S/PV.373 Security Council

Dncument 8/1052, dated 23 Oetober 1948, is before the members. [t reads as follows : "1 a:[~ infol'med hy my Government that the zionist forces in Palestine are constantly and increasingly violating the truce and defying the cease-fire -ordeTs given by the Security Council. This is being done to such anextent 'as to enda'nger the safety of our troops and to render it imminently inevitahle for them to take the necessary counter-measures, unless the SecU'rîty Council 'acts in IProper time. .. My Government, therefore, request that an emergency meeting of the Security Council be caHed immediately to consider these serions developments... Two other documents have also ,been field. They are dooument SI1053, ,dated 25 Oetoher 1948, which is a letter dated 25 October 1948 from the Acting Mediator to the Secretary-General transmitting communications from the Government of Egy.pt and the Provisional Government of Israel concerningconvoys to the Negeb settlements ; and document S/1055, dated 25 October 1948, which is a preliminary re·port dated 25 October 1948 from the Acting Mediator for Palestine to the Secretary- General on the -ohservance 'Of the tl'uce in the Negeb and in the Lebanese sector. Unless someone wishes these papers to he read, we shaH make them a part of the record by unanimous consent and treat them as if they had been read. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria) : 1 think it would be better to have them read. They have only just been distTibuted, and we have not had time to read them.

As the representative of Syria has requested that the documents be read, the Secretary win read them. Ml'. SOBOLEV (Assistant Secretary-General in charge of Security Couneil Affairs): The fi1'st document is doc''-"'llen~ S/1053; it reads as foHows : c. 1 have the honour to present the following communications from the GoV'ernment of Egylpt and the Provisior..a,l Government of Is. ael for' transmission to the President of the Security Couneil. These communJÏ- cations indicate full acceptance by the two parties of the decision of the Central Trace Supervision Board in case No. 12 (annex to .. 1. Cable of 24 Octobel' from Mr. Azcarate to Ml'. Bunche: ... Egy.ptian Government has accepted CT8B decisions in -cases e'leven and twelve. Aeceptance twelve taking into aecount assurances by Jewish authorities quoted your tellegram nine. ' .. 2. Extract from Ml'. Eban's letter l'O lVIrr·.. Bunche of lR October 1948, receive-d on 20 Octobel' : .. 'You referre.d to the difficl1'lty experiencedby you and your representatives in perSl1a'dïng the Egyptians to grant passage to Israeli eonvoys through Karatiyeh owing to the faet that the Israeli Army was not indined eilther to discontinue its flight~ to the Negeb or to su.bject these flights to United Nations supervision. The Foreign Ministry replies to this that Dr. Eytan's letter No. 124 to Dr. Mohon of 30 September confirmed in writing our acceptance of the decision in case No. 12, which provided, inter alia, fJr the discont:i:nuance of Israeli air supplies to the Negeb ex~~ept to settlements inaccessible by road, and for United Nations sl.l,ipervision over aU flights to the Negeb, , "(Signed) Ralph J. BUNCHE A4cting Mediator" The second document is document S/1055 ; il rea·ds as follows : . "1 have the honour to submit the following report for transmission to the President of the Security Conncil. " I. The Negeb "1. In accordance with the Securitv Council's resolution of 19 October regarding the rccent fighting in the Negeb, both sides accepted a cease-fire effective as from 1200 hours GMT, 22 October. The Chief. of Staff of the Truce Supervision informed me by ,cable dispatche.d on 22 Oetober that U?ited Nations senior military observers wlth the Egyptian Army and in Tel Aviv, l'espectively, were instrncted ta give the ar~a the widest coverage !possible. The Ch1ef of Staff has subsequently dispatchcd to me a number of l'c,ports concerning the post-.cea'Se-fire situation in the Negeb, which are snmmariz·ed as foUows : ~ "2. On 23 October the senior United Nations military observer at Gaza reported oc (b) That on 23 October at 1135 hours GMT, Jewish attacks were oContinuing in an area 8 kilometres southeast of Faluja • oc (c) That on the morning of 23 October, Jewish forces attackcd and ,captured the villages of Deiraban, Zakariya, Aj jur and Dawayima, and ilositions in anal'ea 8 kilometres southeast of Faluja and !Gi. Megrah Esh Sherif 6 kilometres northeast of Bir Asluj on the Beersheba road. .. 3. Gaza observers were unabli:~ to check on these allegations owing to the fact that the roads were blocked by the oCombatants. " 4. The representative of the Acting Mediator in Cai·ro reports that he was info:mned on 23 October by the Egyptian military authorities that the Israeli forces had daunched a 'strong general ofI·e~sive on the whole (Negeh) front' on the night of 22 October. He was also informed that on the night of 22-23 October at 1130 hours . Jewish gunboats sank Egyptian cruiser King Farouk'. The Egyptian authorities stated that if the àttacks did not oease effectively by 2000 hours (local time) they would consider themselves fl'ee to 'take any necessary action for the defence of Egyptian forces and positions '. .. 5. fu a later message also sent on 23 October the representative of the Acting Mediator in Caire reported fuat 'having heen informed General Riley ex.pected in Negeb tomorrow Minister War agrees to postponement (of anyaction) in order to make possible peaceful settlement difficulties'. a 6. The following cable from the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision is the report of Tel Aviv observer teams in the Negeb an 22 to 23 Octoher: " 'FollowinR Is... ;report from Tel Aviv observer teams in Negeb on 22-23 October. 22 October: Deirahan evacuated by Egyptians and area, quiet. Negeb generally quiet except for sporadic fire. (Observ~r) Teams at B'eiraban and in sector east of Julig- Gaza ~oad. 23 October: 1215Z Israeli machine guns vicinity Beit Hanun fu.ed on Egyptian trucks trying to escape from Majdal. Negeb area ob5erved quiet ather- "7. On 24 Octaber the Chief of Staff of the Truce Su/p-ervision met the General Officer commanding ,the Egyptian Forces in Gaza and discussed with him the situation in the Negeh with a view t(. maintaining the cease-fire and settling outstanding differences. "8. Unitêd Nations observers who visited various parts of the Negeb front sinee 22 October, including a visU to Beersheba on 23 October, reported .oniy sporadic hurs1s of :fi:re and no evidence of aUaeks '. Observations, 1l0wever, were not c0111jplete since they were 1imited te daylight hours and to predetermined places, and the t€a:ms were required by the Israeli authorities to retum to Tel Aviv ibefore darkness. n'ont ces puisqu'eUes les l'avance, Hennes tombée servateurs l'accès message raI la taires était teurs tobre. 24 que « « « Caire savoir du « « « « « « « « « « « « « "9. On 24 October aIl observer teams from 'T'el Aviv were denied aecess to the Negeb -&':ld the southern front. A later message dispatched from Truce Supervision headquarters late on ,24 Oclober stated t~at the Israeli military authorities dedared that this denial was an error and that observers would be able to visit the Negeb on 25 October. "10. In his daily:re:port of 24 Octryber the Chief o.f Staff re-ported that the . Egyptian corvett.e King Farouk was sunk at about 221930Z by aUack of Jewish explosive- 'Iaden Tmotorhoat'. .. 11. On 25 Oetober the representative of the Acting Mediator in Cairo informed me that he had received the following message from the'Prime Minister of Egypt : n'l. Jews sUll attackin~ Egyptian forces at BeH Jibrin and Bei! Hanun 'a'IJJd other _places. w'" - .. - ~._-- _._.~ - .. _.~~-----. ~ ... 2~ Since Egyptian Gove:rnment issued cease-:fire order which was carried out, Jews have seized opportunity to advance and from strategie positions eommand the road Majdal-Beit Jibrin-Kahil. • fi' 3. We received message from Egypban ofdicer eommanding troops saying that Jews in ~pite of General Riley's decision have refused to withdraw to 14 October Positions. ~.. 4. .Five Jewish -gunboats appea;red hefore Gaza and -Majdal menaCÏ'ng Egyp- " . 5. Ullless Mediator Ol'<iers Jews to cease fire and return to 14 October 'positions in order to se,cure safety our roa,ds. the Egyoptian Government will be for.ced lo secure these roads within twenty-four hours of receipt or this message by Senot' Azcarate. ' " II. Fighting in the Letbmlese sedo[' "12. On 23 October the Chief of Stafl' l'o,ported that according to Israeli reports. Lebanese forces had atta'Cked on the nighl of 21-22 October in the Manar.a area, 8 kilometres 1South of .lVletulla, and that fighting continued on 22 Oetober. Accûl'ding to the same reports the Lebanese forces hatdca,ptured HHl Shabbab and three adjacent hillscommanding the Jordan Valley road. The United Nations observers at Tiberias were not 3110wed by Jewish liaison officers to visil this tu'ea on the grounds that it was unsafe. "13. On 22 October the United Nations observers in Tyre reported that the previous night at 2120-2200 hour.s 'a plane drÛ'pped [Û'ur 2OQ-,pound bomhs and six incendiaries 0'11 suburbseast of Tyre. According to this report two civilians were killed and t'Wo wounded. A more complete report is expected. "14. On 23 October at 2100Z hours, Colon-el Baruch, Jsraeli liaison officer, informed the Chief of Staff of the T1'uce Supervision tIlat the situation in the North was grave. "15. On the same day at 1940Z the senior United Nations milital'y observer at Tiberias reported to the Chief of Staff as follows; ... Returned to Ttiberias at 1900 aftelf entire day in lines from Kaukji and Jewish for.ces. Situation along entire front of Lebanese forces grave. Heavy fighting continues along norihern end Û'f line from Nahi Yusha to one kilÛ'metre no1'th of Manara. Kaukji in persan aocepted cease-fire order fl'om Sunmo Tiherias effedive 1600 today, Jews refused to accept order, and continued firing for three hourg with aH weapons including artillery. J{aukj.i also accepted order to withdraw his forces within own side of truœ Une pending 8!oceptance 01 œase-fire oroer by Jews. Kaukji forces now 2 kilomelres east ofagreed truce Hne and have eut Nabi Yusha-Manara l'oad in three places and have mined road. Kaukji Will not keep agreement on cease-fire or withdrawaI order aftel' 1900 today since Jews continUied firing and refused to recog- "lô. The Chief of Staff of the Trnce Supervision promptly requested the Provisional Government of Israel to instruet Hs military authorities scrupulously to observe the truce order by the Security Council and to co-operate with the United Nations observers toward bringing about an effective cease-fire. This message of the Chief of Staff was conveyed to Ml'. Shiloah of the Provisional Government of Israel who promised, to contact the Israeli military authorities immediately. "17. Simultaneously the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision sent to the Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs the following message : '" United Nations observe.rs have reported on grave situation along entire Lebanese fron t. Jewish liaison officers have aIsa drawn attention of' this headquarters on same situation, inidicating that Kaukji may ,he taldng independent action. Under Security Conncil resolution of 19 August Lebanese Government is responsible for any miIitary action undertakenby any force co-operating with Lebanese fo:r.ces in the 'paDt of Pallestine occupied by them. In view of gravity of situation 1 earnestly request Lebanese Government to instruct aIl military authorities operating in ,Lebanese sector, including non-Lebanese, scrupu- Iously to obs·erve truce ordered by SecuTity Council and to co-operate with United Na.- lions OIbservers in oDder to bring about effective œase-fire. lInvestigation of any complaint fTom either .sidlEl regarding violation of terms of tl~uce will becarried out as. soonas cease-fireeffective and ne~es­ sary decision will be ,issued. Same representations made in Tel Avivo ' "(Signed) Ralph J. BUNCHE Acting Mediator"

The Acting Mediator informs me that hehas nothing to add to his report. The pTovision 1 have j'list cited has neen re-stated in al,l the Securily Council's resolutions on the subject of Palestine. The Security Councn consequenUy forbade to anyonethe importation of arms, war material or combatants into any country affected by the conflict. This prohibition natuTaHy appUed a,bove aU to Palestine itself. Even before the Security Council's decision, the United States had proclaimed an embargo on arms ex.ports to the areas 1 have mentioned. At the same time, the Securily Council set up a whole system of control enabling United Nations observers to ensure the sCTupulous im,plementation of ils decision. Let us now see what aetuafly took place. Let us see how the decisions of the Security Council were implemented, and how they fared in the face of zionist manœuvres, intrigues and ambition. Were we not entitled to hope that ac1s of violence and aggression would cease until a solution of the question was found? Such le.gi.timate expe.ctation hardly corresponded to the dreams cherished hy the Zionists. 'rVe wanted peace, but the Zionists dreamt only of conquest, even at the price of peace. They had no use forany discussions, exhortations or decisions that might deprive them of the arms they needed to realiz·e their schemes of domination. Even United Nations observ(~rs were not safe from their attacks. They have not even respected the person of the Mediator himself. Is il suprising, then, that they have violated the embargo on arms? Before .the very eyes of the United Nations observers, during the truce, the Zionists aecumulated considerable quantities of arms and war material. They have set up an air force, they have built war factories, bought naval units and, brought into the coun.try large. numbers of combatants rep.resenting the mûst subversive elements from the most varied origins. The events which have taken place in Palestine since 14 October are only another phase in the long series of zionist acts of aggression which have taken piace since the beginning of the truce,acts they have If one tries hard enough, it is always possible to invent a spurious justification for viàlating the truce. This time, the Zionists invented the story of an attack on a Jewish convoy. Neither the Egyptian forces nor the United Nations observers have ever had any knowledge of that convoy. The scope of the zionist attack has been so wide that the Acting Mediator could not fail to see through th,e pretext they offered. In his own terms, he concluded that "it would seem clear that the military action of the last few days has been on a scale which ,could only be undertaken after considerable 'Preparation, and could scarcely be explained as simple retaliatory action for an attack on a convoy" [811042J. In this connexion, it is aIso fitting to qu'ote the fi-rst part of the Acting Mediator's conclusions : " A serious breach of the truce is involved in the Negeb outbreak as defiHed in the resolutions of the SecurityCcùncil on 29 May, 15 July and 19 August. The resolution of 15 July ordered an indefinite cease-me, while the resalution of 19 August specifically prec1udes acts of reI,Prisal or ·retaliation... . In ordel' to talœ away the Zionists' last pretext, however unfounded if might be, for violating the truce, the Egyptian Military Commander has just confirmed his aoeceptance of a convoy system established by United Nations observers in cases listed under Nos. 11 and 12 which were submitted for their de.cision. That system clearly stipulates that convoys shall be more than ever subject to the authorization and supervision of United Nations observers. In this discussion, we must not los,e sight of the essential issue, namely the previously established princÏiple that neither side shaH principe, ou tique pour g~in any political or material advantage by vlolating the truce. But it is clear that the Zionists have heen violating the truce by launching aUacksat certain points and putting the populations of ce~tain areas to Can there hy any doubt of the fact that, in accordance with the C mcil's decisions, the Zionists musLretur~~ to the positions they held before the violation of the truce, namely before 14 Oetabe.r? 1 should like to hear the Acting Mediator's authoritative opinion on that subject. 1 myself have no doubts about this at aIl. 1 am sure that the repeated violations of the truce by the Zionists are due to their certainty that a fait accompli is always accepted in the long l'un. ls the Council going to aIlow those aets of premeditated and systematic violation to continue indefinitely? vVe expect the Council not merely to issue a cease-fire order and an injunction to the Zionists to return to the positions they occupied before 14 October, but above aIl to take up a clear and ene~getic ~ttituàe, so as to prevent any res?mption of such. aets of aggression, WhICh harm the prestIge of the Coundl and of the United Nations itself. vVe ask you to take seTious measures for the maintenance of peace an.d security, which is the purpose and the razoon d'être of this Organization and for our presence here. Mr. Fouad AJ\'ThIOUN (Lebanon) (translated from French) : The Security Council i5 meeting at the request of Egypt to note, not a further violation of the truce by the Jews but, what is mOTe serious, the ,persistence of the violations which have been the subject of previous discussions of the Conncil. Jn other words, the matter l.mder discussion is the contempt shown for the CounciI's solemn resolution ordering the Zionists to cease lire and to withdraw from the ,positions they had gained by means of a surprise attack. This resolution is dated 19 October and the Jewish general attack came to an end only on 22 October, that is to say, three days after the cease-fire oroer. 1 wish to make it clear that 1 am referring now to the Jewish general attack. 1 do not want to dwell on this suibjE:ct, but 1 leave it to the Council to dTaw the necessary conclusions. In the meantime, thanks to a manœuvre very deverly directed against the United Nations representatives in Palestine, the Jews have suceeeded in occupying new l am glad, moreover, that the question raised in the Egyptian Tequest is not the only one before the Council and that you have also been caHed upon, following on the documents which have been distributed, to examine the truce violation of which the Lebanese Amny and the Transjordan fl·oolps in Jerusalem are U'coused. l hav,e seen those documents. It is essential that the problem should he raised as a whole, so that the Counci~ shouldbe a1ble to fOTm an exact opinion of the Jewish and Ara'b attitudes. The Council has been told at a previous meeting that Jewish aetivities were the result of a concerted plan to confront the United Nations Will a fail accompli, and my colleague, the Egy,ptian repl'esentative, confirmed that once again this morning. Let us note with regret lhat certain deci- :';0'11S or official attitudes have encouraged them in this ,course of action. The vague image of a national home heM out as a promise to Mr. Chaim Weizmann in cil'- cumstanceS' which we shall have occasion to recaH has become, or aspires to become, the State of ISTael, as a resuH of a series of concessions in the. face of faits accomplis following one surrender aIter another. I repeat, therefore, that Jewish adivities in lhe Negeb or elsewhere are the result of a conceTted plan to ,confront the United Nations with a: fait accompli. Proof of this is found in the report of the Acting Mediatoi' itself, which was submitted. to you at the last meeting and from which three points ernerge quite dearly. , First of an, decision No. 12 of 11 September, whieh regulated the. traffie of Egyptian and Jewish convoys. has not been implemented because of Je.wish activities. The report [811042] says: . . "The failure, however, to implement the decision in case No. 12, must be ascribed, in considerable measure, to the refusaI. of the Provisional Government of Israel to accept thatpart of thedecision relating to the 'control of ai'r suppiJ.y to the Negeb settlements. For had this ,esse'llî:ial prior condition been fulfil.IedaH le.gitimate Egyptian objections wou.J.dhave been !'emoved. " . The second point, whieh I also fi~ld in the Acting Mediator's l'€Jport,. is thal the Jews not only refused to implement decision No. 12, but also l;efused permission to the o!bserveTs to ,carry out their mission in the .Negeb. and a certain number of .otJl.er se,c- .fors. The report actually states: .' ... We know already that the opposition to the implementation of decision No. 12 did not come from Egypt. Thel'e is, in fact, an obvious determination _on the part of the Jews to paralyze the control mission so as to achiev,e their expansionïst aims. The Negelb is not the only place where they have adopted that attitude. Mr. Bunche tells us that the Provisional Government of Israel refused permission to the United Nations observers to visit many of the IsraeH airfields, and we know the reason for that refusaI. Lastly, the third conclusion to he drawn from the Acting MediatOT's report-a conclusion which supports what 1 have just said-'-is thaf the Jews launched the ge'lleral attack in the Negeb without provocation in order to gain control over a territory of which Count Bernadotte had deprived them and which they wanted to conquer so as to gain a new concession from the United Nations. 1 quote from Mr. Bunche's report: "The reports of the United Nations military observers wiih the Egyptian forces... " -which shows that the Egyptian forces welcome the United Nations observers as indeed do aIl the other Arab countries- " ...in: the Gaza area substantiate tha't there have been wideSipread attacks on Egyptian positions by Israeli land and air forces in the Negtfu during 15 and 16 October, inc1uding heavy shelli.ag and aedal hombing of Gaza. " Further we read : cc It would seem dear that the military action of the last few days has been on a scale which could only be undertaken after considerable preparation, and could sca;rcely be expiained as simple retaliatory action for an attack on a convoy. " 1 shaIl not dwell on the question of the Negeb any longer. as th~ Security Council is sufficiently enlightened by now on that subject. One might have wished, however, that the resolution of 19 October had been more specificaIly addressed to the Jews and had stated matters more clearly as regards the fulfilment by the observers of their mission. This -conception of the fait accompli has been confirmed not only by the attempts at eX[Jansion in the areas coveted by the· .lointain où souffle ceux balles être oil gement Naz,areth tance sont ne du Is it not conceivable that sorne of those vino may have fired a few shots in Jerusalem or elsewhere are the fathers of those children or the husbands and sons of the women who have been savage'ly driven out of their homes or massacred in Nazareth or· in the villages of GaliIee? Ea,ch event must he judged according to Hs importance. The Ibullets-and they are not aIl of Arab origin-are nothing compared with the battles of Gaza and of the Negeb. 1 shaH nowalso say a few words about the haWes on the Lebanese front. é~alement l,ihanais. égyptien. nonobstant justifi,eI' tant, les forces enes a à You have noted the situation on the Egyptian front; the persistent character of the a,ggression, con'tinuing despite the ceasefire Ol'de·r, might have justified a diversion. Yet, that is Dot the case, for it was not the Lebanese who took the initiative. The Lebanese forces defended themselves, but the vigou!' with which they did so made it possible to allege that they were the first to open fire. Ml'. Bunche's report also states that an inquiry into aU complaints from any party regarding the violation of the tl'uce conditions would be opened as soon as hostilities had effedivelyceased, and that aIl necessary decisions \Vould be announced. ThlŒ the United Nations are unable to open an inquiry now, and promise it for a later <date. And what is the reasan? Because the Jews refuse permission to United Nations observers to enter the territory. where the battle is taking iplace. Fllrther evidence of Jewish bad faith, a bad faith which reveals their guilt, can be found in Ml'. Bunche's preliminary report [S/1055]. Dealing with the request of the observers tu the troops of both parties to cease fire and tocome back ta their former' positions, it states that : "Kaukji in person accepted cease-fire order from Sunmo T1berias effective 1600 today. Jt.ws refused ta accept order, and continued firing for three hours with aU weapons including artillery. " We await with ,confidence the result of th...... enquiry which the observers have not yetbeen able ta open because of Jewish iH-win. In conclusion, what can one say of the attack launcJ:ed at night . il an open city by a Jewish ailrcrafit? :It is true that the victims are not soldiers and that we have be,cOlille accustomed at Deir Yassin and elsewhere to the Jews attacking others than soldiers. Ml'. EL-KHOURI (Syria) : This meeting, as is known, was called to examine anù investigate certain matters in respect of the violation of the tmce in Palestine. 1 thirrk that the information ,contained in the report of the Acting Mediator, and the otheT :information which is now hefore the Security -Council, is sufficient for memhers to formulate >sorne opinions',' and for the It is quite clear that the Jewish forces have heen violati'llg the ll'uce iucessantlynot just once. They have waged attacks, in particular, in the Negeb. As I explained in the last meeting on this subjecl [367t7' meeting], they have a certain objective in mind, w]ùch is weIl known. They have been ~)re­ paring for this offensive for a long lime ; that is weIl known too. As the Mediator has stated in one of his past reports, the Jews have not been carrying on these activities merely to obtain a sa:Fe passage for their ,convoys ; they have a widet' objective. In the meantime, they have Ib\.-en using every means to make the world understand that they intend to keep the Negeb-or at least a iarge part of itfor themselves. They have been encouraged by certain States, even in the Security Council itseH, to entel,fain snch a hope of 'extending their frontiers and of expanding their territory. Il has been taken as a rule or a tradition in the United Nations for the fait accompli to he respecled. If someone occupies and possesses a certain territory, it is his whether he is an aggressor or whether he occupies it by right, just as if the right of conquest were still being respected in this. age. It is justas if, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, in the twentieth century, when any ,party uses force to occuPY a territory which does not belong to him, the international organ says : " AU' right, as he has used force to occupy that p'1ace, let il be his, irrespective of the ground or justification for il." Whether it is right or wrong, they do not· care. The .J.ews think thut as the matter is approaching sorne solution.... the United Nations-eitber in the General Assemblv or in the Security Council-it would he ·well for them to confront the United Nations with their having taken certain positions and occupied certain territories. Even while ~he United Nations Spe,cial Committee on Palestine was at work, they were trYlllg haI~do to lay their hands on Weste,rn GaIHee, Nazareth and 0'11 other areas whel'e not a single Jew is living. The whole of "Testern Galilee is Arab territory, but the Jews wanted it to be included in their area-that w~s not pa;r,f of the partition plan. They trIe,d. by aIl means to lay théir hands on it eve,n ~uring the truce. They first àttacked the, CIty.' of', St: 'Jean' d'A'cre which is not inC'ludedo· in the' area ,doefined'.by the pâ:rtl- They also want the Negeb and they have tried to occupy it 50 that when the matter is examined by the United Nations and any form of solution is proposed, it will already be in their 'possession. The United States has a'lready supported one such action; they have recognized the Israeli Government as a de facto government and,10 doubt, if they extend their occupation to other areas, that also will be recognized as de fac.N}. . This situation ought tobe considereà by the Security Counc.il, and so should the background of the case. SOI1lletimes, in re.ply to a letter from the Jewish authorities in Palestine or to a short cable from any of the oibservers of the Truce Commission stating that the Arabs have violated the truce, the President of the Seourity Council has immediately called a meeting as a matter of urgency. In such cases the representatives of the United States and even of other countries have never hesitated to threaten the Araibs and prepare resolutions ordering tbem to do this or that. Now we can see that the case is quite different. So many accusations are being made; il has become well-known that the Jews ,are violating the truce, and those who were always rushing forward to propose resolutions directe:d against the Arabs are not ,doing so any longer. The Security Council is not ·even summoned, except at the request of the party which has been molested. 1 think il would be proper for the Security Council to ado.pt sorne l'eS'olution on this subject and for it to realize that the Jewish authorities have violated the truce and ought notto be allowed to p,rofit from any territorial or military advantages which they have gaill'ed as a result of violating the truce. 1 shouM have been quite ready to submit a draft resolution myself but, as Syria i5 praetically a pa,rty to the question, it would not be fair if 1 were to propose a resolution myself. 1 hope that other and neutral members of the Security Councîl will do 50. As neutrals we haV'e heen hard at work on the Be,rlin question in 'an effort to find sorne solution which would eliminate danger in the future. We achieved, sornething, although our resolution was vetoed .by one of the great Powers, but we consider that world !public opinion will think that so far we haV'e aequitted our- The Arabs are ready to defend themselves but they have no confidence nor have they any assurance that if th1ey we'fe to wage war on aU fronts the Security Council wouid excuse them. On the contralOY, the Security CouncH would say, " The' Arabs have been violating the truce, l,et us crucify them ". If the Securitv Conncil wishes to withdraw from the maller and leave the parties to take whatev:er action sooms apprOipriate, let it inform the parties that they are qllire free to protect their .positions ; but to insist on the application of the truce and on the implementation of the Security Council r-esolutiO'ns whHe the international crime of violating the truce is being committed and do nothing, that is a contradiction which cannot be admitted. After this statement whioch 1 have had the he/nour to submit 1 would request tha! my colleagues consider the situation prO!lJerly without 'prejudging the matter. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : 1 am sure the Security Council is not as indifferent to what is going on as our Syrian colleague seems to fear. Faced with this latest report from the Acting Mediator, 1 think that aH members of the . Council are fully aware of the gravity of the situation and 1 should hope they wou!d he det,ermined to do everything in their power not only to strengthen the hands of' the Acting Mediator but to su.pport the officers and observers of the Truce Com- ~j.SSiOIi on the spot andalso to pres,erve the 'Prestige and authority of the Security Council itself. As 1 hl.we often said before, it is difficult for us, sïtting her~ around this table, to ~orm an exact picture of what is happ·ening In Palestine. We hear accusations and counter-accusations made at this table and in other ways, and it is diffiëult for us ta assess them at their true value. 1 feel that aH we ·cari do is to 1"ely on the reports that We can obtain from our own Truce Coin- 'mission and ils observers 'and from the ~c~ng Me4iator. 1 therefore 'always seru- Îllllz'e very' closely aIl the reports that elDanate from those souroes. Vve must haVe There are one or two passages in -the lalest report from the Acting Mediator, document Sjl055, to which 1 must draw attention. ln pall'agra'ph 8, which deaIs wiHr the Negeb front, the following sentence appears: "Observations, however, were not coonpiete since they were limited to daylight hours and to .pl'edetermined places, and the teams were required by the Israeli authorities ta return to Tel' Aviv hefme darkness. " That seems to me to he rather unsatisfactory. Under conditions of that kind, 1 should think, one cannat expect full and objective reports Ifrom the observ'ers on the spot, and l[ should hope that that situation win not persist. ln paragraph 9 of document Sj1055, tbel'e appears the following sentence: " On 24 October aIl observer teams from Tel Aviv were de'nied 'aocess to tbe Negeb and the southern front.," 1 am bound to say that the next sentence states: " A later message ,dis.patched from Truce Supervision headquarters 'late on 24 October stated that the Israeli military' authorities ,declared that this denial'was an error and that ohserVoers would he able to visit the Negeb on 25 October." We acceipt that denial, but atthe same time it cannot be di'spute·d that, during that one rathercritical day, observers were, in practice, denied access. There is a further passage; in paragraph 12, which reads : "The United Nations obserVers at Tiberias were not allowed by Jewish liaison officers to visit thisarea. on the grounds that it was unsafe." AH these passages ar.eunsatisfactory, and 1 must say that tbey cause me' and. 1 should think, other members of the Security Coun- ëiI, ,considerab1e ,concern. 'If we have our p~opèrly accredited representatives on the S!pot, we will really have to insist that they ibe givC'u the fuIlest facilities for observation, and 1 wou'1d suggest to the p'arties that it is greatly in their interest thàt they should he able to show that tbey have put no ,obstruction or hindrance whateve[" in the' way Df the O'bse:nners intbe carrying out of theirduties. As 1 said befol'e, it is only on the' basis of reports received' f.rom our represientati;ves on th,e spot tha:t we. 'can . Ml'. EBAN (Provisional Government of Israel) : The invasion of Palestine iby Egyptian amuies five months ago, in defiance of the Charter and with the avowed pur- !]Jose of frustrating the decisions of the General Assembly 'by force, has brought upon aIl the peoples of Palestine a melanchol,y sequence of bloodshed, fighting, bombardment, suffering, privation, the uprooting of people from their homes and the disturhance of international l'elations. Week by week, the Security Council assembles to comt,emplate the resuJ.ts of that initial aggression. . The representatïve of Egypt has aHuded to the wider framework of th1ese current events, and in that connexion, it is important ,to realise that Egyp.f does not passes~ and has not been awarded by the Dmted Nations any substantive rights in any part' of the Negeb at aIl. Es'pecially intolerable is any attempt !hy Egypt to ~ssert by invasion a right of 'possession or mfl~ence in that !part of the Negeb which, havmg once become part of the sov,ereign State of !Israel, cannot be alienated without the consent of that State. That consent is not and cannot be accorded. But within the wider framework of this Egyptian invasion, described by many anembers of the Security Councilat the time as an aggression of international charoacter, the~e was a truoe violation at Karatiyeh wh!ch threatened to substantiate Egyptian ~launs ta the Ne,geb and to confÎ1m Egypt lU the possession of a military and political advantage. This was one of six or seven On the outstanding matters in the Negeb, the Security Couneil expressed itself as follows on 19 October [367'th meetingJ on the matter of th'e seUlement of the problem as à whole : " ...the following conditions might well be considereà as the hasis for further negotiations looking toward insurance that similar outbreaks will not again occur and that ·the truœ will he fuHy observed in this area [811044J '''. There then follows an allusion to thr.ee categories 'of sllbjects which might properly form the sllbj.ect of those negotiations. The Security Council will observe that no distinction is made in the terms of that resolution between sub-paragr~ph (a), referring to suggested withdrawal to !previous positions, and sub-paragraphs (b) and (c), referring to other questions the outcome of which was not prejudged by the Security Council but which were referred to th,e parties with a recommendation for di.rect negotiation. But, in the speech of the representatiVle of Egypt this morning, we find tha!, instead of 'Olpening the negotiations on subjects recognized by the Security Council as controversial, he seeks to prejudice the outcome of those negotiations by expressing himself in favour of withdrawa:1 and ignoring .the Security Council's injunction to make these Ù"Jee points an Nl1me·diate subj.ect of negotiation. A few weeks ago, the Egyptian and Israeli forces were mingled in a chaotic fashion along the main Hne;; of communication to the Negeb, with the Egyptian forces enjoying sorne influence at the Karatiyeh crossroads as a result of the violation of the truce. This situation 1 ~d to chronic conflict and ~o a conflict the principies of which the Mediator's staff could not reconcile until Jewish forces, by their action, secured Egy;ptian compliance with decisions Nos. 11 and 12, at a time when the latter decision has hecome obsolete by events. Decision No. 12 was is&ûed over a month ago, and was aooepted unreservedly by Israel and rejected unrese.rvedly by Egypt. We cannat fail to see, in the Egyptian reply now,a certain. criterion of good failli, for they refused to aHow free communications to the Negeb when the crossroads were in their hands, ibut when the crossroads are The 'Confusion to which 1 have referred in the Negeb has had grave political effects sinee it encouraged illegitimate claims for the transf.er to the Arab invaders, as a reward for their invasion, of the greater flart of the te:ocitory of Israel. But in place of this confusion in the Negeb there is now clarity ; in place ofa c.onflkt of control and j'llrisdiction there is DOW same stability, the basic condition of a negotiated peace, with military control of that territory now vested in the State of Israel, to which that territory legally belongs. There is, in fact, for the first time, complete unity be1ween the legal and the actual position in the Negeb. . sécurité culièrement au commandemen.t trôler méthodes ont d'une Negeb port forces des ment ne vVe awaii to htear news of the negotiations which the Security Council has requested to take place, and 1 do not wish to prejudiœ their outcome. In general princ~ple, however, it must be dear that we cannot re-create the previous tangle and chaos. This would he impossible in practice and inadmissible in principle. The Negeb has lescaped from a straitjacket ; it cannot ~eturn to ils own pr.evious crippling and mutilation. For that to haiPpen would he c.ontrary to the main purpose of the tresuluhon 'Of 19 Octoher, which is stated to be "insurance that similar outhreaks wiU not again occur" [811044J. That insurance, it seems to us, has at last be'en a,chiev,ed in the Ne,geb, and il should not be surrender- 00. The. ~~urity Council., with ils primary responslbIlIly for the mamtenance of inter- . n~tional ,peace and security, would hardly wlsh to re-create the coniditions in which international peace and security are under a perpetuaI thrent. The serious aspect of the situation app!ears to us to lie not in the south but in ,the north where irregll'lar {orees undèr Lebanese command ar.e attempting the control of communications in a manneor reminiscent of the similar Egyptian attempt in the Negeh last July. . We notice frOllll paragraph 15 of the Actmg Mediator's rep'Ort that the Arab forces wel1e halted weIl heyond their !ines. We are not in a position at the moment to give a full account of the ev,ents which have taken Iplac,e the;r,e, and pending further We 'notice in the report of the Acting Mediator, and in the declaration Just made hy the repJ.'lesentative· of the United Ki:ugdom, an allusion to the difficulties of observers in finding access to places where inv,estigations shouM take place. The Secu- ~dty ,Council, we hope, wHI not underrate the difficul1ies and the complexities of a war situaJtion. But 1 shall certainly convey Ito the Government of Israel what ap,pears tn be the sense of feeling in the Security Oouncil in favou!' of facilitating the work of the United Nations observers.

Unless there is'objection, the Security Council will now takea recess until Thursday. Ml'. EL-KHOURI (Syria) : What is to he ·done in the meantime? Hav:e there been any instructions or has any information been given bythe Acting Mediator? What is going to be doue ·during these two days to meet the situation and to off.er assurances for the future? What will happen between now and Thursday? Is the cease-fire to continue? Aille t'he parties to withdraw to their pr:evious positions? Hav,e any instructions ·!:>een given to thaï effect? 1 should like to know about these points.

ln case we adjourn, there ane no instructions; ther:e is no ,change in :the or:der, and 1 believe that the representat'ive 'of Syœia knows what that ordel" is. [n his request for adjournment, the relpresentative of the United Kingdom staled, if 1 understood him correctly, that wc ,could ,e:x:pect to ,receiv:e a fUTther report on the situation from the Acting Mediator. We have just heard from the J1epr:e8'entative of the Provisional Government of Israel that we mightex.pect to r:eceive furtheT information r:egar:ding the situation in northern Palestine. In the meantime, each member of the Security Council will giv:e this subject careful ·thought. , Ml'. EL-KHOURi {Syria) : If the President will ·excuse me. 1 wish to l'aise a smalI point for the Acting Mediator. At onle of our proevious meetings [367t7l. meeting] 1 stated ihat my GOViernment has informed me that it was 'Offering no difficulties whatever to ihe UnitEd' Nations observers, and that aH its ,!?orts, air-fields and any other activity taking place in Syria were open to the AdingMediator. In his ll'epJy to my statement, the Acting Me.diator, Ml'. Bunche, stated 1 wish to ask him to state now whether he was referring to Syria (}r to sorne other places, to Ara1b oountries or to Palestinie itself. 1 should likJe to know, concerning Syria, whether my statement was correct or not. .!\il'. BUNCHE (United Nations Acting Mediator for Palestine): With regard to the particular quiestion just put to me by the l'epresentative of Syda, 1 may reca:ll to the attention of tlle membeTs of the Secull'ity Gouncil that the discussion the other day relatted to the question of obstruction of observers in ports. 1 pointed out at that thp.e [367t11 meeting] that tllere had heen no -difficulty on our part with regard to to access of United Na.tions observ,ers to ports in Israel, and that there had been an unsettled difficuIty with r.egard 1'0 access to one Arab port. 1 did not add that Syria was in no way involveid af that time and 1 did not have at hand any information concerning obstructions on the part of Syrian forces to the activities of United Nations oooervel's. That is not, howeVier, to be int,erpreted as indicalting fhat thene had not been difficuHies in sorne Arah sectors \Vith regard to the activities of observers. But 1 can say quHe definitely that, on the particular question under discussion, Syria was not at aH invO'lved. cerne ,séance un En été [8/1055J ciellement prise central At this time 1 might caII to the attention of the Security Oouneil the fact that an order was issued yeste~day by the Chief of Staff of the Truce Sup,ervision coneerning the withdrawal to truce Iînes. In this connexion 1 might state that sinoe the meeting of the Seeurity Council of 19 Octoner the important new factor in t!lis situation in the Nege:h is found in the fad that hoth sides, as indicated in the l'leport circul'ated to 'the Secur1ty Council [8/1055], have uow formaIIyan<l unconditionaHy accepted the Central Truce SupervisIon Board d,ecision in case No. 12; involving the passing of 'convoys to the IsraeIi settlements in the Negeh. Following the uncond!tional acc'e!ptance of this decision by both sIdes, 1 received the l'eply from the GoveXIILl'ent of Egypt on Sunday. On 25 Octoher, Chief of Staff General Riley, acting oil my hehalf, communicated to the Government of Egypt and to the Provisional GoV'ernment of Israel a no'~ which ineluded, among otber things, maps indicating the .truce lines as they exi'Sted in the Negeb sector O'Th 14 October, and a request to the parties, that the fOTees of both sides shotiJd he withdrawn 'Uuder detailed procedures d~dsionqui vers geb. de ·cause, Gouvernement général en ment visoire entre les lpaient In eXlPlanation, l might say ·that the basis on which this request was made by the Chief of Staff, in my name, is the fundamental principle ,under which the truce has been ap,plied by the Mediator, by the truee supervision organizaHon and by mysdf, namely,that no military advantage shtmld accrue to either side as a result of the application of the truce. There can he no questiO'n /bur that it would have given a definite military advantage to the Egyptians had they been 'permitted, t11rough tIre refusaI of !passag'e for the convoys-and, as has been pointed out to this Council, the convoys we:lie held up a very considerable time-to starve out the Israeli settlements in the Negeb :and do so under cov-er of the tirude 'w'iÏ:thout inem'ring the mifitary hazards 'that would r.esult from military action. The unconditional acoep'tance hy both parties of the .central Truc·e Supervision Board decision in case No. 12 has removed this convoy 'problem as a bone of contention. In thisconnexion, it will be recaUed th-aot it was ·theconvoy ipll'oblem which was cited as the cause of the recent outbreak in the N-egeb. It woU'ld seem equaHy elear that, should the IsraeHand Egyptian forees not return to ,the truee line'S existing on 14 October, Ollie or :the other party would he gaining a distinct military advanfage as a result of the truce, since it is unquestionable that any advance of the figbting '!ines would constitute such an advantage. From the point of view of the Truce Supervision operation, the request to withdraw to the truce' lines was virtuaHy aU:Î'omatic, hecause aot no time dra-ring either the first or the second truce have w.e peTmittedany advance by' either party to go unchaHenged and withoU't an immediate demand for withdrawal. l may add thrut, in aIl Dut two or L'Iree soU unsettled cases, aIl such demands hav'e be,en complied, with. In the absence of ,explicit instructions from the Security Council in this iregar?- we coU'ld not assume that t'he fundamL,' ..} principle on which the truce T'ests, and "'h~ whkh ,the .truœhas been applied, had bt'en modifi'ed in 'any way by the Seeurity Council at Hs mee'ting 0'l119 October [367th meeting]. Mahmonrl FAwzI Bey (Egytp'l) : 1 shall· not make a long statement tod·ay. 1 shaH not eV'en try .fo answer the long list of arguments which we are accustomed to hear from the represell'tative of the zionist wodd. 1 shaH (mly malœ reference to the first part qf his statement which is rallier revelatory. He does not seem to like t'he presence of any Egypiian forces in the Negeb, anid his r-emarks indicaœ that truce or no, truce, cease-fIDe or no {,"ease-fire, the Zionists want to get hold of that part of Palestine. This morning, we' heard His Excellency, the Foreign Ministe.r of Egypt. Among other things, he particularly mentioned two points. The tirst 'point was in conueyjon with ,the: continuation of the fighting in the Negeb. 1 have just receiy.ed word by lele- !phone from Cairo that, a·t least until a half to thvee-quarters of an hour ago, fighting was S'tiU going on in the Negeb. We accepted the cease...fire unconditionully.We accepted the observers' decision. on cases Nos. 11 and 12. Thus, we have tuken away any vestige of p.vetext for delaying the cease-fire and the withdrawal o.! the zionist forces to their original posi- 1 tIO?s. But what is happening? We are still hemg attacked. Fighting i'S still going on. . 1 do not want to he harsh or to use too slirong words. 1 hope that the Arabs are very much mistaken when they occasionally reel, that if it were their side which commilted these truce violations, we would proibahly see glittering words' ibrandi'Shed and much pomp ~md circumstance, gIory and ,power·brought forthrin and around the debates of this Council, and tha-t we might haVJe seen many thl'eats and intimidations levelled against the Arabs. 1 re'peat th'Ht 1 hope ·thaï those Arabs who are indiT~ed to have such feelings are quite mistaken. The second -poin1 which was mentioned hy t~e Egyptian Foreign Miuister, this ll10rnmg, related to the mattex of the withnégociations. -dra~alof t~e zionist forces to their original POSItions.. TW: :~ilier day, and again today, we he;ard a r·<i<ther drol1 and queer anterp:retation of paragra!ph. 18 of the report of the Acting M~diator daterl 18 October.This was to the tfr·eôt that that withdrawal is subject to fux'lüer nego·tiation. Negotiation, about what? The convoys are now'uuder How then can it be that when one side is acting in violation of the trnce and in defiance of the Security Conncil, aIl thnt is done is ta say : .. aH Il'ight, go and llegotiate with the other sideand we shaH see what will happen... If 1 am not mistaken in my understanding pf -the Acting Mediator's statement, 1 thirhe does not subscrihe to the interpretationgiven to paTagraph 18 of his 11eport of 18 October by t~e :representative of the Zionists. In fact, 1 was ·glad to hear that the AoOting Mediator gave instructions to the chief military oibserver iu Palestine, who, iu his turn, ûrdered the zionist fm'ces to go baek ,to their original positions as they Wfere ibefore 14 Odober. :J think tllis is the !proper attitude to adopt ; this is the proper interptretation. Meanwhile, may 1 ask what the Seourity Couneil is going to do about the things that are; happening at this very moment in the Negeb.: the contmued fighting, the CO'iltinued driving Hway of still more families, thecontinued defiance of the authority of the Security Couneil and of tbe "lhole family of nations? 1do not think the' Sieeurity Couneil can.si:mply say: "we adjourn until Thursday ". What is going to !he done ? Thei'ie is not ev.en, so far, any expression of rea1- cO'ncern by the Security Council as to the things .that are happening at this moment in the Negeb. l shouId like ta hear -and 1 hope 1 shal'l-oomething further said and that Sûmething will he done, 1 repeat done fi) deal with the situation. The qUeJSItion of Palestiné might he a v·ery c-omplicated one theoretically. Il is a difficuU ,problem, il is true. But from tbe military point of view il is a microscopie thing. If we had heen told at San Francisco that the United Nations-with aU the ,pa.:r.aphernaj~a ol t.1tings prepared for ils .hanrilm~ cf big issues in à military way as. ':':"eI.i !'lS In apalitical way-would not lire able to handle in a milHary way fui::>, l repent, miocoscO!pie military situation ID Pa'lestine, 1 very mueh doubt ,that any United Nations would have been created. . 1 am no! going 10 speak uuy more for tht.~ time heing-. 1 &baU simply wait to see what

It is my intentioD to adjourn the Seeurity Oonncil U'ntil Thnrsday, 28 OctObeT. The points whxch have been made regarding bias, and defiance of the Security 'Councn, are on the record. In due course, after proper consideration, the Security Oouncil will act. [t cannot he lashed jnto action by aoousations of bias. The meeting rose at 12.BO p.rn.