S/PV.353 Security Council

The,letter from the Belgian representative has been circulated to members of the Security Couneil who have apparently noted its contents. As the agenda of the Security Council was somewhat overloaded upon receipt of this letter and as the question was not considered particularly urgent, it was thought that we might ex:unine tb.e matter in Paris;, before the opening of the General Assembly. If, however, the Belgian representative thinks it is of great urgency, a special meeting Cm.l1-i. be called next week here in New ynrk. Mr. NISO'f (Belgium) (translated f'1om French): l shaIl abide by the opinion of the Council on this point. The PRESIDENT {translated fram Russian): As no one wishes. to spe::lk on this matter, the proposal that the question should be dealt with iIi Paris will. be considered as adopted. Thç PRESIDENT (translated from Russian)'~ Before opening the discussion .on the matter before us, l should like to draw the attention of Council members ta the cablegram received this morning .from the Mediator [S/977], in wWch he makes a number of suggestions for maintain- mg peace in Palestine, in particular in Jerusalem. As the represe9tatîvès of the Governments who risually particip~te in our discussions on Palestine are not present, 1 think we 'should decide. when to cqnsider the cablegram; either this morning after concluding our discussion ail Trieste, or this. aftemoon before our c10sed meet- ing, or tomorrow morning at a special meeting. . We must invite the representatives of the inter- estedparties in.good. tÎD)e, .in accùrdance with . the decisionwe take. 1 should like to hear the opinions of themembeis qf the Security Coun- cil. . ; Mr. JESSUP (United States of America):. l agtee tha~.the. Security Council should give urgent consideration tù this communication from the Mediator. Having in mind the facts which the President has just stated, it would appear toPrésidentvient me thatperhaps the mostconvenient arrange- . ment wouldbe the sèhedulingof a meeting of the SecurityCouncilfor: 2.30this afternoon, to begin onthe Palestine question, that discussion to be. follo\Ved·. by.the c10sed meeting which has al., ,ready .beenscheduled for this aftemoon. 1 offet '. .thfft merely asa suggestion. . 212. Continuation of the dis:ussion on the 212. Trieste question' At the invitation of the President, Mr. Vilfan, representative of Yugoslavia, took his place at représentant the Si;curity Council table. table Mr. VILFAN (Yùgoslavia): The speeches of the representatives of the United States and the glais): United Kingdom at a previous meeting [350th tants meeting] of the Security Council have only con- cours firmed the correctnesS bf my assertion t}at the sécurité problem weare considering is not ~ne of.legal mer interprctation. An interpretation of the Peace quelle Treaty with Italy and especially of the pro- un visions wmch pertain to the Free Territory of je Trieste, as 1 mentioned previously, entai.ls no paix difficulty; that is, it entails no difficulty for those .clauses who approach the implementation of the. ~ro- necOJ;nporte visions of the Peace Treaty· and the prOVISIOns visagent rclating to the Free Territory of Trieste with the clauses sincere wish to fulfil their obli.gations. avec le In their last speeches, the. representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom have des giveu new proof of the insincerity of the policy de of their Govemments. In fact, 1 fail ta see even la a po~ibility for any legal discussion when there ne , is a consistent distortion of provisions wmçh were la formuiated to bring about an independent and ne free Territory of Trieste. The representativeS of qui the United States and the United Kingdom have toire s1mply continued. to apply the method of in- sentants .corr~ct interpretation, as 1 demonstrated in:r:i:ly simplement 1!tSf; speech [348th meeti~g]; .and at the last d'interprétation meeting [350tk meeting] their. speeches seem' des onlyto have perfected this method. .. prononcés semblent Our thesis from the verybeginning was and continues to bethatthe Provisional Regime has only one object, which is to ensure a transition to the complete indèpendence of the Free Terri- tory of Trieste. In other words, the Provisional Regime exists for the construction and consolida- tion of .the independence of the Free Territory of Trieste. Our thesis was. and continues to be,further, that every;measure undertaken by the military administrations to carry out the Instrument for the.Provisional Regime must 'bedirected towards the same goal, nameIy, the reconstruction and .consolidation of. the..independenceand integrity ofthe Free Territory of Trieste; and that, there- fore,every ·measure must .be in accord with the pr{)visions .of· article 24, paragraph.·.4, of 'the positions. The reprfsentatives of the United States and the UIÙted Kingdom attempt to bec!oud this obvious fact; and in their frequent statements they further attempt artificially.to. divide the Provisional Regime into two periods, name1y, the period in which the military administrations are in command and the period in which the Gov- ernor and the Provisional Couneil of Govem- ment assume their. functions. In e.stablislûng these two periods they go sa far a.."i to assert that in the fimt period of the Provisional Regime it is impûSSwle and even prohibited to undertake anything which would lead the F~ee Territory of Trieste towards econcmic independence. To this end, they .devise a method of ëlistinguishing between those provisions in the Instrument for the Pmvisional Regime which are applica:.ble during the period of military'administration and those which·are not. They maintain that none of the provisions which mention either the Gover- fior and!or the Provisional Coûncil of Govem-- ment are applicable during the first period. The representatives of the UIÙted States and the'United Kingdom should be more consistent if they wish their theory to sound plausible. They should eliminate not orny those provisions where the Governor and theProvisional Government 'are explicitly mentioned, but aIso·those in which. the participation of the.Governor and' the Pro- 'visional Government is merelyimplied. In that case, however, the list of the inapplicable pro- visions would be even longer. The .,question would then arise forthem as to whether •the Peace Treaty, except' for thelast sentence of article 1 of Annex VII, intendedany single pro- .vision to beiniplemented by the military ad- ministrations .alone. In any case, it is· certain that article 11 of Annex VII wasunquestionaHy intended to.beexecuted by the Governor and the Provisional Council of Government. This is apparent from what Imentioned in myspeech. of 13 August [348th meeting], and here 1 should like orny to quote once again artiçle.11 of Annex VII, as well as paragrapll 6 of chapter V of the report of the Trieste Commission·of Inquity. accord dessus rait ments." Trieste Gouvernements: Gouvernement du "ltaly and the Free Territory shall enter into an agreement to give efIect to the above pro- visions as weil ,as, to provide for any settlement between the two Govemments :which may be . d" reqUlfe . . . There is mention of the Free Territory and of Italy; and there is mention oI two Governments, which are c1early the Government of Italy and ,the Government of the Free Territory of Triest~. la co~e vernement tou'e italienne qu'à vrait contenir des forcer gères dans le Territoire libre." Paragraph 6 of chapter V of the report of the Trieste -Connnission of Inquiry reads: . "The agreement ta be concluded between the Italian Govemment and the Govemment of the Free Territory of Triestes on the use of th.:.l. :J- ian lira in the Free Territory of Trieste until the creation of a final currency, shollid include such provisions as would seem to strengthen the sys- tem of control of foreign .exchange of the Free Territory." tion Trieste. Once more the Government of the Free Terri- tory of Trieste is expressly m~ntioned. membres ment, ritoire ticle cet From these quotations it will be clear toall members of the Security Council that article Il of Annex VII was intended, in the first place, to .be executed by the.Government of the Free Territory of Trieste and, secondly, wa... insepara- blv linked with other measures which wei'e fOlmulated for thecqmtruction and consolida- tion of the independence of the Free Territory and which, according to thetheory of the repre- sentatives of the United States· and. the· United' Kingdom, should be ·left within the' exclusive competence cf the Governor and the Provisional Council of Government. However, if the representatives of the United States and theVnited Kingdom con.eicler, as they do, that article 11 of Annex VIl.is applicable in this,seIlSe, that the military administra.tion takes the place of the Governor and the' Pro- visional Council of .Government, then' they should likewise, considerapplicable aIl oth~r provisions of the Instrument for the Provisional Regime, as wellas the report of the Commission and the. decision of the Council of Foreign' Min- isters [S/577], which provisions, dècisionsand recommendations demand that paragraph. 4 of article 24 of the Permanent Statute shouId' be . respected. . lIt is not permissible to mterpret sorne pro- visions' of .the same peace treaty· one way' and However, they pretend that a thfrdaltemative . exists. They,take from the Instrument for the ProvisionaI Regime whatever is cûnvenient for tht'm and, whatever they think can -he manipu- lated to justify the continued dependency of the Free, Territory ori ItaIy., In brid, their policy, as lpointed out in my speech of 13 August ,". ':~48:h meeting], can he summarized 'as follows: llQW Ilotto inlplement the Peace'Treaty while at the sanie titne givingthe appearance' of impIe- menting it. The insincerity of their argumentation is re- flected in their emphasis on the long view, that is, on the fact that aU the measures referred to in 'the Yugoslav Government's complaiDt are of a provisiollaI nature only, since they are subject tCl è~angeor annulment by the Governor or the P#ovisionaI Govemment.' They are well aware iliat their legaI, arguments convince no.one and therefore they so strongly contend that the ac.. tions of the inilitary administrations may 1ater becQrrectedbythe Governcror the Provisional Council of Government. 1 beli~ve that the,1egaI meaning<ofsuch athesis is clearto ..n()~ne. It is not a questii?nof what is provisionaI or not pro'" visionaI.Rather it is a question of observing or ,not, observing the obligations of the Peace Treaty. " , !fW'ea.ccepted the logicoftherepresentatives 6fPteUIiited States. and the United Kingdom, it wguldbe possible, hyvjrtue of thisprecedent, to justity ,e\"~ry "viola,tionof th{l independence 'andintegrity of the Free TeiritoryofTrleste" ,ey.~nafter the n0nrinationof a Govcrnorand '.,-:ePteç0m.ïn.g int() forœofJhePellIlanent Statute: ,'l"hdtcannotbeconsidereda good deed becallse oftheva,~epoS$ibilitythatth,estolengoocÎs, Ul~Y1:>eretumed.Tlîis 1 sayonly inpassing;pourrai~ntêtre l,I'()wever, 'Whatis Illore important isthis:on the on~ band~tberepresentativespf the 'United StatesandtlielJnitedKingdoma$Sertthatthe agi'eemell~a.reprovisionaland that theyrn.a.ybe cancelled. by the Governnr;, andontheother hând tlJ.eydaim that.it., ,~, .~possible',to· solvè theprghlemof Trl~tejnthemanner p:t:0vided'1JlèD1~ , ill/the FeaceTreaty." .cc' 0' 'I1Iey,together\VÏthFranc~" openly·délay .thepe n9Il1ÏJ1îffipnofthe aovernoJ;", therebyprolonging theprovisiol1alcharacte~ of' the present,regÎine ,,'pftlJ,eTemtory.Tpis theydo in anticipation of ,tlJ,eW,?D1entwhentheir p()1icy-of undennining. 1 should like now further ta ilhilstrate with a few eXamples the insincerity of the actions of the United States and the United Kingdom., It is unneçessary, l believ.e, to prove thatthe natural duty of themilitary administrations is, as far as tâche possible, to consider the.Free Territory of Trieste as an entity andtherefore as far as possible to le ,synchronize their actions and set ·common ob- quent~ jectives. It isnatural that betwecn the two zones la there should exist the closest contact by which tifs the possibility of a common development of eco- les nomic and sociallife could be createà. Contrary là to this, and to what wouldbe considei'ed most ment normal, the Allied administration pursues 'a CoIitrairement poliey of progressive alienation and, division of à one zone from the other. politique tendant The Allied administration rejected nle: offer of the Yugoslav ac1Ini$tration to ,create a faite common organ fot solving the econo~c pro~ créer lems, of both zones. Itrefused to al10w the free problèmes movemerit within the whole Territory of the· refusé iIihabitartts of the Free Tenitory of Trieste- l'ensemble citizens cr 'ne and the same Statè-and rejected' toke .libre ,de'Trieste, thè prop'.i6al that. workers' shoùld be allowed et freely to seek employment ID the whole Terri- dantà tory. The normal commercial' traffic ,between librement the .zones has heen reduced toa minimum by the toire; sans distinction de zone. reguiations of the Allied administration whjch merciaux require that. orily goods valued at 10,000 lire réduits labout 20 dàll~rs} may be ttansported freely,promulgués whereas an ()ther traffic is subjected to special "que import andexport licences,' pas être.transportés .librement, trafic ciales Every action of the Allied administration with '. ' regard to the Yugoslav zone is intended to prè~, 'l'égard vent any economic tiewhich would sttfuigthen pêcher the econOlny of Trieste, .·.and.in' its oWil.zone' '.quipourraielltrenforcer eVêry action is intended to delay the solution of danssa,propr~zone,chacun the mostnrgenteconomic problemsof Trieste but lÜld to isolate Trieste fromi~ European hinter- 'plus urgen:tspour laneL With tbis purpose of obstructingthe- de- le velopmentof economicties}Viththe4interland, A the Allied' àd~11inistrationkeeps' in idleness fac- tives des usines tories in which the workers ofTriestecouldfind raient ernploymeI;1t. •. The majority of' theindustrial en- prises terprises in Trieste werep,ara-Statalproperty~f par3.Statalede Itnly, which coIitrolled theseenterprisesthrough' prisesp~ 'the "IRI." In the Peaœ Treaty-itwas estab- ,de Jished thataIl pata-Statalproperty should be devra Probably the hest illustration of aU this may be found in the actions of the AIlied adminis- tration on the question of a trade agreement lvith, Yugoslavia. The Allied Military Com- m':dld, right up ta the end of February, was of.menable to the idea that the development of trade with Yugoslavia might be advantageous 10 its zone and considered that it would not be <:ontrary to the Peace Treaty. Negotiations with the Yugoslav mission were undertaken and ap- peared to be very successful. They -~sulted in an agreement under which the exchange of goods between the Allied zone of the Free Territory of Trieste and Yugo!j,lavia was ta amount to 7,100,000,000 lire in exports and the equivalent in imports, representing a.Imost half of the im- ports and exports envisaged in the report of the Trieste Commission of Inquiry. The lists of articles to be exchanged under this agreement were drawn up. Suddenly, at the beginning of March, the Allied administration changed its mind and in- definitely postponed the conclusion of this agree- ment. The Allied admirristration, as Sir Alex- ander Cadogan would like to convince us, was of the opinion that associations with Portugal or Ireland would be more advantageous ta the Free Territory of Trieste than trade agreements with neighbour..ng States; yet êven Mr. Willard Th0rp, of the United States State Department, has pointed out that Trieste should have its normal trade. with the hinterland. 1 can agree, with only one thing, namely, that in the group of States included in the Ma.TShall Plan, Trieste enjoysthe sa~e prospect of interference in ifs intemalaffairs and of economic enslavement as' do the other countries included in this Plan. The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom pass over the efforts of the Yugoslav authorities to create the cIosest contact between the two zones and, within the limits of' possibility, to adInïnb1:er. the Free Territory of Trieste as an entity. The representatives of the United States and the· United Kingdom ignore these attempts by Yugoslavia to stimulate the natura! development of the industry of Trieste. But Yugoslavia's efforts, th.ough they have been frustrated by the Allied administration, have served ta H~Lrn~~k t.he ,Anglo-American en· deavours to present the actions oi their admin;. istration as measures whichimplement the 'Peace Treaty. AlI our efforts~ though unsuccessful, con-· firm.that the Allied administration avoids every measure which woulJ cüntribute to the construc- tionànd consolidation of the independence of the Free Territory of Trieste. .fait First of all, 1 ~onsider that it is clear to the members of the Security Couneil that even if there were any truth in the statements of the representatives of the United States and of the United Kingdom, this would not, therefore,. grant their Governments the right to commit violations of the Treaty. They have the privilege to bring the subject before the Security Council, as my Government has done. But they have not made use of this privilege because they hesitate ta appear before the Security Council with faIse accusations. rité fondement, lance seul tente militaire tuellement, en "yougolire" zone taine. savoir mandé lires tant vernement sur "Unis Royaume-Uni, du dire goslaveest l'une ,quelles Goùvernements niaintenir fait Uni. Secondly, to give the Security Council a very clear picture of the maliciously invented and un- founded accusations of the Govemments of the United States and the United Kingdom, 1 would mention only one ~tample. The represcntative of the United Kingdom is trying to establish the gailt of the Yugoslav military administration on the basis of the fact that even today, so many months after the Peace- Treaty with Italy came into force, the so-called yugolira is still in circula- 'tian in the Yugoslav zone, in addition to the metropolitan lira. The representative of the United Kingdom must know that Yugoslavia has more than once r.equested the Italian Gov- emment to supply the Yugoslav administration with lire. The representative of the United King.:. dom must know that the Italian GOvemment, on the basis, 1 firm1y believe, of instructions from the Govemment of the United States and in agreement with the Govemment of the United ,Kingdom, has rejected every propos~l of the Yugoslav Government in this regard. Prohibiting Italy from supplying the Yugoslav zone with lire is one of. the numerous measures whereby the Allied administratiofl spècifically, the Govern- ments which it represents, endeavQurs to keep t.~e two zones separated.. ~ ~ amazed at the courage of the representative of the United Kingdom in accusing Yugoslavia in this "respect. 1 could add a personal reminiscence. Sir Alex- ander Cadogan would like to convey the. belief that .our people's courts and public prosecutors were introduced in the Yugoslav zone by a de- çree of 3 August 1947 and that they, as wellas the people's committees, are· only creations -of the Yugoslav military administration. However, in going through my. papers the other day, 1 came across sorne decrees which 1 hadco-signed in 1944, at the' height of the war,as a member of the National Liberation "Committee for a region which ~ now inc1uded in the Yugoslav zone. Those decrees were voted by assemblies which were convened under the most difficult combat conditions. They referred to regulations Alexander que publics furent par ·les tions Cependant, tre été guerre, libération nationale daÎls une région m.aintenant "'fur-.ent 1 viviclly reca11 those times. Then it would have seemed a nightmarc iliat only three years after the end of the war, in an organ of the Organization which was created ta safeguard the achievements of the war, representatives of our war allies should be insinuating that we were not right when we destroyed a fascist State and created our people's administration. It is truc- our people accomplished this task thoroughly and the Yugoslav Army, when it finally liberated this terrltory, found no other authorities, no other laws and no other order than those which the people itself had created. 1 can only impress upon Sir Alexander Cadogan that the American and British aviators who sought safety in this territory were happy that such an uuthority existed. Tn('.n it would have seemed like a night~ mare ta me that the Allied Command should destroy this power in their zone and substitute for it the former fascist administration. ln viewing the whole policy of the Unitèd States and of the United Kingdom in the light of the foregoing facts, it is rather easy to arrive ata correct interpretation of their actions in regard to the nomination of the Governor. 1 shall dwel1 on this question only in so far as it directIy concerns Yugoslavia. With reference to the decision of the Security Council of 18 December 1947 T223rd meeting], recommending that Yugoslavia and Italy should come to an agreement regarding the selection of a Governor within the given period ending 5 Jan~aary 1948~ my Govemment has done eVleryclrlng toreach such an agreement. The Yugoslav Minister in Rome, Mr. Iveko~ vic, after having spent ~hree days in attempting to contact the representative of the Italian Min- istry of Foreign Affairs, finally succeeded,' on 26 December 1947, in proposing the following candidates to the Italian Govenllnent: Mr. Emil Stang, President of the SupremeCourt of Nor- way; General Bohuslav Eeer, Chairman of the Czechoslovak qelegation to the "International M1Ht~ry Tribunal in Nuremberg~ and the Swed- ish Senator, Mr. Ge()rg)ilranting. ,Only on 31 December 1947 did the repre- sentative of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs advise our represen~ativethat,the Italian Government· considered it necessary .to select a candidate for Governor from a rteutraf country, specllh:a1ly, from Switzerland, as it wasdifficuit forJtaly to accept a cand~date who was a citizen of ·a country with which it'had;been at ·war. ;For thiS reason, the Italian.Government rejected an three candidates suggestedby Yugoslavia. On the aftemoon of the same day, 31 De- cember 1947, the representative of the Italian Ministry of Foreign, Affairs communicated the names of the candidates proposed by bis Gov- emment: General Henri Guisan of Switzerland and the Swiss diplomat, Mr. Walter Stucki. .ment . .le plomate sud-afriçain. On the same day, the Yugoslav Government issued instructions ta Mr. Ivekovic to reject these candidates. Their choice indicated that the Italian Govemment did not seriously intend ta reach agreement with the Yugoslav Govemment on the question of a Governor, both persans having already refused such candidacy once, Genèral Guisan in Apro 1947 and Mr. Stucki in September 1947. The Yugoslav Govemment made yet another effort and submitted as can- didates' Mr. Maurice Dejean, French Ambassa- dor in Prague, and Mr. Pablo de Azcarate, ex- Ambassador of the Spanish Republic in'London, . who had been proposed as a candidate by the French' Governroent as well. . . On 5 January 1948, after an interval of five days, the Italian Government rejected the new Yugoslav proposai and advised that it was pro- posing new candidates of its own, namely, the Swiss dipiomat, Mr. Paul Ruegger and the South African diplomat, Mr. Leif Egeland. The Italian Government offered no reasons for its re- jection of the candidates proposed by the Yugo- sIav Govemment, other than that it considered that its candidates would be better qualified to fulfil the functions of the Governor. The Yugoslav Government was convinced that the Italian Government must have known in advance that the naIneS' ·Slmm!tred/·in tbis proposaï ~ould, also be~n~\f.~Pkble t the Yugoslav' fovemment; and ~t~~,(,)nlypossible interpretatiün of theentire proéedure of the Italian Government was that the said Govern- inent had no'desire toreach agreement as ta the person to be selected as Governor and' that its proposFds 'of candidates were a mere formality ~' était d'avance pourrait cette tion ment aucun d'un cessives 1 should like to conclude with some observa- tions. Trieste presents a picture which refiects, in miniature, aU the problems of present-day Europe. Many of the features of this picture are especia11y pronounced and extreme in the case of Trieste. At this particular moment 1 should like to mention only one to illustrate the utter truth of Mr. Manuilsky's remark that the policy _of violatihg one's obligations ends, sooner or later, with the people having to pay with their blood. The orientation of Anglo-American policy to the provocation of new conflicts be- tween nations is paiticularly manifest in the case of Trieste. The basic object of a peace treaty is the es- tabIishment of peace between neighbouring na- tions. Its primary purpose; therefore, should be the liquidation of ex.isting conflicts between neighbouring nations and the creation of condi- tions which develop mutual accord and under- ~anding. In the case of Trieste, which is a meet- ing point between Yugoslavia and Italy, the policyof the United States and the United King- dom has been, from the beginning, not to ease friction, but to create it. The United States consistentIy rejected Yugo- slavia's rightful demands at thePeace Con- ference and later, in December 1946, frustrated every attempt to achieve direct agreement be- tween Yugoslavia and Italy on tpe Trieste ques- tion. When, at that time, Yugoslavia tried through direct n~gotiations to reach an agree- ment with Italy on the basis of a general border correction, the' State Department's attitude was that it would recognize no change in the de- cisions of the Council of F'oreign Ministers, not even a change based on direct agreement be- tween the nations concemed. Nevertheless, in March 1948,. the United States not only initiateda change in the same decisions of the Council of Foreign MÎnisters without seeking prior agreement between tIle two countries directIy. concemed, but attempted, to ac:;complish this change in a particularly aggres- sive way. Yugoslavia was asked to attenda11 sessions of the Council C?f Foreign, Ministers' at which the Trieste question.was u~der considera- !jon. Yugoslavia was a country directIy con- cemed inthis question at the Peace Conference., Her special rights and duties h"lrelation to the FreçTerritoryolTrieste were recognized in the PeaceTreaty. Yugosl~via administers one zone orthe Free'Ter,ritoryof Trieste. When, however, on 2DMarch '!'1~3, the UnitedStates announced itspropo.'lal [8/707], Yugoslavia was informed ofitonlybyacopy of the note. Notonly the Républiques ment modifier ou de pour contraire cratie. Thanks to the position adopted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a position con- sistently founded on principle, this attempt to change the Peace Treaty by correspondence or by means of private conversations met with no success, as such methods were inacceptable to the USSR Government inasmuch as they were contrary to the elementary principles of democ- racy. été premiers faite accords tend d'un The agreements [S/78-1] which are under consideration here were concluded during ap- proximately the same period. The first agree- ments were signed on 9 March. Quite apart from this coincidence, it is clear that these agree- ments were concluded in the spirit of the same policy, a policy of revising the Peace Treaty without the consent of a country directIy con- cemed and of imposing on that country a fait accompli. citer hasard Such a policy can result only in fomenting conflicts. It was not by accident that the mainte- nance of the independence and integrity of the Free Territory of Trieste was entrusted to the Security Council. The faithful and sincere exe- cution of the Treaty tenns regarding the Free Territory of Trieste is one of the conditions of peaceful relations between Italy and Yugoslavia. To'violate these obligations is tantamount to de- siring to pro,,-nke conflicts between them. The Security Council, as the custodian of in- ternational peace and security, cannot and must not consider lightheartedly the violations of the Treaty in resp~ct of the Free Territory of Trieste; and 1 again appeal to the Council ta comply with the requests of the Yugoslav Gov- ernment.

Speaking on behalf of the' USSR delegation, 1 should like.to comment briefly on some of the points touched upon at the 350th meeting of .the Security Council by the representatives' of the United Kingdom and the United States of Atnerica, who proved unable to refute the arguments mld facts set forth in my declaration r- 10 August [346th meeting]. \ . The United Kingdom representative tried to supplement and correct my review of the facts regarding 'the appointment of a Governor for the Free Territory. of Trieste; bis attempt was clearly biased and designed to complicate the : issue and to''create the faIse iIilpression that the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the ,Security Council was delaying That in no way corresponds to tM facts. The United Kingdom representative gave an account not of the history, but of the pre-history of the case, namely, the preparatory stage in the appointtnent of <1. Govemor for the Free Territory of Trieste. No one can deny thllt the question required serious study; that it required time. Each possible candidate had to be con.'Ùdered before the most suitable and the best qualified person could he selected.' We know that the names of more than ten candidates for the governorship of Trieste wer.e submitted to the Security Council hetween February 1947 and the time when tiJ.e 'Treaty of Peace with Italy came into force. Of th~.se, four were nominated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Thè representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States of America obviously did not want to consider the candidates suggested by the delegations of other countries. They did not want to choose a candidate who would satisfy other countries as well. They simply demanded that their own candidates should be accepted unconditionally. . It was in January 1948, however, that tt~ United Kingdom and United States delegations began openly .. to delay the appointment of a Governor, at a ,time when all the preparatory work' was virtually completed and the Peace; Treaty with Italy had come into force. The fourteen candidates proposed "to the Security Council by that timè had been considered long enough, and the time had come to take a decision. It was at that stage thatthe representatives of the United .States, the United Kingdom .and Fn)~uce, by delaying a decision in the matter,' interfered with the execution of the decision taken by the Council of Foreign Ministers on 12 December 1946 and with the implernentation of the provisions of the Italian Peace Treaty relating to the appointment of a Governor for the Free Territory of Trieste. The Urrl,ted Kingdom representative could not and cannot. deny that those three delegations have, since Janua...-y 1948,attempted to .avoid the examination of the question of the appointment of a. çovetnor for the Free Territory of Trieste, either br remaining silent or by declaring ,that they had no instructions. But obviously it wasone thing not to have instructionS. whenthe. question ~as first discussed, at the .];)eginning .of 194·7, and quite. another to daim to have no instructions a year Jaterin' January .1948, when all the preparatory;wC)r~ ofconsidering the candidates had. been terminated. Whatismore, in March 1948_ three .. delegations, whilecontinuingstubbornly to re- The joint statement of the three Governments on 20 March 1948 [8/707] fully confirms this. That is how matters stood, and the United Kingdom representative will not succeed in pulling the wool over anybody's eyes or in shifting the responsibility on to anyone e1se's shoulders. The United Kingdom representative in hiS statement again mentioned the joint proposaI of ,the three Powers concerning the transfer of Trieste to Italy. He attempted to base bis argument on the fact that the note of 20 March gave two reasons as grounds for the revision of the Peace Treaty with ItaIy: first, the impossibility of reaching agreement on' the appointment of a Governor and secondly, evidence alleged1y received to the effect that the Yugoslav zone of the Free Territory of Trieste had become a part of Yugoslavia. These arg;uments, however, do not alter the substance of the matter. The second reason is clearly far-fetched; it was required because the first reason was so obviously groundless and because the drafters of the note did not dare to use it alone as an argument for the return of Trieste to Italy. As for the so-called evidence regarding the Yugoslav zone, it. has remained the exclusive knowledge of the three Governments. It is quite obvious that if the three Governments concemed were anxious ta carry out the 'provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Italy and ta fulfil their obligations undt:r that Treaty, as wellas the obligations resulting fromthe decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers regarding Trieste [8/577], they would in the first place refer any questions which .arose in connexion with Trieste to the Security Council, to which has been entrusted the task of safeguarding the integrity and independence of the Free Territory of Trieste. Instead, however, the GovernmentE have confined·themse1ves to dec1arations alout, some kind of -evidence in their possession and known to nobody else and have hastened to submit a proposal toreview the Treaty of Peace and to hand over the F:l'ee Territory of Trieste to Italy. It is quite·dear that they were obliged to do , aJ!. this simply in order to provide themselves Wlth at least some sort of pretext for their unlawful demands for a revision of the Treaty of Peace with. Italy. ' The explanatioDs givenby· the representative of the United Kingdom merely confirm that the 'des - ,au l'intégrité - sédaient empressés que mandeEillégit4nes Trait~ du· Further, the United Kingdom rt:presentative, having apparently forgotten what was said about the mattc.x in General Airey's report for the period 1 April-3D June 1948 [8/953], stated that no negotiations had taken place between the authorities of the zone and those empowered to carry out the so-caIled Marshall Plan. That being 50, it is difficult to understand the following sentence on page 10 of General Airey's report: "It has recently heen announced that the United Kingdom-United States zone is to participate in the European Recovery Programme." If there were no negotiations, how could such' a definite statement _have been made in an official document? Apparently the United Kingdom representative has undertaken to prove somethingwhich cannot be proved. The question of the participation of the United Kingdom': United States zone in the Marshall Plan appears from General Airey's report to have been settled, and the United Kingdom representativeknows it. But for some reason or other, he does not deem it desirable to confirm that fact, apparently· because it would constitute another praof that the United Kingdom-United States Command has violated the Treaty of Peace with Italy. That is why he is trying, notwithstanding the facts, to prçsent the matter as though _there were no inclusion of the Unite,d Kingdom- United States zone in the Marshall Plan. Tne United States representative has said that he does not understand why the inclusion of Trieste in the Marshall Plan would constitute a violation of the Treaty of Peace with Italy. Yet· the United States representative is fully. acquainted with paragraph 4 of article 24, Annex ,VI of the Treaty ofPeace with Italy, which states that: "Economie union or associations of an exclusive character with any State are in;. compatiblewith the status of the Free Territory." For the United .F:Jngdom-United States Command toinclude. the Free Territory. of Trieste in the Marshall Plan is tantamount to forming an economic union of an exclusive character, which can lead to the conclusion pf an oppressive agreement, under which the. Çlbligations arbitrarily imposed by the United Kingdom- United States authorities on their zone and, all the more so, the inlplementation of those obliga~ons, would eventually be binding upon" the entire .Free Territory of Tlieste. The future Gov-' eroment ·of the Free TerritQry of Trieste, consi$ting of the Governor· and·the .Pôpular Assembly, would ~e forced to carry out one-sided obligations imposed without the knowledge or agreement of the people and of· the future Government.of the 'Frèe l'erritory .of Trieste. l'extension Why did he remain silent on that score? Because the United Kingdom-United States Command, by concluding an agreement with Italy and by making the United Kingdom-United States zone of the FreeTerritory of Trieste financially and economically subject to Italy, openly and direcdy violates the principle' of the economic indépendence of the Fteç Territory of Trieste, as laid down by the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers. The inclusion of the United Kingdom-United States zone in the Marshall Plan also represents a flagrant breach of that dei..ision. The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom med ta provethat, so long as there is no Governor, the United Kingdom- United States Command has the right to administer ,'l'he United Kingdom-United States zone of the Free Territory of Trieste at its own discretion, regardless of the provisions .of the Peace Treaty. That js nothing but an attempt to justify the flagrant violation of article 21, paragraph 30f the Treaty of Peace with Italy, which provides for the coming into effect of the Instrument for the Proyisional Regime of the Free Territory of Trieste immediately upon the tennination of Italian sovereignty over that Territory. et tant Commandement !ait Territoire c'est-à-dire sans tions ment qui paix l'alinéa sur du conformément relatif The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, however, prefer to give a one-sidedinterpretation to the provisions of the Peace Treaty. Thus, for example, they flud acceptable article 1 of the Instrument for the Provisional Regime of the Free Territory, in which itis st&.ted that: "Pending assumption of office by the Governor, the Free Territory shall, continue to be administeredhy the Allied Military Conunands within their respective zones." .Thât article is.ta their advantageand it suits them; But at the same time they attempt ta prove that the United Kingdom-United StatesCommand, while administering' the zone pending the assumption bythe Governor of bis duties, should not be guided byother articles of 'the Instrument, even though, as 1 have already pointed out,'arti.cle 21 of the Treaty of Peace with Italy states clearly that upon the 'termination of Ital- 'iansûvereigntY over the FreeTerritory.of Trieste, that Territory should he governed in accordance with Pte Instru:p1ent for a Provisional RetJlD.e.' rique interprétation Traité l'article visoire, fonctions tinuera ments zone vient même ver cain, !I .a se ment. du clairement que, lorsque sur celui-ci sera ment The discussi<!m of the question of the United Kingdom-United States zone has sufficient1y estabÎished the fact that the United Kingdom- Unitèd States Command in Trieste is violating, with the knowledge of the. GovemmeIlts of the United States and the United Kingdom, the pfovisiol'lS of the Treaty of Peace with Italy, the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers, and, in particular, the principles of territorial, political and economic independence of the Free . Territory of Trieste, as laid down in the Treaty of Peace with .Italy andthe decision of the ,Council of Foreign Ministers. Such aré the facts' which neither the represèntative of the United Kingdom. nor the representative of the United States of America could refute in their long and frequent statements. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (translated tram Russian): The de1egation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic supports theresolution of'the representatives of Yugoslavia [S/968] calling for the termination of the agreements concluded between the United Kingdom-United States authorities and Italy between 9 March and 6 May 1948, which violate'the provisiqns of the Peace Treaty with ItalY'and'the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministersof 22. April 1947 [S/577] concerning the establishmeIit and the administration of the Free Territory of Trieste. The de1egatiort of the Ukrainian'SSR at the same .time deems it necessary to submit a separateresoluti.on on the urgency of appointing a Governorfor the Free Territory of Trieste, as every. delay in the settlement of this question, provided for in the Peace Treatywith Italy, makes· it more difficult to implement the other .provisions df the Treatyând the decision of the Councilof Foreign Ministers of 22 April 1947. The text of this resolution is as follows [S/9~Ol: cçHaving cansidered the note.of the Government of the FederalPeople's Repllblic of Yugoslavia and , ttConsidering thatthe question of the appoint; ment oIa Govemorof the Free Territory ~f Trieste has· not yet.· been settled, and.that the de1ay.·ismaking Jt difficll1t to implement other provisions of. the Peace· Treaty with Italy l!-nd decisions ofthè Council of Ministers. of Foreign Affairsof 22 April 1947, Je voir Mr. PARODI (France): (translated trom French): It is not by my remarks that our debate has been drawn out to such lengths. 1 have said little because 1 wished first to obtain a clear . insight into the discussion in wIDch we were engaged. tion qui, rations 1 should now like to make an observation which, in my opinion, is the conclusion to be drawn from the statements we have heard this morning. . nous, slavie, sous précis d'actes étaient préciséS dispositions auraient été accomplis. The question of Trieste was brought before ~e Security Council by the representative of Yugoslavia in a very detailed document [8/927J, in which certain actions of ;he Military COD;ld mand of Trieste were questioned. Those actions were specified, analyzed and compared with certain provisions of the Statute which they had allegedly violated. . son le Royaume-Uni, par The presentation of that complaint was commendable for its precision and its legal character. Therepresentatives of the United States and later of the United Kingdom have replied to it by taking up point by point each of the arguments advanced. été Yougoslavie lui-même, représentant pIètement représentant intervention la ni été tique venaient Marshall n'avaient précise, même pIètement du d'abord cise .tée. tire 1 note that, in the stat(~ments made today tirst by the representative ûf Yugoslavia himself and later by the representative of the USSR, the question has· been transferred to an.entirely different plane. The representative af Yugoslavia began bis statement today by saying that the point at issue was no longer of a juridicaI or legal nature. Indeed, his statement transformed the entire matter into a general çriticism of policy including the appointment of a Governor, the Marshall Plan and a series of other points which had nothing to do with the original comoplaint in the detinite fù:rm in which he himself had presented it. In my opinion, tllls effort to shüt the discussion to other grounds constitutes iliè- best proof of the fact that the definite juridical çomplaint which was originallyintroduced has been answered in a way that is equally definite and tertainly convincing. Thatis the conclusion . which 1 draw from this morning's deba;te. - gager générale, convie délégation, été réponses 1do not think that we need embark now on a ,disc~ssion of the entirely unre1ated matter of general policy,as is being suggested. My dele-' gation is of the opinion that the original· complaint bas been entirely refuted by the replies given before the Council. ce si nous, .With regard to the general question of Trieste, ifthat.isthe' way in which it is to be put ,before us, Ishould like to add that .J can only refer to the positiontaken by' my Govemment in. the Mr. EL-boUR! (Syria):" The matter of which the Security Council is seized is an accusation directed by the Government of Yugoslavia against the administering authorities of the United Kingdom and the United States, charging that in their 2;one of the Free Territory of Trieste they have violated certain clauses of the Peace Treaty with Italy by concluding, on 9 Mar<'.h 1948, on behalf of Trieste, three economic agreements [SI781] with the Italian Government. It is a1.~ alleged that this act is likely to lead to a threat to international peace and security wi'iliin the meaning of Article 34 of the Charter. The representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States have declared that these agreements are in fùll hannony with the Peace Treaty andfall within the scope of their obligations under that Treaty and that the all,egations of the Yugos1av Government are unfounded. , My delegation has considered from the be- 'ginning of this discussion that ilii,,: situation was essentially of a legal, juridical nature and tha, all these accusàtions fall within the competenœ of the International Court of Justice. In article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice it is stated: "The States parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recogniZe as compuIsory ipso facto and withoutspecial agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction .of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: "a. the interpretation of a treaty; ~'b. any question of internationalla,w; "c. the ex.istence of any fact which, if estab:- lishcd, would consrltute a breach of an inter- . al bli' " nation 0 gation. .. . If we consider these three items, we find that all these' accusations fall within the competence of the International Court of Justice, and 1 do not see why the Yugoslav. Government, instead of bringingthis situation to'the attention of the Security Council uilder Article. 35 of the ~harter, has. not brought it before the Internatio~ Court of Justice, accusing the other two States of nothavingacted in cOnformity ~th their obligations under the Treaty of Peace Wlth Italy. The interpretation of the· Treaty is a matter of. international law and an obligation under that"~reaty.1 do not see that theSecurlty Councilis in a position té interpret treaties to that extent ;;Lnd (0 determine whetherthe agreements rèfêtred to," which served as a basis ~or the est Paragraph 3 of Article 36 of the Charter states: "In making recommendations under this Article, the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general mIe be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court." présent tenir rale, être nale du le 'faire aurait tous tion décidé si les ties It would have been more appropriate and }Ilore correct had the Yugoslav Government taken its case before the International Court of Justice, which would have interpreted th.e Treaty and all the documents which serve as the basis fôr this accusation, and would have decided whether the actions attributed to the other two parties-if established-eonstituted a breach, of international obligations. That is the precise capacity and co~petenceof the Court. 1 do not see that the Security Council is entitled pr etnpowered .to make -such interpretations or to decide on these points, by virtue either of its experience or of its position as a political organ. It would be encroaching upon the rights of the International Court of Justice. intematio~uùes. tions pas position ou ou atteinte tionale de Justice. For this reason my delegation cannot support the draft resolution of the Yugoslav Govemment [8/968]. As to the other proposaI submitted by the reptesentative of .the Ukrainian SSR [8/980], conceming the appointment of a Govemor for Trieste, it is a fact that we accepted this responsibility last year andagreed that the Security Council would nominate a Governor. It does not reflect honourably upon the Security Council if, among all the millions of people in this world who might.beable to take such a post, it is unable to flnd one man who is impartial and acceptable to its members. If we fail in this it means that we have committed a blunder in accepting the responsibility for supervising the regime established for the Free Territory of Trieste. In such circumstances it would be more hoilOurable for the Security Council to relinquish this responsibility than to persist.in its failure to fulfil it, leaving it tothe people of Trieste itself ta exercise its right of self..determination by choosing accession to Ital)', Yugoslavia or any' other State, or by opting to remain independent. That would aIso be in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, with human rights and with the fundamental principles governing all peoples of the world, particularly a peoplesuch as that of Trieste, which does not need to he undeitrusteeship or under the command of others..Itis able to choose foritself. donner Gouvernement proposition l'Ukraine d'un nous nier rité à pouvoir qui homme Conseil cèlasignifiera en régime Dans du plutôt l'accomplir, droit de à ou également Urnes, . fondamentaux du population placés sous tutelle ou sous peuples. même. This would c~rtaicly iead to some modificatioll or revision of the clauses of the/!:r7aty of The PRESlllENT (translated trom Russian): The debate is closed. Two proposais have been submitted. We will now proceed ta the vote. We shaIl :first vote on the resolution submitted by the Government of Yugoslavia [8/968] ana supported by the represtmtative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. 1 shall ask the representative of the Secretariat to read the resolution. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America): 1 do not want ta re-open· the debate. 1 do feel, however, that if the President ÏDtends ta put bath of these draft resolutions ta the vote at this time, it is necessary ta say a word in regard ta the draft resolution submitted by the representative of the Ukrainil!U SSR. It seems to me that raising the question of the Governor is in no way pertinent ta the question which is on our agenda, namely, the complaint of the representative of Yugoslavia. 1 think this is a wholly irrelevant issue which is introduced here, and 1 donot think: it belongs in the discussion which we have had on this question..

The question of the Free Terri\ory of Trieste is on the Security Council'sagenda. That is the wording on the agenda. The question arose in connexion with the Yugoslav Government's communication. The Security Council would be wrong, however, if it were to close its eyes to the fact that the majn a;"ld fundamental problem ta be solved is the question of the appointment of a Governor for ilie Free Territory of Trieste. In the course of che discussion of the issue brought ta our attention by the Yugoslav Government, it was ouly natural that this fundamental question of the appointment of a Governor should have arisen. . The USSR delegation, in its statement of 10 August [346th meeting], pointed out that to bring about a speedy solution of the situation which has arisen in connexion with the Free Territory of Trieste, theSecurity Couneil should carefully study the question submitted to. it by the Government of Yugoslavia, and should take steps ta appoin~, without delay, a Governor for the Territory. This proposal was made by the' USSR delegation, while the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR tabled it as a.formal resolutiori. Thus the question of a ~overnor was discussed ltere and it is quite natûral that the representative of the Ukrainian SSR should table such a proposaI. There is no reason why it should not be put to the vote. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): It is unquestionable, as the President pointed out; that the agenda for this meeting cantains, as item 2, the question of the Free Territory of Trieste. But that question, as 1 think the President himse1f admitted, is further defined by a sub-paragraph (a), which refers to the letter from the representative of Yugoslavia dated 28 July 1948 [8/927]. That is the. subject matter of our discussion. That lètter contains certain precil:e and definit~ allegations, as so clearly pointed out by the French representative, ta the effect that the Allied Military Government has violated certain.specifie articles of the Peace Treaty. It is true, as the President himself said during the discussion, that what he called the main question was raised :several times. 1 am not sure, but 1 think that the President himself was the first ta inm. iuce the question of the appointment of a Governor [346th meeting]. It does happen sometimes, 1 am afraid, that extraneous questions are dragged into a discussion. But the Presiqent added that 1 had taken part in ' the discussion of that aspect of the matter. That is perfecdy true. 'The members of the Security Council may remember that, after the President had given bis version of what had happened in the past in connexionwith the effort ta reach .agreement on the appointment of a Govemor, 1 offered what 1 called a supplement because 1 thought that the President's account was so incomplete as to be utterly misleading; 1 had to correct that account for the record. However, 1 do not admit that, when the Security Council meets and engages in a discussion of certain specified allegations made by the Yugoslav l'epresentative in respect of the carrying out of certain articles of the Peace Treaty, at the end we can suddenly have a resolution put ta us which affects the whole future of the Free Territory of Trieste. That may be a question which the Security Council would have ta take up, but in that casé it has to be put on the agenda in the proper way, with due notice; and then adopted as an, agenda item by the Security Council. Non~ of those processes has been gone through in this ,case. Therefore if any attempt is made to put forward' the resolution [8/980] submitted by the representative of the Dkrainian SSR, 1 shall refuse ta take part in l'exécution l'on tion de sécurité pourrait ce l'ordre ensuite point malités conséquence, résolution, l'Ukrainè '-- ., ,--Mr~M,ANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialîst Republic) (translated trom Russian): The entire discussion which bas taken place in connexion with the Yugos1av complaint concerns the question of the status of ·the Free Territory of Trieste.That was the subject of the debate. The United States representative based bis defence of the actions of the United States militaryauthorities of 9 Marcb and 6 May 1948, which violated the Peace Treaty with Italy, on the ~oD.tention that they were allegedly temporary llleasures. But if they were only temporary measures, may 1 say that it is time that this teniporary state of affairs was ended. The Treaty . should beimplemented; and one of the fundamental conditioIlS' envisaged by the Treaty, for putting an end to. the temporary status of Trieste,is that the Governorof the Free Terri- ' tory should be appointed. '.That is the first con- , dition arisingout of the Treaty. ' Secondly, the question has been raised here of where the responsibility lies for' the c;lelay in appointing a Governor. It is in this connexion thatthe Ukrainian delegation has submitted a reselution [8/980]. declaring that the Security ". Collncil considers that it is urgently necessary to settle the question so that Trieste may retum to normal conditions and that the.Treaty inay bè put into effect. Such isthe. purpose of the Ukrainian resolution. The members of the Council mày évade the issue,may abstain or refuseto vote on this resotution, butby doing so they will beshowir~gthat itcis they who wish to prolongthe abnormal situation which has arÏSen in Trieste and that theyare trying to 'avoid implementing' the TrealyÏI1respectofTrieste. TheP,RESIDENT (translàted from.Russian,): Both.the clockontherightand the clock on the left ·show that it is 1.~5 p.m., and 1 still have four speakers .on •my list. It has been suggested that weadjournuntil 3.30p.m. , The first question for .discussion will 'he that QfTrieste; the secondihat of. PaIéstine; andwith that we shallbeable to conclude.th~:Seèurity Council's .'()pen meeting. . .