S/PV.364 Security Council

There wiII be nocollsecutive interpretation into F'.rench or into English unless one of Ihe representativ,es concerncd asks for il. As 'Ihe representatives of Ihe United Kingdom and France are inscribed on my list of speakers and aoS it is now 12.10 p.m. the meeting will adjourn unlH 3 o'clock this afternoon. THREE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FOURTH MEETINe Reld at tlze Palais de Chaillot. Paris, on Wedne:sday, 6 oclober 194.8, at 3 p.m. President: Ml'. Juan ALilio BRAl\wGLlA (Argentine) . Present: The repre8'entafives of the fol- lowing countries : Argentiua, Belgium, Ca- nada, China, Colombia, France, Syria, Ukrai'nJan Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United King- dom, United States of America. 4, COi'ltinuation of the discussion on identic ;" l'notifications dated 29 September 1948 trom the Covernments of the french Republic, the United States of America ~: and the United Kingdom to the Secretary ~:Ceneral (5/1020 and S/1020jAdd. 1). Sir Alexander CADOGAN (UnHed King- dom)': The Security Councn has heard, this morning, the represel1't'ative of the United StateJs sp'eaking in regard to the dangerou8' situaHon which has been 1 \Vish to endorse fully in aIl respects wha t the represell'tative of the United States has said and to declare on behalf of mv Government .also tha'l, in our view, this action is in conflict with the rights of His Majesty's Government in the Uni,ted Ki'I1.g- dom with regal,d ·to the occupation and adminiSllration of Berlh This is not the principalreason why mu Governments have broughl the Berlin situation before the Security Council. The :main rea80n why they have done this is that the unilateral aclion of the Governmell't of the USSR which is contrary ItO ils obligations under Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations Cl'eates a threat '10 the peace within the mea'n.ing of Chapte!' VII of Ilhe Charter. 1 want to emphasize at -the outset of my remarks the simplicHy of the issue which we ·are presenting to the Security Council. The Gove:rnme'l1t of the USSR has resorted to illegal and foœible measures in order to asserl its will in Berlin, That is something which -cannot be jusilified. Technical argu- ment-s about CUl're'ncy, and allegations that the United Kingdom, Uni,ted States an(l Fl'ench Governments have, by theil' actions, invalidated 'their juridical rights in Berlin may beput forwal'd to cloud the issue. They are beside the point. Atlempts may also be made to persuade memhers of the Security Council that the 'Ves'tern Powers should :negotiate, both as regards their aotions and their rights -and as regard-s the Berlin situation, under the duress and pres- sure of 'the blockade. This is unacc-eptable because il would he equivalent 1'0 admitting the justification of the blockade and aecept- ing i,ts use by the Government of the USSR as a hargaining weapon; it is predsely of 'Ihe 'blockade which His Majesty's Govern- ment colll!plains, and there can be 110 negotiations under the conditions of duress which il creates. The position of His Majesty'sGovernment as an 'OCCUpyÏ'll,g Powel' in Berlin is exactly ,the same -as, and no better 'Und no worse. than that of any of the olher three occupying Powers. Before- and after the unconditional surrender of Germany, in 1945, the Governanents of the United King- dom, the United States, France and the USSR entered into agreements rela'ting to the subdivision of Germany into four zones of oocup-ation, and of the; City of Berlin into fOUIr ·sectors.These agreements pla.ced Ithe 1'11, discharging these fUllClliollS, the British authorities have elljoyed access to and from Berlin by land, waller und in the air. This right of access is inherenl in the status which His Maj-esty'sGovernmen:l possesses as regards the British sector in Berlin laud the administration of the City of Bel'lin as a whoJe. lit was and il is necessury to 'lhe full enjoYIUe'11t of His Majes.ly's Government's rights as an occupying Power and to the proper discharge of its .duties· and rcspons- ibilities, from which il logically flows. ln Mar.ch of this year, 1948, the GoV'ern- me'1lI1 of the USSR embarked upon a S'eries of measures which hav:e ·culminated in the im:position. of the blockade measures to which l'eference ha's already been made. On 20 Marcl1 1948, the Soviet Military Governor walk.~d out of a meeting of the AHied Control Council, which was thc body ,estabUshed by ,the four-Power Agreement for the administraition of Germany as fi whole. No m~etings have been held sinc,e that date. On 30 March the Soviet D-eputy Military Governor informed his ,thl'ee coUe,agues that supplementary regulations governing traffie by rail and road between Berlin and the Western Zones qf Occupation would he imposed on the following day. From 1 April BrHish and United Sta't,es .passen.ger trains were stopp'ed and l'efused ,a,dmission to the Soviet Zone because ·they had not .complied with these new USSR regulations. . serait Between that dalte and 15 June the USSR authoxilies in Germany interfered repeat- 'edly and ,on an ever-inCl'06asing scaH~; wHh the communications hy road, rail and water between the Western Zones of Oceup,ation and Be:rlin. Oppressive regulations were made re.gardïng the documentation of both persans and goods traveJling by road, l'ail und water.. Railway waggons wel.'e turned back in Jarge numbers on the pretence that they wel'e unsa~e. Traffic on the Autobahn between Ithe British Zone and Berlin was se~e['06ly impeded by the closing of the brl·dge OVeT the Elbe, and an o:ff.er by thé At 'Ihis point, 1 would like to remin,d the Security Council that the Government of the USSR has put fOl'ward varying and inconsistent reasons for these reslrictions on transpoflt and communications between Berlin and Western Germany. They have alleged that these restrictions were neces- Sitated by what lthey caHed .. technical difficulties" and aUernatively ,that they \Vere what they called "defensive .. against conditions created by the currency reform carried out in Western Germany and in the western sector· of Berlin. The restrictive measures \Vhich 1 have already described we're, ho\Vever, imposed by the USSR authorities before any action was Laken by the otIler three occupying Powers to intro- ducecu:rrency reform either in Western Germany or in the western sector of Berlin. The Govcrnment of the USSR itself cO'n,tiuued to use the pretext that teclmical difficulHes \Vere causing new restrictions aner the introduction of currency refonn in Western Germany. Indeed events have shown tbat ea,ch new l'estriction w,a's part of a deliherate coercive plan ratber than tbe !l'esult of genuine technical difficulties. 1 may add that, to support their case, the USSR aUithorities have also ,thrown out allegations that certain new restrictions \Vere necessary because the Wes.tern oc- cupying Powers bad been removing large quantities of industrial equipment from BerJiin to Western Germany. Theseal1ega- tions are unfounded. On 16 June 1948, ,the day after the bridge over the Elbe was closed, the delegation of the USSR walked out of the Kommandatura in Berlin. Owing to the intransigence of the USSR authorities in GeTmany, the B'1:'itish, United States and French authorities had not been able to l'eachagreement for a reformed CUl'· rency throughout Germany as a whole, tbe desirability of which was admitted by aIl four Powers. Accordingly, on 18 June, the tbree Western occUiPying Powe:rs announced Ithat the currency of rthe Ithree WesteJrn Zo- nes woU'ld he ooformed and th-at a new cur- rency would be issued in the pla,ce of thart which had eXisted hitherlo. The USSR authorities thereupon imposeJd a total blockade on aIl remaining com- munications by; land and wateT hetween Berlin and Western Germany. As regards rail rtraffic rthe USSR Military Governor at The USSR authorities, having refused to agree to four-Power cOll/trol over a reform- ed Berlin currency, announced reform for the Soviet Zone which expressly provided for Hs application to the whole city of Berlin. On. 23 June, General Robel,tson wrote to Marshal Sokolovsky and stated again, 1 quote his letter : " 1 was and ·am prepal'ed to .consider any reaBonable arrangements for the use of a single curl'ency in Berlin under quadri- partite -control not exc!udi'll.g the possibmty of this being the same as that in use in your zone n. Genel'al Robe:rtson pointed out, howev·er, that it was iDl!P0ssible for him ,to aoCCept .the position created by the action of ,the USSR. In order to prote,ct their co-equal position as occupying Powers in Berlin, Ithe British, Uni'ted States and French authorHies, on 25 June, inliroduced a refo~ currency into the western sectors of Berlin which was linkred to that which had been introduced a few daysearlie:r into ,the Wes!-ern Zones but was' not identical. They con'tinued, however, to siate their willingll'ess to dis- cuss the use of one currency in Berlin provided il was under four-Power control. Efforts to se.cure agreement on the lifiting of the blockade', which Wiere made COIn... tinuously between 23 June and 3 July, were equally unsucc:essful. The Soviet Military Governor still maintained tha't .. technical difficulties" pl'evented the trestoration of rail communications and he wouid not gUaran,tee that, even when these alleged ~echnical difficulities had been removed, At lhis jUllcture, 1 should likc to repent the point which 1 made ail the outsel. The Security Coullcil should disregard any false arguments that His Majesty's Governmellt and the G()vernmell!ls of the United States and France ùave fod'eUed their rigM to be iu Berlin. "Vhatever may have beell the attitude of the Government of the USSR to the agreements relating to Berlin which had beenell'tered into between the four oc- cupying Powe:rs, the fact llemain.s that His Majesty's Government, as allies of the Gov.ernment of the USSR, had beeu maill- taining Hs forces in Berlin for three yea:rs. His Majesty's Government wasexel1cising, through Hs oc~u'pation f-orces and author- ities,certain ,dulies and -obligations not only in respe-et of the maintenance and security of Ithose f-orces and authorities but also with regard 'la thecivilian population of Berlin. If the Government of the USSR was not satisfied with the aUilude of His Majesty's Government on any matter r.elating ta the f-our-Power administration of Berlin, it should have discussed il with His Majesty's Governmenlb through any of the normal channels which were open t-o H, and should nat have resorted to a:rMtrary and forcible methods. The unilateœ.-al imposition by the Govern- ment of ,the USSR of reskictions on com- munications by rail, road and walter between Berlin and the Western Zon.es of O~cll!P~tioninvolved an i~terf.e;l'enceby the Go vernmell!t of the USSR in the discharg.e by H;is ,Majesty's Government of its dulies a;:Jd responsibili:ties. It also involved the use of duress and o~ means wmch are contraryto the Charter of the United Na- tions. The 'action tal{;Cn by '~11e Government of the USSR,\l1e:r,efo~e,amounted to nothing less than the: e:x:ercise of iUegal pressure upün His Majesty's Government in further- ance of ils politica} and economic object- ives. Faced with this situation, His MajeSJly's Government, in agreement with the United States and F1"ench Governinents, add:œssed a note ,doated 6 July Itolthe Govel'll1menf of the: USSR. This note, whi,ch is inc1uded in the documents which have ,;,been submitted to the Securitty Council [S/1020jAdd 1], sets out the position of His Majesty's G-overn- ment in cle·ar ter-ms and also shtesthat his Maj.esty's Govern1nent "further declares tha! il will :11Iot be'induced hy threats, ip1"es- mainltenan~e of international pence and secu:rity, sLtll, first of aU, seek a solution by negotiation, €nquiry, mediaHon, concili-a- tion, arbi.tratio'llt, judidal settlement, l'esort ta l'egional agendes or arrangemen1ts or other p'éaceful means of their own choice... In spite of all,the efforts which His Ma- j,esty's Government has made to seHle the questions at issue under ,th€ provisions of this Article, the Government of ,the USSR has :not abandoned the ilIegan means of dul'eSS and pressure whi,ch it has employed by the imposition of the blockade measurct". On the cO!l'tl'ary, the documents submH- ted show ,conclusively that the intention of the Government of the USSR in entering on ,the discussivns was not to reach any seUlement of .the matters aif issue, but to secure thos'e same politieal and economic adV'antages in Berlin which it had in the tirst instance plaimed to se,cure by the' im- position of the :MQck~de. A proof of the attitudè of the Government of the USSH towards these discussio'us i8 to he found in the c1aim, put forward by,the Soviet Military Governor wh.en discussions took place in Berlin, and assCll'ted in specific It,e,rms in the Soviet note of 25' Sept- emhar [Sl1020IAdd 1], to cr 'trol air traffle between the western sectors of Berlin oU'nid fhe Western Zones. Irl the :6rst .place this claim constitl1'ted i a {temand for the imposition of a restriction : which had not rexiS'ted hefore. The Gov,ern.- . ll1-oent of the USSR sougM to limit air fraffle : to the ful:61menf of the needs of the oc- ~upyinlg Powers. No agre,emenit to sueh a ! lnnitation had everbeell in existence previously. In the second place, the Govern- ' I1lellt of 'the USSR was wellaware that' its : deman~ .wàS' unacceptable 'Hud must lead : tO.ithe .fa~IUr.e·, of t~e .negotiations. The' !M~sh Mi~i:tary· Govel1'lor had already: .;:licaledWillingness 10 Îlislilnle me'sures . Moreovcr, 'und cven while 'llegotialions :in Moscow were in progrcss, ·lhe USSR authorM ities in Berlin carded out a systematic pl'ogramllll~ designed to disrupt the legal German administration an.d to cause unrest in the dty. A constant stream of propa~ ganda from USSR~controlled sources aUeg- ed that the elected city governmen:t was no longer reU>l'esentative. Without going into details of USSR aclions, 1 will mel'ely pC'int ,to a few clcarly unilateral activitie,s. Ou 14 July the head of the Central Berlin Security Police was dismissed on USSR orders. On 26 .Tuly, the USSR authorities ordered a division of the Berlin Cenn'ul Food Office. and the creation of a special department under their own authorHy. Accommodation was selzed land members of the staff who .r.efused to work for the new department were deprived of their passes. On 17 August, !the USSR authoriities Ol'dered the dismissal of the head of the Berlin Cen~ 1ral Coal Organization, and three days later they arrested him for remaining at his post. Since 26 August the City Assernbly has been unable- to meet in the City Hall, which is in. the Soviet sector, owing 110 moh violence organized by the Communists and condoned by the USSR authorities. The USSR commandant refused to meet request by the Assembly to prevent dis- orders in ,the vicinity of the City Hall while the Assembly was in session. Thus the eleC'!- ed representatives of the people of Berlin hav:e bee:n. de'1lie:d Ithe personal protection and the security to which they are entitled in order Ito carry out their duties. By violence and threats of force the popular administration of the city has been disrupt- ed. 1 understand that :the USSR comman- dant has now made sorne proposaIs to ;the City Assembly about their future mee'tings. These prQlPosals, however, seem to b~ 50 hedged around w:Ïith reservations that their meaning and value seem very doubtful and they appear :to have given v:ery little com- fort !to the city authorities. The plain truth is that, in spite of the various pretexts which have been pUlt forward by the USSR Governmen1t to jus- tify its actions such as for instance the specious excuse liliat the break!down In pursuance of Us political and economic objectives, the Government of the USSR has resorted to the threat of force to prevent the other oCClllPying Powers f.rom excrcising theil' legitimate rigMs aond discharging :tl1eir legal and humani' ..,rian responsibilities. 'fhat is contrary to Article 2 of the Charter. In addition, the :threat of force by the USSR Gov,ernment has confronted the otIler occupying Powers with a ehoice which can he summed up as follows : First, they could submit passively ta the efforts of the Government of the USSR to deprive them of aIl their authority and rights in Berlin and thereby to consolidate the political system which it desires forc- ibly to impose upon Berlin and the Soviet Zone. ,Secondly, they could agree to eontinue dIscussions in the conditions which 1 have described, n'nder duress. As 1 have al1"eady made clear" it is incon- ~eivable that His Majesty's Government, for Its part, ·conldconsent 'to eHher or these courses. Thirdly, His Majesty's Gove.rnmell't and the Governments of the United States and France could themselves resort ·to force as the. only ~possible way. of defe'nding and maIntaining their legitimate rights. But to do that wouM be equivalent to adop'ling the very methods employed by Ithe Govern- ment of the USSR, of which we now complain. In aIl the circnmstances, the only step which His Majesty's Government and the Governments of the United States and France can now take is to bring this matter to the attention of tIIe Securi'ty Council as Majesté, Etats-Unis aussi, moyen leurs à que dont Sa Etats-Unis S1a.isir tion, nace la ~ clear threat to the peace within the mean- lng of Chap,ter VII of the Charter. olt lis uudcuiuble that wc had hoped that issues of this kind might he settted <lircel hehvecu 't·lw four Powers, eitllCr in th'!.' Council of Foreign l\Iinistel's or hy direct (\xchange of vicws in any other a1ppropriate manner. But the mal~hinery of the CounciJ of Foreign iVIinisters is preventcd from functioni'llg h)' the introduction of illegnl menus of pressure. snch as the withholdiug of th".l means of communication. Aud l'ven if -that maehinery had heen functioning and seHlemC'llt proved impossible, 1 haye nover before hem'd il suggested that the existence of that machinery would 'exclude and de.bar the Security Council from fulfilling, in the last l'l'sort. ifs dUitY of aUempting to find an amicable seUlement where other means have failed. My delegation, as 1 have already made plain, deny emphatically thnt there can be any such bar. Eight other delega1tions in this Council of eleven seem to -take the same view. Everyone knows-and documents already before the Security Council prove if-that His Majesty's Government, together wHh the United States and French Governments, have made, through weeks and months, every possihle 'effort to compose thei,r dif- ferences wilth the Government of the USSR. "We fulfilled to the limit Article 33 of the Charter, which 1 ha,"e already quoted. We failed.fo achieve a'DY satisfactory l'l'suIt. Ar- ticle 37 of the Charter lavs down 1hat "should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle ilt by the mea'ns indicated in that Article, they shaH reier il to the Security Conncil n. We complied with Articl-e 37. The Go- vernment of the USSR tried to bar the road, and when the Security CounciI, hy a vOlte of nine to t~o, agreed to meet its respons- ibHity :il·lld to take :the matter on ils agenda [362nrL meeNng], we are· met, to our great regret, hy non-co-operation on -the pa,rt of the USSR delegation. The United Nations, hy Article 1, para- graph 4, of its Charter, is dedared cr to bea centre for harmoDising the aotions of na- Wlum wc bring our difficulties to the Security Couneil wc should eome with the desir(\ to rench ngl'eemenl. \Vhere wc have lll'Cviously faUed, wc should seek to take advantage of the collective wisdom of this body. O.IJviously, each party will state Hs case with the utmost force at its disposaI, which should not, however, exclude the exerdse of ordinary moderation. So fa.r as my deiegation is concerned, 1 have. tried '10 confine myself to a statement of the faels as my Government sees them. 11 was with great l'egl'et that my Govern- ment leai'ned that the USSR delegation would take no pal'! .in the discussion of the substance of this question. How ean we progrcss toward a solution of difficuHies if one party refuses to jOÙil in: discussions ? Have they no arguments, or is it that Itheir minds are .ah'eady made up to refuse ucquiescence in anything that the Security Conncil may recommend ? Is that the way by which Ithe USSR dele- galion seeks peace and understanding? l fear that too onen in the short history of the Security Council we have seen paJ.'ltïes ta a dispute mming to this table .exhibiting mUe desi.re to adjust conflicting views, and making jmmoderate Sit,atement of their own case and, worse still, sometimes attacking and imputing base motives to the other side. Tao oHen have we found certain delega- tians refusing their co-ope.ration in :the search for peaœful solutions. For their part, my Government is content ta place itself in the hands of the SecurHy Council, and 1 am authorised here 'and now ,to deelare thai it isprepared to carry out in .aH good faith any resolution which the Conneil in Hs wisdom may see fit to adopt. Ml'. PARODI (France) (tr.œnslated from French) : The French Government, jointly with the Govermnents of the United States and United Kingdom has informed the Security Council of the situation created in Berlin, which, in ifs opinion, constitutes a threat to peace. The fads which we thus submitted to .the attention of the Security CouDcil are 3.1- ready known both from the complaint itself [8/1020J and from :the accompanying annex,es [Sj1020/Add 1]. In. addition, they have been reviewed this morning [363rd meeting] by the represeutative of the Unit- ed Stat.es and this v,ery afte'l"noon by the representative of .the United Kingdom. 1 intend, in the circumstances, to limit Inyself to a general review of the faets and ta exp~ain and clarify the 'position of my Goyernmeu.t whei'e ne,cessary. France had begun to t.ake part in the Commission's work as f.rom November 1944 and ils right to coHaborate in the joinrt occupation of Gei'many having been recog- nized at the Crimea Conference, the Pro- tocol which 1 have quoted was amended on 26 July 1945. The French Zone of Occupa- tion in Germany was then defined and 'the principle whereby France was to occupy a se~tor of Berlin was approved, it being left to the eommanders-in-chief in Germany to fix the boundaries thereof. . The quadripa...dte occupation of Berlin was therefore orga'l1ized ait the same time as the quadripartite occupa'lion of the rest of Germany. One of the logical -and ne-ces- sary conditions of the inter-allied occupa- tion of Berlin was, in the nature of things, 'the rigM of the occupying Powers freely to use ,the communication faeilities giving them a,ccess to what used to be the capital of the former Reich. This ri.ght was inhe- rent in the very act of occupa'tion, being an indispensable eondition the.reof, and it was no't cO'l1tested, at any -lime, by any of the occupying Powers untH the beginning of 1948. . ~e:nch troops in Berlin implied for the 'lhree Western Powers the same l'esponsi- bilities as in the zones of occupation. The ag,reements to which 1 hav,e referred are format They justify the pres.enoe of the four oecupying Powers' in Berlin as weIl as in the rest of Germany, in a'CCOl~d­ ance wi1fu the delimitation of the German zones of occupa1tion and of the sectors of Berlin which had been ,allotled to each of them. Moreover, the&e agreements have bren confirmed by more than t,wo years of :prac- tice; the de facto situa1tion has thus con- firmed fue de jure situation, if such confirm- ation were necessary. It is on the basis of those agreements ,that the French Governmen:t daims its legitimate right to share in Ithe occupation of Berlin as weIl as in that of Germany as a whole. It cannot agree that Ithe whole question should be re-opened by unilateral and for'CÎble ac'tion. Indeed, it has perhaps not been alppal'ent at aIl stages of the negotïations underlaken with the Government of the Soviet Union whether 'the latter intended :to contest the priucipl,e of the quadripartite occupation of Berlin. That Government could have, as any other Government could have on any other matter, rais'ed oblections in Ithe maHel' if it believed them to be well- founded. It would have been 'e!fi.titled do so :provided it resorted to regular chall'nels, that is, either ,to nego:tiations, or, if those brought no resuH., by having recourse to other procedures provided in the United Nations Charter, -as we ours'elves are doing today. The Government of the Soviet Union has not followed Ithat course; instead it has resorted to a series of ads which place dil'ectly upon itself the responsihllity for . the dangerous situation created in Berlin. . autorités That pressure exer.tedby force bega'll early in 1948, when the Soviet authorities ~egan to place more and more difficuHies l!Il the way of German ,travellers going to or coming from Berlin ; at first these mea- On 30 Mar.ch 1948, General Bl,atvin, Adjutant to the USSR Commander-in-Chief, began :10 subject aH passeng,er trains, includ- ing Allied military h'ains, to control mea- su~es to which !the Yvestern Powers natu- l'laUy refused to submit. Passenger train service was inter,rupted, with Ithe exception of the Nord-Express, which was in turn forbidden on 22 April. Allied oc.cupation personnel~ thereafter, had to be transported either by bus or by air. Similarly, military freight had ta be carried by air. On 14 June 'lhe bridge at Magdebu,rg was dosed. On 15 June three frontier posts were also closed. On 20 June Allied car traffie in the west-east di.rectiOill was interrupted, and on 9 July it was also interrupted in the 'east- west direction. Finally, on 24 June, the mana.gement of the German railways in, the Soviet Zone made ift known to 'the Allied authorities that, in future, no train ,could use the Helms'tedt-Magdeburg route, the only one la have been used for rail transport since 1945. On 2 July, the last, barge loaded with food for Berlin ~ea,ched Ilhat city. Thus traffic on waterways, whi,ch had been interrupted on various occasions under pil'etex:t of repairs,also came Ito a stop. Such are in brief the actions taken by the Soviet authorities. The represen:tative of the United Statesenumera't,ed them in greater detail fuis morning. They fully justify tbeexpression "bloekade" which we have already used. lit is, indeed, a forcibJ.e blockrade established by the Soviet Com- mand againS't the American, British and French sectors, and it is the first time, as far as we kJnow, that one of the Allies in the war against Germany has made use of coercive measures against those who had be,en comrades in the sltruggle of yesterday. Needless !to say, the ',commande,rs of the occupation forces of the three Western Powers hav-e th,el'leby been led to 'lake measures to maintain contact wi'th the detachments occupying 'the sectors in Berlin, and to ellsure food supplies for the !POPU- Jation of Ithose sector.s for which tbey had become responsihle in the circumSltances 1 have .a.Iready described. lt is quHe clear that by exerting 'p1'essure against its Allies, and by doing so by such extraordinary meaus, the Gov·ernment of Ihe SovieL Union has f·uiled :10 rccognize ils obligations under the Charter. Vnder Article 2 it \Vas proh~bÏ'led from l'esorting to the threat or use of force in the settlement of an intemational dispute; a fortiori, i't was unusual to l'Csort to such means agaiust AlJies, who had fought side by side with the Soviet forces to save the world from the Nazi peril. Il is ·equally obvious that the Soviet action has given rise to a situation which constitutes a threat to 'the peace. That the situation in Berlin is of such a chal~a.c:ter is obvious from a simple recapitul,ation of the fa,cts ; and public opinion in a~l coun- Iries is, we believe, aware of this danger. When an armed force ·daims ·the right to cut the communications and sUPlPlies of military units of three other Powers, when il ,compels these Powers to maiD't,ain their con~acts by the fea't of organizing their air transport, it undoubtedly assumes l'espon- sibiliity for an action whkh is obviously <langerous. If ey,ery State which is a Member of the United Nations \Vere tQ adopt ,the same method as the Soviet Union in its interna- tional relations, Ithe community of na'tions wOllld he Hable to ,countless disputes in which the ,law of the stJ.'ongest would be Ihe pnly one applied. It is in order to put allend 'lo such 'Practices-and :predsely willh that aim-that th,e Charter of the United Nations lays upon aIl Memhers of Ihe Organisation the obligation to adjus't disputes between themselves bY p,ea.ceful means. The refusaI to adopt such peaceful means and the claim to malœ arbi'trary decisionscan'no ,longer be allowed. FinaIly, il is hal'dly necessaryto add 'Ulat, if there is a threat topeace, the d'anger .is likely to inc.rease at any moment. Faced wHh this situation, the GoV'ern- lllents of the United Stat'cs, the United Kingdom and France did not wish to reply Our partner, however, found therein o:nly a means of prolonging the 'talks by piling up arguments on quéstions of de-tail and continually failing to give us satisfa-c1ian on -the essential point. Repleated discussi\116 led our representatives a,t Moscow 'c. "Pc Generalissimo SfJalin a,gain on 23 Au~.~·~t after sevN'al interviews with Ml'. Mok,!ov. As a result of that meeting, an agreement in principle was reached on 30 August. :rt seemed to provide for the raising of th,e blockade, while giving our Governments We had gonelo Moscow to obtain the raising of the blockade and to show that we were prepared, subsequently, to exl3.- mine aIl the problems connècted with Berlin in a spirit of friendly co-operation. Wie found ourselves ba·ck in Berlin with the blockade maintained and strengthened, now thl1eatened not only materially, but in our very right to occUipy and, administer the city. Nevertheless, we made a further effort. In the identical note transmitted on 14 Sept- emher we asked the Governmen,t of Ithe Sovi,et Union to J'eturn 'to the spirit of the agreement of 30 August and, in order to permi't the ,resumption of the Berlin, 'talks, to send tr;esh instructions to Marshal Soko· lovsky. The USSR Government's negative reply on 18 SeJptember' frustrated this effort. Notwithstanding, the three Govern- ments made yet another ap,pil'oacb on 22 Seplember 1. They again took up the three points with which the Berlin talks had delalt ; 't'hey again stated their position and requested tha! the blockade should he raised. The reply of the USSR of 25 Sept- emhe'l' 1 rendered further action impossible. These ar'e the circumstances in whicll ot:r Ihree Governments decided to refer the matter to the Security Couneil. The note of 26 Se'plember' set fortll the l'easons for this decision. 1 shaH not go back on them. The commercial concession made by the Government of the Soviet Union in ils last note did no't seUle the substance of th~ problem. Not only w,as the blockade not l'alsed, but the threat to intensify it Was maintained; norcould the reply be consi- dered to have .conh-:I'uted any new factor to the currency sitn;H"J'n. In all :pegoû11tlons there comes a time when it must he hdmi'tted that no further prQgresscan be :nadoe. True to itstradi- t~ble: each, pm·tner must contrihute an eqlml uudt:rstanding and the same l'eadi~ ness to discuss and seltle the problems. That i~ ~he spi.dt of thè United Nations. But t.hat Wag uot, in, the last analysis, the s:pirit of the negôtiations at Moscow and Berlin. . "SinCè', the' Sècurity Couneil' has' been seized' 'Ofthis matter, the Government of the Soviet Union made a -newdemarche, whièh does not s·eern to show any change in' the way il has envisa.ged the Berlin blockade for the 'past six months. During the night of SUll'day-Monday, indeed whe'D theSec.u,rity Councilwas already seizf:d of lhe, quesion, 1 repeat, the Gove,rnment of tll SavieL Union transmitted a further note to the French Embassy in Moscow. On the preliminary examination which we have bf;en able to give it, it does not appear that this note can remove the causes of the noti- fication .submiUed bv mv Government to the ·Security Council.· . 'First of aIl 'Deed 1 .repeat, that what we hav·e 'presented to the Security Couneil lS simply the question of the Berlin blockade ? The last Soviet note issomewhat equivocal in ihis respect. It attempts to justify the me'asiires taken by the USSR ·authorities by sorne allegeà responsibility on the Iparl of 'the three, VV\,stern Governments. 1 have already pointed out that, if il is intended to l'aise this legal problem, it should be considered separately llnd elsewhere,' and that it does not in any way prejudice the only question which is befm.'e ,the Council -"":'that of the use of fome in order to impose cèrtain daims. The Soviet note not only fails to mention the raising of the blockade; il actually denies its existence. It seems doubtful whether we could find any useful rapprochement of view~ when facedby this 'kind of staiement. lVIoreover, the blockade measureR "!:aken by the. USSR authoritjes 'are represented in' the 'Dote asa reply to the monetary reform in the Western Zones and the intro- ducti.Qn of the Western oCurrency in the sectOl's of Berlin, 1 have already !pointed out ~.1'''J. ;,lJP. 4';<.'8t measu:r:es to blockade Berlin ;;;tt·ccded by several months the currency refonns, atthough it is nowal1egedto hé tbe reason for llie actions- of the So.viet Union. . .. 'l'h:enote of the USSR' also sfate<s' that the threeWeste·rn PQwers 'had 'requested thatthe' Financial Commission should' be cmti:iled to ·controllthe issue of the German mark in the Sovit}.tZone, a, .daim whic'h Wc do nGt think, therefore--on a first examination, at least-that the latest Soviet note ~ouldaniount to anytbingIi:J.cire than anûther item in the col,lection of documents whieh we 'are presenting to ,the Security Council. There is ':lothing in that note to lead the three Governments to reconsider their decision to submit the matterto the Security Council. Aner this last.-minutecommunication -just as before it---,the Governments of France, the United States and the United Kingdom must admit that the negotiaHons which they had undertaken ,and conducted for so long and with such p'atience were making no progress and had finally ended in a deadlock. What path was still open .to them? There . is no question of the three Western Powers yielding to force. As they have shown sinee the beginning of thei1' talks with the Soviet authorities, they do not intend to negotiate nnder the ,threat and pressure which the maintenance 0f the blockade of the S'ectors which they occupy in Berlin represent. The conversations dealing particularly with the conditions for the raising of the blockade are still at a dead end, and at present there seems no way out in prospect. ,In other words,~he whole situation endangering peace -and resulting from the blockade remains unchanged. In these tCircumstanees, the French· GOY- ernment decided, jointIy with the Govern- ments of the United States and "f ;fhe United Kingdom, to have recourse to the Security Conneil. lt did so for two rea'sons. II!' the first place, il considers that the entIre situation constituting a threat to worldpeace should now he submitted to ~e ~~hest international authority, which 18 d1rectly and essentially concerned with My Government furthermore -entcrtains the fm'Vent hope thn", by taking the sit~ nation in hand and applying to it the methods of seUlement which are at its command, ,the Security Council, with the weight of its high authority and acting in the uame of world public opinion, will succeed, where direct conversations have failed, in bl'inging about an end of the intolerable bloclmde of Berlin.

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