S/PV.382 Security Council

Joes any member “wish to comment on the éport which, has: been presented, that is to say, a the observations which the Rapporteur made vations le 1 presenting the report? . Mr. Urpaneta ARBELAEZ (Colombia) translated from Spanish) : We have heard the- Naw BL at! Council to confine itself to expressing the hope that the negotiations will end successfully and to inviting the parties to continue to work with the Commission as they have been doing so far, in order that the negotiations now being carried on through the intermediary of the Commission may, in the shortest possible time, come to a final conclusion which will establish peace between the two countries and find for the problem which has kept them apart, a definitive solution in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Therefore, I repeat, I would suggest that the Security Council should, for the moment, merely invite the parties to continue their collaboration wit: the Commission in the negotiations now in progress. Mr. Tstane (China): I gladly associate myself with the remarks just made by the representative of Colombia. The “‘nited Nations Commission for India and Pakistan has begun iis great and difficult task and a moment ago we heard the oral report of its Rapporteur. I understood him to speak in a tone of cautious optimism. He realizes the difficulties ahead but he distinctly led us to understand that negotiations have begun and that they are very hopeful. As I said when we passed the resolution last April [286th meeting], the sending out of the Commission was rather like the launching of a big vessel. It went out on a very important assignment and it went accompanied by all our good wishes. It seems to me that, at the present moment, we should not wish anything to be said or done here which would place heavier burdens on the Commission. On the contrary, we should all wish to help the Commission to create the proper atmosphere and to promote the goad feelings which are necessary for the fulfilment of its task. I therefore gladly associate myself with the wish expressed by the representative of Colombia that, at this stage, the Security Council should ‘Timit itself to giving the Commission all its moral backing, wishing it success, and expressing the hope that it will finally return to the sub-continent of India and undertake its task in serious earnest on the spot. A lengthy and heated debate here would not serve the purpose of the Security Council or the interests of the parties involved. The Presment (éransiated from Spanish): If no other member of the Council wishes to Mr. Jessup (United States of America): The few words which I wish to say will merely confirm what the President has just said. T think that probably all members of the Security Council, in listening to the oral report of the Rapporteur of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan feel even more strongly — as indeed they must have felt on looking through the Commission’s report — that the Commission, in its consideration of this case, is rendering a very valuable service to the Security Council. I believe that it is a sound principle, one or which the Security Council has operated in other instances in the past, that when it has entrusted important tasks to a particular individual or to a particular commission or committee, it should leave in the hands of that individual or commission — in this case a commission — a great deal of authority and responsibility, and that the Security Council should rely upon it. In this case the progress reports we have to date fully justify that type of reliance. My delegation fully supports the views which have been expressed in support of what has been said by the Chairman of the Gommission, and my Government strongly supports the appeal of the Commission itself to the Governments of - Itidia and Pakistan, an appeal which is set out in the letier of the Chairman of the Commission which is before us as document S/1087. I would again remind the Security Council of the words of that appeal. It is that the Governments of India and Pakistan should “refrain. from any action which might aggravate the military and political situation and thus endanger the negotiations which are at present being directed towards the preparation of a peaceful final settlement.” I believe that the action of the Commission ‘in pursuing the question of the appointment of a military adviser to travel to the Indian subcontinent and keep <.. Commission currently informed is further concrete evidence of the energy and ability with which the Commission is carrying out the activities which my Government heartily supports. I note also, in the communication we have received from the Chairman of the Commission, - that it is stated that the Commission will keep the Security Council informed of further development in the case. Perhaps, in the light of some of the statements which have been made as to. -the military situation, and without at this time passing upon the substance, I might suggest the usefulness of hearing further from the Cominission on its estimate of the situation, con further developments and negotiations, together with the Commission’s recommendations, perhaps in the course of next week. Sir Alexander Canocan (United Kingdom): T have little to add to what has been said by those members of the Security Council who have spoken. on this subject this afternoon. I am sure that all the members who have received, and have been able to read, the interim report of the Commission, will have appreciated the thorough and conscientious manner in which the Commission has approached its task. ‘The Gommission, now that it is here in Paris, has resumed contact with leaders of both parties, and I am sure that we all hope that it will be able to achieve good results in the effort it is making. We have all heard an expression of hope by the Rapporteur of the Commission this afternoon to the effect that the omens are favourable and that something effective can be achieved. J am sure, myself, that the Security Council would be following a good practice under those circumstances if it withheld its own intervention for the time being and allowed a short interval of time to see whether or not this effort, which is being pursued by the Commission, can be brought to a fruitful result within a moderate space of time. . T am sure that all the members of the Security Council will wish to express their good wishes to the Commission, and will also wish to urge the parties, if that be necessary, to give their full co-operation to the Commission in carrying on these discussions. Equally, I am sure that there is another point -on which the Council would wish to express itself. It is a point which was raised in the observations just made by the representative of the United States, namely, that we would wish to urge that, while this attempt is being made to approach a final settlement of this difficult problem, neither party should do anything locally . that might impair the.chances of success or that might in any way aggravate the situation and thus impede the very important work in which the Commission is at present engaged. One other point is that I think we can all see that, in the present situation, it is urgently necessary that the earliest possible solution should be found. There are dangers in the situation which will. brook no delay. Therefore, I should hope that we may look for fairly rapid progress in these conversations, and that we may hope. that the Commission might be able to present a further report within a few days. The Security Council must keep iti close touch with the developments of the situation, and I should hope that we might be able to fix a provisional date in the early part of next week, when the Council mighi be able to meet to receive a further report, ‘possibly not a final one, but at feast an interim report, from the Rapporteur of the Commission. - which has been pending so long. My desire is to draw attention to just one limited aspect of the problem which, if not adverted to at this stage, might contribute to causitig the very obstructic: and delay, and possibly even the failure, of the efforts on which the Commission is at the moment engaged. In the first place, I should like to express my tribute and that of my Government to the anxiety diligence and devotion which the Commission has brought to bear upon the very delicate and very important task upon which it has been engaged. . As the Chairman of the Commission has already intimated to the Security Council, the Commission has very recently handed to the representatives of the two Governments a set of what I might describe as proposals — very informal at this stage — which, in the view of the Commission, might enable the parties to bridge the differences between them which at the present moment are obstructing a settlement. Tn order that those proposals may have a chance of being calmly considered and that there may be the maximum possible chance of their being agreed to as a basis for carrying the work of the Commission further, it is absolutely essential that the atmosphere between the two Governments should continue to be as unruffled as possible. It will be recalled that, under the instructions of my Government, I have recently addressed a ‘letter to the Security Council through the Commission. I followed the procedure of submitting that letter to the Security Council through the Commission for the very ‘reason that, when I received the directions to present that letter to the Security Council, I knew that the Commission ‘was then engaged upon the elaboration of - those proposals which have recently been handed to the representatives of the two Governments, and I was therefore very anxious that nothing ‘should be done which might in any manner interrupt or, as I have said, obstruct the very delicate stage of the work upon which the Commission was engaged. But that document, as the Security Council is aware, related to the actual military situation as it has recently developed on the front. No doubt, no one single phase of. the military development is more directly concer::: d with the work of the Gommission than the whole problem is; and, even in ‘drawing attention to that, I wish to make it quite clear that it is not my desire in any manner to take any aspect of the problem out of the However, this particular situation is such that, if something is not done immediately, in some manner, to stop it from deteriorating and to stabilize it, the very efforts upon which the Commission is engaged might unfortunately prove fruitless. I am anxious to prevent that from happening and that has prompted me to ask permission to intervene in the discussion, at this stage. The letter to which I have drawn attention, and which now is nearly a week old, sets ont briefly the military situation as it has developed. I have since received further communications — one of which was handed to me at this table a few moments ago —— which show that the delicacy of that situation is now indeed extreme, in the sense that the military situation has resulted in a large number of refugees from certain areas in Kashmir being actually on the march in order to reach and find safety in Pakistan areas. The Chairman of the Commission has just informed the Security Council that his information from Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai is that the action upon which the Indian military is engaged is of a somewhat formal character, to secure one or two objectives in the field. I am afraid that is not so. No doubt the Chairman of the Commission has been informed to that effect. I have got the material here on ‘the basis of which, if it were necessary, I could substantiate by reference to chapter and verse that that is an entirely wrong picture of what is actually happening. In the first place, the very increase of the numbers and the armour on the Indian side indicates that that is not so. But apart from that, look at two aspects of it. The main military action is being taken in two areas: First of all it is bemg taken in the South, ~ where during the last few days, an advance of at least fifty miles has been made, resulting in the occupation of over one thousand square miles -of area populated entirely, down to the last. ‘individual, by Muslims, at least fifty thousand of whom. — as I have already submitted — are on the march towards Pakistan and a minimum of another fifty thousand have been cut off by the advance of the Indian Army and prevented ’ from reaching Pakistan. That does siot show - that the action taken is one of a purely formal kind aimed at correcting a situation that might have arisen, even if by any stretch of imagination the Indian amnion could be so described. The sitiation, that is sought to be corrected in that sector, has been in existence for many cut off a certain number of Azad troops. If action of that kind can be called purely corrective, on the other hand it might be taken as an attempt to secure a release of those troops that have been cut off. The situation is bound to continue deteriorating. This morning’s issue of the Continental Deily Mail contains an item of news which I found very distressing from the point of view of the chances of reaching a peaceful settlement of this very important but delicate question between the two Dominions. It is said there that artillery duels had taken place all along a line between Tithwal and Jhangar in West Kashmir. That is practically the whole line, in the South, along which troops are facing each other. If nothing happens almost immediately to prevent, in some manner, the further deterioration of this situation, one of two consequences is bound to follow. On the one hand, Pakistan may be compelled to oppose this all-out effort by an all-out effort on its own, which would mean a complete flare up. on all fronts. I may remark parenthetically that during the first half of May, Pakistan, as the result of similar action then taken by the Indian military forces had to send in its troops to halt the Indian forces at certain points beyond the Pakistan borders to stop streams of refugees that had started pouring into Pakistan, and to protect certain Pakistan interests inside Azad territory, for instance, the Mangla Head { Works, which feeds one of the main irrigation canals “of West Punjab. Up till now, during the six months that have elapsed, since the entry of Pakistan troops into the State, Pakistan has altogether refrained from using either its armour or its air force in the -hope that such defensive action that it had to take would continue io be limited to the two objectives that I have pointed out. Pakistan has so far shown great restraint, but during the last week, the sitnation has been such, and has rapidly developed in such proportions that Pakistan cannot afford to continue to look on and let the situation go on deteriorating. We are passionately anxious that a way should be found for the peaceful settlement of the problem, but we cannot overlook the situation as it is actually developing on the spot. If, while efforts are being made to find a peaceful solution — arid we are co-operating with the. Commission to find such « solution and, an TF L_--- countries, then the Security Council can itself appreciate what chance will be left of reaching a peaceful settlement. That is one consequence that might flow from the unfortunate situation ’ that has developed. _ The second consequence may be that if Pakistan merely continues in a defensive role, as it has done so far, then, shortly, no scope may be left for any kind of peaceful settlement of the problem, India has, from the very beginning, been anxious to score a military decision in Kashmir. When that is achieved, no scope will be left for any settlement by rautual discussion, or any agreement on a scheme for a peaceful solution to this problem. I appreciate the observations that have fallen from the lips of some members _ of the Security Council that the problem should continue to be dealt with by the Commission — . and I heartily endorse these observations. There is no other way of dealing with the problem and in any case, the Commission has reached a stage when it is within sight of a possible setilement by peaceful means. The Council or the Commis- ~ sion, as the case maybe, are under the. urgent necessity of first adverting to this question: what _is to be done to stabilize the military situation? If it is correct— assuming that it is —. as has been reported by the Chairman of the Commission and by Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, that the _ action taken by the military forces of India in the State was only of a formal or a corrective ua,Mature, in spite of the serious deterioration of the situation which has already taken place, why should there now be any difficulty — that action having been taken, and taken more than completely successfully, whatever the objective may have been and having resulted: in a situation - which is likely to prove another serious jolt to the economy of Pakistan as the result of the refugee ‘problem. — why should there be any difficulty in reaching an understanding that things should ‘stay: as they are until the Commission’s proposals ~ have had a, chance of being calmly discussed and, let us hope, accepted by the parties, so that the ‘solution of this problem along Peaceful lines may be: achieved? : As I have said, the military situation is very “dynamic. I have just received a telegram from Karachi with regard to the latest military developments. The “telegram relates only ‘to one sector, and one single item will show the Security’ Council how delicate the s situation is. Following the. capture of: Mendhar, in ‘the Compare this with the second telegram. That ‘clarait, _ telegram stated, as I have already said, that fifty thousand refugees were already on the move from this area towards Pakistan. This means that large numbers of additional refugees. with sheep and cattle are moving westward, that they are being attacked from the air, and that fifty thousand refugees on the other side of the line established by the Indian. military forces have been cut off. The telegram adds: “Indian broadcasts on 24 November described operations as ‘more or less offensive’ and laid much stress on the welcome which the Indian Army received from Muslims in the liberated areas” I do aot want to raise the purely technical point .of whether Sir Girja Bajpai was Or was not accurate in describing the situation to the Chairman of the United Nations Commission as being merely corrective. But what I want to do, with all the earnestness that I can command, is to submit that whether the action is described _ as corrective or defensive or offensive, that is the situation, and, if the situation is allowed to continue as it is, the members of the Security Council can themselves visualize the alternative with which the Pakistan Government and even the United Nations Commission would be faced. ment I hope that the members’ of ‘the Security Council will forgive me for my intervention. I do not wish to prolong the discussions or my submission to the Security Council, but. if it would be: considered necessary that I should submit any material, I have it all here. I have described what the situation is. It threatens on -the one hand to blow up into a full scale conflict, with consequerices which are too térrible to imagine, or, on the other, to render absolutely futile and fruitless the very diligent efforts upon which the Commission is now engaged to bring about a solution of the dispute. . Sir Girja Shankar BAJPAL (India): Coming as I do to the table of this august Council for the first time, it is not unnatural that I should feel somewhat overpowered by the sense of my esponsibility. The Security Council has power and it has authority. I hope that it will extend | to me the indulgence and the patience that are due to a newcomer. tan, Before I deal with the military aspect of the situation and its implications as they have been described by the representative of Pakistan, I should like to associate myself with what he has said, and. with what. other members of the Security Council have said, regarding the very important work which the United Nations Com-~ mission on India and ‘Pakistan - has already | | accomplished. You may remember that when the Security Caimi aAantnd fa. -----1- Re 6O The representative of Pakistan has referred to some statements which I made to the Chairman of the Commission, Mr. Lozano, a few days ago, about the military situation. These observations of mine were made on information which had reached me before I received the text of Sir Zafrullah Khan’s letter to the Chairman of the Commission, in which. he gives details of our military action, of the strengthening of our forces and of our military objectives. If I may venture ta correct what the representative of Pakistan said, I did not say that the military action which the Government of India had taken in Kashmir was of.a formal character. What I did say was that it was of a defensive character and that no major offensive had either been launched or was contemplated. I wish, as much as the representative of Pakistan, to avoid saying anything that might make - the task of conciliatiori more difficult, because we ‘are believers in peace in India just as, I am sure, our friends on the other side are anxious to find a peaceful settlement. I wish to avoid any recrimination and I wish-te say nothing that may _ adversely affect the activities of the Commission. However, since a suggestion has been made _ that we even now are acting aggressively, it is ‘only fair that I should draw the attention of the Security Council to certain facts. The first of these facts is that since May, according to the statement that the representative of Pakistan made to the Commission of the Security. Council, and perhaps somewhat earlier according to our own information, Pakistan ferces have been and still are on the territory of Jammu and Kashmir, which ° we regard as Indian territory. Yn all our statements before the Security ‘Gouncil, we made it clear that we reserved to . ourselves the right of self-defence, the right of - expelling from our territory those who had no | tight to be there. However, the fact remains that, unlike what has been suggested just now — namely, that Pakistan’s troops were on the terri- _ tory of Jammu and Kashmir purely in a defensive role, and not playing any active military role at all — I should like to say here and now North East, of relieving pressure on Leh in the Ladakh Valley, and of generally safeguarding our military situation in that part of Jammu and Kashmir. Turning now to the South, our information — and this is not based on what I told the Chairman of the Commission the other day, but on later information —- was that the encircled garrison which we maintained in Poonch — and, under the ‘protection of that garrison, thousands of refugees from other parts of Kashmir — that that garrisun and its civilian population were being subjected to an intensified effort for to establish a stranglehold which would have made it impossible for us to supply either our garrison or the people under the protection of that garrison. The action which we have taken, including the. capture of Mandhar, to which the representative of Pakistan referred has been designed exclusively to keep the supply line and the road to Poonch open. A suggestion has been made that we have reinforced our air forces. I have it on the strength of a telegram received from my Government only this morning that no addition has been made to our air force in Jammu and Kashmir. In the second place — and I am referring now to the letter which Sir Zafrullah has addressed _ to the Chairman of the Commiission. [$/1087] - - and which we are now considering — it has been suggested, that we have considerably reinforced our land troops or the army in this area. — Now, over a period of two months, all we. have done is to send five thousand troops, partly. for purposes of replacing old garrisons and partly in order to assist in the defensive action in -Ladakh and in the Poonch area, as I have just tried to describe to you. Anything in the nature of new brigades or divisions, as mentioned here, have certainly not been sent to Jammu and Kashmir at all. The mention of brigades is possibly based on some misunderstanding of whit is a purelv organizational cten —— nomab- I do not think that it is necessary for me to expatiate at any greater length on the military situation. I have given you the-facts which my Government have furnished to me in reply to the enquiries that I made after receiving Sir Zafrullah _Khan’s letter to the Chairman of the Commission. - The Chairman of the Commission said that he has been in communication with us and in communication, I believe, with the representative of Pakistan regarding the possibilities of | further negotiation. I should only like to say that the informal preposals of principle regarding a. plebiscite, which were handed to me, have been communicated to my Government. They were handed to me on Saturday. They were com- -municated to miy Government by telegram on Sunday morning. . They.are important proposals; _there has not;yet been sufficient time to receive instructions from my Government. However, it is certainly my intention to do what I can to explore the possibilities of some kind of renewed and formal negotiations with regard to this particular matter. This T say not with any commitment either on my own part or on the part of the Government of India, but as an index of our desire to make the fullest possible use of the. good offices of. the Commission for the purpose of reaching a friendly and amicable settlement. _ The representative of Pakistan said that it has been the purpose of India from the very begin- . ning to achieve a military decision. I wish to say: this: .Since we invoked the good offices of - the Security. Council to help us in settling this - matter amicably, we have not tried to achieve | a solution. by the sword, and we are not trying | -to do it now.. We still have the fullest faith in the United Nations, and we are desirous of a friendly and peaceful settlement. I would, however, permit myself to say that, if we are told, ‘as we are told in this letter, that because of. imagined offensives and alleged hostile intentions - of the Government of India, there is going to be afresh effort by Pakistan in the sense of a _ counter-offensive, we must in these circumstances naturally. exercise the prerogative that belongs to every Member of the United Nations: the pre- -rogative of self-defence. _ . 1 hope that the representative of Pakistan will ~not misunderstand me if I say that, ‘perhaps on. We have done no more than to iry and defend our position without prejudice to a friendly solution by negotiation and, certainly, with no desire whatsoever to impede the work of the Gommission which the United Nations has appointed. Sir Mohammed Zarruntan Kaan (Pakistan): I have no desire to start a controversy over anything that my friend, Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, has stated because it would be very inept at this stage to take up a statement sentence by sentence and to’say how much one agrees with it and how much one differs with it. I have submitted to the Security Council the picture of the military situation, and my friend on the other side has made his comments on it. The actual situation, the Security Council will perceive, is no different from what I described it to be. What are the apt words to describe it? Tt may be a matter of difference, of controversy - | between the representatives of the two Governments. I do wish to say this: is it not somewhat cur-ous, to, say the least, that whereas Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai seeks to assign the offensive role - to Pakistan, it should be Pakistan which is ‘anxious that the fighting and the killing should come to an immediate stop. Is it ever the desire of a party taking the offensive role, and wishing to carry it to completion, to be keenly anxious . that fighting should come to an end? As I have said, I will enter no controversy as to what is the particular appellation which might fitly describe what has been happening during the last week or so, particularly in the military sphere. Call it by whatever ‘name or expression " it might please the Council or might please the. representative of India, intensive fighting has flared up. Of course, when there is a fight, both. Sides have to participate in it; but apart from. the fighting itself, which results in killing and - destruction, ° large i mbers of people are subjected to a great deal of privation, destitution, ‘misery, leaving of their homes, and so:on. If it is true that, whatever the legal position ‘may be, — and the Security. Council knows well that the two sides differ on. the appreciation of the legal position —- India regards Kashmir as part of its territory as a result of the accession | which was attempted last year, Pakistan has _ Rever accepted that position. But whatever may be the legal implications of the situation, and . ‘whatever. rights each side may reserve to itself of ° sending troops, of carrying .on the fighting and of trying to exclude the other side from the territory of Kashmir, at least in order to provide the best chance and to afford a peaceful atmosphere for the consideration of the Proposals now before the two Governments, the fighting, the killing, and the migrations of people : should be ‘stopped, if not permanently, at least tempo- Council then what difficulty is there in stopping the fighting — I assure the Council that that. can be done before the sun sets tomorrow — and letting the Commission carry on its extremely valuable efforts in a peaceful atmosphere, since that is the only chance of bringing about some kind of peaceful settlement of this dispute, and thereby preventing further exacerbation of the situation? , On the eve of its departure from the subcontinent of India and Pakistan, the Commission made an appeal to both sides, an appeal of which the Council is aware, not to take any action which might worsen the situation. Within the last few days it has repeated that appeal to ‘both parties, requesting that nothing should be done on the political or military side which might further exacerbate the situation. They have already taken the step of drawing the attention of the Secretary-General to the request ' made as early as July for the appointment of a military advisor to the Commission. No doubt that request is receiving the attention of the ’ Secretary-General. These measures ought to be -encouraged rather than obstructed. As I have said, I have no desire to start a con- . troversy on the appreciation of the military situation. Let the appreciation of my friend on the other side be accepted, but even if that is done, at least while these proposals are being consid- ‘ered and have any chance of being accepted by _ either side, why should there not be a cessation of the fighting? Once those proposals are accepted, though they are based on certain prin~ ciples which for instance will require details - being worked out, —- and that could be done in - the later stages — the truce proposals will then immediately come into operation, and those truce proposals, as the members of the Council are aware, involve and require the withdrawal of ‘all Pakistan forces and that has been agreed to by the Pakistan Government. The controversy that arose and stopped the” progress of the work that the Commission was then doing arose over the third part of the Commission’s resolution that is as to what was to happen after the truce. ‘Phere was no trouble with regard tc the cease-fire or the truce itself. The Commission is now engaged upon f ~nulation of its plebiscite proposals, so that if the cease-fire .could provide an opportunity allowing these proposals to be calmly considered and for some principles to be accepted by the two sides, the truce would come into force at once. And then India would have gained the point on the ‘military side to which it attaches a great deal Therefore, I have no desire either to controvert the statement made on the other side, or to make debating points on this side, or to try and show that it is correct, or that it is not, proving that we were not to blame in this situation. This is no occasion for that. My appeal is a simple one: that without prejudice to anything else and with the sole desire of carrying forward the work of the Commission, something may be arranged which should stop the further deterioration of the situation on the spot, You may call the Indian military action “defensive”, but it has resulted ‘in thousands of people ‘being rendered not only homeless, but having to make a long and difficult trek in order to reach security. It may be that they are unreasonably afraid. But it must be fear of a very grave character which compels a person to leave his own home and hearth, however modest, however humble, or on however poor a scale it was being conducted, in order to make the difficult journey and to become a stranger in a compara~ tively strange country. Well, that is happening on a very large scale. At Jeast that would bestopped. The further deterioration of that situa-_ tion would be stopped. What difficulty stands in the way of the attainment of that at least? The request to the two Governments, the direction to the two Government, the order, if you so choose to call it to the two Governments, in that respect, may come from the Commission or may come from the _ Council; it is immaterial; but our object is that if anything has to have a chance of success, ‘the deterioration of the military situation must be stopped. Otherwise, as I have said, one or two of the very grave and most regrettable consequences are bound to ensue. There is no threat from either side. No threat has been expressed by us; none has been expressed by the other: side. There is a certain amount of. difference with regard to the descriptions to be applied to the situation. But there is agreement cn this, that India took certain military actions in order to achieve certain objectives. ‘We differed with regard to the character of the action taken. This is what has happened. We cannot reverse it. We are not asking the Security Council or the Commission to take steps to reverse that, _ but let us at least stop the further deterioration. of the situation which would result, one day or the other, in something that would be disastrous from every point of view. ; also to my Government, I had no option but to explain the circumstances which led up to that military situation. . The representative of Pakistan is concerned — and if I may say so, rightly concerned —- over a situation in which men are being killed, maimed and wounded. It is not a situation in which we rejoice; it is not a situation which we desire; it is not a situation which we wish to continue. The members of the Council will have by now, I hope, read, marked and inwardly digested the report of their own Commission. That Commission sets out a resolution which it presented to both Governments, the resohution of 18 August which provides for a cease-fire, which provides for a truce, which provides for consideration of the conditions of a plebiscite. Did India. decline to accept ‘that resolution? No. Does India decline to accept that resolution now? No. Having accepted once, that acceptance stands. Might I suggest to the representative of Pakistan, ini a spirit of conciliation and friendship, that perhaps he has second thoughts and his Government has second thoughts regarding the acceptance of that resolution. _ E venture to suggest that parts one and two of that resolution contain material by which the object that he has in view and I have in view — his Government and my Government have in view — namely, a cessation of hostilities, can be: achieved. Those two parts contain provisions which are fair to both sides; by their acceptance the very desirable and humane objective of a cessation of hostilities can be quickly attained. Sir Mohammed ZarruttanH Kuan (Pakistan): With reference to what the representative of India has said towards the end of his remarks, I would beg to submit that that has a tendency of opening a controversy on the merits of the _ question now pending before the Commission. The representative of India has said: We do not: decline to accept the resolution of. 13 August. _ Equally, and with complete justice, I might submit, we did not decline to accept the resolution _of 13 August either. The resolution of 13 August provided for a cease-fire in part I, for a‘truce agreement in part IT, and, with all respect to , the..Commission, if I might so describe it, a ~ somewhat indefinite proposal. in part ITI with ‘regard to what would happen after the truce. It. was with regard to that part that Pakistan ‘put forward its proposal. Lo It took no objection to the proposals contained in the first and second parts. The issue had been clarified to the Pakistan Government in certain respects by the Commission. There appears a second condition in our reply to the Commission, but it is only a nominal condition. Certain clarificatioris and elucidations had been given to us and, as the Commission had been discussing its proposals on an equal basis with both Governments, it was possible that certain clarifications had been given to the Government of India. It subsequently appeared that clarifications had in fact been given, and our second condition was only to the effect that the clarifica~ tions and elucidations given to each side should be communicated to the other side and should be acceptable to it. This was inherent in the | - very. nature of the negotiations themselves - — it was not a condition. . The only condition that we put forward was that in default of any additions or modifications, or subject to any conditions or modifications which might be agreed upon, both sides should accept paragraphs 6 to 15 of the Security Council’s resolution of 21 April. I am not seeking to raise a debating point; this is not a matter which we wished to raise here, it is not a matter which has urgency today. Ever since we had the honour of welcoming the Commission in Karachi on 7 July, we have been at all times riot only agreeable but anxious to: “put an end to the fighting on the basis of an immediate cease-fire. We have never at any. time put condi- ' tions ‘upon that proposal or showed any hesitation about it. The conditions of the truce as. laid down in the second part of the Commission’s proposals Poan I am prepared to agree here and now, once again; that if the Government of India is prepared to accept paragraphs 6 to 15 of the Security Council’s resolution of 21 April — to which they had some objections and to which we had some objections — subject to any conditions or modifications which may be arrived at with the help of the good offices of the Commission, the whole matter can be settled now, before this meeting of the Security Council adjourns. There may be some difficulty in the way of the Government of India which prevents it from doing that. Again, I am not seeking to score a debating point; the difficulty may be very real and I am not trying to force it into that position at all; these things have to be ironed out. But I submit that we are ready and always have been ready for an immediate cease-fire without imposing any conditions upon anybody. Then, once the further conditions or principles are agreed upon, the truce proposals can come into effect and the preparations for a plebiscite can be taken in hand so that the whole thing can be settled. That is our position and has been all along. Mr. pe tA TourNELLE (France) (translated from French): The dispute between India and Pakistan has row been before the Security Council for nearly a year. The Council is therefore fully aware of the complexity and difficulties of the task entrusted to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. All the representatives who spoke before me are, I think, in agreement with the French delegation on this point. Our Commission has done its work with an impartiality and energy deserving of the highest praise. The Rapporteur has informed us, at this meeting, that the report circulated to us some days ago was a historical survey of the facts, and a concise statement of the present position, and that the Commission intended to supplement the - report by drafting its concluions at a later date. I associate myself with the wish expressed by the United Kingdom representative that these conclusions should be submitted to the Security Council as soon as possible for examination at a future meeting. ‘Mr. Ex-Kaourtr (Syria): In the first place I agree with what has already been said, first by the representatives of Canada and Colombia and Further, I have heard the representative of the United States refer to the question of keeping order and ensuring the cessation of all fighting in the meantime, in order that the Commission should not be faced with obstacles in the accomplishment of its taks. The question. of a ceasefire has beea referred to in previous resolutions of the Security Council including that of 21 April 1948, requesting both Pakistan and India to do their utmost to bring about a cessation of all fighting. Today’s meeting has been summoned to deal with two items; upon one of them, the interim report, no differences have been expressed in the speeches and statements which have been made. There is however a second item which is the letter dated 22 November 1948 from the Chairman of the United Nations Coramission for India and Pakistan. and another letter addressed to the President of the Security Council by Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, which is contained in document 8/1087. Certain paragraphs in that letter, for instance paragraph 3, state that the situation threatens to flare up into an armed conflict of the most serious magnitude between two States which are Members of. the United Nations. The verbal statements which we have heard from both parties also show to a certain extent that the situation is rather critical. I think the suggestion made by the representative of the United States to the effect that we should recall to the parties the request of the _ Security Council for a cease-fire and the cessation of all fighting in the meantime, so that there may be no further obtacles to the activities of ' the Commission, would be helpful in the present situation. If the representative of the United States would put his suggestion in writing im; ‘order that it might be incorporated -in a letter from the President of the Security Council to both parties, I think that would close the discussion of this question. We could then pass to the other item on our agenda, the question of Hyderabad. Mr. Jessup (United States of America): I just wish to make a brief clarification. I think that the representative of Syria and I are in complete agreement. But, his final vemark suggesting that I should put something in writing led me to feel that perhaps I had not made myself quite clear in what I said before. When I. spoke earlier on, the. President had just suggested that, if there were no other views, in’ view ~ of what had been said by.the members of the cate the fact that it supported the Commission in that appeal. Personally, I would feel that, in view of all the statements that have been made by members of the Security Council, that indeed - would be a true representation of the views of the Council and that the President might draw such conclusions from the debate. The Preswenr (translated from Spanish): Tf no other member of the Council wishes to make any comments on this matter, I shall take it that the general opinion of the Council is in favour of two things. Firstly, it desires to inform the Commission appointed to intervene in the dispute between India and Pakistan that it can count on the full support of the Security Council ~ and that the Council wishes it to continue its work for the purpose of arriving at a peaceful solution. Secondly, it desires to bring to the attention of the Governments. of India and Pakistan the need for refraining from any action which might aggravate the military or the political situation and consequently prejudice the negotiations which are at present being carried on for the purpose of arriving at a final and peaceful understanding in the matter. If no member of the Council objects to what I have just said, I shall proceed accordingly. . As there are no objections, I consider that what I have just said is approved by the Security Council and, in due course, I shall address my- ‘self to the Commission and to the representatives of India and ‘Pakistan in the manner which I have indicated. Before closing the discussion of this item, I should like to remind the members of the Council that the representative of the United Kingdom, — and on this point he was supported by. another representative whose name I cannot recall at the moment — suggésted the desirability of a meeting in the near future, at the beginning .or in the middle of next week, to consider this same question. I should like to know, since the Presidency of the Security Council will change - next Tuesday, whether members of the Council ' wish to fix a date for that purpose now. . _ Sir Alexander Capocan (United. Kingdom) : - I made the suggestion because I thought there ‘was some serious. urgency about this matter, and I therefore hoped that the Security Council might be able,’ provisionally, to fix a date, to show that it-was going to keep the matter under prac-- '. tically continuous review. I also thought that, will no doubt lose no time whatever in reporting to the President of the Security Council when he has anything to report. Therefore, if the members of the Security Council think it inconvenient to fix a specific date, perhaps they would be content to await an intimation from the Chairman of the Commission to the. effect that the Commission has reached the stage at which it has something to report to the Security Council. However, I would express the hope that that | will be as early as possible — or, if that does not take place early next week, that the Chairman of the Commission ‘might appeal to the Council to assist him in expediting the examination of the question. oe The Presmentr (translated from Spanish): If. there are no other comments, we could decide that the matter rests in the hands of the Chairman of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, and that if it should prove necessary to hold another meeting of the Council, he would communicate with whoever is President of the Council at that time for the purpose of calling another meeting. As there are no objections, it is so agreed. The Security Council-usually meets for about three hours. As-it is already 6 p.m., I should like to know whether the Council wishes to continue with the next item on the agenda. Mr. Ex-Kuourr (Syria): In order to be able to give an answer to that questicn, we should at least know something about the other item on the agenda. What is it about? No new dotument is before us. We should like to know what the essence of the question is, before giving an opinion «as to whether we should discuss it now or postpone its discussion to another meeting. The PRESENT (translated from Spanish): I am going to answer the question of the repre- | sentative of Syria. On 20 November, that is a few days ago, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan addressed himself to the President of the Security Council [$/1084] reminding him that already last October, he had sent him a note on the question of Hyderabad. That is why the Secretariat and the President considered that the question should be placed on the agenda. The Council must now take the decision it ‘deems fitting in the matter. — 7 On this same subject, I should like to point out to the members of the Council that I have - received a letter from the Head of the permanent. delegation of India [5/1089] informing me that, - with regard to that question, the Indian Governmanét Lian at ban tadien within motel sent to the Council because the’ delegation had received the agenda; it is siened by Mrs. Pandit, Head of the delegation of India. Mr. Urpaneta ARBELAEZ (Colombia) (translated from Spanish): Since it is after 6 p.m., as you Mr, President have said, it seems to me ‘that the Council should not now undertake the consideration of a new item because it could certainly not deal fully with the question at this meeting. Furthermore, as India at present has no representative or spokesman who is quali- ‘fied to take part.in the discussion, I sugest that examination of this item on the agend= be postponed to a future meeting of the Council. R Mr. Ex-Kuourt (Syria): I think there is one point which might be discussed and upon which a-decision might be reached today. I am referring to the letter trom the representative of Pakistan requesting to be allowed to participate in the discussion of the Hyderabad question. This-matter has been presented to the Security Council and no decision has been taken about it. I think that during this meeting it would be “well, at least to let the representative of Pakistan know whether he will be invited to participate in this discussion so that he may be ready whenever such discussion ‘may take place. The Presment (translated from Spanish): If the members of the Council have. no objections, the letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan will be read. a Letter from the Minister of Foreign | Affairs of Pakisian requesting to participate in the discussien of the Hy- _ derabad question . Mr. Sozotev (Assistant Secretary-General in charge of the Department of Security Council Affairs): The letter is dated 6 October 1948, ' addressed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan to the President of the Security Council - and Teads as follows: “JT have been instructed by my Government to request that under Article 31 of the Charter of the United Nations read with rule 37 of the . provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, Pakistan may be permitted to participate in the discussion of the Hyderabad-India question when discussion of the question is resumed by the Council. “(Signed) ZAFRULLAH KHAN Minister of Foreign Affairs of. Pakistan” I wish to remind the members of the Council that the representative of Colombia requested postponement of this item until a later meeting, and I ask for comments on this proposal. Mr. Ex-Kuourt (Syria): I do not think the suggestion of the representative of Colombia ‘referred to this particular point. I believe he referred to the whole question of Hyderabad which is before the Security Council. This is a subsidiary point which should be dealt with before discussing the question of Hyderabad as a whole. Hyderabad is a part of the subcontinent of India which has been divided into two States. We may take a decision in regard to the request of Pakistan, as this is a matter which has nothing to do with the question of Hyderabad. It is simply a request from one State asking to be invited to participate in the discussion without vote, The Presment (translated from Spanish): For the further information of the members of the Council, I wish to say that the French interpretation of the letter to the President from the permanent representative of India, Mrs. Pandit, appears to have been inaccurate. What the head of the delegation of India wished to say is that there is no representative of the Government of India in Paris at present who is authorized to discuss this question. Does the representative of Syria insist on a decision being taken on this matter at present? Mr. Ex-Kuourr (Syria): No, I do not insist. But I wish to state that such a question could be decided in the absence of any representative of India or Hyderabad. The Security Council could decide such a matter by itself before invit- : ing the parties. That question has no connexion with the two parties. If the President wishes to postpone the decision-to another time, I do not insist. . The Preswent (translated from Spanish) : Does the representative of Colombia insist on the suggestion which he made earlier? - Mr. Urpaneta Arperazz (Colombia) (translated from Spanish}: Yes. The PresmenT (translated from Spanish): If there are no objections from members of the Council, I shall act on the suggestion of the represeritative of Colombia. { understand that this is the desire of the Council, and I therefore declare the meeting adjourned, Librairie: “La 9 Sh. 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