S/PV.361 Security Council

Il is myduty to caU Ithe attention of ,the Security Coundl to the situation which exists under rule 20 of the ,l'nIes of procedure, which 1 shaH now read: "Whenever !the President of the Securitv Council deems that, for the proper fulfilment of the re~ponsibilities of the Pl1'esidency, he should Illot ,preside over the Council during the consideration of a particular question wUh which the member he rep~e­ sents is dÎ1~ect1y connected, he shaH indicate his d,ecision to the Council. The Presidential chair shaH then devolve, for the purpose Inconsequence of that ruIe, and to put il Ïiu !the language of the rnie itse1f, 1 deem that for the proper fulfilment of the l'esponsilbilities of the Presidency, 1 sbould not preside over the SecurHy Council during the conside.r:ation of the par'ticular question ".rlch is on our agenda, namely, the . Identic notifications of the Governments of the French Republic, the Unite·d States .of America ailld the United Kingdom to the Secretrny-General, dated 29 September 1948." The P,œsidential chair then devolves, automatically, on His Exc·ellency, the Foreign Minister of Argentina who is the representative on the Securiity Council whieh is the next member in alphabetical order. The exceptions whieh are mentioned in this rule, namely, rules 7 a,ud 19, are the following : Rule 7 states: "The provisional agenda for eaeh meeting of 'the SecurHy Council shall be drawn up by the Secl'etary-General and atPproved by the President of the Security Council." Rule 7 does not permit me to evade or avoid the re8'ponsibility ai passing upon the provisional agenda. 1 am not reading the whole rule because 1 regard ·the se,cond parag["aph as not heing UiPplica,ble to this situation. Rule 19 stah~s: "The President shaH pifeside over the meetings of the Security Cauncil and, under the authority of the Security Council, shall repr.esent if in its capacity as an organ of the United Nations:' Therefore, 1 have the honlOur to introduc,e His Excellency, the Foreign Minist'eT of Argellltina. At thel z1witation of the .President, Ml'. Bramuglia, representative of Argentina, assumed the Presidency. 3. Discussion on the method or interpretation to be used Mr. URDANETA-ARBELAEZ (Colombia) (translated from Spanish) : In ord'er to facililtate this discussion, 1 should like to ask that wc should use Ithe system of simultaneous interpretation-without pr.ejudice, of course, ta using consecutive interpretation-should represe,ntatives so desir.e. ,:Ml'. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (transla- Led {rom French): 1 Jully support the statement just mad~ by the representativ,e of France. 1 am intel~est,ed in this point for the same reasons as he is; but if 1 have rightly understood ,the proposaI of the, representative of Colombia, simultaneous interpretation would be used without !prejudice to the consecu!tive interpr.etation. This pr.ocedure would be of great help to some members of the Security Council who may not he fully conversant with the working languages of the United Nations. Mr. PAROD! (France) (transla~ed {rom FrenclL): If the Belgian representative's interpretation is cor1'e'Ct, iheh of course 1 shall have no objections; on .the c.ontrary, Hcan OInJy he advantageous ;to have a simultaneous inteI1p.retation fust, pl'ovided that the consecutive translation follows. l have no obj,ections at aIl, if this is indeed what is intended. General McNAUGHTON (Canada) : 1 spe21k only to sU,p:port the suggestion made by ,the œpresentative of Be1gium. 1 think that the proposaI made hy Ithe representativ.e of Colombia i8 very hel;pfuI indeed. 1 am sure that, with the understanding eXipressed by the representative of F.rance, that proposaI could he adopted lby the Security Council with great advantage fo aIl of us. Ml'. VVSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Repuhlics) (translated fmmRussian) : The USSR delegation considers tha't ther.e is no . reasOln to reject the proposaI made hy the representative of Colombill' The faet is that the argument advanced by Mr. Parodi -that, in view of the importance of the question undel' discussion, consecutive intel'lpretation is desirable-cannot stand up to anycriticism. If simultaneous interpl'etanon is inadJequate for the discuss'ion of serious questions, then how is it that the Gen('ral Assembly uses simultaneoU's interpretation for the discussion of aIl questions \Vith which it deaIs, including im;portanlt ones? And again, how can simultaneous interpr.etation hamper the discussion of important problems ? On the conkary,. this formof inter.pretation faciliÏtates the discussion of such questions. As regards the proposaI of the representativ,e of. Belgium, to 't,he eff,ect that we should have first a simultaneoUis, and thoo a consecutive interpretation, ilb is my opinion, that this plroposal .is also unsound. It would lead Ito what iscaUed in Fr.ench an embarras·· de richesses. 1 do not think The' ussa delegnt.ion considel's ihnt more ndvanced techuical methods should ulways he preferred !l'O those which nœ less ndvanced. SimuHnneous interJ)l~etati01111 is, of course, a more ndvllnced method thnn consecutive interpretation. And we are aIl striving ,to introduce ils use in an committees of the United Nations. The USSR delega'tion thel~efore sees no valid r.eason to oppose the ,entil'el: logical proposaI put forward by the representative of Colombia. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria) : The ;practice we had adopted in the United States was to have one ,consecutive !ll't'erpretation into one of the working languages of the United Nations, whether English or French. When a speech was delivered in English. it was interpreted into French consecutÏvely, and when given in French it wad inter,preted into English consecutively. However when a speech is delivered in a non-working langua.ge, one simultaneous and one consecutive interpretation should he sufficient. For this reason and also hecause we are now siHing in Paris, and most of the audience are Fl'Cnch-speaking, 1 believe that it would he convenient to make a compromise and save one-th:i,r.d of the time wasted on consecutive interpretations. With regard to any speech which is delivered in any non-worki'llg language of ,the Security Council-that is, eHher Russian or 8:panish -we could have simultaneous interpretation into English and consecutive interp,retation into French. Those speeches only wouM he simultaneously interp!'eted into English and then there would be aconsecutÏVie interpretation into French. 1 think that would be convernent, and that procedure would be exactly the same as the one we have adopted in the United States. At the same time, considering tha,t we are here in France, it would be better to hav,e' the interpretation system conducted in the manner 1 have suggested. 1 think that, in that way, we would saVie time, and it would he more correct than to have a double interpretation for any language other than the wo:rking languages of the Security Council. -Ml' . PARODI (F.rance) (translate-d (rom French) : 1 should like to say just a word here in re.ply to the staternent just made by Mi.'. Vyshinsky. Th~ example which he gave 1 should al80 Hke to point t.dt '1hat the more eloquent ,the speakers. the mo,re d'ifficult the interpœter's work in simultaneous interpl~etation becomp.s. And sinee 1 am particularly anxious ,to follow the statements of Ml'. Vyshinsky, 1 think it esp·ecially important to adhere' ito consecullive inte11pretations. 1 am only asking at p:I1e-sent fuat we should continue to follow the ;practice observed iu New York, described a momenlt aga by the representative of Syria, with whom 1 fully agl'lee. Ml'. JESSUP (United States of Ameri,ca) : l should like ,to associafJe myself with the remarks which have just been made by the representative of France in referring to the reasons for the established practice of the Security Council of utilizi'ng cons,ecutive inte,"por.eta'tions. 1 believe that 1 am correct in tl.'ec-alling that on earHer occasions in the Security Council, where simuI.taneous interpretations wereused, the sugg.estion that 'they 'should he 'employed was made partly to facilitalte the task of thie' President in the conduct of the meetings, so that he might he able ,to follow a11 'the statements as they \Vere beilng made. tromper antéri'eUl"es appel proposé pour en rations, fattes. M. Conseil ont l'exactitude clarations, sirable cutive, à However. the consideration to which Ml'. Parodi has caUed attention, namely, the consideration that members of the Securï.ty CouiIlcil have found Î't useful, in ,their estalblished Ipractice, to have the OppOtl.'- tunity to -check upon the accuracy of the interpretation of their S'ta'tements; this practice has poin1ted to the desirabilHy of retainingconsecutive interpretations even \Vhen simul'taneous' interpl'letam.ons wer,e also used. . . Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): 1 am generally an advocate of simu1.talllleous interpretation, which has many advantages. 1 recognize, hüwever, that it is an tinnovation and that il~ was not forese1en in our original procedure. If representa'lives take exception to its adoption 1 do not think 'that we would wish to force il upon them. At the same' time, 1 should like to sup,port the suggestion made by the represen.tative of Syria !that in a case where a speech is made nei'ther in PDe!Ilch or in English there should be ollie simultaneous interp;retation iuto one of Ith€ work1ing languages and then a consecutive interpreta1tion into the otheT la'n,guage. As far as 1 am concerned, as ,the 11epl'esenta'tive of an Eng1ish-speaking Gov,ernment, 1 would say that if it wel'e decided that the English inf.erpretation should be given simultaneously, 1 shuuld he quite content if that were the desire of the others members of the Council. General McNAUGHTON (Canada): The Canadian delegation would be willing to accept the pro/posaI placed before us by the representa'bive of the Unite·d Kingdom, ~ub}ect to one additional condition which 1 thinks is important in the present circumstances-nameiy, that one of the additional languages iuto which simultaneous interpretation was giv,en should be Spani'sh so as to help the P,r<esident in his ,dreliberations and the conduct of ,this meeting. Ml'. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian) : In my opinion ithe iproposal of the Canadian representative is unacceptable, on the grounds that, if it is a matter of departing from the usual :procedure in the' common interest, then there should be no discrimination against ihe other official languages. In my opintion, such a proposaI' is contrary both ,to the spirit and to the let~er of the United Nations Organization; neither does it correspond ,to the methods which we

In conformity with the' OpilfiiohlS cxpœssed by almost all r.e;presentativetS, 1 shaH put to a vote ItwO proposaIs which result there'- l'rom. Wl'th regard to the first, they should vote " yes" or .. no" on the p.roposai made by the l'epresell'taHve of Colombia in favour of the system of simultaneous interpr.e!f1ation. The secone vote will he taken on the question whether simuHaneous interpreta- -tion shaH he followed by consecutive iiD:tle~r­ pretation. interventions. Mr. JESSUP (United States of Amemca) : If 1 may bel p,ermitted 1 should lik'e ['0 ask a question in the intell',ests of clarification. As 1 underS'tand it, the President has st·ated two prOiposal,s whkh he init1ends to put to the vote. The' first proposaI is, ID. Jf'Afect, a prüjposal that wc shaH use simu1talllltoUs int,e;rpretalion 'exclush·'ely. Ther.efore, if one should vote in favoUJ' of the first proposaI, Ï't would mean that one favouœd the exclusive use of simultaneous interp'l~eta­ tion ".Vlithout ·consecuitiv,e interp:l'etation. If one believes in consecutive interpretation, as 1 undHstand the proposaI of the President, one l1'eeds to vote in !t'he negat1y,e on the fi.l'st proposaI and itll, the affirmativ-e on the second. Am 1 con'ect in my interpretation ?

It is as stated by the Tep:resenfative of the United States of America. If the first iproposal put to the vote is rejected, that means that ithe 'provisional rules of pro- . cedul"e must heapplied, and, 'u.ccordring to them, we use consecutiVie, not simultUilleous, interpretation. The Security COl.mcil would be adoiPfing ·a new ·p.rocedu:œ if lit nsed simu1lf:aneous intell'pretation though that would facilitate handling the suhject. . Ml'. URDANETA-ARBELÂEZ (Colombia) (translai'ed from Spanish) : 1 regret that 1 have taken up so much of the Council's time. When 1 made' this proposa:. 1 did not think that the COUln.cil wouJdsp,end so much Mme upon it. My proposaI does Ilot, in fact, exdude consecutive Interpretation, but inltToduces simultaneous interpretation without exeluding cons'e.cutive, if l"ep~e'sentatives request d!t In this case, for ,example, the il"e;presen- 'tative of France has -already oaslœd for consecutive inte1"preta,tion iuto French. Tf IllY proposaI 1'5 accepted, his 11eques-t will he met. 1 think, therefore, that il would be sufficient to 'put my delegntion's proposaI to a vol-e; if il is adop1ted, simultnneous int,erpretrition would be introduced, which would make our work easier for aH of us; and if consecutive i.n,terpretation is l'equestcd, it could be granted. iVIr. EL-l{HOURI (Syrin) : The alternatives which the President has suggested should be vO'led upon do not -cover the ;proposaI which 1 have made. l ,proposed that we should adopt here also the practice which has been followed in New "York; it is a practice which is known to aU the members of the Security Council :md which worked v,ery well; namely, '~hat the,re should he only one consecutive interpretation besides the simultaneous interpretation. In this way it could beeither into English or into French according to Ithe audience. This pro- :posal has been supported by the represen- -tatives of France and the United Kingdom, the delegations which are most intel'ested in the matter. The suggesl'ion made by tbe P.l'esident does not coyer thisalternative of mine, ·therefore, 1 think my ,proposal should be put to the vote al'8o. 1 hope my suggestion will meet with the approval of all the members, since ilt would be pref,e:rable always ta follow a specifie .practice in the Security Council without having to -change to one method or another at every speech. This would give rise to complications, and 1 think it would be bell,telr toadopt the me'thod 1 have prQiposed.

Considering that the proposaI of the representativ-e of Co'.lombia has be,en altered making it quite clear that simultaneous inJberpr.etation would not exc1ude consecutive i.nterpretation, 1 shan now put this prop'osal to a vote. 1 shall ask that members of the Council who are 1n, favour of the p,ropos-al made by 'the re,presentative of Colombia ito l'aise their hands. MI". MANUILSKY (Ukrainian SOVli,et Socialist Republic) (lranslated from French): As the interpr.etation cannot always be hea'l'd perfectly clear1y, l 'should like to ask the r:eprreseuta1tiv,e of Colombioa whether he abid2s by bis original proposaI or whelther he now su,pports the French representative's proposaI. Ml'. URDANETA-ARBEl:AEZ (Colombia) (tmnslaled from SFunish) : 1 have not altered my origilnal proposaI and 1 should like to state it once' more in the form in which 1 submitted if. Thait, was, quite simply, that simuI- Thus, my !proposaI leaves il entirely open to use consecutive inter,pretation when rcpre&eilltatives request it. Interp:vetation i'noto French has already heen requested. If my proposaI is adopted, th,c reque-st for in1terpretation into French made hy the representatives nf France and Syria would hav,e to he granted. If the representative of the United Kingdom should then ask for irüe~r­ pretatiou. in1to English, fuis too would he gralll~t·ed. This was the method ellliPloyed on fOl'me'r occasions in the- SecuTlÎty Council. Simultaneous interpretation was used aiIld consecu.tive in·terpretation was giv.en when reques!ted. This, then, is my p,roposal. 1 haVIe not altered il. Mrr. MAN'UILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Repubtic) (t.ranslate.ei from French): Would the simultaneous interpretation he in the five official languages, fha;! is French, English, Russian, Chinese and Spanish ?

Y:es, i.t would indude aIl five official languages. 1 shaIl DOW put to a vote the iP:r.oposal of the re,presentative of Colomhia. Will those representa:tÎ\nes in favour 0; the proposaI that simultaœous interpretation shall he .used, without p:r.ejudi'ce ;toconsecutive interpretaitïon mtoFrench or EngHsh if requested, l'aise theiT hands? 4. Adoption of the agenda

We will now turn :to fhe Mst item which is :the .adoption of the ag.enda. 1 calI upon the representatiVlc of the Union of Soviet Socialist Repuhlics. M1r. VYSHINSKY (Union of SoViÏ,et Socialist Republics) (translaf!ed from Russiein-) : The Gover1llIllent of the USSRis compelled to state that il filllds the ~p:ro,Posal of the Governments of the United States of AmeT- ~c~, flle United Kingdom and Franoe, to mclude the question of the situation which had arisen in Berlin in the agenda of 'the There can be no question that the situation in Berlin is not closely bound up with the question of Gemnany as a whole and ,that any syparation of the question of the situation in, Berlin from the 'problem of Geil'many as a whole would he complete,ly artificial and would iIl1erely lead to erroneou'S anidunpractical decisions. To retie:l' the Berlin question to the SecuriJty 'Council would he a direct violation of Article 107 of the UnHed Nations Charter, which states that : "Nothing i'il the ,present Charleil' shaH invalidate or preclude action, in i1.'elation to any S:tate which during the Second World War has he'en an enemyof any sigul3.tory to the present OhaTter,. taken or authoriz,ec1 as a xesult of that war by the GovernlID'errts having l'esponsibility for such action." l ,,,:,, .. ., In fael, as :r:egards Germany in gellieral and in Berlin in particulall', thereexists a ",'hole series of important interna:tional agreements and treaties signed by the four p~wers: the Soviet Union, the Uni;ted States of America, the United Ringdom and France. Of these, the most impor:tant are the, agreements eonduded by the g.reat Powers at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, which lay down th'e political and economic principles governing relations with Gelmany. These documents deal intel' alia wi:th such important questions as the D<eelaration regarding :the defeat of Germany and the quadripartite Statement on the control ma'Chinery in Germany. They are international treaties and ,agre,ements, signed by the grea~t Powers, which then took oVJer full 'authority in Germany for the duration of the period of 'Ïrr''Plementation by Germany of ,the hasic requirements of unconditional, surrender. Thiere are severalagreeme'Dits, signed by the above..lJllentioned Powers which refer to .the zones of occupation in Germany and to :the admin'isbration 'of ,greater Berlin. In thisconnexion, ,attention must be drawn to a most important provisiol1l of the Berlin Conferience of tlu'ee Powers :to whi'ch later France and China adhered, namely the provision estahldshing the Council of Foreign Ministers. That ,Council was asked, among D'ther things, to prepa:œ a pa'Ci:fic seUlement for Germany and if was stipulated Ithat :the docume:Illt thus preIPaI'ied 'would be accepted by a demO'cratic German Government as soon as :suoh a government had beenestablished. 'entr,e ment magne, ~era gouVoernement tique, titué. Thus, in view of the special international agreements all'd treaties signed by the grea't Powers, t'he whole 'pll'oblem of Geil.'- many, including ithe Berlin questionl, is a matter to be settled by the GOViernments which hear the r:e&ponsihility foor the o'COupation of Germany; this problem ·cannot, :therefore, be' aUowed to come up ;for consideraition before any othe,r body than ,that defined in th,e internlational agreements under which ar,e the signature .' the great Po~'ers. internationaux sances, magn,e, est les sabilité Cela ce quies/, nationales Puissances. . Inàt, in short, i's :the principle Iproclaimed ' ln Article 107 of ,the United Nations Chartel', ' which makes if de,all' ,that the responsibility for ,conditions in the territories of enemy principe Charte manière For the solution of such matters, by the international agreements to which l have jllst referred a special control maclril1'ery for Germany was establisheod: the Four Power Control Council and ithe Council of Foreign Mil1'isters. At .the same time, the Council of Foreign lVIinisters wasentrusted witn the ;preliminary task 'Of preparing the peace setnemen:l in general; and a setHement with Germany in lParticular. together with ·the ·consideration of any other questions. which subject to the agreement of the Governments rep':r:esented on the Council of Foreign Ministers might be referred to it from time lta time. If we aIle to keep to the terms of the above-mentioned international agreements. and to respect :the signatures a'ppended 010 them. then it c~nnot be recognised as either legal or correct to refer to the Security Council any question ,coll'cerning Germany. including ·thatof Berlin. A de'cision .lo l'efer any such question to ,the Security Council would constitute a direct violation of :bhe provisions of the United Nations Charter and of :the international ag.reements 1 haV'e mentioned. Most blatantly of aIl. it would he a violation, of the agr:eements signed at Yal:ta and Poltsdam. in acc()!l"dance .to whiclh the question of Germany falls within ,the sole corniP,etenlce of the four Pow,ers bearing the responsibility for the occupation of Germany. The·ve can be no doubt that the German questions ar·e the very ones which may have :to he ,colllSidered and decidedex:clusively by Ithe machinery set l1'p by the international agre1ements concluded by the great Powers, with respect to Germany. . In vi:rtue of the treaties signed hy :them, the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France have at their disposaI aH the necessary leg...? means ,to ,enab1e tbem to submit their daims anid to rectify by legal means any grievances arising in connexion with Germa:n.y. , des The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and France must therefo;re choose the legal way, the way or procedure established in the international agreements s,igned by l'hem, and by others .nt a later date. Thal is the legal method. Those who follow il will not violate eHher the Charler of the· United Nations, orthe international instruments which, those Governments hav:e signed. As the tpll'ee Gov:ernments already know from the USSR note of 3 October, Ithe Government of the Soviet Union ,proiposed the ronvening of ,the Coundl of F-oreign Ministers which is ,the body competent to deal with (the settlement of the Berlin question. Now, il is rather strange ibat a body which has been functioning regularly for a considerable period, should fall intooblivion and be completely ignored, now, just when, aocording to the three Powers, a compIicaited and difficult situation has arisen~a situation requiring an authoritalive intervention. The Council of Foreign MinJisters was set upto settle the German question. Il was in accordance wilth the arrangements made àt the Potsdam Confeœnce with regard to the creation of a COllluoil of Foreign Minisfers that aIl problems should be ,ex.aInined oil a quadripartite basis, from time to time, and decisions t-aken on the questions for which such a Council was set up. That question is the peaceful setUement foll" Germany, a question uipon which hinge 'aIl thoseproblems which ,have now a.cquired such great significance. That same body which was se,t UT by the thr.e~ Powers-and aptpToved by : five (smee France and ChiJIl!a aclhered to :the Potsdam Agr;eement later)- for the specifie purpose of settlingthe German question is being ignored andby-passed. That sicle of th:e question is not ,conlSideDedl by those very Powers which ,established :the Council, which assumed .d:efinite obligations towards il, and which laid on il CJertain obligations with rega,rd to the seUlement ~f 'bhe German qUe:ltion. Pacla servanida sunl ("trea:ties aIle made to be observed")----such is the basic principle of international law, of international co-op,e:ration. So, if youplease, cal'lry out that fundamental requirement. Turn to that body wmeh was set up fol' that purpose in accordance with the '!l'eaties which you YOUl'Selves have 'signed, and in this way discharge the obliga:tions which this tœaty imposes Uipon you. The GOV1ernments of the tln~ee States the United S'tates of America, the United Kingdom and France maintain, .in a note addressed to :the Secretary-GeIieral of the United Nations,. that the. situation in Berlin is a threa't to internatioJllalpeace and security. In tha:t note, it iJs S'tated :that the S'aid Governments have decided to SlUibmit the Be'l'1inquestion to the Security CO'llncil's considera;tion inorder that the ex,ïst'ing 'threat to international p'ea'ce and seeurity may he ,eliminated, al1eging by that sta:tement that inte,rnational ,peace and security a:r:e'now being threatened on account of the situation in Berlin. But snch statements are unfounded and absurdo As it is made c1ear in the note presented hy the Gov,ernment of the USSR on 3 October 1948, that ·is to say, the note which was presenrted yesterday, 'the statement by the United States of America, alleging the cl'Ieation of :a situation in Berlin threatening in:temational !pea'ce and 'secUirity, does not correspond to the trUie facts and is but a means ofexerting 'pressure, an attempt to use the United Naltioos to further j ts mvn aggressive tends. Snch statements by the three Governments which, 'as l have alreadv said, are completely 'Unfounded and absurd, are' meant to l'aise a hubbud arou:nd the ques:tion of theso-called Berlin blockadie, although no snch blockade in fad exists. The staternents regarding the danger of famine are also ,completely unfouTIided; they are simplya propaganda manœuvre. As far back as Ule beginning of June, the Soviet Government, at the reqUiest of the USSR Military Administration in Germany had ·decided to assume res:ponsihility for sUPJplying the ,eDltire .population of. Berlin. In a sta'tement which Marshall Sokolovsky made ,to a number of correspondents of Berlin. newspapers, it was indicated that hundreds of thousands of itons of grain, and over ten thousand tons of fats, had Consequently, all the accusations levelled at the Union of Sovi,et Socialist Relpublics do not withstandcriticism, and aH those rumours are being s.pread me"ely to sow fear,. worry and war hys~erja, and are not at aH intended to further a real settlement of ,the situation in Berlin. :tionnement In the note submitted by the ,three Governments on 26 September, there is also the unfounded assertion that the USSR authorities in Berlin had allegedly permitted an attempt hy a minori.ty of the Berlin population to set aside the Berlin M!Œll'Îcipality by fO'floe. The Gov:ernment of the Sovie:t Union, in its note of 3 Octoher to the Governments of the Unlited States of America, the UnlÎted Kingdom and France has officiallyrefuted those unfounded aocusations. The militail'Y authorities in Berlin had received firm instructions from the Government of the Soviet Union that thev shouldensure the normal work of local organs of government in spite of the Berlin population's discontent with the existing situation. That fact has heen confimned by the Foreign Minister of the Union of Sovièt Socialist Republics, Ml'. Molo,tov, at the meeting of 30 August with the representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France. Theabsurdity of the above:-mentioned assertions 'concerning the USSRauthoriiies is also shown by the bct that .the disoTders mentioned by the notes of the three Governments 'took place in parts of Berlin which , correspond ar~.not ul1lder the jurisdiction of the USSR ml~Itary authorities and res'ponsibility for. WhlCh :doescoll'sequ.ently 'Uot rest with it, but 'M!th the mili:tary authorities of th'e û~er thIree sectors of Berlin. Ther.efore, tlns asse.vtion made by the three Govern- ~ents does notcorrespond to the facts elther, and thus ,the argument that th,e present ,situation in Berlin 1S a threat to InterDIational peace and security, an argument which has been ,put forwaTd to prove tha:tthe Securi:ty Cou:ndl must ,examine the Berlin question, must also be 'coll's-ideil'ed co~pIetely unfounded. It should be sim[J,Jy r~Jec~ed as not corresponding to the actual SItuatIon. The PRESIDENT .(translated from Spanish) : Icall on the representative of Belgium to speak on a poin<t of or,der. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated from Fl"elJlch): 1 have listenedcarefully to the statement of the USSR representative. The very fuH comments he has made, however, ,cOD'cern main~y the substance of the que'stion.'Y.et, if 1 am not mistalœ'll, we a'l"e at this moment stHI at the stage of adopting the ·agenda. Mr. Vyshinsky's remarks would :therefore seem to be pl"ema'ture. Thal is why Iasked to S'peak on a point of order. The item which appears on the ïprovisional agenda for this meeting is worded as follows: "Identic notifications of the Governmentts of the Fl'ench Republic, the United S:ta:tes of America and the United Kingdom to the Secretary-General dated 29 September 1948:' What do these words mean ? They mealll! tha'l the Security CouiIldl is seized of 'Communications from States Members of ithe United Nations. Th.-e:right of ,calling upon the Seoority Council is one of the rights of Meinher States under the ierms of the Char.leil". When a Memb'er S'tate lexercises that right, the' CountCil is automaticaHy seized of if. Consequently, the inclusion by the Council of thecommunÏocatioTh fuus made on ils agooida is mel"elya formality. The Council notes that the Il"lequest in fact ,emanates from a Member State: and that, consequently, il has been seized of the ma:tter in a regular fashion. As such, the inclusion of the item on the agenda has no othér significa,nce. I:t does not im;ply any admission of competence on the part of the COUD'cil. The d~scussion on .compe'tence should foUow the formaI inclusioru of the item on the agenda, but not precede il. Indeed, to discuss whether it is ·competent or not, the Councii must mst be in a position to consider the matter, and this ii cau only ·do by ,plaoCing the item on its agenda, thatis, among ,the items with which il is seized. Il1l these 'conditions, ithe1"efo1"e, the Council will not p,rejudiee Hs ,competence hy induding ithe communications addressed to it by three .Memfber Sta'tes'in its agenda, communications of which it has consequen<tly already been seiz,ed in a regular way. The IegaUty of thatcomp:etence will be aU the less affected in view of the faet :that, as we have jus't 'he.ard, it ha·s been .formally cODitested. .In ,thesecirCfums:tanœs, 1 cau see lDJO diffioulty hi ,adopting ithe agenda~ Once the agenda 'has beenadopted, the members of Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist flepublics) (translated from Russian): 1 cannot ,agree with ithe views of the representative of Belgium. He has indicated thal the question of the competence of the Security Conneil with il"espect :to tIlis case should be discussed only aftel' the question has been included in the agenda. But let me draw the -attellltion of the Security 'Council [0 rule 9 of the provisional rules of procedure of ,the -Council, which states -that : "The first item of the provisiO'llal agenda f~Teach meeting of the Security Conncil shaH be the adoption of the agenda. " What is the meoaning of this? What is the meanmg of a rule stating ,that the Sec:urUy Couneil, before heginllling ifs work, must first approve its agenda? To approve an agenda means -to recognize that it is ap'Propriate, ,and tha:t the questions tobe included in its agenda a:l"e suitable and correspond ta the 'competence of :the body in questio:n~. If any ollier stand were adoIP'ted, the resuH would be this : the Security Council would mst approve the agenida, then affierwards diSicover that a given question which had, been included in that agenda, already approved, did not faU within ifs compet~nce. Wha:t would: you: have us do then ? Remove ,thisquestion from the agenda? But snch a 'course would be un~thinkable and illogical. If l'uie 9 states that the Mst item on the provisional agenda for each meeting of the SecurityCoJUndl is the adoption of the agenda, this 'can mean only one thing, namely that the Se.curity Council must discuss whether the agenda has heen correc:tly draw:n u:p, -and whether 'certain questions should or should not be induded on the agenda. If the agenda is corre,ct it should beadopted'; if it is incorrect, it should not; but the maUer must first he discussed. What is involVied in dedding whether or not,certam questions shouJd or should not he included iill! the 'agenda ? I:t me·ans taking a d'ecision with r:egard to the rea'sons and grounds .adduoed in .ravour of the inclusion of certain items; or, on the otheT hand, rejecting the :œasons \put forwalrd against the inclusion of ;these paI'iticular questions in the age:nJda. Oule of the most important arguments put forw'a-rd by the USSR delegation for the purpose Qf dissuadingthe Security Council f!l"omconfirming the agenda, ithat i5 to say of not aocepting ·thisparticular item for considerationby the SecudtyCouncil, i5 Fill"stly, ithatthe German question as a whole, and any pa;!'t of this question~and the Berlin question is a part of the German question-is 'a question for which there exists an international agreement, bitnding on us ,aIl; this a,greemenit pl'Ovides for a certain /procedure with resp'ect to questions T'elevant to it,and it ·constitutes an obligation enter:ed iuto hy those Powe~'" signatory to it, to examinle aU llUatters, whetber par- Hcular or general, whichdeal with Germal11y as a whole or in part, and the entirety of which 'consti:ffites what we calI the German question. Thal isthe first point. Does such a hody exist, 01' does il not ? It does. 'Ne have the Council of Foreign Minis,ters. vVhat has the Security Council :to do with tbis ? Nothing at ,aIl. Secondly, another argument is put forward : il is said, .if yon. please, that there has arisen a threat ;topeace and security which, in other words, makes it a ma.tter o~ direct COnC-e:fll to the Security Conncil. But, eVeJD: if there elid ex:ist a thr.eat 10 'peace and .s'ecurity, Article 107 of the Charter exdudes intervention in othis matter hy the Uniited Nations Organization. This is the·meaning of Article 107. BUlt does such a threat in fa,ct exist, or is it a figmeut 01 the imagination, is it merely apr.etext fol' itrying to 'transfer responsibility for examinatiO!Il: of ,this question by the four Powers-in accordance with the provisions of the international agreement-to the Security Council, which neVier undertook to examine ithe .German question., and whi'ch indeed,in view of Article 107, never COllld have assumed othis' res.ponsibility. The second point is ·fhis-that there is no thl'leat to peace and security. We ,are toId that we ·are now .dealing with the substance of the matter. No, Ml'. van Langenho'V'e, 1 am not dealing with the substance of the matter, and do not intend to do so, and for this Toe·ason.: 1 do not admit, and my Gov,ernmell't does not admit, tbat the Seourity Council has any competence in tbis matter. You have sent YOUl' complaints through the wrong channel, gentlemen. Kindlyaddress them, as requested in, ·the USSR Governmellit's note of 3 Oetober, through the ·chan!Il:el e'Stahlished by the lagreement which you yourselves have signed. Theonly legal ,channel through which such 'complaints ,can be submitted is the Couneil of Fœeign Ministers; be kind enough to refer your question to them. 18 this a question of substance? No•. I:t is a We cannot understand what it is proposed we shO'U'ld do. It is pro)posed· that we should approve and rubber-stamp the agenda without discussion. Our proposaI is that the agenda should be discussed, and 1 have the right,and shaH exercise if, of discussing :the question of the adoption of the agenda. In view of the existence of the international agœements hinding on the thre'e great PO'wers.; and of Artide 107 uf the Charter 'confirming the stipulations of the above agreements and putting this question outside the s,phere of jurisdiction of the United Nations Orga:n1zH't:i.on as -a whole, 1 submit ,that the question of Belllin is not within the competence of the Security CouncH.I therefore object, on formallegal grounds, ;to the inclusion of :this question in the agenda of today's meeting of the Security Cûuncil, and 1 insist that the said ag:enda, ,concerni'llg the Berlin question,be rejeded, and that the Security Council should not ,proceed to the examina.fion of this question, sinee to do 50 would be a violation of the Charter,and inter,n~ational obligations. We shaH uof he.a. party to such violations, hut shaH oppose them. . . Mir. JESSUP (United States of America) : l have very gnat resp,ect for the representative of Belgium and for the argument which he has made. In view, however, of the t'wo statements whkh have heen made by the l'epresentative of the USSR, l feel compelled to comment on the situation which is befor·e us. 1 note that the view of the represen~tative of the USSR on the !point of order raised by the representative of BelgiUJ.Ii is to the eff.ed that the question must he dis·cussed now before the adoption of the agenda as to wh,~ii'er :the Securit::;' Council should consider this question. In the records of the London meetings of the Se1curity Council in Jllnuary 1946, wheJIl! it h9d under consideration the question of placing the Iranian question oUlthe agenda. 1 find tha t P. ratheT diffeœnt argumentwas presented. fhen ,the statement was made [2"Œmeeting]. " If this Hem is placed on the agenda st> that we may discuss whether the question should be considered, then 1 have no objec~ tion to its inclusion on the' agenda for th,; next me,eting. " That was the statement made by Ml'. Vyshinsky at that time. However, we are confronted with an objection ,to the jurisdiction of the Security CounciI. 1 had rathel' ex,pe'Cted thaï the representative of the USSR· wOlUld obJect to havingany O1"gan This latest note from the Government of the USSR, howeve'r, does not change the situation! which has been laid beforc the Security Council. The reason why if does not change the situation is that the Government of the USSR still refuses to' lift the blockade and thus to vemove the threat to the ,peaoce which is the issue befol'e the Security CouncH. 1 stress the fact Ihnt the issue before the Security Council is a ·threat to the peace. 1 believe that the rC.p'resentative of the USSR has been misinformed in thinking that the whole problem of Germany has been laid befol'e the Securitv CounlCÎl in the communic'ations of the G~vernmentsof the United States of America, of France and of the United Kingdom. The issue wasc1early put in the communications of the three Governments to the Secrefary-General in document S/1020 which is 1l0W hefore the members of the Security Council. The issue is dearly stated. Il could be re-emphasized in ferros of the fact or of the alIegation to which Mr. Vyshinsky referred, that the issue is ;fha:t ,the GOViernment of the USSR has cleady shown by its actions that it is attempting by iUegal and coercive measur-es, in disregard of its obligations, to seCU1'Ie political objectiVies to which it is not entitIed and which it could not achieve by IJeaceful means. 1 quote that from the communication. It is Ilot the issue of Ge!l'many as a whole or the other issues to which the representative of the USSR referred. 1 do not intend, however, to be drawn into a discussion of the substance of the maUer which is hefore the Security Council. l hope 1 shaH be move succesful in trying to attain the objedhne of confining my remarks to the jurisdict'io'll!al question. On that jurisdictional question and the objection '10 the jurisdiction whi,ch has been made by therepresentative of the USSR, 1 wish to IPoint out that the obj ection which has been made i8 Jo keeping with his Government's continuou'l and systematic disregard of the Charter. The technical question which he has raised to the consideration of'this Hern hy the SeClul'ity Council is v.rhether, under Article 107 of the Charte'r, the Se-curity Council if! precluded from assuming jurisdiction of this case. The reopresentative of the USSR has mentioned the Conneil of Foreign Ministers. 1 shaH deal with that point in a few moments, but 1 wish '10 ·eaH attention, at this stag·e, to the faet that there was no referenee in his remarks to the machinery of the UnÎt'ed Nations, except in the sense of a refiusal to consider resort to that maohinery. The Governmel1lt of Ule United State~ believes in the UnHed Nations. Il believes that when we ail signed the Charter we did so with an honest beHef in the ,declaratiou of the peoples of the United Nalions that we were agreed-and 1 use -the words of the Charter-" to 'pradise toleralnoe and live toge-thel' in peace with one another as good neighbours, and to 'n'nite our strength t.o m,?intain international peace and seeurIty... The Government of the United States believe.s in the pm'poses set forth in Article 1 of the Charter and inbhe prindples stated in ArtÏ'cle 2 of the Charter. It is hecauS'e we belieV'e in these p'u.~poses and principles tha·t we have joined in referrîng tbis case to the Security Council. The represen!tatiV'e of the USSR made a number of references to the desirability of respecting signatures to international agreements. 1 wo.uld 'like 10 Ipoint out that the Charter of . the United Nations is an international agreement and that il hears the signature of the USSR In accordance with our obligations IUtnder Article 33 of 'that Oharter, the Government of the United States, in agœ,ement with the Governments of France ailld the United Kingdom has made every effort to l'eIDove the threat to ,the ,pea,oe ,created by the USSR, t,hrough direct discussions with the Government of the Soviet Union. The systematicaHy periodic 'evasion and l'epudiation of the promises by ,that Government has mllde fUirther recouxse to these direct discussions fu!tile. M~'3nwhile, the USSR continues, in violation of its obligations under the Charter, 10 apply force or the ·threat of force against the Governments of the United Staltes, France and the United Kingdom. The representativ·e of the Sovie't Union has intimll'ted, as his Govemment has already aHeged, thatthe iHegal USSR Any such argument on the part ofi2e USSR will not succeed in obscuring the actuaI situation whioh conifronted the Governments of the United States, France and the United Kingdom and ta which 1 have j ust '1'eferred. Faced with that situation, the three Governments were confronted with the following alternatives. One, they could have supinely bowed ta the USSR us'e of force; or two, they could in turn have resorted to force to meet the fOl~e of :the USRR; or tbree, they could have recognized the faet s't'ated in Article 24: of the Charter that the Security Council has "primaJ;y responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security... " The Governments of the United States, }<J.·ance and the United Kingdom chose :that thi'1'd alternative. Il was the oll'ly alternative consistent with the obligations of a Member of the UnHed Nations. Il was a recognition of the conviction of the three Governmell'ts that the United Nations is and will remain the 'Corner-stone on which the stllucture of peace must be buHt. The GoverlllIllent of the USSR has been loud in itsprotestations of support for the United Nations. If these protestations had been since're ,they would haVoe welcomed an o;p.portunity to involœ the assistance of :the Security CGuncil in bringing about a termination <.lf the present serions situation in ord~l' tha'ta:llquestions and i'ssues between them and the Gov:ernments of the United States, France and ithe United Kingdom might he solved by peaœful means. The GovernlIllent of the USSR has Dot laken that course. Il repudiatesthe ma,chinery of pacific seUlement ,established by the United Nations. The USSR de:nies tha't the United Nations is 'an organ to which the peoples of the worldcan tUI'n for help in maintaining international p:eace and security. Again, at' this point, 1 would 'cHe to the represoota'live of the USSR the great Latin maxim to which he has referred, pacta servanda sant. The USSR, in repudiating the machinery of peaceful seUlement, and repudiating its obligations under the Charter, is trying to secnre for itself unilateral fJ.'leedom ta reSO'rt to force. H is evidently unwilling ,to have the Security Council and the public opinion of the world eX'amine the If the USSR wants peace, let it welcome a resort to the United Nations, the instrument of peace. If the USSR intends to support the United Natio'I1s, let it acce;pt the established prl~~edures of the United Nations. We, for our part, do intend to support the United Nations, and we are theTefore invoking it after the resott to direct disoussion wiith the USSR has failed to remove the ·threat to peaœ, !resorting to it i!D the hope thai the Securitj Council, in wscharge of ifs :restPonsibilities under the Charter, can make Hs contribution where other means have failed. When the SeCUTity Council begins ifs actual consideration of this 'case, my delegation will he ,prepaT:ed to Iay before it aU of the pertinent fads, >3nd H win be prepared to answer ,then aH :pertinent questions. At this point, as 1 have indicated, it seems to me ina,ppropriate to enter into th 'se details, and now 1 wish merely to deal brieîly wHh the technical argument which has heen advanced by the 'relpresentativr of the USSR with refe'rence to ArHcle 107 of the Charter. The argumel1ts put forward by Ithe representative of the USSR make H appear tha l the question brought before the Security Council is :the ,eutire problem of GeTmany. As 1 have already said, if :that is his impres- -sion he has bee!n misinfomned. That is not the case. The question hefore this Council is a diff.erent one, namely, th·e threat to international'peaœ and se'curity caused by the imposHion and maintenance of the USSR hlockade of Berlin and other mea- SU1'es of duress taken against the three other occupying POWeTS. Tbe representative of the USSR, in the second series of remarks which he has made this afternoon, has saidtha'teven if it is a ;threat to the peace H is still outside the competence of the Security CounciI. 1 believe ithat an exramination of the Charter will show the fallacy of ,that aTgument. Article 107 i8 one of the two Articles of Chapte'r XVII which provides for transitiona,}: !Securify arra'l1gem~Illts to he in effed ullitil such time as the peace settlements have become effiective and internatiolllai stflbility restored, anduntil the Unif.ed Na- At the time of the framing of the Charter, il was Ithe hQpe of aH that the United Nations would not hecaUed upon to deal with questions di're'ctry a'1"ising out of the last war or in '~onnexion with the making of :the peace. Butclearly there was no intention l.OpreVient three of ,the four' gre/at Powers in ,EurO[Je, in their operations in relation to a defeated Ge1'lll1any and having primary respOlllsibility for aet!Îon in rela'tÏon Ito that enemy State, f'romseeking the assistance of the United Nations when they were confronted with a blockiade supoported by the a:rnned forees of another grea't Power, even though the measures cf blockade happened to be instituted in the territory of an exenemy State. Il is true that no one ithen contemplated that one of these Powers would so violate ils obligations unde'r the Charter. Bwt 'the door was not 'Closed to possible action in such a contingency. In 1945 we aU hoped tha't the USSR would co-operate in multual confidence. nespite aU indications to the 'contrary, we 'continue to hold that hope. These 'conclusions as to the meaning of Ar.tide 107 are inescapable from a study of the language of the Article itself, from ils lêgislBltive history at San Francisco' and .. NO'thing in the ,present Charter s'hal! invalidate or preclude a,c.tion, in relation to al11Y State whichduring the Second WoTld Wiar had been an enemy of any signatory to the iP'resent Charter, taken or a'Uthorize-d as a result 'of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such actions... The language of the Artide applies only to action sa tak,en or authorized; it does not ,exclude from the jurisdicition of the United Na'tions- 'aIl matters relating to exenellhy States l'Iegardless of 'the ciTcumstances of the Powers affected. précisent If the Alilicle had been designed for that broader pUl'pose, it would have be,en easy so to provide in dear and un~quivœable language as it Wlas done in ·another Article of the Charter Telating to the prohibition against United Nations interverntion in domestic affairs. The 'contrast between the language of Article 107 and the language of paragraph 7 of Article 2 is signmcant. In :the latte'r ~ase, namely, ;thecase of Article 2, paragralph 7, where the pU'l'pose was to prohibit action by organs -of ,the United Nation's, the language used reflecJed th(' purpose in unmistakable terms. Thus, in !Tticle 2, paragm,ph 7, it is sta,ted : .Charte Hellement .. Nothing contained in the .present Cha'rte'l' shaH authorize the United Nations to in:tervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shaH require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter... " No cOnJjparable language is found in Article 107. Furthermore, the language of Article 107 ref.ers to action illl relation ,to fOTffieT em~my States; it does uot refer ioaction by a victorious Power in the territory of former enemy St,ates againS't or in Tela:tion to another Member of the United Nations. This sense of the Article is specifi,caUy t..vident from the language of Artide 53, paragraph 1, where the ,Charter ref.ers to: .. '" measures against any enemy Sta'te... p'fovided for pursuant to Article 107... " As, one looks back 'at the recol'd at San Francisco, one sees Ilhat il was recogniz,ed that the reS'ponsibHity for 'the further pro- ~eCUjtion of the war against Japan, the makmg of the .peaœ, and for sorne pe·riod tIre control of ex~enemy States, wouM bt:. 'the primaTY task of 'the gre'at Powers. The U Vile are in agreement with the generul intention of this paragraph, thalt intention heing, in onr understanding, that the anmistice terms imposed on our enemies will he carried out strictly.., " 1 The United Staltes delegation made the point at San Francisco, in ,connexion with Article 107, tha't 'llothing should be induded in the ChaTter which would hi.nder adion against the ,enemy on the pant of the vietors in the second Wori:d War. Similarly, the re,prese'lltative of Callad'a, in Commission TTI, S'tated : ""V.e have, for instance, Ito adopt a text which will permit ,the taking of aIl necessary action against Ja'p1an by the GOVoernments directly responsible for waging the war. " 2 There \Vas an additional and also an important reasolll for the inclusion of Arlide 107 in the 'Charter, and that was the recognition of ithe need to ,prevent the exenemy States themselves from distorting thepurposes of the Charter by using if n·s an instrument to appeal to the Un1ted Nations to restrict measures taken against them by the Powers having res,pOlnsibility for 'theirconltrol. The Conference rightly decided that, during the perio~when transHiotnal sercurity arrangements were in effect, this limit<ation should he made abundantly clear, Committee 3 of Commission III vO'ted unanimously to insert the following statement in ils r.eport : "Il is understood that the enemy S'tates in tbis war shaH not have the right of recourse to the Security Council or the General Assembly hefolie 'the Securily Council grants them this rigbt. "', Thus it is applarent that there is nothing in the Charter that prevents 'Ihe Security 1 See Documents o{ the United Xation.s Cont'erence on Inte17Ultional 01'ganization, San Francisco, 1945, volUJme XI, p. 197. 3Ibid., p. 195. , Ibid., volume ~Il, p. 560. An argument might he made that the Security Council had .no jurisdiction in the case before us, if the ba'sis of the c{)Iffiplaint were action taken by the USSR Governme.ut against GN'mauy llo pl'event a renewal of German aggression. But that is not the basis ofthis case. The gravamen of the complaint which the United States, the United Kingdom ~and France have brought before the Security Council is ,the action of the Government of the Sovi,et Union taken against them and action taken a,gainst il:heir armed forces and occupation authorities and constituting a threat or use of force, AdmiHedly, the blockade which the Government of the Soviet Union ha., instituted has its locale in Ger.many, but il 'is a wea:pon employed against France, the United Kingdom and the United S'tates. Obviously, it can make no diffe:rence, so far as the jurisdiction of the Security Oouncil is concerned that the blockade is maintained in the territory of a former enCdïlY State. In their formaI communication to the Se'cretary-General of 'the United Nations, the three Governments hav,e asserted ~h;:).t the blockade meaSUl~es COLllstitute a threiUt to the 'Peace wÏ'thin the meaning of Chapter VU of ;the Charter. Under Article 24 of the Charter, w,e ,agreed - and l quote the language of 'the Charter - to "conf,er on the Se-curity Council primary responsibHity for the maintenance of international peaœ and security." 1 have no dO'ubt 'that the Security Council will reject the demand of the r'ellH.'esentative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Repuhlics that it should shrinh: from di'schargillg this l'esponsibility. .,remiplïr Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Killgdom) : A,s 1 ulnderstand it, we 'are still engaged in dlscussing whether or not ,to adopt the provisional agenda which is befo'l\C us. Objection to snch adoption has been raised hy one del'egatioll, ithe delegation of the USSR, on the ground that the SeoULrity Council Uself is not competent to diS'cusa the question raised in the identÏtc noiles from the three Gov;ernments. The representativ,e of Belgium sugges'ted, 1 think, that we could actuaUy put /the question Œl the formaI agenda and subsequently disc'U!ss the competence of1 the Security Council, and he seems to be of the opinion that tha't would he a !proper prooedure. 1 do not wish '10 pil.'olnounce myself on that Aduallv it does Hot seem ,to me to make very muèh differ- - prononcer What is dear, howev,eil.·, is that the SecUl'- Îlty Council should address itself ta 'this question of ,competence, since il has been l'laised, beforê embarking on a disoussion of the 'Substance of the matter. In the few remarks wihieh 1 p·rc_.)se ta malr,e at this stage, 1 shall try ta k(ep ta that prel'iminary questiOin of the ·competence of the Security Couneil. 1 do not neeid ta repeat a great deal that has been S1aid by the representative of the United States, with whioh 1 am in entire agreement, 'but 1 do want simply ta emphasiz,e Ollie or two points. The l"ejp,resentative of the USSR has urged with great empha,sis that tihese diffeTences are slllich as should be discussed and settled between the four Powers themselves. Without ,contesting that, l would ask what happens if they do not ag!reel? Wha,t happens if, after months of discussion and negotia.tîon, 'tbey still find themselves in disagreement ? The USSR Government maintains - and Mr. VYSihÎ'nsky has repeated it with emphasis this afternoon - tha't there i5 no bloekade of Be·rlin, that there is no thTP,at ta the peace. We disagree with that. Can bhere be no appeal ta the Security Coundl ? Mr. Vyshinsky says <. no", because of Article 107 of the Charter. 1 should, therefore, like ta say one OT' two words 'about Ithat pa·rticular Article bath as ta Hs intention, as 1 understalIld it. and as ta its intel"pl'etation. 1 do not :think tha,t 1 need ta quote the text of that A.nticle. Il has alveady been quO'ted here this afternoon. The repTe'Sentatïv,es hav,e il in mind and perthap'S under toheir eyes at ithe same time. What 1 would 'lilœ ta say is this: the sole abject of this provision which wle fiJnd in the Chai"ter, Article 107 which was based ana draft originally made at Dumba,rton Oaks while the war was in full swing, was ,ta lelave the hands of the AHied Power:> free as regards any action they might think it noecessary ta 'lake in relation ta one of thp enemy States, either in the .continualIl·ce of aClt'Ual ihostilities or as œgards !post-lhostil'ity action, snch as the oCicupa'tion of enemy temtory, the ,enfOO"cement· of tr.ansfers of territory under a ,peace treaty, exactingreparations, and sa on. But for a :provision of 'lhis kmd. much of the actioln whi~h the Allies wis'h to take regaI~dIS ,tille .ev,entuaJ lPeace treati·es or arrangements. So muc:ili for the intention of ibis Artide to whirch 1 am referring. Now let us look at ~ts actual 'tenus. lt will be seen that ,the only case that cornes under Article 107 is one of action taken - these are the words - "in relation to" an.·enemy Sbute. The USSR action, of which the "Vrestern Powers are complaining, has not however heen taken in l'elation to Genuany. It is essentially action 'tal{,en in relation to the Western Powers Ithemselves by cutting off their communications with a ,pal'~ of GenualIlY where they haVie the right to be and by latt,empting ·to deny them a:ccess to it or to ,compell their withdrawal. That the locale of this aotion is Germany and tJbal~ the population of Berlin is a:Œected by it does not suffi,ce to constitute it as ifl'Cition taken in relatiolll to Germany or to bring it und-er ATticle 107. The term used, as 1 have said, is ".. .in relation to" -not affecting or ·concerning-and in the CORtext "... in relation ,to" is dearly intended I~O mean :;tction of which the enemy State IS the ob~'ect and not merely the subj,ect, bhe occaSIon or the locale. Tihe objoect of the USSR action in HIe case of Berlin is clearly the three Western Powers and their posittion, and it is inhe~eilltly in relation to !he!ll a~d not in relat~on to Germany Ithat l~ IS bem,g taken. It Is their status, their rl~hts, not G~Im~ny's, Ithat are direoHy affected or pTeJudI-Ced by the USSR action. For these reasons, it cannot he claimed that the adiOlll of the Governmelllt' of the USSR in Berlin escap0S ,the application of the Charter, or that it is taken out of the Chart,er by A,nUde 107, since it is not at all the type of adion ·contemplated in that provision. It might he held t,hait· there is some· ambiguity about ,this Artide, and that its Scope is not absolUitely c1ear, hut the claim that it debars the Security Council from examining or discussing any action taken or authorized hy the Governments responsible for such action in Telation to an ex-enemy State is inadmissible. "Nothing ·contained in tibe present ·Charter sha11 aUithorise the United Nations to intervene in matte'l'S which al'e ,essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State... " Nothingcan. he dearer than that, but thaï is not the fOImula employ;ed in Article 107, and we ·can confidently conclude thalt the intention of Ithe Article is different from th3lt of Article 2, paragraph 7, which 1 have just quoted; that is to say, it does not debar the Security COUilcil from dealing with 'a illlaltte'l' ,sUich as that which is now submitted to il~. Therecan. be no doubt about the competence of the Security Coundl in this matter, which, therefol'e, should and mUSlt be included in the agenda for the future discussion of tthe substance of the question. The PRESIDENT {tnanslated from 5panish): 1 have' on my list of those wishing to speak the representatives of Syria and of F:rance. But since il is 'late a1ud representattiVies are probably tired, we might now adjourn, if Hlel'e are no objections, until tomorrow at 3 1P·m. The meeting rose al 6.35 p.m. AUSTRALJA-AUsrRAUI H. A. Goddard Pty. Ltd. 255a ('.eorge Street SYDNEY"N.·S; W~ FINLAND-IINUNDE Akateeminen 2, Keakuskatu HELSINKI IE1GIUM-8ELGIQUI Agence et Messagerie. de 1. Presse. S.' A. . 14-22 rue du Penil BRUXELLES nANCE Edition. A. ]3, rue Soumot PARIS. V· GREECE-GRECE "EJeftheroudakï.'" Librairie internationale Place' de la ATHÈNES IOLiVIA--IOUVIE Libreria Cientific:a , Literaria , Avenida ]6 de Julio, 216 Casilla 972 LA PAZ GUATEMALA José Coubaud Goubaud &"Cia. SucelOr Sa Av. 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