S/PV.3660 Security Council

Friday, April 26, 1996 — Session 51, Meeting 3660 — New York — UN Document ↗

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.
I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda, in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council’s agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure. There being no objection, it is so decided.
At the invitation of the President, Mr. Eteffa (Ethiopia) and Mr. Yassin (Sudan) took seats at the Council table; Mr. Mukasa-Ssali (Uganda) took the seat reserved for him at the side of the Council Chamber.
The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations. Members of the Council have before them the report of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 1044 (1996), document S/1996/179. Members of the Council also have before them document S/1996/293, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by Botswana, Chile, Egypt, Guinea- Bissau and Honduras. Furthermore, I wish to draw the attention of the members of the Council to the following other documents: S/1996/197, S/1996/201, letters dated 14 and 15 March 1996, respectively, from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General; S/1996/226, S/1996/246, S/1996/255 and S/1996/311, letters dated 28 March, 4 April, 8 April and 22 April 1996, respectively, from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council; S/1996/271, letter dated 11 April 1996 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General; S/1996/254 and S/1996/264, letters dated 8 April and 11 April 1996, respectively, from the Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council; S/1996/288, letter dated 15 April 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council; and S/1996/294, letter dated 12 April 1996 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Central African Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council. The first speaker is the representative of the Sudan, on whom I now call.
I should like to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. We are fully confident in your ability to lead the work of the Council to the desired success and to permit transparency in its work. We would also like to express our appreciation to your predecessor, Mr. Legwaila of Botswana, for his presidency of the Council last month. When Security Council resolution 1044 (1996) was adopted, the pretexts used by the Council were the claims that Sudan had not complied with the requests of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as contained in its statements issued on 11 September 1995 and 19 December 1995. Regardless of the validity of these claims, the objective of Security Council resolution 1044 (1996), as was reaffirmed by most of the members of the Council at that time, was to reaffirm the strong will It is abundantly clear from the consultations that were held prior to the adoption of Security Council resolution 1044 (1996) and the language used by the Council in its provisions that the emphasis is placed on the particular importance of the United Nations providing the necessary support for the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution so that it can arrive at an appropriate formula to resolve that question. It is true that the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter establish the legal framework for cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations, including the OAU. Yet we find that the States parties to the current dispute have resorted directly to the United Nations in order for it to adopt measures to condemn and punish Sudan. The OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution was established originally to play that role. It should have been given the opportunity it needed to prove its ability in this regard and should be enabled to intervene appropriately in the initial stages of any dispute in order for those disputes to be settled at the regional level. That organization’s familiarity with the conditions obtaining in the region makes it more capable of using preventive diplomacy to contain disputes and minimize their negative effects. This is one of the most important reasons that inspired the Council to adopt the aforementioned resolution, thus providing the necessary flexibility for complementarity between the responsibilities of the United Nations and those of the Organization of African Unity. The OAU has spared no effort in its search for a solution to that dispute, and it is continuing its activities in that regard. The matter is expected to be discussed at the summit on the conflict-settlement Mechanism next month. We would like to recall that the Secretary-General of the OAU, in speaking to the President of the Council for last month, affirmed that the OAU was continuing its efforts to resolve the question. He also reaffirmed Sudan’s seriousness and its willingness to cooperate with the Organization in order to arrive at that objective, despite the fact Security Council resolution 1044 (1996) contradicts that of the conflict-settlement Mechanism. Despite the fact that the report (S/1996/179) of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to Security Council The draft resolution the Council intends to adopt today falls within the framework of the measures provided for in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. We must pause here for a second to recall the following. Security Council resolution 1044 (1996), for the reasons mentioned above, contains no condemnation of Sudan: it only calls on Sudan to comply with the resolutions of the OAU, under Chapter VI of the Charter. Furthermore, the Security Council resolution did not take the form of a warning to be followed by sanctions because that was not the main objective of its adoption, especially considering that the Security Council did not consider the substance of the dispute and considered what the OAU had done to be sufficient in that regard. After the adoption of the resolution, both the United Nations and the OAU took a number of steps to find a way out of the current crisis. In implementation of paragraph 7 of the resolution, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations travelled to the region, covering Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Sudan, Egypt and Tunisia. He prepared a report of bizarre content and form, in which he referred to some of what had been said by the States neighbouring Sudan, two of which are parties to the current dispute — and one of those two did not state that Sudan was trying to create instability — and two of which are antagonistic to Sudan and support separatist rebels along its borders with Sudan. As for the fifth State, many people do not understand why it was covered in the Secretary-General’s mission, not being a neighbouring State of Sudan. I would like to ask the Council to pause with us here to wonder how the Secretary-General came to formulate the mission of his Special Envoy in that way? That is to say, why did he limit the scope of that trip to only those States that were visited? Limiting the Special Envoy’s trip to those States meant that he was going only to come back with the same fabrications that were repeated by some States before this Council. Indeed, it was a strange mission. The claim by the Secretary-General and his Special Envoy is a mere fabrication based on no facts and with no connection to reality. On the very day on which the Council met to adopt resolution 1044 (1996), the President of Sudan was participating in the tripartite summit held in Bangui on 31 January and 1 February and attended by the Presidents of Sudan, the Central African Republic and Chad. In their final communiqué, the Presidents reaffirmed the need to make the triangle of Sudan, the Central African Republic and Chad a model of regional cooperation and integration on all levels. The meetings demonstrated the Sudan’s keen interest in developing good-neighbourly relations with its neighbours and their appreciation of the Sudan’s role and potential. Convinced of the Sudan’s earnestness in achieving that cooperation and of its good-neighbourly intentions, the President of the Central African Republic, Mr. Ange-Félix Patassé, sent a letter to the President of the Security Council (S/1996/294) in which he referred to the tripartite summit, aimed at maintaining peace and security, which are essential conditions for lasting development. The letter appealed to the Security Council to search for a peaceful solution precluding punitive measures against the Sudan, which might compromise regional initiatives and set back progress towards cooperation and development. Such measures would be in contravention of the Charter and its lofty principles. As a reaffirmation of its commitment to those principles, the Sudan participated in the summit meetings of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and It is worth noting that the Sudan supported the Eritrean candidacy for the post of Executive Secretary in order to achieve the necessary consensus. IGADD will hold a ministerial meeting this month in Djibouti to implement the summit’s decisions. In response to Malawi’s initiative to normalize relations between the Sudan and Uganda, as well as to the invitation of that country’s Government, the delegation of the Sudan in the multilateral monitoring group travelled to Malawi in mid-January to attend a meeting aimed at pursuing those efforts, but the Ugandan delegation was unable to attend. At the domestic level, the President of the Republic made an important statement at the inaugural session of the new Parliament in which he said that the Sudan, as an expression of its free will and not of fear, wished to improve relations in all forms with all its neighbours, in particular sisterly Egypt. This is how the Sudan views its relations with its neighbours, which the Secretary-General should not have ignored in his report. Furthermore, observers had hoped that the visit of the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy would achieve some positive results as regards narrowing differences and helping the parties to open channels of communication in order to exchange information and to clarify the facts. The Special Envoy did not even meet those accused of the assassination attempt, who are being held by Ethiopia and on whose confessions it is to be assumed that Ethiopia is basing its accusations and claims against the Sudan. It is regrettable that such a meeting did not occur. The Secretary-General’s Special Envoy had preconceptions of the Sudan as a State that supports terrorism and does not respect good-neighbourly relations. The Secretary-General’s claim that the Sudan has not complied with paragraph 4 of resolution 1044 (1996) is indeed amazing. Paragraph 4 (a) of that resolution calls upon the Government of the Sudan to comply with the requests of the Organization of African Unity by immediately extraditing to Ethiopia for prosecution the three suspects. We wish particularly to stress here that the Council has, in a dubious and suspicious manner, ignored the text of the OAU Mechanism of 12 December 1995, in which it called on all the parties to the dispute to cooperate and to provide all the necessary data and information that could help the Government of the Sudan to search for and locate the suspects and extradite them to the Ethiopian authorities. Instead, it should be noted that the Security Council not only ignored this particular paragraph of the OAU resolution, but asserted in paragraph 4 (a) that the suspects are sheltering in the Sudan. It should also be noted that the resolution deliberately avoided any reference to the fact that the suspects are Egyptian citizens. Moreover, the international community has followed the circumstances related to the resolution, foremost among which is that the Council failed to consider the substance of these claims and has not decided upon them. It has merely confined itself to urging the Sudan to cooperate with the OAU. As to the extradition of the suspects, the Government has declared its full readiness to apprehend them once it knows their location and subsequently to extradite them to Ethiopia. The Government has informed the Secretary- General’s Special Envoy of all the steps it has taken in this regard. It has given him a full dossier, contained in document S/1996/197, outlining all the details of the Government’s efforts to search for the suspects and apprehend them. It has called upon Egypt and Ethiopia to cooperate and exchange information in order to clarify the situation with regard to the suspects and to discover their whereabouts. The move by some States to persuade the Council to adopt a resolution imposing sanctions against the Sudan under Chapter VII of the Charter, under the pretext that it has not responded to the demands of paragraph 4 (a) of resolution 1044 (1996), will lead to a dead end. The Council’s demand that Sudan extradite the suspects to Ethiopia will make resolution 1044 (1996) and all subsequent resolutions a whirlwind from which there is no escape, especially since many States are convinced that there is no evidence that the suspects are in Sudan’s territory. There are reports in the international media about their presence in the territory of other States; since the adoption of resolution 1044 (1996) there have been many reports of some of those suspects being outside the Sudan. On 27 February 1996, the Islamic group to which all the participants in the incident at Addis Ababa belong issued a long statement in which it clarified all the circumstances of the incident and declared that Sudan had played no role in the attempt. It also affirmed the fact that none of them was in the Sudan before, during or after the incident. On 14 April 1996, the “Orient” radio station, which broadcasts from Paris in both Arabic and French, stated that a previously unknown person named Abu Hazim, speaking in an Egyptian dialect, had contacted its office in Beshawr and faxed a statement reaffirming that those who had participated in the attempt on the life of President Mubarak in Addis Ababa were outside the Sudan, and that there were only two of them, not three as the Ethiopian authorities claimed. The speaker said that he was one of the participants in the attempt, which was carried out by the Egyptian Islamic group with Egyptian planning, and his presence in Kabul is evidence that the suspects in that attempt are not in the Sudan. He denied that his group had any relations with the Government of Sudan. On 21 April 1996, the Arabic newspaper Al Hayat, issued in New York and London, published an interview with a person called Mustafa Hamza in the Afghan province of Konor. He revealed that he was the first How did the parties deal with this information? First, the Sudan referred the contents of the interview to the President of the Security Council, asking that it be distributed as an official document of the Council. It has been circulated in document S/1996/311. The Sudan also addressed a letter to the President of the Council drawing his attention to this new information. It made it clear that if the information is true it fully supports what the Sudan has always said — that the suspects are not in its territory, and that the Sudan has absolutely no connection with that incident. The letter called upon the President of the Council to confirm the information in the newspaper interview through a fact-finding mission conducted on the basis of previous similar practices of the Council. Secondly, Egypt did not deny the fact that this suspect was in Afghanistan. It turned a blind eye to the importance of the confessions of the suspect, Mustafa Hamza, in order to incriminate Sudan without any evidence. We had hoped that for the sake of truth the suspect’s statements would be evaluated objectively so as to arrive at a productive resolution of the matter supporting the cooperation called for by the Sudan to combat terrorism in all its manifestations. There are reports that certain diplomatic sources have said that information exists confirming that Mustafa Hamza entered the Sudan after the failed attempt. It was also reported that Egyptian sources continued to say that the Government of Sudan was still under suspicion and accusation and that it must provide evidence of its innocence. The declaration made by the Sudanese Foreign Minister was actually altered. When speaking in Cairo, he specifically mentioned the source of his information, which was the “Orient” broadcast in Paris. I was standing next to him at the time. He spoke about the source of the news, not the news item itself. He said: “There are some reports about the presence of the person named Mustafa Hamza in Afghanistan”, and mentioned the content of the “Orient” broadcast in Paris, which was based on the suspect’s telephone and fax contact. Anyone who claims otherwise is trying to distort reality. The Egyptian reaction to what the suspect told the newspaper, to the effect that the Sudan continued to be guilty until proved innocent, is a contravention of the The suspect also said that only two, not three, people participated in that operation and managed to leave Addis Ababa. That was confirmed by the weak information that Sudan received from Ethiopia about what it called the third suspect, which arrived without a photograph of that suspect, which was not the case with the other wanted suspects. Whoever examines this matter will find a great many contradictions between Ethiopia’s complaint to the Council and the interview of the first suspect. Information relating to the suspects’ entry into Ethiopia, their departure from the country, the fact that they received passports and the States that they came from or passed through, all raises serious doubts about the Ethiopian complaints as a whole, especially as Ethiopia insisted on trying its suspects in secret and refused to accept the request of some Egyptian lawyers to defend them. It even refused to give those lawyers a visa to go to Addis Ababa. That newspaper interview contains important information that the Council should not ignore. If it does so it will have denied all the principles of justice and equity. I heard the statements made by all the speakers when the question of Lebanon was discussed in the Council. Most of them — there were only a few exceptions — condemned the conduct of the Security Council, accusing it of double standards and bias. If that is how the Council behaves, will Sudan find redress and justice here? The statement made by the first suspect has much greater value in proving the facts than the claims of the Ethiopians. If the Council sincerely wants, for once in its recent history, to arrive at the truth and, in particular, to arrive at the realities of the bizarre question before it, it is high time for it to evaluate the Ethiopian claims and their sources in the light of what the first suspect revealed. Paragraph 4 (b) of resolution 1044 (1996) is even worse. Its demand for the Sudan to desist from supporting terrorism is a condemnation of the innocent by delivering a verdict and punishing the innocent without any convincing proof. This, too, is a contravention of all legal systems. Resolution 1044 (1996) has failed to clarify the The claim by the Secretary-General in his report to the Council that the Sudan has not complied with paragraph 4 (b) of resolution 1044 (1996) since all the neighbouring countries visited by his Special Envoy have accused it of supporting terrorist activities within their territories, gives cause for suspicion and distrust and casts much doubt on the organs of the United Nations. The claim that all the neighbours of the Sudan that were visited by the Special Envoy is a misleading generalization. It runs counter to what was contained in the report itself, since one of the four States did not say that the Sudan was attempting to destabilize its territories. Therefore, the use of terms such as “all” is a falsification of the facts and dishonest. The same report states that the Sudan was described to the Special Envoy as a country that is subject to destabilizing activities which are supported and encouraged by its neighbours. Sudanese officials reminded the Special Envoy of letters sent by the Sudan to the President of the Security Council complaining about the active aggression perpetrated against it by some of those States, letters contained in documents S/1995/522, S/1995/616 and S/1996/29. One can only wonder how the Secretary-General can justify his claim regarding Sudan’s non-compliance with paragraph 4 (b) of resolution 1044 (1996) on the basis of some of the statements his Special Envoy heard in some of the States he visited, while totally ignoring the Sudan’s accusations concerning those States that shelter terrorists — for example, Uganda — even if we assume that both types of statement have equal weight as evidence. Sudan has repeatedly declared its full readiness to cooperate with international and regional organizations to The Sudan would like here to repeat that it has not yet received any additional information about the suspects, information that might help the Sudanese authorities to determine their location. On the contrary, the Sudan is daily surprised by the emergence of so-called new information in the corridors here, presented by the States concerned. Let us look at this new information. First, Egypt has distributed two documents, the first of which claims to be a transcript of the interrogation of some of the suspects in the attempt who are currently held in Ethiopia. This document does not reveal who interrogated those mentioned in it. This is of extreme importance in evaluating the value of such documents as evidence. Secondly, the interrogation was based on the assumption that Sudan and its security organs were involved in the matter. That is an assumption that has no connection with what the suspects said. Thirdly, the document goes on to mention names, claiming that they are the names of Sudanese citizens, as proof of Sudan’s involvement in the incident. What was given was only the first name of four persons, without referring to their jobs or their connections with the State and its organs. Fourthly, in very general terms, the document claims that the Sudan smuggles arms in order to prove that the Sudan was involved in the incident. The interrogation did not refer to the method or the persons or the organ that carried out this smuggling operation. Fifthly, as a general State policy of the Sudan, the entry and exit of foreigners, in particular Arabs, without a visa was a very easy matter at the time. The insinuation that the facilities’ being made available was proof of Sudan’s support for the suspects has no basis in fact, as the document itself reveals, those suspects have received greater facilities from Ethiopia. Why should that not be used as proof of Ethiopia’s involvement? The mere claim that there is evidence that one of the suspects, or all of them, entered the Sudan is not in and of itself evidence Sixthly, why did Egypt provide this document now? Why did it not provide the Sudan with the information contained therein? Although we find this information unfruitful and unproductive as evidence, why was it not given to the Sudan before the adoption of the resolution of the Council, particularly since Egypt is obliged, under the provisions of the 1973 New York Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, to provide other States parties to that Convention with the information available to it about the suspects, and especially since the Sudan is a party to that Convention, which was mentioned in the third preambular paragraph of resolution 1044 (1996)? Egypt also distributed another document, a photocopy of a local Sudanese newspaper, Heart of the street, which reported last March that the three suspects would be holding a press conference in some State, when they would dispel all the accusations of Sudan’s involvement in the attempt on the Egyptian President’s life. The intent behind distributing that newspaper was to prove that the Sudan at least knew where the suspects were located. This newspaper is privately owned; it is independent, and has no connection with the Government. Therefore, it does not speak on behalf of the State, and the State should not be questioned about news reports in it. Nevertheless, the Government has responded to that news item with the necessary seriousness. It questioned the editor of that newspaper, who refused to reveal the sources of the information he published, claiming that the laws of the country give journalists immunity from having to reveal the sources of their information. The Government had no choice but to release him. It is obvious that the State is not supposed to respond to sensationalist news in the media, either by confirming it or by denying it. This is true of all States of the world. It is worth noting that journalists in the Sudan are in close contact with the press and journalists in Egypt. Egypt was and continues to be a source of culture in the Sudan. The second allegation employed in order to convince the members of the Security Council to impose coercive measures against the Sudan is the claim by the United States of America that the Sudan was a party to a The Sudan has rejected strongly this conduct by the host country. It has denied completely that the Sudan or its representatives have any connection with any terrorist acts, in any State or in any form. The Sudan called on the host country to provide it with evidence proving its claims. Many delegations and Member States know the diplomat who was expelled, on both an official and a personal level. This is testimony enough to his innocence. This action by the host country came at a time when many observers were asking why it had chosen to remain silent ever since 1993, and why it had not levelled any charges against that diplomat? The answer to these questions is very clear: these actions represent a political mobilization to influence negatively the atmosphere of discussions on the draft resolution currently before the Security Council. All this is aimed at strategic and political objectives that cannot be hidden from anyone. The United States, through some of its representatives, has spoken to the press in a manner that is offensive to the Sudan and that is not usual in the Security Council or in the corridors of the United Nations. For our part, we will continue to act with courtesy and decency. We are a people who show patience in the face of adversity, and if we are offended we also know how to forgive. The third allegation is by the State that has put the complaint before the Council and on whose territory the crime took place. Ethiopia finds it sufficient to say that it is in possession of evidence that cannot be revealed currently for security reasons, but that indicates that the Sudanese Government is aware of the location of the suspects. It also says that it will consider the question of providing additional information, if it proves necessary, to expedite the legal steps necessary for extradition and that it has started to try in secret those held in its prisons. Anyone who has followed the development of the events would not be blamed if he or she doubted the credibility of those States, their seriousness and their readiness to cooperate with the Sudan to provide it with information in order to assist it in apprehending the suspects. All this is done in order to incriminate the Sudan and to tarnish its image with the charge of supporting and being involved in terrorism. We believe that such statements are clear proof that the States parties to that dispute are bent on perpetuating it by claiming that they have materials and evidence that many doubt even exist. How could the Security Council bear the historical responsibility of condemning the Sudan and punishing it on the basis of such unclear and flimsy statements? The draft resolution before the Council today is gravely inconsistent with the principles of justice and equality on which this Organization was founded. This draft resolution would be another blemish on the record of this Council, which is replete with injustice, and will lead ultimately to nothing but greater doubt in the credibility of this Organization in its application of the concepts of international peace and security. When the United Nations Charter gave the Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and provided that the Council would represent all the other States in discharging its responsibility, it also stated that the Council should discharge this responsibility in accordance with the principles and objectives of the United Nations. Among these is the resort to peaceful means, in accordance with the principles of justice and international law, to resolve disputes and to achieve international cooperation to that end. It is indeed regrettable that these principles are being exploited as a pretext for punishing States and peoples that are not well liked by some members of the Council, while, at the same time, the Council turns a blind eye to the practices of other States that perpetrate great atrocities that would be punishable under Chapter VII of the Charter. All The draft resolution before the Council ignores completely the positive developments that have taken place in the Sudan during the last three months vis-à-vis the first free presidential and parliamentary elections in the history of the Sudan. From many quarters — in particular the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the League of Arab States — the international community has testified as to the freedom and fairness of these elections and the lack of violence in connection with them. Among these positive developments is also the establishment of the rules of democracy, the establishment of a federal system in the country and the signing of peace treaties with the rebels in the south in order to put an end to bloody internal conflicts and to stop the civil war between the sons of the country. We would like to recall here the contents of the letter contained in document S/1996/271, which proves the good intentions of the Sudanese Government to establish comprehensive peace in the country, to introduce the concept of rights and duties on the basis of citizenship and to promote and protect the human rights of the Sudanese citizens by all means possible. The adoption by the Council of any measures against the Sudan under Chapter VII of the Charter will be an obstacle to these achievements instead of helping the Sudan to continue along that path, as if this were the Council’s reward to the Sudan for its great achievements. The imposition of any measures by the Council against the Sudan, whatever their political nature and however limited they may be, will have a far-reaching effect on the stability of the Sudan and on the unity of its territory, and therefore will have a grave effect on the stability of the region as a whole. They will also have grave humanitarian repercussions throughout the region, in particular in the States neighbouring the Sudan. The draft resolution before the Council today ignores completely all the efforts made by the Sudan to comply with resolution 1044 (1996). This is a grave injustice. The present draft resolution has renounced completely any There is no doubt that the overwhelming majority of the States Members of the United Nations agree with our rejection of the sanctions, since they are inhuman, selective and run counter to morality, and have destructive consequences for peoples. In addition, the victims are always developing countries, and thus the sanctions increase the poverty and the suffering of their peoples. They also create instability in the countries on which they are imposed. They block the channels of dialogue and communication between States. Therefore, a working group was established to study these sanctions in the light of the experience of the United Nations. The Council’s return, at the instigation of some of its members, to adopt a resolution to impose sanctions against the Sudan, despite all those facts, raises a number of questions as to the priority in the work of the Council, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Is it to promote the principles of international cooperation and the maintenance of international peace and security, or is it to increase the suffering of peoples and impose sanctions on them, one after the other? The Sudan is the third State in one geographical region to be isolated and to have sanctions imposed on it. Can we consider this a coincidence, or is this a deliberate strategy against that region, its peoples, its cultures and its faiths? Finally, allow me to reaffirm that the Sudan, true to its principles, which are rooted in its religion and in its traditions, maintains its commitment, entered into earlier and since repeated in many forums and at all levels, to condemn, in the strongest possible terms, terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, regardless of its causes, motivations or perpetrators. The Sudan has not allowed, and will not allow, its territory to be used for any terrorist action or to be a shelter for terrorists or for fugitives from justice. The Sudan remains committed to the implementation of all resolutions adopted by all international organizations, including the OAU, and those of this Council, however contrary they may be to the spirit of justice and equality. The Sudan will also take a keen interest in maintaining good-neighbourly relations with all neighbouring States, in particular Egypt, and will attempt to develop regional and bilateral cooperation with these States. The Sudan will All this is due to Sudan’s strong interest in clarifying the facts and dispelling doubts. It is not seeking sympathy or justifying its position. It wishes only to clarify the facts and to take a clear stance on this important matter. I apologize for speaking at such length.
May I first of all congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of April. I am confident that under your wise and able leadership the Council will continue to cope successfully with its heavy responsibilities during the current month. May I also extend my appreciation to your predecessor, the Permanent Representative of Botswana, Ambassador Joseph Legwaila, for the outstanding manner in which he guided the work of the Council last month. I also wish to take this opportunity to thank the Secretary- General for his report to the Security Council regarding the implementation of resolution 1044 (1996). When Ethiopia decided to bring this grave issue to the Security Council more than three months ago, it did so with the conviction that the Council would be so enraged by the enormity of the crime committed by the Sudanese authorities that the message it would send to them would be clear, unambiguous and principled. It was our hope that the Council would tell the authorities in the Sudan that our world has no place for a leadership that sponsors assassination plots against a Head of State. In such a clear-cut case of an act of terror, in which the Sudanese authorities were caught red-handed, Ethiopia thought the reaction of the Council would be as forceful as the gravity of the crime dictates, and as unambiguous as the blatant nature of the international terrorism carried out and sponsored by the Sudanese authorities warrants. The draft resolution before the Council, however, has made us wonder whether the confidence we initially had was warranted and whether those, like the Sudanese authorities, who engage in State-sponsored terrorism will ever fully, and with no equivocation, be held accountable for the crimes they have committed. The draft resolution to be adopted now and the events immediately preceding it have indeed caused us to recall the painful memories of our past. We have so much been victims of political expediency in the past that we There is no doubt that the facts about the involvement of the Sudanese authorities in the assassination attempt are as clear as day. This has been proved beyond the shadow of a doubt, and the Sudanese authorities know that they were caught red-handed. This was also the conviction of the Security Council when it adopted resolution 1044 (1996), which calls on the Sudanese authorities to hand over to Ethiopia for prosecution the three terrorists it is sheltering in its territory, and to desist from supporting and assisting terrorists. Not only have the Sudanese authorities not complied with the demands of the Council, but they have continued to ridicule the Council by the many antics and ploys they have resorted to, starting from the very morrow of the adoption of resolution 1044 (1996). The latest ploy is the interview, or the alleged interview, by Mustafa Hamza, the leader of the terrorist group, vindicating the Sudanese authorities of involvement in the crime. This, for Ethiopia, is a veritable insult to the intelligence of the members of the Council. The Secretary-General’s report makes it abundantly clear that Sudan has not complied with the Council’s demands contained in resolution 1044 (1996). Obviously, Ethiopia had no illusion that the resolution to be adopted would be strong enough to compel the Sudanese authorities to respect the decision of the Council. It was precisely for this reason that an arms embargo would have been one of the most appropriate and proper steps, which the Council should have taken, in order to put the requisite pressure on the Sudanese authorities to secure their compliance with its demands. The call was for a comprehensive arms embargo applicable to all, and as such all arguments put forth against such a step by the Council are patently hollow, extremely unconvincing, and lacking in transparency, which is so much demanded by the appalling nature of the crime committed by the Sudanese authorities and by the serious implications for international peace and security. The fact that the Security Council has found it difficult to impose an arms embargo on a leadership which sponsors and assists, as well as supplies arms to, terrorists and which, in any case, needs the arms to suppress parts of its own people whom it has difficulty accepting on the basis of equality, is indeed difficult to comprehend. It is the conviction of my Government that trying to appease those who have consciously chosen terrorism as an instrument of State policy will not work and will not produce the desired results. The evidence for this is abundant and needs no recitation. The mentality of the Sudanese authorities is such that, no matter how wrong they might be, they are bound to view the resolution to be adopted by the Council as a successful outcome of their ploys and prevarications. True, we have not yet come to the end of the road on this issue, and it might be too soon for the Sudanese authorities to believe that they can continue to carry out terrorism and target Heads of State for assassination with impunity. But there is one clear victor today — expediency. There is one clear loser — principle. The fact that principles — and very important principles having to do with international law and with the fight against terrorism — have been sacrificed today on the altars of political expediency and political calculations should be admitted with all candour. It is our hope that we will draw the proper lessons from the experience, one of which might perhaps sadly be that the world is not as yet ready to fight against State-sponsored terrorism with determination, courage and a sense of responsibility, justice and solidarity. As I conclude, I wish to express Ethiopia’s sincere appreciation to all those who chose to focus on the merit of the case before the Council, independently of other considerations, and who, despite all the confusion deliberately created, decided to remain steadfast and acted on the basis of principles and with the conviction that State-sponsored terrorism, whether committed in Africa, Europe or America, remains a crime which should never be tolerated.
I should like to express our congratulations to you, Sir, upon your assumption of the presidency for the month of April and also to offer our gratitude to your predecessor. I also thank you for giving me this opportunity to participate in the present discussion, which touches on matters of particular interest to my Government. Since this matter before the Council deals, to a large extent, with the dangerous policy of the Sudanese Government’s support for terrorism, especially in the subregion, I would like to take time to inform the Council of the persistent and determined efforts by the Sudanese regime to destabilize Uganda. In spite of our efforts to maintain a policy of good- neighbourliness with all our neighbours, the Sudanese regime has continued its activities of assisting, supporting, facilitating and even giving shelter and sanctuary to two rebel movements based on its soil, whose sole purpose is to wreak havoc and misery on defenceless civilians in the north and northwestern districts of Uganda. It will be recalled that the Government of Uganda severed diplomatic relations with the Government of Sudan on 13 April 1995, over incidents aimed at destabilizing Uganda and compromising its security and stability. It is with regret that I inform the Council that, since then, rather than improving, the situation has progressively worsened, with frequent incursions by Kony Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the West Nile Bank Front of Juma Oris into northern and northwestern Uganda, respectively. Both rebel movements are based well inside the territory of Sudan, whence they make incursions into Uganda. It is important that I give details of some of the numerous incidents that have taken place starting last year and up to as recently as 17 April 1996. On 17 April 1995, two LRA brigades of Stocree and Gilva, numbering between 250 and 300 and all dressed in Sudanese military uniforms, entered Uganda from Parajok in the Sudan. They invaded Adodi, north-west of Parabek, and attacked Lukung Trading Centre on 18 April 1995, killing 24 people, most of whom were women and children, and abducting over 30 others. On 20 April 1995 the LRA attacked Atiak, murdered over 200 civilians and carried out atrocities of such wide magnitude that they attracted international attention and concern. On 20 July 1995 about 500 rebels of Lords Resistance Army, armed by the Sudan with anti-aircraft missiles, mortars and personal weapons, and fully dressed in Sudanese Armed Forces uniforms, crossed into Uganda from Palutaka in Sudan and invaded Padibe in Uganda on 28 July 1995. During this attack the LRA murdered three civilians, inflicted injuries on four others and abducted 10 more. Thereafter, the rebels carried out acts of arson — burning homesteads and setting granaries on fire — looted merchandise in the trading centre and vandalized what they could not carry. Two motorcycles from a missionary hospital were also looted. After committing these crimes against innocent civilians, the rebels withdrew to their safe haven in the Sudan on 30 July 1995. The Sudanese Armed Forces based in Palutaka sent trucks to the rebels, which picked them up from River Amur with their booty on 31 July 1995. On 11 August 1995 a group of 500 LRA rebels, again heavily armed by Sudan, entered Uganda through Lellabul and ravaged Lukung Division in Kitgum District. It is also important to note that all the captives in all these incidents were herded to Palutaka, where they were forcibly put on military training. In the north-western Ugandan districts of Arua and Moyo, the Sudanese Government is grooming the West Nile Bank Front, numbering between 1,000 and 1,500 men, under Colonel Juma Oris. In a similar manner as in the case of Kony, the Sudanese Government offers sanctuary and training facilities to these rebels in and around Morobo, at Atende, Mahajub and Alebo. Their operational force is in Kaya at places called Kimba, Poki and Arabamiji near the Uganda-Sudan border under Lieutenant Colonel Yasin Noah, and also in Baazi, on the Sudan-Zaire border. The Sudan intends to The latest of the horrendous incursions into Uganda by the Sudanese-assisted rebels was when over 500 LRA rebels crossed into Uganda from Aru in the Sudan via Mogali on 7 February this year. So far over 50 innocent civilians have been killed, with many others abducted and millions of dollars’ worth of personal and State property looted or destroyed. Others, most of them women and children, have been maimed by anti-personnel mines planted in their farmlands by the rebels, who are all well supplied by the Sudanese regime with these and various other types of explosive devices. In the north-western part of the country, rebels of the West Nile Bank Front based in southern Sudan and led by Colonel Juma Oris entered Uganda on 17 April this year at a place called Kei Hill in Midigo, Arua District. The rebels, numbering between 300 and 500, were all armed and dressed in Sudanese military combat fatigues. They planted anti-tank and anti-personnel mines along the route after attacking Ikafe refugee camp and abducting nine workers from Oxfam, whom they later released. Our people in the north-western districts have mobilized themselves to support our security forces to defeat this aggression from Sudan. Armed with bows, arrows, spears and pangas, they have assisted the Uganda People’s Defence Forces in routing the rebels sent by their masters in Khartoum to wreak havoc in our country. As a result of the patriotic sacrifices of our people and armed forces, several of these bandits have been killed and others captured, while 70 of those remaining fled to Zaire on 23 April this year. Our people and security forces have played and will continue to play their appropriate roles in defending the country against foreign aggression, but we also need the support of the international community, and the Security Council in particular, to put an end to the evil designs of the regime in Khartoum. The Sudanese regime has not stopped at training, arming and sending rebels into Uganda to wreak havoc but has also, on several occasions, shelled, and its air force We are preparing for presidential and parliamentary elections to be held in our country between early May and early June, but the activities to which I have referred have not made it easy for our people in the affected districts to prepare to freely exercise their democratic rights as citizens for the first time in about 30 years, and to elect a Government of their choice. As a result of Sudanese activities and those of its supported rebels, economic, social and political activities in north and north-western Uganda have been disrupted, and there is general panic. This situation cannot be allowed to continue. We have always stressed that efforts to improve and normalize relations between Uganda and Sudan would be helped if Sudan disbanded and disarmed the Ugandan dissidents or rebels in the Sudan, confined them in camps, capable of being monitored and verifiable, and confined the leaders of these rebels — or, better still, resettled them in a country of asylum in accordance with international conventions on refugees. As the evidence clearly shows, the Sudanese Government has not heeded our advice and has, in fact, stepped up its destabilization programme against Uganda. Its pretext for these actions has been the alleged Ugandan Government support for the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA), a pretext which we have dismissed as unfounded and lacking any basis in fact. The whole world knows that the conflict in the Sudan is purely an internal matter, and that its solution will have to be found by the Sudanese people themselves through dialogue. Uganda condemns in the strongest possible terms the unprovoked acts of aggression visited on us by the Sudanese Government and calls upon the Security Council and the international community at large to do the same, and to take the strongest possible measures to halt them completely. The matter before the Council is further evidence of the actions of a regime that has set as its policy the destabilization of its neighbours, using whatever means it deems necessary. It is the duty of this Council to live up We have looked at the draft resolution before the Council, and wish to express our disappointment that it does not send the strong signal that we had hoped for. Our terrorized and brutalized people are looking to this Council and the international community for an assurance that the Sudanese air force will no longer bomb their homes, that the Sudanese armed forces will no longer shell their villages, and that the Sudanese-sponsored rebels will no longer kill, rape or maim them, rob them of their property or abduct their children, simply because the international community has finally prevailed on the Sudanese regime to desist from all acts of terrorism and aggression against all its neighbours. We would like, therefore, to reiterate the need for the Security Council to take any measures necessary, including an arms embargo against the Sudan, to ensure that it desists from engaging in activities that are not only destabilizing Uganda but plunging the entire subregion into chaos.
It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. Unless I hear any objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote. There being no objection, it is so decided. I shall first call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting.
The Russian delegation confirms with the utmost clarity its strong, unwavering rejection of the evil of international terrorism in all its manifestations. In the struggle against this new and extremely dangerous threat to global peace and security, our country is ready, at a solid and practical level, to cooperate constructively with all international and regional organizations and States. The Russian Federation strongly condemned the attempted assassination of the President of Egypt, Mr. Mubarak, in Addis Ababa on 26 June last year. We strongly urge that an objective investigation of this crime, to establish the facts, be carried out fully and be completed, and that those involved be brought to justice. One cannot avoid feeling that the draft resolution was used not so much to speed up the search for the suspects as to isolate Sudan internationally. It is a pity that such an important organization as the OAU, with such authority, was not able to counter that trend, basically just distancing itself from implementing its own decisions on the matter. Really convincing evidence about the involvement of Khartoum in the assassination attempt and in the whereabouts of the suspects has not been given to the Security Council or to the Secretary-General. Incidentally, the co-sponsors of the draft resolution were forced to acknowledge this when they indicated that the Secretary- General of the United Nations should be asked to establish the facts. The situation becomes even more complicated in view of recent reports that the suspects, or at least one of them, are not in Sudan. Of course, the information needs to be checked very thoroughly, but, if it turns out to be true, other practical steps will have to be taken. The draft resolution before us, with all of the proper and correct provisions it contains, basically in other parts disregards the points which I have just made. Moreover, the draft creates an extremely serious problem which is totally unrelated to the situation of Sudan. I am referring to the overall approach to the use of an instrument such as international sanctions. The members of the Security Council and other Members of the United Nations have on several occasions come to realize that the arbitrary application of sanctions is essentially flawed when there However, despite the growing understanding which has now taken root in the United Nations about the need for clear criteria on sanctions matters, in this case apart from the understandable demand for the extradition of the three suspects, if, of course, they are still in the Sudan — abstract demands are being made of Khartoum along the lines of living in friendly relations with its neighbours and complying with the Charter of the United Nations and with the Charter of the OAU. I believe that all representatives, including the co-sponsors, understand full well that objective criteria for checking implementation of such vague demands simply do not exist. That means that, if desired, Sudan can be kept under sanctions indefinitely. Apparently there are some who would be willing to do this, and then we would have a repetition of what we are already seeing in other situations — namely, the introduction of economic sanctions with no time-frame, the suffering of broad sectors of the population, an unavoidable humanitarian crisis, and the search for ways of dealing with that crisis, including, probably, the adoption of a resolution along the lines of resolution 986 (1995), and then it would go on and on in that already rather well-known vicious circle. I believe that many colleagues in this Chamber understand the situation. The fact that it is known in advance that this kind of demand cannot be met, along with the logic contained in paragraph 8 of the resolution, predetermines in a way the inevitability of a further escalation of sanctions against Sudan, and this could lead the Security Council in the very near future into a stalemate, with no simple way out. I want to be sure that I am correctly understood. We are absolutely in favour of involving the Security Council in a real — I emphasize “a real” — struggle against international terrorism, but we are against attempts to make use of this in order to punish certain régimes or in order to attain other political goals of one or more Member States. Such an approach, as far as we are concerned, is unacceptable, for it is not only destructive for the people of the Sudan and for the peoples of the countries in the region, but it also creates a very dangerous precedent which could do real damage to the authority of the Security Council and Accordingly, despite the rumours last night, the Russian delegation cannot support the draft resolution. We have found it possible not to prevent its adoption simply because implementation of the measures contained therein relating to diplomatic pressure on Sudan will depend on the Members of the United Nations themselves. At the same time, we trust that what we have said — which is the position of principle of Russia — has been heard and understood in all of its details, including what we have said about future consideration of this matter in the Security Council in two months’ time. We remain convinced that the problem of bringing the suspects to justice can and must be resolved urgently. We hope that the Government of the Sudan, in the spirit of the proposals and promises that it has made, will — in cooperation with the authorities of Ethiopia and Egypt — take additional real steps in the interest of attaining this goal.
I wish to thank the non- aligned members of the Council for having prepared and introduced the draft resolution. The Italian delegation has great respect for the positions of the Non-Aligned Caucus, particularly its African members, since they are the ones that have worked on this very same case in the framework of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The draft resolution before us meets the Security Council’s purpose — that is, to send a clear signal in the hope that the Sudan will comply with resolution S/1044 (1996), thereby avoiding the dangerous isolation of that country from the international community. The time has come for Khartoum to heed its responsibilities to the international community and to show its political will to fully comply with Security Council resolutions. My country’s relations with this region of Africa are ancient and traditionally intense. Italy wants peace to return to the region and also strongly believes in the need to fight terrorism, wherever it may be, in the interests of international peace and security. For these reasons, Italy will vote in favour of the draft resolution. We hope that the Sudan will be responsive to this clear signal from the international community and make every effort to fulfil its obligations
My delegation considers the assassination attempt on the life of the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, in Addis Ababa, in June 1995, as requiring our most serious attention. We believe that this act has created concern among the international community, bearing in mind the profound interest the international community attaches to the question of international terrorism and to the safety and security of Heads of State or Government. I should also like to take this opportunity to reiterate our steadfast position that Indonesia is firmly against international terrorism and strongly condemns all acts of violence. It is our view that such acts constitute the most flagrant violation of human rights. Consequently, from the beginning, when this matter was brought to the Council, my delegation has made it clear that we unequivocally condemn the assassination attempt on the life of President Hosni Mubarak and that the perpetrators of this act of violence should be brought swiftly to justice. With regard to the prevailing situation, it seems that the Government of the Sudan has not yet fully fulfilled all its obligations with regard to the efforts undertaken by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). We are, however, aware of the fact that the Sudan had indeed already taken some steps and is still continuing its efforts to fulfil its obligations under Security Council resolution 1044 (1996). It is pertinent to note that the Sudan had extended invitations to the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity to visit Khartoum and had requested Interpol’s assistance in looking for the suspects. These steps reflect the positive attitude of the Government of the Sudan, which needs to be acknowledged by the international community. It is therefore incumbent upon the Government of the Sudan to redouble its efforts with a view to fulfilling the provisions contained in resolution 1044 (1996). In order to ensure compliance from the Government of the Sudan with the Security Council’s demands, the Indonesian delegation believes that it would have been more appropriate to deal with the situation in a gradual manner, by way of a presidential statement, rather than a draft resolution containing elements of sanctions. This indeed would have been our preference. A step-by-step approach would, in our opinion, have provided the opportunity and the time necessary for the Government of We also believe that close cooperation between the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, Ethiopia and the Sudan is of the utmost importance if the matter is to be resolved in a peaceful manner. In this respect, it is our fervent hope that the efforts of the Organization of African Unity, as the regional organization directly concerned, would, and indeed should, make substantial contributions towards the resolution of the issues, in the interest of all its member States. It would also be appropriate for the Council to consider the letter of the Permanent Representative of the Sudan, dated 21 April 1996, contained in document S/1996/311, pertaining to this matter. If, however, after all avenues have been explored and all efforts exhausted, the Council ultimately assesses that the Government of the Sudan has still not fully complied with its requests, only then should the Security Council consider adopting further measures to ensure implementation of resolution 1044 (1996). While my delegation considers the draft resolution before us as supporting the thrust and objectives of the statements adopted by the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution on 11 September 1995 and 19 December 1995, we cannot but express our concern that this text goes beyond our expectations. We are fully aware of the serious and untiring efforts exerted by various delegations, and welcome the cooperative spirit demonstrated by all members in their attempt to accommodate various amendments addressing the concerns of not only the Council members, but also the parties involved. It is nevertheless unfortunate that it still contains measures which constitute sanctions. As a matter of principle, Indonesia has always maintained the view that the imposition of sanctions as a means to bring pressure to bear on some Governments is a matter of the utmost seriousness. The imposition of sanctions should be considered only after all means for the pacific settlement of disputes under Chapter VI of the Charter have been exhausted and thorough consideration has been undertaken of the long-term and short-term effects of such sanctions. Sanctions are not meant to be punitive, but it is widely acknowledged that, irrespective of their objectives, they do affect the innocent population. We retain our understanding that in order for a resolution to achieve the desired results and for it to become a truly effective tool for rectifying the situation, by persuading the party concerned to comply with the obligations under the resolution, it is imperative that it not only properly address the concerns of the issue at hand, but also maintain strict adherence to those basic principles to which we all aspire. In conclusion, I wish to express my delegation’s understanding of some paragraphs contained in the draft resolution. With regard to operative paragraph 1 (a), my delegation is of the view that the matter of extradition is a legal one and only involves two States. In the case before us, the Sudan can extradite to Ethiopia only those suspects who are in its territory. With regard to operative paragraph 8, our interpretation is that it does not prejudge whether further measures will be taken by the Council. The adoption of further measures by the Council will be determined only by its assessment of the situation and of the conditions prevailing after the 60 days’ re-examination period has elapsed. Let me conclude by stating that under these circumstances, and in the light of the observations I have just expressed, my delegation will vote in favour of this draft resolution.
When the Security Council adopted resolution 1044 (1996) on 31 January 1996, my delegation expressed the hope that it would be the last resolution to be adopted by the Council on the question of the extradition to Ethiopia of the three suspects wanted in connection with the assassination attempt on the life of the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, last June. We had hoped the Government of the Sudan would comply with the demands of resolution 1044 (1996) and avoid a prolonged dispute with the Security Council. It is not too late; the Sudan can still do what is expected of it by Security Council resolution 1044 (1996). The Sudan is a fellow African country, and we do not harbour any ill intentions against its brotherly people. We are aware that the draft resolution before us is not as stringent on the Sudan as it could have been, or as some would have wanted it to be, thanks to the efforts of the co-sponsors. We are banking on the compliance of the Immediately following the adoption of resolution 1044 (1996), the Secretary-General dispatched a Special Envoy to Africa for consultations on the implementation of that resolution, and a report on the results of that diplomatic effort was submitted to the Security Council. What is most striking about the report is that all the Sudan’s neighbours, visited by the Special Envoy, accuse the Sudanese Government of supporting terrorist activities in their countries. We find this most disturbing. Africa is drowning in all manner of problems, and it can ill afford to add more. We therefore appeal to the Sudan and its neighbours to respect each other’s territorial integrity. My delegation voted in favour of resolution 1044 (1996) because of its firm aversion to terrorism. Terrorism is the scourge of world society today, and it is incumbent upon all States, including the Sudan, to get rid of this scourge. The extradition of the three suspects to Ethiopia would serve as a deterrent to terrorists in the region and beyond. Those with terrorist intentions would know that there is no place to hide. The draft resolution before us sends the right message about the commitment of the international community to effectively combat terrorism. All States should cooperate in the efforts to rid the world of the menace of terrorism. It is therefore our ardent hope that the Government of the Sudan will also cooperate in this endeavour and take concrete steps to ensure compliance with the demands of the international community. This would send a clear signal that the Sudan does not abet terrorist activities and the Government of the Sudan would have clearly dissociated itself from the terrorism that its neighbours accuse it of encouraging. The peoples of East Africa want peace, without which they cannot develop their countries. Coming from southern Africa, we are fully alive to the negative effects that terrorism and destabilization can have on the economies of countries. We do not wish them to be visited upon the countries of East Africa, or any group of States, for that matter.
On 31 January 1996, the Security Council Nevertheless, my delegation regrets that the Government of the Sudan has not yet complied with the request of the Security Council, despite the efforts of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and of the OAU. Guinea-Bissau condemns acts of international terrorism in all their forms, and believes that the international community should adopt practical measures to address such heinous acts. In this context, my delegation reaffirms its support for the 1994 United Nations Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism. My delegation also reiterates its strong condemnation of the attempted assassination of President Mubarak and its solidarity with the Arab Republic of Egypt. It believes that the attack affected the sovereignty, integrity and stability not only of Ethiopia, but of all of Africa. My delegation encourages the authorities of the Sudan to take every necessary measure to promote all efforts aimed at ensuring the implementation of Security Council resolution 1044 (1996). As the draft resolution before us does not, in our view, seem to have economic implications that could adversely affect the civilian population of the Sudan, my delegation will vote in favour.
My Government is on record as to the clarity of its position with respect to international terrorism. We view international terrorism as a major threat to international peace and security in today’s world. We remain committed to its eradication from the face of the globe through concerted international action, and welcome the attention and the seriousness with which the Security Council is facing up to the issue. My delegation deeply regrets that the Security Council has come to where it stands in the implementation of its resolution 1044 (1996) of 31 January 1996. My Government is one of those that advocate the utmost caution and prudence in taking action under Chapter VII of the Charter. In the case at hand, however, we see no Sudan has been under the legal obligation to extradite to Ethiopia for prosecution the three suspects wanted in connection with the assassination attempt on the life of President Mubarak, as called for in paragraph 4 (a) of resolution 1044 (1996). There has been no lack of diplomatic efforts to seek Sudan’s compliance on the part of either the United Nations Secretary-General or the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity. Unfortunately, to date all these efforts have been to no avail. Nor have we heard of any progress in the implementation of paragraph 4 (b) of the resolution. Although the draft resolution before us invokes Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the sanctions contemplated in operative paragraph 3 are of a symbolic rather than a substantive nature. It should be noted that they carefully exclude any measure that could have a direct impact on the Sudanese population. None the less, operative paragraph 8 of the draft resolution demonstrates the Council’s determination to consider further measures, in the event that the Council’s demands specified in operative paragraph 1 are not complied with within 60 days of 10 May. This is a clear message that must be taken seriously. Noting that the draft resolution adequately reflects the views of my Government and the international community in addressing the issue of the assassination attempt on the life of President Mubarak and the issue of international terrorism, my delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution before the Council. We sincerely hope that the Government of Sudan will heed the decision of the Security Council by promptly extraditing the three suspects, in full compliance with resolution 1044 (1996). Sudan has been suffering from a longstanding civil war and already has more than its fair share of economic difficulties. Any further aggravation of the plight of the Sudanese people and any further deepening of the isolation of Sudan are the last things my Government wishes to see. Lastly, may I take this occasion to express our sincere thanks to the Non-Aligned Caucus for submitting a balanced text. Germany can accept the draft resolution. We agree with other delegations that the purpose of sanctions should not be punishment, but that they should serve to achieve the implementation of measures decided upon by the Council. We also agree that sanctions should be used only if the issue is so serious that coercive measures are required. This condition is being met here. The purpose is to put those suspected of an attempt against the life of the President of Egypt on trial, an attempt which was strongly condemned by all the countries represented in this Council. At the same time, we appreciate the efforts to target the sanctions in such a way that they do not affect the population as such, but are limited to those who are in a position to take the required measures. Nobody wants to see harm being inflicted on the Sudanese civilian population, which is already living in poor conditions. What this draft resolution intends is to ensure compliance by the Sudanese Government with Security Council resolution 1044 (1996). Most importantly, Sudan must do all it can to ensure that the three suspects who are sheltering or did take shelter in Sudan can be prosecuted in Ethiopia. “To ensure extradition” encompasses more than the extradition of the suspects when they are inside Sudan’s territory: Sudan cannot free itself from its obligations by allowing the suspects to leave for other countries, and Sudan, like other countries, also bears responsibility for persons outside its borders whom it supports in one way or another. My delegation sees the draft resolution to be adopted today as a clear signal to the Sudanese Government to comply with Security Council resolution 1044 (1996). We appeal to the Government of Sudan to use the 60-day period ahead of us now and to take the necessary steps not only to avoid even farther-reaching measures, but to allow for an early lifting of the measures the Security Council is imposing today. We will vote in favour of the draft resolution. First, the Chinese Government vigorously opposes and strongly condemns all forms of terrorism. We hold that terrorist activities not only wreak havoc on life, property and social stability, but also threaten international peace and security. We therefore have expressed our strong indignation at the attempted assassination of President Mubarak of Egypt and believe that terrorists involved in this attempt should be brought to justice. In this context, we fully understand the concern of Ethiopia, Egypt and others. Secondly, we are of the view that this act of terrorism, like any other international question, should be addressed by the Council in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. It is necessary to base ourselves on facts, making sure that we stand on legal ground, pay attention to evidence and deal with this question in a fair, objective and serious manner. Thirdly, in principle, we are against frequent recourse to sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter. No matter how complex the question may be and how difficult it is to resolve it, we should always insist on a peaceful solution through dialogue, consultation and mediation. Facts have shown that sanctions are often in the way of a settlement and, worse still, they might even exacerbate tension, bring suffering to the countries and peoples of the region and have serious adverse effects not only on the target country, but also on the neighbouring countries. Although the draft resolution before us talks about diplomatic sanctions only, diplomatic sanctions are still a form of sanctions. And by invoking Chapter VII of the Charter, the draft resolution also makes reference to further measures to be taken by the Council, thus paving the way for possible strengthening of the sanctions. We are of the opinion that imposing sanctions on the Sudan before incontrovertible evidence is in hand will set a bad precedent for the future work of the Council. Our position was made clear by our delegation when Security Council resolution 1044 (1996) was adopted by the Council. I would also like to reaffirm once again our reservation on the part of the draft resolution that calls on the Sudan, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1044 (1996), to refrain from engaging in activities of assisting, Ever since the failed attempt on the life of President Mubarak in June last year, the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and others have all made tireless efforts in trying to resolve this question as early as possible. Egypt, Ethiopia and others have also done a great deal of painstaking investigative work in seeking to establish facts and track down the suspects. The Government of the Sudan has also publicly condemned terrorism and clearly stated its willingness to continue cooperation with the OAU and other States concerned, in order to have this problem properly resolved. It has also held consultations with these countries for this purpose. We appreciate and support all these efforts. We hope that the parties concerned will, through dialogue and consultation, and taking full advantage of the role of the OAU, continue their efforts in this regard.
I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution contained in document S/1996/293.
A vote was taken by show of hands.
The result of the vote is as follows: 13 in favour, none against and 2 abstentions. The draft resolution has been adopted as resolution 1054 (1996).
I shall now call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting.
The French delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution submitted by several members of the Caucus of Non-Aligned States. On 31 January last, the Security Council, in resolution 1044 (1996), made several demands of the Sudan. In his report of 11 March, the Secretary-General reported that the Sudan had not fully met those demands. The resolution just adopted is aimed mainly at requiring that State to fulfil its obligations under resolution 1044 (1996), and in particular to work to extradite to Ethiopia the individuals suspected of having participated in the attack and who are within its territory. The text of the resolution must be understood in the light of available information that leads us to suppose that the three suspects are in the Sudan. In order to comply with the resolution, Sudan is required to work towards the extradition of these individuals if they are indeed within its territory. To ask more of it would not be in accordance with international law on extradition, nor is the resolution intended to do so. The Council cannot hold Sudan responsible for what it is not. The Council has chosen not to impose on the Sudan sanctions that would have a noticeable economic impact on the population, which is among the most destitute in Africa. In two months’ time, the Council will have to consider, on the basis of facts established by the Secretary-General, whether the Sudan has met the demands made of it and, if it has not, whether it should envisage the adoption of further measures. In this way, the Security Council’s ability to judge the situation is retained.
My Government supports this resolution, but it does so with reservations. We do not believe that the sanctions outlined in this resolution are sufficient to convince the Government of Sudan to cease its sponsorship of international terrorism and return to the fold of responsible, law-abiding nations. My Government welcomes this Council’s concern to combat terrorism. However, in failing to impose more meaningful sanctions against Sudan, we risk further insecurity and instability for the people of eastern Africa, the Middle East and the Sudan. In adopting resolution 1044 (1996), the Council recognized Sudan’s complicity in supporting and sheltering those who plotted the attempted assassination of Egyptian President Mubarak and the Government of Sudan’s sponsorship of terrorism as part of its foreign policy. Resolution 1044 (1996) required two simple steps from Sudan for it to begin to return to the good graces of the international community: to surrender the three remaining suspects in the Mubarak assassination attempt and to cease its support for terrorism. The Government of Sudan has refused to comply with these two simple requirements, as the Secretary-General makes clear in his report. Instead, Khartoum has focused its efforts on a public-relations campaign and on smuggling the three suspects out of the Sudan. We have noted press reports that one of the suspects has now turned up in Afghanistan, making the absolutely unbelievable claim that he has not been in Sudan in months. His recent arrival in Afghanistan from Sudan does not change the fact that the Government of Sudan has the responsibility to ensure his extradition to Ethiopia. Let us be clear: If Sudan believes that it can escape its responsibility simply by sending the three suspects out of the Sudan, it is wrong. As today’s resolution makes clear, the Government of Sudan, which sheltered these terrorists, has broad responsibility for seeing that they are returned to Ethiopia for trial. We will not be satisfied until Sudan has fulfilled this responsibility. The claims of the Government of the Sudan that it has tried to locate the three wanted suspects have no credibility. Sudanese authorities were aware of the location of the three before, during and after the assassination attempt, and after the extradition request from Ethiopia was received. Sudan has harboured the three suspects, and officials of the National Islamic Front have protected them. As shocking as are Sudan’s complicity in, and efforts to cover up, the attack on President Mubarak, they are only part of a broader pattern of Sudanese support for terrorism, which equally demands action by the international community. The National Islamic Front also supports Islamic and other opposition groups from Tunisia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda, as we heard earlier. All of these Governments have beseeched Sudan to cease its sponsorship of violent opposition movements, but without success, as we heard from the representative of Uganda earlier in this debate. Uganda and Eritrea have been forced to sever relations with Khartoum because of the threat these organizations based in Sudan posed to them. Sudan’s efforts to export terrorism have even reached the United Nations. Two employees of the Sudanese Mission to the United Nations were active accomplices in the plot to assassinate President Mubarak during a visit to New York. They were also active accomplices in efforts to blow up the very building that we are meeting in today. They provided information on the President’s itinerary. These two employees also offered to provide identification cards and parking passes so that terrorists could plant a bomb, like the one at the World Trade Center, in the basement of this building. These are not just allegations — they are part of the public, official record of a criminal trial held openly here in the courts of the City of New York. To support its terrorist clients, Sudan regularly abuses the prerogatives of sovereign States by giving out Sudanese passports, both diplomatic and regular, to help non-Sudanese terrorists travel freely, as documented in cases involving Ethiopia, Egypt and Tunisia. It uses Sudan Airways to transport terrorists and their weapons, as in the cases of Ethiopia and Tunisia; it makes financial resources and safe refuges available to terrorists; and it provides the very weapons terrorists use to inflict their horror, as in the Mubarak assassination attempt in Addis Ababa. All Member States face the international threat of terrorism. We have all stressed in various forums that we will fight global terrorism wherever it appears. Our objective, often repeated by Egypt, Ethiopia and other Today’s resolution is another step toward true action. On the positive side, the Council has finally determined that Sudan’s actions in supporting the cowardly terrorist attack on President Mubarak, and continuing to foster terrorism around the globe, are indeed a threat to international peace and security. By imposing initial sanctions, the Council is telling the Government of Sudan that we will not be content with mere words. We favour the steps the Council is taking today, but we must say again that they are not big enough. We believe that firmer measures should be taken, not against the people of Sudan, but against their unresponsive Government. The Government of Sudan, however, should take no comfort from the fact that today’s measures are not as strong as they might be. For the Council has promised that if the Government of Sudan fails to meet our requirements in the next 60 days, we will seek more meaningful sanctions. We hope that the Government of Sudan gets the message, turns over the suspects and stops supporting other terrorists. If not, we will be back here in two months to do whatever is necessary to compel Sudan to abide by the rules of a civilized nation.
Honduras condemns all acts, methods and practices of terrorism, wherever they may occur, and whoever commits them, and reiterates its support for all the efforts being made under international law to end the threat of international terrorism to international peace and security. The attempted assassination of the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt in Addis Ababa on 26 June 1995 was a reprehensible act, and an example of a practice which the international community cannot tolerate. It affected the sovereignty and stability not only of Ethiopia, but of the African region as a whole, and should not be treated with impunity, as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has recognized. My delegation therefore supported the adoption of Security Council resolution 1044 (1996), and deplores the fact that it has not yet been complied with. My delegation regrets the fact that the Government of Sudan has not complied with the requirements of paragraph 4 of resolution My delegation believes that in the struggle against the scourge of international terrorism, States should be aware of their responsibility for adopting measures intended to combat and eliminate terrorism, as well as their obligation to refrain from instigating, inciting or promoting terrorist acts and from allowing their preparation in their territory. It is also the duty of States to refuse to receive or protect those who commit such acts. My delegation voted in favour of the resolution the Council has just adopted, in the hope that the measures it contains will prompt the Government of Sudan to meet, without further delay, the requirements contained in resolution 1044 (1996) and to act in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Furthermore, we believe that this resolution has been carefully worded so as not to include economic measures that could adversely affect the civilian population of Sudan.
In January the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1044 (1996) to send a clear, unambiguous message to the Government of the Sudan that the international community, as represented in the Security Council, was taking a firm stand against the phenomenon of international terrorism, and to deter those contemplating supporting terrorism, including countries involved in such criminal acts. In this respect, we should recall that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) considered the assassination attempt against the life of President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt to be an attack on the whole of Africa, threatening regional stability and international peace and security. The report of the Secretary-General on the efforts of his Special Envoy pursuant to resolution 1044 (1996), drew two firm conclusions: first, that Sudan has not yet complied with the Security Council’s demand to extradite the three suspects to Ethiopia; and, secondly, that all the neighbouring countries of Sudan visited by the Secretary- General’s Special Envoy, accused it, in one way or another, of supporting terrorist activities within their territories. I listened very carefully to the statement of the Permanent Representative of the Sudan, and would like to correct his claim — on page 16 of his text — that Egypt circulated a document that included a record of an investigation of some of the suspects currently in Ethiopian jails. I would like to make it clear that Egypt has not circulated this document, and I wish that he would be more precise in such matters. I would also like to say that I do not understand what the Sudanese Ambassador meant when he wondered why Egypt has not denied that one of the suspects is in Afghanistan. I do not understand this. Egypt has nothing to do with these suspects. It has absolutely no relationship with them, so it cannot deny, confirm or affirm their whereabouts. This stands in stark contrast to the established link between the Sudan and the suspects. It is regrettable that some official Sudanese circles, in an attempt to deny the relationship of the Sudanese Government to these terrorists, have proved this infamous relationship beyond any doubt. The Sudanese Ambassador mentioned a Sudanese newspaper that was closely linked to security and official circles in Khartoum. I would like to say that in a front-page article, on 14 March 1996, that newspaper reported that the three suspects harboured by Sudan would appear in a different country and would tell the press that the Sudan was innocent and had not taken part in the assassination attempt. In fact, on 20 April, an Arab newspaper published an interview with a person who said he was one of the suspects, claiming that he was in Afghanistan. Despite the fact that that terrorist confessed to his involvement in the assassination attempt and stated that before that others had entered Ethiopia via the Sudan, he denied that the Sudan had taken part in the conspiracy, just as the Sudanese newspaper had predicted more than a month before. Since the adoption of resolution 1044 (1996), the Sudanese Government has hinted that it was about to change its policies vis-à-vis the support of international acts and activities that target the security and stability of neighbouring countries. We have heard two neighbouring countries today — Ethiopia and Uganda. Regrettably, we do not see that the words of the officials of the Government of Sudan match their deeds. We hope that the resolution just adopted by the Council will reaffirm the irreversible resolve to implement the earlier resolution. By adopting resolution 1054 (1996) today, under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council reaffirmed that the dangers of international terrorism represent a grave threat to international peace and security and that concerted efforts by countries to eliminate that threat and to deter those who assist in its perpetration are a basic requirement for the maintenance of international peace and security in today’s world. History will record that in the Council’s deliberations on this resolution, Egypt categorically rejected the inclusion of any measure that would harm the Sudanese people or increase its suffering, which results from the policies of its Government. Egypt also rejected the inclusion of any measure that would negatively affect the unity, independence and territorial integrity of the Sudan. The members of the Council supported that position, and I should like to extend my thanks to all of them. The measures imposed by the resolution adopted today were restricted to diplomatic action in order to send to the Sudan a clear warning of the consequences of continuing its present policies, and I hope that the Sudanese Government will not misinterpret the message. The Council is determined, in accordance with the resolution, to ensure the implementation of resolution 1044 (1996). It will look at the matter again in 60 days to decide whether the Sudan has complied with the resolution, and other measures can be adopted to guarantee this compliance. The Egyptian Government still hopes that the Sudanese Government will comply, without delay or Egypt hopes that diplomatic measures adopted by various countries in the implementation of the resolution adopted today, along with the efforts of all other countries, will contribute to encouraging the Sudan to comply. The implementation by the Sudan of the resolution adopted by the Council today can bring about a real change in Sudan’s orientation and in the Sudanese Government’s policies, which have led it to the present regrettable situation. Allow me to conclude my statement by reaffirming that every Egyptian feels and appreciates the special nature of the historical relations that bind the peoples of the Nile Valley in Egypt and in the Sudan. I repeat once again — and I am speaking to the Ambassador of the Sudan — that we in Egypt feel that we are a natural extension of the Sudan, that the Sudan is a natural extension of us, that anything that harms the people of the Sudan harms the people of Egypt and vice versa. There is no doubt that Egypt is eager for relations between the countries to return to normal so that the brotherly Sudanese people can enjoy stability, prosperity and good relations with all its neighbours, particularly with Egypt, and we trust that the deep-seated links that bind the Egyptian and Sudanese peoples together — links that were formed and strengthened over time — will continue to be strong in the future. Sir John Weston (United Kingdom): The conclusions of the comprehensive report produced by the Secretary- General in response to resolution 1044 (1996) are clear: first, Sudan has not complied with the demand in that resolution to extradite the three suspects wanted in connection with the assassination attempt on President Mubarak, and, secondly, many of Sudan’s neighbours remain concerned about its support for terrorist activities within their territories. That is why the Council has had to take further action. It has nothing to do with the orientation of the current Government in Sudan: it is purely and simply a necessary We therefore welcome the initiative of the non-aligned members of the Council in bringing forward the resolution which has just been adopted. We fully support the measures it contains and hope that they will contribute to an early change of heart in Khartoum. The solution to the problem is simple: the Government of Sudan must recognize international concern about its behaviour and comply with the demands of the Security Council and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). One of the principal demands of the resolution is the requirement for Sudan to ensure that the three suspects wanted in connection with the assassination attempt are brought to justice in Ethiopia. We are convinced that the Government of Sudan knows where they are. If they are still in Sudan, the answer is straightforward: the Government must extradite them to Ethiopia under the terms of the Bilateral Extradition Treaty. If, as may be the case, Sudan has helped at least one of the three leave the country, this resolution clearly requires that the Government of Sudan must take immediate action, including, for example, by providing the necessary evidence, to bring about extradition to Ethiopia. We will not be satisfied until Sudan has secured this objective, and has also ceased its support for international terrorism. We draw the Government of Sudan’s attention to the last paragraph of the resolution: it is a clear message that the Security Council will remain engaged in this matter.
Speaking on the occasion of the Security Council debate concerning resolution 1044 (1996), the Polish delegation expressed its strong position on terrorism. We confirmed, in particular, that the Government of the Republic of Poland condemns terrorism in every form and that there are no circumstances that could possibly justify its use. We also made it clear that the accountability of those who committed the acts of terrorism is a matter of primary importance. We regret to conclude that resolution 1044 (1996) remains unheeded in what constitutes its main thrust — namely, ensuring that those suspected of the terrorist attempt on the life of President Mubarak are extradited from the Sudan to Ethiopia to stand trial in a court of law, which would demonstrate that the Government of the The Polish delegation has voted in favour of the resolution which the Security Council has just adopted. This resolution contains a clear message to all those responsible for allowing justice to be served, as appropriate. The message is that the perpetrators of the acts of terrorism will not go unpunished. To conclude, let me also thank the Non-Aligned Caucus for its work with regard to the resolution which has been adopted this evening.
I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Chile. On the occasion of the adoption of resolution 1044 (1996) on 31 January 1996, my delegation clearly stated its position concerning terrorism, which Chile condemns and repudiates. We also expressed our strongest rejection of the attempted assassination of President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. At this time we wish to reiterate what we stated on that occasion. On 11 March 1996 we received the Secretary- General’s report contained in document S/1996/179. After that, the Security Council undertook a long process of consultations and negotiations. Today we have adopted a new resolution on this subject, which stems from Sudan’s non-compliance with resolution 1044 (1996), which we regret. Chile listened carefully to the African members of the Security Council to find guidance with respect to the path we should follow. In that respect, we gave special consideration in the Security Council to the option of regional action, as well as to the views of the countries of the region in question, and in particular, to the views of the Organization of African Unity and its Secretary-General. We have also been guided at all times — especially now, when it has fallen to me to assume the delicate task of President of the Security Council — by the need to follow a procedure and a treatment of this question that would be fair and transparent and in which the Security Council would have all available background information and evidence. The Sudan and all Governments wishing to express their views on this subject were offered our full cooperation, including the possibility of holding an open The draft that became today’s resolution gave rise to considerable discussion of the measures to be adopted, and, as we have said on various occasions, Chile, in principle, has doubts as to the effectiveness of using sanctions. We are convinced that economic sanctions disproportionately affect the innocent and the weak rather than the leaders responsible for the reprehensible acts for which we impugn the countries. In this case, the great challenge that the Security Council still has ahead is how to apply sanctions that are effective and, at the same time, human. This is not being achieved with our current practices. Sanctions regimes must be increasingly aimed at the leaders who are politically responsible, and not at the common people. In the quest for international peace and security the Security Council cannot forget its humanitarian responsibility. In this particular case, we are using diplomatic sanctions which, while they exert a considerable degree of pressure, cannot be equated with economic sanctions. Together with this, we must also say that we are deeply concerned over the statements of neighbouring countries about the activities of the Sudan in their territories. They are the countries of the region; they share borders and should, in theory, be brotherly countries. We are also concerned over the information that terrorist groups could be operating in their territories. The Security Council will continue to follow developments related to the implementation of this new resolution. The terrorism of a few, or of many, cannot leave us indifferent. The Security Council must know how to act when it determines that it is occurring. We appeal to the Government of the Sudan to do everything within its power to comply with the resolution adopted today. We sincerely hope that in that way this item can be removed from the agenda of the Security Council. I now resume my function as the President of the Council. There are no further speakers. The Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.
The meeting rose at 7.20 p.m.