S/PV.362 Security Council

In accordance wHh the wishes expressed by the representatives of the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States, flfom now on, there will be no consecutive interpretation into English at meetings concerned with .the discussion of this question. Ml'. EL-KHOURI (Syria) : \Ve spent more than three hours yesterday [361st meeting] discussing the substance of the question without adopting our agenda. If 1 remember rightly, the Ifepresentative of Belgium raised a point of order yesterday, in which he asked the President to submit first of aIl, to the Coundl, the adÛ'p'tion of the agenda. Rule 30 of the ,provisional rules of procedure reads as follows : "If a repil'eSellitative raises a point of arder, the President sh:<ll immediately state his ruling. If it is challenged, the President shall submH his ruling to the Security Council for immediate decision ~nd i.t shall stand unless overruled." bilitéd'ex,ercer, soulever l';erreur. ou n'exdut d'incompetence, des lorsqu'il vant compétent est question autres, n'avais discussion été que faveur Bien-plus, This is a question which has not arisen in the Security Council before. 1 do not remember any occasion in the course of our aetivities in this Council when a similar case concerned wHh competence and the adoption of the agenda presented itself. AHhough the Security Council's ways of procedur,e and voting are exceptional, this matter is not clear in our rules of procedure. However, if we consult the regulaotions of aIl the other similar depall'tments or organs, we find that the adoption of the agenda does not preclude discussion or contentions against 'the competence of the organ in a particular respect. The adoption of the agenda means the rece,ption of a cer.tain case to be put before the Security Conncil or befoll'e a court. In 'the courts of justice they accept the case, they discuss it, and then the defendant has the full right ta l'aise ,the question of competence and to OJlpose the competence of the court. Then the court deddes whether or not it was competent, but only af'ter being seized of the case and having placed it under discussion. If Ml'. Vyshinsky thought that the adoption of the agenda would preclude his right of o,pposing the competence of the Coundl, 1 do not think he would he correct. 1 believe -and 1 do not know whether or not 1 am right-that the adoption of the agenda does not -preclude the right of challenging competence, and thl:lt competence is one of the firs! contention!:; to be raised by the defendant when he believes that the court or the organ before which 'the case is presented is not competent -to deal with il. Then a decision should be itaken accordingly. The whole discussion yestl;rday was on the question of competence, it was centered upon Article 107 and other Articles of the Charter. 1 did not intend to take parot in that discussion until 'the agenda had been adopted, but now 1 see that most of -the arguments against or in favour of I3z,m,petence have been presented. In addition these arguments have been widely and fully As 1 have already been given permission ta do so, 1 should also like to speak, as the other representatives have done, sa as to express my views regarding the competence of the Security 'Counci1 on ,this' question. If we agree that we are competent ta discuss this matter, it does not mean'that we decide that there is a ,threat ta the peace or that there is no threat to the peace, or whether the USSR or other na lions are responsible for Ït. That is a matter :to he discussed subsequently, after the matier of competence has been solved. The first matter to be decided by the Security Council is the maHer of the competence of :the Council. After we have proved that we are competent, and aner we have voted on that, then we can pass on ta the other detailed questions. Article 107 of ,the Charter, which has been quoted here, states: "Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action"-action as it is defined here-"in relation to any Sta.te which during the Second World Wax has been an enemy of any signatory ta the present Charter..," Here we have to examine the present situa'tÏon, the blockade, which is the basis of .the accusations. Is the hlockade enforced on part of the city of Berlin? Is that acdon considered as being taken against Germany? 01'-1 go furthex-is it against the inhabitants of Berlin? If the \VeSîtern Powers, the United States and the United Kingdom, were not in Berlin, would the USSR have enforced this blockade on the inhabitallots of Germany? 1 consider that this blockade is neither against Germany nor against a part of the inhabitants of Berlin. It is made in op,position ta the other partners in the occupation of .the city of Berlin. There are ·people, individuals belonging ta the allied Powers in Berlin, besides the inhabitants of Berlin, and the blocka·de includes them aIl. Itis a political affair against the Allies, and the Allies are opposing il for the sake of :their responsibility in that State. Further, Article 107 goes on mentioning action "taken or authorized as the result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for snch action." 1 shall consider 1have heard other arguments concerning the violation of agreements entèred into at Potsdam and elsewhere, but that is another matter which should be considered separately. For the time being 1 am restricting myself to the question of A'1'ticle 107, and the analysis which 1 have given isinfended to show why 1 am unable to see how this bloekade can be considered to be recond- Hable and in harmony with that Article-as if the USSR had authoritv to take such action. The other as,pect or" the question as 1have said, will be dealt with later during the development of ,the discussion as to whether Article 107 applies in this case. My personal opinion is that it does not. That is aIl 1 have to sayat this stage.

It would first of aIl appea!l' desirable to consider and elucidate the remarks which have been made. Indeed it is laid -down in the first dause of rule 30 that the President shaH state his ruling on any point of order raised by a representative. My reason fo!l' not immediately stating my ruling on the .point raised by the representative of Belgium was that, while he mentioned a ·point of order, he did not put it into concrete form. He merely used formaI arguments which we aIl unde!l'- stand and fully appreciate but upon which 1eannot take a decision as if il were a definite motion. That is what 1 have to say with regard to the stll'ict application of rule 30. 1 should, however, like to point out here that in a discussion of this character and scope, where universal intexests are at stake, hard and fast rules cf this kind which restrict the freedom of ex,pression of members of the SecurHy Council cannot be applied. If no ·representative has any observations to make, 1 shaH put the first item, namely, the ado,ption of the agenda, to the vote. 1 caU upon the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Ml'. VYSHINSKY (Vnion of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian) : In his statement yesterday [361st meeting], the United States representative repeated the ahsurd accusations about the so-called Berlin blockade, the coercive measures aUegedly taken in Bel'>lin by the USSR authorities, and so forth. Yesterday we cited a series of facts-and faets, of course, speak louder than words-which proved that no blocka-de was being enforced in Berlin by the USSR authorities, :that there was no threat of starvation, that the situation, in fact, W,RS not in the least as the Unîted States representative tried so hard to describe it yesterday. IncidentaUy, he was so carried away as to state that the USSR itself admitted that the Berlin blockade represented a retaliationas .Ml'. Jessup said-for the measures taken by the Western Powers in the western zone of Geormany. That, of course, is Jlure fabrication. AlI such unfounded and irresponsible statements-often ascribed ,to representatives of the USSR, who have said or done nothing of the kind-are in effect dishonest propaganda used to achieve certain ends and bearing no relation to any aHempt to settle various questions yet unsolved. The specific nature of the speech made yest&day,by the United States representative should therefore be clear to every Llnbiassed person. The Government of ,the USSR has already given a convincing reply to these absurd and unfounded allegations in ils note of 3 October; consequently, 1 see no need -to dwell any longer on this question and to restate what must be regarded as estahlished faets. The most important part of Ml'. Jessup's speech yesterday was Ithaï part in which he attempted to prove, by citing Article 107 of the ,Charter, that it was tProper to 'put the Berlin question before the Security CouncH. .Jnasmuch 'Us the inmators ofthat proposaI lacked sufficiently convincing arguments-as was made plain yesterday by the in view of the singularly short memories of .my opponenls, 1 am obliged once more, ta remind them of a se:ries of international agreements concluded in London. 1 have in mind the agreed decisions reac:P..ed by the Advisory Commission for Europe, in 1945, hefore the defeat of Germany. 1 also have in mind the decisions taken at Yalta and Potsdam: historie decisions which determined the basic economic and political principles of the great Powers in regard to Germany throughout the period following the latter's unconditional surrender. Furthermme 1 have in mind a number of agreements concluded, in Berlin,by the four Powers on the occU'pa:tion of the differ~ ent zones of Germany;mçw~Uasa number of other internatirmal agreements which irrefutably establish the faet that questions of post-warpeaceful seUlement with Germany fall within the competence of the Council of Foreign Ministers. These international agreements were arrived at by the three great Powers and later by five, when France and China joined the.m, as in the case of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements. It should be added that ,the ,Council of Foreign Ministers is itself an instrument for the maintenance of peace and security. The line of demarcation between its competence and that of the Security Council is quite differenf from that indlcated by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom. To say that one of these organs is an instrument for the maintenance .of peace and securityand the other 1 should mention also that besides the Council of Foreign 'Ministe,rs, ,the qüadripartite control macl1inery set ~p for Germany is alsQ an instrument for the maintenance of peace and security. 1 should like to recall that in the "Declaration ,regarding the defeat of Ge~many" and the assumption by the four occupying Powers of the responsibility for the gcvemment of Germany, signed by the four gr';~a,t Powel's in May 1945, it is stated plainly that with the assumption of the supreme authority in Germany, the Governments of the USSR, the United KineJom, the United Sta/tes and France, in accordance with the obligations undertaken by them, will take the necessa,ry measures, including measures for the complete disarmament and demili.tarization of Germany (and may 1 mention here that they are most important and effective oues) in order that in future ,people should he filled with aversion against ,the possibility of German aggression and to ensure the peace and security of nations. In the "Declaration regarding the defeat of Gerrnany" it is stated that these four Powers shaH take such measures in Germany -as they consider necessary for the mainten.ance of peace and secl1rity. Surely that i8 sufficient basis for the contention of the USSR delegation that the Council of Foreign Ministers is also an instrument for the maintenance of peace and security, and that /to contrast it in that sense with the Security CounciI would be unjustified :and a gross distortion of the l'eal state of affairs, as weIl as the politieal nature of ,the two organs and of the legal foundations upon whïch it rests. Those foundations are the greatest historical documents of our times - the international agreements of the four Powers known as the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements and the other quadripartite decisions concerning Germany. In spite of aIl fuis, the audacious statcment is made here ,that the USSR is reÎusing to admit the possibility of settling· thÏf; question and is rej ecting the machinery of peaceful seUlement. I.t should be clear from what 1 have said that, at least in so far as Germany is concerned, s,pecial quadripartite organs - the que The meaning of Article 107 of the Charter is p1"ecisely that questions of the postwar peaceful seUlement in Germany, questions coneerning the government of Germany, and aIl other related questions, fall witbin the ·competence of those quaddpartHe organs: the Control Coundl for Germanyand the Council of Foreign Ministers. Those who hav·e damaged these organs, who have disrupted their normal aetivity and who are possibly bent on .destroyingthem altogether, must hear the re.sponsibility for refusing to fulfil their international obligation to use these organs as instruments for 'peaœ and security in Germany. This should he aIl the easier .10 understand when it is remembered that the Security CouIlcil has quite a few other tasks with which it has so far, unfortunately, not yet coped, which bem an even closer relation to its function of maintaining peace and security. There is the Indonesian question, the Palestine question, the Greek question, e.te. Surely memberr of the Se-curi.ty Council have enough to do and to worry about in the field of maintaining peace and securily without - to the detrim 'ht of their direct obliga.tion's -- taking upon themselves to deal with questions for the solution of which spedal organs and special regulations hav,e been created 'and which l'est on international agreements as important as those which form the ,cornerstone of the United Nations Charter; both the Brst and the second l'est upon agreement between the five great Powers, without which co-opera1tion in any internationnl organization is impossible. lève qui nales quelles conclnes sans impossi1ble tionales. Sir Alexander Cadogan, in his speech yesterday, declared that Article 107 was rather ambi,guous and that ils scope w~s not clear at fi·rst glance. It shoulcl be recognized. however, that Sir Alexande'l."s second and ,third glances brought no claritv intervenu il sentait contenu faut vations Cadogan coup son t~ the situation. As a matter of fact, his vle~s ,cannot be accepted at aIl, because ArtIcle 107 is very dear - 1 would sav. absolutely c1ear. There is no need for ariy Nevertheless, as the point was raised at yesterday's meeting, 1 too feel obliged to furnish certain information, which muy shed another ray 01 1ight on the subject. am doing it for the benefit of those who iind the question lacking in clarity. 1 would refer to the statement made by the Canadian representative in Committee III at San Francisco. He stressed the fad that no one could doubt the need for collective action on the Ipart of the four Powers during the interim period. He further emphasized that the language of 'the second ,paragraph of Chapter XII of the dr3ft 'Charter of the United Nations, which then bore the provisional title l"f International Security Organization, was so broad - 1 am quoting the Canadian representative ward for word - as to enable any action relating to the surrender terms and the -peace treaties to be !l"emoved from ,the scope of the Or.ganization for an indcfinite period. ;1 can even refer to the statement of 'the United Sta,tes representative in the same Committee, in which he pointed out with respect to paragraph 2 of Chaipter XII, thal the Organisation had no responsibility in respect to surrender terms or :peace settlements. AlI that is perfectly understandable since that responsibility is borne primarHy by the five great Powers, by the Council of Foreign Ministers, which was set üp precisl~ly for the purpose of effecting peaceful seUlement wi:th ex-enemycountries ; it is thus that Article 107 should he understood. We may be told: "Very weIl, that is what representatives said at San Francisco" - not only the Australian representative who was cited yesterday and whose words 1 treated with aIl due respect, but also the United St~tes and Canadian representatives, whom 1 meniioned today. We may be told that there is no peace freaty with Ge:rmany, yet the USSR has constantly insisted, a~ it did at the session of the Council of FOI'ei,gn Ministers in London - which was artifiCially interrupted, which aIl will rememher - that this trel:lty should be concluded as saon as possible, whereas the three Western Powers wish to 'Substitute astate of occupation for a peace treaty. . ln bis interpreltation of Article 107, Sil' Alexander Cadogan went so far as to say that the expression" in relation to any State which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the :present Charter" was to he interpreted so tha,t the words: c'in relation to" should mean an action of which the enemy Stafe is the object and not, as he said, merely the locale. 1 am very glad to see that Sir Alexander Cadogan has kindly nodded to con:firm my interpretation of his sentence. 1 must admit 1 did not come to that interpretation immediately, as the English text we received was extremely confused at this point and we had ta ask the interpreters to clarify Sir Alexander Cadog~n's ex,tremely confused and vague interpretation of thi~ .very important matter. From this ;point, both opponents - Sir Alexander Cadogan and Ml'. Jessup - come to t.lteconclusion that since Germany is not the ohject of such actions as may h~ discussedj by the Security Council but merely the scene of adion, Artide 107 has no relation to ,the case under discussion. The same thought has also been expressed by the representative of Syria'; speakin.q about the concrete case of the so-called hlockade - thai mythical story that has heen put into circulation for epecific PUl'- poses - he said that the blockade was directed not against Germany but against !heother occupying ;powers and that, consequently, Article 107 was not applicahle But here we have the Tossoev case: a USSR colonel was kidnapped by British and United States occupation authorÏ.ties -and it was just one of those cases that have no relation ,at aIl ta Ar:ticle 107. Ta l'efer ta this Article 107, aIthough the incident took place in Germany, would be completely absurd and nonsensical. Perhaps this example may make our ,position clearer. B!.~l. when we talk of a currency reform carried out in Germany by unilateral' aelion, how can it he said that that in no way concerus Germany - that it is taking place somewhere in the ether, under -conditionsthat have no real :'\ignificance for Germany a,t aIl ? Is il l'eally true that aIl ithese unilateral measures, which, ,by the way, are in contra~iction with agreed deeisions taken under international agreements concluded between the four Powers, have no relation whatever ta Germany and in such cases that Germany is merely the scene of action? We must remember that the adions in question are the implementation of decisions taken in London during Fehruary and Mar-ch by 'fhe three Gov,ernments which assumed the l'ole of a Council of FOl"oeign Ministers for Germany. The three Western Governments are carrying out a S'eparate currency reform in Germany. They are taking equipment out of Be1"lin, despite aIl Il would be strange and nonsensica,l therefore to assert that such measures are merely Anglo-Franco-American measures bearing no relation to Germany. Il would be absurd to assert -that the counter-measures and the proteetive and defensive measures which ·the LSSR militarv authorilies were thus forceo totake in the Soviet Occupation Zone in Germany concern only the occupation authorities and bear no relation ta Germany. Consequentlyany attempt made to undermine Berlin's economy by means of -a separate currency reform - since there obviously cannat be two or three different, ourrencies in the same dtv - must, in faet, _lead to economic chaos and disorganization. Now, when such attempts are heing made ta disorganize the economy of Berlin and hence to undermine the economy of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, it is said thai ~he steps taken to proteet that economy and ta localize dangerous and evil consequences are direeted against the other occupation authorities and bear no relation to C~r­ many. It is of course difficult ta f.:{0 further in tha,t kind of sophism, althou~h 1 do know that there are sorne who would carrv their fallacious arguments beyond the pif· lars of Hercules. Article 107 speaks of action by Governments having a res.ponsibility in relation to a former enemy State. It stipulates that the Cha.rter of the United Nations does noi invalidate action taken by Governments having responsibilit: for such action anll which is in relaltion to any ex-enemy State of the Second World War. The actual state Even if we take up your position, thal of those who maintain that this matter constitutes a threat to peace and security, it would be aIl the moreapparent that it is connected with the problem of a peaceful seUlement for Germany because it concerns Germany as a' whole and not only ils territory. In this matter, H is essential to folJow .a legal course, and we, the Soviet representatives, and the Soviet Govermnent consider that such a course would be to refer the question to the 'Council of Foreign Ministers. We are told that the four Powers have been unahle to agree on anything unHl now. Now 1 ask you - and 1 put my question with aIl the more justification as those who make this assertion object to the Berlin question being linked up with the German problem as a whole - to be kind enoup,h to tell me when and where did the Couneil of, Foreign Ministers study the Berlin question ? Will you who have raised the question of Berlin be good enough to show me a document, mention a date, or name those present and tell me of the sub}ect, and the decisions, if any, taken by the Councila:t any discussion of the Berolin question. 1 maintain tbat no one has examined the qu.estîon. There have been negotiations in Moscow which were conducted on one side by Ml'. Bevin's representative, M:r. Roberts, the United States Ambassador in Moscow, Mr. Smith, and the French Ambassador, Mr. ChMaigneau. These th:ree gentlemen have stated - and incidentally this was reflected in the note subm.itted by the three Governments on 26 September - that the negotiations in Moscow were no more th,m an •• informaI discussion". Moreover, Ml'. Roberts 'has 'even indicafed that if in the future i:t becomes 'possible to open up negotiations in Moscow and thus open u~p tl1e way to new conversations, the conduct of such negotiations would Iikely beentrusted to someone of higher and more responsihle 'rank than himself. The United When attempts are again being made to circumvent the Council of Foreign Ministers and to include this question forthwith in ,the agenda of the Secu:dty Council, 1 must say that 1 view such haste with great suspJcion. Of course, the future will sbow the real reasons for this haste. But faets ,remain facts. The situation with which we are faced now is that a legal organ established by interna.tiona,l agreements signed hy the four great Powers, namely the Council of Foreign Ministers, is being ignored. The pretext is tha,t negotiations have led nowhere and that this question should, therefore, be referred to the Security Couneil. But that is not so, since the argument is false. There have been no such negotiations in the ,Council Foreign Ministers. There have ouly heen preliminary discussiuns - an informaI discussion - in Moscow. The Council of Foreign Ministers has not had its say. There are sorne who do not want to hear what :the CouncH has to say and who are now all intent on passing this question on to the SecuJ'Ïty Council. Are we then not justified in saying thaï We are faced with sorne kind of politien1 gaille the aims of which have nothing in common with any real desire to settle the I repeat that in view of the arbove-mentioned considerations the USSR Government considers it impossible and incorrect to include the Berlin question on ,the agenda of the Security Council und I have been empowered 'ta abject to such a decision. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated from French): Ml'. President, a few moments a.go you gave your decision with regard ,ta the remarks I made yesterday [361st meeting] on a point of order. I nm quite willing ta bow to your decision. I recognize the fact that I did not insist that you should rule on the ,point 1 had raised. May I be allowed ta point out, neverthe- Jess, that events haveshown that my comments on the arder of our work were well-founded? The Security Council has engaged itself in a discussion of the Berlin question without waiting until 'thai question was inclnded in the agenda. It has been said that il was not 10gical ,to adopt the agenda without kn'Owing whether the Council was competent to discuss the item proposed for the agenda. I wonder whether il is really more logical to spend ,two meetings ·discussing a question which is not even on the agenàa. 1 wonder what is the use of having an agenda in this case, imd whethe,r it wouM not be easier ~to do without one in future? ls it not a deniaI of common sense to :prolong the fiction that a ques-tion is not on the agenda when two meetings have already been devoted to the discussion of that very item? But these are questions of method which are relatively secondary ta the matter which has been brought before us. Since the question of competence is actuaHy under discussion, I, in turn, intend to outline the position of my delegation on this question. . The ,principal ar.gument which has been advanced against the >competence of the Council has been based on Article 107 of Y:esterday, and again foday in the brilliant speech which he has just made, Ml'. Vyshinsky has op,posed the competence of the Governments :responsible for the occupa/lion of Germany and ,the competence of the Council of Foreign Ministers to the competence of the Secui"ity Council. In order ,to contest thecompet·ence of the Security ·Council~ he has recalled agree,.. ments between the Governments responsi'ble for the occupation of Germany. 1 do not think Ithat such an argument can he defended. In princ~ple, there are no exce,ptions to the competence of the Council other than those set forth in the Charter iJtself, that is to say, 'provisions which apply to aIl Memlber States. The Charter is a collective treaty, concluded for the purpose oÏ safegual'ding the peace, a matter which concerns international public lawand order among the signatory States. !ts operation cannot be obstructed by the workings of private agreements, except where the Charter itseli may have ;provided for such action hy 'private treatie.s. It has not been proved, however, that such is the case before us, and that the competence of the Security Council should thus be denied. In the past, members of the Security Council and, if my memorydoes not fail me, in particular the representative of the USSR, have reproached other memlbers for dealing withcer.tain international questions without regard to the competent organs of the United Nations. l do not think it is necessary to s~.y anything more at this time. For the reasons which 1 have just indicated, the Belgian delegatïon ·approves the agenda and considers .that the Council is competent to deal with the questions inscribed thereon.

l shall now submit for decision by the CouncH the apiproval of the first item, namely the adO,ption of the agenda. Before we vote, however, as the representative of Argentina, l should like to give very briefly the reasons for my vote. Mydelegation has examined with great interest the ,provisions and rules dealing with the a.genda and its adoption. These areexpressly laid doWlll in rule 6 of the provisional rules of procedure and in l'nIes 7, 8 and 9, which mus.t be considered in that order as they are closely interrelated. There is .perhaps no need for me to recall these provisions to members of th'e Council for ,they know them well ; it might be appropriate, however, tha,t l should read them for the benefit of the ·public; l shaH do so with that aim in view and, of course, not to acquaint the members of the Council of ,them. Rule 6 is as foHows: "The Secretary- General shall immediatelybring to the attention of -all representatives on the Security Council all communications from States, organs of the United Na:tions, or the Secretary-General concerning any matter for the consideration of the Seourity Council in accordance with the provisions of the ICharter." Rule 7 pœscribes who is .10 prepare the agenda. It reads as follows: "The provisional agenda for each meeting of the Security rCouncil shall be drawn u:pby the Secretary-General and approved by the President of the Security Council. "Only items which have been ibrought to the attention of the representatives on the Security Council in accordance with rule 6, items covered by rule 10, or roatters which :the Security Council has previouSlly decided to defer, may he included in the porovisional agenda." The text of these pï'ovisions can be interpreted lHeraHy and theyare so clear in the,msel'Ves tha't it is unnecessary ,to elaborate them 50 as to understand the exact meaning. They show in a definite manner that it is not necessary to refer to other provisions so as to c1arify aH the probl,ems connected \Vith the adop:fion of the agenda. With aH res:pect to members who may hold different views, l affirni that these rules c1early express wha! is to be understood by a'n agenda. How should the Security Council approach ihis ·question of approving the agenda? Should il regard ,the matter from a procedural point of view, or should it base its judgment on questions of substance, competence and j urisdiction, questions which are aIl almost a'bsolutely distinct from each other and ·entirely separate in public law? In eff.eet, aIl those questions conneeted with external procedure must be taken into account, tha,t is to say, the items should fust he submitted, and then communicated to aIl members of the Security Couneil, and ,the particular agenda should be drawn up by the Secretary-General, approved by the P,r,esident, and communicated to members of the .Council. The delegation of Argentina is of the opinion that these formaI aspects of the agenda have been duly complied with, and that there is no need to refer to questions of competence, jurisdietion or substance in order to deeide whether ,the agenda should be approved or r-eJeeted. The Argentine delegation wiIJ accordingly vote for the a.doption of the 'agenda, it heing understood, however, that by this vote i.t does not express any opinion on com.petence, jurisdiction, or substance of the matter. l shaH now ;put the first item to the vote. 1 shall ask the reptl'esentatives, as soon as the interpretation is over, to raise their hands if they are in favour of adoption. A vote was t(Jken by shaw of hands. .The agenda was adO'pted by 9 votes ta 2. Ml'. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Soeialist Republics) (translated from Russian): ln connexion with the deeision which has just been ado;p,ted by the majority of the SecurityCouncil to include the Berlin question on ils agenda, the USSR delegation considers itessential to make the following statement. In Hs note of 3 Odober the Goyernrnent of the USSR pointed out that the statement of the Governments of the United States of America, the Uni,ted Kingdom and France to the effect that the situation which had arisen in Berlin constituted a lhreat to peace and securi,ty, was without any foundation whatsoev,er. In its note, the Government of the USSR pointed out that the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France l1ad ignored their obligation to submit contentions questions ,regardiug Germany and Berlin ,to the Council of Foreign Ministers, the body competen t to settle such ,questions. For its .part, the delegation of the USSH has, at yesterday's and today's meetings, outlined its objections against the inclusion of the Berlin question on the agenda of the Security Couneil. The delegation of the USSR states on behalf of the USSR Government that the inclusion of this question in the Se·curHy Council's agenda, by a majority of the Couneil, represents a violation of Artide 107 according to which such a question is to be resolved by the Governr'l1,enls having responsibility for the occupation of Germany and cannot be refe,rred. 'to the Security Couneil. ln view of theabove considerations the delegation of the USSR declares that it will not ,take part in the discussion of the'Berlin question in 'the Security Couneil. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America): 1 simply want to state, in view of the fact that 1 had asked ,the President to inscribe my name on his list of s;peakers, that in view of the consideration he has stated, 1 am quite prepared to accept his suggestion that 1 should speak in the morning instead ofnow. 15 est

1 have already suggested thult the meeting should now adjourn and that we should meet twice tomorrow, from 10.30 to 12 in the moming, if the representatives agree, and again from 3 to 6 in the afternoon. Since there is no objection, the pro- ,posaI is approved. The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m. AUSTRALIA-AUSTRAUE H. A. Goddard Ply. Ltd. 255a George Street SYDNEY. N. S. W. FINLAND-FINLANDE Akateeminen 2, Keskuskatu HELSINKI 8.J.GIUM-BELGIQUE Ag~ce et Messageries de la Presse. S. A. 14-22 rue du Persil BRuxnLEs fiANCE Editions A. PèdOlle 13, rue Soumet PARIS. V· GREECE-GRECE "Elehheroudakis" J,.ibrairie internationale Place de la ConstitutioD. ATHÈNES BOLIVIA--80UVIE Libreria Cientifica , Literarh Avenida 16 de luliQ.216 Casilla 972 L., PAZ ÇUATEMALA José Goubaud' Goubaud 8: Ciao Sucelior 5a Av. Sur No. GUATEMALA CANADA The Ryerson Pres!' 299 Queen SUcél West TORONTO CHILE-CHIU Edmundo Pizarro .' Metced-846 SAN.TtA,CO "HAITI Max Bouchereau Librairie-l'A la Boiie postale PORT-AV·PRINCE CHINA-eHINE' The Commercial Press ltd.. 211 Honan Road SHANGHAI "NOIA-INDE Oxford' Book Scindia House NEW DELHI COlOMOIA--(OLOMIIE Libreria Latîna Ltda; . Apar.tado Aêreo 4011 BOGOT" IRAN Bongahe Piaderow' 731 Shah Avenue TtHERAN -COSTA·RICA...:...cOSTA-RICA Trejos l;Iermanos . Apartado1313 SAN JosÉ . -' IRAQ-IRAK Mackenzie & The Bookshop BAGHDAD CUBA La Casa'· Belt!4 René deSr!lftdt O'Remy 455 "LA.HABA~A . UBANON-lISAN Librairie tmivèmiello' - BEYROUTH ~ÇMOS10VAK.A...;"o;, TCHECOSLOVAQU1E F. 'foJliê_ . '.' . NatoanrTrida9 lUXEMBOURG Librairie J.Scbwnmer Place GuiUa'ume PRA1I.~1 1.~~"EMBOll~G NETHERLAND5-PAYS-SAS N. V. Martin LangeVoorhout9 S·GRAVENHAGE DENtMRfC"":':OANEMARK. ··Einar Munskgaard . Nûrregade6 KJOBENHM"N OOMINICANIlEPUBUe- .RE'UBUQUE.·l)OMIN,CAINE Libreda '. Domirdeafla " ... caI1e.Mercedes..No.49 Apartado .•~. '-iWDAD 'IauJauO 'NEWZEALANo- NOUVEUE·ZELANDE Gordoo&Gotch, Waring. TayloI Wt;LtINCTON •..rCUÂDQR·•• EQUArEUIl ..,' .MUÎitlZ HennMt0!yÇia., NICARAGUA ;~Jtamiro nlimtrezV. Agçoda d~. PublicllCiollel, Nueyede.·Qctl,l~r~·70~( CasilIa .• 10·2~ .... CVAYAQt11f...• '. .MUAtu~, D.~..