S/PV.357 Security Council

Before w@ address ourselvcsto the business of the day, 1 shoulcl like to take ,tihis opportunity of eXJpressing on my hehalf, and 1 am sure on Ibehalf of aH my colleagues, our pleasure a t finding ourselves here for the first time in ihis historie andbeautiful capital und our appreciation of aU arrangements that have been made for us ,and for the smooth diseharge of our work by the Fl1ench Government. 1 hope ,that we shaH have an efficient and fruitful session in Paris. français auprès ments 1 should like to ask our French colleague if he would be good enough to make himself the interpreter of our feelings of gratitude to his Governmenl for aIl it has 1 have been asked ta welcome the mem· bers of the Security Couucil on .hehalf of the French Goverllment. 1 hope the Council will find here every facility and convenience for work hitherto sa abundantly pro' ded by the hospitality of the United States of America. In any case 1 desire ta assure the 'Council that the French Government has made every efl'ort ta pla-ce at the disposaI of -aU the members of the Council the best means of carrying out the duties entrusted to us, and it will continue ta do BO. 3. Adoption of the agenda Ml'. TSIANG (China): 1 lahour undcr the difficulty of not having received instructions from my Government. lt sa happens that the Minister of Foreign Afl'airs ok' my Government is on his way ta Paris. 1 am not in a position ta secure instructions immediately. However, 1 should be able to obtain such instr.uctions by Monday. 1 wonder whether the President wouid consider it oonvenicnt from the point of view of the Security ,Council's work ta postpone our meeting until Monday afternoon.

1 shouJd Jike to hear the opinions of ~:>ther members of the Security Council hefore -giving any ruling on that point or suggesting any adjournment. l, under&tand the difficulty in which the representative of China finds himself. On the other hand, it must he admitted that, owing ta ils very nature, there is sorne urgency in this question. As the Security Council is aware, things are happening, and if anything ,can ibe done to improve the situation, the sooner ,that can Ile taken lh haud, the ·better. 1 should ,be gIad, therefore, ta heal' what ,the other members have t~ sayon the Iproposal just madeby the reipl'esentative of China. 1 feel bound ta take the lead in expressing sorne douM myself as.to whether the Secu· rity CounciJ. would he justified in having so long an adjournment without coming ta grips at aIl with this ·problem. 1 am not quite sure of what is the exact difficulty which the representative of China feels. 1 wonder whether he would mind if the discussion at Jeast began while he awaits instructions; It seems ta me il would he a 1 therefore support the suggestion which you, Ml'. President, 'have put forward. Ml'. LEBEAU (Belgium) ~translat(!)d (rom l<ire1nch)': M. van Langenhove,· the representatîve of Belgium on the Security Council, has, for reasons ibeyond bis control, been unable ,~o come to Paris today. 1 alpologise ta you on his behaJf. For this rea~;o.n, as his deputy, .y feel ibound' to support any proposaI for a postponement of the discussion and favouT the idea of an adjournment expressed by the representative of China. Nevel'theless, 1 share your views, Ml'. President. An adjournment such as that proposed by the repr-esentative of China, that is to say four days, is perhaps l'ath-el' long. It seems to me that we might he a:ble' to aW'ee on an a'djournment untel tomorrow aftei'Doon, on the understanding that, should we he unahle 10 finish thoen, wle should continue on Saturday morning. ,Ml'. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Re,publics) (translaœd from Russian) : The documents submitted to the Security Council by Hyderabad w,ve rise 10 a numbel1' of questions en which il would he desirable to obtain additional information before proceeding ta consider whether or not this question should he placed on the agenda of the Security COUDcil. In view of the fact that the President of the Council represents a ,country which has been closely connected with both India and Hyderabad ove.r a long period and is quite weIl acquainted hoth with the situation in these coullitries and with their relations with one another, it Wiould be desirable ta obtain answers to such ques.- tions fil'om him. In particular, if wouldbe desirable to asce,rtain how the status of Hyderabad was defined in the Indian Independence Act of 15 August 1947 and what are the, rights and obligations of India - and Hyderabad under the treaties and agreements existing betWieen them. FinaHy if Wiould a150 he desirable to have informa-

In reply to what has just been said ·by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1 may sayat once that II shaIl he happy at the proper moment togive him the information he has requested, and to help my colleagues on the Security Council to the best of my ability in aIl other ways in the examlnation of this matter. But, for the proper ord'er of our work, 1 think we ought, for the moment, to keep to the question raised by the representative of China as to whether we should 'continue with this meeting or whether we should adjourn for a longer or shorter period. If any of my coIleagues have anything to sayon that :point, 1 should like fiil'st of aIl '10 hear ,them. 1\11'. JESSUP (United States of America): 1 should Jike to speak briefly merely on the question involved iu our pro~ecdings here. 1 beIieve that aIl the mernbers of the Secudty Council constantly desire to meet the co:nvenience of their fellow members to the greatest possible extent, and 1 think that we a,re aIlcognisant of the difficuHies of· holding this meeting just when many persons are en route for Paris. But, as has already been called to our attention, 1 believe the question of the adoption of the agenda does not lead us, in my opinio'n, into any expression of opinion on any substantive ,problems involved in the consideration of this question. 1 am reminded that atthe 171st meeting of the Security Council, on 31 July 1947, the question arase as to. the adoption of the agenda, and the President stated : ' ; "1 should like to make i't clea.r that the adoption of this item on the agenda does not in any way prejudge either ,the competence of the Security Council in the matter or any of the méits of the case," In my opinion, that is a sound r:uling and an adequate precedent for action by the Security Council. The agend·a could be adopted without in any way ,prejlUdging either the competence of the Security Council or any of the merits of the case. 1 should hope, therefore, that since this view may he adopted-as 1 hope the Security Council might adO'pt it-it wouid seem to aIl the members of the Security Council GGnv.enient to adoplt the agenda and to proceed as far as 'We cau at this stage while memhers of the Council are still desirous of.obtah.ling furthe.r instroctions in regard to any judgment or opinion théy may care ta ~xpress on the questio,n of competence or on the question of merits. lt haa been said here more than once that, by adopi:ing the agenda and beginning the discussion, during which we may be able to obtain a11 the information we muy need-I refer to the remarks of the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-we are in no way prejudging the 'position of the Security Council or any of its members, and we may weIl he able to save tïme. For the basic fact, and here 1 l'efer ta the Charter of the United Nations, is that the Security Cauncil is aware that, 1in a part of the world, one country appears i to have invaded another, that fighting is "taking place thereliiï<lpeople are being killed and wounded. That is a situation wlüch the Security Couneil must remedy. The Argentine delegation will therefore vote for the adoption of the provisional agenda and asks tha,t the case of Hyderabad 'should begiven immediate consideration. Ml'. TSIANG ~China): The quotation which the representative of the United States of America read to the Council from Hs records relates, if 1 am not mistaken, ta the question of Iudonesia. 1 think that the Indouesian question i8 not ent1rely analogous ta the .que.stion which il is proposed to place on the agenda today. While it is true that placing a question on the agenda of the Security Council does not prej udge "the merits of the question, while that is true, it is not 'equally true that placing the question on th~ agenda does not involve a certain view of thecompetency of the Security Cùuncil in regard to that question. The Security Coun21 is set up to guard international peace.fThe admission of a question to the agend-a does' imply a certain view 'Of the juridical status of ,the parties to a dispute. 1 am not sure that ·eVien a ruling by the Pr·esident on thalt aspect of this questiollcan safely aud completely guard the position of the Security Couneil with regard to the competency of the Council in relation to this matter. Certainly, in the absence ,of a presidentia.I statement on that asp'cct of the question, my delegation feels that the adoption of the agenda does prejudice fi vei'y important aspect of this question.~- The PRESIDENT: This discussion arose out of toe question which 1 put to the Security Mr. TSIANG (Ohina) : The adoption of an agenda in most cases is a routine matter on which wc seldom l'aise difficulties. (roday, the adoption of ·the agenda is, in the opinion of my delegaHon, not a routine matter. 1 have tried to point out in what way the adoption of the agenda is a serious matter; that was othe intention of the remarks 1 made a moment ago. Because of the serious natu·re of the matter, 1 should a·ppreciate it if the Secocity Council would give me an o.pportunity to .obtain instructions from my Government.)

1 quHe understand the point of view of the represeutative of China, which in fact 1 share myself. 1 only wish to ask him whether he would see any objection to hearing any statements or questions by other members of the Security Couneil which they IDight have to malœ on the question of competence, It would be unnecessary; in fact, in deference 'Îo the request of the re'presentativ·e of China, 1 certainly should not ask that a decision should be taken on that point today, if the œp['esentative of China fe·els that he has any difficulty in joining in a de'Cision one way or the otber. But it might he that there would be a good deal to he s'aid on this aspect of the matter by various other representatives, and if we could start on that today it seems to me that it might prepare the way for rather more rapid progress when we me,et again. Ml'. TSIANG (China): 1 cannot reasonably object to any discussion which will throw light on this question as to whethêr the lVil". ARCE (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): ln view of the present situation in India, 1 believe that the Se,curity Council must take a decision. It must vote whether or not it should adopt the provisional agenda. 1 agree that wecallnot take a'ny substantive decision, but 1 repeat that 1 Ibelieve the Security Council must adopt

As the representative of Argen~ina has submitted a formaI motion, 1 am bound to put it ta the ,·ote. Actually, however, there may be said to have been a previous motion ,by the re,presentative of China to postpone the discussion. Therefore, if we aire going to take decisions, 1 hope the representative of Argentina will agree that 1 must put, first of a11, the motion sponsored by 'the representafive of China to the eil'ect that the discussion be adjourned. Ibelieve that motion W'!lS ta adjourn until Monday. If that nlOtion were not carried, there would be, perhaps, a subsequent Belgian proposaI ta adjourn until tomorrow. If that were 'not carried, [ should then put the Argen'tina proposa1 ta the vote. Therefore, 1 shaH firsl put the Chinese pirOposaI to adjourn the Security Coundi until Monday next. Ml'. PARODI (France) (translated {rom French): Before we proceed to the vote, 1 should like to make the following observations. If 1 am correct, we are faced with a difficulty which we have previously encountered: to know the exact impHcation of adop'ting an item of the agenda{It may be maintained that, in order that 'tin item of the agenda may be adopted, the Security Council must have determined its competency -to deai with the question. ,.' It may, on the other hand, be thought that, in order to discuss its competency in the matter, -the Conncil must first of aIl have ·decided to .place the Hem on the agenda. The French delegation has always cO'nsi- dered the latter pirocedure to be the more 10gicaI, and the more consistent with the good ordering of the work of the Council. 1 believe that we have here one of these cases in whichdetermination of the Coun- cil's competence is closely linked with substantive .considerations, a'nd that, in arder to decide our competence, we have fust to study the rlocume'nts before us and perhaps l'ven to ,give heariügs. In such circumstances, it seems ta me preferable ta ,pla'ce the item on the agendJ, il being understood, as one of the members of the Council has indicated-I believe it wasthe re,prerer.iative ofChina-that while so doing we are at the same time reserving aIl subsequent decisions of the Couneil, including the possibility ()If its dedari'ng Use!f incomp.etent in the matter.

1 quite underatand the point of view expressedby the re.presentntive of France and his contention may weIl be correct, but l would ,point out that if the .representative of China maintains his proposaI for an adjour.nment, that would menn, if it were carried, that any further action, or even discussion, would, for the moment, cease, and any decision and further discussion would be deferred. Thel'efore, it seems to me ,that if the representalive of China still maintains his 'proposaI, wc should vote on that first. Ml'. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Security Council has at ils disposaI mformation from one party only. The other party, the Government of India, has not submitted any info.rmation on the substance of the question place,d before the Couneil by the Hyderabad authorities. As a result the SecU'rity Council is not in possession of sufficiently full information with regard to either the substance of the question or the status of Hyderabad. The delegation of the USSR considers ihat before the Security Council decides whethe.r there are grounds for including the question of Hyderabad on its agenda, it is essential that it should first obta~n complete, and not merely unilateral information, both on the subsi:anoe of the question .and on the staius of Hyderabad. This information should, of ,course, include the question of the rights and obligations both of Hyderabad and India undel' the treaties and agreen::.~u~s concluded hetween them. The receipt of this p.relïminary information wouId be extremely desirable.

l still feel bound to iput to the Security Council the proposaI formally made by the representative of China. Under rule 33 of the rules' of procedure of the Security Council, proposaIs "to adjourn the meeting to a certain day or hour" or "to postpone discussion of the question to a certain day or indefinitely" have a 'certain precedence. The proposaI has heen made, and 1 cannot do otherwise than to ask the Security Council to vote on il. The 'p,roposal is that the Security Conncil adjoul'n uotil next Monday. A vote was taken by show of hands.. The resull of the vote w,as 1 vote in favour and 10 abstentions. ,

1 do not know whether the representative of Belgium wishes me to move his proposaI. Ml'. LEBEAU .(Belgium) (translated from French): What 1 made was not a formai proposaI but simply a suggestion; und as il has received no support from any of the members of the -Council, 1 shall not press it. l 'can quÏte weIl accep,t the interpretation givcn by the representative of France, and consequently reserve for the representative of Belgium on the Securily Couneil the right to make further observations on the question of the Council's competency in this maUer.

We thencome to the proposaI made by the representative of Argentina. 1 am not quite Sln'~ of the wordiug of the proposai, and 1 should therefore Hke to ask the representative of Argentina whether he would formulate it in precise terros. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): 1 do not think 1 ne,ed 10 suhmit a motion. The proposaI has already been ·put before us by the President in the form of the provisional agenda. What we have to do is to vote on whether the provisional agenda should he adapte.d. With reference to the remarks of the representative of the Union of Sovi,et Socialist Republics, who ,pointed out that we have ni) information from India because the Indian Government has not said anything, 1 should Hke to add that the very reason for .placing this question on the agenda is to obtain such information, and then ti) ask India and Hyderabad for {Iny statements they may wish to make.

Then 1 shall put to a vote the question of the adoption of the provisional agenda.@ shall vote in favour of its adoption, but 1 should like to make it clear that 1 do so with a rese:rvation in the sense' indicated by the representative of France; that the adoption of the a~enda does not decide or affect in any way the question of the Security 'Council's 'competence and that we should have the right to revert to that question, if that is necessary and if we so desire, at a later stage} Ml'. JESSUP (United States of America): 1 should merely Hke to state that the view of the delegation of the United States, as to the significance of a vote to adopt the agenda, is in the same sense as the President has just ex,pressed, and as formerly expressed by the representative of France. 1 have already indicated that was my view, according to -precedel1'oo in the Se,eurity

Then 1 shaH put ta the Council the qu~stion: does the Security Council adopt the provisional agenda? A vote by show of bands zoos taken. Thel result of t/ze vote was 8 in favour and 3 abstentions. The agenda was adopted. 4. Communications from the Covernment of Hyderabad ro the Security Counc" (5,988. 5,998 and, 5,/1000)

As this questioh has been placed on the agenda as the result of communications from the Government of Hyderabad, l ,,'ould ask the representative of ~~~at Government ta make a statement in amplification of the communications already made. N. MOIN NAWAZ JUNG (Hyderabad): 1 thank the Security 'Council for giving me this opportunity ta address il on behalf of the State of Hydua.'bad. 1 am 'conscious of the responsibility which has f·allen upon me of presenting the case of Hyderabad before the Security Council. The ve-ryexistence of my country is now being defended on the field of battle against .a brutal invasion which has shocked the conscience of the world and which has rallied ta the defence of the ·principles of the United Nations even those who, not having had an opportunity of listening ta our own plea iu defence of our right ta live, bave been inclined ta j ustify the daims of India. But we are conscious that a great and most significant portion of the task of de'fendin-g Hyderabad will have ta beperformed bere, before this higb organ of the United Nations and before the publk opinion of the world. For the world has been stirred ta dee.pest apprehe'l1sions by this ,premeditated act of war emanating from aState which has based the claim ta ils own independence On high spiritual ideals of non-violence. The wor'- = has listeu.: before ta the shrill explanations of the invader pointing ta disorder and anarchy \vhich its liberating army was about ta remove. Such is the anarchy and disorder alleged ta p'revail in Hyderabad that hundreds of foreigners have declined the assistauce of their Governments ofl'er- 'Ve are confident that the Security Council of the United Nations will listen alike ta the deep apprehension or the wO'l'Id at this great and menadng event in Hyderabad and ta the anguished cry of the people of Hyderabad itself. For, as we hope to explain fully to the members of the Security Council and to the nations of the world in the course of these proceedings, this is an anguished cry not only of the Government of Hyderabad but of the masses of the .people of HydeTabad without regard to creed or communal allegiance. Our delegation incIudes the leader of the dep'ressed classes who form a. very substantial part of the population of Hyderabad. It will be recalled that on 21 August 1948, Hyde'ra'bad first b:rought the dispute between India and Hyderabad before the Security Council under Article 35, .paragraph 2, of the Charter which enables S·tate a not a Member of the United Nations to bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the GeneTal Assemhly any dispute ta which it is a party. On 13 Septe'lllber 1948, India committed an act of aggression by invading the independent State of Hydera'bad. Our case is thât the United Nations is • confronted with the most determined and mûst serious onslaught on its principles since the Organization was set up; that this breach of the CharteT is not the result of a sudden eruption of passion ·but is due to a .premeditated plan, the implications of which have been carefully weighed and deliherately accepted; 1that the action talœn hy the Dominion of India constitutes a denial of the ,principles of independence and equality, as laid down in the Charter; that the cause of Hyderabad has nowheen identified with those principles; that if is within the province and in the power of the United Nations to prevent the accomplishmer ~ ~f the criminal design; and that action-swift, authoritative, and determined -must he takentoprevent and to stop this threat to international peaœ and jus- ·· is now of the essence of the matter. The situation denmnds immediate action by the Seeurity Councilllot only under Chapler VI of the Charter relating to the peaceful seUlement of.disputes, but a180 under -Chapter VII which bears on the action of the SecU'rity Council for enforcing its decisions for safeguarding the pence of the world. In that Chapter, Article 39 of the Charter enjoins upon the Security Council the dutY to determine the existence of. any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and that it shaH take appropTiate action. Who canl doubt that these conditions are now present? Who can doubt that a case has arisen for the Security Council to calI upon the parties to comply with provisional measures contemplated hy Article 40 of the Charter and intended, without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the paTties concerned, to prevent an aggrayation of the situation? While, therefore, our first desire, at the present stage of this dis.pute, is that the Security Couneil should take such action as is obviously called for by the acf!.~â! hostilities and aggression now in progre~s, wc hO,pe that the Council will cO'lside-r, investigate fully, and make recommendations upon the dispute 'between Hydera'bad and the Dominion of India in relation to the situation as it existed when the dispute was first brought before the Security Couneil under Article 35, paragraph 2, I)f the ChaTter. That situation was in itself of such gravity as to make the ap,peal of Hyderabad to the United Nations imperative. The economic life of a peaceful people was being strangled by a systematic bloekade admittedly adopted as an instrume t of JloHtical coercion. The blockacle w,- so rigid as to make the distinction between cO'nditional and unconditionalcontru'band as obsolete as it has been made by total warfare. (Medicines and chlorine for purifying the water have heen prevented from reaching the country, and epidemics have broken out. An organized :c'ampaign of border incidents and raids was started in a manner which showed clearly the connivance and, he security forces of Hyderabad to receive arms to enable them to maintain order in an sectors of the extensive frontier. ~ On one and the same page of the White Book on Hyderabad published by the Government of India you will find an example of the unmeasured and, indeed, incoherent official propaganda of the Government of India. It is stated there, with only a fe\v tlines intervening between the contradictory llpassages, that Hyderabad is both a Fascist .!IState and a hotbed of Gommunism. Ii: was ~ clear from the outset that the purpose of that 1J>olicy was to create on the borders of Hyderabad and India a condition of -conf.usion and disorder which would provide the aggressor with a plausible justification for what he would describe, in the approved language of aggressors, as police action. This was so although the "Standstill" Agreement of 29 November 1947 between India and HydeTabad expressly provided that nothing in the Agreement shall give India the right "to send tTOOpS to assist the Nizam in the maintenance of internaI order". Subversive activities within Hyderabad were encouraged not only by the Indian Press and politicians, but by members of the Indian Government. Ample evidence 'Substantiating these charges will he found in the memoranda and in the volume of documents now before the Security Council. At the same timeonce more in kee.ping with the practice of aggressors-the Government of India levelled against Hyderabad accusations of breaches of the Agreement, the "Standstill" Agreement of NovembeT 1947, the purpose of which was, at le'ast in ,the intention of the Government of HydeTa.bad, to put the relations between the two countries on a peacefaI basis pending the ,conclusion of a ·comprehens,ive settlement. At the same time, again in keeping with the practice of aggressors in the past, the Governmeut of India declined to agree to the arbitration, expressly Iprovided for in the "Standstill" Agreement, of the mutual charg.es of breaches of ils clauses. That Agreement has now been formally torn ta pieces-in fact, the Government of India treated il as a scrap of paper from the very outset-'but, in our view, an authO'ritative finding as to the way in which it has 'been implemented will form an essential part of the investigation of the Security Council. . What have bee·n the reasons for that active . and virulent hostility of the Government of India? These motives, by now known to the wor.Id, have been reoeatedly admitted by the GOy.e.I'llment of India. Of this the docUU!ents now before the Security Coun- (, "The Indian Independence Act releases the States from aIl .their obliggations to the Crown. The States have complete freedom technically and legally they. 'are inde- :pendent. .." In the same speech he emphasized .that the withdrawal of British paramoulltcy e:nabled the Indian States "ta regain complete sove:reignty". The: fact of that right to independence has been given repeated andemphatic expression by other official spokesmen of the British Government. It has been occasionally admiUed by the representatives of the Illdian Government themselves. We shall make it abundantly clear, in the course of these proceedings, why the Governement of Hyderabad has considered the continued maintenance of the independence of Hyderabad, within the framework of the most integrated co-ope:ratioll with India, .to be not only its legal right but its absolute moral dutY to the people of Hyderabad. 1 hav,e used the words "within the framework of the most integrated co-opera- Hon with India". By thesé words we stand and, if the Government of India sa wishes, we are determi,ned to give to these words their full meu'Ding and reality. Even at this hour, l 'declare that if a stop is put to hostilities, and provided that the indaving forces are withdrawn, we are l'eady to put forward constructive proposaIs for a general settlement which no fairminded person would regard as unreasonable 'or as failing to .give full ,effect ta ,the essentialaspects of the' unity of the India:n continent. Moreover, 1 attach the greatest importance to r.epeating and reaffirming here the pass'age of page 17 of the Case of Hyderabad relating to the offer of a plebiscite in the matter of accession. That passage reads as follows: "The Government of Hyderabad offered that the question of aocession i.n matte["s of Defenoe, External Affairs and Communica- However, this, in relation ta the war which has now been launched against Hyderabad, is a maHler of the past. At this moment we desire and pray the Security CO'uncil, in the first instance, ta use aIl ifs powers under the Charter and under aIl the applicable Chapters of the Charter, to put a haIt ta the invasion and ta bring about the withdrawal of the invading troops. This, clearly, is a matter for instantaneous action, and it brooks no delay, When this has been done, wc; shaH look ta the Security Council for an inquiry into our complaint as presented priaI' 'to the invasion and, if our complaint is found to be justified, for action calculaied ta remove a most serious threat ta international peace, ta the principles of the Charter, and to the safety and weU-being of Hyderabad. But in order that the Security Conneil may be in the position ta fulfil bath these tasks, we daim the unrestrieted 'l'ight, the natural right, ta put our case before the Council in our own name and by our owu representatives. We hope, therefore, that at this hour-which is sa decisive and sa crucial for the life of our country, as indeed it is for the ,peace of India, the peace of the world and the authority of the United Nations-----'no delays of procedure and of jurisdictional objections will tbe permifted ta postpone vital decisions of the Council. These vital decisions must be taken now. The :bombing of Hyderabad and me,chanized warfare, bringing danger and misery to the eighteen million people of Hyderabad, must be stopped at once. The prevention of war is the abject of the United Nations. Unless· measures are taken immediately, there is a distinct possi. bility that the world may otherwise be confronted with a fait accompli engendered by triumphant force. Subj-ect to that overriding necessity of taking immediate action for the 'restoration of peace, we are ready and willing to answer in ·detail the O'bjections, of a jurisdietional and legal nature, which have :been raised against 'Lhe right of the Security Council to entertain our complaint and our right to bring it before the Security Couneil. Thus, it has been said, that this is a matter which is exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of India. In our view, We have submitted, in the general .presentation of the case of Hyderabad-and we stand by that statement-that even if the intolerable acts of coercion 'by means of systematic blockade, official intimidation und repeated assaults upon the froutiers of Hyderabad, had not talœn place, the fact of the of,ficial claim that a dispute between Hyderabad and India, relaUl1g largely ta the intelipretation of an agreement fl'eely concluded be'tween them, is a damestic matter of India, that very faet would in itselfbe sufficient ta hring the entire situation to the attention of the Security Council. -Il has aIso been maintained that the briuging of the dispute before the Sl;curity Cauncil is wrong in law on the ground that in the "Standstill" Agreement of 29 November 1947, Hyderabad has temporarily renounced the right to .eonduct ils foreign relations, including the submission of disputes ta an intemational ageney. As 1 will sub'1lit presently, this argument was totally unfounded when it was first put forward following upan our submission of the case ta the Security Council on 21 August 1948 [S/986]. Today the appeal ta 'that argument by the State which, by the act of aggressive war, has torn the "Standstill" Agreement ta shreds, is, ta say the least, incongruous. But even in the days immediately following 21 August theœ was no legal substance at aIl in that jurisdietional objec,tion. In addition ta vindicating ils independence, one of the main purposes of the a,ppeal of Hyderabad ta the Security Council on that day was to obtain an impartial findiug as ta the interpretation and application of the disputed clauses of the "Standstill" A,greement. Its purpose was not to challenge the "Standstill" Agreement but to uphold il. India has re.peatedly refused to abide iby the clause of the Agreement which provided for thearbitration of disputes relating to its interpretation. It was not open ta aState which had thus wrongfully declined to abide by the Agreement in so far as it prescribed the dutY of arbitral seUlement of disputes arising thereunder ta challenge the efforts of the other party ta bring about an impartial decision as to the meaning of the Agreement. Moreover, in sa far as the "Standstill" Agreement provided for arhitration iby a third party, it limited that ,provision of the Agreement by Finally, for various reasons into which it i8 not practicable ta enter at this stage, India has chosen ta challenge the statehood of Hyderabad. An answer, which in our view is a ,complete answer, ta that objection will 'be found at the end of the general statement of the case of Hyderahad. We reserve the right ta elaborate in aIl requisite detail the argument presented there. At this vital moment we will give no countenance ta the attempt ta entangle the Security Council in a network of judidal argument on the requirements of statehood and the r€levance of recognition in internationallaw. Neither will wc, at this stage, pralong the ,proceedings by elaborating and supplying proof for the statement of the last Viceroy of Gr.eat Britain that we have regained complete sovereignty and that te.chnically and legally we are independent. This is the time for action. We ferveutly hope and pray that once this most urgent case has been placed on the agenda of the Security Council, the mûst expeditious procedure will he adopted ta restore peace, ta free our country from the invact-er, and thus ta render possible a sustained effort for achieving a lasting seUlement. Sir Ramaswami MUDALIAR (India): 1 am grateful ta the President and the Security Council for the opportunity given to my country ta make a short statement on the case which has just hee.n presented ta the Security CounciI. As 1 understand your recent discussions which 1 have had the ,privilege of hearing, the Security Council has not ,come to auy conclusion in re·gard ta the competence of Hyderabad to bring ibis question before this august body. The Security Conncil is at present engaged in determini1ng facts which may lead il to the conclusion either that Hydera'bad is competent to come hefore the Security Council or that it i5 not. In my.statement today, which will be" very brief, 1 wish to make it quite clear ~'::=~~~::~~:::'e:~~:.od: 1 think it is extremely important that lhe Security Council should carefully consider this aspect of the question. It is vital to India, and 1 venture ta suggest it is vital to every sovereign nation which is a Member of the United Nations. 1 am one of those who has had, and who contfnues to have, the highest regard for the organization called the United Nations. In faet, the part that 1 have tuken from time ta time in the activities of the United Nations could not have been taken but for my finh conviction, a conviction which my Government amply shares, that the United Nations is the proper tribunal to safeguard the peace of the world and thaï the Security Council has that dutY before il. If, therefore, 1 deny the competence of any area to come befoJ:e the Seeurity Couneil on a matter like this, it is beca.lse my Gove,rnment and 1 are convinced that if the Articles of the Charter are not properly read, appreeiated and respeeted, if opportunHy is given to any particular area which does not possess the characteristics of aState to lay wha't it considers ils grievanees before the Security Council, the utility of the United Nations will he considerably impaired and great damage will be done ta the cause of peace itself. It is from thatpoint of view-not purely from a legalistic point of view-that 1 venture .ta 'le ",; forward the case of my Government(that Hyderabad has not the status ta come and present any .case before this Conncil. It has to be remembered that the case of Hyderabad was presented on 21 August, that the very gruesome tale that has been mentioned to this Council-the aggresshm of my country, the invasion by my country of pOOl' Hyderabad, the mechanized forces that are marching in dealing death and destruction on their way-that this story has no bearing at all on the application which Hyderabad made on 21 August before ,ever any such incident arose. The case that the Security Council has, therefore, to consider is, fust, Îoremos.t and primarily, whether on 21 August, when Hyderabad Ipresented its case, it had the competence tocome before the Security Couneil. Il has been said that this was aggression, that we went delibera.tely, without any provocation, and that by sheer force were doing certain things which were wrong. Anybody who has 'lo use force- -and my country even more than any abhors the use of force-anybody who has to use force must ·think a hundred times, and a thousand times, before force is invoked. Would it surprise you 'that time andagain my Government has considered whether it was necessary to intervene at aIl? The march of events, the compulsion of events, bas at lastexhausted ils patience and has obliged. it to take that action. «On the very first day that the Army Of India marched into Hydera'bad territory it recovered ·two twenty-five-pounder guns. 1 ask you, were those two twenly-fivepounder guns utilizedby the Govel'nment of Hyderabad to preserve local law and or.der? If so, locallaw and order mU:3t have been in a very perilous state indeed. Or is there a more sirnister signillcance in the possession of two twenty-five-pounder guns by that Government? And it talks of me.chaniz'ed forces. Let us also remember the equipment that the Hy:derabad Government today possesses. You, Ml'. President, representing the Government· of the United Kingdom, are in a better ,position than any other representative on the Security 'Council to state how far they were justifiably possessed of such weapons of destruction. A harrowing tale has been given out about the Army of India marching into .that State. As l said, 1 am not prepared to go into the details of these matters, :but 1 should like .to invoke your sympathy, Ml'. President, and that of "very repl'esentative on the Security Councll to the ha1'- rowing details which. hav'e been reliably reported to us and about which our best inquir'ies have had ample confirma,tion; harrowing tales of death, of arson, of 100t, of l'a,pe, by what were called the private armies in Hyderabad, private armies never·· theless ·encouraged or countenanoed by the ~overnment of Hy:derabad 1 sha11, if neeessary, and at the proper lime, state that hoth legally and technically and,even more-and 1 consider this fundamentally important-politically, Hyderabad cari never be independent territory and Ihut the Securily Council can never recognize il as an independent territory or Sta'le. 1 do not know what morE' the Securitv CouDcil expects me to sayat' this stage. -1 have just received the two bulky volumes that have been presented by Hyderabad to lhe Security Council. 1 have had no op·portunity even ta glance at the first page. 1 am grateful to the representative of the United States of America and to the representative of France for dearly ,pointing out that at tllis stage there is no decision-there can be no decision-JJy the Security Couneil as regards the competency of Hyderabad ta come before il with any case. 1 am equally thankful that this Conneil recognizes that India's documents and India's version of the case should be presented before the Council to enable it to come to a conclusion whether or not il can be seized of the matter. W'e shaH, most willingly, do our best to heI,p the Council in this matter. We shaH publish aIl the documents we can to show how Hyderahad is not competent to come before this Council, and that wiII take sorne time. Therefore, 1 suggest that we he given time, until Monday, to present our documents and ta make our statement of the case before this august body.

Does any other member of the Securily Council wish to join in this discussion at this stage? 1 understand that members of the Council wish to have the o·pportunity of studying the statements which have been made today and perhaps aIsa consuIt among themselves, and to have the possibility of examining the further information which we have been promised. Therefore, if that is agreeahle, 1 wfJuld ·propose that the Council should now adjourn nntiI Monday next, unless any member, in the intervaI, requests me to ealI a'llearli:er meeting. The meeting rose' at 5.38 p.rn. AUSTeAUA--AUSTRAUE H: A. Goddard Pty. Ltd. 255a George Street SYDNEY, N. S. W. FlNLAND-FIN1ANDE Akateeminen Kirjakaupps 2, Keskuskatu HELSINKI BELGIUM-SELG1QUE Agence et-MeSsageries de la Presse. S. A. 14·22 rue du Persil BRUXELLES FRANCE Editions A. Pedone 13. rue SoufBot PARIS. V· ) GREECE-GRECE "EIeftberoudakis" Librairie intèrnationale Place de la CODstitution ATHÈNES BOLIVIA-SOUV1E Libreria Cientifica y Literaria Avenida 16 de Julio, 216 CasiIla 972 LA PAZ GUATEMALA José Goubaud- Goubaud & Ciao SuceiOr Sa Av. Sur No. GUATEMALA. CANADA , The Ryerson Press 299 Queen Street West TORONTO CHILE-CHIU Edmundo Pizarro Merced 846 SANTIAGO HAITI Max Bouchereau Librairie "A la Boite postale Ill·B PORT-AU-PRINCE CHINA--CHINE The Commercial Presa LtcL 211 Honan Road SHANGHAI \ INDIA-INDE Oxford Book Scindia House NEW DELHI COLOMBIA--eOLC1M81E Libreria Latina Ltda. Apartado Aéreo 4011 BOGod. IRAN Bongahe Piaderow 731 Shah Avenue TEHERAN . . IRAQ-IRAK Mackenzie & The Bookshop BACHDAD COSTA RICA--COSTA-RICA Trejos Hermanos Apartado 1313 SAN JosÉ CUBA La Casa BeIga René de Smedt O'ReiIly 455 LA HABANA LEBANON-LIBAN • Librairie universelle BEYROUTH CZECHOSLOVrAKIA-, lCHECOSLOVAQU1E F. Topic Narodni Trida 9 PIUHA 1 LUXEMBOUIG Librairie J. Schummer Place Guillaume' LUXEMBOURG. DENMARK--DANEMAR~ Einar Munskganrd Norregade 6 NETHERLAND5-PAYS-8AS N. V. Martinus Lange Voorhout S'GRAVENHACE KJOBENHA~N DOMINICANREPUBUe- REPUBLIQUE DOMINICAINE Libreria Dorninicana - Calle Mercedes No. 49 Apartado 656 CIUDAD TRUJILLO NEW ZEALAND- NOUVELLE-ZELANDE Gordon & Gotch" Waring Taylor WELLINCTON 'ECUADOR-EQUATEUR. Munoz Hermanos y Ga:; Nueve de Octuhre 70~' CasiIIa 10-24 GUAYAQUIL NICARAGUA Ramiro RamireZ' Agencia· de Pllblicaciones; UAJI/ACUA, D.