S/PV.365 Security Council

Thursday, Oct. 14, 1948 — Session None, Meeting 365 — UN Document ↗ OCR ✓ 9 unattributed speechs
This meeting at a glance
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General statements and positions War and military aggression General debate rhetoric Syrian conflict and attacks Security Council deliberations UN membership and Cold War

The President unattributed #147129
1 am very glad ta allswer the representativ<cl of Sya.'ia, The suhjeet matter whieh 'presents sorne 1\11'- genoy is the re'port by the Acting Mediator [8/1022]; there is hoth a written report and an oral relport. The Acting Mediator is in Paris toda)' and-unless there is any objection-il is my intention 'ta invite hÏim to the Connoil table ta support this written report by his oral statement. Now, with l'egard to the sU11prise eleme ~{, if there is any .sUl~pri'Se: ever since thesè ,urgent ife,ports have a-p:peared here ---and they have beell }}ublished documents for sorne time-it has been my intention ta caU a meeting of the Secll'rity Council. The report 1 have before me is 'a ca:blegram dated 30 Se.ptemher 1948 bearing dOCillment number S/1022 ; thus it lIas 'l10W been with us for about two weeks. However, it has heen inconvenient, to caH the Security Counoil hefore so as to ,consider H, even though the matter is an urgent one, matter relating to lue and death. Yesterday in the First CommiUee,' w:hen it appeared that there might be a suspensiCrn of that Committee's activHies today, had made a 'puiblic announcement at the earliest opportunity-which is no doubt included in the record--that if it were 'possible ta hold fuis meeting today, \ve would do sa. Subsequently, during the meeting, events proved that it would be possible to hold this' meeting of the Security Council today, and 1 announced that we would hold snch a meeting on this Palestine question, which is an old question which has been on the agenda for a long time. Therefore, 1 feel that thecalling of niia meeting is fuHy inaccordanoe with the letler and spirit of the last part of rule 8 which states: " ... but in urgent circumstances it may he ,communicated simultaneously with the notice of the meeting." 1 think it is right and pl'oper, and: unlikely to injure anyone, if we hoId this meeting today, and 1 hope that the re'presentative of Syria will find it convenient to proceed. Ml'. EL-KHOURI I(Syria) : 1 thank you, Ml'. President, for the ex'planation you have given, but -II am not satisfied with H, ,/, qU'estion,
The President unattributed #147131
1 assure the representative of SYiI'ia that 1 have no idea of departing from this subjee:t. Somebody may try to depart from it; ïn that event, the rule of the chair wlil have to be accepted, or overruled. Ml'. MALIK (Union of Soyj:et Socialist Republics) (tmmlated {rom Russian) : The Syrian representative has already 'called attention to the fact that the agenda was notcir.culated at the 'proper tÎme. 1 do not know about the other representatÎ'ves on the Security Council, but 1 myself have ouly just seen the agenda. Il was 'celI'tainly not ,circulated in advanœ. Moreover, the agenda carries only the bal'e tiUe : "The Pale&tine question". Usually the documents which are to he discussed at a meeting of the Security Council are Iisted in the agenda. repréS'entant quel' viens connaissanoe. distri'bué jour l'oTdre des doit documents 1022, est 9 ,lement aourait ments membres alors sance ils der du aucun dans commencer puisque l'avance examiner. droit ment aurons toutes documents. Several documents have heen laid before [811013, 1014, 1016, 1018, 1019, 1022, 1023, 1024, 1025, 1030]. The first is dated 24 September and the last 9 October. Ii would of courBe have 'been proper to 'CÏrculate in advance an agenda listing aH the docu- ·ments which we are to consider. The repl'esentatives on the Secu:rity Council wouId then have been aoble to re-read those documents beforehand and wou1d thus hav,e been better prepared for today's debate. Nothing of the sort has been done. Now, ~ am not raising the question of Ul'gency, for none of these documents is urgent; but in allcircumstances, unless we are previously informed whatdoc'uments we are !o discuss, il is difflcuH to ·proceed to an Immediate discussion. 1 cOllsequently l'eserve the right to ex'press my view latell', after the opening of the debate, when 1 have familiarized myself with the substance of aH the questions set ont in the documents.
The President unattributed #147137
1 now 'put to the vote Ihe adQip;tion of the agenda. 3. Continuation of· the discussil)n on the Palestine question At the invitation of the 1-'reside.n.t, Mr. Fawzi Ani, represeniative of Egypt, Mil'. Fouad Ammoun, representative of Lebaaon, and Mr. Aubrey Eban, representative of the Provisional Gove'rnment of Israel, took their places at the Council table. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Ralph BUil1.che, Acting Me.diato-r, also took his plaoe at the Council fable. The· PRESIDENT: Before caHing upon Mr. Bunche, 1 wiU ask for the reading of the document S/1022, dated 30 September 1948. Mi.-. SOBOLEV (Assistant Secretary-Gel~­ erai in -charge of Se1curity Conncil Affairs): This is a ·cablegram dated 30 September 1948 from Mr. Ra-Ipt. Bunch.e to the Secretary-General, and H reads as follows: "For Piresident Security COUTIcil : "1. The assassinations of Count Bernadotte aad Colonel Serot hay.e thrown tragic light onan increasingly serions situation in Palestine as regards the authority, prestige and. 'even the safety of the personnel engaged in the truce supervision work. .. 2. During the truce ordered by the Security CouncH in iifs T'esolution of 15 July 1948 (document S/902), there has been ùisturbing tendercy on the 'part of both Arabs and Jews to withhold co-opera,tion from the Truce Supervision Organization and to ~pllace oiJJstades in the way of its effectiy.e OIpœation. .. 3. The foUowing may be cited as illustrative of 'current practices and attitudes which greatly hamper the conduct of .fhe truce supervision : .. (a) Requiring advance clearance of fw;enty-fouT hours or longer for flights of United Nations .aircraft,al1 of which are painted white with bigMy visible United Nations markings; " (b) Imposing conditions fo:raocess of United Nations 6bservers to airfields or to he stationed there, which in 'pradice have proved tantamount to refusaI of access ; • (c) Refusa! to aJ.Jow observers fll"ee access to certain ,ports ,and stràtegic areas . . n 4. The evidences of disrega:rd for the allthority of the United Nations, Hs .personnel,credentials, flag and markings on. vehides, find most serious refiection !in udual assaults upon Îll"uce supervision personnel. To date, six lives have been 10st in the truce supervision work, including that of the Mediator himself, and seven men have been wounded. The unarmed Unîted Nations personnel engaged in this work and theïr ail'Ctraft .and vehicles have been frequently subjected to snip'er and other types of fir,e, tparticularJy in the Jerusa.'1em all"ea; and on hvo. recent occasions individual observel's hav'e> been waylaid and have had their cars and personal funds taken from them at gun..,point. '"f'ùe:re is '1ittleevidence thaï UiP to now the au.nor.. Hies on either side have rega[';ded incidents involving attacks on United Nations personnel as demanding anyextrao:rdinary effort ·toward ap,prehending and disciplining theguilty individuaLs. That the truce supervision personnel,ci'Vilian and military alike, al,l of whom are unarmed, carry on their hazardous work under these ciroumstances iseloquent testimony ~w their high sense of duty. "5. The CUITent attitudes of :both paiI"tîes EDward the truce supervision involve ·a serioes tendency to disregard the provisions of the resolutions of the Secull"ity CouDcil of 29 May (document Sj801) and 15 July (document Sj902). "The resol'lltion of 29 May' CaUed upon aIl concerned to give the greatest 'possible assistance to the United Nations Mediator' while .fhe resolution of 15 July , Calls upon aH Governments and authorities concerned tocontinue 1:0 'co-operate with the Mediator ~ith a view to the maintenance of pea'ce 1~ Palestine inconformity with the :resolu:. honadopted by the Security Council on 29 May 1948 '. ': 6. There 'can be little doub.t ,that ap:proprmte action by the Security Council, at this time, would be helpful to the ·effort to ensure the maintenance and the effectrnives!l'PeJrVision of the truce in Palestine. thIS :regard it might weN becallerl to .. 7. lIn particuJar i.t would seem desirable to give s.pecial emphasis to the following obligations and liabilities of the parties with regard to the truce supel'vision .. (a) The oibligation ·oallow duly accl'ed- Hed United Nations oDservel'S and other truce 'Supervision 'personnel bearing pmper credentiaJs on official notification CLA l'eady aoccess to a11 places where their dulies reql1ire them to go includingairfields, ports, truce lines and strategie points and areas; ,. (b) The obliga,uon to facilitate the freedom of movement of truce supervision personnel and transport hy al1eviation of burdensome flight clearance restrictions on United Nations aireraf,t now in effect, and by assurance of safe -conduct for aH United Nations airCll'aft and other means of transport; "(c) The oMigation ,to co-aperate fully with the truce 'Supervisor personnel in theiT conduet of investigations into incidents involving alleged br~a-ches of the tr:uce, inclnding the making availahle cf wit·· nesses, telstimony 'and other evddence on l'eql1est; "(d) The obligaHon to implement fully by appropriate and -prompt instructions to the commanders in the field dl agreements entered into through the good offices of the Mediator or h1s representatirves; "(e) The obligation of each party to take aIl reasonable measures to ensure ,the safety and safe conduct of the tl'Uce Sl1rpeil'- vision personnel and the representatives of the Medi'ator, ,their aircraft and vehicles, while in territory under its control; "(f) The Hability of each party forany assault 'llpon or other aggressive act ugainst the truce 'Supervision personnel or the represen~atives of the Mediator in territory u'llder ils 'control, including the obligation to make every effort to a:pprehend and promptly punish the guilty. "8. Since the question of reparations for injuries incurred in the service. of the United Nations is now under consideration 1 wil1 now read document SjlO23 wlüch b a cablegramdated 30 Sep'tem!ber 1948 from ·.:le Chairman of the Truce Commission, Ml'. John J. MacDonald, to the President of the Security Council. "For ,the President of the Secu. ·ïty CQ'uncil : "Deliberate Jewish campaign led by military governor, Dr. Bern.ard Joseph, to discredit Trouee Commission and Acting Mediator Dr. Bunche now ·apparent deve- ~oping aJ.ong Unels of ·attalck JalujlloChed against late Count Bernadotte 'prior to his assassination and marked by such deliberate discourtesies as release to Press of communications sent to United Nations hodies !before their l'eceiI)t by addressees. Obviously undertaken in effoDt to destroy ,public confidence in, and aronse :publioc animosity towards, the two bodies now striv.ing toenforce truce in Jerusalem and bringabout demilitarization Gf JerusaJem inaccordance with Security Coundl reso~ lution of 15 Jiuly. Coincides with Jewish effort before General Assern'bly to obtain inconporation of Jerusalem in ,the State of Israel and is 'calculated to 'prove both Jewish determination to lœep Jerusalem and inability of United NaHons ItO internalionaliz.e Cilty in accordaLlce with late Mediator's recommendations. "In reply to Dr. Bunche's 'statement that Israeli ·authoTities were lax in providing security for Count BernadCltte, Dr. Joseph, in a Press release, hlamed ùnited Nations authorities for negligence in s,e'curity' measures. He daimed United Nations had declined J.ewish suggestion thalt United Nations personnel be aœomp'anied by Israeli military versonneL He maintained ,Jewish authorities, had they reœived slightest inltimation thaï Unitetl Nations representatives wished to have special protection a'CCorded ,to them, wOl1'ld have gladly 'Comp.Jied with Ithe reqaest'. Truce Cœ:nrmission is writing to Dr. Joseph as follows : As long as Jewish officiaIs 'pretend to exucise gove:rnmentalauthority in .Ter.usaJem for .safety United NalÎions ~per­ sonnel will hold him personaHy and I~rae1i army J.erusalem command re'SlponslbJe for aets by Jewish' terrorists; however, l'CStrictions on freedom of movement of United Nations personnel under 'prétext of safety reasons wiU not !he toJerated; if .. In a second Press release a proposaI by the Truce Commission that ft zone eomprisi'fig the King David Hotel, YlVICA, French and American Consulates General be considered a neutraJ area was declared unaoecc.ptable by the Israel a.rmy. Dr. Joseph claimed the Truce Commission had no authority to designate neutral zones and reserved freedom of action. He stated no Jewish troOips were now in the area. In accordance with instructions from the late Mediator to implement the Seeurity Coundl resolution of 15 July with respect to the demilita:rbation of Jerusalem and in an effort ,toassure .the sarety of United Nations -personnel, the Truce Commission, on 30 Augu.st, pro,posed to both mHitary .commanders the creation of zone as demilitari?:ed a:rea. The Arab Commander accep.ted in prinCÏ'p,le 'but the Jewish Commander ignored the letter until the Press release of yesterday. "Truce Commission and United Nations observers hel'e consider sueh a zone not only as logical first step towards demilitarization but necessary for the safety of United Nations ip~rsonnel here. The Truce Commission consider il essentiaJ to bring to the Security CouncH's attention the actions of the Military Governor and the local Israeli army command in view of the grave consequences which may resuIt from malicious and distorted attacks on United Nations bodies. The aUitude adnpted a.p,pears to be expressly designed to hinder the carrying out of the Security Council resolution of 15 July. The Truce Commission helieves that the' non-co-ü'perativeness towards United Nations exhibiled by lncal Jewish authorities is diametrica:lly opposed to the statements of responsibles:pokesmcn of the Provisional Go'Vernment of Israel ·pledging utmost cooperation with the efforts of United Nations. "
The President unattributed #147139
Ml'. Sobolev will now read document S11018. "2. Official view of the Provisional Government therefore ls that the crimewas 'planned and perpetraled by 'Fatherland Front' of notorious terrorists long known as the Sitern Group (Fightel's for the Freedom of Isra'el). "3. H has been weU known that terrorist groups organized to pursue 'Political ends by vioJent means have existed in terl'Hary ,controlled h\T Provisiona,l Government of Israel. Sucb groups had op'erated in Palestine during 'Mandate, and were re81ponsahle foi' many hldeous ,c·rimes committed in name of Ipolitkal objectives. These organizations' contiilued their' adivities after termination of Mandate, and the 'Provisional Governméi1.t" Qf Israel found it ne'cesS'ary to take meaSUires desig'1l'ed. to drcumscribe their independent ,milital'Y activiUes: Until 20 Septeanber, however, when the new ordinance a~ed'at the 'prevention of 'terrorism was enacted, following the J'èl'usalem assassiu'â,tions, theycontiilUed to function open1i, organis.aHons indépendante. assassinats ordonnau,ce de tinué que an~ witliout efi'eoctive res'triction 6r'apipIi"; cahon of avaHable legal sanctioDls against "5. Nevertheless, as late as 6 September 1948, . Fighters for the Ffleedom of Israel " in their daily Press bulletins issued in Tel Aviv, vigorously attadœd both the United Nations Mediator and mediation effort, concluding with the words: .The task of the moment lS to oust Bernadotte and his ohservers. Blessed he the hand that does it '. Parrticular signifiance shonJd ha'Ve b!een attrihuted to a staJtement of this kind precisely be'cause it came from a group which had oper,ated for a nùmber of years as an underground force ruthlessly and notoriously employing assassination, kidnapping and othler forms of violence, as a means to its ends. "6. Incidental development which had giV'6n ,concern to the Mediator and his staff was the lact thalt in local Jewish Press, in reeent weeks, there had been steadily intensifiedattack against the Mediator, mediation effort, trnœ supervision and the United Nations itself Ito the effiect that the Mediator was arbitrarily opposed to Jewish dans, and that supervision of trucedeliberately discriminated against the inter-est of Israel. The Provisional GoV'ernment of Israel, in ifs official rpronouncements, did nothing to counteract these unfounded arta:cks on good faith of the United Nations and on the efforts of the Mediator as ifs representative. On the contrary, public statements were made by responsilile officiaIs in the Government which cast reflection particularly upon truce S'upervision. On severai occasions, re1pr,esentations were made on behalf of the Mediator to officiaIs of the Provisional Government regarding potentiaUy .dangerous situation which • "10, At the time of the mU!l'ders, l'''sponsibHity for the safety of Count Bierüadotte and hi, party rested upon the Provisional Government of Israel and immediately Upon the Milital'V Governor of the Jewishoccu'pièd area of Jerusalem. P,rior notification of the visit was gi~en to Israeli authorities. In fact, at the moment of 9.ttack, the .. 12. Resolution of Security Couneil of 19 August (document S/983) definitely 'places the responsibility upon cU'ch party for the actions of any irregula\l' forces in ils midst and obligates each ,party to use aH means at its disposaI to prevent violations of the truce by individuaIs or groups under ils authority or in tel'ritory under ils control. It is quite clear, therefore, that ProvisionaJ Government of 'Israel must assume the fun reS'p'Ûnsibility f()r the ~etion of these assassinations, invo'lving a breacll of the truce of utmost gra'Vity. Official statements issued by the Provisional Gov-elïlment immediately after outrage, and previouslycommunicated to Security Council (docmments S/1005 and S/1007) would seem to indicate that Provi-sional Government accepts responsibility for these assassiuations within an area un~~r its control. .. 13. Essential faets of assassinatious are deady established by several corroborative eye-witncsS' accounts. They are the following :at ap'proximately 5 p.m. (Israeli time) Mediator andhis party left Government HouS'C a'rea in Jerusalem to retùrn to YMCA !prior to his ap!p'Ûintment at 6.30 p.m. with Dr. Josreph. Party trav,eUed in tlll~e>c cars proceedi,ng in line. The tirs t'car ,vhich carried, United Nations and white flags was driven by United, Nations observer, and carrier ':.:: pasS'Cngers two Swedish ~ffi('Jers atta'ched to, Mediato;r's p~rsonal staff, .l.Iis slecretary, and Jewish U~i~onofficer.S~'Pond car painted with red cross insignia imd This je'ep was similar in colour to those Jsed by IsraeH army. As the convoy stopped, two men, dressed in Israeli army uniforms and armed with automatic weapons of sten or tommy-gun tYlpe, ap.proached left side of car in which Mediator was riding. Carefully scrutinizing passengers, one of them thrust rus gUI1 th], 'ough rear left window and wed sevtf l'al hursts directly at Me.diator, killing h1n and Colonel Sero.t. Two other men, armed with similar guns, approached Mediator's car from right and fired, a.pparently for pur- .pose of covering assault and preventing pursuit. Subsequent examination of car showed ten certain and two possible bullet perforations in back seat U'pholstery and right side of .chassis, and in addition one bullet perforation through front of chassis andanother through top of radiatOI' grill. !p,ar sieurs que protéger, éviter ultérieur perforations de siège une châssis teur. enquête vernement sent, résultats niqué. damné et œuvre dui:r.e tations et également terroristes lancé ristes nisation médiation '!inien. non sions un Nations ahsolument faire Uni-es "14. Assassinations are now under investigations by authorities of P,rovisional Government, but to date no official retport on progress or results of this investigation has been communicated to me. Provisional Governmellt has vigorously condemned this brutal act and has deda·red its intention to exert eVlery effort to apprehend criminals and hring them to justice. Considerable number of arrests have been made in Jerusa'lem, Te.l Aviv and other ·places. ~erg.ency measures outlawing aIl terror- 18t organizations hay.e also tbeen enaetee'!. "15. These assassinations constitute a critical 'chaJlenge from an unbridled band of Jewish terrorists to the very effort of United Nations to achiey.e, by means of Il!-ediation, a'peaoeful adjustment of the dIspute in Palestine. In a broader sense, they give evidence not only ofconVernpt for the actions of the Security CounciJ, but aiso, of a cynicaJ disregard for the United ~ahons as a whole. It is cJ.early imperati'Ve th at urg·ent measures be taken to ensure t at the aims of the United Nations in Palestine should not he f:;:-üstrated by crim-
The President unattributed #147142
1 shaH nowcnlJ upon the Acting Mediator, Ml'. Ralph Bunche, who will supply the Security Conucil with infol'iluatlon concerning those matters withiu the .competence of the Council wlüch nœ referred to in the documents just rend. Ml'. BUNCHE (Acting United Nations Mediator for Palestiu'e) : There are no words available to me which ,could express the sorrow 1 ·exlperience in tl'p.pearing hcfore the Security Conllcil on tllis occasion in the place of the laUe Mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, with whom 1 had the privilege of ,colla·borating over a ·period of some fOUor months in his valiant and untiring effort to hring peace to Palestine. 1 may say to this Connât that a great international servant of peace was lost to the world when Count Bernadotte was struck down hy assassins' hul'lets in Jenlsalem on 17 Septem·her. Connt Bernadotte \Vas a thoroughly honest, im.partial, inde,pendent and fearless man who ·drove hims'elf rel,ent1essly in his determination to rescue the Holy Land from its tragic 'plight. 1 earnestly hope that his life and the Hves of the five othe,r gallant men which ha~e belen sacrificed in the service of the United Nations in Palestine have not been given in vain. 1 parti.cnlarly wish to make some brief rema;rks in expl'anution and elaboration of the substance cOlltained in my report to the Council of 26 Septemher [8/1018], rega,r.ding the assassination of Count Bernadotte and Colonel Serot, and my report of 1 Octoher [8/1022J, ~egarding certain aspects of the truce sup'ervision. 1 should like first to ouiline the essential facts in the assassinatïolls in Jerusalcm. The assassinations welre unquestionably well...planned and ,carefuJly timed. They were unquestionably aimed .directly at the life of the Mediator. They occur.r,ed in territory which \Vas controHed and administered by the al'il11ed for,ces and officiaIs of the Provisional Government of Israel. hav,e been officiaHy infol'il11ed that the crime was admowledged by an auxiliary of the notorious terrorists known as the Stern Group, the Fighters for the Freedom of Israel. This o.rganizatioll had, from the beginning of the truce s'll'p·e,rvision in Palestine, carried on a campaign against the Mediator, against the mediation effort and fhe tl'nce supervision work in generaI. This had been done through the medium daily bulletins issued by the Group. What the political motivation behind the crime may have heen, il do not know and 1do not care to speculate upon. It came as a terrific shock to the truce sup·ervision and mediation personnel in Palestine and the Arab States. But, 1 am happy to say that the work has gone on, the truce supervision continues and the 'llloraJ·e of the organization remains high. If it was the plUJ)'Üse of this effort to demoralize the work and destroy the trl1'ce supervision, then, indeed, that plU'pose faHed. dont On the occasion of the Mediator's last visit ta Jerusalem, no prote,ction whatsoeve,r was provided for hi!1ll and his party, despite the demonstration against him on his previous visil and public attacks by the Stern GroUlp, a group especially strong and active in Jerusao1em. 1 may say that this was in contrast to the treatment wlüch had gelleraUy been accorded him elsewhere. on 'et,en 'mort, 'Government At Rhodes, his headqua,rters, an escort was uIways 'provided and he was under twenty-four hour guard in the holet In v,isits ta Arab States escorts Wel'C usunlly provided and, indeed, on some earlier visils lo Israel 'l'S'corts had be,en provided aIso. At the time of his death, Count Bernadotte was in Jerusalem on official business. He had just made a visit to Government House for th.e 'plU'pose of inS'pecting that structure \VIth a view to de1erminillg its possibHiües as a future heaodquarters for the truce supervision and mediation work. His visit to Jerusalem and to Government HIJuse had been notified through offi.cial channels in Jerusalem w,eJI in advance. 'en , On the subJect of protection, 1 may lUfo.rm the Security Council that the att.i-I t~lde of the Mediator had always and cons\stently been that he wo:uld not shirk going to any !place in Pal,estine or in the Arab States t,a which members of his 'staff, mililary and civiJian alike, had to go, though. on Mcasions. members of his staff had a'ttempted to 'induce him not to go because of the possibility of danger in this or that det'~lUllinedby the leading car in the threecar convoy ln which the liaison offioer assigned to the !party by the Jelfusalem authorities, Captain H1.l1man, was l'iding. ln this regard I have seen an unofficial al1egation. that Count Bernadotte had deliherately invaded the Stern Group's stronghold in Jerusalem, an.d 1 must say that any such insinuation can only be described as maliciously untrue. With regard to his attitude on the question of ,protection, Count Bernadotte never asked for protection at anyplace, but on no occasion did he ever refuse Ï't when it was offoered. As 1 have :r.emarked, the usual lPractice was that such protection would be given ta him. He considered the protection of .himself and his party ta be the e:xdusive responsibility of the local authorities wherever he went, and that it was for them to ,dete,rmine whether the local situation was such as to require protection to ble accorded to him. 1 think that this must be made ciear-in-{)rder-thtl.t this is not confused with some suggzstions whlch have been made in more than one place with l'egard to United Nations personnel goenerally, and with regard to military observers in the 'truce supervision work in lparticular, which would require them to move about only when they were in the company of guards assigned to th'em, and only if such gua-r,ds were available. This sort of ,protection had been declined because had il· been aœerpted, it would ha,ve ma,de the trUtde supervision work utterly impossible. Count Bernadotte, of course, knew that there was always danger attached to this work; but it was a danger which, in bis mind and in ours, related to sniping attacks and, perhaps, to crackpots; but no spe,cillc warning had he,en given regarding the existence of this kind of danger in Jerousalem, and the lack of any armed escort made the crime relativc1y ,easy to commit. .D'llring our work out ther,e, members of the staff and Count Bernadotte himself were stopped several times daily at roa,d blocks, and at ,check 'points ar.med guar.ds would move along the sides of thecaJ;', look in for pur.posres of identification and, sometimes, calI for identification paipers. This instance was thought to be yet ano'thelJ.' such check, the difference being that the assassin stuck his gun through the window of the car and fired. At this stage 1 have no official information as to ,the 'progress of the investigation. 1 was iuformed on 19 September by the ISl'aeli Foreign Minist.er in Tel Aviv ihat il \Vas already under way and that a considerable numher of arrests-at that 'lime in the neighbourhood of 200 to SOO-had been made. Since that date, 1 have l'eceived a communication which 1 have transmitted la the Security Council setting forth the measures which had been taken by the GoV'ernment of Israel tO stamp out the terl'orist groups in Pa'lestine [8/1008J. 1 have no knowleodge of the official .progress of the investiga'tion other than that, or of the exient to which suspects may have been arrested and efforts made to identify them. On this subjed, 1 have nothing further to add to the reports 1 have already submitted, exce'pt to say that it would seem to . me highly desirable for the United Nations la haVIe available to it a full and official roeport on the progress of the investigation of the murders, the steps taken thus far to apprehend the assassins, and the appraisal of any possib1e individuai œsponsibility in the official family for poermitting the crime. The second report to wl1ioch 1 was to add~ess myself is document S/1022, dated 1 October 1948, which isconnected with certain difficulties now being encountered out tl]lere in connexion with the truce supervision. BefOl'e discussing the ~ubs'lance of that report, ! woul<1 feel 1 was being remiss in Iny dUbes if Il did not say to thi~ Council that the courage and the loyalty to the Uni'" In ,connexion with the truce sU'P,ervision, there is inevitably a gl'eat deal of local irritation and impatience with the operation generaHy-which is ul1.derstandable-because there is ap. inevitably unpleasant impact from the l'estr1ctions wh'ich must apply in order to doeverything 'possible to ensure -that no military advantage accrues toeither side as a result -of the application of the !oruce. We make no claim that the truce sup.ervision machinery does not make mistakes or thai it is not sometimes unduly slow in l'eaching decisions on allegatio'lls of truce violations submitted to il. This is freéI.y admitted. That this is SO, however, is not inf~equent1y due to circumstallces quite beyond our control. But the ~eal basis for 'ihIS report is to he found in the: fact that what 1s disturbing is the inrcreasing tendency, ,eslpieciallv of lat,e, for the narties coneerned to ignore their :responsibilities unde[" the truee resolutio118. This telldency expresses ils,elf in the various ways mentioned in the ':report. AHempls are made to place unneeessary and, at limes. arb~trary l'estdctions on the movements of United Nations tl'uee supc'rvision personnel, whieh makes thieir task of obs'ervation much moredifficult and less effident. There is an increasing tendency, on the 'part·of local commanders and other reSlpo'llsi'ble 'local officiers, to 1f)lace ohstades in the way of observers. which not only hamper their moVement but' adversely affect their 'p~estüre in the al'eas in whkh they Û'plerate. This aU helps to' Create an atmos,phere in whidl less. disèiplined and If 1 may, 1 shaH brietly point to œlJ.'tain specific aSlp,ects of this problem, and, in doing so, 1 shaH not attempt to say that one side is more responsible than the other with regard to spedfic incidents of obstruction to the 'truce super-lision. Thiese incidents, 1 illlay say, are fairly epidemi,c in Paiestine today. Specifically, they faJl into the foUowing genreral 'categories: There are restrictions on movements of observers, 'unreasonaMy long no.tice b'eill'g requi,re-d on flights of aireraft, such as twenty-four hours in one place and thirtysix hours in another. There ar.e severe' restrictîons on routes and on ai,r co1'ri,dors to he followed, with the threat thatplanes would be shot dowill if ihey strayed away from these courses. Thtere is the refmml of aocess to ports, 'ex,cep i: on a restricted basis, in the 'case of at least one of the parties. ThelJ.'e is the ,Jack of cO-Ol~dination with ooserv,ers in the fie.ld; fi1'8t of aIl the requirem,ent that there shaH be liaison officers, and then the lack of av.ailability of liaison officers, making the movements of obsel'versat the fironts impossible or so long delayed 'as to be ineffedive. l'accès limites; des inefficace. gode vateurs, eux, d'autres écha,pper ·les locaux un cales ont de tioHdu tement les de haut A second 'caf1egory is that of attacks and physical .assalUltson ohserve1's. Six of them have IDst tL~;'I.' lives, includin~ the Medi.atOI' ; others have been wounded. and others have had fortUinatre-escapes. It is dear that thel~ is insufficient control maintained in fuis respect over the local t,roops andother elements, by the reSiPonsib1e GoV'ernments allld 'commanders.There is an increasing tendency for these assauUs to take pilace and to uass by with only ca,sual notice. des~pite: the fact that each one is .promptly caHed to ,the attention of the 'Govermnent ~on~erned by the trnce supervision organnatIon. Another category is the failure to carry out agreemeni:s reached at top level. Aweements, often artel' arduous neQ'otiations. will he 'concludiéd at Gove'rllolnent· 'level and then held up in their implementationbv -the failure of local commandel's and officiaIs to 'carry out the tenns of thè agreement, somètimes 011 the ~round thatthiey ~ouverÎ1emental', de d'accords duE': tionnaires termes FinaHy, theI'e is often a striking contrast betwe'eJn. the expressions of co-ope<ration given by high Government offidals in response to direct approaches-assurances of full co-operation in connexior. with the observation of the truce-and the direct contradiction at th1e operationalleveli in the field. If time -permifted, 1 cou1d document each of these 'Points at 'considerable length. In my view, an expression by the Security CoulDeil, at this time, of its firm exp1ectation that an the obligations resting on the disputingparties as a result of the Council's truce resolutions of 29 May [818011, 15 July [8/902] and 19' August r8/9831 wonld be honoured, would be very helpful indeed to the situation, and would he of immeasurable assistance to 'the wmk and the morale of the men in the trace supervision operation. [n my opinion, th-e trueJe can he 'effective and it can be fair to bOUI sides only if the truce supervision machinery is afforded a reasoIiable degree of co- 0p'eration, and 1 fear that if the present t€lIldency continues, a reasonable minimum of co-operation wiH soon be lacking, with consequences of ufmost seriousness to the preservaüon of the tl'uce and its continueo supervision
The President unattributed #147145
1 am going ta give an op!portunity to the representatives to make remarks if thev so wish. 1 intend to close this meeting at 5.30 ·p.m. which means that the representatives will probably 'Ilot have as much time at their disposaI to make full statements as the occasion seems to recruire, but there will he another meeting of "the Security Coundl at a date to he fixed later. Hiowever. at the prese.nt time.· it is cruite impossibIre to' foresee W}h"'1 the Sec'llritv CouncHwHI be able fo 'consider this subipct again because of th1e discussioos on .the Berlin question ; and it is a'lso difficmlt to adant ourselves to other work thrust unon us bv a session of the General AssernhJv. . ~ v At the same time, 1 wish to ref'er to a point which Mr. BUlllche has mentioned regarding the tendency to negligence or carelessness in conlIlexion with the United Nations and its observers, and the re,!!l.llations made by the Security Council. He referred to both .parties and did not make any distinction as to whether one was more responsible. than the other. 1 am not going to verify theSle things nor try.and ascertain the details, but 1 wish to deda'l"e here that according to the information which 1 have from my Government and from Syria, observers of the Unite.d Nations are being l'eceived very resp'ectful1y and access is being given to them for the purpos'E'.s of il/lvestigation, study and observation in any department, any port, or anv other kind of place. They are aible to move across the country without escort. Evervon1e receives them in a pleasant and frien:dly manner : IDeonle are ~lad to see renresentatives of t~e United Nations among them. Thiey consIder if an assurance of :peace and security. This, as f.ar as [ know, is the case in Syria. With reference to the casualties which Mr. Bunche' has merntioU'ed-six deaths and seven wounded-we know the details of the last f.wo deaths, and aoecording to our information, the uther four were caused by snipers an.d thase who commiUed the crimes are not Imown and hav,e not been discovered. The Arabs in Palestine could confirm that these ,casualties were nlever intended by Alrabs or caused by lack of pre,caution on their side. The last crime, the assassination of the Mediator, was a deliberate one; it was not committed by a group of three or four persons, but by a large group which has at its disposaI ten thousand fighters who have heen actin~ aH the time in the past under the su.pervision of ,the Jewish Agiency in Palestinle allld l~nder the ansipi.ces of the Zionist or~.an.iza­ hon. The sm1l'gogling of ar.ms and other things into PalestÎllle was evep. achieved through the efforts of these groups and othiers with them. His a wonder that up tothe present time, . ~lthough a month has 'elapsed, no rrea1 l~vestigation has been made in an effort to dlscover and arrest the criminals who l~al ,C'riminal because it is i:mpossible to find a witness who wiB testify. This is 11'1'001' that this crime was not committed jus't by individuals. 1 wish to say that the Arabs are not particulnrly gratified by the activities of the late Mediator in Pa'lesotine. Vve know that he was not doing things accol1ding toprindples of justice, that he did not endeavour to obtain 'results 011 a basis of law or justice; he simply treated matters as a.ccomplished facts. Seeing the situation as it existed th1ere, he meI'ely wmüed to establish and confirm it disregaroding the background. His report states that the J,e'ws are there. that they have OIrganized thems'C1ves, and that il is necessary to cons'Olidate thle situation. The late Mediator did not l'are ta e.'Xamill'e why they were there and how they ,came therc and what justification thel~ is for thei)' being there. He di.d not go into the core of the matter; he only lool\:(\d at it in a supeorfidaol manner and came to this conclusion. We do not favour such a course, but certainly that would .not permit us to hear any hatl'ed against him 'personally. vVe re·gret his death and cOlldemn the way in which il was brûllght about, and wc con- ,clemn th08e who committed this crime against snch a messe:ng'er of 'plea'ce. 1 helieve the late Me,diatOir aoetcd in good faît'h, and that he had' no intention of heing partial or unjust, l-.ut .iust as any other person. he might have made sorne mistakes. He was assassinated in this manner whUe serving the Jewish cause and establishing for thern what they wanted, and perhans ·eVleU m01'le than t;hey wanted originaUy. And yoet th'eir ingratHude was diorccted at him as it ha.d'a~so been diI'ected beforc at the Unite,d Kingdom Govcrnme'llt, the Government vrhIch had hrought ,them ta Palestine and had ,prore.cUed thern with their weapons, with the Balfour Dedaration, wifh ,the Mandate a'nd by the sacrifice of the firiends'hip of milli'Ons of Arabs who have a'lways bCicn fri.endly towards the United Kingdom. Thle United Kin,gdom Government dM this in order to estabHsh the .Jews in Palestine. a't fhe sacrifi.ce not onlv of money but 'Of the\ lives of t11,eir owil soldiers and the int'Cliests of the United Kingdom--they did this for the ~alw or the .Jews. and yet, in s.pite of niB thnl, nll l'he worId knows w11at compen.sation the United pl'~sent time with worse methods. They arc mussacring thlCilll and expelling thell11 from the.ir homes. They arc committil1g atrocities and outrages. on a scale which eyon the Nazis did not-as if the Arabs had becn their ,pc1rscctüors. They urc coming 1'1'0:1.11 Eus~ern and eenu'al Europe to retaoliate ngaillst the Ambs. Tbese are things which ought to he takcn illtoconsiderntion when the SC'Curitv Council takes any decision in this matter. The Sccurity Coul1cil shotdd not overlook Hie p1resent situation nud its background. Il should find sorne method to come to a final settlement so thnt the decision mny he a llenceful and ,iust solution estahlishing peace and security in the -country. The Mediator was nominated by the General Assembly and the SecUl~ity Council, and he' was entrusted with a certain mîssion to accomplish in Palestine. TCl'l11S of refercnrl~ '\V,er(' giv1en to him to find a l'{'- lld.iustmb.~t of the future situation of Palestine, with the condition that it must hl' p'el\!ceful. The re1port wlüch he p11esented. after hnving accomplîshed his stndy. does Ilot off'er a Ipeaceful s-olutîon. This heing sn. 1 am sorry that it cannot he aec{'llt('d. Il contaill1s \1'0 eliE'llH'nts which ar1e inviting 01' aœe:ptance. During th(' eX1el'cis(' of his offke :in Pa; lcstine, Ml'. Bunche siate,d todav that IH' had tried 'hm',d not ta l'Ct aIW si<1r ohtnin allY military advantages dnrirÏg thr t1'11c('. T nssure the Securitv Coullicil that t'll{' Arah.. have obtaine,rl '11'0' adyanta,ges. I-Iowever. T am sure-and Ml'. Bunche, 'his friel1lds and collaborators Imow this-that the .Tews lww obtainedconsiderablea.dvantages lnr the claily and we-ekly Sl1l1ugglil1g of al'ms and fighters from EasteiJ.·n Europe into Palestine. Mr. Bunche stated that the ohSer\"("1's we1'e Ilot given access to ports. It should he ~mderstoOid by re.u,ding hetwe,en the l:iln1es .lust whal that means. Why are the .J.ews not giving aCCless to the ports if there is nothing to Mde ? SUlrely the wat'Crs of the sea. ar.e not open ta srÎs'pidon ! The shions wInch ar.e i'noessantly 'coming tO'Wn'rrls theÏ1' S~o!es are loaderl with ammunition and ddlel'cnt ldnds of armaments Hnd ûght1crs ~vho 'cuter w:ithotlt the observalion of 01' lilslle'ction bv t'lIe OhSN'VNS of the UnHen Nations. . ~ Sil' Alexaude,rCADOGAN (UnitedKingdom) : l am sure aIl the membel's of the Couneil have Hst,ell'ed with interest and sympathy 't~ the report made to us this afternoon by the Acting Mediator, Ml'. BUTIche. l ailll sure that the members of the Couneil would like to expl'ess, through him, to aIl the services of the United Nations who areengaged on this ,difficult and ,dangerous task in Palestine their appreciation of the devotion and 'coura-ge which they have shown. l thiük the members of the COllncil will also have listelled' to Ml' Bunehe's report with ,considerable coneerll. It reveals indeed a rather amazmg situation. l do not think that the Council can properly, here and DOW, atternpt to atp'pOTtion Marne to one si,de more than the other. At pres,ent, it seems to me that what ls urgent is that the Couneil should do w1ratev.er it can to assert its authority to uphold the authorHy of thos,e who are working on the s.pot. That, it s,cems to me, is the fkst thing that the Council has to do. You will aIl rememhel' that the First Committee of the General' Assembly has now to consider the report of the late Count Bernadotte on his work in Pa'lestine. It is of the highest importaIlioe that the Ass'embly and its Political Committee should f.eel confident that the truce will be maintained in Palestine both during their discussion and uutil whatev.er l'ecommendation they make can be put into effeet. Unfortunately il cannot be said that the reoent telegraphk We are told by the Tl'nce Commission , that thel,e is a delihel'ate campaign to disclledit the Commission and the Acting Mediator in the ,eyes of the Jewish community, that this campaign is l,ed by Dr. Joseph, Military Governor of the parts of Je:rusalem undet· Jewîsh conh'ol, and Ihat it is intended to arouse anillllosity against the late Count Bernadotte. The Truce Commission have fOUind it Iiecessary to caH our attention to such an organization in Palestill,e. The Acting Mediator in his telegram of 30 Septemher [811022] made a similar assessment of the situation. He informs us that the authority, IPrestîg,e alltdeven the .persona'l safety of the representatives of the United Nations a,re imperilled. Both Arabs and Je"\vs were placing obstacles in the way of the effectiv.e supervislipn ,of the truoe. D:isl'!e{ga~d for the authority of the United Nations has found its most serious ex:pression in acts of violence cOllllmitte,d against the servants of the OrganizatiÜln itself. Ah'eady, ,Ml' Bunche '1'eminds us that six representatives of the Orgunization have lost their lives in Palestine, and that sev'en others hav,e beelI1 wounded. This is a very graye ,picture. W,e have grown accustomed, during the period of the truce, to aUegalions being made :byeach party that the other lP,a,rty hasbeen guilty of tdisœgarding the resolutions of 29 :Ma;y ,and 15 Ju1y. What we are now ,confronted with is something different, and something rather more seŒious. It is no longer a question of an. isolated infringement of the truce by Arahs or J.ews but ratller a threat to the foull1dation of the truœ and to the authority of the Security Council by which it is maintained. It isevident that there aife' gr~upS in Palestine which are seeking to elnmnate the influence of the United Nations from thatcountry altog,ether. It seems to me: that the Coundl shou1d ,do aIl in ils power to arrest this process and to re-assert the 'Council's authority. That is one matter. At the beginning of our meeting tbis afternoon, the urgency of this matter was questioned and it was pleadetl thatsome of these ,documents now hefore us had heen received many days ago. 1 think that ev,ery day 111.at has passed sin'ce the ~eceipt of the first of thes,e documents has added urgency to the situation. It is high time that the Council should do something, at the ,carliest 'possible opportunœty, '10 re-assert ils authority and assis,t Uïose op. the spot. vVhat has happened since 17 September ? 1 shou1d have expected a vigorous interrogation of the criminals and a thOirough investigation into the meaSUTes taken for the securitv of COUint Bernadotte in the oentral -part of Jerusalem. The Acting Mediator tells us he has not vet received any report saying that these mëasures have been taken. vVe are dependent, in the main, from \Vhat we leaIlIl from the Press and it ap,pears therein that sorne members of the Stern Gang have been afiDestetd and are now in prison. The reeent e;p'isode in Jaffa when these .prisoners entertained their jaHers to ClipS of ,eoffee and gave a further demons- (iration of their good relations by returning voluntarily to their prison at night, i's not calculatcd ta impress the authoritics with the seriousllIess of the Jewish authorilies in thtis matter. Il mC7 be, of course, that Ml'. Ehan will be able ta tell us this afternoon tha,t the lea.de:rs of the Stern Gang have heen arrested or that an enquiry is pl'Oeeeding iuto the failure to provide any protection for Count Bernadotte on the .day of his murder. If he is not in a posirtion ta give us this information now, thell it i'S the view of my Government that the Security Council shou!.d caH for it as saon as possible. The Council owes this ta the staff of officiaIs and obSleTvers who are contin:uing loyally ta .carry out their dulies in P.alestine. Unlessenerg,etic measures are taken by the Jewish a:uthorities ta prevent a repetition of the ·ev,ents of 17 Septe.mber, the terrorist gangs wiU feel they can ope:rate \Vith impuni1ty agai'l1'st the servants of the United Nations. di~passionate:l:yfirst to bring about a Ipolitical agreement and then, having failed in tllu't, to .detemnine at what point HIe most eqnitable balance could be struck between the ,eonflicting parties is well known. It is the view of my Government that not only did he try to ·do that, but further, that he suoceeded so far as was humanly possible. lot would not be approp1riate to enter into a discussion on 11is political proposaIs today, but the 'point 1 wish to maIre is that the assassination of the Mediator cannot possibly be regarded as a protest against the character of the influence of the United Nations in Palestine. It wasa chalLenge to the whole United Nations partidpation in efforts to achieve peace and justice in that country. ilt is the dutty of ihis CoulIlcil to take up that challenge .and to insist on the maintenance of resped for its 'Uut11orityand for thos.e who ex·eœise il on ,the spot. The Ading Medi'ator outlined, in the teIegram to which 1 hav,e already referred, the ·detailed measU'res which heconsidered to be necessary in the light of ex'p,e:riencc in arder to increase the efficiency of the mad1Ïnery f~or sUipervising the trnce in Palestine, 1 think we ought to pay great attention to those recOInmendations. After, a stndy of the papers that have 'been hefore us for some time, my dlelegation have reached the condusion that it would' he weIl if the Council could sec fit to adopt a resolution on this matter, a text for whkh 1 have .prepared and which 'cau be distrihuted immediately. 1 have Iconsulted. one or two of IlllY .colleagues about il, and in particular 1 have shown it to my Chinese colleague, who ex'p'r.e,ssed ai}J·proval of its !erms and his willingness to join with us lU sponsoring this resolution, which therefore now appears as a joint Anglo-Chinese draft resolution [S11032]. 1 cO'lllmen.d its consideration to my 'coHeagues. 1 beg them to. reflect upon il and 1 hope that you will \VIsh to adopt il at the earHest possible moment,
The President unattributed #147147
The draft resolution referred to readsas follows: Sérot~documentSj1018), the re:pOl't of the Acting Mediator concerning difficulties enoountered il11 the supervision of the truce (document Sj1022) ; and the oreport 'of the Tl'uce CQIlllInission for Palestine ,concerning the situation in Jerusale.m (document Sj1023), .. NO'tBS with conoern that the Provisional Government of Israel has to ,date submitte.d no report to the Security Council or to the Acting Mediator ·r;egavd"g the progress of the inV'estigation into Lie assassinations, .. Requests that Government ta 'submit to the SecurHy Council ·at an ·early date an account of the progress made in the investigation and to indicate therein the measures taken with regard to negligence on the part of officiaIs or other fadors affecting the rcrime, .. Reminds the Governments and authorities concerned that aH the: obligations and responsibilities of the parties set forth in its resolutions of 15 July and 19 August 1948 are to he dischar.ged fully and in good faith .. Dete'rmines, pm.'suant to its re:solutions of 15 July and 19 August 1948, that the Governments andauthorities have the dutY: "(a) To aUow duly aocredited Unit-ed Nations observers and other truce supervision personnel bearing proper or.edentia!Js, on official notifica·tion, ready access to .aIl places where their duties require th,em to go including airfields, ports, truce lines and st,rategk points and areas; " (b) To fadlitate the fre,edom of movement of trace supervision personnel and transport by'silIl!PHfying procedures on United Nations ai11Craft now in effect,and by assurance of safe-conduct for aU United Nationsai,rcraft and other means of transpor~, "{c) To ,co-operate fully with the truœ supervision personnel in their conduet of investigations into incidents involving aIleged breaehes of the truc~ inlC1uding the making available of witnesses, testimony and other evidence on request; "(d) To implement fuHy by appro.priate and !pTDmpt instructions to the 'commanders in the field aH agreements entered into through the go,?d offices of the Mediator or his representatives; "(e) To take aIl reasonable measwres to ensu['e the safety and safe-conduct of the "{f) To make ev.ery ,effort to app,rehend 'lIld pl'Omptly pumsh any and aIl !persons ~vithin their jurisdictions guilty of any 'lSSRult 'Upon or other aggressive aet :lo"ainst the truce 'Supervision personnel or '0 • f th M di t " the rep11esentahves 0 e ·e,· a or . . Ml'. PARODI (France) (translated (rom French): 1 am in general agreement with the representative of the United Kingdom. 1 think we shouLd express our g11atitude to l\fr. Bunche and' re,co-gniz·e the courage he has shown 'both in acting as interim Mediator - and we need no reminder of the dange,rs of fuis !post - and in making so dear and oUltSipoken a statement at the present meeting. The situation he has described is obviously ullsatisfaetory. It has cast the life of the man who l'epresented the authority of the United Nations, and also the lives of a number of bis coHaborators, including four French officers. 1 am sure that the representatives of the Jewish cause cannot but be aware of the damaging effed tbis situation, if allowed to continue, wHI inevitably have on the hitherto favourable attitude of the pu.blic. When we l'ecall how much the J.ewish cause owes to the United Nations, we 'cannot faH to be deeply ctisappointed if the Jewish authOlities do not undertake more eneorgetic measures than they have sa far undertaken. 1 reserve the right to 'ex·amine the resolulion of the United Kingdom when II have a CO'P'Y of it before me. It seems to me, however, ,essential that the representative of Israel should, at the ea'l"iôiest .pO'Ssilile date, ,provide us with the aSSUDances which we are now entiUed to ask from mm. When the news of the ,assassination ofCountBernadotte was made .public, we heàrd of statements that were made immed~ately by members of the Jewish GoV'ernment, announcing arrests and 'Othe,r severe measures. We should now know the results of these measures, the precise effects' they h~ve had, and what the J ewish authorioties -arepré,p'Ul'ed to do to facilitate work of the observe['s in future. 1 am anxious therefore tha.t we shoudd rooeive this infomnation and should re:ceive it as saon .as :possible. In my view we must have it befOl~e taking a decision and voting on'a reso'lution. r lVIr. EBAN (Provisional GoV'ernment of TbeS!c immediate measures, drasti.c as they were, fuJl short of effediveness, howev'er, in one vital respect. It is quHe obvious thtat :primalJT responsibility for this 'crime does 'Ilot l'est solely with the insensate men who actually filled tbe sbot. The motive and volition of the crime may well have re.posed in directing miilds, whicb aœording to aIl the evidence at our disposaI pIanued the aSSIassination in advance. An important $otage in ,the investigations of the Governmentof Israel was therefore reached by the am'est of the' leader and 'commander of the suspected oIlganization. He had eluded arrest suocessfuJly for years ueder the Mandatory regime, and having be:en oncec:aptured, the Mandatory Authorities were unable to pre:v,ent his es:cape and that of an his p'rincipal lieutenants from a prison at Latrun. The Govemment of Israel lrike tbe world 'at llarge has inherited the conse,quenceof this escape and will endeavour io repair i t. Il is not for me to predid the course of the judicial 'proceedings which are now about' to take place under the emergency .regulations a1nd duri'llg which noeifort will be spa:r.ed to detern1Ï'ne and visil the reg.ponsibility for the actual murder and the perhaps ev,en greater responsibility fol' its direction and planning. The Se,curity Council w.ill be' ke1pt eX!Jlr~sedthe view that nothing would fully respond to this tragic s~tua~ion but the .co:mplete and final ,eradlcation of thase vicions lllovements which grew up in the exploitation of public biUerness IUlld f~rus­ tratiop. and have bequeatlhed to the Gov'ernment of Jsrael a most unenviahle legacy. AlI measures taken by the Provisionu! Govemment of Israel have that radical objective of complete eradic:ation in mind. As a result of strongaction and an unconditional ultimatum, the body known as, Il'gun Zvai Lewmi su;rœnderl~d ils arms to the Provisional Governmel:t andceased to exist las -a lllHib~.ry ol'ganization. The Stern G\roup is -ail:so, efi'ectlly.ely broken up, Hs leadership and direction a:l'e disrup'ted,.and although a mena-ce to -puhlic and !}Jrivate security may still exist through the presence al laDge of irresponsible illodivid:uals, we believe that il can be said, for ,the first time, that the ,days of organ.ized terrorism are over. The Gove,rmnent of Ismel has been in existence for five months. Ii wascalled upon to estahlish itself under a semi...cÎ!nc1e of fire out of the administrative chaos which il hal(} to inherit. Tihe mark of imperfedion is wrltten on aIL human achievement, 'and it 1S .written on the -p-enormance of the Government of Israel as \Vell. Bu! when we com,par,e fuis swift ,and genera.J assertion of governmental authority witib. the conditions of aggI'ess-'Îon out of wh:kh itgrew, withthe perils am.idst whi'CJh il was a>ccomplish~d and.withthe background of disorder which preceded il, we do not find it possible, taking the 'picture as a whole, to come to tbis table with any feelings of ·S1hame. In .}J'articular, I ney:er 'cease to be surprised at hearing the GoV'ernment of. Israel repeatedly eujoined to 'e:x:eœise its IpowerfuI gc;.vernmental authority by those who deny that any Government of Israel exists. Nev~rtheless, it will exercise that authority irresll'êctiv,e of ;all attempts to subvert il from without 0'1' from within; it will move forwaoo towards the 'lawful assertion of its authority throughout theentire aœ-a of the State of Is,rael as weIl as in the -al'eas which, as a result of Arabaggression. have ,come under Jewish military cootroL Ii will, in p-artic!-üar, co-operate with th~ SecUtl'ity COUDiCH and the AiCting Mediator, for. the restoration and maintenance of .peace ~,a 'pour t~o.ughout the ,country. . 1 understand that the Security CouncH has assembled to SUl'Vey the' situation of lIhe tl'wce, andall parties must beconcerned In this connexion Ml'. Bunche draws attention to the obligations 'and liabHHies of the pa,rties \Vith :regard to truce supervision. il should like to ,comment on the first, third and fOUirth of those obligations. The fil'st of them is set out in sub-!paragraph (a) of the United Kingdom draft resolution. It 'cannot be doubted that there does 'exist an obligation by both }Ja'rties to allow aocredited United Nations representatives ready access to aior fields, ports and h~u:c-e Hnes. The Government of Israel, how(wer,considers that there exists a correSIPonding obligation on the part of the United Nations representatives to ensure that their c('~trols are dish'ibuted equitably on bath sides. It is, 1 think, a generally aocepted fact that th-ere has not becn any suchequitable distribution of 'controls at any period of the truce. In the p,rogress report of the Mediator [811025] it i8 ac1mowledged, thaï there .is for.ce in the compJaint of the Provisional Government of Israel that during both the first and second trU!ces the trurce supervision work wasconfined almostexdusive'ly to Palestine and that il was inadequate in the Arab States. . ln the same section of that r~pol't the nu~bers ef observers stationed in Arab and Jewish areas respectively are given with r(>speet toeach of the truce pedods. We find that whereas the.L·eare 76 observ·ers in Haïfa and 28 in Tel-Aviv, there are only 18 in the whole. of Transj dan and 14 in the wh.:>le of EgYPl, although Egypt and Transjordan m'e the two -countries on wh1ch the major Arab war effort is based. Uniless the balance ,can somehow he restored, il is obviously inequitable in practiCC' and in principle, that the close and vigilant scru- . Uny of IIsraoel's territory should be still further tightened. If is dear that if the Mediator',s mission now has facillities for widening the scope of ifs mission, if must begin by extending supervision to Arab ports. anJ air ports The third point mentioned by 1\11'. Bunche is the obligation on the .parties to co-operate \Vith truce sUlp·ervision personnel in their conduct of investigations into incidents involving alleged brea,ches of the truce. That is referred to in simHar language in sub-paragraph (c) of the United IHngdom <lraft resolution. vVhile fully accepting this principle, 1 must urge that the<re is a corresponding duty on the part of the supervision personnel to associate the 'p'arties ;7ith investigations bearing upon their alleged responsibility. Public sentiment in Israel has been considerably agitated by a number of ruJings issued by the Mediator's staff based on nD evidence other than the Arabs' unilateral assertion. Sorne of these instances have ibe,en set out in correspondence with the Mediator's mission with the detaiIs of which 1 will not weary thE' Security Council. But one coucerns an Egyptian oomplaint on 6 August that the Israeli army fired on an Egyptian ,ambulance south of Beersheba. 1 now quote the ·evidence invoked by the Mediator's representatives: .. An EgYJpHan ambulance car was viewed by the United Nations observers on the saille .day ,and il did have bu1det marks in its l'ear. On the strength of this ·evidence the Chief of Staff decidedthat the Egyptian complaint ltad bee:n substantiated and that the Israeli amny was guilty of a breach of the truce ". Neither in fui:; incident nOT ln many others was the 'party 'charged with the violation given any opportunity to ,comment on -ibis evidence or to give its own version of these incidents, i.Ï indeed they ever took place. Wè therefore feel that the matter should not he put soJely in terms of the obligations owed iby the parties to truC'e supervisory personnel; weshould think !Dather of mutual :Ii~ations hetween the parties and United a~oüS repi'es'OOJ!atives, of -a relation of Ih'eçlProcity in which arhUrary judgments aVe no 'Place. Yet, in aU ,the six instances enumerated in my letter of 8 October, A,r,ab forces al'e at this very moment enjoying military advantage as a direct resul,t of their violation of the truce. The water sup'ply of Je'eusalem is stŒ rtduced to inadequate proportions and. the Jewish popul,ation of the -city is immune from pestiJ:ence and death hy thirst sokJy through the 'effort and sacrifices of Israeli fOI1Ces who established the limHedemergency sup;ply amidst the brunt and .peril of war. None of the consequences of the explosion of that Ipumping 'Station have been 'l'emedieddespite the clear injunction of the Security Council on 13 August. Arab forces oocupied advantageous and menacing positions near Karatia, in the Negeb, at Mishmar Hayarden Ga.mee, at Deir al Torand, Mount Zion and Jerusalem, and they hold those positions the fruit of certified tru~e violations. Taken together, these positions'constitute a tangible aU-round im,provement in the general b~lance of military advantage from the Arab Ipoint of view, and sorne of them, such as the EgJ1ptianposition in Karatia, have recent.1y served as springboards for new mHitary operations against IsraeH territory and communications. It seems to us that the situation today in the Negeh is of special importance since ,A.rab ,action in that area is dearly related toconsiderations of ~political as w.eII as of military adv-untage. During the first ten days Oif Oc.tober numerous incidents of bombardmellt by guns and ai~rllft took place, sorne of them in the presence of United Nations observers. It is impossihle, in our view, to isolate the effect and IPurpose of those ev'ents in that area from certain far-reaching and ill-j udged pro,posaIs for awarding to Arab Governments the gr.e-aterpa,rt of the territory of Israel. There is every reason to confirm that :the purpose of Egyptian. 'activity in the Negeb was accurately described by the ,correspondent of The Times of 12 October when he wrote: The invasion whkh began on 15 May faHed to make :3.uy suhstantial inroads into Israel's terrHory in the south. Il failed in that part of the Negeb on thecoa-st allotted to the Arah State by virtue of the General Assembly resolution of last yea'r. The invading fOl'ces, however,established a line along part of the road from El Maj,del to Faluja, but Jewish communkations \Vith the main 'part of the Negeb were stillpossThJe through KaraHa. It is this tille of communication whkh Arab forces are nowable to ,bring under fil'e solely through their violations of the truce betwe·en 18 and 25 JuJy. The 'position is, ~erefore, that snch limitoo Al'ab 'control as exists .in any part of the Negeb is the result of a truce violation deriving from aggression of an internalional'character. rIt is this truœ violation within an .a-ggresS'ion whIich 'Certain Pl'O'" posaIs about to be di&cussedelsewher,e would have ,the United Nations ratify and smbiilize. The Secul'Hy Councïl is doubtless aware that tbis attempt to secure 'crudal politieal advarrtage hy a vio~ation of the lru'Ce has caused heavy fighting in recent days in the Karatia area. The Government of Israel hasevery 'l'1ght, under the terms of the truce, to resist this attempt, in violation of the truce, to ,cut off communications with the Negeb, which is and wiU remain an integral part of the Sta,te of Israel. The thoughtful document prepared by Mr. Bunche stands out, we are afruid, in welcome contrast to document 8/1023 whichpreseut:i., over the signature of Ml'. John J. MacDonald, a series oif personal attacks on a distinguished 'public official, Dr. Bernard Joseph, ,in intemperate lan- ~u:age seldom seen ÎnpubUc <communicatIons. We reg'ret to statei:hat in our view mos,t of ·these ,charges hav,e no substance. There is no Jewish 'campaign ta diseredit the Truee Commission or Ml'. Bunche. Dr. Joseiph has never published or written or. s~okena word against the Truce Com- 11U:sslo.n. If he had, the Security Council cou1d have been iS,u:re that tbûse wOl'ds w.ould have been reprodUiced in Ml'. Ma,c- Donald's ,communication. Nor has he utteTed a single ward of cl'itidsm of Ml'. Bunche. 1 .cannot 'Conceal that, without being too sensitive to legHimate criticism, we do regard this as. ·a deploTable letter. You cannot walk in the streels of Jërusalem these days without 'a sense of haunting tragedy over the plaoe. And with .ail their imp1eorfections on their head's, Dr. Joselph and bis colleagues, have made a bigger contribution than any one else toward-:i restorîng the processes of oI'ldinary Hfe in a .sitUlat\ion wJrich would have otherwise been chaotic. In ,conclusion, 1 will off-el' one word about the: general situation of the: truce. When this matter was under discussion in the Security Coundl dtH'ing its sessiollJS· in New York, il woas my dutY on heharlf of the ProvlisionalGovernment of _ISirael to ,ex\piI.'ess· two hasic ideas: .1. It was becoming ,evident that the tlruce hy its very nature, 'as weNas through ils defects in its operation, could not ,long end:Uil'e even as a temporary sub~tim.te for formaI pea1ce. 2. Il \Vas mannest that the ro'ad to pea1ce cou:Ld on1y lie through direct .negotiations between the Goveil.'nment of Israel and the neighbouring Arab States. And as a ,contribution t:o that pUl'!pose, the Foreign Minister oi Israel indicated willingness to institute siUiCh negotiations. at once. . Everything that has happened since 'then has ,confirmed lUIS in· our ·conviction that thes8 .two .basic :idea~little ,ap;proved or ruppla11:ded at the time-weil.'e soUd and valid. The Govermuent of Isr.ael is gratineighbou~'s furnish the onay chance o! a stable ad'J1ustment. Vve hold that the Um.ted Nations 'can ;pJay a great ;p'art in the task nf pacification 'by se,curing the repJa'Cement of the trurce 'and ils ma,chinery by the deolaration of 'a fomnal lpeaœ and by insistincr, as the internationaJ ·comnmnity has a rlght to insist, that the :parties meet together to adjust their differences by peacefUlI means. We are persuaded that exercise of international pressure to these two ends ·can ,contribute toa peaceful seUlement, whereas territorial improvisations at the expense of the integrity of an existing st'ate can do litUe but hann. ·dernier les
The President unattributed #147150
The last speaker on my list is the ,ret,presentative of China. There are now five minutes left to us, .and the representative of China may use them if he wishes, with the understanding that he will have pe:mniss~Dn to continue to s!peak at the opening of the next meeting. Mr. TSIANG (China) : 1 think that aH 1 shaH need 'are the five minutes that are left. My 'delegation gladJy associates itself with the delegation of the United Kingdom in .placing hefoTe fhe SecUlity ConDcil the draft resolution whkh aptpea'rs in doculllent Sjl032. 1 must say that the oCl"'edit, and 1 will !S,ay the good credit, for the earefulpreparatioll! of this draft resolution sllO'U'ld be giv.en to the de1legation of my British 'coHe-ague. We have just heard the 'representative of the Provisional Governme.nt of Isra·el state that the truce must he Teplaced by a fOl1mal peace. 1 amafraid that that formaI pea'ce cannot 'be achieved if, in the meanlime, ,the truoe is notûhserved. Up to the pres,ent time in this a,rd:UIQUs task whilch we have undertaken in Pa~estine, it ap/pears ta my delegation that the most suhstantial achievement has been the truce, and it is on the tJ.1Uce that we must buHd what we hOip'e to huild ; that is the rock on which we l'eally must huild the final ·pea'ce. It is le ce une 'puisse f{)'I." fuis reason that my delegation ho!pes th~t aU the other dele.gations' wÏJU aœe'pt thls draft resolution. It is not a controversial resolution; it is not a poiitical resolution ·at 'aU. Hs· 'aim is to rnake easier and more éfi'e,ctive in the fultur~ tbis work of 'preserving the truce. That 1S the on~y Ipurpose of this resolution. When we take up matters of this kind. mydelegation always thinks about the eventual development of the Security CoolIlcil. \Ve hope that the1'e will not be many occasions in the future when we shall have ta send out ob5e1'vers, but il is likely that there will be several occasions when a similar technique wilJ be develOJped. Il is always the hope of my -delegation that wc willperfect that technique and, more important, that we will build 'Up a body with an international tradition which aIl the civiHzed Governrments and Ipeoples will resp-eet, in regard ta the safety of the representatives 'Of this Organization as weIl as with tregard to the facilities which their work requires. Il is for these l'casons that my delegatioll glad'ly associates itself with the delegation of the United Kingdom in submitting this resolutiQn.
The President unattributed #147152
Il would -be only on the basis of unanimous consent that 1 would undertake ta pass this resOllution today, but 1 assume that that is utterly impossible. Therefore, 1 will adjouru this meeting, subJe'Ct to -calI. AUSTRALIA-AUSTRAUE H. A. Goddard Pty. Ltd.· 255a George Street SYDNEY. N. S. W. FINfAND-f/NLANOE Akateeminen Kirjakauppa 2, Keskuskatu HELSINKI; BELGIUM-BELGIQUe Agence et Messageries de la Presse, S. A. 14-22 rue du Persil· BRUXELLES fRANCE Editions A. Pedone i3, rue Souffiot PARIS. Ve GREECE-GRfCE "EIeftheroudakis Librairie internationale Piace de la Constitution ATHÈNES BOLIVIA-BOUV1E Libreria Cientifica y Literarla Avenida ~6 de Julio. 216 CasiUa 972 LA PAZ GUATEMALA José Gouhaud Gcubaud & Cia. Sucesor Sa Av. Sur No. GUATEMALA CANADA The Ryerson Press' 299 Queen Street West TORONTO CHILE-CHIU Edmundo Pizarro Merced 846 SANTIAGO HAITI Max Bouchereau Librairie "A la Boite postale PORT-AU-PRINCE CHINA--CHiNE The Cœnmercial Press Ltd~ 211 'Henan Road SHANGHAI' INDIA--JNDE Oxford Book Scindia House NEW DELHi COL~BIA-COLOMBIE· Libreria Latina Ltda. . Aparlado Aéreo 4011 BOGOTA. IRAN Bongahe Piadero'", ( .731 Shah Avenue ,TElJERAN COSTA RICA-COSTA..R"A Trejos 'Hermanos Apartado 1313 SAN JOSÉ IRAQ-/RAK Mackenzie & The Hookshop BAGHD,ID CUBA La Casa Belga Rèné de Smedt _O'Reilly 455 L\ !bBANA. LEBANON-UBAN Librairie universello BEYROUTH CZECHOSLOVA!(fA- TCHECOSLOVAQUIE F. Topic Narodni Trida 9 PRAHA 1 I.UXEMBOURG ·Librairie J. Schummer Place Guillaume LUXEMBOURG !iENMARK~ANEMARK. Einar Munskgaard Norregade 6 KJOBENHANN NETHERlAt"Ds-:.PAYS-SAS N. V. Martinus Lange.Voorhout ·S'GRAVENHAGE DOMINICAN REPUBUC- REPUBUQUE DOMINICAIN' Lihreria Dominicana Calle Mercedes No. 49 Apartado 656 CIUDAD TRUJILLO 'NEW. ZEALAND- .NOUVELLE-ZELANDE Gordon & Cotch, Waring Taylor WELLINGTON.. ECUADOR-EQUATEUI Muiioz Hermanos y Cia, Nueve de Octubre 703 CasiUa 10-24 GUAYAQUIL, NICARAGUA Raniiro Ramirez Agencia de Publicaciones M.wAGt1~, D.
T'he meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.
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