S/PV.397 Security Council

As President of the Security Council for the month of January, I should like, on behalf of the Conneil, to extend a welcome to the new members who join us at this meeting. May I say that the Council looks forward to the contributions which the representatives of Cuba, Egypt and Norway will make to its deliberations. At the same time, I believe that the Security Council will wish me to recall with sincere appreciation the distinguished services given to the Council by the retiring members, namely, Belgium, Colombia and Syria. I wish to thank them, on behalf of the Security Council, for all that they have done to uphold the interests of the United Nations during their terms of office. The Council has, indeed, been fOl"tllilate in the services rendered by Mr. Fads E!-Khomi of Syria, Mr. L6pez and Mr. Urdaneta Arbe1aez of Colombia, and, in particular, I wish to express my sincere appreciation to my predecessor in the office of President, Mr. van Langenhove of Belgium, whose qualities of statesmanship have contributed so much to the work of this Council. J e suis certain de me faire egalement l'interprete des membres du' Conseil de securite en evoquant avec reconnaissance les services eminents rendus au Conseil par les membres sortants, a savoir, la 'Belgique, la Colombie et la Syrie. Je desire les remercier, au nom du Conseil de securite, de tout ce qu'ils ant fait pendant la duree de Jeur mandat pour maintenir le prestige de l'Organisation cles Nations Unies. Le Conseil ne peut que se feliciter des services que lui ont rendus M. Faris El-Khouri, de Syrie, M. L6pez et M. Urdaneta Arbe1aez, de Cobm-bie; je tiens en' particulier a remercier tres sincerement celui qui m'a precede dans les fonctions de President, M. van Langenhove, de Belgique, dont les qualites d'homme politique ant ete d'une aide si precieuse pour Ies travaux du Consei!. TROIS.CENT.QUATRE-VINGT.DIX. SEPTIEME SEANCE Tenue 11 Lake Success, New-York, le vtmdredi 7 janvier 1949, a 15 heures. President: Le general McNAUGHTON (Canada). Presents: Les representants des pays suivants: Argentine, Canada, Chine, Cuha, Egypte, France, Norvege, Republique sodaliste sovietique cl'Ukraine, Union des Republiques sodalistes sovietiques, Royaume-Uni, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. I. Ordre du jour provisoire (SIAgenda 397) 1. Adoption de l'ordre du jour. 2. La question indonesienne. 2. Allocutioll du President et des nouveaux memhres Le PRESIDENT (t1'oduit de l'anglais): En rua qualite de President du Consei! de securite pour le mois de janvier, je desire souhaiter la bienvenue, au nom du Consei!, anx nouveaux membres qui se trouvent parmi nous a cette seance. Qu'il me soit permis de dire que le Consei! est heureux de la contribution que les representants de Cuba, de l'Egypte et de la Norvege apporteront aces debats, Mr. ALVAREZ (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): I wish, first of all, to p.ay my respects to General McNaugllton, the President of the Security Council, and to all the members of that body. It is also a great satisfaction to me to have this opportunity of presenting my respects, as representative of the Reptlblic of Cuba, to all the Members of the United Nations, who, at the recent session of the General Assembly in Paris,! unanimously elected my country to serve as a non~perr.1aneLlt member of the Security Council. vVe are aware of the great responsibility involved in the discharge of so delicate a mission, and ,while re"affirming Cuba's adherence to the Charter of the United Nations, I hope I may be permitted to point out that my country contributed to the drawing up of that Charter and has worked tirelessly ever since the San Francisco Conference to strengthen it.. At the same time we affirm emphatically that the conduct of the Cuban delegation in this Council, guided as it is by the directives of a Chief of State who applies in full measure the principles of true democracy, must be such as to fulfil at all times the obligation to promote in this Council a just and impartial attitude in the solution of the difficult problems sL1bmitted for our consideration. In the name of the Republic of Cuba, of its Chief of State, and of the delegation which I have the hononr to head, I beg once again to express ottr heart~feJt gratitude to the President and members of this Cottncil, to the United States of America for its generous hospitality, and in general to all those who have welcomed us. Mallmoud F:\WZI Bey (Egypt): I am most grateful to the President and to the other mem~ bers of the Sewrity Council in whose name he spoke for the \vords of welcome which 'he addressed to Egypt as well as to the other incoming members of the Security Council. In this respect I am most happy to be able to mention sincerely the great services which have been rendered to this Council and to the United Nations ns a whole by the retiring members. We represent here the world at large. It is tme that at the same tima we also represent in ,some measme the regions from which we come, and in this respect I consider myself to some extent as succeeding the representative of Syria, Mr. Faris EI-Khouri, who has rendered such a great contribution to the war1e of thl" Council and to the work of the Onited Nations as a whole. Egypt considers it to be a great Expression of confidence in her that the family of the United Nations should twice have elected her for mcm- 'See Offj~ir>1 Rl!cordJ of thl! third scssiDn Df fhe Gentral Assel1lbly, part r, 14~th 'Plenary meeting. M. ALvARr;;z (Cuba) (iraduit de l'espagnol) Tout d'abord, je voudrais exprimer mon respect a general McNat;ghton, President du Conseil cl securite, et a taus les membres de cet organisml Je suis egalement tn.':s hettreux d'avoir cette ace:: sion d'exprimer, en tant que representant de 1 Republique de Cuba, notre respect pour tous l~ Membres de l'Organisation des Nations Unie qui, au cours·de la session de l'Assemb1ee gen~ ra1e tenue a Paris!, ont designe a l'Ltnanimit mon pays pour occuper ur, siege non permaner. au Coilsei1 de securite. Nous nous rendons compte de la grande re~ ponsabilite qu'entraine une mission aussi delicatE A cette occasion, Cuba rcaffirme sa fidelite a 1 Charte des Nations Unies, et j'espere qu'il m sera permis de signaler que mon pays a colla bore it l'e1aboration de cette Charte et que, depui la Conference de San-Francisco, il a travaiJ1, sans cesse it la fortifier. Nous soulignons egale ment de la maniere la plus energiqne que, sou, la direction du Chef de notre Etat qui appliqll' rigoureusement les principes d'une veritable de mocratie, la delegation de Cuba agira au Consei de securite de maniere it maintenir constammen une attitude de justice et d'impartialite dans I, discussion et la solution des graves pTO'bleme~ qui sont soumis it I'examen de cet organisme. Au nom de la Republique de Cuba, du, Che de l'Etat cubain et de la delegation que je preside j'exprime une fois de plus mes plus cordiam remerciements au President et aux membres clt ConseD de securite, ainsi gu'aux Etats-Uni~ d'Amerique qui netts offrent leur aimable hospi talite et, en general, a tOllS ceux: qui nous ani souhaite la bienvenlle. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypte) (traduit dl l'anglais) : le remerde trts vivement le President et les antres l'l1em!.J.res au Conseil de seeurite, au nom uesque)s il a parle, des paroles de bienvenue qu'il a adrrssees al'Egypte ninsi qu'aux antres nOllveattx membres du Conseil de securite. le :;uis heLtreUx de pouvoir o'lllssi evoquer en totlte sincerite 1es grands services que les membres sortants ant rendu, tant au Conseil de securite gu'a l'Organisation des Nations lJnies dans son ensemble. Nous sommes ici pour rcpresenter le monde entier. Mais il est ega1ement vrai que nQllS re~ presentons, dans une certaine mesure, les regions dont nous venons, et, a cet egard, je me considere, jusqu'a un certain point, comme le successeur de M. Faris El-Khouri, representant de la Syrie, qui a si grandemcnt contribue atlX travaux du Conseil et, {j'lIne faJ;on genera1e, a ceux de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. En elisant a deux reprises l'Egypte comme men~bre dn Conseil de secttrite all cours de la periode de temps limitee pendant laquelle 1'Or- 'Voir les Documents officieh de lr> traisieme sess101t d~ i'Assl!l1lblee generale, [)remiere partie, 14geme seance Mr. MOB (Norway): On behalf of the Norwegian delegation, I thank the President and the meinDeI's of the Security Council for their words of welcome. The Norwegian people and the Norwegian Government are fully aware that it is a great responsibility to be a member of the Security Council, especially one of the nonpcrm;;lnent members which are supposed to represent the VIews not merely of their own countries but aiso of those Member States of the United Nations which are not represented here. \Ve are mindful of this responsibility, and proLId of the confidence which the General Assemblv has shown in electing Norway as a member of the Security Council. We shall do our utmost to merit this confidence, We regard it as one of the most important tasks for everyone of us to try to dissipate the atmosphere of distrust which is the nlain obstacle to the effective functioning of the United Nations today. It is in this spirit that my delegation will contri:bute what it can towards making the Charter the guirle and the superior law of the conduct of all Member Governments in their international relations, 3. Adoption of the agenda 4,. Continuation of the discussion on the Indonesian question Le PRESIDENT: (trad1dt de I'anglnis): Avimt d'inviter it. la table du Conseil les rcpresentants" des Gouvernements qui ont deja pris part a la discussion de la question indonesienne, confor- l11ement a l'Article 31 de la Charte, je desire regIer Ulle question s01tleveedans une 1ettre· adressee par le represent;Lnt permanent de la Belgique au President du Consei1 de securite' [5/1192J. Cette lettre est datee du 6 janvier 1949 et des exemplaires en sont distribues aux membres du Co.nseil. . Dans cette lettre, le Gouvernement belge n' demande la faveur de prendre part it la discus"': skin de la question indotiesietine au Sell1· du~ : Conseil de securite; cette demande est faite' en' raison de la participation permanente·de'la·Bel-" gique a la Commission de ··bons offices et a -la Commission consulaire de. Batavia. Le COl1seil', de securite, commele, sa-vent, sel' membres; a confi6 d'inwortantes fonctions a ces deux orga- nismes, et .il y aurait donc avantage a benefic'ier de la participatfon du-representant de lQ. Belgique it 110S debats. Je 5uppOse'que les membres dt1, Conseil reconnaitront (ju'il fant faire droit a.. :la demande du Gouvernement belge, A moins,: .qu'il- n'y ait des objections, je cQl1sidere donc. que. le Consei1 accepte qu~ le representant de· la 'Belgique pI'enne place a la table dn ConseiL avec les autres membres qtli y ont ete invites, . The "PRESIDENT: Before calling to the Council table the representatives of those Governments which have already participated in the discussion of the Indonesian question under Article 31 of the Charter, I should like to dispose of the ques- tion which has been raised in a letter from the permanent representative of Belgium, addressed to the President of the Security Council (5/1192]. The letter is dated 6 January 1949, and copies are -being distributed to members of the Council. In this letter, the Belgian Govermnent has requested the privilege of participation· in the discussion of the Indonesian (j~estion in the Se~ curity Council, a request which arises in conse- quence of Belgium's continued membership on the Committee of Good Offices and on the Con- sular Commission in Batavia, As the members of the Council are awnre, both these bodies have been assig'ned' important duties by the 'Security Council and it is, therefore, expedient that we should have the benefit of the participation of the Belgian :.,-epresm!<'Ltive in our discussion; I presume that the members of the Security Coundl will agree that the request. of the· Belgian Govern- ment should be granted. Unless r hear any ob~ jections, ] will therefore take it that the Council agree~ t11at the representative of Be1giu.m should take his seat at the Co.unci! table with the other members who have been in:vited.· M, MOE (Non'eg-e) (traduit de l'ang/flis); All nom de la cteU~gation llorvegienne, je remercie le President et les membres du Conseil de seeu-· rite de leur.'l paroles debienvenue. Le penple et le Gouvernement norvegiens sont pleil1ement cot1scients du fait qu'etre membre du Coriseil, de securite e:;t une lom·de responsabilite, en par~ ticnlier dans le cas des membres non pe,'manents, qui ~ont censes representer, non seulement l'opi~ nion de leur propre pays, mais aLlssi celle des Etats Membres des Nations Unies qui ne sont pas repn~sentes au Conseil. Nons sommes cons- cients de cette responsabilite et :fiers de la con- fiance que l'AssembJee generale nous a temoignee en elisallt la Norvege comme membre du Conseil de securite. Nous ferons tout notl'e possible pour meriter cette confiance, N 011S estimons que l'une des taches les plus importantes qui Incombent a chacull d'entre 110llS est- d'essayer de dissiper ['atmosphere de mefiance qui est aujourd'1l1.1i l'obstac1e majeur all fonctionnemellt effectif de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. C'est clans cet esprit que ma delegation apportera hI. contribu- tion qui est en son pouvoir, en Vlle de hire de la Charte le guide et la loi supreme (les relations entre les Etats Membtes, 3. Adoption de l'ordre du jour L'ordre du four est adopti. 4. Suite de la discussion sur la question indonesienne Le PRESIDENT: (traduit de l'anglai.r): Alt stade actuel de l'examen de la question indone- sienne, je snis certain que les membres du ConseH de secur:te desireront, en premier lieu, avoir con- naissance du rapport du representant des Pays- Etas sur les I11estres que son Gouvernement a prises pour se conformer aux resolutions adop- tees par le Conseil, et, en particulier, a celles qui ont ete adoptees les 24 [5/1150] et 28 decembre dernier (5/1164], au COlUS des seances tenues . par le Conseil a Paris. Mais, avant de donl1er :la parole all representant deS Pays-Bas, je desire ,attirer l'attention des membres du Conseil Stlr les rapports de la Commission de bons offices .et de la Commission consulaire qui IlOUS sont ,parvenus ce matin et qui, g:-ace aux efforts parti~ culierement intenses du Secretariat, sont a notre dL"position cet apres-midi pOltr que nous en pre- nions connaissance; ee sont les docun:ents 5/1189 et 5/1190. Je reconnais que les membres du Conseil n'ont pas eu encore l'occasion de les etudier, et il serait peut-ehe preferable que nOllS j)oursuivions nos debats au debut de la semaine prochaine, afin ele permettre aux representants d'examir.er attentivement ces documents. Je donne maintenant la parole au representant des Pays-Bas qui va nous communiquer le texte du rapport que j'ai mentionne. J'indique qu'on utilisera l'interpretatiQ11 simul- t,mee pour les interventions des orateurs qui ne sont pas membres dn Conseil, et l'interpretation consultative pour celles des membres du Conseil.

As we open the present phase in the consideration' of the Indonesian cuestion, I am sure that the 5ectiritv Council would like, as a first step, to hear from the representative of the Netherlands a report on the action which his Government has taken to comply with the resolutions adopted by the· Council, particularly with the resolutions adopted on 24 r5/1150J and 28 December last [5/1164], when the Security Council met:n Paris. Before calling upon the representative of the Netherlands, however, I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Council to tl:e reports of the Committee of Good Offices and uf the Consular Commission which were received. this morning and which, as a result of very special efforts on the part of the Secretariat, have been made avai1a-ble :or our readingthis afternoon as documents 5/1189 and 5/1190 res[ltctively. I recognize that members have not yet had an opportuniry to stuc.y these documents, and it may well be that it wiJ prove advisable to continue'our discussions early next week, when there will have been an opportunity to peruse the documentS. I shall now call upon the represenl;"ltive of the Netherlands to give us the report to which 1 have referred. May I say that there will be simultaneous interpretation :or speakers other thlln melr.bers of the Council .and consecutive interpretation for members of the Col.lncil? Mr. VAN ROIJEN (Netherlands): More than a week }Jas passed since the Security Council last met to discl:sS the Indonesian question [396th meetingJ. As important developments have taken place since then, and three new membe~s have tal,en their places as members of the Council, it may be useful briefly to review the events which have occurred in the meantime. M. VAN ROIJEN (Pays-Ba,:,) (traAllit de> ]'(A1!M glais): Plus d'une semaine s'est ecoulee depuis la demiere seance dtl Conseil de securite consacree a la question indonesienne [396~me ,dance]. Depuis lors, la situation a evolue considerabJe~ ment, et, en outre. trois nOLlveaux membres ont occupe leur siege au Conseil; il petIt etre utile, pal' consequent, de passer bril~:veUlent en revue les evenements qui se sont deroules dans l'intet:valh:. On 29 December (396th meeting] I ri:1'ade a Le 29 decembre (396eme seance] j'ai fait, au nom de man Gou,'ernement, et en reponse aux trois resO~lltjons adoptees par le Conseil ele securite, line declaratior. que je mepermets de reiteTer ci-apres, a l'intent:on des representants qui ne participaient pas aux debats precedemment: "1. Les hostilites sont Stlr le point de cesser. En tout cas, en ce qui concerne les forceS ne.erstat~l;Jlent on behalf of my Government. in reply to the three resolutions adopted by the Security Counc!1,. which..statemeI:lt I may repeat here for ~he qenefit.ofthose representatives Who were not presen.t on that occasion. . "1. Hostiliies are in the (:ourse 'of ~ing terminated. In allY event hostilities in Java will, as far as the Netherlands· forces are 'concerned, cease, at the latest, on 31 December 1948 at 24.00 ~andaiscs, les hostilites cesseront a Jaya le 31 de M cembre 1948, a 24 heures au plus tard. En raison de la situation critique particuliere qui existe a Sumatra, la cessation des hostilites· ne pourra y avoir 1icu que deux ou b'ois jours pIns tard. 11 ,estera evidemment necessai,e de POllfsllivre les meSUres contre les elements de desordre, qui, soh imlividuellement, soit colleetivement, compromettent la securite publiqne, genent ou empechent le ravitaillement d'une population manquant de denrees aJimentaires et d'autres produits de premiere necesslte. ho~r~. 0:ving to the speCial emergency situation txlStIng In Sllmatra, the cessation of hostilities there cannot be effectuated until t",o or three days later. It will, of course, remain necessary to act against disturbing elernents, who either individu~ ally or collectively, endangf'r p/lblic security or interfere with or prevent the supply of food and ~ther essential commodities to the needy popnlation . "3. To further constructive co-operation in tile task of rebl1ilding the whole of Indonesia, the Netherlands Government has decided that the Prime Minister, Mr. Drees, will leave for Indonesia within a few days. "4. In order to assist in the carrying out of the request of the Security Council to he fully informed regarding the situation since 12 December, the Netherlands Government has already declared that all possible facilities will be granted to the military observers and their staff. The necessary facilities will also be given to the members of the Consular Commission." This was the text of my statement of 29 December. With regard to the different points with which it dealt, the following developments took place. Hostilities have now ceased on the part of the Netherlands forces in the whole of the former Republican territory. For the full information of the Security Council I shall read an English translation of the order of the day of the Cornmander~in-Chjef of the Netherlands forces announcing the end of hostiliti('s in Java: "1. Military activities, and therefore also hostilities in Java, were terminated on 31 December 1948. "2. After that date the task of the troops is consequently confined and limited to action against roving groups, bands or individuals who attempt to cause unrest or, as was stated by our representative to the Security Council, 'to act against disturbing elements who either individually or collectively endanger public security or interfere with or prevent the supply of food and other essential commodities to the needy population'. "3. I charge you and the troops under YOllr command to carry out this task, within its limits, strictly and with great diligence." The order of the day announcing the end of hostilities in Sumatra is identical, except that the first sentence reads: "1. Military activities, and therefore also hostilities in Sumatra, will be terminated on 5 January 1949 at 12 o'clock midday." The possibility mentioned in the order of action which might be necessary "against roving groups, bands or individuals who attempt to cause unrest" is in accordance with point 1 of my statement of 29 December and is only a different wording of the same restriction. Thus hostilities have come to an end as f<Lr as the Netherlands forces are concerned. We anly hope. now that the disorganized groups which . Moreover, some self-styled, so-called emergency Republican Governments, of which up to now three different ones, according to news~ paper reports, Jmve constituted themselves, are taking :l similar attitude. An A$sociated Press repmi in the New York Times of 6 January 1949 selid that one of them, led by Mc Sjaffruddill Pmwiranegara. issned a statement from "somewhere in Sum<ltra" according to which it would issue a cease-fire order only if five conditions were complied with by the Netherlands. I do not know whether there are any armed groups or itidi"idmJs left in Sumatra who follow the orders of Mr. Sjaffruddin Prawiranegara, and how -much -effect such a cease-fire order would co.nsequently have, but I have to point out that we must disclaim responsibility if a statement like his, which implies a call to continue hostilities, shol1ld lead to new clashes with scattered groups. The same applies to the order of the d<:ty isslled on 31 December by Colonel Hidajat, so-called Commander of the Republican forces, saying that the fight would be continued until certain conditions pttt forward by the same Mr. Sjaffruddin Prawirallegara on 23 December would be fulfilled by the Netherlands. The total number of losses of the Net11er1ands forces up to :3 January WJ.$ sixty-six men 1dlled. The total number of losses on the Republican side is not yet known, but, even asstlming that it were somewhat higher than the losses on our side, t4e following conclusion c,m be drawn. ·-The loss of life incurred is, of COtlrse, highly regrettable, and we should have been far happier if. Cl. peaceful soh!tion CQllld have been achieved, suclt as we -tried to reach during almost three,_ ye.'us of negotiiltions. Putting the loss of human life at its full value, however, I must stressand I mU,;;t urge the Council to realize-that the figure oJ t)J.ese.losses is fai-below the number of, peaceful Indonesian civilians· that were ITIurdered," by Republicans who' had in"filtrated dhring the', months preceding o~t action. ,The actioll, which lastecJ. focbyo: weeks, cost the lives of sixty-six Netherlands tTOOPS j but in the one week preceding the action, whep. the "truce" was supposed to be in force, sixty-seven Federalist Indonesian offic~als . were . murdered by Republican bands which had infiltrated, The total number of Indonesian-and I repeat, Indonesian-officials in' Netherlands-controlled territory murdered hy Repu'blican terrorists between 25 August and 18 December 1948 was over four hundred. That figure does not include the numbers of private Indonesian civilians killed and kidnapped, which, in tp.e, la'st months, averaged fiftyper week. Those pd~s de trois ans. M~s, tout en appreciant a .sa juste valeur la perte de vies humaines, je dois sQu1igner - et je prie instamment le Conseil de le constater - que le chiffte de ces pertes est bi'en inferieur au nombl'e de civi1.s indonesiens pacifiglles assassines par les- Republicains qui s'etllient infiltres dans n09' -lignes au ,cours des mois qui ant precede I'a'ctitm que nous avons entreprise. Cette action, qui a _dure deux semaines, a coute la vie de soixante-six soldats neerlandais. Mais, ati COltfS de, 'la seule semaine precedanl notre action, a10rs que la "treve" etait censee etre ellvigueur, soixante-sept fonctionnaires de la Federation indonesienne ant ete assassines par des bandes de Republicains qui s'etaient innltres clans nos lignes. Le 110mbre total de fonctionnaires indonsiens - je dis bien, indonesiens - as'sassines par des terroristes repllblicains entre le 25 aout et le 18 uecembre 1948, clans les terri- . toires controles par 1es Pays-Bas, s'est eleve i In the face of the .numbers of VlctnTls of 1\epubiican terrorism which I have mentioned, the ntlmber of victims of this military purge, how~ ever regrettable; is low. I repeat, it would have been fa,better if the:; end of the bloodshed resulting from murder and kidnfl.pping COilId have been achieved by peaceful means. It was with that aim in view that, month after month, we urged the RepLtblic to put an end to HlOse organized cleeds of terrat executed by infl1trating Republicans. The only result was a contintlecl increase in their number. In order to demonstrate that constantly mounting figure, I have, for the benel1t of the new me!11bers and representatives on this Conneil, cil'Culated a graph of the weekly number of truce violations during the year 1948 [S/1136/Add.1]. Apparently the RepllbJican Government was either llnwilling or unable to bring this untenable situation to an end. Month after month, too, we sent dozens of complaints about these infiltrations to the Committee of Good Offices. In response, the Committee issued a can to both pa~tjes to respect the trllce agreement [5/649, a.!>pendix XI]. The effect on the side of the Republican forces is demon" strated by the figures I have ju~t mentioned, It was in the face of theincapac:ity of both the H.epublican Government and the Committee of Good Offices to achieve effective measures to end this bloodshed that the Netherlands Government at long last re1uctaatly decided to exercise its right as sovereign authority to purge the Repub- Hc hy armed action, in order to stamp out terror and disorder. The Netherlands forces have paid the price of .sixty-six dead to achieve this end. The Repnblican forces have paid a similar price. 1,'hat.is a tragic.pri<;e, all the more tragic became it could have been avoided. In view of the fact that the Republic could not er would not cooperate to re-establish security, the price paid is riot too high in comparison with theclaily·loss of Hfe through terror which had been going on for months 'and months, and which would no doubt have. continu~d to increase if we had not intervened. I wOl1ld: like'this circumstance to be pondered by the Council, and particu1arly·by those members who, decry so, loudly thepJoodshed inherent in the purge which we have earried out, . I now tllm to ment, the release the second point of my ~tate­ of certain Republican political p~tsona'ities. As ,soon as hostilitles. in Java and Sumatra were ended, on 5 January~that is, the day before Des la fin des hostilites a Java et,~ Sumatral ,le 5 janvier, c'est-a-dire avant-hier, les autorites En comparaison du nombre des vietimes du terrodsme republicain, dont je viens de parler, cehti des victimes de l'epuration militaire; quel~ que regrettable qu'il sait, estpeu eleve. Je repete qu'i1 eut ete de beatlCOup preferable 'de meltre fin par des moyens padfiques a I'effu~ sion de sang provoquee par le metlrtre et l'enle~ v-eluent. C'est a cette fin que, pendant de longs 1110is, nous avons adjnre la Republique de mettre fin aces actes de terrorisme perpetres par des elements republicains qui s'etaient infiltres dans nos !ignes. La seule reponse e:tait une augmentation continue d\.~ nombre de ces actcs. Afin d'illustrcr cette courbe constal1lluent ascendante, j'ai fait distribuer, a l'intention des nouveattx. membres du COllstil de securite, un graphique indiquant le nombre de violations de ]a treve per~ petrees chaque semaine au cours de l'annee 1945 [S/1136/Acld.l], 11 semble que le GOLlvernement n~pub1icain ne vottlait au ne pOllvait pas mettre fill a cette situation intolerable. Pendant de longs mois egalement, nous avons adresse a la Commission ue bans offices des douzaines de plaintes cancernant ces infiltrations. En reponse, la Commission a invite les deux parties a respecter l'accord de treve [S/649/annexe XI]. Les chiffres que je viens de mentionner indiquent le resu1tat qu'a eu cette invitation, du cote 1"6- publicain. C'est parce que le Gouvernement ele la Republiqtte et la Commission de bons affices se sont montres incapab1es de prendre des mesures efficaces pour mettre fin a cette effusion de sang que le Gouvernement de5 Pays-Bas, a la 10ng'-1e et 'bien ma1gre lui, a decide c1'exercer se", droits d'autorite souveraille et d'entreprendre par les armes une operation de llettoyage des zones republicaines, ele manihe it y faire cesser la terreur et le desardre. Les Pays·Bas ont paye de soixante·six morts l'effort entrevris a cette fin. Les forces repubJ:caines ont paye Ull prix du meme ordre. C'est 11ll prix tragique, d'autant plus tragiquc qu'il aurait pu etre epargne. Mais, etant dOlll'le qlle la RepubJiql1e ne pouvait ou ne voulait pas' col1aborer au retab1issement de la securite, le prix qui a ete paye n'est pas trap eleve; si. on .le ,.compare aux PeTtes quotidiennes en vies hU11laines provenant de la. terreur qui a regne pendant des mois et des mois, et qui aurait, sans aucun doute, contiriue a s'aggraver si n·ons ·n'etiO!lS pas interven'ils. ' le souhaite que ces circonstances soientprises en consideration par le Conseil de securite et, plus, particulieremenl, par ceux de ses membr~s qui regrettent rivec tant d'insistance l'cffusion <1f: sang provoquee par l'6puration que ,nous avoIl,s entrepris.e. J'en viens maintenant au deuxieme point de ma declaration: j'e1argisseluent de certaines personnalites politlqL1es republicaines. Mr. Djuanda, who was Minister of Communications; Mr. Laoh, who was Minister of Traffic and Reconstruction; Mr. Kusnan, who was Minister of Youth; Mr. Kiai Hadji Dewantoro, one of the foremost personalities in the educational field. Four other leaders, namely, Mr. Soekarno, Mr. Hatta-, Mr. Sjahrir and Mr. Agus Salim, have likewise been released from their enforced residence. Since it was considered that for the moment it might still endanger public security if they were a!lowed entire freedom of movement throughout the whole of Indonesia, that freedom has for the time being :been limited to the island of Bangka. They enjoy complete liberty throughout the entire island, which has an area of over 4,500 square miles. I hope the Council will appreciate that such a result within two days of the end of hostilities and in view of the still confused situation in the former Republican areas constitutes a generous and liberal attitude on the part of the Netherlands Government. I now come to the fourth point of the Netherlands Government's statement of 29 December, which deals with the facilities for the military observers and the Consular Commission to observe and r'eport on certain aspects of the situation. I can inform the Council that the necessary instructions have been given to, enable the Committee of Good Offices, the Consular Commission and the military experts to carry out the task entrusted to them in the resolutions of the Security Coundl [S/1142, S/1150 and 5/1165J. Th, Committee of Good Offices and the Consular Commission have been informed accordingly. The former has been requested to use its own aircraft as much as possible, since the other transport facilities which can be placed at its disposal are of necessity scarce, owing to present circumstances. It will furthermore be obvious that the liberty of movement of the organs mentioned is inevitably limited by the fact that visits to some areas may temporarily be restricted as a result of measures taken by the Netherlands authorities for reasons of safety and military necessity. It should also ·be pointed out that visits to some areas may entail considerable personal risk, for which the Netherlands Government must disclaim responsibility, These two Ifestricticms, I <:an assure the Council, will be interpreted in such a manner that no unnecessary hindrance will be placed in the way of observers in the execution of their task. M. Leimena, qui, au 18 deecembre, etait Ministre de la sante publique dans le Gouvernement republicain; M. Djuanda, qui etait Ministre des communications; M. Lnoh, qui etait Ministre des transports et de la reconstruction; M. Kusnan, qui etait Ministre de la jeunesse; M. Kiai Radji Dewantoro, l'une des personna1itt~s 1es plus en vue dans le domaine de l'instruction. Quatre autres chefs, a savoir M. Soekarno, M. Hatta, M. Sjahrir et M. Agus Salim, qui avaient ete mis en residence surveillee, ont ete Hberes de cette mesure. Camme on pensait que le fait de leur accorder une entiere liberte de mouvement dans toute l'Indonesie representerait encore un danger potlr l'ordre public, cette liberte a ete temporairement limitee arile de Banka. I1s jouissent d'une ltberte complete dans toute cette ile, dont la surface est de plus de 4.500 milles canes. Le Conseil reconnaitra, je l'espere, que le fait d'avoir obtenu un pareil resultat deux joms apres la fin des hostilites, en depit de la situation confuse qui regne encore dans les anciens territoires republicains, denote une attitude genereuse et liberale de la part du Gouvernement des Pays- Bas. J'en viens maintenant au quatrierne point de la declaration du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas, en date du 29 decembre, qui concerne les facilites donnces aux observateurs militaires et a la Commission consulaire pour observer certains aspects de la situation et fail'e rapport a leur sujet. Je peux informer le Consei! que les instructions necessaires ont ete donnees pour permettre a la Commission de bons offices, a la Commission consulaire et <lUX experts militaires d'executer les taches qUi leur ont ete confiees par les resolutions du Conseil de securite [S/1142, S/1150 et S/1165]. La Commission de 'bons offices et la Commission consulaire Ont ete inforl11ees en consequence. La premiere a ete invitee a utiliser autant que possible son propre avian, car, dans les eirconstances actuelles, les moyens de transport qu'on pourrait mettre a sa disposition sont necessairement reduits. I1 est en outre evident que la liberte de mouvement accordee aux organes ci-dessus mentionnes est inevita'blement limitee du fait que les visites dans certaines zones peuvent etre temporairement interdites en raison des mesures qu'ont prises les autorites neerlandaises pour des raisons de securite et par necessite militaire. 11 faut egalement faire observer que les visites dans certaines zones peuvent entrainer un risque personnel considerable pour lequel le Gouverne~ ment des Pays-Bas decline toute responsabilite. Ces deux restrictions, je peux en assurer le Conseil, seront interpretees de faljon qu'aucun obstacle inutile ne vienne gener les observateurs dans l'execution de leur tache. In the field of health, mltrition and public utilities, the first steps on the way to reconstruction have already been taken. Relief consignments of rice and textiles to a value of 20 million guilders have been imported into the former Republican :lreas. The health service has started functioning again; in Jogjakarta that service 11as been placed uncler the direction of Dr. Leimena, former Minister of Health of the Republic of Indonesia. Postal and telegraph services are being restored; the railways have started running again. More important than these measures of a material nature are the steps which are to be take for political reconstruction. These steps will follow the patient set forth for the first time in essence in the speech of Her Majesty Queen Wilhelmina of 7 December 1942. It has been elaborated and repeated many times since then, and Ims been formally laid down in the Linggadjati2 and Rcnville Agreements [5/649], appendi:: XI] concluded with the Republic of Indonesia. My Government continues to stand by the political principles underlying these Agreements and will carry them into effect. It will do so without any prodding by the Security Council. For the benefit of those representatives on the Council who were not present in Paris I may once more summarize the steps toward political reconstruction which are to be taken. We have first restOred real peace in Indonesia, in order to create the conditions of order and security which are indispensable basis for the creation of a healthy democratic. State. We shall now proceed to the establishment of an aU-Indonesian federal interim government for the whole of Indonesia. In the consultations for the establishment of this government, representatives of all parts of Indonesia, without any exception, will take part. The first step towards these consultations has been taken in the journey of the Netherlands Prime Minister, Mr. Drees, to Indonesia, where he arrived only yesterd~y. The task of this all-Indonesian government will be to take over the administration of bdoriesia in accordance with the stip'Jlations of the decree concerning the administration in Indonesia in the interim period, promulgated on 18 Decem~ ber 1948. At the same time, the federal interim Government will have the task of making the • See The Political Evenfs in Ihe Republic of Indonesia. The Netherlands Information Bureau, New YQrk, page' 34. Dans le dornaine de la sante, de l'alimentation et des services puhIics, on a deja pris certaines mesures initiales en vue de la reconstruction. Des envois de secours de riz et de textile d'une valeur de 20 millions de florins Ont ete importes sur les anciens territoires republicains. Le service de sante a recommence iL fonctionner a Djokja~ karta. Ce service a ete place sous la direction de M. Leimena, ancien Ministre de la sante puhlique de la Repuhlique d'Indone.sie. Les ser~ vices postaux et telegraphiques sont en voie de retablissement; les train5 recommencent i fonctiollner. Plus importante encore que ces mesures d'ordre materiel sont les mesures que I'on va prendre pour la reconstrtlction politique. Ces mesures s'inscrivant dans le programme dont les grandes lignes ant ete enoncees pour la premiere fois dans le discours de Sa Maieste la Reine Wilhelmine le 7 decemhre 194:2. Ce programme a ete precise et l'eitere a de nombreuses reprises depuis cette date, et il a fte formellement enregistr!! dans les Accords de Linggadjati2 et du RC11ville [Sj649, amJl!xe XI] conclus avec la Repuhlique d'Illdonesie. Mon Gouvernement cwtinue a s'en tenir aux principes politiques qui sont les fondements de ces accords, et it les applic,uera. I1 le ·fera sans meme que le Consei! de securite ait besoin de l'y encourager. A l'intention des membres du Conseil qui n'etaient pas presents a Paris. je me permets, ttne fois de plus, de resumer les mesures de reconstruction politique qui vont etre prises. Nous avons tout d'abord effectivement retabli la paix en IndonLsie, afin ele creer les conditions d'ordre et de securite CJui sont le fondement indispensable a la creation d'un Etat democratique sain. Nous allons maintenant proceder a. I'etablis~ sement d'un g,ouvernement federal provisoire essentiellernent indonesien, pour l'ensemble de l'Indonesie. Les representants de toutes les par~ ties de l'Indonesie, sans exception, prendront part aux consultations en vue de l'institll.tion de ce gouvernement. La premiere etape dans cette voie a ete le voyage de M. Drees, Premier Ministre des Pays-Bas, qui est arrive hier eri Indonesie. La tache de ce gouvernement essentiellement indonesien consistera a se charger de I'administrationde l'Indonesie, conformement aux tennes du dt:cret concernant I'administration de J'Indo· nesie pendant la periode inMrimaire, promu)gl1ee le 18 decembre 1948. En meme temps, le Gou~ vernement federal provisoire aura pour tache • Voir The Poll'trcal Evetl-tl in the RI!/J"blic of. Indonesia, pubJ.ie par 1e Bureau d'li'nfoTJll'ation des Pays-Bas, New-York, p3ge 34. One of the steps to this end will be the holding of free elections for a'representative body on a democratic basis. In this respect, too, we shall have nothing to hide. The world will be able to convince itself that we shall put the plan into effect with absolute sincerity. Upon the creation Of the United States of In~ donesia, sovereignty over Indonesia will be transferred by the Netherlands to this new State, which will then, we propose, become a Member of the United Nations in its own right. This is our programme for the creation of a democratic new country in South East Asia, which will not only be independent-for that in itself .is not enough-but will also be viable and immune to the influence of extremist groups which are only too successful in some other independent States in that part of the wolrd. With the new year, we are entering a new phase in the relationS with Indonesia which will mark the beginning of an era of partnership between the Netherlands and Indonesia on the basis of equality and voluntary co-operation. I know that some are skeptical of this idea, but I predict that not long from now the Netherlands- Indonesia partnership will be recognized as a proof of possible East-West co~operation and as a bulwark of stability in the Far East. I cannot express ottr intentions better than has been clone by Her Majesty Queen luliana, when she said yesterday: "It is my sincere wish that within a few weeks, an Indonesian federal government be created, to take upon itself the responsibilities and to carry out the duties inherent in democratic government. This federal government shall immediately, by, virtue of its rightful powers, make further preparations for the transition toward and the establishment of the new commonwealth. It will be one of the tasks of that government to holdin accord with the high representative of the ,Crowri-free elections in Indonesia. In this way, I hope, the sovereign United States of Indonesia will soon become a reality. Indonesia and the Netherlands will then, linked together in a union, give all their strength in harmonious co- ,operation toward the sound and healthy develop~ .ment of both countries and the increase of prosperity in the world. Then-as my mother 'wished-the foundations for a better and happier future will have been laid." Mr. PALAR (Republic of Indonesia): Three important points demand our attention: first, the' ,so-called cease-fire brder issued by the Nether~ lands; secondly, the fact that the Netherlands has not yet released our President and several members of our Government; thirdly, the visit of the Netherlands Prime Minister, Mr. Drees, to Indo~ nesia. M. PALAR (Republique d'Indonesie) (traduit de l'anglaior): Trois points importants retiennent notre attention: tout d'abord, le pretendu ordre ,de cesser le feu donne par les Pays-Bas; deuxihmement, le fait que les autorites neerlandaises n'ont pas encore relflche notre President et plusieurs membres de notre Gouvernement ;ti"oisie:' ,mement, lavisite en Indone~ie de M. Drees. Premier Ministre des Pays-Bas. The Committee of Good Offices reported on 19 December [S/1129/Add.1] as follows: "In their repudiation of the Renville Agreement, the Netherlands has thus not fulfilled the requirements of article 10 of the truce agreement." This article 10 obliges either party to give notice to the other party and to the Committee of Good Offices of its termination of the truce agreement. By not doing so adequately, the Netherlands succeeded in capturing om President and our Government. On 21 December tlle Committee of Good Offices reported in document 5/1138 as follows; "In commencing military operations on 19 December the NetherlanCls Government acted in violation of its obligations under the Rmville Truce Agreement." Fmm the same report I quote the following: "Not only have the possibilities of negotiations under the auspices of the Committee not been exhausted, but they have not been adequately explored." It is perfectly clear that the Netherlands violated and repudiated the tnlce agreement and started the war while there were still possibilities for negotiations. The Security Council considered this Netherlands military action on the basis of urgency in Paris. It adopted a resolution [S/1150] calling upon both parties to cease fire f01'thwith and upon the Nether1:lnds to release our President and all captured [Joliticalleaders of the Republic of Indonesia forthwith. What happened, however? Notwithstanding this resolution, the Netherlands continued fighting and capturing our towns. Our army, following its own tactics, divided itself into small grollps in order to start guerrilla warfare, Our troops, according to plan, did not defend the towns but retreated to the mountains and woods, only fighting in selfdefence where necessary, while carrying out a scorched-eal'th policy in self-defence. From the mountains and the woods they continued their war of self-defence. They started the tactics of self-defence pa-r excellence-guerrilla warfare. And now the Netherlands has anounced that it has issued the order to its army commanders to cease hostilities. The Netherlands feels it is now feasible to do so since it has already attained its military objectives. To the announcement of this technical cease-fire order, however, the Netherlands. adds the statement that its anny must continue shooting because it expects disturbance around the occupied towns, Indeed, all over Java and Sumatra our resistance has started. Let me read you a telegram which I received yesterday from our Government; eet article 10 oblige l'ltne des parties anotifier a l'autre partie ainsi qu'a la Commission de bons offices sa denonciation de l'accord de treve, C'est en n'exectltant pas convenablement cette clause que les Hollandais ant reussi a capturer notre President et les membres de notre Gouvemement. Le 21 decembre, la Commission de hons offices a fait le l'apport suivant [S/1138]: "En declencbant les operations mjJitaires, le 19 decembre. le GOl1vernement des Pays-Bas a agi en violation des obligations qui decoulent pour lui de l'Accord de treve du Rmville." Je cite aussi la phrase suivante qui se trottve dans le meme rapport: "Non seulement les possibilites de negotiations sons les auspices de la Commission n'ont pas ete epuisees, rnais e[les n'ont meme pas ete examinees serieusement." 11 est nettement etabli que les Pays-Bas ant viole et repudie j'accord de treve et ant commence la guerre all moment Oll des negociations etaient encore possibles. Le Conseil de securite a examine d'urgence, a Paris, la situation creee par l'action militaire entreprise par les Pays- Bas. Il a adopte une resolution [S/1150] invitant les deux parties a cesser le feu immediatement et enjoignant aux Pays-Bas de remettre imme~ diatement en liberte notre President et tous les dirigeants politiques de la Republique d'Indonesie qui avaientete faits prisonniers, Or, que s'est·i1 passe? En depit de cette resolution, les Pays-Bas ont continue le combat et ant capture nos villes. Notre armee, appliquant sa propr:e tactique de combat, s'est divisee en petits groupes afin d'entreprendre des operations de guerilla. Nos troupes, conformement a ce plan, n'ont pas dHendu les villes, mais se sont retirees clans les montagnes et dans les bois, n'acceptant le comhat qu'en cas de necessite pour assumer leur ddense, et appliquant, a cette fin, la methoc1e ele la. terre brUlee. Ainsi, rHugiees dans les montagnes et les hois, dies ant continue lettr guerre de legitime dHense; elles ant utilise la tactique defensive par excellence, celle de la guerilla. Void maintenant que les Pays-Bas annoncent qu'ils ant donll(~ I'ordre a leur comrnanoement de cesser les hostilites. Les Pays-Bas estiment que cela leur est possible a l'heure actnelle, pnisqu'ils ont deja atteint leurs objectifs militaires. Mais, apres avoir proclame en pri,;cipe I'ordre de cesser le feu, les Pays~Bas declarent que leur armee doit continuer le combat parce qu'ils s'attendent a des troubles dans les regions des villes occupees, En effet, noire resistance a corn· mence sur toute l'etendue de Java et de Sumatra. Permettez-moi de vous donner lecture d'un telegramme que j'ai r~u hier de ootre Gouvernemeot: "Radio republicaine a annonce que de lourdes pertes ont ete infligees aux voies ferrees et aux plantations; nouvelles confirmces par les journaux chinois et parfois par les Hollandais. Le:> dernieres plantations de caolltchouc qui restent a Bogor sont endommagees et inutilisables du fait d'attaques ininterrompues. Meme situation a Bandoeng. Voies ferrees a l'est et au nord de Bandoeng coupees chaque nuit. Trains reliant Cheribon a Djakatra constamment sous le feu; ponts sautes et voie fern~e de Cheribon i Banjumas impratieables. Toutes les plantations dans les parties orientale et centrale de Java demolies. La ville de Mageland dans les ruines fumantes. Routes constamment sous la menace de guerillas. Plantation de Bagelen, Djokjakarta, de la valJ.ee de Seraju et de la valh~e de Solo compU~tement detruites. Les voies ferrees et les routes contro- Jees par le TNI" - c'est le nom de notre armee8, "Heavy damages inflicted on railroad tracks and estates were reported by Republican radio and confirmed by Chinese newspapers and occa~ sionally by the Dutch. Last remaining rttbber estates in Bogor damaged and out of production through continuous attacks, Same appearance in Bandung. Railroad tracks east and north of Bandung broken nightly. Trains running from Cheribon to Djakatra under constant fire and bridges blown up. Railroad from Cheribon to Banjumas impassable. All estates in eastern and central Java demolished. Mage1and town in mins. Roads under constant threat of guerrillas. Estates in Bagelen, Jogjakarta valley, Seraju valley and Solo valley completely destroyed. Rail and hig,hroads controlled by TNI"-which is our army.s "Postes neerlandais a Samarang et a Bodjonegoro attaques. Methode de la terre brulee hien organisee. Aucune destruction de propriete chinoise ou indonesienne. Stocks gouvernementaux et usines importantes et Tjepu" ~ centre petrolifere - "seuls demolis. A Madiun, de sel'ieux combats sont engages. Plantations de Kediri, Blitar, ,Wlingi, et de la region de Dampit ctetruites. Malang, Pasuruhan, Probolingo, Djatiroto, Djember et Bondowoso presentent aspect de villes attaquees et demolies. "Dutch posts in Samarang and Bodjonegoro attacked. Scorched-earth well organized, No demolition of Olinese or Indonesian property. Only Government stocks and larger factories and Tjepu"-the oil centre-"demolished. In Madiun heavy fighting has broken out. Estates in Kediri, Blitar, Wlingi, Dampit region destroyed. Same appearance of attack and demolition in Malang, Pasuruhan, Probolinggo, Djatiroto, Djember and Bondowoso. "Dutch reported disitlrbances in South Borneo centred around Hoe1oe Soengai. Dutch rushed reinforcements by land and sea from Java. In South Sumatra Military Governor A. K. Gani ordered .scorched earth' at all points and [destruction] of estates and factories of vital importance. No heavy fighting, but constant harassing of communications and outlying posts. "Hollandais signalent des troubles dans le sud de Borneo dans 1.0. region de Hulusungei. Hol~ landais depechent des renfofts de Java par terre et par mer. Dans la partie meridionale de Sumatra, Gouverneur militaire A. K. Gani a ordonne application genernle de la methode de la terre brulee et (destruction] des plantations et usines d'importance vitale. Aucun combat serieux, mais harcelement constant des voies de communication et des pastes d'avant-garde. "In West Sumatra heavy fighting, especially in Padang, Republican troops stronger. In highlands Dutch under constant attack of guerrillas. In Tapanoeli and East Sumatra troops hnder Kawilarang evade head-on clash with Dutch and move into rich plantation areas of East Sumatra, leaving behind small bands of guerrillas harassing Dutch positions. Our troops from Atjet attacked Dutch in Tandjoengpoera and defeated them, Town occupied. Pushing through toward Medan. Whole of Atjet still Republican. Last report, one plane shot down over Bondjol, West Sumatra. In Djambi, Dutch occupied scorched earth oilfields and harbours in lowlands of East Sumatra," "Serieu." combats dans la partie occidentale de Sumatra, particulierement a Padang. Forces republicaines l'empol'tent. Sur le.s hauts plateaux, Hollandais constamment attaqlleS par les guerillas. A Tapanu et dans la partie orientale de Sumatra, les troupes sous les ordres de Kawilarang evitent tout choc direct avec Hollandais et s'avancent dans les regions des riches plantations a l'est de Sumatra, laissant en arriere quelques bandes de guerillas qui harcelent positions neerlandaises. Nos troupes venant cl'Atjet ant attaque les Hollandais a Tandjungpura et les ont battus. Ville occupee. Avancent vers Medan, Atjet toujours entierement aux mains des Repu~ blicains. Selon dernier rapport, un avian abattu au~dessus de Bondjol, dans la partie occidentale de S11matra. A Djamb-i, Hollandais ont occupe champs petrolifi:res bniles et ports des terres basses dans la partie orientale de Sumatra." I receive telegrams of this kind daily. This is only the beginning of our war of self~defence. This means of self-defence was well known in the Netherlands, Be.lgil1m and France during the' German occupatIOn. I have never kept secret from the Security Council the fact that our Je re<;ois journelJement des telegrammes de ce genre. Ce n'est la qtte le debut de notre guerre de legitime defense, Cette methode de defense etait bien connue aux Pays-Bas, en Belgique et en France pendant I'occllpation allemande. Je n'ai jamais cache au ConseiI de securite le fait So we now llflve this sittlation. The Nether~ lands ignored the Securitv Council's demand to cease fire until it had achIeved its military aims. Now it has offici<llly ordered the cessation of hostilities, while Simtlllaneollsly ordering its army to fire on the units of the enemy forces which have remained among the Dutch units in accord- ance with their defence tactics. The Netherlands cease-fire order i~ not an order in compliance with the Security COl:ncil's order. In fact, it makes a mockery of it. It is an order which once again sanctions brutal military aggression. In this way, we could have the ridiculous situation wherein the attacker, under cover of an official cease-fire, is allowed to continue firing, while the Indonesian Army will 'be compelled to continue its self· defence, and will then be accused of violating- the Security Council's -cease-fire demand. If the Security Council were to accept this situation, it would make a victim of the Republic of Indo- nesia. All members of the Security Council know that the Republic of Indonesia has always strictly adhered to the Council's decisions and suggestions and has also complied at all times with the suggestions and advice of the Security Council's Committee of Good Offices. Must we now again be the victims of the policy of complete confi- dence in the Security Council? This ridieu10tls and impossible situation of cease-fire, or rather of the ending of a military attack 'Without cease-fire, can exist only because the Security Council has not yet succeeded in returning the attacking troops to the original truce lines. It is virtually impossible to carry out the resolution for cease-fire adopted by the Se~ curity Council, because the withdrawal of the troops was not included in the resolution. The development in Palestine shows that the Security Council is obviously capable of ordering a with- drawal of troops to Ihe truce lines. I should like to remind the Council of the point raised by the Committee of Good Offices in its report to the Council dated 27 December [5/1156J: "Cb) Politically, the people of one party, with- out whose support any agreement, even if achieved, may well be unenforceable, wiU be reluctant to accept as bona fid!: any negotiations in which again they start with an area under their control diminished as a result of the resort to armed force by the other. "Cc) Practically, when a demarcation line no longer exists, it becomes virtually impossible to ascertain the positions of the Republican forces, particularly in view of the capture by the Nether- lands forces of the Republican High Command. As a result it, may become necessary to observe any events of a military nature throughout the Les Pays-Bas n'ont pas lenn compte de l'ordre de cesser le feu dOllne par le Conseil de seettrite tant qu'ils n'eurent pas atteint leurs buts mili- taires. A l'henre actuelle, ils ont officieIlement ordonl1e la cessation des hostilites, tout en don- nant l'ordre a. leur armee de tirer sur les unites des forces ennemies qui sont restees a. l'interiel1r des lignes neerlandai~es, eonformement a lettr tactique de defense, L'ordre de cesser le feu donne par les Bollandais n'est pas confonne a l'ordre donne par le Conseil de securite. En fait, cet ordre est toume en derision. Le "cessez-le- feu" n'est, tme fois de plus, que la consecration d'une b.utale agression militaire. Ainsi, nous pourrions nous trOltver dans la situation ridicule ou l'agresse\1l", sous le couvert d'ttn ordre officiel de cesser-le-feu, pourrait continuer le feu, obli- geant aiosi l'armee indonesienne acontinuer le combat pour assurer sa defense, ce qui 1ui per- mettrait ensuite d'accuser celle-ci d'avoir viole l'injonction de cesser le feu donnee par le Conseil de securite. Si le Conseil de securite acceptait eet etat de choses, i1 ferait de la Repttb1ique d'Indo- llesie une victime. Tous les mernbres du Conseil de securite save.nt que la Republique d'Inclonesie a tOl1jOLlfS stricte- ment observe les decisions et les suggestions du Conseil et s'est, en tout temps, confarmee aux suggestions et avis de la Commission de bons offices du Conseil de sectlrile. Devons-nous une fois de plus etre les victimes de cette politigue de <:onfiance a:bsolue dans le Conseil de securite? Cette situation ridicule et impossible qui con- siste it cesser le feu, ou plut6t a mettre fin a une attaque militaire sans cesser le feu, ne peut exister (jue parce que le Conseil de securite n'a pas encore retlssi a faire retirer les troupes d'agression sur les lignes qui avaient ete deli- mitees par la treve. Il est pratiquernent impos- sible de mettre en application la resolution relative au "cessez-le-feu" adoptee par le Conseil de secllrite parce que cette resolution ne contient aucune disposition relative au retrait des troupes. L'evolution de la situation en Palestine montre que le Cooseil de seeurite est parfaitement capa- ble d'ordonner le retl'ait des troupes sur les l)ositions que teur assignent 1es conditions de la treve. Je voudrais attirer I'attention du Conseil sur le point souleve par la Commission de bons offices dans son rapport au Conseil en date du 27 decembre [5/1156]: "b) Du point de vue politique, la population de l'une des parties, dont le consentement risque fort d'etre indispensable a !'execution, sinon a la conclusion de tout accord, ne sera guere dis- posee a considerer eomme veritable toute nego- ciation au cours de laquel1e elle s'est trouvee amputee d'une region placee sous son autorite, du fait que l'antre partie a reCOUfll a la force. "c) Du point de vue pratique, lorsqu'il n'existe plus de ligne de demarcation, iI devient prati~ quement impossible de determiner la position des forces de la Republique, en raison, notamment, du fait que les forces neerlandaises se sont em- parees du Raut Commandement republicain. En consequence, il deviendra peut~etre necessaire In so reporting, the Comrnitt~e of Good Offices has placed the pro?!em~ with reg~rd to the actual difficulties preval1mg ID In~onesJa, r~­ su1ting from the orders by the Se~unty C0t;ncl1, squarely in the lap of the Secunty COllnc~l. I cannot but stress with the greatest emphasls at my disposal that these proble!?s deman~ .an immediate solution by the Couno1. The decIsIon called for here is, in my opinion, the reconsidera~ tion of the question of withdrawal of the troops to the old truce lines in Indonesia. The second point which the Security Council now has to face is the fact that the Netherlands, in outright defiance of the Security Council, lip to now has not yet complied with the ~ecurity Council's resolution to release forthWith the President and several of the members of our Government [5/1150]. The representative of the Netherlands has told the Council that the Repub- lican authorities have been released but that some of them may be subject to certain restrictions regarding the maintenance of law <1I1d order. This means that there is no intention on the part of the Netherlands to release our President and some of the members of my Government, nor to give them freedom of action or freedom of movement to make it possible for them to reach their people. In fact, it means that our Government leaders will not be allowed to exer- cise the'l', functions as they were able to prior to the military attack 'by the Netherlands. There can be no doubt concerning the purport of the resolution with regard to the release of our political leaders [5/1150], and there can be no doubt in the minds of the members of the Council. Th'e release of the President and other polit- ical prisoners means the restoration of their free~ dom of movelllent and freedom of action, and the freedom to 'exercise their governmental powers, which has been prohibited as a result of the violation by the Netherlands of a solemn truce agreement. Thus, if and when the Nether- lands decides to release our President and o'ther politka'l' prisoners, this will not be in accordance with wh"t the Security Council had in mind in issuing its order. It will not be a compliance with the two Security Council resolutions on the subject. S11Ch a decision by the Netherlands wiIi be another act of defiance of Security Council orders. We do hope that the S'eC\lrity Counc.il will take due note of this fact, and will not hesitate to force the Netherlands to comply with this order of the Council'. The third point which I should like to bring to the attention of the Security Council is the visit to Indonesia of the Netherlands Prime fa~on certaine les mcsures ,pri~e~ pa~ ~es Pays- Bas pour des raisODS de secunte mtenenre des hostilites entre les parties." Dans ce rapport, la Commission de bans offices renvoie directement all Conseil de securite les problemes souleves par les difficultes actuelles en Indonesie, difficultes qui resultent des ordres du Conseil de securite. Je ne puis que souligner avec la plus .grande insista~ce I.J0ssJ.~)l~ que ces problemes eX1gent une solutIOn lmmedlate ~e la part du Consei!. La decision que reclame la sltua~ tion consiste, a mon avis, aexaminer de nouveau la question du retrait des troupes sur les lignes que leur avait assignees la treve en Indonesie. Le second point que le Conseil de seCllrite doit envisager est le fait .que les Pays~Bas, defiant ouvertement le Conseil de securite, n'ont pas jusqu'id mis en application la resolution du Conseil les invitant a rclicher immediatement le President et plusieurs des membres de notre Gouvernement [S/1150j. Le representant des Pays-Bas a declare au Conseil que les menlbres du Gouvernement republicain avaient ete rela- eMs, mais (jue certains d'entre eux pourraient Hre soumis it quelques mesures restrictives, afin d'assurer le respect de J'ordre et de la loi. Cela signifie que les autorites neerlandaises n'ont nullement I'intention de relacher notre Pre- 5id~nt et certains membres de notre Gouverne- ment, ni de leur accorder la liberte cl'action et. de mouvement; cela signifie qu'i1 leur sera impossible d'entrer en rapport avec km peuple. Autrement dit, les chefs de notre Gouvernement ne seront pas autorises it exercer lenrs fonctions corome il Ies exen:;aient avant l'attaque militaire des Pays-Bas. Or, i1 ne saurait y avoir aucllne doute quant a la p01tee de la resolution relative it la mise en 1iberte de nos chefs politiqlles [S/1150], et aucune hesitation ne peut subsister a cet egard dans l'esprit des mernbres du Consei!. Quand on parle de la liberation du President et des autres prisonniers politiques, cela signifie qu'ils doivent retrouver lellr liberte de mouve- ment et d'action; cela signifie egalement qu'ils doivent etre libres d'exercer leurs fondions gou- vrmement.ales, dont I'exercice 11 ete interrompu a la sllite de la violation d'un accord solennel de treve par les Pays-Bas. Donc, merne all cas ou les Pays-Bas decideraient de 1iberer notre Presi- dent et d'autres prisonniers politiques, leur action ne serait pas conforme a. ce qU'avait envisage le Conseil de securite en dormant son ordre. Ils ne se conformeraient pas aux deux resolutions que le Conseil de securite a adoptees a cet egard. En prenant cette decision, les Pays-Bas agiraient de nouveau au mepris des ordres donnes par le Conseil. Nous esperons fermerne~t que le Conseil de securite prendra aete de ce fait et qu'il n'hesi- tera pas a forcer les Pays-Bas a executer son ordre. Le troisieme point sur lequel je voudrais attirer j'attention du Conseil de securite est le voyage de M. Drees, Premier Ministre des Pays-Bas" Que1s sont 1es entretiens que le Premier Mi- nistre des 'pays-Bas a l'intention d'avoir avec les dirigeants indonesiens afin d'etablir un gotlver- nement provisoire? Il ne s'agit pas de ereer le gOlwernement provisoire envisage dans l'Accord de treve du Rmville. Les rapPol"ts de la Commis- sion de bons offices montrent que11e a ete l'am- pleur des efforts deployes par les Pavs-Bas afin d'empecher la formation d'un gouvernement pro~ visoire avec le concours de la Commission de bons offices. Tottte la politiqu~ des Pays-Bas a ete fondee sur le desir de circonvenir la Commission de bons offices et avait pour but la creation d'un gouvernement provisoire par les Pays-Bas seu1s et dans des conditions determinees par enx. Les rapports de la Commission de bons offices prot1~ vent neltement que les Pays-Bas ont p1einement retlssi a ecarter cette Commission. What are the talks which the Netherlands Prime Minister intends to have with the Indo- nesian leaders in order to create an lnterim gov- ernment? It is not the creation of the interim government envisaged in the Renvi/le Tru~ Agreement. The reports of tlle Committee of Good Offices are there to prove how completely the Netherlands has tried to prevent the forma- tion of an interim govermnent through the Com- mittee of Good Offices. The entire policy of the Netherlands was based on th~ circumvention of that Committee of Good Offices and on the idea of creating such an interim government on Netl1erlands terms and On the part of the Neth- erlands alone. The reports of the Committee of Good Offices prove dearly how well the Netller~ lands has succeeded in putting aside the Commit- tee of Good Ofue-es. Les Pays-Bas estiment maintenant que, a la suite de leur action mi1itaire et etant donne que le Conscil de securite n'a rien entrepris POllt faire respecter les ordres qu'il leur avait adresses, ils n'auront plus besoin de negocier avec une tierce partie diffieile i contenter, que ce soit la Commission de bons offices ou tout autre organe etabli par le Consei1 de secmite. C'est ainsi qu'il faut interpreter le voyage du Premier Ministl'e des Pays-Bas. Cela prouve une fois de plus que les Pays-Bas n'ont pas et n'ont jamais eu l'in- tention d'entreprendre de bOl1ne foi des nego- ciations avec les Indonesiens. A la suite de lellr agression, qui est restee impunie, les Pays-Bas s'efforceront simp1ement d'imposer au pays un regime de gouvernement. The Netherlands now feels that, by its military action and the consequent inaction of the Security Council in enforcing its orders to the Nether- lands Government, that Government will no longer have to deal in its negotiations with a difficult third party either in the form of the Committee of Good Offices or any other body set up by the Security Council. It is in tbis light that the visit of the Netherlands Prime lIfinister has to be regarded. It proves once more that the Netherlands does not have and has neV'cr had in mind the conducting of bOllfl. fide negotiations with the Indonesians. What will happen in Indo- nesia is an effort by the Netherlands to impose a. governmental strllCture on the Indonesians in the wake of its uncensnrecl military attack. These so-callcel talks will serve only to impose upon the Indonesians a royaL detree setting Ltp an interim Government to secure complete Neth- erlands domination in Indonesia. This royal decree was llot a result of negotiations with the Republic, nor was it arrived at through the Com- mittee of Good Offices; it is the result of a com~ p1ctely one-sided action on the part of the Netherlands. Cl'S pretendus pourparlers serviront unique~ ment i imposer aux Indonesiens 1111 Mcret royal etablissant un gOllvernement provisoire dest.ine a assurer la domination complete de.'! Pays-Bas sUr l'Indonesie. Ce oecret royal n'a pas ete pro- mulglle il la suite de negoeiations avec la Repu- blique, il n'a p<lS ete elabore avec le concours de la Commission de bons offices; il s'agit d'une mesure strictemcnt unilaterale de la part des Pays-Bas Dans un de ses derniers rapport [5/1085], la Commission de bons offices a indiql1e ql1e cetie poJitique aboutirait inevitab1el11ent a un sQuleve- ment popt11aire, non seulement sur le telTitoire republicaih, mais dans tou!e l'Indom~~ie. L~ si~ tuation achlelle en Indonesle protlVe 1exactttude de ces previsions. QueUe sera la nahlre des pourparJer~ que le Premier Ministre des Pays-Bas a l'infention de mener avec 1es dirigeants indonesiens? Il aura des .pourparlers avec des prisormiers qui sont The Committee of Good Offices, in onc of its latest reports [5/1085] spoke of popular 11p- heaval throughout Indonesia-not only iri Re- publican territory-which would inevitably result from the pursuance of such a policy. The present situation in Indonesia only proves the accuracy of the Committee's views. What will be the nature of the talks which the Netherlands Prime Minister intends to have with Indones.ian leaders? He is going to have talks with prisoners who are separated from their tijj~ any such hope it futile. None of the impris- oned leaders will be found willing to start any negotiations under these circumstances, nor will the people accept the conducting of any such talks under duress. The Netherlands will build up these talks as a proof of its sincere intentions to meet the legiti~ mate desires of the Indonesian people, but the reports of the Committee of Good Offices show all too clearly that there is not and never has been any proof of sincere willingness all the part of the Netherlands to tonduct 170110 fide negotiations. In the face of the general resentment of the peoples of the whole world against the military attac~ by the Netherlands, the Dutch have felt obliged to repeal all the pledges they, hav'e made to the world and to the people of Indonesia. The history of Ol1r bitter experiences with the Neth- erlands in the past three years only serves to prove the value of such pledges, and we do not feel that the s:tatement made yesterday by the Queen of the Netherlands, in which all these pledges were renewed, opens any new prospect or alters ill any wa~ the grounds for our COm- plete lack of confidence in these Netherlands pleu.ges. Moreover, this statement, which was very obviously timed in order to obviate criti- cism in today's Security Council meeting of the attitude 0 f the Netherlands, and to divert the discussions in a direction which might be re- garded by the Scetlrity Council as a new possi- bility, refers to a promulgation of the royal decree I mentioned before. From this I hope that it will be [Jerfectly clear that this statement does not contribute in any way to a solution in lndonesia, but only gives proof of the determinntion of the Netherlands to. continue its policy which led to the resl1mp~ tion of its colonial warfare. Moreover, the "phrasing of the Dutch state- ments with regard to the pur~ose of M. Drees' visit: to Indonesia is such that we can arrive at no Conclusion but that the Netherlands cloes not intend to consider our President and other polit~ kat prisoners as members of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia. In fact, these state- ments only prove that the Netherlands has based its policy on the dissolution and complete anni- hilation of the Republic of Indonesia. How then can there be any talk about demonstration of good intentions? If there are any good intentions, they can be demonstrated only by the immediate rclease- in the fullest sense of the word-of our President and other political prisoners, the immediate with· drawal of Netherlands tro"ops and the re~opening of negotiations 'With the Government of the Republic of Indonesia on the basis of the Renville Agreement and under the auspices of the Com- mittee of Good Offices. Once again, the reports of the Committee of Good Offices prove the Les Pays-Bas presenteront ces conversations comme une preuve de leur intel)tion sincere de tenir compte des aspirations legitimes dll peuple indonesien, mais les rapports de la Commission de bons offices ne montrent que trop clairement CJlle les Pays-Bas n'ont jamais donnt: de preuve qil'ils etaient sincerement desireux de mener des negociations de bonne {oi. Etant donne la uesapprobation generale provo- CJuee chez les peuples du monde entier par l'agres- sion des Pays~Bas, les Hollandais se sont vus obliges de repeter les promcsses qu'ils avaient faites au monde et au pellple indonesien. L'amere experience que nous avons e11e au cours de nos relations avec les Hollandais pendant ces trois dernieres annees montre queUe est la valeur de ces promesses; aussi ne pensons~nous pas que la declaration faite hier par la Reine des Pays- Bas, et dans laquelle tOlltes ces promesses ont He renollvelees, apporte un element nouveau ou qu'elle modifie en quoi que ce soit les raisons que IlOUS dvons d'eprouver une profonde mefiance a l'~g:ard de ees promesses des Pays~Bas. De plus, cette declaration, qui a ete evidemmet1t faite hier ann de prevenir les critiques qui pOl1rraient etre formulees a l'egard de l'attitude des Pays-Bas au cours de la presente seance du Conseil de securite et afin d'introduire clans la discussion un element qui pourrait etre considen~ par le Conseil de seeurite comme ouvrant des perspectives nou~ velles, mentionne la promulgation du decret royal dont j'ai deja parle. J'espere qu'i! ressort nettement de ce que je viens de di're qlle cette declaration ne contribue aucunement a trouver une solution au probleme indonesien; elle ne fait que prol1ver que les Pays~ Bas sont decides it pOl1rsuivre lel1r politique, qui a abouti a ia reprise de leur guerre coloniale. De plus, les termes dans lesquels les declara~ tions des Pays-Bas au sujet dtt voyage de M. Drees en Indonesie sont redigees nOIlS permettent de condure avec certitude que les Pays~Bas n'ont pas l'intention de considerer notre President et ies autres prisonniers politiqlles comme membres du Gouvernement de la Republique d'Indonesie. Ces declarations prouvent, ell fait, que la poli- tiqne des Pays~Bas tend a la dissolution et a la destrtlction complete de la Republique indone~ sienne. Dans ces conditions. comment pellt~on parler de bonnes intentions? Si el1es existent, ces bonnes intentions ne peu- vent etre prollvees que par la liberation imme~ diate et totale de notre President et des autres prisonniers politiques, par le retrait immediat des troupes neerlandaises et par la reprise des neg0~ ciations avec le Gouvernement de la Republique d'JndOllesie sur la -base de l'Accord du RenviUe et SOIlS les auspices de la Commission de bonsoffi~ ces. Vne fois de plus, les rapports de la Com~ mission prouvent la justesse de notre opinion Vie feel tbat only after be implenlentation of tl:ese conditions can the Republic of Indonesia re-open negotiations under the auspices of the Committee of Good Offices or any other body established by the Security Council for the pur- pose of reachinga permanent and stable solution in Indonesia. There is another point I should like to stress here. Under the present political conditions, and especiaHy in the face of the prevailing sentiments of world cpinion, the Netherlands Prime Minis- ter will feel obliged to retcrn home with some definite results in order to be able to justify the Netherlands policy of colonial warfare. Since he will find our leaders and our people unwilling to surrender to the demands of the Netherlands under the present circumstances, he will feel com- pelled to deal with other individuals to arrive at the projected Netherlands-controlled Federal Interim Govemment. In connexion with this point, any such govern- mental structure will lack the stability which only popular su?port will be abl~ to give, 1 should like to impress upon the members of the Security Council that any governmental structure arrived at by these means will not in any way alter the present situation. It will only mean the continu- ation of guerrilla warfare in Java and Sumatra and popular uprisings in the other islands. There is another aspect of this Indones:an question w:lich becomes more and more import- ant and which will have a very definite and de- cisive bearing on the whole issue. Tirr.e and again I have pobted out before the Security Coup.cil that the Indonesian problem is not only a problem between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia. The problem we are facing now is no longer only that of how to cope with the color.ial war started by the Netherlands and with the con- tinuation of its colonial policy. We are nut 0:11.11 faced with a conder:mation of this Dutch policy. To the peoples of neighbouring countries in Asia it lS eviden: that the Netherhnds is ...-iolating the peace in Indonesia and endangering the peace in South East Asia, ar.d that it is also endangering the relationships between Asia and the other parts of the world. None of these people will acquiesce in annihilation of th~ Republic. I should like to stress that the solution of the Indone:~i~n lJ.m~­ don will be determined very decisively by the conceptions of these countries in South East Asia of right, justice and peace. The question of the withdrawal of Nether- lards troops to the previous truce Hnes will in- evitably have to be rec:onsidered in the light of this standpoint. The withdrawal of Netherlands hcaps will prove to he consistent with the pre- vailing feelinR's of the peoples in that PJ'l.rt of thl' world. General ROMULO (Philippines): Owing to the circumstances stated in a cab:egrarn addressed to Nous esSmons que c'est dans ces conditi~ seulement que la R,epublique d'Indonesie pourra reprendre les negociations sousles auspices de la Commission de bom offices DU d'un autre orgme etabli par :e Conseit de securite a.fin d'arriver a une solution permanente et stable en Indonesie. II y a un autre point que je voudrais souligner iei. Dans les conditions politiques actuelles, et su,tout etant donne les reactions de I'opinion pu- blique mondiale, le Premier Ministre des Pays- Bas se ver:a dans I'obligation d'obtenir certains resultats precis avant de rentrer chez lui, de fa<;on a pOl.:voir justifier la guerre coloniale pour- suivie par les Pays-Bas. Etant donne que ui :105 dirigeants, ni notre penple ri'accepteront 1es exi- gences des Pays·Bas dans les circonstances pre- sentes, le Premier Ministre se vena dans l'ojli- gation de traiter ave:: d'autres individus, de fa<;on a pouvoir constituer le gouverncment federal provisoire sous contr61e neerlandais dont la creation est envisagee par les Pays-Bas. Je voudrais dire, it ce propos, qu'aucun regime gOllvernemental constitue dans ces conditions n'aura la stabilite que seu! I'appui popuJaire peut donner. Je voudrais souEgner devont le Canseil de securite qu'aucun gouvernement cree dans ces conditions ne pourra changer en quoi que ce soit la situation actuelIe. Si un tel gouvernement 6tait constitue, J'activite des guerillas se poursuivrait a Java et a Sumatn., et des soulevements papu· laires auraient lieu dans les autres iles. La question indonesienne presente egalemcnt un <lutre aspect, qui devienclra de plus en plus important et qui aura une influence certaine et decisive sur I'ensemble de la situation. J'ai fait remarquel' amaintes reprises au Conseil de secu- rite que le probleme indonesien' ne se pose pas actuellement seulement entre les Pays-Bas et la Republique d'Indonesie. Le proble1l1c n'est plus seulement celui de la guerre declenchee par les Pays-Bas et de la politique :::01011ia1e poursui-vie par eux en Indollesie. I1 ne s'agit plus seu1ement de condamner la politique des Pays~Bas. Aux yeux des peuples asiatiques voisins. it est evi- dent que t'action des Pays-Bas, en entra1nant une rupture de la paix en Indonesie, constitue une menace it la paix dans l'Asie du Sud-Est et met en danger les 'bonnes relations entre l'Asie et le reste du monde. AUCUll de ees peuples n'acceptera la destruction de la Re[)ublique. Je desil'era.i.s souligner qlle la cO:1ception gu'ont ces petlp:c$ du' droit, de la just:ce et de la paix jouera :10 role determinant dans le niglement de la question indonesienne. A ce point de vue, la question du retrait ces trollpes neerlandaises se posera certainement a nouveau. Le retrait des trol1pes neerlandaises donnerait satisfaction a tous les peuples qui habitent cette partie du rnonde. Le general ROMULO (Philippines) (traduit de l'anglais): Pour les raisonsexposees dans le tele- t(~-L of (Jur views on this question since the re- neWal of armed hostilities in Indonesia, , The sttbstance of these views was first em- bodied in the cablegram already mentioned, whirh has since been issued as document S/1140. Per- mit me to G,tlOte a brief passage from that written s~atem.el1t which is pertincnt not only to what 1 am gomg to say, but also to the present status of the problem before the Security Council. This is whnt the Philippine delegation s::lirl at that time: H, , • The Council is faced only with an act by a,Member of thc United Nations which con- stitutes a breach of the peace and an act of aggression. It is C011£rOnted moreover not by a new act requiring prolonged exaruillation and debate but by the resumption of a military action which the Council ordered stopped more than one year ago. "Since the pattern oftlle action by the Netner- l::ll1rls. has remair:ed the same, it would be logical for tl1e Security Cotmeil to face the situatioll in a manner consistent also with its previous deci- sions. The fint dtttv of the Council in our ''Opinion is to order a cease-fire immediately. The Council should call upon the Netherlands authori- ties to desist forthwith from further hostile actiyities agai:t;lst the Republic of lndonesia, to withdraw tl,eir troops to the positions they occu- pied prior to the resumption of the military action, aoel to release at once the authorities of the Repllb1ic of Indonesia whom they han interned ... "The Philippine delegation further suggests that the Security Council consider other more positive measures that are to be applied t11 the event that the ccaseMfire order should be ignored, specifically measures that may be taken in accord- ance with Article 41 of the Charter, ,." The text of the Philippine statement was trans- mitted to Paris one whole day before any reso- lution was submitted to the Cotmcil. I submit that nothing has happened during the seventeen days that have elapsed since this state- ment was made that would diminish tts pertinence to the problem before the Council. A cease·fire order has been issued, and although the Nether- lands authurities now say that they h..we complied with it, <lt their pleasure and in their own good time-that is, having in the meantime achieved their, principal military objectives-I do. not think anybody really believes that hostilities have ceased or will soon cease in that unhappy coun- try UIllt~S there is effective withc1r,awal of Neth- -erlands troops to their positions before the truce was broken, Nor has there been full compliance with that part of the Security Council resolution of 24 December 1948 [5/1150], calling for the :immediate release of the President and .other offi- , Ces vues ant deja ete exposees en substance- rlans le telegramme qne je viens de mentionner et Qui a ete pllblie sons la cote S/t140, Qu'il me soit permis de cite!" un bref passage de cette de- claration ecrite qui, non settlement se rapportc' a ce que je vais dire, mais encore permet de miellX comprendre ou en est actuellement le probleme SOl\mis au Conseil de securitt. Voici ce que la delegation des Philippines ecrivait: " . Le Conseil est uniquement en presence d'un acte d'un Membre des Nntions Unies, co115- tituant une rupture de la paix et un acte d'agres- sion. Il ne s'agit d'ailleurs pas la d'tm acte nou- veau qui necessiterait un e:x::nncn pl"olonge, mtlis de la reprise d'une acbon militairc dont le Conseil de securite avait ordonne la· cessation il ya plus d'un an, "Les procedes employes par les Pays-Bas n'ayant pas change, ilscrait logique qtle le Conseil de securite prenne, devant cette sitllation, lltle attitude conforme it ses decisions anterieures. A notre avis, le premier devoir du Conseil est de donner immediatement I'ordre de cesser le feu; le Conseil devrait inviter les autorites neerlan- daises a s'abstenir sur·le-champ de tous nou- veaux aetes d'llOstiEtt envers la Repul>liquc cl'In- de,nesie, a retirer leurs troupes sur les positions qu'elles occupaient ,lVant la reprise de l'action militaire et a remettre immediatement en liberte ]es autorites de la Republique d'Indonesie qu'elles Ollt internees . , . , "La delegation des Philippines estime, en outre, que le Conseil de secUl'ite devnlit envisager d'aLltres mcsures pillS concretes qui seraient appliquees all cas ou l'ordre de cesser le feu nc· serait pas execute, notamment des meSl1reS a. prPflrlre rn application de l'Article 41 de la Cflarte , , ." Le texte de cette declaration des Philippines a ete tra115mis a Paris vingt-quatre helll·es avan t qn'aucllD projet ele resolution n'ait etf pn~sente. au Conseil. A mon avis, rien de ce qui s'est passe an cours des diksept jOllrs qui se sont ecoll1es depuis n'est venu diminuer la pertinence de cette declaration., Le Conseil a donne l'ordre de cesser le feu; les- antorites neerlandaises affirment maintenan t qu'elles ont obei a eet ordre, lorsqll'elles l'ont: jllge bon et au moment choisi par eUeS, c'est-a.- dire 10rsqu'eUes eurent atteint leurs principau:x: objectifs militaires. Personne, il me semble, ne peut croire qtle les hostilites ont cesse DU cess€,;- ront bient6t dans ce malheureux pays, a moins que les troupes necrlandaises ne se soient retin~es en fait sur leg positions qu'elles occupaient avant la rupture de la tn§se. D'anlre part, on ne pent pas dire non. plu's,l:J-ue les Pays-Bas se soient conformes a la chsposltton de la resolution du 24 dccembre 1948 [S/1150] {Iui le.s invitait a. rcm<;ttre immediatement en Finally, it .is not reasonable to expect that peacefulnegotiatiolls of any kind can be res.umed so long as the Security Council chooses to con- done the brazen attempt to seek a solution of the Indonesian question by force of arms. In going over the records of the Council's meetings in Paris on tile Indonesian question, one is struck with dismay, almost with awe, by the series of vacillations, contradictions and in'elevancies which marked Hlose deliberations as being among the most tragic in the history of the United NatiOlls; and it is largely beoouse of that indecision that the Council meets today, for the first time in the new year, to face a far more complicated and potentially more explosive problem thall that which confronted it seventeen days ago. The whole world has watched with unbelieving eyes the tangled issues, the muddled attitudes and the labyrinthine self-justifications that emerged in the. course of the meetings in Paris. It is a sad story which will, perhaps, never be fully told, but I believe that it is a story which must be told, even if only briefly and in bare outline, since elaboration cannot possibly add anything to the inherent 'tragedy of it. The story begins with the letter dated 14 De- cember 1948 [5/1120J from the head of the Indonesian delegation to the President of the See.ttrity Council, who was at that time the rep~ resentative of Belgium. The letter warned the Council of the danger of renewed conflict in these words: "The Committce"-th,tt is, the Committee of Good Offices-"has. . expressed its deliberate conviction that the present situation can only lead to 'intensification of the factors already making for further eConomic deterioration, gen- eral unrest and social upheaval. Widespread hos- tilities involving the conflict of organized armed groups on a large scale might be tile outcome.' "The situation is ther.etore one of extreme gravity ... Under the circumstances, the Gov- ernment of the Republic of Indonesia urges the Security Council to summon an -immediate meet- ing to consider the situation ..." Thaf'was on 14 December 1948. This warn- ing went unheeded and the meeting requested was never held. Enfin, on ne peut g1.1ere s'attendre a tme re~ prise des negociations pacifiques si le Conseil de securite continue d'accueillir avec indlllgence les tentatives 3udacieuses des Pays·Bas, qui n'hesitent pas a rechercher une solution de la question indonesienne par .Ia force des armes. Lorsqu'on examine les comptes rendns des seances consacrees .i la question indoncsienne; tenues a Paris par le Conseil de securite, on est stupefait, presque terrine, a la vue des innom~ brables hesitations, contradictions et inconse- quences qui ont fait que ces deliberations ont ete les plus tragiques que I'Organisation des Nations Unies ait encore connues, C'est en grande partie en raison de cette indecision que le Conseil, en se n§:unissant aujourd'hui pour la premiere fois en cette notlvelle annee, se trouve en presence d\m probleme devenu beaucoup plus complexe et infiniment plus grave qu'il ne l'etait i] y a dix-sept jours. C'est en hesitant de se rendre a l'evidellce que le monde entier a suivi les seances tenues aParis, avec les declarations confuses, les prises de posi- tion contradictoires et les justifications sybillines qui les ant marquees. Tout cela constitue une bien triste histoire, qui ne sera pcut-e:tre jamais rendue entierement publique, mais qui, je crotS, merite d'etre racontee, ne serait-ce que brieve~ ment et dans ses grandes lignes ; un n§:cit detaille ne saurait, en effet, rien ajol.lte.r au caractere tra- gique des faits. L'affail'e s'ouvre avec la reception, par le Pre.~ sident du Couseil de securite, qui etait alars le representant de h Delgique, d'une lettre en date du 14 decembl'e 1948 du chef de la delegation indonesienne [5/1120]. La lettre allnon~ait au Conseil que les hostilites l11ena~aient de reprendre en Indonesie; elle disait; "La Commission" - il s'agit de la Commission de bons offices - "se declare ... profondement convaincne que la situation actuelle ne permet d'envisager que "l'intensification des facteurs qui contribuent deja a I'aggravation de la situation economique, font naitre un malaise general et provoquent des bouleversements sociaux. Il pour- rait en resulter des hostilites generalisees oPPO- sant, sur des grandes etendues, des groupes arme$ organises." "La situation est donc extremement grave ... Dans ces circonstances, le Gouvernement de la Republique d'Indonesie prie instamment le Con- seil de securite de tenir immediatement une seance afin d'etudier la situation ..." eela se passait le 14 decembre 1948. Le Comeit ne tint aucnn compte de cet avertissement, et la seance demandee n'eut jamais lieu. This evidence came' in the form of the joint resolution introduced by Colombia, Syria and the United States [5/1142] which considered the resumption of hostilities to be a violation of the cease-fire resolution of 1 August 1947 [5/459], and called upon the parties to cease hostilities forthwith, and to withdraw their armed forces to the respective sides of the demilitarized zones established under the Rmi/i!fe truce agreement of 17 January 1948 [S/649, appelldix XI]. The Australian delegation, whose attitude on this question from the very beginning has been dear and straightforward and deserves the praise and gratitude of :all liberty-loving peoples, proposed an amendment [Sj1145] calling for the immedi~ ate release of the President and other political prisoners arrested since 18 December and in- structing the Committee of Good Offices to ensure that there should be no reprisals or puni- tive action taken against individuals. The action of the Netherlands was condemned by most of the members of the Security Council as "unjustified", "brutal" and "shocking"-I am quoting words from the verbatim records of the statements made by representatives in the Council. The mildest expression of reproof by members who had special reasons of their own for being mild was the lifted eyebrow and a statement of regret. It is not for me to question the manner in which any member of this body votes on IO.ny resolution, or any part of any reso- lution. I merely note the fact that Belgium, France, the Ukrainian Soviet. Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics abstained on the cease-nre paragraph which, nevertheless, was carried; that Argentina, Bel- gium, Canada, France, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics abstained on the paragrapll on troop withdrawal, which consequently was defeated; and tl1at Belgium, France, the Ukrain- ian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of -Soviet Socialist Republics abstained on the reso- lution as a whole., One must, however, be 110nest and say that it is not too difficult to understand the abstention on the part of France, which, nevertheless, de· denon~aient l'actlol1 militaire des Pays-Bas comme constituant une violation, tant de l'ordre de cesser le feu du ler aout 1947 que des dispo- sitions de l'Accord de treve du Rf!1wille. It is equally difficult to explain the abstention of Arger.tina and Canada on the troop with· drawal claus'e, but the hardest of all to explain is the: total abstention on each and every para- graph of the resolution on the part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which has posed before the whole world as the defender of the weak and oppressed nations, reaping a rich harvest of favourable propaganda in the process, and \vhieh withheld its vote from the troop with- drawal clause merely because it did not specify the Netherlands as the sole offender in the case, As if this vacillation and indecision were not enough, however, the USSR itself submitted a resolution on 24 December [5/1148J containing its own version of the troop withdrawal clause aimed exclusively at the Netherlands, and this time the United States and the United Kingelom, which had supported the troop withdrawal provision in the joint three-Power resolution, abstained, the result beiug the defeat of the para- graph, thus compounding twice over the unhappy blunder of the USSR. 11 est ega1ement difficile d'expliquer l'abstention de l'Argentine el clu Canada sttr le paragraphe concernant le rctrait des troupes. Mais plus in- comprehensible encore est l'attitl1de de l'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, qui s'est abstell\le sur chacun des paragraphes et sur I'en- semble du pwjet de resolution; l'URSS s'est pourtant toujours presentee au monde comme le defensellr des nations faibles et opprimees, ce qui a fort utilement servi sa propagande. L'Union sovietique a decide de s'abstenir sur le paragraphe relatif au retrait des troupes, pour la settle raison que les Pays-Bas n'y sont pas designes comme les seuls coupables en la matiere. Mais, comme si ces hesitations n'etaient pas 'suffisantes, l'URSS a presente elle-meme le 24 decembre 1948 un projet de resolution [5/1148J qui presentait une llouvelle version de la clause relative au rctrait des troupes et qui visait exclusivement les Pays- Bas; mais alors, les Etats-Unis et le Royaume- Uni, qui avaient appuye la disposition concernant le retrait des troupes dans le projet de resolution commlln des trois Puissances, ont decide de s'abs- tenir et, de cc fait, le paragraphe a ete rejete; tel a ete le double resu1tat de I'erreut regrettable commise pat l'URSS. I have expl'esseel regret for the abstention of the Soviet Union on the United States resolu- tion, but one had the right to expect that the United States, which had no devious propaganda game to play, would vote its own conviction, which the United States representative had expresserl in his statement to the Council [389th meeting], identifying the Netherlands as the breaker of the truce. As for the; United King- dom, they saiel it was a matter of second thoughts, but on this I shall say more later. J'ai dit combien it etait regrettable que l'Union sovietique se fut abstenue sur le projet de reso- lution des Etats-Unis; mais on etait en droit d'esperer que les Etats-Unis, qui ne poursuivent pas une propagande tortueuse, voteraient confor- mement aux convictions que le representant des Etats-Unis a exposees dans sa declaration au Conseil [38ge1tte seance]. lorsqu'il a attt"ibue aux Pays~Bas la responsabilite de la violation de la treve. Le Royaume-Uni a explique qu'il avait dti reconsiderer sa position; je reviendrai sur cette question. ]e m'excuse el'avoir retarde le Conseil en Itli rappe1n.m de queUe maniere il a traite la ques- tion indonesienne. Je voudrais assurer au Conseil que mon intention n\~tait nullement de mettre all pilori certains de ses membres en raison de la politique tortueuse qu'ils peuvent avoir suivie en cette affaire. NOllS savons tous que ce qui peut paraitre acertains ne constituer que des questions techniCJues secondaires, des points de terminologie ou meme de la simple vanite d'auteur, s'explique parfois en fait par des motifs 'puissants et deci- sifs qui sont souvent difficilcs a avouer ou a expliquer. Mon but a ete de retracer la voie compliquee que le Conseil a suivie pour arriver fmalement it ses decisions sur la question indone- sienne; je me suis efforce de montl'er que le Conscil n'a pas su saisir certaines occasions qui s'6ffraient et s'offrent encore a lui et qui lui au- raient permis d'agir avec justice et effiCilcite. Le Consei1 peut peut-etre encore revenir Sur ses pas, ne sernit-ce que dans une certaiJle 1l1esure, et examiner, avec tme ardeur nouvelle, 1es possi- bilites negligees jusqu'ici. I am sorry to have detained the COWlci1 with this account of its own recent performance on the 1ndoneSlian question. I wish to assure the members of this body that it has not been my ptll·pose to hold up to scorn any member State of the Council on account of the devious course it may have followed upon this problem. We are all aware that what may often seem to others merely minor matters of technica'lity, terminology or even pride of authorship, might really spring fr-om some strong and overriding motives that are not always convenient tD admit or easy to ·explain. My purpose, rather, has been to trace the intricate labyrinth bv which the Council finally arrived at its var"ious decisions on the Indonesian question, and to point to the yet re- maining opportunities for just and effective 'action that were missed. In this manner, it may be possible for the Council to retrace its course, if only for part of the way, and to explore, with -a fair amount of renewed zeal, the opportunities that have been neglected. In objecting to the wording of this paragraph in the original three-Power resolution [392nd meeting], the representative of the USSR made much of the point that it called upon both sides to withdraw their troo[Js, when it was plain from all reports that the orders should have been addressed only to the Netherlands armed forces. While this position may be correct in strict logic, it can malte no rc..'d difference in the actual observance of the order, On the face of it, the order would apply to both sides. If, as we firmly believe, only the Netherlands troops have advanced anywhere beyond the demarcation lines, while the Republican forces have retreated, then the order would apply only to the fOlmer, for certainly it would not be logical to require retreat- ing troops to retire to the side Ot the demi1i~ tarized zone where they have always been and now are-only farther inside it. In other words, even a general order for withdrawal, which does no more than to try to appear impartial, would apply only to those forces to which it can, in reason and common sense, apply. It is of interest to note that the Indonesian delegation itseH was willing to accept this para- graph as worded in the three~Power draft l'eso- lution, and no wonder, since their conscience was clear and they knew that such an order, like the law against murder, for instance, would spare tbe innocent and apply only to the guilty, This being the attitude of the Indonesmn delega- tion, it is difficult to see what good purpose and whose genuine interest would be served by a stubborn insistence on the logical construction of the order of withdr-.J.wal and on the precision of its terminology. Certainly, it would not be in the interest of the Indonesian people and their Government. The question of troop withdrawal is of cru- cial importance at this moment. As the Council is aware, mobile operations characteristic of guerrilla warfare have already started in various parts of the archipelago, Such operations are certain to be intensified, for one cannot call upon people who have been twice stabbed in the back to fold their arms and bare their breasts to the bayonets of a wily and ruthless Opponent who has a record of having broken one cease-fire order and of having ignored a second. Once again, the portents are clear. Only two days ago, on 5 January, Lieutenant-General Spoor, Commander-in-Chief of the Netherlands armed forces, announced-and he was quoted 1'- Lorsqu'il s'est eleve contre les termes em- ployes dans le projet de resolution original des trois Puissances [392eme seance], le represen- tant de l'URSS a beaucoup insiste sur le fait que ce projet de resolution invite l'une et l'autre partie a retirer leurs troupes; alors qu'il ressort clairement de tous les rapports que les ordres devraient s'adresser seulement aux forces armees des Pays-Bas. Cette position est peut-etre cor- recte du point de vue de la stricte logique; rnais elle ne change rien au fond meme de la question. Au point de vue formel, cet ordre s'applique aux del1x parties. Mais si, comme nouS en sommes persuades, seules les troupes des Pays-Bas ont d6passe la ligne de demarcation, tandis que les forces de la Republique ont battu en retraite, alors, l'ordre ne s'appliquera en fait qu'aux seules troupes des Pays-Bas; it ne serait pas logique, en effet, de demander a des troupes qui reculent de se retirer en de<;a d'une zone demilitarisee dans laque11e e11es ne sont jamais entrees et dont eUes sont actuellement tres eloignees. En d'atttres ter- mes, meme un ordre de retrait de caractere g(be- ral, qui n'aurait ee caractere que par souci d'impartialite, ne s'appliquerait qu'aux forces militaires al1xquelles il peut raisonnablcment s'appliquer. 11 est interess.'\nt de remarquer que la dkle- g<:ltion de I'lndonesie elle-meme etait prete a accepter le projet de resolution des trois Pnis~ sances dans cette redaction. Cela n'<:l rien d'eton- nant, puisque les Indonesiens avaient la cons~ cience neUe et savaient bien qu'un tel ordre, tout c~)l1llne ,par exemple, bIoi qui reprime l'assas- smat, epargne les mnocents et ne s'applique qu'aux coupables. Devant cette attitude de la delegation de l'Indonesie, i1 est difficile de com- prendre pourquoi, dans que! interet il hut s'obs- tiner ademander que l'ordre de retrait soit redige d'une rnaniere plus logique et dans des termes plus precis, Ce ne serait certes pas dans l'interet du peuple indonesien et de son Gouvernement. La question du retrait des troupes est extre- mement importante a l'hettreactuelle. Comme le Conseil le sait, des operations de mouvement c;;:~ctkristique~ d'nne ca~1pagne de guerilla ont deja commence dans plusleurs parties de l'archi- pel, Ces operations sont appelees a s'intensifiero 011 ne peut, en ciIet, demander a des gens qui' par deux fois, ont ete poignardes dans le dos' de se croiser les bras et de s'offrir sans resistanc~ aux :ba:I~nnet!~~ ~'u~ adversaire ruse et impla- cable qUt a deja vlOle un premier ordre de cesser le feu et n'a tenu aUCun compte du second. Dne fois de plus, on voit c1airement comment les kvenements von~ se ?erouler. Il y a deux jours seulement, le 5 Janvler, le lieutenant-general Spoor, conunandant en chef des forces armees "1 charge you and the troops under your com- mand to carry out this task, within its limits, strictly and with great diligence." If the NetherIands troops will show even half the diligence that was shown by thcir observers in reporting the so-called infiltratior.s and alleged violations of the trnce by RepubI:can elements prior to 18 December, the Council knows what to expect from th~ orders that have been issued by Lieutenant-General Spoor to his officers and men. There will be no lack d incidents which the Netherlands authorities will seize upon to justify the cor.tinuance of their military operations. The plain fact of the matter is tl:at the second cease-fire resolution cannot be effectively imple- mented as it stands. Thel'e are no means of ensur- ing the observance of the cease-fire unless and until there is a withdrawal of troops to the posi- tions they occtlpied hdorf' the resumption of military operations. I presume that the reconsideration of the ques- tion of troop withdrawal is not precluded by tite decisions that the Counei: has already taken, In the resolution adopted by the Cour:dl on 28 De- cember [5/1165], the cOl:su1ar representatives in Batavia were requested tD send a report on the situation in Indonesia, " ... covering in such report the observance of the rease-I1re orders and the conditions prevailing in areas under military occupation or from which armed forces now in occupation may be withdrawn." I repeat:" . or hem which armed forces now ir: occuplltion may be withdrawn." Tel est l'onlre qll'a donne le Canseil le 28 cle~ ccnlbre dernier. La dernien" di_\po~ition: ".. au qui aL1ront pu etre evacuees par les force3 armees. qui les occupent actuellement" semble indiquer que le COBseil s'est reserve la possibilite d'exa- miner une fois de plUS ce point fondamental, qui n'"- ete rejete que par wite d'un desaccord portant eS5entiellement slIr une question que ma. dele- gation considere comme etant cl'importance tout a fait secondaire. ]e l'ei deja flit, et je le repete encore ~ i1 semit prati<]uement impossible, dans les circonstances actuelles, d'executer loyalelllel1t et d'une maniere continue l'orclre de cesser le fec, si celui-ci n'etait pas accompagne d'un ordre pl'evoyant le retrait des trottpes. Si 1es evenements confil'ment cette assertion, i1 deviendra necessaire de prendre de nc,uvcltes mesul't':s. C'est ce qu'i] declare en termes tres c1airs le representant des Etats-Unis 10rs- qu'il a clit all Conseil, des le 22 lIout 1947 [193eme s6:mce] : "rai a peine besoi:J de soulignel" le caractere de gravite que mon Gouvernelllent attac~erait au defaut d'observance pd.r 1es parties de 1'8rdre dtt cesser le feu donne par le Conseil. Naturelle- That was the Council's order on 28 December. The last clause--"... or from whidl aImed. forces now in occupation may be withdrawn"- seems to have kept the door open for the recon- sideration of a vital point which was rejected only because of what my delegation considers to be a disagreement on an issue of very minor importance, I have aln:ady :;aid, and I l'"epeat it once 1~10l'"e, that faithful and contim:ed compLance with the cease-fire order would be virtually impossible III the present cin::umstances unless it is accom~ panied by an order for troop withdrawaL. In the event of this proving to be trtte, fmther action wotlld be l1ecessary. This fact was dearly stated by the representative of the United States as early <l.S 22 August 1947 [193.,d meeting], when he told tht" rOllnci!: "It is hardly necessary for me to empbsize the seriousness with which my Government would ~'iew a failure by the parties to comply with the Council's cease-fire order. Of course A supposer meme que les troupes neerlandaises ne fassent preuve que de deux fois moins de diligence que les observateurs neerlandais ne l'ont fait lorsqu'il s'est agi de signaler les pre- teudues inliltrations et violations de la treve par- Ies elements republicains avant le 18 decembre,. le Conseil sait tres bie.1 ee que ~'on peut attendre· des ordres qui ont ete donnes par le lieutenant- ger.eral Spoor. Les incidents ne manqtleTOllt pas. (jue les autontes nee~landajses sauront utiliser- pour justifier la poursuite de leurs operations, miJitaires. ' Il est evident que la 1euxieme resohttion onion~ nant de cesser le feu ne peut pas etre efficacement mise en application sous sa forme actuelle. 11 sera im:JOssible J'assurer l'execution de ['ordre de Cesser le feu, taut que les troupes ne se seront pas retirees sur les positions qu'elles occupaient avant la reprise des o~l"ations militaires. .Te suppose qlle 1es decisions dejA prises par le Conseil n'empechent pas celui-ci d'exa:niner a nO:lVeau la question du retrait des troupes. La re.,olution adoptee par le Conseil le 28 decembre [5,11165J demande aux represe:ltants consulaires a 3atavia, d'envoyer un rapport SDr la situation en Il1donesic.: If••• qui e..xpose la maniere dont les ot'dres de cesser le feu sont observes et les Conditions qui existent dans les zones mBitai- rement oCCtlpees ou qui attront ptt etre evacuees par les forces armees qui les occupent actucl- lement". • .Te repete: "ou qui amant pu etre evacuees par les forces armees qui les occupent acttlel~ lernent". This significant statement was repeated with approval by Mr. JCSSllP in his statement to the Security Council on 22 December 1948 [389/11 mutingJ. This statement, 1 say, is significant, not only bec.<luse it cites Article 40, but because it $eaks of further action that must be con- sidered in the event of failure to comply, where.:lS Article 40 itself merely says in a general way that "The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such (lTOvi- sional measures". The interpolation by the United St'ltes repl"e~ sentative of the words "further action" in the context of Article 40 is especiaHy significant be- cattse it obviously and logknlly points to the measures mentioned in the next Article, narnciy, " measures 110t involving the usc of armed force. , ." which are to be employed to give effect to the decisions of the Secudty Council. An instance on such "further action" bas been provided by the United States itself, and the world, I am sure, welcomed it with thanks and praise, It was (lrovided by the United State~ unilaterally, it is true, btd nevertheless it is of the type contemplated in the statement Q fits representatives here. It is the withholding of M.nrshall Plan aid to the Netherlands in the lndies. "Further action" of a collective character, for the moment outside of the Security Council but within the framework of the United Nations, is soon to be considered in the forthcoming con- ference of Eastern States in New Delhi. I close my remarks with an earnest a(lpeal to the members of the Security Cottncil not to :\lIow themselves to be deflected from the llrgent task whicJl remains to be done. The bewildering changes that have marked the attitudes of certain Powers in the Council have ;been ascribed to "second thoughts". The wisdom of second thoughts is ra~ely to be doubted, but if the changes I havt noted, which have gravely tujured the interests of the Indonesian people and the prestige of the United Nations, were indeed the result of second thoughts, then I respectfully suggest that a third attempt to straightell out our thinking should be made, and made now. No matter what narrow self-interest may or~ dain, no matter what short-tenn eX(lediencies may dictate, and no matter what propaganda may say, the only way to save Asia for democracy is to give it fre~dom and to accept its many nations and numerous peoples-mare than one-half of the human race-as co~eql1ai partners in the making of a freer and a better world. Celte declaration s:gnificative a ete reprise t:t approuvee par M. JesSltp dal1s la declaration qu'il a f'lite au Conscil de sceurite le 22 dt'iccmhrt' 1948 [389cmc seance]. Cette declaration, dis+~·, cst significatjyc, non seulement parce qu'el1e mentionne I'Article 40, mais sttrtO\1t parce qu'il y est parle d'atltrcs mesures qu'il faudrait em'i- sager si l'ordrc de cesser le feu n'etait pa.'> observe, a10r5 que l'Alticle 40 se borne a indiq\ler d'l1ne manicre Jienerale que "en cas de non-execution de ccs mesures provisoires, le Conseil de securite tient dument compte de ceUe defaillance". L'emploi par le representant des Etats~Unts des mots "al1tres TIl~sl1res" a propos de l'Arti· de 40 revet utle signification pnrticuliere, car ccs mots se rHerent, evidemment et log-iquement, dUX lllCStlfeS mentionttecs ,lans l'Article suivant. ;\ snvoir "les mcsurcs n'impliqu<lnt pas I'emploi de ]rJ force al'lllce" qui doivcnt etre prises pout" clonner diet aux decisions du Conseil de securite. Les Etats-Unis eux-memes ant donne l'exem- (lIe de ce que peuvent etre ces "atltres mesures>l, et le monde, j'en suis certain, a acclleilli leut" geste avec reconnaissance et louange. Ccs mesnres, il est vrai, ont ete prises par les Et<lts- Unis unilah::ralement, mais il n'en reste pas moins qu'eHes ont 6tc dans la ligne de cc qui a e.tc envi- sage par les representants de Cl". pays ici. 11 s'agit de la suspension de l'aide au titre <iu plan Marshall ::l.t1X Pays-Bas, dans les Inues neerlandaises. L" conference des Etats orielltallx 'ltli <Joit se tenir proehainement it. la Nouvelle-Dclhi etudiera SOllS (lell, pOll!" le moment en dehors du Conseil de sccuritc, mais dans le cadre de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, "d'alttl'es lUcsures" d'un caractere collectif. Je tct'lninel'<ii mOll inten'ention ell mlrcssant un pressant appel aux lllcmbrcs rlu Conseil dl" SCCllrite rom CJtl'ils ne se bissent pa:<; 116tourner de In tache urgente qu'il reste a accompli!"". Lt' ... modifications cleconccrtantes qui ont marque j'attitude de certaincs Ptlissance..~ au sein clu Cnnseil ont ete attribttees a une plus ample rc-- flcxion sm la qllefitinn. Il est g-eneralement sage de proceder :i. de plus amples reflexiolll'i, mOli!", si les modifications que j'ai fait remarqncr et qui ant parte gravemcnt atteinte aux interets des Indonesicns et au prestige de l'Organisation de:; Nations Unies sont le result-at de plus amples re£lcxions, je me permets de demander qu'on fas.~e sans delai un Iloltvel et troisieme effort ponr rectifier notre mani<):re cl'envisager la question. Quoi que puissent consc.i1ler des interets cg-oistes, quelles que soient les solutions dictec~ par des raisons d'opportunisme a cour.t terme et les affirmations de la prapag-ande, it n'y a qu'un moyen d'assurer le triamphe de In. democratie en Asic, et c'est de lui donnel· la liberte et d'aeceptcr de donner a ses nombreuses nations et a ses peuples multiples, qui representent plus de. la moitie de la race humaine, le role de parti- cipants, Sllr un pied d'egalite, dans la callstruction d'un monde plus libre et meilltur. "Plus elle est baignee dans le sang, dans les larmes et dans l'amertume, plus tine colonie, si eUe possecle quelque vitalite, apprend a com- battre et a se perfectionner dans la lutte, tandis que la metropole, dont l'existence aux colonies depend de la paix et de la soumission de ses sujets, s'affaiblit constamment. Al1ssi, meme si elle entreprend d'heroiques efforts, la metro· pole finit-elle par succomber, car elle est nume- riquement plus faible et n'a qu'une existence fictive. Elle est comme le riche sybarite habitu~ a etre servi par llne foule de serviteurs qui pei. nent et travaillent pour hti, mais qui, le jour ou ses esc1aves refusent de lui oMir doit mourir car il ne vit pas par ses propres efforts"." "In proportion liS it is bathed in 'b10od and drenched in tearS and gall, the colony, if it has arty ....itality, learns how to struggle and perfect itself in fighting, while the mother country, whose colonial life depends upon peace and the submission of the subjects, is constantly weak~ ened, and, even though she were to make heroic efforts, as her number is less and she has only a £ictitious existence, she finally perishes. She is like the rich voluptt:ary accustomed to be waited upon by a crowd of servants toiling and planting for him, and who, on the day his slaves refuse him obedience, as he does not live by his own efforts, must die."! Rizal etudiaif avec passion I'histoire et etait ban prophete. Riza1 was a keen student of history and a good prophet. If the Security Council needs a fresher re- minder than this, I shalt quote the eloquent plea a.ddressed to the Netherlands Government on 17 December 1948 by the United States representa- tive on the Committee of Good Offices, Mr. Cochran [5/1129], who is a credit to his great country. He said: Si le Conseil de securite veut une reference a un dOcument plus recent, je dterai le passage suivant de l'eloquent appel adresse au GOllver- nement des Pays-Bas le 17 decembre 1948 [5/1129] par M. Cochran, representant des Etats-Unis a la Commission de bons offices, appel qui fait honneur a son grand pays; "The iSSLles at stake are too tremendous for all concerned, the human values too incalculable, to permit any of us to'relax our efforts at this crucinl time." "Les problemes en jeu sont trop importants pour taus 1es intcresses, la vie humaine a trop de' prix pour qu'al1cl.ln de nous puisse relacher ses efforts a cette heure critique." Cela a ete affirme au nom de la liberte, la veille meme du jour OU les Pays-Bas ont attaque par la force des armes la Republique d'Indonesie. M. Cochran, qui est Americain, avait Sl.lrtOl.lt l'Indonesie en vue. Quant a moi, c'est dans le cadre de l'Asie tout entiere et, par dela elk, de l'univers tout enticr, que je demande instamment au COllseil de securite de penser aujourd'hui nux prob1emes en jeu et aux vies humaines qui en dependent. Je remerde le President dll Conseil de secn- rite de m'avoir penuis de faire cette intervention. On behalf of freedom, this was said on the very eve of the Netherlands military action against the Republic of Indonesia. Mr. Cochran, an American, was thinking mainly of Indonesia. I beg the Sect.:rity Council to think today of the issues at stake and of the human values involved in this question in terms of the whole of Asia and, beyond that, of the whole world. I thank the President of the Security Council f or the privilege of being permitted to make this intervention. Mt". MAKIN (Australia); I desire to empha- size in the strongest possible terms that I feel that this Security Council sho..tld not adjourn vvithout taking at least the immediate steps W"hich the situation in Indonesia urgently re· quires. Let me summarize, very briefly, what that situation is as it appears to the Australian Gov- ernment. M. MAKIN (AustraIie) (tradllit de l'anglais) ; Je desire declarer, avec la plus grande energie qUe, a mon avis, le Conseil de securite ne devrait pas lever cette seance sans avoir pris au moins les mesures immediates que rec1ame de toute urgence la situation en Indonesie. Qu'il me sait permis de resumer brievement comment la situa- tion se presente aux yeux du Gou....ernement atlstralien. Two weeks ago, On 24 December [3921td 1-nel1ting], the Security Council by a vote of seven to none, with four abstentions, called npon the Government of the Netherlands and the Govem- ~ent of the Republic of Indonesia to cease has- hlities forthwith [S/1150J. It also called upon the parties to release the President and other political Ie.aders arrested since 18 December. 11 Y a deux semaines, le 24 decembre [392eme seat/ce], le Consei1 de securite, a la suite d'une decision prise par sept voix contre zero, avec quatre abstentions, a invite le GOtlvernement des Pays-Bas et le Gouvernement de la Repllbliqlle d'Indonesie a cesser immediatement les hostilites [5/1150J. II a egalement invite les parties a mettre en liberte le President et 1es autres per- • Rical's L;f~ and Millor Writings, The Philippines Eduea-tlon . COmp;tllY, .Manila, 1927. • Tradult de IRi:al'.r Life and Minor Writing, ptlblie par The PhilippineB Education Company, Man;lle, 1927. On 28 December [39Sth meeting], the Security Coullcil, noting that the Netherlands. Government had not so far released the PreSident of the Republic of Indonesia and all other political leaders, passed a further resolution [S/1164J calling 1.1pon the Netherlands to release the political prisoners forthwith and to report to the Security Council within twenty-four hours. It has been difficult to gel first-hand information on some aspects of the situation in Java. The mili- tary observers of the Committee of Good Offices were, accordillg' to its report set forth in document S/1166 "concentrated in Batavia". Notwithstanding the statements of the representa- tive of the Nether1<'mds in the Security Council on 27 December [393rd meeting] and again to~ day, it appears from the report of the Commit~ tee of Good Offices dated 7 January [S/1189J that no concrete progress has been made towards the return to the field of the military observers. Not one military observer is as yet in process of returning to the field. A decision was to llave been made 'by the Commander-in-Chief, but nothing has been received from him, This is stated in the letter of 6 January from the Com- mittee of Good Offices addressed to the Nether R lands delegation, as set forth in the report of the Committee of Good Offices [S/1189J which 11as been circulated today to the members of the Council, Alleged confusion about the existence of two committees and their respective functions has been used to justify obstruction of the work of the military observers. The Committee does not consider that there is confusion of a type which should delay it in the performance of its urgent duty to report. I quote again from the same letter reproduced in the report of the Committee of Good Offices: "Not one military observer is yet in process of returning to the field, from which, as set forth in our letter of 23 December, the military ob- servers were excluded by Netherlands Army offi- cials soon after hostilities were begun. The Com- mittee must emphasize that the passing of time and the progress of military action may well destroy the value to the Committee and to the Security Council of the direct observations of the military observers,by whom alone, in many cases, the Committee can procl11'e the first-hand infor- mation needed for the reports caned for by the resolution of tJle Security Council of 24 De- cember." However, the essential facts are dear from the Netherlands statements and Press reports. The Nether'lands forces did. not cease hostilitie~, and Le 28 decel11bre [3950me seance] le Conseil de securite, observant que le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas n'avait pas encore remis en liberte le President de la Republique d'Indonesie et les autres personnalites politiques, a adopte une oou- velle resolution [S/1164J invitant les Pays~Bas a mettre en liberte sans deJai les prisonniers po1iti- ques et a hire rapport au Conseil de sec:urite dans les vingt-quatre heures. 11 a ete difficile d'obtenir des renseignements de premiere main sur certains aspects de la situation i Java. Les observatenrs militaires de la Commission de bons offices se trouvaient, d'apres le rapport de celle-ci qui fnit l'objet du document S/1166, "rassemblesa Ba- tavia". Malgre les declarations que le represen- tant des Pays-Bas au Consei! de securite a faites le 27 decembre [393eme seGnce] et aujour- d'hui encore, il ressort d'J rapport de laCom- mission de bons offices en date du 7 janvier [S/1189] que rien n'a ete fait pour que les observateurs militaires puissent retourner sur le theatre des operations. Aucun ohservateur militaire n'est en ce moment en route vers le theatre des operations. Le Com- mandant en chef devait prendre une decision, maLs on n'a re~u allcune communication de sa part. Cela est indique dans la lettre du 6 janvier adressee par la Commission de bons offices EL la delegation neerlandaise et qui figure dans le r<lpport de la Commission [S/1189] distrilJl1e aujourd'hui auxmembres du Conseil. Pour justifier les entraves que I'on met a l'ac- tivite des observatettrs militaires, on parle de la confusion qui reslllterait, pretend-on, de l'exis- tence de deux commissions et du c11evauchement ell'. lours fonctions. De I'avis de la Commission, il n'existe a!lCUne confusion qui soit de nature it retarder I'execution de la tache Ul'gente qui lui incombe, a savoir, faire rapport au Conseil. Je citcrai encore 110 passage de la meme lettre qui figure dans le rapport de la Commission de bons offices: "Aucun observateur militaire n'est en ce mo- ment en route vers le champ des operations du- quel, comme le precise notre lettre du 23 de- cembre, les alltorites militaires des Pays-Bas ant ecarte tOllS les observateurs militaires peu apres le debut des hostilites. L'1 Commission doit insister sur le fait que le temps et le deve]oppement des operations militaires sont susceptib1es de detrlllre pour la Commission et pour le Conseil de secu~ rite, la valeur des observations directes des obser- vateurs militaires; dans de nombreux cas, ce n'est que par l'intermediaire des observatetlrs militaires que la Commission peut se procurer les renseignements de premiere main qui sont necessaires pour l'elaboration des rapports de- mandes par la resolution du Conseil de securite du 24 dec:embre." Cependant, les faits essentiels ressortent clai~ rement des declarations et des communiques de presse emanant des Pays-Bas. Les forces neer. La declaration de M. van Roijen selcn laquelle ils jauissent d'une liberte complete dans les limites de I'ile de Ba.aka, bien que sa:isfaisante sn le plan hllmanit:.ire, ne change rien au fait que, du point de vue politique, ils sont toujours prisonniers. The statement of Mr. van Roijen that they have complete liberty on the island of Banka, while gl'atifying on humanitarian grounds, does not affect the fact that they are still, politically, prisoners. La seule rnesure prise par le Gouvernemenl des Pays-Bas, en dehors du maintien des mesures de police el des distributions de riz ct d'etoffes, a §te d'envayer le Premier Mir.istre des Pays-Bas a Batavia, proba'blement a ['occasion de l'etablis- sement d'un pretendu Gouvernement ?TOvisoirc choisi p"r les Hollandais et pour faire des pm- messes d'ordre general au Conseil de securite et an rnonde, en affirmant que tout ira bien pout les Indonesiens. Ce n'est pas la prer.1iere fois que l'on donne de telles assurances. a The only action taken by the Netherlands r Government apart from continuing police meas- a tlres and handing out supplies of rice and cloth e has been to send the Netherlands Prime Minister ~ to Batavia, presumably in connexion with the establishment of a nominated interim Govern~ ment, and to make general pro:nises to this Council and to the world t11at at will be well for tIle Indonesian people. This is not the first time such assurances have been made. Da.ns ceUe situatio:J., qlie doit faire le Conscil? 11 ne pent evidemment pas jailer i l'autruche et se cacher la tete dans les sables de Lake St1C~ cess, en oubliant le defi parte a San 2.utorite et la menace continuelle C]ui s'exerce contre la paix. 11 ne petlt evidemment pas laisser la slmplement s'enseve1ir, dans la poussiere des arC:lives, des decisions qu'il a prises et qlle taus les Membres de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, y camprie: les Pays~Bas, se sont engages a accepter et aexe- cuter aux termcs de J'Artide 25. T 'l."rr:ploi de h force armee ne saurait eire, ni excuse, ni passe sous silence. Les assurances, a eUes senles, ne sllffisent pas. Ce qu'il faut avant tout, ce. sont des mesures concretes, des preuves de bonne fai et l'etahlissemeilt de conditions necessaires a de libres negociations. VVhat is the Council to do in this situation? Clearly, it cannot play the ostrich and bury its head in the sanes of Lake Success, oblivious to defiance of its authority and the continuing t~reat to the peace. Clearly, it cannot simply leave its decisior.s, which all Members of tbe United Na- tions, including the Netherlands, have pledged themselves to accept and carry out under A~ticle 25, to gather dust in the archives. The use of farce cannot be condonec., nor can it be passed uy in silence. Assurances alone are insufficient. Concrete action, evidence of good faith, and the creatior of conditions of free negotiation are essential. " " e ,i " ,- ,- , e- "le e, l- e- :e -; QueHe e:ait la base de ces decisions, prises il y a queIques jours seulement a Paris? A mon avis, e1les ont ete adoptees patce que le Conseil Hait convaincu que :'emploi de. la force est con- traire a la Charte et qu'un juste teglement de la question indonesienne ne pent et,e impose par la voie militaire. Aucun Gotlvernement qui se respecte ne negociera SOllS la menace, et encore moins sous la contrainte. Le Gouvernement aU!1" tralien est convaincu que les aspirations tegitimes da peuple :l1donesien, qu'il etait deja difficile :de satisfaire lorsque les forces neerlandai5es entolt What;,vas the basis of those deci"ions, taken only a few days ago in Paris? I suggest that they r.esulted from the conviction of the Council that the use of force was contrary to the Charter and that a iust settlement in· Indonesia. could not be imposed by military action. No self~ respecting Government will negotiate under duress, still less- under coercion. The Australian i- Government is- convinced that satidacLion of the le legitimate .aspirations of tlJe Indanesian people, r- difficlllt while Netherlands forces s~trounded the _Republic and enforced an economic blockade, is ,-" In view of the apparent confusion regarding the respective roles of the Committee of Good Offices and the Consular Commission, the func- tions of the two bodies should be clarified, as suggested by the Committee amI the Commission in their reports [5/1189 and ..'ij1190] today. Perhaps tl1e best procedure might be to transfer the fu nctions {){ the consular body to the COIlI- mittee, whose membership might at the same time be enlarged, The Australian Government envisages two fl1rtber steps which will be necessary to facilitate a final settlement: first, supervision of plebiscites and elections by the Committee of Good Offices; secondly, decisions by the Committee of Good Offices concerning the time-table of elections and the achievement of ultimate sovereignty by the United States of Indonesia. These are not new proposals. They nrc lJrili~ dples which were freely nccepted and agreed to by tlle Netherlands in the RClIvillc Agreement, concluded under the allspices of the Council's Committee of Good Offices. Tbose principles were hailed by Council members at the time as a workable basis for a final settlement. They have been accepted by the Republic, which has the allegiance of tens of millions of the Indo~ nesian people. It is the duty of the Council to see that they are not discarded ill favonr Ot dubious unilateral assurances after military in- tervention contrary to the principles of the Char- ter, The action of the Netherlands cannot be {:ondoned. To ignore is to condone; to delay is to condone. The Council should not adjourn but should immediately consider measures it can take wlthin its authority to bring peace to Indonesia and assurance to South East Asia. Sir Benegal Rama RAv (India): I do not in- tend at titis stage to make any lengthy state-' men!. In fact, after the very able presentation of the case. by the repre~e?tative of the Republic of I.ndoncsla and the bnlllant analysis of the sitl1a~ ban and the application of devastating logic by the representative of the Philippines, any lengthy statement on the merits of the case is probably unnecessary. ' I should like, before I speak further on this subject, to explain the significance of some of the developments in Asia that have attt'acted con- sidera!)le attention in Europe as well as in ~merJca. As the ~embeys.of thf Security Coun- cd know, the Pnme MInister of India, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehn1, has issued invitations to fif_ commission.~ c!]es~llH~mcs dans lelirs rapports dis~ tribues ,llljour<!'hlli [5/1189 ct 1190]. Pellt-etre la meilJcure ~ollltioll serait-cUe de transferer It'S fonclions de la COlllmission consulaire a la Com- mission de bons offices en elargis~ant en meme temps la composition de cette <!erniere, Le GouVernCOlent australien envisage deux autres mesurcs qui seront necessaires si on vetlt arrivcr a un accord final: controle des pU:biscitc5 et des iilections par la Commission ele bans Offil't~S ; fixation par 1<1 COlUmission de ballS officc~ de elates [Jour les eJections et pour I'obtentioll l>ar lc~s Etats·Unis d'Inc1onesie de leur pleille WIJ~ verainete. Ce ne sont pas lil des propositions llou\'clk,:,. Ce sont Ies pdllcipes qui ant cte lihrcmellt accl'p- tes et J'l'C'onDlls par les P<lys-Jhs clan,; l'Ac:wrd till RCIlVil/L', conc1u SOilS Ics auspices (le 1<1 (()J1I· mission de bOilS ofiices du Conscil (le ~ccl1rih;. Cc sont les principcs de l'adoptioIl c1c5CJucls It.:,:;. ll1el11hres rill Conscil se sont f~licit~s, car ils. l'st:~ maient qll'il.~ ponvaient servir de b;l.~e :\ till rCg'k'- ment rlcfinitif. Ce sont les principes qui ont ctc areeptes par la Republique, qui pos~cde b COllli<lIll:(' de dizaines de millions d'lndollesiclIS. C'cst le tlt·- voir du Conseil de veiller i cc que ecs principes Ill" soient pas, ala foveLtr d'une intervention lllilitail'c contraire aux principcs de la Cl1artc, remplaces par des promesses puremcnt unilatcrnles et de valeur douteuse. L'action des Pays-Das ne pent eIre cxcusee. Or, on I'excuserait si on l'ig-norait; on l'excusernit aussi si I'on tardait a prendre line decision, Loin de lever la seance, le Conseil de- vrnit, sans autre delai, commencer a etudier lcs mesures qu'i] est en son pouvoir de prendre pour ramener la paix en Indonesie et la confiance dans l'Asie du SlId·Est. Sir Benegal Rama R ...u (Inde) (lradlliJ de I'ang/ais): Je n'ai pas l'intention, a ce point de la discussion, de bire une longlle declaration. En fait, apre~ l'excellent expose de la question fait p>lr lc representant de la Republiq\,\c d'lndonesie et I;;. brillante analyse ele la situation qu'a faite, avec une implacable logique, le representant lies Philippines, tonte declaration detnitlee sur les faits de la cause est probablement superflue, J'nimerais, avant de pOl1rsuivre, preciser le sens de certains evenements 'lui se deroulent en Asie et qu'Ol1 suit avec beaucoup d'attention, rn Europe comme ell Amerique. COll101e les mell1- brc.s du Conseil de securite le savent, le Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Premier Ministre de I'lude a envoye des invitations A quin:ze pays, y compri~ "We have seen the most naked and unabashed aggression and the use of armed might to sup· press a people and a Government. We see attempts to revive the dying imperialism and colonialism. That this imperialism will die I have no doubt, but there is danger now that in the process of fading away, it might bring catas- trophe on a large scale in its train." Pandit Nehru then stated that it was of vital importance that the countries concerned should all confer together and that all freedom~loving countries should co-operate in protecting free- dom from this onslaught. If this was not done now, he saId, the consequences won[d be dis- astrous for the world. This co-operation, he explained, should be within the framework of the United Nations. It is this last statement that I wish to emphasize. Fears have; be;cn expressed in some quarters that this conference might be; intended to sidetrack or by-pass the United Nations. There is no such intention. India has always supported the United Nations very strongly, and tt is India's desire to co-operate fully with the Security Council in any effective measures it may take with the object of solving this difficult problem on a satisfactory basis. As I have stated, I do not wish to spend very mltch time in explaining the position in regard to the resoiution passed some time ago by the Security Council, because that work has been done by the previous speakers, by the representa. tives of Australia and of the Philippines and the representative of the Republic of Indonesia. There is no doubt that that resolution has not been carried out by the Netherlands Govern- ment. Nor is it possible, if I may say so, to carry out the cease-fire order withoat removal of the troops to their original lines. What has happened in Indonesia? The Netherlands Gov- ernment has attacked the cities and the Indo- nesian forces have offered no resistance, but have withdrawn from the cities and organized them- selves into small guerrilla bands. I notice from the statement just made by the representative of the Netherlands that his Government says that it will fulfil the cease-fire order but will reserve the liberty to carry out "mopping-up" operations against tbe guerrilla bands. What does that mean in practice? Can anybody say that the Nether- lands Government has carried out this resolution so far as the cease-fire order is concerned? These "mopping-up" operations are directed against the Indonesian forces, but organized on a differ- ent basis, owing to pressure of circumstances. That is the position in regard to the cease-fire order. 11 est evident que cette resolution n'a pas ete executee par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas. D'autre part, je n'irai pas trop loin en disant qu'il est impossible d'appliquer l'ordre de; cesser le feu tant que les troupes n'auront pas ete. ramenees a leurs positions de depart. Qu'est~il arrive en Indonesie? Le Gouvernement des Pays- Bas a attaque les villes; sans offrir de resistance, les forces indonesiennes se sor.t retirees de ces villes et se sont organisees en petites troupes de guerillas. Je remarque que, par I'organe de son representant, le Gouvemement des Pays-Bas nous a dec1art~ qu'il se confonnera a I'ordre de cesser le feu, mais se reservera la faculte de pro· ceder a des "operations de netto)'age" contre les trolipe;s de guerillas. Que cela signifie-t-il en pratique? Peut-on dire que le Geuvernement des Pays-Bas applique cette resohItion prescrivant de cesser le feu? Ces "operations de nettoyage" sont dirigees contre les forces jndonesiennes, mais, en raison de la pression des evenements, e1les revetent une forme differente. Telie est la s,ituation en ee qui concerne l'ordre de cesser le feu. "Nous avons ete temoins de l'agression la plus 'brutale et la plus cynique et de I'emploi de la force armee pour bire disparaitre un pcuple et :m Gouvernement. Nous assistons a une tenta- tive de faire renaitre I'imperialisme et [e colo- nialisme mourants. Je n'ai aucun cloute que eet imperialisme finira par disparaitre, mais, dans son processus de desintegration, i1 risque aI'heure actuelle de provoquer une vaste catastrophe." Le Pandit Nehru a declare ensuite qu'il etait d'une importance primordiale pour les pays inte- resses de se consulter et pour tous les pays epris de liberte de cooperer pour proteger la Iiberte contre cet assaut. Si cela n'est pas fait et fait maintenant, a-t-il dit, i1 en resultera des conse· quences desastreuses pour le mende. Cette coope- ration, a+il precise, devrait s'effectuer dans le cadre de t'Organisation des Nations Unies. C'est sur ce;tte demiere d~c1aration que je veux insi5ter. On a exprime, dans certains milieux, la crainte que, en convoquant cette conference, nous n'ayons eu pour hut de releguer au second plan l'Organi w sation d!";s Nations Unies ou d'ignorer son auto- rite. Nous n'avons point d'intention de cette nature. L'Inde a toujours soutenu energiquement l'Organisation des Nations Unies, et e1le desire cooperer pleinement avec le Conseil de securite pour toutes les roesures effectlves qu'i1 pe;ut prendre afin de resoudre ce difficile probleme d'une manib'e satisfaisante. Comme je rai indique je ne desire pas consa- erer beaucoup de temps aune analyse de ia situa- tion qui s'est creee a la suite de l'adoption, par le Conseil de seeurite. de sa recente resolution; ce1a a ete fait par les oratel1rS precedents, par Ies repre- sentants de l'Australie et des Philippines, et par le representant de la Republique d'Indonesie. carrie~ qltt' the resoltltion on this point. At the end of his statement, the representative of the Netherlands stated the intentions of his Government. .He said' that it was the sincere wish of the Netherlands Government 'Ithat within a< few weeks an Indonesian federal government be created, to take upOn itself the-responsibilities and to c.1rry Ol1t the duties inherent in demo~ cratle ~~vernment". Can anyone believe in the sincerity of the Netherlands Government? The leaders of the Republic of Indonesia are confined to a smaIJ island; they are to be cut off from all direct contact with their followers-who form the majority in these islands-anr.! the Netherlands Government says it is going to set up a govem~ ment on a democratic basis. I really cannot under· stand how such a thing is possible under the conditions which the Netherbnds Government is de'tennined to impose. r do not wish to say very ml1ch about the resolution, for it is impossible for anybody to argue that that resolution has been c3l"ried out, but I wish to say something of the repercussions of this problem on Europe. r need not say very much on the repercussions on Asia. Members of the Council already know tl1:1t a conference of all the Asian countries and some other countries will meet in New Delhi to LOn- sider the whole position. The promptness with which these invitations have been accepted is an indication of the gravity of the situation. Om· Prime Minister was in no way exaggerating the situation when he said that if no effective meas- ures are taken the cOllseqllences will be disastrous f9r· the whole of Asia and for th,e whole of the world. Let me say a few words, -,however; on the repercussions of this problem on the E1;l1'opean· situation. This country, which is the.:agg.ressor, is a member ,of .the Western Eumpean Union or the north Atlantic Pact, as it is sometimes ~al1ed. This development in Asia raises the- question: what ,are the implications' of this Pact? We are naturally--inslined to "Wonder whether u!1-der cover· of the sect1rity afforde<.J, by the Pact one of the parties' to it is to be allowed to create insecurity elsewhere 'an<;l to bec(lme a menace to world peace. Undoubtedly, attempts will be made to obtain' the .sppport of other Powers to the Union, and I am.st~re that this aspect of the question wil! be carefully considered by those Powers whIch are not now members of the Union before they decide to lend their support to the Union. The second point arises in regard to the assist- ance given under the Marshall Plan to the Weeit- Pays~Bas a expose les intentions de son Gotlver- nel11ent. Il a declare que le Gouvernement des· Pays·Bas c1esirait sincerement qlle, "dans quel- lques semaines, ltn gouvernement federal indone- sien soit cree qlli prenne lui-meme les Te~pon- ·sabilites et accomplisse les fomtions lnherentes ·ft tlD gouvernement democratique". Peut-on croire a la sincerite dlt GOllvernement des Pays-Bas? Les dirigeants de la Republique d'Indonesie sont isoles dans une petite ill'; ils n'auront attcnn rapport direct avec leurs parti- ,S:1..11S, qui fonnent la majorite de la population de l'archipel. Cela n'empeche pas le Gouvernement des Pays~Bas de dire qu'il vu etablir un gOllver- ,nemeot sur tlne base democratique. Je ne peux vraiment pas comprendre comment cela serait possible dans les conditions qlle le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas est decide a imposer. Je n'ai pas grand-chose adire apropos de cette resolution, car il est impossible de pretendre qn'elle ait ete eXect1tee, mais je desire ajotlter qnelques mots sur les repercussions que ce pro- hleme peut avail" en Europe. Jl est inutile de s'etendre sur ses repercussions en Asie. Les membres uu Canse!1 savent deja qn'tme conference, a laquelle prendl'ont part taus le.s pays asiatiques et quelque$ 3utres pays, se reunira procllainement a la NQuvelle-De1hi pour etudier tOllS les aspects de la situation. La rapidite avec laquelle les invitations a. cetie conference ant ete acceptecs revele totlte la gravite de la situation :1ctnelle. Notre Premier Ministre n'exaghait nul- lelllent 10l"squ'il a declare, que si on ne prenait ,pas de mesttres efficaces, les evenements actl1f~ls auraient des consequences desastreuses pour l'Asie tOllt entiere et le reste du monde. Mais qu'il me soit permis de dire quelgues mats 'des reperct1ssions de ce probleme sur la siutation europeenne. Le pays qui s'est rendu coupabte ·d'agression est membre de I'UnioJ;l occidentale, ic'est·a~dire qlJ'jl a adhere a ce qu'on appelle 'padois le Fade de l'Atlantique, Avec les eVel1e- 'im~ntll qui vienn~n~ ,de se ·derol;l1er en Asie, line :question se pose: qu'implique· donc ce Pacte.? JNous sommes natllrellement pprres-a nOllS deman- der si I'une des, parties a cc Pacte, forte de la secu- ,rite qui 1ui est assuree, peut etre atltorisee a creer des 'conditions d'insecurite dans d'autres pays et· ,iL rnemicer la paix mondiale. Sans aucun doute, ce pays s'efforeera d'obtenir l'appui d'autres Pl1issa'nces affiliees 'a cette Union; je suis sur que c'est la un aspect de la question auql1el les Puissances qui n'ont pas adhere a l'Union prete- ront la plus grande attention, avant de decider de soutenir cette Union. Une autre question se pose a propos de l'aide . accordee aux PlIissances occidentales pour le I do tiot wish to put forward at this stage any concrete proposals for the solution -of this prob- lem. It is a matter that should be discussed and considered 'outside the Security Council before any suggestions are put forward here. I should, however, like to impress upon the Council the gravity and the urgency of the situation. I do so because such informal conversations as I have heard have left me somewhat pessimistic. Some have referred to the healing qualities of time. They think that if you allow things to drift, the solution win ultimately be found- somehow or other. Whenever this argument is. produced, I am reminded of a very stnl{ing passage in one of the writings of the late Lord Keynes, the great economist. He was refer- ring to the attitude of his fellow economists during the acute world crisis in the thirties. I do not remember his exact words, for I am quoting fram memory, but he said something to this effect: We economists are setting ourselves too easy and too futile a task if, during a period of aClite depression, all that we can tell the world is that in the long run things will be all right and that t,he period of depression will be followed by a ,boom. What consolation is it to the sailor on a ship sinking in a stonny sea to be told that in the 'long run the ocean will be flat? In the]ong run, we are all dead. ~Jf today, for any reason, we hesitate to take t aj?.'y action and if for any r.eason the Security h Cpundl does. not accept this challenge, the conse- ,~ qu.ences will pe of a very serio1.is character. Not ~ onl)' will Indonesian independence be dead, but C-" thlsinactio!l will deal a fatal blow to the effective· n ness of the Security Council and of the whole_· u- United -Nations. ,, .. I hope that the re'SI)Qnse of the Security Comi.cij to this challenge thrown out by the,' Netherlands 'Government will be swift' and [,., i~ effective and that it will act as a deterrent to k Other aggressors in the future. [, . Mahmoud FAWZI 'Bey (Egypte) (tradltit de J'angJais):- Je n'ai I'intention de faire aujourd'hui qu'une declaration preliminaire sur le probleme dont s'occupe en ce moment le Conseil de securite. Mahmoud FA,WZI Bey (Egypt): My intention today is to make only a preliminary statement i~ r~garding the question now before the Security ~ Council. The matter before us now is perhaps sympto- matic of one of the most serious diseases affect- ing our ettdeavours to establish a world of peace. This disease might be descr:ibed as the one of fait accompli. We have witnessed more than one instance in which acquiescence and submission have been given to fait.! accomplis, whetller good or bad, and in many cases it has been a very bad fait CJ.Cco1h.pli. We realize that the Security Council has made some sincere endeavours to face its responsi- bilities in connexion with the question of lndo· nesia. However, these endeavours have been neither 2mple nor steady nor unhesitant, nor have they been able, even partly, to cope with the seriousness of the situation. On 22 December the Security Council had before it the joint draft resolution submitted by the delegations of Colombia, Syria and the United States [5/1142]. That draft resolution was not strong enough, but even that was not adopted by the Secllrity Council. It was watered down into a resolution which was adopted on 24 De- cember [5/1150J. The sub-paragraph concerr.~ ing the withdrawal of forces to previous positions was not adopted. As a result of this and other omissions and changes, We have the weak reso~ lution of 24 December which does speak of the cessation of hostilities and of the immediate re- lease of the President and other political prisoners who havi; been arrested since IB December. How~ ever, even that weak resolution has not been implemented. This cannot be denied by anyone, including the representative of the Netherlands. The c.essation of hostilities has been taken lip in a very curious manner, The Netherlands Government, I regret to say, has picked and chosen. It wants to cease fire where it likes, and not to cease fire where it does not like, Even the release of the political prisoners is being made a mockery. How long this state of affairs will prevail I do not know. I wish it would not be long; I hope it wilt not be long. Two alternatives confront us. We can sub~ mit to force, to a fait accompli; or the United Nations and its Members, and particularly the Security Council and its members, can face their responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations. I do not recommend hasty decisions, but this matter has been under discussion and examination by the Security Council for many months. For how many more months will it continue? What are we waiting for? Is there any ambigllity or misunderstanding abOllt the facts of the situation, or the stipulations of the Charter, or the responsibilities of the members of tbe Security Council and the Security Council as La question qui DOUS occupe est, peut-etre, caracteristique de I'un des maux les plus graves qui nous atteignent lorsque nous nous efforl1ons d'etablir la paix mondiale, et que l'on pourrait appeler le mal du fait accompli. Bien des fois on s'est incline devant le fait accompli" bon ou mauvais, et, dans bien des cas, iI etait vraiment mauvais. Nous nous rendons compte que le ConseiI de securite a accompli de sinceres efforts pour s'ac- quitter de ses responsabilites en ce qui concerne la question indonesienne. Cependant, ces efforts n'ont ete ni suffisants, ni durables, ni soutenttS, et n'ant ete attcunement en rapport avec la gra- vite de la situation. Le 22 decembre, le Conseil de securite a ete saisi cl'un projet de resolution commun presente par les delegations de la Colombie, de la Syrie et des Etats-Unis [5/1142J. Meme ce projet de resolution, qui n'etait pas assez energique, n'a pas ete adopte par le Conseil de securite. 11 a ete edulcore et est devenu la resolution qui a ete adoptee le 24 decembre [5/1150]. L'alinea qui concernait le retrait des troupes sur les positions qu'elles occupaient auparavant n'a pas ete adopte. En consequence de cela et d'autres omissions et modifications, nOllS en sommes arri- ves a la faible resolution du 24 decembre, ou i1 est questic'ln de cessation des hostilites et de mise en liberte immediate du President de la Republique d'lndonesie et des autres prisonniers politiques detenlls depuis le 18 decembre. Mais meme ceUe resolution, si faible qu'elle soit, nta pas ete appliquee. Persdnne ne peut affirmer le contraire, et le representant des Pays-Bas lui- meme ne pOUrra le nier. Le probleme de la cessation des hostilites a ete traite de fa~on tres curieuse. Le Gouverne_ ment des Pays-Bas, j'aj le regret de le dire, agit selon son 'bon plaisir. 11 cessera le feu la Oll ceJa 1UI convient, et ne le cessera pas la OU cela. ne lui convient pas, Meme la liberation des prison_ niers politiques n'est qu'un simulacre. J'ignore combien de temps durera cet etat de choses. ]e sOllhaite et j'espere que ce ne sera pas longtemps. Nous nous trouvons en presence de l'a:lter- native suivante: nous incliner devant la force et le fait accompli; 01.1 bien faire face aux res- ponsabilites qui incombent i l'Organisation des Nations Unies et a ses Membres, et notamment au Conseil de securite et a ses membres, en vertu de la Charte des Nations Unies. ]e ne suis pas en faveur de decisions hatives, mais il y a des mois que le Conseil de securite etudie cette ques- tion. Combien de mois encore lui faudra-t-il? Ql.l'attendons-nolls done? Y a-t-il queIque equi- ·vogue, quelque meprise sur les faits de la cause les stipulations de la Charte et les responsabilite:; ;des membres du Consei! de securite et du Conseil I shall speak a little more frankly than I have done during the, last few minutes. It might be. said by some that the United Nations has no armed force aths disposal in order to handle such situations; that it has no other means for the handling of such situations. Concerning armed force, the responsibilities of the mem,bers of the Security Council and of the Members of the United Nations arise not only from Article 43, but also from Article ~06 pending the imple- mentation of Article, 43. I hope we shall not reach the stage at which resort to either Article will be necessary. I sincerely hope not. Mean- while, I think the least the Security Council can do is to take a much firmer stand than it has taken hitherto, not only in the interest, of the unfortunate people of Indonesia, but, I submit, in the interest of the Netherlands iself. The Netherlands Government seems to find some difficulty in crossing the bridge over the gap between the old era of colonialism and im- perialism and the new era in which we are sup- posed to live, namely, the era of the United Nations and of freedom, equality of oppor- tunity and the right of developing people--not suppressed people, but developing people, freely breathing people. I again submit that it might be helpft11 to the Netherlands itself if the Security Council insisted upon these ingredients of free- dom being instilled into its relations with the unfortunate people of Indonesia. "e•s, • e · ,, Can we hope that troops will be withdrawn to previous position~, that political prisoners will be released, that the Repttblic of Indonesia will he afforded the atmosphere and opportunity of living and functioning, and that no more military aid of any kind or form will be given to the Netherlands Government which might help it to wage still further war against the people of Indonesia? Can we hope that the future negotia- tions will be carried Ollt under the supen'ision and auspices of the United Nations, free of pressure and of untoward influences whicll are apt to distort them and to make of them some- thing other than serious negotiations? -it I, ",. I shall not speak any further on this matter today, but I reserve the right of my delegation to ask pennission to intervene on a future occa- sion. re le s, f. "•" 11 u "",.

Unless other members of the Council or those who are participating in our debate under Article 31 wish to speak, it will be necessary to adjourn this meeting now. Vie have had a number of important statements and we have also received reports from the representatives of the Council on the spot. I refer to the Committee of Good Offices and the Consular Commission, and it seems that the members of the Council will wish to have an opportunity to study this material. Furthermore, as the representative of India has so rightly observed, we shall need also to have the benefit of consultation with others before the Council can continue its I1 i· e, !s :il Je voudrais m'expr.imer. maintenant ave;c plus :de liberte que je ne l'ai fait an cours des dernieres . :minutes, D'auctins disent peut-etre que l'Organisation des Nations Unies ne dispose pas de .forces armees lui permettant de faire face a des 'situations de ce genre et qu'elle n'a pas i sa disposition'd'autres moyens. En ce quiconcerne la force armee, les responsabilites des membres du Conseil de seturite et des Membres de l'Orga.., ..nisation des Nations Unies decoulent, non seulement de l'Article 43, mais egalement de l'Article 106, en attendant la mise en reuvre de ,l'Article 43. ]'espere qu'il ne deviendra. pas ne- .cessaire de recourir a l'un ou l'autre de ces ,Articles. Je l'espere vivement. Mais, en attendant, le moins que le Conseil de securite puisse faire est d'adopter une position beaucoup plus ferme que ceDe qui a ete la sienne jusqu'i present, et ce, non seulement dans l'interet du malheureux peuple indonesien, mais dans ce1ui des Pay~-Bas eux-memes. Le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas semble eprouvel' quelqtte difficulte a franchir le fosse entre l'age revolu du systeme colonial et imperialiste de I'ere nouvelle dans laquelle nous sommes censes vivre, c'est-a-dire !'ere des Nations Unies, l'ere de liberte, d'egalite et du droit a se developper de peuples qui ne sont plus opprimes, mais qui respirent librement. 11 me semble que les Pays-Bas eux-memes auraient tout interet 11 ce que, Stlr l'initiative du Conseil de securite, ces elements de Iiberte apparaissent dans les rapports gu'ils entretienllent avec le ma1heureux peuple indonesien. Pouvons-nous esperer que les troupes seront ramenees sur les positions qu'elles occupaient precedemment, que les prisonniers politiques seront liberes, que la Republique d'Indonesie jouira d'un climat ou elle pourra vivre et fonctionner et que le Gouverncment des Pays-Bas ne recevra plus aucllne aide militaire qui lui permettrait de continner a combattre le peuple d'Indonesie? Pouvons-nous esperer que, a l'avenir, les nego~ dations se derouleront sous la surveillance et sous l'egide de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, en dehors de toute pression et de toute influence nefaste capable de les denaturer et de leur ater tout sens? Je n'en dirai pas davantage aujourd'hui, mais je reserve a ma delegation le droit de reprendre la parole ulterieurement. Le PRESIDENT (t,.aduit de l'al1glais): A moins que d'autres membres du Conseil de securite ou des representants des nations invitees en vertu de I'Article 31 de la Charte a participer a nos discussions ne desirent prendre la parole, i1 conviendrait de lever maintenant la seance. Nous avons entendu un certain nombre de declarations importantcs, et nous avons re~u des rapports des representants du Conseil de securite qtli sont sur place. J'entends par la la Commission de bons offices et la Commission consulaire. 11 est probable que les membres du Conseil voudront disposer d'un certain temps pour etudier ces documents. Ainsi que l'a si justtment fait observer I' suggest, therefore, that the Council should adjourn now and should continue this discussion on Tuesday. 11 January, at 3 p.m. Unless I hear objections, the Council will now adjourn and meet as I have stlggested. Mr. MAKIN (Australia): I am somewhat diffident about intruding at this moment, but I am wondering whether it would not be possible, in view of the urgency of this matter, for the Security Council to meet Oil Monday, 10 January. As the members of the Council will realize, delays that may take place are only going to add to the difficulties of this situation and, as I mentioned this afternoon, the situation is one in which we should take the most immediate action possible. I am most anxious that the Council should meet at the earliest possible moment. Therefore, I seek guidance from the President regarding the possibility of resuming the discussion on Monday.

I have consulted the members of the Security Council and in some cases it has been indicated that it would be advisable to have Monday available for other inquiries and consultations and that we could proceed much more usefully if we allowed those discussions to take place and met again on Tuesday. However, I am in the hands of the Council. I fully realize, and I think every member of the Council realizes, that it is vitally important that no time shonld be lost. The point I have tried to make is thnt time is not being lost and that we shall have a better opportunity to proceed usefully and with more complete information if we meet on Tl1esday as I have suggested. As no member of the Council wishes to speak on this subject, we shall meet on Tuesday, 11 January, at 3 p.m. The muting rose at 6 (J.m. M. MAKIN (Australie) (traduij dl: l'lwglais): J'hesite que1que peu a prendre la parole al'heure actuclle, mais je me dcmande s'il ne serait pas possible, etant donne l'urgence de la question, que le ConseiJ de securite se reunisse le lundi 10 jltn~ vier. Les membres dn Conseil se rendent compte que tout retard ne peut qu'aggraver la situation actuelle, et, "insi que je l'ai fait remarqtlcr cet apres-micli, les circonsfances sont teHes que des mesures immediates s'imposent. J'ai le plus vif desir de voir le Conseil se reunir clans le plus bref de.1ai. Je demande done au President s'iJ est possible de reprcndrc l'cxalllen de cette question lundi. Le PRESIDENT (lradltit de l'ollglais): J'ai demande l'avis des membres du Conseil de sccurite, et certains ant juge souhaitable que la jourtlce du htndi soit reservee a des entretiens et des recherches supp1t~mentaire.<;. Il semble qtt'il serait preferable de permettre a ces discussions d'a.,oir liel! et de IlOUS nhmir le rnardi. Cepcnd<lnl, c'est all Conseil qt1'il appartient de prendre tine (ltkision. Je comprcnds parfaitement - et je suis certain q11e tous les mell1bres <Ill Conseil le CUll1~ pl'ennent egalement - CJl1'il est c.<;sentiel (le ne pas perdrc de temps. J'ai voull1 sOllligner qu'il n'y am<l. pas de perte de temps et qu'il sera plus utile de nOllS rellnir rnardi commc je J'ai propose. car nOllS aurOllS alors des rellseignements plus complets ;l notre disposition. AUClln membre clu Conseil ne desirant prendre la pal'ole, la prochaine seance aura lieu le mardi 11 janvier, a 15 heures. La seancc est levee cl 18 het/res.