S/PV.375 Security Council

This morning, we shaH have consecutive interp1"etation. There are S? many Committees meeting at the same rune that it would be difficult for Uts to have simultaneous inte~p'retation.

The repre~ntatives will find document Sj1059J'lev.2 on the table bef.Û1re them. 1 shaH ash. the representative of the United Kingdom to ex,p'lain this new document. Siir Mexander CADOGAN (United Kingdoon)· ...'he document to which the Presi,dent referred embodie:s, in the first place, the few amendments that were proposed. and accepted in the course of our last discussion. But, it 'contains a furthe:r revision in the form of a ,rewriting of the fourth paragraph. :In fact, you will note that the fourth paragraph has be'en divided iuto two. In ifs original forro, with a change ,that was agreed at the last meeting, it read : .. Endorses the request communicated to the Government of Egypt and the Provisional Government of lsirael by the Acting Mediator on 25 October ca'llling for the withdrawal of lIllil'ita,ry forces to the positions occupied on 14 October, with a view to the establishment of a permanent truce Hne." [Sj1059jRev.1.] Memhers of the Secu:rity COUincïl will, 1 think, rememher tha:t at that last meeting, our French coUeague raised a difficuUy in connexion with the las! paragraph where it is slated, towards the end: "if either pa:rty or both shouM fail to comply with the preceding paragraph of this resolution". The preœding .paragraph is the one 1 - have just i"ead. Mr. Parodi pointed out ,that the preceding pa,ragraph, as it was then drafted, merely endorsed the request of the Acting Mediator, and he sugge&ted, very i"ightly 1 think, that that was not sufficient to proceed as contemplated ·in the last paragraph. Consequenttly, we have now divided the fourth paragraph into two [Sj1059jRev.2]. The fus! part reads : . .. EndorsèS the request communica'ted to the Government of Egy,p-t and the Provisional Government of Israel by the Acting Mediator on 26 Odoher (Sj1058) and"; Then cornes the second p.art : "CaUs upon." "-that is, the Security COlmcH iltse'lf caBs npon-".. .lhem to withdraw their military forces to the positions they occupied on 14 October, with a view to the establishment of a permanent truae fine." Sir" AlLexander CADOGAN (United King- dom) : May 1 say one word aibout the inter- p:reta<tion. 1 think l heard the interpl'eter sày demande where the English text says "caEs .upon ". l think oUir Fr.enôh coHeague will agree that the: French versi;ull of " calls upon " is invite. Mr. TSIANG (China) : These re.'Visions were indicated to me before being introdwced to the Security Council, and 1 have already a,greed to these changes.

Does the l'epresentative of France wish to he heard at this Nme regarding these changes? Ml'. PARODI (France) (translated from French) : 1 have only jllst received the reviSeid text suhmitted' by the United Kingdom repcresentative and 1 have just heard f'Ocr the first lime the explanation he has giv,en. 1 must confess that 1 am not 'errt:iœly convmced 'that the new version does eliminate the ,difficulties 1 pointed out yesterday. The situation then wa:s as foHows: a request had been sent by the Acting Mediator to the two parties, calling upon them to do œr~ain things,all morte or less !connected, among which was the fact that they should retire to ,the positions which they heJd at the start of hostilHies. The creply from. Israel to thi'S <request qUe8ilions-if 1 recaU it correctly, and 1 think 1 rememher the course of eventJsthe 'Ïn'tel'pretation to be placed upon the Acting Mediator's IDequest, and its conformity with a previo.us Securitty Council decis,ion. At the 1ast meeting 1 think we reached a ~ta,ge. at .which we were trying to dispel thlS obJectIon and arrange for the SecurUy Co~ncil lio endorse the action tak,en by the ActIng Meldia'tor, and adopt it as Hs own. We therefore endorsed the request addr,essed to both parties. The reV'Ïsed text J:p. view of the 'Situation in PaFestine, 1 wonder whether it is really adV'iisab1e to proceedalong snch lînes. Sînce a truce has be'en O1~dered, 1 fully app;r.eciate that it is fittïng and necessary; that we should request the troops to return to their original positions. But we must rememher that we are asking something whi'ch, in practï.ce, is rather difficult to carry out. 1 think it would he preferable to lœep .to the ·dirait previously adopted, but from which, in the pl'esent circumstances, if would he he:tter to omit from the last paragraph the words "under Artide 41 of the Charter" for their inclusion might easily lead t() argument as we were mercly conoern'ed with a Tequest. If ,the 'reqUiest to the two p,<lrti,es, which we 'Shallthus have endol'lSed, r€lceives no satisfac:to:ry reply, we will reconsider the matter in th'e light of the information availaible to us ait that moment. We will then consider the advisabHity of re-issuing this te!Xt as an order, implying the il:hreat of more eneTget,ic measures. 1 shouldthevef.oil"e 'prefer the original teX't snibmitted by the United Kingdom .delegation, with ·the omiss'ion of the words "under Article 41 of the ühaI1ter". Thal is the fust comment 1 wish to make. Nex1, 1 asked yestevday f,or the exact meaIring atta'c.hed tothe word "wHbdrawal". 1 have hef01"e me the French translation of ithe United Kingdom Tesolution, which does not seem to me to have followed rthe originai rext very closely, or which, at least, gives a ra'ther diffër,ent intell'pretati'On,although .the w()Tdis, in the United Kingdoni draftare the same as those p:veviously accepted. l!nstead of the words "withdraw to their original positions" 1 see the words .. CaUs upon them !to. withdraw theil1' miHtary forees t() the .posœtions they occupi'eld on 14 Oct'obe.r ". 1 am wiHing to accept the fact that the words 'pl1o:bahly mean the same thing; hut 1 should like 'toascertain that 'the interp!l'eta·tion is the same as that whirch 1 proposed yestooday, !that ·is, that the troops will'ch have advanced wiII ,r:etire, hut that those whrich have retired wHl Dot advance. 1 have read again the answer given to me by the Acting Mediator on this point. 1 suggest that the pamgraph might be improved if, instead of using the words ",vith a view 1'0 the establishment of a permanent truce tliIl'e" we used the words: "witn. a'view to the ,establi-shmeDit of a zone whic'h would noi be OCd.upieà by the military forces of any of the interested parties ". l have: D!O.W a comment to make on the tirst part .of the lresdlution, that is', on ,the paragraph which constitutes a reminde·l' of preV'ÏoulS. dedsions. The resolUltio.ns of 15 July, 19 August and 29 May are aIl mentioned: but 1 think there shouJ:d ~L . he a rcle:rence to the ·decision of 19 Octoiber as thaï resolultion [S/1045J, to whlch this wHI he the direct sequel, does not a'ppear to have been mentioneid. These, then, a,].'e ,the cmnmerrts 1 wished ta make. 1 shouU.d like, however, to reserve the righ't 1'0. ask for the tloor again in the COUl'se of the discUJS,sion. 1 wish, however, to add dn explanation Io t.he statement 1 have just made. Il con- {lems the last paragraph of the :resolution, fr{)m which 1 suggested the omission of the words "under Art~cle 41 of the Charter". On re-reading tbepil"'esent tert of the resolution, 1 note that among the paragra:phlS' furming a S011t ofpreamb1e caU:ing attention to 'previous resolutions, the thi·:r.d rreads as follows : "Havi'l1g decided on 29 May that, if the t~uce was subs,equentl1y repudiated or vwlated..., 'the situation in P,alestine would he reconsidered with a view'oo action under Chapter VI[ of the Charter; " 1 think Ithat this pointer, in oonjunction with the textp;roposed for the last parag~aph of the -resolution, makes it sufficrentlly oClear that the measures which might ha,:e to be conteJDilplated would be taken U'fiuer Chapter VII of the Charter. It fuel'ef0l"ie sleems to me that the omission I suggest 1S eV'en moa-e justified:.

1 should lilœ tO suggest that proposed amendments be submitted in written form !Sometime today and, if 'ConvenienJt, during the course of this meeting. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt) : 1 have t'wo brief remarks lio make, ,especially in connexion with what the repre\Sentative of France has said. FirsHy, 1 think that we aU understand, anJd that the Il'epresentativ.e of France ag.rees, that a mere repetition of 1he Security ·Coundl's l~esolution of 19 Octobcr Wiou~d be of no avail. l have a \long list of new violations by the Zion:i:sts since that œsolution was passed. This list of violations was :comml.l'nicated to :the United Nations ohservers in due Jtime, and 1 am willing to provide the Security Coundl with a sumniary. of them jf 1 am so œquesfed. Howeve:r, l'Say again that simply 1:0 repeat what the Security Coundl decided on 19 Oetoher would !he of no he:ip in the presel1lt situation in Palestine. .My second comment concerns the use of ~he wO'rd "withdrawal " in the, fOlirth para~ gra,ph :of the draft resolution. 1 should feel mUrch happier if the word "return" were suibstituted for" withdrawal ". If that welDe not done, ilt would mean fhat those forces wmch have gone back cOl.l'ld Hot return to th~ir originall positions. In other words it would entail something quite contrary to the whole structure of the t'ruee or the cease-fire : it would meanVhat one party would have gainetd an advantage through violatiolll of the truce, hecause that party wouM be withdrawing wilthout Ithe other side being aMe to go back to the positions from which itl had withdrawn. 1 ho,pe 1 have made myse'lf clear on that point. My suggestion is that the word "return" be s1lhstirtuted for Ithe word "wHhdrawaŒ" in the fourth paragraph.

For the SecurHy GOUI11- cil :to act npon if, it would be nec€:ssary fo:r sorne member of 'the Ooundl to prc!sent liliat ,proposaI' Lormally. Does any member of the Se'Curity Council wÏsh ,to suhmit as a proposaI the suggestion made by the ,r:cpresentativc of Egypt ? Sllir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom} : 1 should like to ask whether the Presidelllt wo,uld he, ready to e:nquire of the Acting Mediator whether he can enLighten us 'a'! aU upon this point wlrich has now been definiteiy 'proposed hy the reprGsentative of Syria; whether he can give 'US bis views on the possihHity and the desirability of ad:o.p!ting a ~our.5,.; such as thai foreshadowed in the· Syrian proposaI. Mr. BUNCHE (United Nations Acting .Mediator for Palestine) : 1 wouM reitcra'te· the stateme'llt l made yesterday [374th meeting] ana perhaps clamîfy it somewhat, bearing in IIDind the state<Ineuts wIDch have been made this morning by the representatives of France and EgY'Pt. 1 ,poilllted out yester,day that, in dealing with ,cases of advance made as a resnlt of local fightlng under the trUlce, tlre· basic principle upon which we have had to operate is that ;there shall he no advance, or el,g,e' il entails a mi'litar:r advRntage; however, thi's does not mean n:ecessarily that in every case there must ibe a rigid restoration of the fighting liues as they existe'd prior '10 the· indd'eut. This wouM onlv rnean ihat a situation would be re- ,Cl. ',ted in which Ithe' inddent--or one of a similar ldnd-would ibe soon repeated. We have exercised a certain fiexi'bHity particularly w.ith regard to the creation of diemi:lliltari'z,ed zone:s and no mants lands, 'So 'ihat after numeroUlS such incidents there was no pT1ecise restoraot10n of the original figh'iing lines or It.ruce Hnes but a revision of them, with the United Nations itself assuminrg r,eS'ponsihi'lity in areas designaied ei'ther as dernHi'lariz'edzones or as no man's' lands fioir the specific 'purpose of giving maximum insuran:ce that theJI'le would not be a re,petition of the inciden1t and to elimiuate the cause, for il. Thus, the1'le' is a desirabillity, in my view that a certain dis,cœtion should be vested in !he Truce Supervisiem organization 'So that l:! IShru~.i1d not ibe iboundlto a complete ohliga- 'fio?:OO l~estoring the situation just as it was orlg'l..nally hecause, if 1!hat we:re doue, the . likeŒihood would be very gre:at that wle W~)llld he haek again in the Security COlUllcil Wlth a new difficullty in the same area; il wa;s for ,that reason tha,t 1 tried to indicate yes&e~day fha:t a flexibility Wloru.ld be .d;eSlirable l'il the wording, with1he ba'sic pria- At its meeting on 19 October [367th meeting], ilhe Security Council defined its objectives in t,he foUowing words of the Acting Mediator "insurance 'lliat simila:r ou1breaks wiIl1 not again oocur and tha,t the rtruce will be fuUy observed inthis area". We have to ask ours-elves whether the position of 14 Odober 1:S an insurance against such out1:Jœ.eaks. Is f.hatposition congenial to the mainrtenance of the truee? We think that the answer cornes from the recordof flecent events. The position on 14 october, far fl1'om being an ideal towards which the Security Canneil should work, Wllii the dimnx of the most prolonged and sustained truce vi1od.a-tion În thewholeof the sfury, and it was the prelude iv its worst .conflict. We should have thought .fhat on that record alone the VN'otues /Qf that 14 October position might he ThoSte who sponsor tbis drafit resolution did not then irrter.pose wit'h .any obwr.vations on the defiaa1lce of a1lJthorily or on .the consequenœs .of weakness. No 'One suhmitted a resol'ution endorsing the Mediator's request; least of aH did the Security Coun:cil devOite itsellf to a corusiÏdera't1'On of sanctions to be imposed on the reca~citra1llt pa,l'Ity. There was ,patience---infinite patience-and those who now refuse us a few days of ûrderly unprejudic:ed negotiation before judging the issue were then pl.1epared to aUow a certified violation of the truce .to proceed for si'XIteen weeks. 1 do not think it would he usefu~ to estimate either the motive51 of this d:raft resûlution or the situation which it hopes to prod'Ulce. 1 .content myself with the Oibservati'On that il is not objective in its effects, in its 'consequences. It ignores the fact fuat. snch miliitary disadvarrtage as the Egyptïllln. ilorces now suflier: is a direot consequence of lfueir use of !InÎ1itary force to Qbs~ct 'Communications for sixteen . weeks In defiance of the truce. and of' rerpeated appeals by the Mediator. The draft resoiUltion diIl'Ie.cts ilts ·crÏlticisan not agamst the original violation, but against ~he eXtplllnding effects ofthat violation; it lsolates. the Negeb episode from a host of ot~ers ln. wmch mHïtary advan'tage is now bemg ,enJoyed by a violation of lhe 'truce. If you apply prlndple in tbis .ffiUitter you must surely apply principle as a whole. O~e ~annot he selective in the choice of IJIlIM1clpie. We remember many occasions when the st1'Ongest provisions of the ChartIer, referred to in the c:oncluding paraigr~ph of tMs resoIution, might appropri- \Ve canno.t too oHen repeat that a strict application of ,Charter p,rlncip!1e would have forbidden Egyptian forces fromentering this terri:tory and wouid now r.equire Itheir withd!r'awal. If we oCOuld think in terms 'Of pure Charf>er prindpl<e, the Security Council shouM require the withdrawals of aIl parties to positions held not ihefoJ."ie 14 October, but to positions held before 14 May. Why ·can no such resolution be submÏit'ted? That would solve the lprohlem; ,th81t would l"emove the Palestine question fmm the agenda. In ·case tha·t idea s:eems fantastic or biase:d, that was the very prindple advocated by the Acting Mediator in the remarlmble ~oncll1sionto '!lis address yestel"day. He said : "Such action as an indispensaible .condition to an eventual pea'oeful1 selttleme:nt of the ,political issues might weIl take the forun of a clear and forcefull dedUiration hy the Se,curity Council that the 'parties be requil"ed ;to negotiate ,either dire,Cllly or through the TtflU!ce Supervision 'Ürganization asettlement 'Of alH outstanding problems of the truce in aIl sector:s of Palestine, with a virew to achievinga 'permanent condiJtion 'Of pea.ce inplac,e of ,the: existing truce. Such negOitiation wouJid necessarily alm at a formaI 'Peace or, at the minimum, an armisti:ce which would involve either compl1ete ,vi:thrlir'awa1 and demobilization of armed fOifiCes or their wi'de separation... " [374th meeting]. So much for lthe appHcation of Charter principle to this resolution. The principle But the truce is not a matter of princip'le. The truce is, a .compromise wilth the accomplished fads of invalSion. It stabilize,d invasion at the point which it had rea.ch€d. It is, therefore, in essence, quite distinct from Chartell' principle. Itcan justify itself only on practical grounds in so far as it prevellits the l.ikelihood of further oUltbreaksl• BUlt if a certain course would restore tha1t likelihood, then it cannat or sflOUld not be taken. AŒ,llthat the Government of Israel as-ked from the Security Council, and indeed wIlat it obtained from 'the Council, alf its meeting on 19 Octoiber [367bh meeting], \Vas an opportuniity, before any ~~ep was taken or advocate'd, to ex'pound, in pr.alCtieal terms. the .compel~ingIr:easons of 'prindple and ,pmcHce which operateagaillSit any movemen't to res!tore the 14 Ootober pk:>siltions-for the Sedooity üoundl owes no ·debt of .principfe to the 14 October posil. tion, a !position reached hy invasion fol- Iowed by truce vioiation. We think that the Govemment of Josrae!l isentiHed to make that request, and 'the Securi'ty Counml moraHy ob1i.ged to concede i1. It was owing to the adion of the s'ponsors of It'bis Tesolution that the Se'cUl'ilty Counci! was not able ,t'o hring the fuB brunit of its, authorlty against the action of Al1"ab military fomes heing br.ou1ght i'Dto Israel. The faet that the two 'partiesl ·even survived for a truce to ibe conc1uded between ,them is .due to 'the defenœ of IsraeJ hy itself. On one occasion S'n:I1lÏ.'lar to this, the Governmenlt of Israel resc.ued the Security Council firom an impossible dHenlma hy its own direct action. That was when Ara~ for.ces, defying· the ltruce 'and the MedIator, 'elSitablished a bread and wateT ~lockade of Jerusalem. They refused to lift that hlockade. 1 mUlSt confess that they ~ere notpfessed very hard. But the Se,cur- ;utY Council wouFd havestood before the hlank wan of defiance had not Jewish for<;e:s, in a monumental' effoct, ibuil't their I.)wn r:,oa'd and 'their own wate'li supply throu_ ! an alternative route along the Val~le} anti. up ,the hiH:s. Techni,cally, it is ,qUJte p'fobaible that every mea'ger spoonful o~ wa:ter imbibed in JeruS'a1em today Ï\SI jn vlola'~lon of the h1.1:Cle·; hut it i" cer.tainly no gIft [rom the Security Counreil. We couM h~ve wi,shed 'that the Negeb blockade also iImgb:t have been circumvented as weIll by· 'sorne such conS'tr.uctive operation, Vole suggest, then, that a retul1'ln to sUurution fraught with iueviltabie conflid cannot be advocated here as a principle, nor is H practicaUy feasible even if it coul'd he agreed. AlI the pos!ÏJtions, all1 the al1gnments, the whole· ba'lance D[ fDree and all !the lines of communication have been u:tterly transformed in ,the Negeb. There is now a natural and spontaneous movemelllt a.t wOTk. Egyp-tian forces, Df their ·own accord, have moved from Isdud and Nitzanim towar.d safer sources of supply near Majtd'al, while Israeli forees a['!e regroupjng e[sewhere. The position is graphilCaIly illustrated in a communication to The Times Df London this morning. do not usuaJ:ly IU.ke ,ta rel'Y on newspa1per aœounIts, but this particular newspaper has sometimes ibeen known ta he 'a'ccurate. The descripltion is {)[ 'l'ms Withdrawal of Egyptian troops from forwardpositions in Souithern Palestine, from l'Sdud. ta Majda] about nine milesl to the south. The· Sitory g<Oe8 on to state thalt ... fIsr.aeli forces entered the tDwn at the l1'Iequest of a delegation from .theloca'l ArabpopuFati{)Jl which approached their lillleôSl und'er a whilte fla,g and ap,pealed for protection and suppUes... Troo.p mov:ements in aH directions aTe continuing Ithis morning. II! oth~ w.ords, there is going on a natura} .piJ."ocess which js: a movement to 'posiltions being neither the, 14 Oe.toher positions nor necessari'ly in aIl cases 'J'esullf:- ing in lthe fixing of .• no man's 'land". There are DiO fixed: Hnes in ,the Negeb, sa that the mere lestablilSnmen't of neultral zones iCOul1d nOit enSU!l"e 'equÏi1ibriumand, therefore, there aTe rads of ter.rain which operateagainst the suggestion pUlt forwar:d hy the represenltative of France. But the ,suggestion itself establishes the valualble p.rinciple thal a variation of the status quo sbo'llM he ,consideTed. lt shows -a serious effort, therefore, aif rea.'1ism and flexiliility, and we say Ithat if one variant 'can be consideTed~ 80 can other~, and the conditions w1Jich are set bave m",-lpa compelling baSiC for precise and un'P'tejudiced negotiatiolis on the· spot in the lïght of the conditions ·as 'they exist. In otbeT words, to accept withdrawal' or, stm more, ,to a'cce'Pt Ifeturn to previous positions wDuld he to aècept 'the technically The rep~esentrutive of Egypt advocaltes exa'ct return to previous positions ait a time when his own armies are at the momeut illustrating the untenability of those suggestions. He suggests Ithrut the Security COIUncH should compel Egyptian forcesi to return to positions which they themselves regard as untenaib.1'e and, presumably, under this draft resollrtiou, if Egyptian forces d1d not retum back from Majdal to Isdud, they would he Uiable ItO action under A:rti.cle 41 of the Charter. MovemeniÎ:s have taken pla'ce interehanging the functions -of the Ar.ab armies. Egyptian forces gave over ·thei1r 'ta'Sks in Hebron and the Hebronarea to the Arnb Legion. Presumably the United Kingdom ;repTesentaltive re,alizes that under ithe terms of this diraft resolUition Arab Legion forces wouild he 'cal1ed upon to evacuate the positions whi,ch they took over in relieving the Egyp'tian fOTces. 1 do not wis'h t.o ,plunge the SecU!rity Council into the fuN" 'complexity of the techniœJ. issues here involved. We do say this, 'fuu't they oonstitute oomrpelling ,grounds for not 'tying the' Security .counJCiI to any fixed rprinciple for solvingthis problem prior to an exact -discussion on the spot. The dangers to whiJch 1 hav:e aHuded of 'a clash between a'l'hi1:rary judgmellitand real1ities and 'principfelS' w-ould be avoided if the operative part of Ithe drafil: resoluti'OTI contented itself, for the tm-e being, with an injunction to ,examine and negotiate 'the si'tUla:tion wi'th Sleriousness -and caTe. Let somebody look ait /the Negeb as it is in aIl its ,changes and regrourpings and then come ha·ck and se:e df he ,can slay the positions of 14 OctobeT offer theslightest hope of a peaceful adjU'stment. Let him asstess the feelingsa;rous'ed in the ,ded:ence of tha.t pal't of Israel, for Ilhat is a factor in estlimating ~hether the idea of Israel handing iback Its position to Egyrpt is a praetical or peaceable ideal. We he'1ieve that the operaijv:e action f-o he taken by the Security C'OluillJcil should be a caU fmstudy ,and negOlfi,a1ion, and not f~r ~ ;rash formula no longer applicable to eXlstmg .eventSi. ~ut !he worst fe~~,ur:e of the draft reso- IUlion .IS the Ilast paragraph : the reference to Article 41 of the Charter. The S'aneltions 1 would ask ~he sponsors of tbis draft res.olution 'a very seriÜ'usq:uestion. The Ac,ting Mediator has orde'l1ed Lebanese irregular forces to withdraw from Itheir posHions in Galilee by 1500 hours tomoril.'ow. Why, th-en, is not theoontingency of that refusaI takencare of in Ithis resoŒution? Are they .candidUites for the application of Article 41? A[":ah fomes hav:e -repeaoted~y heen order.ed Ito ·evacUJate Mishmall' Hayarden, to Ifacilitate the wate,r supply of Jerusalem, and Ito aHow Jewish access to the Holy· Places. Nothing of the kind has happened .in ,any one of those instances. 1 would ask the repiresentative of ,the United Kingdom whether he -advocate& conside:raJtion üf Ail"ticle 41 to meet the >consequence olf those refusals-; not 'contingentt refusais, as hffi'e, bUit œfusalls, that have akeady hecome .de·e;ply -embed.ded in -a ~ong record of ,continu.ous defiance. If .if is said that this sort of general appr.oa,ch would open Uip the whole question.' IQlf 'the situation of the 'truce aS.a whole, .then surely that is eX!a'ctly what is nqw irequiTed. It was this con:sider.ation by aN! parties of the situaltion of .the trnce as a whole wh:Fch was advocated by the Acting Mediator yesterday .with' eloquence and.fÛll"ce, 'Und whÏch was Icontrasted with the disa:dv:antages of 'a patchwork and pie-cemeal treaibnent o.f individuaŒ iuciden'IS. BUlt .Ithere js a solution of tba't ques.fion of sanctions, the solution a'lready !adv:ocated by the representative of FTance~it is not·toaHude to'if at :aIl. There is no br.e'8!ch of 'the· 'p'eaœ, 1here is no ad of aggressiion, there is no'figh'ting in progress; the' 'cense-fire, accor.dmg ,to aU reports, is at this moment effective. If there are movelit may he said that by criticising the last three pHragraphs of t~s resolUJtion we all'e invaJidating the resoluhon as a whole, and 1 should not ohject if thal irr~el~preltaltion \VIere given to what 1 have said. We be- Œieve 'that what i.s: :r:equked is nOlt the establishment, in Raris, ofp,rinciples not appficable to the si'tua'tion in Palestine. What is requi'red is·a retUTIl to the prindples of the resolri.tion of 19 Octoher and an instruction to the ,A,ctin~g Mediator and Ithe ,parties to sUl1'v,ey· the posÏ'ti'On ·of the Negeb as a wd1ole, in the lioght of the Charter, in the ligh:t of the 'principles 0If the. truee, .and in the light ûf Ithe e'Xisting sitU!ation, which in one f.Ol'lll ûr anO'th'er mUislt have a govwning ·effect ûn the Ulœlihood of a peacefuI se1tt1ement. ll\k TSIANG (China) : [should like to say a j:;ew wo:r,ds in regard tû 'the ,compla.ints whi,ch Ml'. Eban has just made agJainst the sponsors of -this resolution. Oue complaint is ,to the effect that this resolution blocklS 'Certain desira'ble slteps adv.o:cated by the Acting Mediatûr and thought 'to he desirable by Mir. Eban himself. These desired ste.ps are a p'el1'llIlanent armis,tice, fol1owed bydemobilization of the armies and by eventUial settlemen1t, either by dired negO!tiation among tihe parties ,cofilcerned or by United Nation.s 3!ction. Thege ,a:r:e' the steps which the Actiug Mediator has consid21'ed desir.ahl-e, and which Ml'. Eban considel1's desirahI:e. 1 agree ,that -these ISteps are most desirable. My de'legation wûuld he happy to see a permanent ,armis1iceestaiblishe,d in Palestine follûwed by demobilizatiûn of the ~ies and by a per.manent lS.ettlement, elther iby .direct negotiation or by United ~alti{);ns ,action. But :my delegation consldl€rs that the truce is the only bridge: to thatprûmised land 'Of 'pe:r:manent peace. 1 cannot ,conceive of our taking those desiraMe st.eps if, in ,the meantime, we destroy the oU'ly hridge we ,have buil1t. Then, ,there is the other complaint that the .sponsm.'s ;of this resolution sat' supine wihen Jthe Ar:ab 'armie.s entered Palestine, that. at ,that moment the sponsors of !the p:J.'lesent resolution did not call fOlr action ~da- A:r:tiele 41 of Chapt'er VII, hut that !l'Ow, 'On. thècontraTY; the sponsors are so yery· eager to ajJiply Chap't€ll' .VII. That IntrodU:cès'into this debate the long'history FinaHy, 1 should like to say a few words in regard 'to the resolution i'tsel[. We are now suffering fll'om a certain amhiguity in the phrasing i()f our Jast resol'ution, wMch has given U8ll/ certain amo'Unt of ttroublle. [n the course of ifbis discussion, several of our co!11eagues' 'have suggested variations in ·the phrasin:g. So fair as my delegation is ooncerned, 1 think it wouldbe wise if those who have lSuggestedcbangesl in the resolution were to ·consUlI.'! with eaich other and pla.ce befOl"ethe Conncil, at an early meeting, a :resoiution which, 1 hO'pe, would meet with the unanimol1's approval of the Secuci..ty Conncil. Mf. MALIK (Union of Sovie't Sociaaist Republics) (translate'l1 {rom Russian) : In connexion with the dmft resolution on 1he Pa'lestine question pI'lO'posed by t'he United Kingdom and Chinese representatives yeste:rday, the USSR delegation de·ems H neces'" sa;ry to poin't out the following. As is known the Securiiy Conneil resolution iOf 19 Octobercontains Iwo fundamental parts: Fill'st of aN, a deeision regarding an inimediate 'cessation of military operations in l'he Negeb wihich was adopted unanimously. .Sec.onilly, the conditions which ·couM be used i2S a !basis for Jf.ui"fuer negoti'ations between 'the !Iwo ·parties., 'eithell' direlCf or through 'the Acting Mediator. 'pla~~ ourseJ.ves in an eX~eŒ11eI1y 18Jw.a.nge: posl'tion. No one at aIl wl'll :respect su.c;h dedsions·. What is the ,position regarding the implementation OIf the Security Council's decision of 19 October? The first Ipart of othis decision has been fuUy implemerrted : hoth sides have officially informed the Acting Mediator that they accep·ted the t€lImS of the Security CounClÎYs decision and agree.d to an immediate cessation of mHHary ope,ratilOns. Mr. Bunche, the Acting Mediator, offici,ally toId tihe Securi1y ConnlClÎI yesterday that millitary operations had ceased in the Negeb and that ,quietness ha.d been œ-estored inth'at a·rea. Consequently, that Most important decision of principle talœn by the SecurityCouncil on 'the cessation of mHi- 'tary op,erations in the Negeb has been carnied out. (['he lS,econd part of the reSiOlu.tionnamely the Security Coundl'sde·cision pIl"Ovidin:g fQir a thorough considera,tion of conditions which might become the ibasis fol' further negotiJations between 'the two parties--has' not been carded out ; further, there haiS' not ·even be'en any attempt to caNY it out. We allL ~emem.ber that the Seeurity CouncH had dedded-as reflected in the resolution of 19 October-tha1 conditions 'containe:d in iparagm'phs (a), (b)' ~n~ (c), were intended as a basis for negohalions and as a programme for the Ad:.. ing Mediator in his mission of mediation. Theseoonditions were the withdraWlal by both parties from any 'P0siJtions lthey had oO'cupiedat the time of the outbl'eak; aooeptance by bath parUes of the ·condiliJOns slet forth in ithe CentraliTruce Supervision Board's decision No. 12 affecting oConvoy.s; and, lasfly, the iagreement by both p'arties to undertake negotiation either th!rough United Nationsintermediaries or directly aiS regaros unresollved problems in fhe Negeb. h The represenlfative of the State of Israel . asa~ked the Presi'Œent of the Seciurily ~<mncI110 make if clear whethe!r the Coun- CIII's resoliu.tion should he understood to When ·ex:plainiug the purpose of the draft r.e,solution he suhmitted to fhe Council yesterday, Sir Alexandeœ Cadogan fol.. 10wed Mr.BU!Il!che and interpreted the ru;olution of 19 October in ·a diffeœent way than Ml': AUiSltIn had done when the resolution wasadopted. TJ:1e question na,tull'ally rurises: why do Ml'. Bunche and Sir Mexander Cadogan want to 'lend another meaning and significance to the above-m:entioned resolution thanthos'e ouUined iby Ml'. Aiustin on 19 Odober and against wIrich, as is known, no {me in the Security CouncH pr.otested? A1though the SecurHy Councill iÏn its Iresolution of 19 October defined the basis for negotiations' between t'he parties con- ,cerned, ther.e have been no nego!tiations. No one has started them or even tried to organize them. Ill'sltead of examining toge.ther .' with the padies the 'conditions ouHmed' in the -resolution of 19 Octobeœ and ·trying to inojlti.ate negotiations, the Acting Mediator has !f·equested both sides to withdraw thelÏr troopsas a lpre:liminary to the opening ().f negotiations. . Any objective and unbiaS'ed pe,rson who has read ·the ir8solution ;Qf 19 Octoher and the.ver!batim re:cords of previous meetings wouFd undersTand and reaHze that il is not' ip. accordance with the spirit and meaning of thé SecuœityCoun'Cil's decision, and that the Acting Mediator and the Seculrity Council ha:ve n:ot only failed to consider an thep'OSsilii:lities for negotiations between ,the two parties for the. settleme']:l't. of outstanding ,prohlems in the Negeb area, but 1).ave in effect done nothing at ·aH. In view of 'the above, ,the delega.tion of the Soviet Union considers it unwise and premature to radopt a uew decision on the creation :t1f a committee in the Security Council, las p,roposed in ,the United Kingdom-Chinesedraft resolution, and cannot SUPPO'l',t il:ha't proposaI. Ge!!erarl McNAUGHTON (Canada) : 1 have been very .gœatly impressed by the observations whi,ch have just he'èln made to the Securily Cauneil iby .fhe :r.epl1'esentative of China. The ,discussion which has taken plwce on the draft ll'esolU'tion before us has brought forth a varielty of opinions .concerning its effec.t, and we have heen presented with a number of suggestions foll' revision. Il ooeurs to me that ,these views and suggestions should be given more detailed c()l1JS!1Clell'ation 'lhan is perhaps possible at this meeting of 'the Secull'ity CouncHand tha,t, iÏ1~"'liticular, the difncult Ipoints of drafoting wnich have been raised heTe shouM receive the most carefua. scrutiny. 1 am also .c.oncerned tbat the general consideiratioos ,to wbJich the Acting Mediwtor r.e:fel'lred 'at the conclusion of his remarks yesterday should be taken into accoulllt at as ·early a stage as possible. %a·t we are aU anxious to tbring about is that a permanent seUlement iby agreement should \l1epllaœ the truce. For these reasons 1 now propose ,that the draft l1'esolution before us, together with aU the propOSIals Ifo:ramendment which have been submitted, should he refel'lreè to;asub-committee which, 1 would sruggest, m:~~ht he 'composed of the ,two States whlJch have proposed ,the d:r.aft l''esolution, na'IUel:y, ,Ithe United Kingdom. and China, t~gether wHh the representatives of Bel,:" gtum,Franceand the Uwrainian Soviet Socialist RepuJbillirc. 1 propose a1so that the 1 submit this p!roiposal to the Secwrity Counciland 1 str.ongly rooommend ils adoption.

ThiS! motion by the rep- !l'esen'ta-tiv:e of ·Canada has pl~ooedence over ,the draf.t resolution, and, theœfore, cornes unde!l.' l'lUlle 33 of our rules of procedurE:. Sir Alexande[' CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : As one of the co-sponsors of the draft resolution, 'perhaps 1 may he eXipected to express my view on the proposaI which has just heen made by the representative of Canada. 1 cannot he1p exp,ressing my regret at the. delay which will necessarily be en- 'tailed by the procedure which the representative of Canada proposes, but at the same time 1 did recogniz,e that that p!l'ocedure might he inevitable and 1 ·am prepal'ed to accept il. The Security Couneil ~~ ') ltad varions suggestions for amendments PUlt before it in the CO'Uil'Se of this discussion, and that alone perhaps caNs rOI' a meeting ,to try to secure a single text which might be su!bmitted to the Council at a fUl'the!l' meeting. Eu.t apart from that, .douhts have also been expresse,d regarding the exact meaning of ceil'tain ,phrases, 'Such as .. wHhdrawal", and if the suh-committee which the representa1ive of Canada has suggested is Ile proc':'.iure. que réserve Canada termes nues ont teni:r de viétique délégatiuJl rer .création solution Chine Président curité il Ml'. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Repubtic) (translated from Russian) : In connexion w.ith the 'Canadian representative's proposaI to set up a sub-committee, the Ukrainian dielegation must state fua't it is opposed to the reso1lutionsuibmitted by the representaHV'es of the United Kingdom and China. However, if the Presiden1t of the SecurHy Counciland the 'Coundl itself oonsider that a11 viewpoints should he :re.presented on 1ha'i: \Sub~ommittee, then the Ukrainian delega.H'On wNI sit on that subcommilftee and œ-operate with H. .socialiste . The PRESIDENT: 1 thank the œpresentalIve of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Repuiblic for ,co-operating. It is the purpose of this ,pl'oposa1-as 1 undel'Staud from its author-to have aU points of view r.ep- :tesented. TheTefore, II am ,glad that the deJegation of ,the Ukrainian SSR is williI;ag to serve on fuis suh-commitlee. .Mf. BUNCHE (United Nationsi Acting MedIator for Palestine) : 1 wish ta make a very brief comment on 'the sotatement by the representative 'Of the Soviet Union. 1 e,:-plained ~uHy at yesterday's meeting hf thIS Conncil the basis upon which 1 ave 3:c~ed and upon which the Tr.uee SuperylSlOu personnel1 have aded since the adoptIoll of the resol1wtion of 19 October, and 1 see no ueed to rep.eat that ex'tensive explanation. . "Vhat 1 mean to say, of COUl'S'e, is that until now the ,pdncip[e of no military advantage for either side as regards the application of the trace has ·always been clear and uncompromised.

The Assis-tant Se-cre'tary- General will Tead the ·draft resolution. Ml'. SOBOLEV (Assistant Secretary...Generol in -charge of the Department of Se:curity Council Affairs): The draft !l'esolution readsas fOllows : " The Security Couneil " Reso,lve,J;' that a sub"'committee be established consisting of ,the representatives of the United King,dom, 'China, Franee, Belgium and the Ukrainiap. Soviet Socialist Repuhlic to .consider aIl the amendments and revisions which have been or may ibe suggested to the second revised draf·t resolution, document Sj10591Rev.2, and in ·consultation with the Acting Mediator to prepare a reviseddraft resolutioll. "

If -representatives are ready, 1 wIU try to .get unanimoUIS consent to this resolution, but iÏf that ,fails 1 will put il to the vote. Is the:re .any objection to the adoption of Ifhis draft resolution? Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Repu:blics) (translated from Russian) : The USSR delegation will absta~n from voting. 'Ml'. MANUILSKY (UkŒ'ainian Soviet Socialist 'RepuMic (translated from Russian): The delegation of the Ukrainian SSB will aIso ahs.1ain.

As' 1 heal' no oibjection, the resolution iÏSf adop'ted. Suhject to.the approval of the Security Council, 1 sugges.t thaï- this Suib-Committee should inform 'the President when it is rea!d'y to :rrep()ll't ·so that, if he .decides so Ito do, he may then ,caU 13. meeting of the Se- Ml'. Er.-KHOURI (SY'ria): Perhaps it would he beUer to fix a meeting for some de:finite time, if not ·tomorrow then ano'ther clay. That would ibe better !han ietting the matter l~est. 1 think the next mee,tin~ ,could 'take place tomoNow; the Sub-Committee <:ould meet this' afte:rnoon or tomorrow morning and the Se,curity Council could then meet tomorrow afternoon if the Sub- Cammittee has finished its wQirk ; 1 do not think we shaH need more than one meeting. The resolution and the differ-ent views haye !been fully 'expressed and the mem.be,·s of the Sub-,committee are fully acquainted with the subj e,c,t, so Il do not think it should take a long time. 1 do not think it would be right ,topostpone ,the matter indefinitely and 1 propose that the Security Council meet tOllIlorrow. Mr MANUILSKY (Ukramian Soviet Sooia1- ist Rer:,~MÏ!c) (translate1d {rom RU1Ssian) : 1 think it would he wise ta defel1" somewhat the moeeting of the Suib-Committee, for dll the viewpoints have ibeen ex,pressednere and are weIl lmown. There would be no purpose in meeting just to continue the same ,discussion. Fu:rthermore, sorne other proposaI may ibe ,put forward and win the support of theentire Sub-ColID.mittee. 1 think i,t wou1d be much wiser to ;ponder the qUlesltion and then ,calI a meeting of the Sub-Committee only next week, and not decide to meet today, as that would amOUD't in faet Ito a repetition of the discussion we have just had. mais Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : l 'cannot entiorely share the optimism of the representative of Syria in 1hinkingtha't the Sub-Committee will ,complete its work in one sitting. 1 s'bouM hope that it might, but 1 am afraid it might not, an~ therefore his suggestion that the Securl1y Couneil should lIIleet again ,tomorrow was, .pe,rhaps, going ahead unne- C~sarily quickly. After lall, it would be qUlte easy for the Su!b~OOllIlmitteeto let the President of the Security Council know ~emible ~hoen it has finished its work, and the CouneIlcou:Id then be summoned at sihoirt nOitice and there w01.dd he no waste of time. l am sorry that 1 cannot a,gree with the representative of the Ukrainian SSR. 1 eannot siee why the Suib-Committee should Ml'. PARODI (Fa.·al1ce) (tmnslated from French) : 1 wish to support the view that has just been ex.pressed. The Sub-Commitl:tee should start work immediate'ly. The question ait issue is urgent. 1 would like to ,point out that, in the course of the last session, the representative of the Uk.raiinian SSR asked for a postponement of fOl"ty-eight houTs'. [n fact, his wish will be fulfiill:ed, as: the SecurHy Council will not reach a decision before the next meeting, which cannot take pla.ce before tomorrow at theearliest.

Vve shall now vote upon the prop-osa'l of the repl'P....sentative of Syria for !fhe adjournment of the SecurHy Councillmtil tomorrow at 3 p·.m. A vote was taken by show of hands. The reszzlt of the vote mas 4- in favour, one against and 6 abstentions. The proposai was not adopted having failed to obtain the affirmative votes of seven members.

The motion to adjoll'rn is n01 carried. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria) : We did not vote on adjourning now, but on fixing the date of the nex't meeting as tomorrow afternoon. 1 thiÏnk we a<re aIl agreed about adjourning now.

If wms prut in the fol'Ill of a motion to adjourn to a ,certain day. Thaif is ,the way I understood the motion. Unless there is any objection 1 shall now adjourn ,this meetin1g in the usual way, suhject to the 'call of ,the President and with notice being given to the Suib-Committee to inform the P,resident as soon as H is ready to report. Ml'. ARCE (Argentina) (transla,ted from Spanlsh): The representative of A,rgen- ,tina will preside over the Security Council as from next Monday. 1 do not wish to take Ulpon myself the rresponsibilHy for dedding the daife of our next me·eting. Ther.efore, unles1s the Sub-COIpmittee has not prepm':ed its report iby that tiJm·e, 1 propose 'that the Cou!Ilcil itself should decide to meet on Tuesday at 10.30 a.m. glais) sécurité, Conseia priée, séance pouvons, date voqué a'ceepter ,cette Je t.ernniné qu'il les Ml'. EL-KHOURI (Syril8) : The next President of the Se1eurity Council, who i8 author- . ized to ,call the Council togethe.rat any time he thinks proper, haIS sitated that the, next meeting will be at 10.30 a.m. on Tuesday. l think we may take that as final. He is ca1J.ing a meeting for that day .and we may aoCCept that Wiithout any further formality. l believe the Sub-Committee will have finished its work iby that time, as if a~;lows if four or five days in which to work. ces vons avec

Vnder these circumstances, l think we shaH leave the matter as it stands wHh the unanimous agreement to adjourn. Ml'. ARCE (Argentina) (tnanslated from Spanish) : l should aike topoint out to the Council that, even if the Sub-Committee finishes ifs work :before Monday, the new President of the Council will not convene a gnol) gnaler Comité nouveau Conseil férié. meet~ng for that day, sinee if is a holiday. The meeting rose at 1.45 p.m. AUSTRAUA-AUSTRAU' H. A. Goddard Pty. LIdo 2-55a George Street SYDNEY. N. S. W. ~INLAND-f/NLANDE Akateemin-en Kirjak<iUPP=c 2, Keskuskatu HELSINKI, BELGIUM-SELG:QUE RANCE Editions A. Pedone 13, rue Soutllot PARIS. V· A~ence et Messageries de la Presse, S. A. _ 14·22 rue du Persil BRUXELLES '1;REECE--GRECS' 101MA-BOUVIE Libreria Cientilica J Literaria Avenida 16 de Julio, 216 Carllla 972 LA PAZ CANADA The Ryerson Press 299 Queen Street Wlest TORONTO - ~'Eleftheroudakis" Librairie internationaie" Place de )a ConstitutiGn ATHÈNES GUATEMALA Josê6oubaud Goubaud & Cia. Sucesor . Sa Av. Sm:.No. GUATEMALA CHILE-CHIU Edmundo Pizarro Merced 846 SANTIACO ...... 'HAin Max Bouchereau Librairie "A )a Caravelle" Boîte postale 111·B PORT-AV·PRINCE CHINA--eHiNI The Commercial PreseLtcll 211 HOMn Road SHANCHAI INDIA~NDE Oxford Book Scinma Bouse N~w DELW eOLoMBIA~OLOM81E LihreriaLatina Ltda. Apartado Aéreo 4011 BOCOT! IRAN BongahePiaderow '731 Shah Avenue TEHERAN COSTA RICA--eOSTA·R/CA Trejo8 Hermanol Apa..-tado 1313 SAN.JOSÉ IRAQ-/IfAK Mackenzie & The· Bookshop BAGHDAD CUBA La.Casa· Belga René de Smedt - O'Reilly 455 LA HABANA . CZECHOSLOVAKtArCHEëoSLOVAQUIE ' F.Topic Narodni Tnda 9 PRAHA 1 LEBANON-UBAN Librairie universelle: BEYROUTH" LUXEMBOURG Librairie J. SChummer Place Guillawne bt1XEMBQURG DENMARK~ANEMAR~ EJnar Munskgaard Norregade 6· - -KJOBENHANl'f .NETHERLANDs-PAYS.8AS N. V.. l\{artinus Lange Voorhout- :S'GRAVENHAGE , DOMINICAN R~PUBL!C­ REP(JBLlQfJE·DOMiNICAINE- Libreria D.,rninicana 'NEW ZEALAND--', NOWELLE·ZELANDE Go~don & (;otcb, WaJingTaylor WJ::ttINGTON. h Calle Mercedes No. ·49 Apartadô 656 CWOAD TRUJILLO EeOADOR~QUArEUI , UuÎÏoz Hennanos y C;~ N,ueve de .Oc.tubr-e703, NICARAGUA -, Ramiro Ramirez Agencia, de .PuiJlicadones: CllsiUal0~24 " GUAYA~t1Ir.l .. ~ . .MANAG(]~, D.