S/PV.368 Security Council

Apparently this resolution is subject to unanimous consent on the part of members of the Coundl. As there is no objection to the resolution as so amended, it is adopted unanimousl'y. THREE HUNDRfiD AND SIXTY-EICHTH MEETING Held al the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, on Tuesday, 19 October 1948, at 3 p.m. President: Mr. Juan Atilio BRAMUGLIA (Argentina) . Present: The representat'.ives of the foHowing oountries: Argentina, Beigium, Canada, China, Colomhia, France, Sya.-ia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet SociaHst Repuhl1cs, United King- dom, United States of America. 1. Provisional agenda (S/Agenda 368) 1. Adoption of the agenda. 2. iIdentic notifications, dated 29 Sep- tember 1948, from ,the Governments of the French Repub1ic, the United States of America and the United Kingdom to the Secretary-General (Sjl020 and Sjl020jAdd.1). 2. Adoption of the agenda 3. Continuation of the discussion on the identic notifications dated 2.9 Sep- tember 1948 from the Governments of the French Republic, the United States of America and the United Kingdom to the Secretary-Ceneral (5/1020 and S/I020/Add. 1). Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United King- dom): My delegation has given caveful .consideration to the first of the two ques- tions which were put at the last meeting of the Security Council [366th meeling]. This question was ,as foHows : .. We request the representatives of the United States of America, the United King- dom, Fil'ance and the Union of Soviet As regards travel by road, allied passen- gers required no special authorization fl'lDill the Soviet military authorities, who merely che,cked the identity of v:ehic1es as they crossed the boundary hetween the British Zone and the Soviet Zone. AH that was needed was a Russian translation Df traffic orders signed on hehalf of one of the three western Military GovernmenÏ'S- in practice, vehicles were seldom checked at aIl. The USSR -authorities did not in- spectcargo 'Or haggage and they had no checking point on the houndary hetween the Soviet. Zone and the western sectors of Bel'llin. Just inside Berlin, the licence nUill- bers 0':'- cars were checked by representa- tives of the three western MilitaryGovern- ments. Germans traveUing hy road needed a pass issued by any one of the Military .Governments, unless it was needed for more than thirty days, wheu it had to be approved by the Military Governor of each zone thflough which the Germans travelled. ~ny of the MHitary Governments could ISsue documents to cover vehicles and fr.:ight. German traveHers were checked by the USSR authorities on the inter-zonal boundary and 'Sometimes by patrols on the highw~y. ' - 1 " I Arrangements for travel by rail were more complex, hut 1 wiU try not to burden Each of the three Western occupying Powers introduced its own -documents to cover the Illlovement of passengers and freight by raR There was' no agreed docu- mentation laid down hy the four POW&s. Allied passengers heM movement orders and identity 'papers, while for freight, mili- tary warrants were issued by ,any one of the occupying Powers. Individualpassen- gers and baggage of the thriee Western occupying Powers travelling between Ber- lin and the Western Zones were not subjed to checking inside the Soviet Zone. These trains did not of course plut .clown or pick up !passengers or cargo mside the Soviet Zone. If Allied passengers travelled in the international coaches attached to German civil trains they heldsimilar ,documents and normally were not subject to exami- nation within the Soviet Zone either. The only Gennans who traveHed on Allied tr:a1ns were those whose journeys were ap:proved in the interest of the Military Governme'Uts. They occÜJPied special œ 'lches and ,carried AlUed movement 'm:- ders or inter-zonal IPasses similar to those for road traViellers. The heaviest traffic to Berlin from the Western Zones was that 'Of Allied supplies for the civil population of the city, sorne of which were dilStributed in the USSR sector. This freight was invoiced under normal ,commercial procedure. German civil freight travelling from the West :required a licence issued iby any one of the three Governments. Frei.ght trp 1T{~1­ ling to the West was authorized by ...,e Gemnan city government, but the tr~d'2 <!e.partment of the USSR sector daimed ilie rigbt to control the export ;:)fcertain types la les n'avaient soviétiques marchailldises occident·auxde. mands posséder sez-passeil.' dés. VOyl8geurs les marcation zone lés 'entre soviétique On this point no agreed ,procedure had been established since the Western occu- pying Powers had not admitted the right of the USSR authorities to veto movement of merchandise from the western sectors of Be1'llin. German passengers who trav- elled on ordinary trains had to possess identity pa'pers as weIl as inter-zonal passes. The Illter-zonal paS'8es were issued in the same way as already described for travellers Iby road. Hoth passengers and baggage were checked by the USSR author- itie!> on the houndary between the Soviet Zone 'and the British Zone. They were not checked between theboundary of the Sov- iet Zone and Berlin. dalliS trall3'pOli: V'enu viétique _Royaume-Uni, principes des leurs soviétiques ment. nique saires. mention militaires viHes fort-'Sur-le-Main, cidentales suivalllt chaClID ·vembre types Ill'avaitété lieu tion peu As regards barge traffic, documentation of cargo, both Allied and German, was simHar fo that for rail transport. An agree- ment reached between the USSR Military Administration and the United Kingdom Military Government on 26 June 1946, laid down prineiples for adequate documenta- tion 'of the harges and their 'crews, although the USSR authorities never fully carried out the agreement. Craft from the British Zone carriedadequate documents. As the Security Conncil will find refer- ences io the ,air ,corridors in the .papers which have already been subn1itted, l should perhaps add a few wor:ds' about this. Military and civil aircraft moved hetween Hamburg, Buckebiurg and Frank- furt-on-Main in the western zones of Ger- many and Berlin through three ,corridors, . each twenty miles in width, which had been established 'by four-Power agreement in the AUied Control Couneil, on 30 No- vember 1945. Airc-raft flying in these corri- dors were unlimitedas to ty.p:e or 'llumber of flights; flights could be made without prior notification to the occupying author- Hies. Aiœraft a'Pproachiug Berlin were re])orted to the Berlin Air Safety Oentre ~naTaj'ent :rité par bilité la pareils. ~~ich had been established byquadr1par- hte agreement. The checking of p'ersonnel and freight ,carried hy aircraft was a re- sponsibility of the occupying Powe? to whOl1ll the aircraft belonged. '1l'ée l!es magne :r,estrietio:nlS .So rnuch for the position at the begin- nmg of this :-,-car. However, sinoo iast January, and éi.iJeciaUv from March 1948 onwards, the USSR mHitary authorities in Germany jnmosed a m.;;mber of re'Strictions on COlll1ml1TJilcrru()ns. tran3port and com- merce by r"x~,d, rail and' water betW1een hl. his opening speech at the Security Council, the representative of the United States üovernment al'So gave a full descrip- tion [361st meeting]. 1 do not propose to weary the Security Council by repeating the facts again. 1 have, however. f'Dr con- veuience of reference, prepared a com- prehensive account setting out these re- strictions in detailand the steps hy which they were progressively impdsed. Copies of this have been circulated to a1l members of the Security Council. E 'ore leaving this part of the answer to the question, l should like to draw the attention of the Security Coullcil very briefiy to four points which 1 think must strike anyone who makes an impartial study üf the history and nature of these l'estrictions. The first is the great varioety of the re- strictions imposed between March and July. A study of these discloses that the imposition of these restrictions constituted a planned and insidious attempt to harass the Western occupying Powers in the discharge of their obligations in Berlin and to whittle away their rights as 1.n occupying Power. The faet that this attack was made at àifIerent points progressively, ov~r a period of time, and not aIl at once, was cleaily desirgned to make it more dif- ficuU for the Western occu;pying Powers to determine at any one moment that the process had gone too far. The second .point to note is the variety and inconsistency of the reasons given hy the Russian authorities for theirllction. The r'eprestntative of ,the United States Government strE'.:5sed this in his opening speech, and 1 pel'haps need not say more about :il now. My third point i5 the manifest insincerity of the reasons advan'~ed. For instance, w.Hhin lhespace 01 a frew short 'w,_'e~{':, tech- nicaliifficuIties üf such magnit,,,dE. nre alleged to have arisen as t0 lnterrllPt almost completely communications lby rail, rmid and water between \Vestern Germany and Berlin. We were never given any clear information as to the exa,ct nature of these technical dif.ficulties ; we- were never toId< what remleJdiJes H was 'proposed to apply, and if was never ,explained v,rhy It was on 15 June last that the USSR authorities closed, for repairs, the Elbe bridge on the Autobalzn between Berlin and the West. If we are asked to believe that it has not yet been possible to effect l'epairs, it is impossible not to feel' sorne resentment at the insu1t to the intelligence of military officers of armies which in the later stages of Lhe war swept oV'er parts of France and the Low Countries, where aImost every river crossing had been shattered. On another occasion, the Russian authorities apparently suddenly discovered that a large proportion of the railway goods wagons which had been passing for a long 'period betwee:u the various zones of Germany were unsafe for luse. The hoUow- Ress of such pretexts' was proved hy the faet that the USSR authorities felt con- strained at times to substitute some other e~euse9 such as the necd to protect the eurrency and economy of the Soviet Zone. The fourth and m.ost important point is the manner in which the Russians imposed these restrictionsunilaterally and by the issue of a series of uhimata. In S'pite of their departure from the Control CouncH, the machinery of four...Powe!' government in control still existed, The, Russian author- Hies, howeV'er, were not prepared to use this machinery or to approach their Allies with a view to reaching .agreement with them on any measures' which they wished to introduce. Instead, they resorted to for- cible means and when inquiries or protests wel'e made, they either œfused to answer or 1:eU back upon sorne speciou~' excuse or othet. The conclusion which His Majesty's Gov- ernment h~.ls been ·compelled to dmw from aIl this is that .fhese restrictive measures were not introduced with the genuine in- tention of defending the economy of the Soviet L'One. They began lon~ ibefol'e CUl'- rency reform took place in We.<ltern Ger- many or in Berlin. Theil' true object was ta apply ,pressure upon the three Western oecupying Powers in'ürder to make the'Ïr position untenabife. ! should perhaps add a word here ~hout the restrictions which ~re heing lmposed upon ·transport and commeI1ce to and from the Soviet Zone of Germany bv the three Western occupying Powers. These mensures weI1e 'onJy infroduce.d with great :telttctance by the Vlestern Powérs German travel1el'S who ·carry no goods can usually cross the boundary hetween the British and Soviet Zones on foot 'and they are also allowed to proceed to Berlin. Ger.man passenger vehicles going only to the Soviet Zone are usually allowed to cross the frontier and occasionally German road vehicles· have been aHowed to reach Berlin. These restri'Ctions on German trav- ellers are liable to continuous vaTi9flons. Road traffic from Berlin to the West is also largely impossible. No goods origina- ting in Berlin can he tak~n to the "Vestern Zones. All residents of Berlin require a special USSR pass to travel to the Western Zones. Any Allied vehicle :prnceeding west would also require a special Russian per- mit and be lia.ble to search. If itcrossed the zonal boundary, il would he unable to return. In practice there Is no movement by road by any of the three Western occu- pying Powers ex~ept for abus service for French offi.cials, which is aUowed by the Soviet autIlOrities to l'un as far as the boun- dary whcre the passengers then ,cross on foot. '.i.n.. onlv e~i',~'Dtions to the above con- cern .:n2:il.... l\'r~E 11',: co the Soviet sector of BerIdn t0 I.heV,Te~k:tn Zones of Gennany As the result of the limitations of the USSR, the three \Vestern Powers inuo- duced certain restrictions already described which mean that, at present, no freight lrafflc except mail from the three \Vestern Zones 'can enter the Soviet Zone, nor can any international trafflc except mail origi- nating or terminating in the Soviet Zone pàss through the three 'Nestern Zones, 1 have made no attempt to deal with air communications, since, as is weIl known, these have been maintained and increased 10 meet the requirements of Berlin. Air tr,affic flows frcely within the agreed corri- dors and, in accor-dance with the arrange- ments which 1 have already explained. 1 must add that sinee cOID!piling the foregoing aecount, 1 have only this morn- ing received news of the imposition of yet fUl'ther measures to prevent any food l'eaching the western sectors of Berlin from the Soviet Zone. Lorries ,carrying food have been stopped, and an announcement has been made by Colonel Markov, the Soviet appointed Police Chief in the Soviet sector of Berlin. And yet. Mr. Vyshinsky has contended that there is no Soviet attempt to blockade Berlin. It is easy enough to understand that the members of the Security Couneil not directly concerned in the 'problem which lhey are now asked to consider should l'equire the fullest possible information and documentation. The issues involved are grave and the pl"ohlem isa complex one with a long and disputed his~ory. The m0mbers of the Security CouDeil, by call:ing for aIl possible material bearing on the subject, have shown that they under- take ihis task with a due sense of re- sponsibility. In its desire to assist them, my Govem- ment has- furniSlled aIl the relevant infor- mation at ils disposaI, and will continue to hold itself, in this respect, at the disposaI of the Security Council. A~ this point 1 should like to emphasize agam the general position of my Gover men~. In _pi'oviding these answers to f'-:, 1 particular questions formulated by the six mernhe.rs of the Seeurity Council, l venture to remlnd the Council of the .exact nature of the question which il has been' caned upon to considere This, as 1 said in my Powel~ in Germany, designed to extract by pressure concessions which could not be WOll from the \Vestern Powers by negotia- tions, and is a threat to t4e .'peace. It is the contention of my Government that the con- tinuation of these blockade measures con- stitutes a barrier to negotiations among the four occupying Powers to seUle out- standing problems regarding Berlin and Gernl1any as a whole. Il is this issue which the Security Council has been asked to consider. The result of the investigations which have 'been conducted by the President must have convinced aIl members of the Security Council, if they were not already aware of it, of the gravity of the situation which has been created by the imposition and continuation Iby the Soviet Govern- ment of these bloclmde measures. lIn the first 'place, this blockade, which Ml'. Vyshinsky can hardIy hope to 'convince anyone does not exist, means that an attempt is being made forcibly to ;prev,ent the three other occupying Powers from exer.cising their legitimate rights and dis- -eharging their legal and humanitarian responsi'bilities as an occupying Power in Berlin, and to impose upon thelIll a seUle- ment. Il is unnecessary to dilak further on l:nis point since aIl thre,e opening state- ments by the representatives of the three Western occupying Powers, and the infor- mation which they hav,e lSubs'equently furnished, have explained the histûry and effects of this blockade in clear terms. Secondly, the threat of force which is constituted hy tms blockade, has now existed for over six months. That is to say, for the whole 'lf this period a GqV'f:' ~ nment which is a signatory to the Ch~H;,'!' of the United Nations and is bound U,·tr·ei)y il~ refrain from the threat or use d Ly',,;·'.; in any manner inconsistent with the lE' ";'uses of the United Nations, has been doing exactly thai. In spite of aH endeavours which have 'been made to induce the Sov- iet Government to abandon these means of pressure, and in spite of the readiness of the other occupying Powers to consider aIl reasouable suggestions in order te Thirdly it is now abundantly clear-and 1 can hardly think that anyone can f~eel uny dount on UlIS score maI il' l continuance of the blockade and this alone which constitutes the barrier to the resurrw- tion of four-Power negotiations on German qu~stions which the Governments of the United Kingdom, France and the United States have repeatedly .declared-and on liehalf of my own Government l now d{l- clare it again-that they are willing to llndertake as soon as the restrictions on communications, transport and ·commerce between the 'Vestern Zones of Occupation in Germany and Berlin have been removed. How then ·can the situation be resolved? lt ean he rresolved quickly and simply by Ihe removal of the restrictions to which l have referre.d. When these rrestridions have been removed, this infringement of the l'ighLs and obligations of His Maj:esty's Government as an occupying Power in Berlin will also be removed, the ·challenge to the United Nations will be withdrawn, the thr:eat to the peace will disappear, and negotiations for the seUlement of outstand- ing issues as regards Berlin and Germany can 'hegin at once. As l think members of the Securily Council will agree, the record shows that His Majesty's Government in the UnHed Kingdom has throughout shown a most ac- commodating spirit in the .desire to rreach a slettlement. For instance, acting together with the United States and French Govern- ments, it took the initiative, ev,en though the blockade still continued, in opening discussions on the Berlin crisis with the Government of the USSR, and -continued' them for six weeks in Moscow and Berlin in August and September. At that stage, it was trying to see whether il cOllld he as- sured that acomprehensiv,e agrleement -cûuld he reached that might have solved .~he Berlin currency problem and resulted Ln the l'emoval of the transport :fIestrictiûns complained of. At one moment it seemed that a scheme for S'uch an agreement had been devise.d, hut the attempt to l'ealize it soon ·sh">wed that this was an illusion. Thepromised con- ditions for the settlement of' the currency Pl'oblem under four-Power control had disap·peared; theve was equivocation on the oornoval of l'iestrictions, and a demand AH the r1estriclions still remain, and so long as they remain it is to he feared that any scheme, including the scheme outlined in the Moscow discussions of 30 August, would meet the same fate if tbe process of formulating it in detail and of ensuring Hs practical implementation on conditions ac- ce·ptable tO aU four occupying Powers had to he ·carried out again uuder the pressure of a continuing blockadte. 1 have only this to add : As l said in the earlier part of my speech, it is now plain that there is onJy one obstacle to the resumption of negotiations between the Powers di1"ectly concerllied in this dispute. 1 hope that this will'be l'oecognized and that uny views which members of the Security Coundl may think fit to express will take iuto account the iparamount importance, not only to the seUlement of the present dispute but to the prestige of the Security Council and the United Nations and for the sake of the worId, of the principle that negotiations between Members of the Uni- ted Nations can properly take place ouly in an atmos;phere free from the threat or employment of force or duress.

ln accordance with the wish of the delegations of the United States and France there will he no 'consecutive interpretation during this meeting. Ml'. JESSUP (United Staies of America) The representative of the United Kindom has giv{'n the Security Council a complete review of the facts of the .complex blockade measures imposed by the USSR over a period of months. These are the actions which were designed to deprive the Western Powers of their ~ust and legal rïghts in Berlin and to force t:le German ca:pital into the Soviet 'economic and political system. These are the aets which, taken as a whole, constitute dur,ess and the threat of force. such as are v....holly inconsistent with the'obligations imposed by thle Charter on Members of the United Nations. ln the course of his remarks, my colleague from the United Kingdom referred to measures which had been talœn by the SovÏet authorities in Beriin, yesterday, in intensifying the measures of restrictions conoerning the western seetor of that city. 1 should like to try to giVie the Security Coundl the adual picture of these additi',ual measures which have been imposed. Perhaps these new measures taken yesterday by the USSR Government in Berlin were intended as a tacit reply to that part of the first question posed by the Security Council, which asked : What is the present status of the blockade? Clearly, one thing which emerg'es frOlll1 these announcements and actions is that the blockade not only ~ists but i:'! being intensified; ils duress of which we complained, and which is a bar to negotiations, is being increas1ed even as the Security Council deliberates, There is an as:pect of the hlockade measures which l ;particularly wish to reemphasize to thie members of the Conneil. As [ pointed out before, under a series of international agreements, the four occupying Powers undertook responsi'bilities for the population of the sedors of Berlin committed to their charge. The blockade is a method used by the USSR for the expansion of its IPower in utter disregard of these joint responsibilities and with a canous indifference' to the effect of their measures on 'the population of the western sectors. 1 would alsoremind the Council that it was not until a month after the blockade was imposed that the USSR made itsoffer ta supply food and coal to the western sectors. It was thus clear that it originally contemplated putting this pressur1e on the population, in an attempt to break their spirit and, it was only after the success of thle: air lift was demoilstrated.that an aUempt was made to counter the air lift . with ail offer of Soviet suppli,es. This is the blockade which Mr. Vyshinsky says is entirely mythical. His contention that there is no blockade .has been amply disproved Iby 'the facts. The Sovi'et interpretation will, in any event, be somewhat disputed by the two and oneha!f million people who are the direct abject of Soviet power poli'tics, who are faced with a ,choi,ce betwoon acoopting the l'eai and potential hardships of flle blockade. ?r fLccepting Soviet political food and pohhca:J 'coal and, hence, Soviet and Communist IPolWcal domination. Theil' choice has been clear and unmistakahle from the beginning. They have chosen hardship and freedom. This is a ho.peful si~ for the fhture peace and security of Europe, for t e sake of which the four Pow~s under- "The Allies will talœ in ag11eement together, now and in the future, the other measures necessary to assure that Germany never again wiU threaten her neighbours or the peaoe of the world. It is not the intention of the Allies to destroy or enslave the German people. It is thle intention of the Allies that the German peoiple be given the opportunily to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of their lif'e on a democratic and peaceful ibasis. " That was agreed at Potsdam. The Government of the Soviet Union, using the harsh ins'trument of the blockade, has indeed chosen a strange way in Berlin to live up to ils agreement to democratize German political life. Thanks to the airbridge and to the suplPort given 'to it by the Berliners, th'e Government of the Soviet Union has not succeeded in its purpose. l should like to get down to the bare bones of the matter and ask the members of the Security Council to visualize the situation as it exists on the map and the face of the globe. There is Berlin, an Island city in the midst of the Soviet Zone. By international agreenJlent, Berlin is a city under the administ.ration of four countries-Fr~nce, the Soviet Union, United Kingdom and United States. It is not a Russian city. OfficiaIs and troops of the four ,countries aœ in the city carrying out their duties in the several sectors assigned to them iby international agreement. Questions affectiug the city as a whole, under those same agreements, are supposed to be conïrolled hy the four countriies acting together in the Control CouncÏ1 and the Kommandatura, the two bodies which they set up for that pUlipose. In 1945, aIl four agreed that aH four should share inbringing 'essential supplies of food, fuel, etc. to Berlin and in distrihuting those supplies in Berlin. For about three years, this island city 01'_ Berlin was administered under those agreements. Then in 1948, for one, reason or another-I shall not now pause to review the evidende which sho'ws what 'the reason was; the varying and inconsistent reasons advancedby the Soviel: Command for these restrictions have already been revealedthe Soviet Union, one of the four Powers, walked out of the Control Council and the Kommandatura and began to close the roui!es .'- Berlin. To reach Berlin, aU these rOL'.tes, .by rail, road and canal cross Soviet Zone territory. The Soviet Army is stationed aH through that territory and, therefore, is in a physical ,position to pI"event traffie fromcrossing il. They have 'Ilot the o~t of Berlin to and from tneir own zones. But the Soviet Union has the Iphysical power, and it has threatened to use it. It does not have th.;' same physical power of co:nh'ol over the air and, therefore, the three Western Governments a~e using the air lanes. The air lift has imposed tremendous additional burdens upon tlte three Western powers who have exactly the same right as the Soviet UnioIlJ to he in Berlin. But if we three 'Vestern Powers had heen unwilling to make that effort, we would bedefaulting on our recognized responsibilities for the econonüc and ,political welfare of the Berlin population. It is not unreasonable to assume that the oibjective of the Soviet Union is to pla'ce the Western Powers in a position where they cannot carry out. their Desponsibilities. If is absurd for the Soviet Un~on to argue that there is no blockade merely because we 'can still reach our own sectors of Berlin by air or hecause theybelatledly offel'eà to supply food in exchange for poUtical control. . Nat.ions Onedoes not need to be an ex,pert on the Charter to rtealize that the use of physical power, lbaclœd by armed force, in an attempt to prevent us from going where we have a right ta he and whe:'" we have i~tel'national dulies to perform is a violahon of thel purposles and principles of the United Nations. If the Soviet Union had complaints against thp three western countries, the whole F\ ~>;(:~ of the Charter . thSorne people may think there was no l'lea'} reat of forc€ 'because they ,did not actually c~early Dequil'les thl~·.: i' try to 80etfle the~e diffel'ences hy Ipeaceful m'eans. Did they try to do sa? They did not. 'From the beginning of 1948 until their surface blockade became complet,e, they never sUgJglested that we should have a lllee?ng of the CouDeil of Foreign Ministers to dISCUSS the broad questions of the futuDe ~f Germany. From the time they withdrew roon the Control Councn in March 1948 they neVier 'Suggested negotiatiol1s in any othel' body. Instead they used the extreme llleasure of blockade. N l On 21 June 1948, United States Military Train No. 20, under the command of an American officer and carrying one warrant officer and interpreter and six train guards, left Helmst1edt en raute to Berlin. Despite the fact that it had 'cŒnlPHed with aIl the agreed regulations, the train was stopped at the Russian ·conh'ol point. There were three day's of argument during which thie Russian demauds were frequeIitIy aItered. FinaIly, the Russian commandant ordered aIl United States personnel off raHroad property -which he claimed was und!er Soviet control-and on to guard cars. Two American guards were forced off the engine by a Russian colonel and two arnli:d. Russian guards. Other Russian guards with automatic guns were placed alongside the train at various spots. The Sovi,ct guards rode in thle train to the border point where they alighted and the train IPr.oceeded ba'ck to Helmstedt. Now as 1 pointed out to the Security Council before, we could have used our armed force against the Soviet threaL Or, we ,could have meekly submitted and surrendeired our rights and duties in Berlin, subjecting nearly two and a haIf million Germans to Soviet rule with aH that that implies. What we actuaHy did, and aI"e still doing, was to live up to our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and try to settle the question by peaceful discussions while ,continuing to discharge our obligations in Berlin. , This leads me to the second question which has been pHt to us by the Sewrïty Council, and 1 should like to quote it : "We r-equest the representatives of the United States of Amlerica, the United Kingdom, France and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to ex.plain in deblil the agreement involved in the instructions giv,en to the Military Governors of the Power'" in Berlin, and to give the precise reason... which IPrevented its implementation... In answering ibis question, one needs to remember what the situation was when the discussions began. The heginning was on 6 JuJy 194M when the three Governments S'ent the fir.st notes to the USSh Government. By that time, the USSR interruption of highway, railroad and canal traffic was complete and the three Western Powers ha.d îbeen fOl'lced to resort tp the air lift to carry out their acknowledged duties in Berlin. This was Il situation creating a We turned to the Security Council on 29 September for exactly the same reason that we entered into discussions with the USSR Government in July, namely to rernove the threat to the ipeace. 'Ve did not come to the Se,curity Cauncil in July, because Article 33 of the Charter required us .. first of an n to exhaust the possihility of dil'ect discussion. But the threat to the peace existed in July as it exists now in October. In July we wondered whether there was sorne ·detail, some misunderstanding whirh hàd led th,e USSR Government, however improperly and illegally, to use force instead oÏ conference. If that were the case, the difficulty could be removed. If, howev,er, as aU the signs seemed to indicate, the USSR was using the th-reat of force to get us out of Berlin, that was a different matteir. , So we put the question ta Marshal Stalin in Moscow on 2 August. Ambassador Smlith of the United States of America spoke f;or the three Governments. 1 want to quote his \Vords although they are reproduced in full in the United States "Vhite Paper on page eighteen. "The UnHed States, the United Kingdom and Froanee do not wish the situation to deteriorate further and assume that the Soviet Government shares this desire. The tIu'ee GoV'ernments have ;'n mind restrictive rneaSUir.es which have heen :placed by Soviet authorities on communication between the Western Zones of Germany and western sectors of Berlin. It was the feeling of our Governments that if these measures arose from technical difficulties, such difficulti,es could easily be remedi,ed. The thr,ee Governments renew their offer of assistance to this end. If in any way l'elated to the currency problem, such measures are obviously uncaHed-for, since this problem could havebeen, and can now be, adjusted hy representathr.es of the fourPowers in Berlin. If, on the other hand, these measures are designed to bring about negotiations among the four occupying Powers they are ,equaHy unnecessary, sinee the Governments of the United Kingdom, the France s'aggrave <.rue dési<r. les riMs communications talles dentaux ments résultent aisément difficultés. ",elIent Si Hées manifestement blème encore, quafir,e côté yoquer 1 have already given the CClllllcil, on 6 October [363t,d meeting], the outline of the discussions which followed, and 1 shaH now repeat only the essential points. At the dose of the meeting on 2 August, Marshal Stalin seemed to meet our iPoint of view. He proposed that the lifting of restrictions on transport and commerce should he carried out simultaneously with the introduction into Berlin of the German mark of the Soviet Zone and the withdrawal from Berlin of the Western mark B. The thr.ee Western Governments assumed that Marshal Stalin's proposaI was hased on the establishment of four-Power control over currency in Berlin and that, therefore, il could he acc~p.ted. A.ccordingly, at the next meeting with Mr. Molotov on 6 August, the three Western re'presentatives suggested Ambassador Smith went on to say: .. In spite of l'ecent occurrences, the three Powers are unwilling to beHeve that this lal3t l'eason is the reaI: one. Rather they assume that the SO\l:et Government sharès their view that il is in the interest of aIl four occupying Powers, of the German people and of the world in general nrevent any further deterioration of the position and to find a way by mutua! agreemen~ to bring to an end the extremely dangerons situation that has developed in Berlin. .. The Soviet Government will, however, appreciate that the three Governments are unable to negotiate in the sih..ution which the Soviet Government has takel1 the initiative in creating. Froee negotiations can only take place in an atmosphel'e relieved of pressure." This is the issue. .. Present restrictions upon communications behveen Berlin and the Western Zones off.end against this princi.ple. \Vhen this issue is resolved, snch difficult1es as stand in the way of l'esumption of conversations on the lines set out should be removed. " The USSR did not accept this draft communique immediately. Instead, pr'otracted discussions were held hetween the four Powers over a three-week .period until what is known as the "directive". was agl'eed upon on 30 August. 1 think it is unnecessary ta give hel'e a detailed chI' ological account of these diwussions, sinl .hat ac- 'count is to he found in the \VhiL Papers which have been published both by mY Government and by the Government of the United Kingdom. 1 think if members will compare the proposaIs made by the ,three Powers on 6 August with the directive of 30 August, the differences between them will he perfedly clear. When this agreement as to the terms of the directive to the Military Governors was reached on 30 August, the United States Government helieved that no more than administrative acts by the technical experts in Berlin were required tocarry out the dhèctivte,. T.here had heen exhaustive dis- . cussion on aH of the issues of principle in the directive. So far as we knew, full accord had been reached. The only thing that r~mained was to put into effect the princlples agreed !UIPon, which we assumed could be done by the four MiHtary Governors. The directive met the points made by the USRR Government in Moscow and at the same time was consistent with the maintenance' of our rights in Berlin. Marshal Stalingave specifie assurances on the question of four-Power ,control over currency in the 23 August meeting wUh ther.epres'entatives of the three Western ~overnments. And on thatpoint 1 would hke to quote from our report from Ambassador Smith: :b "Marshal Stalin stated that the German , ank of emission ,controlled the flow of currency throughout the whole of the Sov- "'- No unliesolved issues of substance, therefOl'e, appeared to be involved on 30 August when the directive was sent to the four lW ttary Governors in Berlin. But what was our experience in Berlin? The ;recCrld shows that the USRR Military Governor departed from the directive on three fuudamental matters ofprinciple. First, he asserted that the use of the air corridors .to Berlin from the "\oYest would be limited ta Slupplying the needs' of the occupation forces; but the directive called for the lifting of restrictions, not the imposition of new ones. Second, he maintained that the trade of Berlin with the Western occupation Zones and foreign countries should he controHed exdusiv,ely by the USSR Military Command ; but the dh'ective provided that a "satisfactory basis" of trade should be worked out rather than unilateral control. Tbird, ·the USSR Military Commander insisted that the four-Power Financial Commission would not have the neeessary authority with respect to activ- Ïties in Bel'lin of the Germ'an bank of emissiondespite the explicit understanding to the contrary reached with Marshal Stalin on 23 August on this particula:r point. The tIu'ee "\oYestern Governments decided to take these issues back to Moscow to determine whether the USSR Government itself was also going to disregar.d the agreements which had been reached. However, in ,going back to Moscow, we did believe that it was essential to obtain unequivocal affirmation by the USSR Go'\'- ernment of the principles of the 30 August directive. We were not iPrepared to embark again on another round of long discussion which wou1dsimpfy reproduce what had gone before, and which would open for further discussion principles previously settled. We wanted straight answers to thl'ee qU'èstions. And we then wanted performan·ce on those answers in Berlin. Whathappened when we went back to Moscow? The three Western Governments request- ·ed in their. aide-mémoire of 14 SC/ptember that the USSR Government affum the It is evident that we did not obtain the simple affirmation we sought of the agreed principles of the 30 August directive. Nor did we obtain any assurance that the USSR Gov:ernment would instruct the USSR Military Governor; to follow the directive. In short, we obtained an unsatisfactory reply. In view of aH that ha.d ha.ppene<lbefore, we came to the considered opinion that the USSR GOVlernmenf was attempting to secure politieal objectives ta which if was not entitled and which il could uot achieve by pea,ceful means. We discover.ed that tbe talks we were holding were ser.ving as an ex'Cuse to prO'long the blockade rather than as' a method of removing il. Thel'efore, on 22 September, the three Western Governments sent identical notes to the USSR Gov.ernment in which they restaood their positions on the three issues of :principle and in which they alsoasked the USSR GoV'ernment to lift the blockade and ta specify the date on which that would be done. The USSR re'ply to this note was r.eceived on ~5 September. It still did not explicitly blarify ·aU of the 'points whioch we had taken ack to Moscow. It did not state that the ~S~R Government agreed that commercial l~l'ght and passenge'ts cOll'ld move to Berc~ ~y air. H. did perhaps inl!P'ly that the air H:rldors ~U1ght ibe used for this' purpose. tri ever, It stabed t~at th'el'ie' must he cono by the USSR High Command over the l would like to point out, at thîs stage, that in the circumstances existing in Berlin the protection of the currency of the Soviet Zone i8 wholly unrelated ·to the volume of . freight or the number of passengers moving by land, water or air between the Western Zones and Berlin. Protection for the cu1'- l'ency of the Soviet Zone is a pradical matter. It ,can he had through adequate exchange and currency controIs as between the two areas, not through ·control of traffic. The Governments of Franœ, the United Kill'gdom and the United StateS' had always been prepared to agree to l'easonable safeguards for the prvtection of the German mark of the Soviet Zone. They have always been, and stiU are, prepared to agree to reasonah1e regu'lations over traffic A limitation of and control over the volume of trafflc moving hetween the Western Zones and Berlin should not he ·confused with the wholly separate and unrelated question of currency and 'exchange ,control. The USSR authorities have used this as one of their excuses for establishing the blockade and as a reason for daiming the right to impose restri,ctions on the use of ~he air ,corridors for the tra'llsportation of freight and passengers. This i8 a subterfuge on the part of the USSRt.o place the air traffic and Berlin under the control of the USSR Commando Because further talks had become manifestly futi'le, we informed the USSR Government that we were referriIllg the matter [0 the Security Council in our identic notes of 26-27 Septemiber. We sent our notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 29 SeJP.tember. As the members of the Security CouncH are aware, the USSR Governmeilt sent a note to the three Western Governments on 3 October,even artel' we had referr·ed the case to the United Nations. That note i5 P furtner iHustration of the tacties which have been .pursued by the USSR Gov·ernment throughout these talks. ilt suggested. for .example, that ·the matter of air traffie control to prevent illega'l CUTI'ency and smuggling operations should be capable of mutuaHy satisfactory negotiation, but it Now 'VI;) are ask,ed why it is tha! the whole matter was not settled on the basis of the directive of 30 August, or, stated in another way, the question is why did the lbreat to the peace ~ontinue after 7 S€jplember when the ,conversations of the four :YIilitary Go,,"ernors were conclu.ded, or after 14' September when the three 'Voestern Governments wrote to the USSR Governmenl explaining in what res'P~ts Marshal Sokolovskv had l'Cfused to live up to the undel'standing reached in MOS-CO\'l. The simple ana direct answnl to the question is that the threac to the peace did not end then boecause if was the USSR blœkade measures which .caused the threat to thepeace and the USSR C'rlnr.ernment refused to lift the bloc.kade. The USSR Government ,cl'eated the threat to the peacc and the USSR Govoernment can l'emovc iL To sum Ulp, the three 'Ves-lern Powers were prepared to discuss practical arrangements to deal with the currency probl,em in ~erlin or other problems, just sa long a~ there was the slightest re~son to believe that the reS'tri~tiollS imp'Osed by the USSB Goyernment were basicaHy relafred to such problems. But. when it became a.pparent, as the ~onversations Iprogressed and particu~arIy artel' the USSR repudiation of the .agN:ed Interpretation of the 30 August directive, that the real USSR intention was ta force the abandonment of our rights in Berlin, which MarshaI Stalin had been informed was totally unaoceptable to the Weste~n Powers, if was o:bvious that the disèussions were doomed to failure. In our' view, these' discussions prove C011- clusively-and we so stated in our note to the USSR of 26 and 27 September-that the USSR GOVoernment was and is attempting by iIlega'} and coercive· measures, in disre~a:rd of its obligations, to secure' poH.tica·1 objectives to which it is not entitloed, and ~hich it 'cotIld not achieve by peacèful means. We could not continue to discuss even.. ~e c~rrency question, ~nder a cle~ly e~taibtished atte~pt· to attam such obJecbv~ by c~ereion and duress. Ml'. PAROD! (Fran-ee) (tmnslated {mm French) : 1 do not think there is any point in my repeating the detailed survèY of events which has j:ust been made by the United Kingdom and United States l~epre­ sentativ·es. l, therefore, propose to confine the French reply to the questions which havebeen put to us on a numher of essential points, and to ask you to refer, as regards the other points, to the observations which have already been made. With regard to the fiFst question, the representative of the United Kingdom has indi'Cated what our reply is. He has appended to his reply a memorandum, which has been place'd ibefore the members of the CouncH, and which cantains a detailed list of the measures taken by the Government of the Soviet Union to restriet and ultimately to prohibit rail, road and canal traffic between Berlin and the 'Vestern Zones. ln connexion· with this first question, 1 only wish to make a few general remarks. Tobegin with, 1 want to remind the members of the Couneil that the firs-t blockade'measures weœ taken before the introduction of the currency reform into the Western Zones. Then, 1 should like to emphasize ·the fad that the Soviet authorities, in order to justify the measures they were taking, gave, at various times, a mnnber of different and confIicting eXlplanations. First of atH, they raised ·technical diffioolties-r.epairs to bridges, locks and raiIways traeks; next. it was a question of measures taken to proteet theeeonomy of the Soviet Zone and the currency in circulation in that Zone. As to this second explanation, it may Dot be out of place -to point out that the total inter.mction of communications be-tween Berlin and the Eastern Zone on the one hand, and hetween the Western Zones on the other is a measure of protection of an extraordinary and exceptionalcharader. In IDresent times, it has happened, and in truth it ha·ppens' fairly frequently, that countries are fvrced to take measures to protect thér economy and their currency. That is a situation with which we are aH familial'. and which has heeome cornmon throughout the worM. But countriJes forced to take safety measures of this kind· have not The Government of the USSR did not hav,e recourse to methods of this kind. 1 do not :propose to make' any further observations on the first qnestion, but to refer the Couneil, as 1 said before, to the answers that have already been given. The second matter on which we have been questioned by the Coul.\cil comprises two e'lements. In the first place, we were a:ske.d to give the exact meaning of the agreement of 30 August, and to say w4at we ,ex'pected of H, and then, secondly, to indicate the reasons why that agreement could not ultimately he implemented. . 1 sh.all begin by darifying an important point. The common directive transmitted by the four GOViernments to the Commanders-in-Chief in Berlin constituted only' a partial agreement not sufficient in its-elf. It was an agreement, and, !I must add, an important agreement, but it was a sort of framewûrk, embodying a numiher of chapter headings and IPoints of princip'le. The Berlin <oonv'ersations which were scheduled to begin forthwith were designe.d to filI in the framework, to supply th~ details and define the contents of the chapters. Without this indispensable s'equel, the directiv,e of 30 August was incom:plete ; il rlid, indeed, lay ,down principJ.es, but it was stHI essential to estahlish the measures for the application of those iprinciples. As a result of the directiv.e addressed to the Commanders-in-Chief, we ex;pected both the raisiug of the blockade and the introduction of thè Soviet Zone mark in the western sectors of Berlin. Th.ese were the points coveredby the agreement. In actual fact, 'these two questions are neither necessarHy nor logically linked tog,ether, ,and il was in order to facilitate agreement with the Soviet Union that we had consented to the withdrawal of the B mark from our sector of Berlin. We also wanted l~efused to us in June. "Vith regard to the actual lifting of the hlockade, the common directive implied the simultaneous removal of the restrictions on communi,cations and transport between Berlin and the \Vestern Zones, which had been imposed by the USSR since March 1948, and of those which wc, for our part, had been compelled to i'1IltPose on communications and transport between the Western Zones and the Soviet Zone. As to the measures .designed to unify curren-cy in Berlin, we wilhdrew the B mark and agreed to ils being replaced, on a basis of equality, by the Soviet Zone ffi31·k. We had accepted tbat condition on the understanding that a quadripartite commission would be empowered to fix exchange conditions, supervise the implementation of quadrilP'artite dedsions, and, in addition, to intervene with the German bank of emission in the Soviet Zone in connexion with matters of direct concern to the western sectors of Berlin. The existence in Berlin of a currency diff.erent from tbat circulating in the Western Zones rightly called for the establishment of a system of control over the introduction of goods and ·currency into Berlin by travellers coming from the Western Zones, so as to avoid any clandestine importation of curr,ency likely to endanger the s~ability of the eastern mark. The existence of that currency a150 justifierl a quadripartite ·control of trade, designed to establish the total import and ex'port l'equirements of the city of Berlin, and to ensure that im,port and export liœnces wouId be issued in accordance with the plan which was to have be.en drawn Up. Those are, in ,broad outline, the contents of the agreement reached on 30 August, and il was on that basis that the Commanders-in-Chief in . Berlin tlIen As to the financial reforms, the main difficuIty was to define the powers to be given to t}.a quadripartite commission which had been ,provided for in the cornmon directiv1e of 30 August. Marshal Sckolovsky, Ml'. Molotov and later Mr. Vyshinsky, during the ·course of the first meeting of the Security GouncH devoted to !bis question. [361st meeting] alleg,ed that the Western Powers had request.ed that the Financia,l Commission should be empowered to control the issue of the German mark in the Sov1et Zone. That statement may perhaps he based on a misunderstanding, but in any case, it is in complcle contradiction to the meaning of the instructions of 30 August. Never, at any time, 'have representatives of thie. Western Powers had any intention of 'ex,ercising any su,ch control, just aiS, for that matttr, t1J.ey have never evinoed adesire to supervise the general activities of the German bank of emission of the Soviet Zone. Infact, the representative· of the Soviet Union wiliihed to limit the activity of the The report, which the three \VeSiel'll Commanders-in-Chief in Berlin have submitted, shows, moreover, that the discnssions did not coyer a num!ber of other points, in particular the [payment for food supplies and coal transported by the vV,estern Powers, the balancing of the budget of the city of Berlin, and the assessment and allocation of the occupation costs. StiU other questions were not discussed at aU and il wOlùd only hav·e been possible to consider them had an agreement been reached on the main ·points which have just mentioned. Among such matters, which 'logieaUy would haVie heen considered at a later stage, in the conversations, should like to caU special attention to the foUowing: the control of exchanges, the monetary reserv,es to be ketpt at the disposaI of the various sectors of Berlin, the establishment of an import-eX'port control system. Moreover, there is no question here of an exhaustive list of ·the questions which ought to settled; 1 have only dted these points in order ta ,bring out in the fuI! light of day the verycomplex nature of the problem. Even if the tnree main points whi,ch 1 have discnssed at length-for it was pDecisely the discussion of them that came to naught-..even if ·these three points had been settled, il would still have been necessary to setHe the other questions 1 hav,e just mentioned and ,perhaps still oiliers as weU, in arder tO' treach an agreement capable of practical implementation. The French Government, like the Govern.:. ments of the United States and the United Kingdom, had the desire and the will to seUle the difficulties involved in the Berlin situation. The very existence of these problems proves, !Illoreo;ver, that il was impossiMe ta imagine that the quadl'lipartite Financial Commission's activities could he restricted by a time limit. 1 shaIl only cite one examp'le, the question of the discount rat'e, which cannot he fixed onee and for aIl.

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