported a statement by Ml'. Arthur Creech Jones, the United Kingdom Colonial Secretary, to the efIect that certain Arab ele- ments woUld stop' at nofu41g to achi~ve their purpose, namely, to prevent the partition of Palestine. That was a clear incitement ta those elements. Replying to a question regarding the .supply of arms from the United Kingdom· ta the Arab forces, Ml'. Creech Jones stated that these arms were suprlied under existing treaties. We can judge the attitude of the United Kingdom tO',yards theArab Legion, Glubb Pasha and the British puppet, Abdtillah of Transjordan, from the following statement made by the representative of· the ·United, Kingdom in the Security Council on 7 JUly 1948 [331st meeting]: "There.is IlO secret about the Arab Legion and Glubb Pasha, and our tre,aty with Transjordan, and all that. It is public pro- perty." And it is also public :property that the Government of the United Kingdom has given Transjordan a loan of 2 million pounds sterling for the maintenance of the Arab Legion. Itisthus perfectIy obvious that theovert att~mpt to sabotage the implementation of the General Assembly resolution on the partition of Palestine, together with the. military and t~ the unleashinp: of bloody battles in Pale- stine. AlI this, of course, has been done and is being done not in the interests of the Arab or Jewish people, but solely in order to safe- gu;rd the interests and high profits of the An~lo-American oil companies and maintain the' United Kingdom's strategic positions in the Near East. Ta ~,.ese selfish interests have been sacri- ficed· the peaceful labour and tranquillity of half a million Arabs who have been forced ta leave their homes as'a result of hostilities instigated from abroad. These people are now homeless and destitute and are undergoing hardship and privatioh. In the light of these facts, it is' easy ta see to whom responsihility for the plight of these people must be attributed. And, in this con- nexion, a pertinent question arises: Is it pos- sible ta solve the problem of the Arab refugees - those half-million unfortunate people, Wan- dering through the deserts of Palestine and TransJordan without shelter or means of sub- sistence - by such measures as the United Kingdom Government proposes ta us, that is, by placÏng at tJ:-c:ir disposal tents and medical supplies from Um~~d Kingdom military depots in the Near East? It is obvious ta every think- ing persan that such palliatives are no solution either of the problem of Arab refugees or of the problem of displaced Jews in Europe. These problems can be solved only by radical mea- sures. . It is now an obvious and undeniable fact that the failure to solve the problem of Jewish displaced persans in Europe and the deve1op- ment of the new probleI11)f Arab refugees in the Near East, result from the sabotage of the General Assembly resolution on Pale- stine. Those who have contributed ta that sabotage are directly responsible for the suffer- ings of these people. Attempts ta set aside me decision of the General Assembly in favJur of various plans and programmes, - indlding Count Berna- qotte's ,plan, which, as is evident from his statements in the SI;curity Council, was prompted in London; :~pproved in Washington and agreed ta in Paris - cannat lead to a solution of the problem. Such plans and pro- grammes, including Count Bernadotte's, have resulted and will result in failure. In the light of these. facts and events, it becomes even' more self-evident that the only \Vay ta ensure the settlement of the whole 1 this simple truth was apparent to those who still seek to sabota~e the implementation of the General Assembly resolution and attempt ta formulate their own plans and programmes for a settlement of the Palestine problem in violation of that resolution w'l.d in defiance of the' authority of theSecurity Council. ln view of the lateness of the hour, 1 agree to dispense with the French interpretation if the representative of France has no objection. 1 Mr. PARODI (France) (translated trom French): 1 agree ta the President's suggestion, provided that a French translation of bis state- ment will appear in the verbatim record of the present meeting, just as would have been the case if an interpretation had been given during the meeting, so that 1·may study it as soon as 1 receive the record.

That i~ understooâ. Mahmoud Bey FAWZI (Egypt): 1 intend to speak for only a few moments and ta limit myself ta .the question of displaced. Arabs. .1 shall be as factual as possible and shall refrain from umlecessary cOIfl.ment. . The ~acts as we, and, 1 believe, most people, .. see them are that between 350,000 and 550,000 Arabs. aImost half the whole Arab population of Palestine, have been driven from their homes, that they are in very tragic êircumstances and in dire nced of help, and should be fully entitled ta return· to their homes. When 1 say "driven av. ay from their homes" that includes the fact which 1 mentioned before [343rd meeting], namely, that for some time before 14 May, which isthe date of the proclamation of the so-called Jewish State in Palestine, and ever since then, the Arabs in certain regions have not been allowed ta continue to live in their homes or even ta harvest their fields. Another. point to which 1 wish to call the' attention of the Security Council is the question which 1 put to the Mediator when' he was here. 1 asked him whether the Arabs who were di'lplaced were entided to go back to their homes and, if they' were,· whether such repatriation shouldbe subject ta any conditioD$ [334thmeeting]. The Mediator replied on the followinp; day [335th ,meeting], after having ponderedthequestion, that "there should not be any conditions whatsoever for theArab relu~ces to return to their·homes". 1 am repeating hisvery words. .At that tinle. the: Security C~uncil seemed to be in perfectagreement. 1 did'riot hear one ward of objection from any quarter here, to the interpretation given on thatoccasion by the Mediator. garantie non bes si vaincu, s'affirmer Actually, what we are facing - and 1 want to say it again - is Zionist ambition, endless,"; limitless ambition, ambition which wants ta. gain more and more ground and never to stop. The other clay, at the Security Council's : Iast meeting on the Palestine question [349th: meeting], 1 quoted a statement from the 16: August issue of Time magazine made by the ' head of the so-called Jewish Government in' Palestine. 1 stopped at a certain point. With: the President's permission l 'Want to quote: one more sentence from that statement. It; was not made years ago; it was made a few : days ago and by a person who is supposedly: responsible and the head of the Jewish authorl ities or the so-called Jewish Government in: 'Palestine. Mr.Ben Gurion said: "We would! not have taken on this war merely for the pur': : pose of enjoying this tiny State." 1 thL~ that IS clear enough. ït is only one example of.many which 1 can quote here, and it cannot be contradicted. It is the continuation of a mad dream of many decades. For anybody who has timC; and desire to do it, 1 would: refer to a book written about two decades ago by the Zionist leader Jabotinsky, who usedto i go around in a military uniform. If 1 remember: weIl, the book was called "The Jewish War, Front". It is a hrilliantly written book, very! brilliantly written, but it is as significant as it : ,Front. is brilliant. ; As early as two decades ago, Jabotinsky was , saying that th~ poor Jews should get, hold, not: only of· Palestine or part of it, but aIso of: Transjordan, part of Syria and ,Egypt.· The' bookis there; It'mightbe out of print, but: 1 am willing ta lenda copy to any one who : The information we have received in the past few dayS, either directly or throllgh the Press, reveals a situation which is eminently unsatisfactory. Although the v'~uce appears to be in force throughout the greater part of Palestine, the situation is not the same in the city of Jerusalem, which was the abject of the Security Council's particular consideration in its resolution of r5 July. Moreover, we have become acquainted 'with certain declarations which have been mentioned here and reveal an, attitude which is dangerous to the maintenance of the truce. 1 . therefore consider that it was desirab!e to state clearly, as the United States repreM sentative has done, that the Security Council expects 'its decision to be respected. 1 hope that the statements made here on those lines may be fully and c1early understood bythe Governments and authorities involved. In that spirit, 1 once more heartily •support the statements made thisafternoon by the representatives 01 the United'States ànd of Canada. do~e the concern which gave rise to those s'inspirent statements. Neverthelèss, 1 cannot help sharing the fears of the representatives of Syria and Egypt with regard to the fate of the refugees. Obv;i.ously this question is particularly urgent. The Security Council will be failing in one of its fundamental duties if it does not undertake to settle this, question at the earliest possible moment. qui Syrie réfugiés. particulièrement rité certain bref 1 plus encore personne la main sacrée The PRERIDENT (translated trom Rus.tian): There are no more speakers on my list. Does anybody else wish to make any observations? Since no Olle else wishes to speak, 1 declare the meeting of the Securitjr Council adjourned. The next meeting will be held tomorro'V, 19 August 1948, at 1O.S0 a.m. to consider the question of the Free l'erritory of Trieste. ; The meeting rose at 6.55 p.m. AUSTRALIA-AUsrRAI.IE H. A. Goddard Pty. Ltd. 255a George Street SYDNEY, N. S. W. 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