S/PV.367 Security Council

Will the Assistant Secl'etary-General identify the documents that are on the table ? prie vouloir qui Ml'. SOBOLEV (Assistant Secretary-Genera1'ïn ,charge of Security Council Affairs) : chargé Document S/1042. Report dated 18 October 1948, from the Acting Mediat.or for Palesti11e to the Secretary-General concerning tl .:: Negeb situation; Document S/1043. iLetter dated 18 October 1948, from the representativ.e of the Plmvisional Government of Jsrael to the President of the Security Couneil, ooncerning al1eged breaeh of the trnce by Egyptian forces. P-ending the uecision of the Security Counci;J., there is also adraft resolution on Palestine, document S/1032, submiUed by the re,presentatives of China and the United Kingdom to which they referred at the meeting of the Security Council of 14 Oetober 1948 [365th meeting]. The PRESIDENT': l,am about to ealllUpon the Acting Mediator, Mr. Bunche, for a statement, 'and we shall have simultaneous, not consecutive, !interpretation, unless it is specifically requested. Mr. BUNCHE (Acting United Nations iMediator! for Palestine) : 1 greatly regret the necessity whieh ïrnpels me to ap'peal to the Security Council in o:Dder to bring an end to the fighting which has raged in the Negeb during the past thr'Ele days. Our standard pil"ocedure in the conduct of the trluce sup,ervision werk in Palestine is to €xhaust every effort to seUle a dispute before appealing to the Security Conneil, as la last r.esort. ln the instant case, which appail'ently has involved fighting on a wider and more severe scale than on any other occasion during the periods of the two truces, two approaches to the p,arties for an uneonditional cease-flre-one by the Chief of Staff of the truce supernsion, and the other by myself-have fai;J.ed to have an effective result, since these appeals were of no avail unless ,accepted unconditionally by both parties. "Government of Israel w;in he ready to meet il'epresentatives of Egy.pt at any time, at such place as may be agreed on, in order to seUle peacefuUy aIl the difficulties whiICh have ·arisen between Israel and Egyipt in Negeb. I shaH be grateful if you wiN transmit this reply to the Acting Mediator. (Signed) ReV'en SHILOAH" The fundamental priuci!pJe on which the tl'uce in Palestine œsts i8 that no military advantage shaH ,accrue to ·either side as a result of the application and the supervision of the truce. A just implementation of that 'prilllcipl,e requires the :illllpositioQof a number of restrictions on the milital'Y aetivities of the !parties and 'a suhstantial degree of freedoIn of mOVoement and of access for the United Nations personnel engaged in the truce supervision work. The function of {he United Nations observers is not mere:ly to report and to try to stop breaches of the truce alrea.dy ,committed or in processof being committed, but, 'even more important, by means of a watchdog l'ole, to, p:rlevent breaches of the tr.uce' before they occur. It would he ex'pe.cting too much that the conflicting 'p'arties should be ha'ppy about these functions of the United Nations dhserv:ers. The parties ·are Jocked in a deadly earnest struggle ·and are not likely tu ?verlook .a·uy Olpportunity to safeguard thell' vital interoests. In this conflict and in !he relationship of the truce supervision to lt, nothingis eV'er black or an white. I may say that .each side has ils soiled hands in Since the .preparation of my r.eport, lute yesterday afternoon, 1 have received further inforlmation from the truoo supervision heoadquarters. ,1 have been informed that the Senior United Nations Observer at Tel Aviv reports that on 15 Oetober he received a despatch f.rom Israeli Army headquartel'ls which reads as folJows : .. Our convoy whieh left Karatiyeh hefore noon attacked. Two trucks burned. Remainder returned. Six Spitfires attacked our traffie nea:ri Dorat and settlements in Northern Negeh. " The Senior Observer at Tel Aviv added that he had had no prior knowledge of Israeli intention ta despatch a convoy. The daily report of 18 Octoheri from the Chief of· Staff' of the truœ supervision staies that no intense fighting had oocurred in the Negeb yesterday, but that Gaza was still being sheHed and there had been heavyartiUery and infantry firing on the previous 'ni,ght, and tuat Israeli air attacks on Gaza, Raffa and El Majdal were continuing. 1 am also infomned that the truce Hne in the area priaI' to the outbreak is known to the United Nations observel'S and that the positions which were held south of that truce liue are also known but ta a lesseli extent. The United Nations observers a~ therefore in a pm.ition to define the positions 'pil.'eviously held by the parties, with a view to detel'lmining, once that fighting can be stopped, that neith& side has improved its position asa I1esu;lt of the recent fighting. In paragraph 12 of my rc!port Icall attention to the refusaI of the Provisional Government of Israel to implement that part of the Central Tl1uce Supervision Board's decisiIQn No. 12 which relates to United Nations control of air supply to the Negeb settlements. l would :like to elaborate a little on tbis 'point. The issue concerning the supplies destined for the twenty-five Jewish settlements in the Negeb has been a difficult one during both truces, owing to the ,position of Egyptian fo.rces athwart the supply line [eading to the settlements. A serious incident was provoked at Negha during the first truce whÈm iEgyptian forces in control of the cross-roads refused to peImlit Jewish supply convoys under United Nations There cau be no less question of the right of the settlements in the Negeb to he supplied through convoys under United Nations 5ulP1e!l'Vision than there is for the right of Jerusalem to he supplied by escorted ,convoys. Thi., right bas been eonsistently upheld by the United Nations truce supervision organization. And ït was with the end in view of supplying these settlements by peaceful means that the Central Truce Supervision Boa1'ld d·ecision No. 12 was issued, following its aPlP,rcvaJby the Mediator. But that decision also re.cogni;:e that unsupervised aerial convoys to the Jewish settlements, frequently tlying at night, could gain a military advantage for the Jews, if amns and other. wax supplies were being ind'Uded in thecargoes of the planes. Under ,the te:mns of the truce, even in the absence of decision No. 12, these aerial oonvoys were 'properly subject ta truce supeTVision inspection. However, no such illiJpecfion wasevel"peImitted. , 1 am not in a .position to say ~"at if the Israeli authorities had been wiH.i,ng to suspend the aerial ,convoya or submit them to United Nations supervision, the Egy;ptians would have definitely permitted the Jewish land convoys topass. The Egyptians were dissatisfied with .Truee Board decision No. 11, which upheld the right of Jewisn forees to remain in the ~sputed villages of Hatta and Karatiyeh ln the Negeb, and the EgypUaus have tended to consider decisions 11 and 12 as inter:-rel'ate-d. But 1 do say that had L'le. Israeli aulhorities acceded to the conditions r~l~ting ta aeria;! convoys, the t'ruce super- VISIon versonnel would have exerted strong efforts to get the land convoys through, just as they had done so successfulJy during the first truce. Failing this the issue would then have heen ;refeITed to t~e Secuxity Counoi!. The IsraeH authorilIes wO!Uld have run no risk in pursuing hUch ," course, since, if the land convoys ad not gone through, they coUild have resurnedthe aenal ,convoys. 1 stress this 'point only because ,1 think that snch ft 1 cannot say that had United Nations observers obtained free acces~ to the Negeb front, on the Israeli side, during the past few weeks, this fighting could have b~en prevented; but 1 am convinced, however, that had our observe.rs not been interfered with in this ,sectOl. the possibility of fighting on the scale whkh has taken place wouI.d have been greatly reduced. That the Israeli authoriti,es antidpated serrious resistance in lheir unsupervised ·effort to push the couvoy through, would appear to be supp0J.'ted 'by the fact that very strong striking forces, both aerial and ground fOl'ces, wer,e quickly made avaiJable at the time of the convoy incident. Having clearlyantidp,ated trouble and having apparently planned well to meet il, it is aU the more ~.ncomplrehensible thai: United Nations obsel'vers should have been obstructed in the area, and shou!d not hav,e been notified of the intent to push the convoy through nntil it was aetually on its wny. In conclusion, 1 must say that il will be understood, 1 hope, that our approach to a probiem such as this is exdusively in temns of the observanoe of the terms of the truce by both parties. If thére may he other important considerations to be taken into account, they are not within the province of the trouce supervision organization, which is 'concerned solely with the maintenance of the military statlls quo without advantage accruing to either side. MHhmoud Bey FAWZI (Egyip,t) : In connexion with the subject dealt with by the Acting Mediator in his report dated 18 October and in the statement which he has jus! made hefore the Security Council, 1 am instructed to express to the Security Council the deepconcè,rn of the Egyptian Govermnent regarding the ,events which 4ave been taking place in the Negeb during the last few days. .These events are not only serious in themsel'V,es but they are serious and perhaps all the more so because they are symptomatic of much more serions basic things. The Acting Mediator has given us a brief but e:loquent ,picture of the gravity of the' ·situation. He would not have asked the Security Council to hnld this urgent meeting if the situation had not been. serious; so therec3;n be no a:vg~ent about this·point. We consi-der that what is hapipening now is Dot a mere incident. it is not a mere hazaI'ld, 'but a premedîtated, predet~rmined attack for the gain both of military and politicaladvantages. I shaH wait to hear what will he said during this debate before l add anything further, but hefore l close l should Iike to say that Eg'yipt expeets the Security CounciI to stand up to its own responsibiHties. Ml'. EBAN (Provisional Government of Israel') : If the Security Council is to fake eŒective action for the restoration of peace to the Negeb, il must be in 'Complete possession of aU the true fads. There is no doubt, in any quaorfoer, tha! the Ql'Îgin of fhe present fighting 'ln the Negeb area lS n{)'~ompiiance with the Mediator's decision in case No. 12, whkh appears as an annex to Ml'. Bunche's report indocument 1042. Had fhat decision been complied with, there would have heen no Egyptian blockade of the Negeb proceeding. with .impunity in the shelte:r of the truoe. skiIlfu:lIy hiding behind the resolution of 19 August, and rejoicing in the impotence of the truce sup,ervisor:, personnel for sixteen weeks to elicit a reply to ifs own ruling from one of the parties. Ml'. Bunche's report does hring up the cruciaF importanoe of the decision in case No. 12 as the cause of th~ 'p,resent fighting, and as the key to ifs temmnation. Yet the whole repo~'t is based upon the allegation, in paragr8'ph 9. that both sides rejected that decision and are, llierefore, responsible for the -consequences of its Irejeetion. This al:legation has been repeated this morning. 1 believe that this is the first time that tbis aI1egafion has been made. and we hove that H has ibeen made for the last time. !t is a false aHegation, for on 30 September. mletter 124 addressed by the Provisional Government of Israel to Dr. Paul Mohn. the Mediatoo-'s representatiVie, the Provisional .. As regards case No. 12 (supply convoys in the El Faluja area), 1 alIll direeted by the M.inister for Foreign Affairs to inform yon that the Provisional Government of Israel has, as requested by the Mediator, instructed its military authoritif: _ to co-operate with the Unit-ed Nations Military Observcrs in the implementation of the decisiOll. (Signed) \Yalter EYTAN, Diredor-GcIl('ra[ .. P.S. 1 should he much obliged if you coutd let meknow as soon as possible. for the information of our militaI")' autborities, whether the Egy.ptian Government has simila:r.ly signified its acce'ptance of the Board's decision in this case. " That wa§ on 30 September. Long before and ever since that date, the Government of IS!"ael had endeavouI1ed repeatedly to secure an indication of EgY'Ptian acceptance, and, on 30 September, 8 Octobe:r and again on 14 Ocrober, it ,drew attention to the continued refusaI of complianoe, with the déarest indication that such compliance would have resulted in the imp:lementation of that decision and the peaceful solution of a lIllost grievous ;problem. ilt is to us uUerly astounding, in the light of these faets, tofind a document on this table portraying the Arab and Jewish replies, in case No. 12, as being equally negative, for the ,Jewish acceptance of that decisiol1 which was conveyed oraUy and also in a letter dated 30 September, was the acceptance of the decision as a whole without anv rëservations on any single point. Yet, in paragraph 12 Ml'. Bunche writes [S;'1042] : " The failure, however, to implement the decision in case No. 12 must he ascribed, in considerable measure, to ihe refusaI of the Provisionail Government of Israel to accept that pai't of the decision relating to the contr91 of air s'Upply to the Negeb settlements. For had this essential prior condition been fulfilled aU legitimate EgyJptian objections would have heen remov,ed. " There was no such refusa}! on the part of the Government of Israel to accep,f any part' of the decision including the contro:! of ,air But the background of this question stretches back far beyond September and October and current events are not intelligible unless we have a clear picture of this long story of achronie truce violation having the most profound po.Iitical, military, economic and ~psychological effecls. The first part of the story is to1'd in the Mediator's report of 16 September, re-produced in document S/1025 on 5 octobel' 1948, and 1 quote the relevant section of that report in full. Il is paragraph 37 : " Another truce violation occurred throu~h the refusai of Egyptian forces to permit the passage of reliefcOlwoyS to Jewish settlements in the· Ne~eb. Sorne of these settlements ha<lpractically been. surrounded hy Egyptian forces during the fighting prior to the commencement of the truce. and were effectively eut off from receivin~ relief or supplies except by air. On the grounds that, if relief coJumns of food and other essential supplies were not pelmIitted tô ,go to the Negeh it wo'Uld constitute a militail'Y disadvantage to the Jews, it was decided that convoys under United Nations . cO·!1trol and escort, and operating on a quota hasis, >5houldproceed to the beleaghered Jewish settlements. Des:pite negotiations ,con'~llded bv United Nations obs.e:rvers, the Egyptian forces on 25 June turned hack a convoy near Neg1ba, anG'two Egyptian Spif1fires fired on a United Nations observer in an Auster p'lane. 1 reported the incident to the Seou1rity ConDcil in docu~ ments S/856, S/856/Add.1, S/856/Add.2 and 8/862. The latter two documents indicated tht the incident had been satisfacto.rily settle,d.· and that the mst convoy· had ;cros'Sed the Egyptian lines on 1 July. On 5 July, however, a United Nations escorted convoy was s'topped and turned ba,ck by ~rah' ·il'l'egularsnear Kfar Dail'om. These ll'reguJa'l's refused to oibey· the orders of the EgyJptian officer who commanc!ed them, and whose behaviour was co-opera1tive and correct On the same day, the Egyp'tian Commander in the Gaza a:rea notified the United Nations' oIbserver in ,command of the southern arC'a that no furtherconvoys The Couneil wiU note that there is no suggestion in that report of anything but unilateral Egyptiall responsibility for the truce violation. The Mediator ruled that Jewish convoys were to he allowed through ; the EgypHans refused ta allow them. In a message ta the Security Council on 25 June, document S/856, the Mediator wrote : CI Ifpretext truce "-Hote the phrase- .. If pretext truce shou:ld be used ta starve out Jewish settlements in Negeb for four weeks period without normal hazards of war action, this would be a clear military advantage for Egylptians and reverse for Jews, thus contrary to bath letter and spiJ:it of truce ". Thus, hy the time the second truce began, there had been a violation proceeding without remedy for four weeks resulting already aJ that time in what the Mediato,r acknowledged to he a dear military advantage for the Egyptians. The position appeared so hopeiess at this stage that Colonel Bonde, of the Mediator's Chief of Staff headquarters, actually gave permission to !s/raeli forces to t,ake any action, includiug miHtary action, that they :pleased in arder to secure frce passage for theh' convoys. This ·advice was not taken. Let us now see how the story p~'oceeds during the current truce whi,chbegan on 18 J'Uly. During the fb.'st week of that p'eriod, Eronptian forces occupied a position south of Karatiy.eh along the Maj dal-Faluj a road with the purpose of cutting off the, Israeli Negeb from aH contact with fhe north. No Arah forces have ever succeeded' in occupying the ;part of the Negeb fOTming part of the State of Isra1el, but this truce .violation enabled them to bring Jewish communications under :6re aimost without effort and it natural1ly formed the basis of a renewed Jewish .complaint. It mÏJght properly have giv-en occasion rOll' defensive counteraction and for corres'ponding Jewish obstruction of ESY)ptian convoys' which l'un from west to east. But at that time, the Government of {Israel helieved, perhaps The Security Council will l'eCan thnt the Mediator had already indicated that thè obstruction of convoys for four weeks constituted a substantial impaiOO1ent of Ismers position. By now tl1..11 obstruction had proceeded for eight weeks. The compelling need for the Trllce Commission to ad was now glaringly e,vident. . At this Ume, as the only alternative ta nUowing the Negeb to he sundered from Isra,el and its Jewish settlers reduced to siow starvation, the forces of Israel began ta supply their minimal needs by air transport. At length the United Nations lVEediator's Chief of Staff, General Lundstroem, gave his decision on 18 August, which .provided for the free and uumolested 'use of the ·cross-roads at Karatiyeh hy each side for a period of six hours in alternation. Il was fully llnderstood that if that decision were complied with the need for aerial sup:pJy would no longer arise. But il was notcoITl/Plied with. It was noteven accepted hy the Rgyptian Gov,ernment ln .principle. In paragi'aph 12 'of his l'eiPort Ml'. Bunche today r.ecords that the EID'JPtian Government siiU does not accept that decision in lPrinciple, sinee it regards it as controversial. After the decision of 18 August, four . more weeks elapsed without resuH. The Egy;ptian military advantage was allowed ta develop and deepen. On 14 September the Central Truce Board confirmed General Lundstroem's ·dedsion. On 15 September, the Mediator confirmed il himself, There were more negotiations with the Egyptian Government. The Government of Israel persistently asked whether any Egyptian reply had beell reœived. Four more weeks ·passed. We were constantly info:Dmed of Senor Ascarate's fruitless attempts ta obtain a l~epJy from the Egyptian Prime Minister and his Government. The blockadecontillued. The Jovernment " Israel assumed that considerations of prcz,tigé prevented an 'explicit Egyptian acceptance of the Mediator's decision, bul that the reglllar exercise of that decisioll might he tacitly aUowed. On 15 Oclobe:r, having given due notice to Genera:l Riley, n convoy of sixteen vehicles proceeded -at the But, surely that refusaI was in accord \Vith the Jaws of nature, and of decision No. 12. Where does it say that the Jews had any dutY ta cut off supplies before the land route was assured, in accordance with the Mediator's decision ? It is rather the contrary that ought to have taken place. Since 25 June, tbere wasa àuty, an unconditional duty, on the part of the Egyptians, ta allow the land routes ta operate. Any indication that Jsrael should have eut off its air supplies while Egypt eut ()ff land supplies, wouM have been a verdict in favour of the starvation of the Nege'b. It wouM hav,e been a completely unobjective suggestion. Perhaps those who have a concern at this moment ta cut off the Negeb, in defiance of the General Assembly's verdict last November, may find it difficult to \Vork conscientiously for the maintenance of Jewish communièation ta the Negeb. . We are ,painfully aware, in this matter, of the ,complete unity of the political proposal's ,concerning the Negeb and the evident lack of sympathy with Jewish efforts to keep the Negeb road open at any cost, but there must bea complete understanding of the other position as weIl. Because Israel regards this area of the Negeb as one of t'he most important parts of Hs lawful heritage, its refusaI ta allow the Negeb tobe pinched off" on the pl~text of th f' truce" is, ta use the Mediator's phrase, ·completely naturaI. . "TIle Provisional Government of Israel has insisted on excluding United Nations observers from ils ah'fields 'llntil snch observexs have been placed on aIl Arah airfields indicated in an exhaustive list after a.long delay... Is that an unreasonnble attitude? The Governm.ent of Israel presumes to suggest a principle of equity and recipl'ocity in the application and distribution of controls. It suggests that, if observers are. to encamp on Jewish airfields, they shouid observe Arab ah1ields as weIl. Should this be held up as a sort of unreasoning intransigeance? 1 think that 1 have said enough to indicate why we hold that the Security Coundl has not been completely or accurately enlightened in the wriUen :report which lies hefore usas to fhe origins or causes of the present impasse. For a true account must have described a unilateral Egy;ptian defiance of an agre.ed ruling a.ccepted by the Government of Israel without reserve-a double violation of that ruling in that Egyptian forces not only denied access ta the Jews within the hours allotted to them, but also used the road for their own purposes at hours al:lotted to the Jews. If at this moment positiv.e. assurance could be given that the Mediator's l'uling in case No. 12 is binding on aIl sides ,and will becOilIlpJi.ed with, the situation might he immediately transformed. Can that assurance he given at long last? The Government of Israel has announced Îts willingness to meet Egyptian auth ~dties for immediate discussions on aIl of ll·ese pr(;~l'ems, and 'pre.s'Umably t'he first subj ect to he discussed woU'ld be tlle cease-fire. . Beyond that there lies the g'eneral queshon of stability in that area. 'V.le shall ~phold the principl'e that fl'ee communicahon to this vital part of the territory of JSJ.'Iael is an unchallengeable right under the General Assembly's resolution of 29 No-· vennber 1947' and under the Mediato;r's It ought not ta happen that, eleven months aftler the General Assembly awarded the Negeb to the State of Israel and ther.eby implicitly denied any Egyptian right to be in the Negeb at a11, we should findany pI"essure in various or.gans of the Unite.d Nations to force Israel to relax its grasp on its own area in def,erence to a prolonged breach of the truce. This should never have hapipiened. Let the 'principles laid down by the >Me.diator on 25 June and 15 September for free communication to the Negeb he now upheld and accepted by al:! parUes, and this episode of conflict mav speedilybe. hrought ta a timely end. Lët the discussions between the parties advocated by the Acting Mediator begin at once with :paraUel undiertakings for a cease-fire, accompanie.d by acceptanoe of the principle relating to freecommunication, a principle upheld by the Mediator '3nddefied and flouted for sixteen ,,~eeks since the Mediator first upheld il. We. think that it wou.ld he disastrous to confidence if the Security Council did not somehow correct the picture presented today lby recording that the origin of the fighting lies in Israeli acceptance and Egyptianrejection of decision No. 12, which is the basic ruling in the matter he:re involved. The way to the immedi'ate restoration of penoe, which must he the aim of an parties, lies in the affirmation at once by a11 sidesand ,espe.cia11y, 1 suggest, by the Egyptian authorities-of acdeptance of the Mediator's basic ru[ing on the question of communication. Mr. BUNCHE (Acting United Nations Mediatcœ for Palestine) : 1 have no intention of ente:ring into mllch ·discussion II1pon this issue. For the sake of the record, howe.ver, 1 wish todear up a few points in connexion with the statement which has just heen made by Ml'. Eban, and particularly with regard to his referenoe to the lett&' of 30 September from Ml'. Eytan of the Israeli Foreign Office ta Ml'. Mohn, a letter which, "Please l'efer to the letter addressed to Ml'. SheTtok on 15 Septemtier hy the late Connt Bernadotte, from Rhodes, relating to two decisions of the Ce-ntml Truce Supervision Board (case Nos. 11 and 12) which the Mediator had approved. " As l'Cgards case No. 12 (supply COllVOYS in the El Faluja area) l am directed by the Minister for Foreign Afl'airs to inform you that the Provisional Governmtent of Israel has, as requested by the Mediator, instructed its milital'y authorities to co-(}perate with the United Nations Military Û_)servers in the implementation of the decision. " What is impo':tant with il'egard to a letter of this kind is the degree to whtich local authoritiesco-o.perate with thle truce supervision personnel in the implementation of the decision. It will be recaHed that ~n my previous statement to the Security Council last W!eek [365t T< meeting], 1 pointed out that one of our very great difficulties lies in the fact that Governments often enter into agreements and d-ecide upon poiicies which ave lentirely satisfactOloiy, ibut that these policies fail to be imp1emented hecause of the refusaII of local authorities ·and local officers in the military forees to carry them out. The ehronology of this case, as Il re·calI if and have it recorded, is that on 17 Septemher, the very day of Count Bernadotte's assassina1ion, Ml'. Mohn-who had heell urgently directed 'by Co:1nt Beornadotte to get action on both sides, Tel Aviv and Cairo, towards the implementation of this important decision because of the serious. situation in the Negeb-had a telephone conversation with Ml'. Shi'lloam. In that telephone conversation, Mr. Mohn was infonmed that no observers would be allowedon Israeli airfiel'ds until similar arrangements had been made in the same proportion in A;rab countries. Subsequ1ently, on 20 September, 1 had a long discu.ssion in Haifa with Mr. Shilloam, in the course of which fuis question !lmse. 1pointed out to Ml'. ShHloam that the difficulty we were having in dealing with the Egyptians on the question was that we we~e not in a position to say. firstly. that UnIted Nations obstervers would he' aMe to check on theael'ial convoys going to the Negeb, and in particular the night flights, owing to the inahility of the United Nations to station observers on Israeli airfields ; and At that meeting Ml'. Shilloam infol'med me that he had previously told Ml'. Mohn that it was the intention of the Provisional Government of Israel to provide the truCie supervision organization with a list of the airfields in the Arab countries: which the United Nations must supervise before Israel could permit United Nations observers on their airfields. That iist, he said, had becomequibe ,extensive; at that time it was in Hebrew and in process of being ch1ecked and translated. That list, 1 may say, was finaUy obtained by Ml'. Mohn somef.hing over a week later which, altogetht,r, meant sorne three weeks after it had beE:ll originaUy vromised, and it includied sorne two hundred airfierlds, sorne of which, 1 must admit, we have not oU:rlselves yet been able to discover on any map. On 5 Octobe:r, 1 held a m1eeting in Haifa with the members of the truce supervision staff, including the Chief of Staff and the Political Adviser, Ml'. Mohn, and 1 asked the specifie question as to whether any progI!ess had been made in breaking this impasse. The report was unanimous that instead of prog;ress there had been retrogression in the sense that it had become increasingly difficult for United Nations obstervers to operate in this sector. In this connexion 1 should like briefly to ,caU your attention to a few of the' despatches which indicate sO'lll>ething of the prohlem with which we have beenconfronted. In a despatch f;rom Haïfa h1eadquarters dated 13 October, 1 am informed as fol'lows : "Regarding access of observers to the southe'rn front the Ismeli liaison officer, speaking for Brigadier Yadin, told the senior United Nations observfer at Tel Aviv, on 11 October, that the Israeli defence fol'lce wùuld not, repeat not, pelIDit theestablishment of a plerm:anent obs:ervation post in the southern sector at least until they receive satisfactory Egyptian answer on the convoy p:roblem. The Haison offioors' stated above answter wonld !he given in writing by Yadin. " Again, on 12 October 1 was informed as foUows: "Israeli headquarters has rescind,ed the previons :permission for Tel Aviv obseI"V€Jrs to establish a p1emnanent post on the Gaza front. Awa~ting fun :report from the senior Yesterday--I helieve it was yesterdayon 18 October, 1 received from Haifa the foHowing :list of reeent documents available to the Trace Supervision headquarters in which il is reported : "Israeli refuses to permit United Nations observers to proceed to the Gaza front for any pUDpose. " \Vithout at~empting to give thedetails of these documents, 1 will merely read the list of daily reports from the senior UnJited Nations military ob&erver at Tel Aviv; they are dated : 2, 4, 6, 11, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21,22, 24, 29, 30 September, 2 and 7 October. The· fol:1owing documents concern Israeli refusaI to permit the ,establishment of a post at Karatiyeh whkh is the' ;point of the convoy passage laid down in, Trouce Board decis'ÎLîl No. 12] : the .daily re,port of 11 Octabler from the senior United Nations military observer at Tel Aviv ; the diSipatch of the same date from that same officer to the Chief of Staff; the letter of 14 Oct-ober from Colonel Baruch to the senior militarv obserVler at Tel Aviv. - The foUowing documents question the right of observ'ers to proceed to the front lines e~cept for investigations of specifie incidents, with special ref1erence to the southern sedor : dis,patch of 30 Se.ptember from the senior United Nations milital'V observer at Tel Aviv to the Chief of Staff-; that from Colonel Baruch dated 30 September to the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Staff's answer drafted on 4 Octobe:r. Colonel Baruch's answer of 7 October regarding this letter, as well' as Ml'. Eytan's of 30 Srep.tember, promised cO-0'Peration: but \Vas fol'Jowed on 11 and 14 Octobe:l" by the Isra,eli refusaIs mentioned a:bove, r.esulting in the inability of observ·ers to proceed on the J(~wish side of the southern front hefore the passage of the convoy on 15 October. In other words, as :repo:rted to me yesterday from Haifa headquarters, the as- SUll"anc'Cs of co-operation held forth in Ml'. Eytan's letter of 30 September were not carried through by the men in the fileld. . Ml'. EL-KHOURI (Syria) : When the: Secur- I~ COUDCil' is·considering this question wlth a view to :rea,ching a judgment !based on facts, it mu.st talœ into aocount the ~ackgroundof the situati-on. If is to he noted ln thie present instance that disturbances and hreaches of the Ip'eace and of the truoe !l'De .only taking place in twoareas of Tho{: Security Council must ascertaill what the position is in the two areas where disturbances are taking place. As 1 understand ii-and as 1 thelieve eve:ry impartial judge would agree-the two areas in question repl'esent ipoints in dispute according to the Mediato"-"s report which Sltggests that the Negeh should be placed in the Arab zone and that Jerusalem should be internationa-liz'ed. These' are two points which have heen 0pp0S'ed by the Jews. In Press stat'ements, at Press conferences, and in official arr..! unofficial dedarations, it has been stated that the Jews will never accept the inclusion of the Negeb in the Arab al1'ea but wish to include if in their own. They have also stated that part of Jerusa'lem ~should be iucluded in their zone. As the l'~S1Jltofpastevents, the Jews havte realized that the Security Council or any other organ of the United Nations interV'ening in the Palestine qu1estion will l1"espect a fail accompli, and that when such an organ is faced thy a situation in which one partv is holding" a certainarea, it wHI say : "ièt them k€'cp it ". They do not try to re-establish justice and ·correctness, or pl-.event invasions and irregularlties. The J'ews occupied West-ern Galile'e, incl'llding Nazareth,and areas in which not a single Jew is living. During the. truces theyattadœd that area and expelled most of the Arabs. The Mediator tben said of Western Ga'lilee:: "let it become a Jewish a~ea". 'Vhy? Because the Jews were the:re. They think that if they occupy the Negeb before any resolution is passed by the Gen1eral Assembly or the Security Council, the Nege'b will be handed to them also. The same thing applies to Jerusalem. Disturbances are going on in places otl~er than the: Negeb. Skhunishes and attacks are taking p,lace hetween Jerusalem and Hetbron. Yesterday, for instance, we read that Jewish forces cut the iine of communication of thle Arah forces between Hebron and the nortn. The Security Cauncil is watching the truœ. Howcan each side show that it is uot hreaking the trurce? SWmply hy me oM trick of always throwing the responsihility on to the other side. In this case, we see that this old trick cannot ibe taken seriously. It is clear that :convoys under the supe'l"Vision of Unitoo Nations observers would he safe and securre; Arrabs and Jews haVie no intentionof violating the truce with respect The convoys and supplies which go to isolated settlements should he controlled and inspected hy United Nations observers. Air -convoys, however, have not been controlled, and the Jews are refusing ta allow any such control. These convoys may not only -carry supplies of food, hut aU sorts of othe~r supplies, indnding ammunition. They ought to he controHed and inspected, and in thisi:onnexion the E~ptians said that they Wlere ready to grant aIl faeilities for the iIllplementatlon of the agre,ement about the ·convoys and sup.plies, provided that the air convoys w&'è also -controlled, but the Jews rej.ected that. They do not even want to allow the observers of the United Nations. to reach ,the sea ports to ,enah1e them ta see for themselves what supplies are being brought in. They do not allow the observers to go ta the airfields to see what is being carried by the aeroplanes as cargo, nor are they aMe to see what the planes have been carl'ying when they land. The EgJ'lptians ::'re within theil' ful'l rights in asking that the convoys ')e controlled. Wc will not allow one convl.iY to ,goby while otbel' ,convoys ar.e being moved about freely without our supervision and that of the United Nations observers. This is not just a maUer of retaliation or l'€Jprisal fol" theconvoys. ""Vhat connexion has Gaza? This place is too far away ta have any connexion with ,convoys, yet it has heen tbombarded by gunsand bombed from the air. Thh is part of a scheme which the Jews l1ave heen preparing for loi~ un ce1p·endant le:rie plan mois. .tiennes .ensuite du qu'ils Nations session. d'·endroits. prévoyait territoire Ipulsé ques molestés pas de de venir, du de autre otages ~onths. They want to force the Egy.p.tïan . forces ta evacuate the Negeb and then they w,iU talœ hold of that pa:l"t of the ,country with the 'iC'ue that, since thè Jews will be there, its· possession for them will he confirmed by the United Nations. They hav,e been doing that in many pl~oes. The City of Jafia was not included ln the Jewish areaeven under the partition plan, yet the Jews expelled the Arabs, and the few Arabs that are still there are suhjected ta molestation and oppression. The J,ews will not allow convoys ta ['each them, nor wiiI they allow planes ta bring thean food. No help is allowed ta reach the A.rabs in Jaffa, which does not form -part of the Jewish area, either according ta the partition plan or according to any othel' 'plan. There are Arabs still being held as hostalges in the Jewish area, and-the Arabs Every day we hear that the Foœign Minister in Tel Aviv has sent c.omplaints and pl1"Otests by ·cable to the Security Counetl, or that he has made long speeches magnifying §oman and insignificant matters ta show that the Jews are heing persecuted, molested and atLaclœd. Yet the Arabs, who are suffering so much, mere,ly make a fe'w insignificant rep! entatîons. The Jews try to delude and IIlÙslead the world by this p;l"opaganda, which i5 designed tl) make people think that the pOOl' Jews are being pemecuted in the Arab countries just as they wetre persecuted by the nazis in eastern and central Europe. This is not the case. The contrary is in fact tfille. They are the (lnes who arepersecuting in Palestine now, they are the ones who arre molesting people and committing a11 sorts of atrocities and outrages against the Arabs. How do you think ha1f a million Arabs bave been expelled from their homes if not in ·a de!p.}omble and pitiful way? Who woul'd leave his house and his belongings for 100t and l'un off barefooted into the fields? \Vho would do that willingly? And yet they say : we did not exp'el thelffi. They left of their own free will. Is it possi'Me that anyone wou1'd i·eave of his own free wïlo1? One would rather be killed defending one's own home than leave il. But the people were giv·en no choiCie. They were forced te' do so. In the Negeb now, there ar.e about 90,000 roving Bedouin trihes who hav:e been living there since prcl1istoric times. The Jews They say that the United Nations observers should inspect and control the airfields • in the Arab ,countries. But, what is there to control? The airfields in the Aran countries are open to the United Nations observers. Let lVIr. Bunche say whether th,ey have ever been œfused p,ermission to go ta the airfie.Jds in tJhe Al'ah ·countIDi'es. Were they ever refused permission to do so ? According to the int'o:rmation 1 hav·e t'rom my own country and from the other Arab countries, aIl Arab 'ports, airfields and other places are open to them. The United Nations observers know that the:v.e is nothing illegal or irrergular at the Arab .airfields or at other places. If they had not known that, they would hav,e gone there. But the'fle is nothing there ta inspect. The Arabs do not have these facilJi.ties for the ;P!Ul'pose o~ bombarding pla-oes. Theil' . airfie.lds ar,e simpJy for economic and commercial use. At the same time, they are open to any kind of ins'pection. Now, under theS'e conditions, the Security Council should take a firm stand and either confimn the truce and stabilize it properly or declare that it has nothing to do in the matter and let the conflictiDig parUes settle their difficulHes themselves. The Arabs would not agree at aIl to any accusation by the Se.curity Council that theyare violating the truce 'Or that they are not l1espe-eting the pledges which tlley ma-d·e to the United Nations. The Arab States are Memhers of the United NationS! and they are loyal and faithful to aH theÏir: duties and to the pledges tlley hav,e undertaken. As lo~g as the Security Council would confirm thls truce and keep it corre,cUy sa as not h to let any advantage, military or territorial, e gained by any party pending the The Jewish authorities 'Use the expression .. dissidents" but 1 do not beHeve tiley ure dissidents. l'use theù' expœssion, but 1 believe that the Jewish community is ncting us oue-one person, oue administraLionund that they direct these so-called dissidents, or gangsters to do the things which they the....~selv-es cannot .du openly. They are iustl1"l.lilting the dissidents to smuggle arms and ammunition, and while they appropriate those aluns and ammunition, they still say" they were brought here by dissideuts and gangsters; we have not nuthorized i1... The attitude of the -Arabs, as 1 have stated, is contrary to any idea of violation of the. truce. If pl'oper investigation and inspection is undertalœn, not a singl:e case will he found in which the Arabs will be found to have. violated the tJ.'luce, or even had any intention of so doing. vVhen 1 say Uùs, 1 speak in the name of my rn>vernment and of my country and 1 believe that all the other Arab States are in agreement with me. Mahmoud Bey FAWZI (Egypt) : Il does uot seem that any othe,r memhers of the Security Council are ready to speak now, so 1 am taking the floo-r once again. Sinee 1 had the opportunity to speak this morning 1 have l'eceived a copy of the telegram from the Prime Minister of Egypt toMr. Azc3!'r.te, which dues not only refer li> !h<:: acceptance of the cease-fil'e order by the Egyptian Government, but to an additional incident in which a Jewish plane attacked a military hosp.ital at Magdal and caused sei'ious damage to it. This is one further instance of a whole series of events which are symbolic and symptomatic of the very basic matter which ,caBs for our most serious considemtion. In his report, atparagraph 17, the Acting Mediator says : "17. A serions breach of the truce is involv,e'd in the Negeh outbreak as defined in the resolutions of the Security Council of 29 May, 15 July and 19 August. The l'Iesol'ution of 15 July ordered an indefinHe cease-fire, while the ;resolution 'Of 19 August specificaUy ,preclud.es Rets of re-prisaI or retaliation. It would seem clear that the military action of the last few days has been on a scale which cou:ld only ibe undertaken aiter considerablepl'le1paratïon, Il is very clear that the Acting Mediator is l'eferring to the aetion of the Zionists in Palestine and in the Negeb. This action, us r suid before, is very dearly premedHated Hnd pl'edetermined, us has heen confirmed by the Acting Mediator himself. It has fi very deep ·significance. !'t is both a defiance ta the Security Council' and a denial of the right of the people living in the Negeb to the relative peace of the cease-fire whieh the Security Council has ordere.d. 'FUl~therlllol'C, the Acting Mediator told liS today that, while the' Egy.ptian Government accepts the cease-fire, the Jewish side does not. Yet, in face of aIl these t'acts,-as has usuaUy happencd ;before-the Zionist spokcsmun has tried to create the customary smokescl'een to (fover aggt'ession. He is trying to draw us into a IUaz,e of little details and small fradions of matlers, in order to confuse the issue, in order-as the camollflellrs of the war used 10 calI it-to dazzle our sight and not allow us to see the' l'cal issue in th{! problem. As the l\epresenlative of Syria saill a while ago; il is most likcly-and this is v·ery 'egl'eUable-th~t the Jews aI'e being encouraged in their p'res1ellt action by what seclllsto them at least to be a clear tendency on the part of the United Nations to bow to foroe, to S'ubmil to force and to whutever faits accomplis which follow Iherefir.om. 1 hop,e that we shall aH l'ealize now that the time has come for us' not to bow to force any longer. in Iparagraph 18 of the Acting Mediator's report 1 sec a refel'ence to the dislocation of laI~gc number·s of Arahs and to their illahility to harvest their crops. They are, as usual, shal ut. They are oHen kiUed if they attempt to harvest their erops'. This is in addition to things which hav'C' been happening during the last few months. The Zioni'Sts have been claiming to he defending thelUs'elves. They had dej;ended themselves in S'Udl a manner as to dlr·ive away fl'om their ancient homes about haU a nlillion Al'ubs who were living on their own land and in theh' O'W11 hOIlH'S in Palestine; and this to th(' advantage of people who had arrivec1 hardly an hour or two beforehulld in Tel Aviv or Haifa. Now thev are adding to the number of displace'd pel'Sons in Palestine. They are adding new a~gression to oId aggression. This, from the ZlOnist ,point of view, is quite understundahIe, 1 ac1mit. The Zionis,ts want more space, more land, whether it is theÏ1's or HOt. ~bis, considering the idea whieh it expl'esses, and conside:rin:gperhaps, at the same time, the complaeency of the expressions of sorne United Nations representatives, the Jews are trying io get more and more territory. 'N'e have seen the late Mediat()ir bow to force and to the fail aocompli. Vv.e have seell' that, even although he objected to certain things. He said : ft but what can we do"? We have seell that during the period from 27 J~une to 16 Septembel', when things happened as a result of military action undertaken by the Zionists which seeUl'ed gains for themselves not through right, but by force; and the Mediator again bowed to force and to the fait accompli. For how Jong is tlùs going to last? For how long are we going to aUow the real issues to remain unsolvcd and the real dange11"s te menaoe the peace in the Middle East and tread upon rights in Palestine? For hmv long are we going to aUow our work here ta be submerged under a rain of argumentation, which 1 discover ta be not only a smoIœ-screen, but what, to use a moderate ex.pression, 1 WOl.ùd calI sill1jply ·a tedious argument of insidious intent. The Zionist side has always tried to bring in little arguments so as to mal' the important issues. l do not want ta dramatize the situation; it does not need ,dramatization. Tt is dramatie enough. -- --LdQ not need cither. 1 hone, to stir th,e Security Couucil into -action~. 1 trust that the Couneil realize'S ifs own responsibility and that it will act. We want to know whether or not there is 'a ·cease-fiil'e. We want to know if, for example, the Council's decision of 15 July still stands. Mr. BUNCHE (Acting United Nations Mediator for Palestine) : II only need one half of a minute, hecause 1 wish to keep the recor'd straight with regard to a statement whieh has now been made twice and which, in my view, is unfottunately misleading. 1 l'efer to the statement wmch has just been made and wasalso made at the previous meeting [365th me'etinu] by the representative of Syria. 1 need only say that il would be entirely inaccurate, in appraising the application of the trüce in Palestine and the co-operation accorded to United Nations observers, to su~gest that full co-operation was extended by As 1 have previously reported '10 this Council, both sides have been guilty of tacHcs, of obstruction in connexion with the truce supervù.sion work. 'Vith specifie reference to ports-a referenoe that has been m~de-I must ·say that we have never encountered any difficulties whatsÛ'ev·er with res.p,ect to truoe supervision in. the po:vts of Israel, while there has been difficultY in this l'egard in the ports of one Arab State, a difficulty which has not yet been setHed. . The PRESIDENT: 1 have no other speaklers on my list. This meeting was caHed for the consideration of the emergency report of the Acting Mediator, 1\:[1'. Bunche, contailled in document S/1042. No member of the Securily Council except one-who is, of course, directly intel'ested in the l'eporthas asked for an opportunity to speak. No resolutioll has been presented. Consequently, :unless the,r·e is obJection to this course, it will be assumed that the A,cting Medialtor' will continue to ad according to the principles set forth in paragraph 18 of this emergency !l',eport to the Secmity Couneil. 1only say, in ,passing, that these principlcs comprehend four points. The first one is Ihe c·essation of hostilitioes. that i·s of the hostilities taldng place now. Ther·e is alreadv a cease-fire order in existence. Then, ,ve have the foHowing points: .. (a) Withdrawal of hOtll parUes from anypüsitions not occupied at the time of the outbl'eak; .. (b) Aece'ptanee by both parties of the conditions set forth in the Central' Truce Supervision Board decision Humber twelve affecting convoys; .. (c)' Agreement by bothparties to under- !ake ne,gotiation through United Nations llltermediaries 0[' diredly as :vegard·s such problems in the Negeb as the' retum to their land of dislocatèd Arabs. the har,r.esting .of -crops, the evacuation of Jewish ~ttlements held by Egyptian force~, and the :pe:rnnanent ·stationillg of Uni>t,e,d obseT- ':ers throughout the area." !s thel'e any obj,edion ,to our considering th1s matrer às standing over dur'ing the I.'ecess which is about. to be taken? General McNAUGHTON (Canada) : 1 uu:derstand tha.t ·this meeting was called this ?orning for the pUl'!pose of considering the al'es>tine' question. 1 would like to know

Yes, 1 was about to reach thatpoint and to 'caU upon the movers of that resolution ,to find out if they wish to proceed to a vote npon il. But befOl~e ,doing so, 1 want to a-scert.ain whether there is any objection to ,carrying this matter over as 1 haye indicated. Ml'. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Rllssian) : As is known, the Security Council Tesolution of 15 July 1948 [81902] called tl,pon the Governments andauthorities ,concerned in PaJes'tille ,to hr,eak off military operations and to continue to co-operate with the Mediator to maintain -pea,ce in Palestine in accordance wHh the Security Council's resolution of 29 May 1'948 [8j801]. The Security Council's resolution of 15 July also provided that, in the absence of another decision 'by the Council or by the Gen.eral' Assembly, the truce would iremain in foree until a ,peaceful seUlement had been a-chieved in Palestine. The resumption of military operations in the Negeb is a contravention of these decisions by the Security Couneil and requires the Itaking of appropriate measures to secure an Immediate cess,ation of hostilities. The Council's first step must he theTefore t~ rtake a decision on the immediate .cessation of military operations in the Negeb. The Council must also study the new situation which 'bas arisen on the basis of the information it has received, namely the Mediator's repOi"t and the statements made by both parties. Until today the newspapers were our sole source of information about the resumption of military operations. But we have since receiv·ed a number of documents induding the Acting Mediator',s report. Military nperations in the Negeb must not continue while we a-re studying the ·question. They must immediatel'y he brought to ,a standstill. 1 consider that the Security Council shoul'd make a 'cease-fire in the Negeb Hs first concern. For this reason the delegation of the USSR supports the proposaI of the Actin~ Mediator and also that of the President of the Council that military operations in Palestine should be suspended without fixing a time limit. As Tegards othel' questions, these l'equire further study. 1said a short while ago that 1 dld not feel that 1 needed to stir up the Security Council to a realization of its own duties, and 1 still wish ta tbe~ieve that that is not neoessary. 1 wouId suggest, how,ever, that, either by amendment of the draft resolution or by some Otther means, sorne more enel'getic and immeidiate action could be ordere:d tby the Se<:urity Co:uncil. Sir Alexander' CADOGAN (United IGngdom): We have been cousidering this report dated ye:sterday from the Acting Mediator in regard to the situation in the Negeb. 1 am not quite sure what you have proposed, Mr. President, in reg~rd to that. Ii it is that the Council! sJ10uld by some means endorse the sugg,estion made by the A-cting Mediator in paragraph 18 <of his report, 1 should he entirely in favour of that. lt seems to me that this is a wise sugg.estion ·and that effect should he giv,en to it if possiMe. It is a question of fiIl!ding the best means by whkh the Council should len:d its authority to it. You yourself have re,called the' fact that there is a draft resolution before the Council in the names of the ,delegations of China and the United Kingdom. That resolution is a rather different thing in one sense. It is ~or,e of a general resolution, recaliling the Joint obligati<ons under the tr.uce agIleement and emphasizing those obligations upon the parties. In ,another sense, il i's a p.articulaI' resolution in that il deals with one particular point, namely, the mUI"der of the late Mediator, and ,caUs for a report on the moo'Sures that have heen taken to see that justice is done in that matter. 1 w:ouI:d liIœ to say tha.t, so fal'! as 1 am c?ncerned as joint author of this resolubon, 1 naturally wish to lœep it before the Conneil, and 1 sugg.est that it might be wis,e fQr the Coun<:il to adopt it hy, 1 shol.lld

1 interpret what has occurred aSI being ,evidence that there is no obJection to the Acting Mediator proceeding--iduring the time' that the substance of his :report is being stuG.Jd-arrd attempting, as he hus, attempted ileretofore, to obtain agr~ement upon the implementation of the truce and of what is here called decision No. 12. Am 1 correct in assuming that there is no objection to this ,course? No membeir has submitted any :proposal. Therefore, 1 am obliiged to aodjourn the meeting without any definire action being taken by the Security Council. This iSI just a temporary matter. Do 1 hear any objection? [ do not. Mahmoud Bey FAWZI (Egypt) : 1 am sorry, but 1 object. 1 think that while military action is beingcontinued by the Zionist forces in the ;Negeb and while families are being driven away from their homes, the Security Council cannat be as complacent as to j'Ust wait and see and hope for the hes't. 1 am 'sure we aIl hope for the best, but the best does not onen happen these days. 1 most respectfuUy submit that the Security Council should take sorne more immediate and energetic measure, and not simply let thing,s drift. We have s'een the consequences of such a policy; 1 hope we shaH not let it happen again. ,1 suggest that the SecuTity Council should try sorne other method of handling this most grave and serious situation.

ln order to, keep the recordcorrect, before recognizing the representative of Syria, 1 wish to state that no member of the Security Council has objected. Ml'. EL-KHOURI (Syria) : 1 did not under'" stand what the President meant when he said he would adjouTn the meeting without the Security Couneil taking ,any decision. We have been convoked here to deal with a very important matter. The Press, not only in France, hut aIl over the world, is very interested in this question 'and is wait- ~Uted his report with the suggestions contai.u~d in paragraph 18. Why doe.s the Security Cûuncil not adopt a :r:esolu,tion base.d on the suggestions of the Mediator? These suggestions are wise ones, and 1 think their immediate adoption is necessary in arder to show, in the first place, that the Security Council is doing Hs duty. We callilot let the situation stand. To do 80 would lIIlean that we are allowing the fighting ta continue. Is that the position which , the Security ICouncil wishes to take? Do we wish to wash our han,dg of the matter and say, .. let them :do whatever they Uke" ? This would mean to allow the continuation of the fighting and the killing. The Acting Mediator has submitted certain proposaIs to which 1 think no one can object. For this reason, 1 p.ropose that we continue llie meeting in order to adopt the proposaIs and hav·e them implemented as soon as possible.

Tbus far there has been no proposaI submitted. Does the representative of Syria wish to submit a proposaI? Ml'. EL-KHOURI (Syria) : ,1 'propose that we a:dopt the suggestiolliSl of the Acting Mediator as contained in paragraph 18 of his report, and have them implemented. General .MCNAUGHTON (Canada) : 1 am in full a·ccord with the proposition which has been put iby the repre8'entative of Syria, namely, that we should take action to implement the recommendations contained in .paragraph 18 of the report which the AJcting Mediator has given us this morning. It seems to us that theseactions are eminently :desil'able and should he taken forthwith. Further it se,ems to me that if we were to deaI with the draft resolutions , whièh were put before this Council by the repl'esentative of the United Kingdo!Ill, supported hy the representative of China, we wouM facilitate the task of th,e MediatOI'. 1 am in favour of specifie support and approval of the Mediator's recommendatio~s tO'day and a1so of examining the Tesoluhon of the United Kingdom which has been p'laced before us and to ,deal with it at this .time. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Rep'Uiblics) (translated trom Russian) : The

Let me state what 1 understand the motion to he. 1 understand that it co'mprehends a ,ces'sation, an immediate œase-fire and a ,cegsgtÏ(,1l of hostilities, hecause it indudes not o'fily the dauses (a), (b) ,and (c), hut al,so the fust clause, which reads as foIlows [8/1042, paragraph 18] : "The present situation in the Negeb is complicated by the fluid nature of military dispo'SUious making a demar.cation -of truce lines ·difficult, the problem of the c-onvoy'S to the Jewish seUlements, as weIl as the prohlems of the dislocation od" large members of Arabs and their inahility to hoa..f'vest their crops. In the drcumstances, the indispensable condition to a restOiration of the situation is :an immediate and effective ce'ase-fire. After the œase-fue, the foUowing conditions might weU he considered as the hasis for fuxfuer negotiations looking toward insurance that similar -outbreaks will n-ot again -occur and that the truce will be fully observed in this -a1'8a. " In my remarks ;r:elating to fuis matter 1 gvou:p,ed al'l the four points and read them out s-o that the rec-ord might show that my enquiry was t-o ascertain whether there was any objection to the Mediat-or carrying on in accordance with those four points, not merely with points (a), (b) and (c), but with aIl fotW of them, 'and l gave contemporaneous interpretation of tbis paragraph whièh, 1 understood, the representative of Syria comprehended in his molion. Is that c-oITect? Ml'. EL-KHoURI (Syria) That is correct. The PRESIDEt.'lT : That is iny 'understanding as President. 1s it the under'Standing of the mover of the proposaI t'hat the language should (he talœn just as it apipears in the report? Ml'. EL-KHOURI (Syria) : It is my intention to take p,aragraph 18 with the three sub-paragraphs which folloow, just as they stand.

Then the operativ,e part of ·paragraph 18 woU'ld .read as follows: "In the circumstances, the indispensable condition to a 1'eS,toration of the situation is an immediate and effective œase-fire After the cease-fir'e, the following conditions might weltlbe considered as tI~e hasis for fnrther nego.tiations looking towar.d insurance that simila;r outbreaks will not again occur and that the truce will he fully observed in this ,area : "(a) Withdr,Qwal of hofh parti,es from any positions no.t occupied at the time of the outbœak ; "{b) Acceptance byboth parties of the conditions set forth in the Central T,ruce 'SUlpervision Boarddecision number twel've affectingconvoys ; "(c) Agreement by 'both parties to undertake negotilation through United Nations inte'tTIlediaries or direcÜy asregarids such problems in the Negeb as the return to their lands of disloctÙed Arahs, the harvesting of 'cro:ps, the evacuation -of 'Jewish s'ettIements heM by Egyptian forces, and the p'eTll11anentsltlationing of United Nations observ;ers throughout the area."

l think there is sorne question ,as to that interpretation. If the me,aning of the representative of Syria is that suh-varagraphs (b) and (c) are conditional upon suh-paragraph (a), l must say fuat l,do not think that that is the purpose of the language. Was thoat the point fuat the representative of Syria was making? Mr. EL-KHOUiU (Syria) : l do not mean that they are conditional. l mean th,at the interpretation of the passage in sub-paragraph (c), to which 1 have referlred, would be within the limits of the meaning of subparagraph (a). Aocording to this language', the Egyptian forces are to withdraw from any settlement which the)T have occupied since the outhreak. Perha.ps t'bey occup~ed places long ago, justas the Jews have heen oocupying many Iplaces whiclh bellong to the Arabs-not only in the Negeb, but also in othel" areas. The passa'ge at the end of suh-para.,graph (c) would therefore be within the meaning of suib-paragraph (a).

,I shalI calI u:pon the author of this text for his intel'pretation, because 1 can see that there exists a poss~ ible ambiguity. Ml'. EL-KHOURI (Syria) : Yes, i think that Ml'. Bunche might '~ve us his iodeas inasmudii as he 1S the author of the S'Uggestions. Mr. BUNCHE (Acting United Nations Mediator fol" PalP"ltinp.): The~ were three steps envlsaged in this paragraph. The first condition, which is indispensïhle to the other two, would be an unconditional cease-fire. FoUowing fhat, there would be ·an opportunitv to llnscramhle the situation as reogoards 'Dositions which may have changed .during the ,course of the recent fighting. The third stage wouIrl be a more prolonlled one, based on that fad that the sitn~tion in the Negeb 'can }lever be stable unnl sorne of the outstanding prob1ems, In other words, these are the fundamental .problems which are outstanding and which would he negotiated by the parties, irrespective of whether they grew directly out of the present fighting or before it. In that sense suh-paragraph (c) would not be fully oCov,ered by sub-pa:ragraph (a) ; it would be partially covered by (a) but not entirely. . Ml'. EL-KHOURI (Syria) : If there are any settlements and I do not know what kind of settlements, which are in the hands of the Egyp,tian forces and which wel'e occupied months ago, and if we are to consider that such settlements should ibe eVlacu:ated, that the Egyptiails should he asked toeva·cuate them, then in order to adjust the situation equitably on both sides, the Aruhs would have every right to ask that the Jews should evacuate Jaffa, Acc~a, Nazareth and the other .places they have occupied previously. If the Egyptian forces have occupied some settlements in the Negeb, why sbould they now be asked to evacuate them while the Jews, who have occupied Arab ;places, induding cHies. are not 'being asked to eva,cuate them? I believe that this proposition would complicate the situation and wouM raise new objections and contention, wmch wouM ,he düficult to solve. If the Egy;ptians are to. he asked to evacuate sorne smaH seUlement whlch is' in their hands, why shauld the Jews not he aske'd to evacuate the dtv of .Taffa or Accra orany other -city or place û0Cup&ed by the Jews whi,ch is fully and completely Arab? !he PRESIDENT: Such questions do not anse on the motion of the re:presentative of Syria. Thev relate ta the execution of the:motion. Unless the repre,sentative of Syria wishes to change' his motion, those questions of poIic'y and judgment with 1 respect to what s'ettlements shall or 'Shall This is my suggestion: to omit in p'aragraph (CI) the words: "'as the return to their lands of dislocated Arabs, the harvesting of crops, the evacuation of Jewisih settlements heM hy Egyptian forces" and to retain the last sentenoe which reads: "the permanent stationing of United Nations observers throughout the area ". We 'a.gree to fuat; the passalge 1 have mentioned is the only one we wish to omit.

Let me see if ,1 interpret tbis as it is illtended to he. It would read as follows: "Agreement by both parties to undertake negotiations through United Nations intermediaries or dire,cUy as regards outstanding .pr"oblems in the Negeh and the permanent stationing of United Nations observers throughout the area. " Ml'. EL-KHOURI <Syria) : That is 'exact.

Is that correct? Ml'. EL-KHOURI (Syria) : That is correct.

1 want to ask the author of this text if tbat would suit him. Mr. BUNCHE (Acting United Nations Mediator for Palestine) : En~irely. Mr. tEBAN (Provisional Governl1llent of Israel) : 1 am sorry to intervene again, but if seems important that the ;parties at least should have a very clear idea of what is involved in this' paragraiPh. My understandmeIl~s of positions, on the other hand, might make new outbl'eaks less likely. AlI tllat, it seems to me, is a subject for negotiatioIl underfhe te1'1ns of this paragl'aph, for the Security 'Coundl is not committing itse.lf to any solutioIl of auy of the problelIl1'S involtved in those three subparagraphs.

That is correct. 1 t'hink 1 have so stated on three occasions. 1 will ask the Security Council wbether it has any objec~;on ta the amendment of the representative of Syria which consists in striking out the wor.d such and substituting for it the word outstanding, and striking out ,entiœly the words .. as the returu to their lands of ,dislocated Arabs, the harvesting of 'crops, the evacuation of Jewish settlements heM iby Egytptian forces";. the paragrap'h thus amended would l'ead as· follows : li (c) Agreement by both parties to undertake negotiations throu.gh United Nations internnediaries or dire.ctly as re'gards outstanding problems in the Negeband the permanent stationing of United Nations observers throughout the area." Is there any objection to this ? Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist .Republics) {translated fJiom Russian) : On behalf of the USSR delegation 1 have already ,expressed the view that the impor- !ant and crucial question on whicli we have Just taken a decision ilS' that of an illlJmed~ iate cease-fire. There appears to 'he compl!€te unanimity among memhers of the Council on this ~oint. The questions 'stilloutstanding, relatmg to a number of questions which have not heen rlais'ed here, ind'UJding decision ~o. 1~ ~hich was ad'opted unclier the Med!lator s mstructions, the problem of l'efugees and that of the evacuation of the The decisions of the Security Council should always be authoritative; thus, if seems to me that 'befOl'e taldng auy decisions. the CO'llncil ought to study these questions in ,gI'eater detail. The amendments submiUed by the re,presentative of Syria are evidence that the Mediator's proposaIs are not sufficiently clear to enable the Security Council to take a final decision now. Therefore', it wouM be better if we were to take a decision here and now on the question of ,cessation of militaI')' operations in the Negeb, a question on which we are a;pparently completely unanimous. As ~ega~ds the remaining questions, we should ask the Mediator to implement the proposaIs 'contained in ,paragraph 18 of his report and negotiate a seUlement with both parties on aU questions which have arisen in the Negeb, including the question of free access for United Nations observers to the territories of both parties. 1 consider that a decision of this kind would he wiser and more authoritative since, if the Semlrity Council were to take decisions now on a number of concrete problems, whic~ it has not discussed, its dedsions would be over-hasty.

1 agree entirely with what the representative of the USSR says cnncerning a ,premature decision. but we are not taking a d'ecision on these subsidiary 'points. What weare doing, if we adopt the Syrian proposaI as amell'ded, is to take a substantive decision on the ceasefire. As for the l'est, weare providing that : " After the cease-fiI'e the following conditions might W1ell be considered ,as the basis for future negotiations, looking, towards insurance that similar oubbreaks will not again occur and that the tr.uce will be fuUy observed in this area... That was the intent of my original' request for unanimous 'consent, and of the Syrian proroS'al. The situation is that unanimous consent regarding the amendment has not been rea,ched in view of the remarks of the representative of the USSR. Therefo:oo. if the Conncil agrees, 1 shan now put the Syrian amendment to his own proposaI to 'a vote. '

1 think that is understood. A vote by show of hands was t«ken. In favour : Argelltina, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, France, Syria. United Kingdolll, United States of America. Abstaining: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialis,t Republies. The Syrian amendment was ade>pted by 9 votes with 2 abstentions.

We shaH now vote upon the Syrian proposaI' as amended. A vote by show of hallds was t«ken. In favour : Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Ohina, Colombia, France, Syria, United Kingdolll, Uniteâ States of America. Abstaining: Ukrainian Sovi'et Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republies. The Syrian pre>posal was al~opted by 9 votes with 2 abstentions. .Ml'. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): 1 shouM like to ask you, Ml'. President, to take a separate vote on the first point regarding an immediate cease-fire, since ,this is a very important question, whioch requires a unanillI10us .decision by the Security Couneil. .

The remarks of the representative of the USSR amount to a request for a reconsideration of the vote which has been taken on the resolution which was :passed, and to separate if in two different parts. If is divisible, and 1 assume that the repres'entative of Syria has -TI? «:b.lecnon to its being voted upon in two dI'shnct :Il'arts. II see that there is no objectiQn. We will then take the first part. If is proposed that the Security Council should adopt 'Part of the motion ;re'lating to the eease-fire, reading as folilows : . "18. The present situation in the Negeb 'lScomplicated by the fluid na'ture of miIitary dispositions makingthe ,demarcation of truce !ines difficuIt, the problem of the • Convoys to the Jewish settlements, as weIl as the problems of the dislocation of lar~e nutnbers of Arabs and their inability to· A vote was taken by show of hands. The first part af paragraph 18 was adopted unanimously.

Now we will take a vote on the remainder of paragraph 18, namely .. After the cease-fire, the following conditions might weIl he considered as the basis for further negotiations looking toward insurance that similar outbreaks will not again occur and that the truce will he fuI.ly observed in this area : .. (a) Wi~hdrawal of both parties from any positions not occupied at the time of the au.tbreak ; .. (b) Acceptance by boUl parties of the conditions' set forth in the Central Truce Supervision Board decision number twel'Ve affecting convûys ; .. (c) Agreement hy both parties to undertake negotiation through United Nations intermediaries or directly as regards outstanding pr'oblems in the Negeb and the permanent stationing of United Nations observers throughout the area... A vote was tŒken by show of hands. rhe .remaining part 0" paragraph 18 was adopted by 9 votes with 2 abstentions. The PRESïDENT: The other resolution still' pending' relates to the protectiûn of United Nations personnel. Al~ we ready to vote on that now? Ml'. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian) : The draft resolutiûn on the Palestine question submiUed by the representatives of the United Kingdom and China on 14 Octûber contains a numberof points which 'constitute the natural oevclùpment of the Security Cound' i resollUtions of 15 Jtùy and 19 August 1948 and puts them into 'concrete form. This resolution is mainly concerned with securing freedom of movement for United NationS staff supervising the ir'uce in Palestine, wïth assisting them in the investigation of incidents conneded with violations and wHh guaranteeing their secur- • For the ,text of the joint resolu\.ion submitted by Ihe delep:ations of the United I{inlldoin and 'China see Official Recol'ds of the Seclll'ity COllnCn, 'I1hil'd Year, :'\'0. HG. The staff of the United Nations truce supervision organization in Palestine should undoubtedly enjoy the support of both .parHes in the execution of their duties. For their part the staff of the United Nations mnst co-operate with both parties in the attempt to ensure an ilIll.parti'al and objective investigation of instances of violation. It is aIso essential' to aim ,at an equal distribution of observers on the terrHory of both parties for the pm'pose of ensurin,g an objective 'Und impartial observation of the truce. This question in particlùar has arisen today.in the course of the discussion of the pIloblem which we are considering. . In this connexion the USSR delegatioll woul'd consider it useful to add the following point to the preamble of the draft .resolution submitted to us, in the form of an additional point 5 : "Reminds the Mediator of the desirahility of the equal distriibution of United Nations ohservers supervising tlle truce on the.territory of both .parties. " The USSR delegation considers that the inclusion of such a point in the Security Council's decision would the very fUsefu1. l will now hand you this amendment in written fOIm. Sir Alexander CADOGA..""l (United Kingdom) : As one of the authors of the original resolution, 1 should he quite prepar.ed to accept the insertion which has heen proposed by our USSR ,co1'league. Mr. Hsu (China) : China accepts also. que Mr. EBAN (Provisional Govermnent of Israel) : l notice, in the second p·aragl'aph o.f the draft resolution, an ,expression of concern arising from the failure of the l'epreseutatives of the Government of Israel ~o report fnIJ.y on the steps taken in the Iuvestigation of reSiponsibility for the assassinatiÏ:on of the Mediator. l understand that this draft resol'Ution \Vas drafte.d before 1 made a full report to the Security Council, at a previous meeting [365th meetingJ of aIl the S'teps that have ~een taken. The Security Council is now lU Possession of full information rclating to the apprehens'ion of the l~aders of the suspected organization and their imminent suhmission to judici'al processes.. There-

Apparently this resolution is subject to unanimous consent on the part of members of the Coundl. As there is no objection to the resolution as so amended, it is adopted unanimousl'y. THREE HUNDRfiD AND SIXTY-EICHTH MEETING Held al the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, on Tuesday, 19 October 1948, at 3 p.m. President: Mr. Juan Atilio BRAMUGLIA (Argentina) . Present: The representat'.ives of the foHowing oountries: Argentina, Beigium, Canada, China, Colomhia, France, Sya.-ia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet SociaHst Repuhl1cs, United King- dom, United States of America. 1. Provisional agenda (S/Agenda 368) 1. Adoption of the agenda. 2. iIdentic notifications, dated 29 Sep- tember 1948, from ,the Governments of the French Repub1ic, the United States of America and the United Kingdom to the Secretary-General (Sjl020 and Sjl020jAdd.1). 2. Adoption of the agenda 3. Continuation of the discussion on the identic notifications dated 2.9 Sep- tember 1948 from the Governments of the French Republic, the United States of America and the United Kingdom to the Secretary-Ceneral (5/1020 and S/I020/Add. 1). Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United King- dom): My delegation has given caveful .consideration to the first of the two ques- tions which were put at the last meeting of the Security Council [366th meeling]. This question was ,as foHows : .. We request the representatives of the United States of America, the United King- dom, Fil'ance and the Union of Soviet