S/PV.402 Security Council

As usual, the interpretation will be consecutive for members of the Security Councll and simuha.w:ous for all others: . simultan~. Ll1ndjdernier~au moment d'ajourner la seance, j'ai exprime l'espoir que, 'lprs de sa seance ;;l1i~ "'ante, le .Conseil serait en mesure d'examiner nne' ptoposli:ion concrete stir la ql1estioil indonof:· sierine. Afin de d0fi11er aux delegations le temps de se consulter mttnellement et de consulter lel1n Gouve:rnements, et apr';'s avoir ente:ldu When we aciourned our,last meet.iug Monday, I stated th<lt I hop~d we would be in il position to, consider a ~peei.(ic proposal ·on the Indonesian question at t~,e next meeting of the 'Security Counc:t. In order. that the. delegations might, have more time to consult each other and, to' consult their Governments, and after taking irito~ fo~~d It necessary to postpone the meeting onglnally scheduled for Wednesday. The meeting scheduled for yeste.day was postpo3ed until today with the consent of all tile members for the same reason. As a result, we nmv have a specific pro~ posal for our consideration, introduced by the representatives of China, Cuba, Norway and the United States [5/1219]. Mr. NlSOT (Belgium) (translated from Frllnclt): Now that the Indonesian question seems about to enter tpon a new phase, I feel bound to draw the COuncil's attentio!1. to certain conside.rations which seem to me paramount. The Netherlands Government has been con· testing the COllncil's compete:1Ce ever since this question w<'.s sl.lbmitted to the Council. It has invoked Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, which debars organs of the United K ations from intervening in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State and, con~ verse1y, recognize:> the right of any State to refuse to submit such matters to settlement under the Charter, Among the Governments represented here, the Government of the Netherlands is not alone in contesting the Council's competence. We a11 remember the very illuminating statement in which the representative of France, on 24- De· cember last [392114 meeting], reaffirming what he had previously maintained, reached the conclusion that the Councilllas no competence in the matter. He re:.ninded us that Indonesia was still under Netherlands sovereignty, a fact admitted by both parties as we:! as by the members of ~e Council. Mr. Parodi added that the relatiDns m which the Council proposes to intervene are rdations at municipal and not at international law. Lastly, he reminded us that inten;ational peace and secudy, wh\ch are the Council's sole concern, are in no way endangered. On the same date the representative of Belgium expressed similar misgivings and reiterated the grave doubts which his GO\7ernme:lt has always felt as to the Council's corr.petence in the matter. The records of our meetings show convincingly that similar doubts ha-ve been p..xpressed at every stage in the evolution of the question. In the circumstances, such doubts appear m.ore than justified, 50 much so tha:t the representattve ?f the U.nited S:ates of AmerJ(,<l, Mr. Johnson, dld not hesitate to make the following statement to t~e Council on the subject, despite the fact that hIS Governnment was satisfied as to the Council's competence [193rd meeting). "The question of the Council's jurisdiction in the conslitufon"l issues of thi:! case is a very real one. Doubts have been expressed about it by several members of the Council. It is a .question which, in our view, would not be hghtly brushed aside by this Council. How are we to support tne rule of law in the wOrld.if we tr~t lightly the basic law of the Secunty CounCll itself? ~e conSentement de tOl.lS les membres. A la suite de ces consultations, le COnseil est saisi d'une proposition precise qui a ete elaboree par les representan:s de la Chine, ne Cuba, de :a Norvege et des Etats-Unis d'Arneriql1e [5/1219]. M. NIsor (Belgique): A ee momen: DU la question indonesienne semble devDir entrer dans une nouvelle pt.ase, je ne crois pas pouvoir m'ab~­ tenir de nppeler a I'aUention du Comeil cer~ taines consideratio:ls qui me paraissent dominer le debat. DeptJis le jour ou ceUe question a ete Jlortee devant le Conseil, le Gouvernement des Pays- Bas conteste la comC)etence de ce dernier. It invoqne le paragrapr:e 7 de l'Artide 2 de la Charte. Cette disposition interdit aux organes des Nations Unies d'intervenir dans les affaires qui releve:tt essentiel1ement de la competence d'un Etat et, inversement, elle reconnait a tout Etat Membre le droit de refuser de se soumettre, en ce qui cancerne les affaires de cet ordre, aux procedures de reglement prevues par la Charte. Panni les Gol1vcrnements ici repn§senh~s, le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas n'est pas le settl acontester la competence du Conseil. Nous avons toes presents a. I'esprit la lumineuse demonstratio:l par laqllellc, le 24 decembre dernier [392~m~ seance], le representant de la France, continuant sa positior. anterieure, a conelu a l'incompetence du Conseil. 12 a rappele, en eifet, que l'Indonesie relevait ellcore de la souvcrninete des P:l.y".Bas, ce qui est admis par les deux parties et par les membres du Conseil. M. Parodi a precise, en outre, que les rapports dans lesquels le CODse.:! pretend i::ltervenir sont dl,!s rapports de drn;t interne, non pas des rapports de droit intern~· tional. II a rappele, enfin, que la paix et la securite internationales - q:1i, seules, concernent le Consell - H'etaitnt nutkmcnt en cause. Lt!' representant de la Belgique a exprime de not:veau, a la meme date, Ies memes preoccupations; il a redit les doutes serieux que n'a cesse d'eprouver son Gumeruement quant Do la competence nu CDnseil e:l la matiere. 11 Sl1ffit de parcGUrlr les proces-verbaux de nos seances po:..tr se convair,cre que pareils dOlltes ant ete 6nis a tous les stades de l'evolution de la question. Etant donne Les conditions dans lesr;uelles se presente l'affaire, ces dontes apparaissent comme hautement justifies. lis le sont a. ce point que le representant des Etats- Unis, M. Johnson, bien que son Gouvernemen.t ftit, pour sa part, convaincu de la competence du Conseil, n'hesita pas cl faire a ce sujet, au sein du Conseil, la declaration suivante [193~l'Ie seanceJ: "La question de savoir si le Conseil a la competence voul Ue pour examiner. dans le cas present, le differend d'ordre constitutionnel, se pose tres· reellernent Plusieurs mernbres du Conseil 011t exprime des doutes a ce sujet·. n s'agit la. d'cne question dont le C..onseil ne devrait pas, selon nous, disposer a la legere. Nons ne pouvons ap~ puyer le prineipe de legalite si nOllS tTaitOI1S .3. la legere la loi fondamentale du Conseil lUIm~me. "The view of the United States delegation is that there is legitimate room for doubt as to the Council's jurisdiction in so far as a settlement of the constitutional issues of the Indonesian question is concerned. My Government would not be prepared, under the existing circumstances, to support action by the Council based on the conclusion that it has such jurisdiction, Consequently, we shall be forced to abstain from voting on any resolution of that nature. "However, we also recognize that the very real doubts which several members of the Council have expressed regarding the Council's jurisdiction in the case before us, might ve.ry weB be substantiaUy resolved by an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice, While the International Court was deliberating, the Council would of course remain free to take such action in conformity with the Charter as it might deem necessary to m.aintain international peace. "Taking these considerations into account, the United States Government believes that the COl1ncil should not besitate, if it judges it wise to do so, to refer the question of its jurisdiction in tillS case to the International Court for an opinion. The United States delegation would be prepared to support a proposal to that effect." In uttering these words, the representative of the United States remained true to the agelong traditions of his noble and generous country. As we know, the Belgian delegation submitted to the Council a draft resolution [5/517] proposing that the question of competence should be submitted to the Court, without, however, any suspension of the Council's conciliatory action. Unfortunately this resolution received only four votes, those of the United States, France, the United Kingdom and Belgium [195th m,eeting] , and it was therefore not adopted. The question of competence remained unsolved. It was deliberately left in abeyance. 11 was expressly agreed that this question could not be regarded as prejudiced by any decisions which the Council might take in the Indonesian question. Expressing the general feeling of the Council, its Presidents have taken a very definite stand on this point, even when they represented Governments which did not profess any doubt as to the com~ petence of the Council. Such was the case with the representative of Syria, Mr, El~Khol1ri, and even more so with the representative of the United States of America, Mr. Austin, wbo stressed in the clearest terms the reservation as to competence with wh'ich decisions of the Council should be invested, These statements were all the more significant in that one was made on 1 August 1947 and the other cn 1 NOl'ember 1947 ~that is to say, on the actual date of the adoption of the resolutions which bear those dates, and which were quite recently invoked in the Council [5/459 and 5/5971, "Toutefoi~, nous 'admettons egalement que, pour mettre fin aI'incertitude tres reelle 'exprimee par plusieurs membres dLl Conseil quant a I'habilite du Conseil a examiner le diHcrend sur les faits de la cause,On pourrait fort hien solliciter, sur le fond, l'avls consultatif de la Cour internationa1e de Justice. Pendant que deJibererait la COllr internationale, le Conseil conseNerait, bien entendu, la. liberte de prendre toute meSllre, conforme a la Charte, qu'il estimerait necessaire au maintien de la paix internationale. "Tenant compte de ces observations, le GOI1- vernement des Etats-Unis estime que. le Conseil ne devrait pas hesiter, s'i1 le jugeait bon, a soumettre, pour avis, a b Collr internationale de Justice, la question ne sa.vcir s'il dispose de la competence voulue pour connaltre de cette affaire. La delegation des Etats~Unis serait disposee a appuyer une proposition dans cc sens." En tenant ce langage, le representant,des Etats~ Unis restait fide1e aux traditions SeCUlalreS de son noble et genereux pays, Comme on sait. la delegation beige presenta au Consei1 un projet de resolution [S/517J te~~ dant a ce que la question ~e ~ompeter;~e ~ut sownise a la Conr, sans que 1ad IOn conC1ha~nce du Conseil cessat pour autant d,e se poursut:rr~. Malheureusement, cette resolutIOn ne ,rec:uellht que quatre voix, celles des Etats-Ums, d~ la France du Royaume-Uni et de la Belglque [195en;e seance], Elle ne fut done pas adop~ee. La question de la competence resta sans solution. Elle fut deliberement laissee en suspenso n fut expressement convenu que cette q:lest}on ne pourrait etre consideree comme pr.eJ~gee par les decisions que prendrait le Co~sel1 a prop~s de la question indonesienne; Ex:pnmant le s,entlment du Conseil ses PreSidents se montrerent categoriqtleS sur ~e point, meme.lorsqu'ils reI;resentaient des Gouvernements qUt ne professment ancun dotlte sur la competence du ConsdL Tel fut le cas du representant de la Syrie, l'.L EI- Khauri, Tel fut surtout le cas d11 repre~entant des Etats-Unis, M. Austin, qui insista, dans les ter~ mes les plus c1airs, sur la reserve. de compete.nce que les dec:isions du Conseil devment, co~npo~ter. Ces deLlarations sont d'autant plus slgmfic:at:lves qu'elles ont ete faites, !'une le 1er aoflt 1947, l'al1tre le ler novembre suivant, c'est-~-dire les jonrs ~lemes Oll furent acloptees les deux reso~ 1utions portant c:es dates, resolntions dont, tout recemment enc:ore, on faisait etat an sein du Conseil [S/459 et S/597J. While the Security Council may be said to haveinctlrred the risk of overstepping its powers, it cannot rightly, in what it has done hitherto, be accused of complete lack of caution. On the whole it has taken care not to do more than the exercise of good offices. By its resolution of 2S August 1947 [S/525 IlJ it offered its good offices to the parties concerned, who accepted them. It confinned this offer by its resolution of 28 February 1948 [S/678]. In remaining within the limits of good ofnces the Council has shown wisdom. The solutions to which its good offices may lead owe their validity to the fact of acceptance by the parties concerned. This acceptance of solutions proposed, in particular by the Security Council, may to a large extent remedy any Glefect in respect of lack of competence attached to the measures taken by the Council. In my opinion, the Council should not depart from this cautious attitude in its forthcoming att~pt to fin.d ways. of settli.ng the Indonesian question. In mternatlOnal pohtics it has mostly i b~en found vain and useless to attempt to act WIthout the good will and collaboration of the responsible Governments. Is the Security Council really in a position to ignore this experience? Would it not evince its wisdom by confining its work to the exercise of good offices? The Council should not contemplate other measures before having made sure, by reference to the Court, that it is empowered to take them. Ever since this unfortunate dispute began, the Government of the Netherlands has been urging the Council to consult the International Court of Justice on this question of competence. It has thereby confirmed that, faithful to the traditions of its cormtry, which was the cradle of international law, it would be willing to defer to the Court's opinion; I have no reason to doubt that the Indonesian authorities too will make it a point of honotlr' to conform to the Court's opinion, thus justifying the hope, which I am sure we all share, of welcoming a duly constituted United States of Indonesia into our organization in the near future. Reference has here been made to the patience and restraint which the Security Council has shown with regard to other and far more deadly armed conflicts; and, it has been pointed out, this Si 1'0n pent dire que le Conseil de securite a assume le risque d'exceder ses pouvoirs, il ne meriterait cependant pas l'accusation d'avoir, dans son action passee, manque totalement de prudence. Dans l'ensemble, en effet, il a tenU jusqu'ici a se maintenir sur le terrain des bons offices. I1 a, par sa resolution du 25 aout 1947 [S/525 Il], offert ses bons offices aux parties qui les ont acceptes. 11 a confirme cette offre par sa resolution du 28 fevrier 1948 [S/678]. Le Conseil, en restant dans le cadre des bons offices, s'est montre avise. Les solutions auxquelles peu· vent conduire les bons offices doivent, en effet, leur validite a l'acceptation des parties. Or, cette acceptation des solutions proposees, notamment par le Conseil de securite, peut, dans une large mesure, remedier au vice d'incompetence dont seraient affectees les mesures prises par le Conseil. A man sens, le Conseil ne devrait pas se departir de cette attitude prudente dans la recherche, a laquelle i1 est sur le point de proceder, des solutions propres a assurer le reglement de la question indonesienne. L'experience de;ffiontre que, en politique internationale, H. est, le plus souvent, futile et vain de pretendre se passer du bon vQuloir et de la collaboration des Gouver~ nements qui exercent les responsabilites. Le Conseil de securite est-il vraiment en position de pouvoir meconnaitre cette experience? Ne ferait-il pas preuve de sagesse en poursuivantson ceuvre dans le cadre des bans offices? Le Conseil ne devrait envisager d'autres me· sures qu'apres s'etre assure, en en rHerant a la Cour, qu'il a le pouvoir de les prendre. Depuis le debut de ce malheureux conflit, le Gotlvernement des Pays-Bas ne cesse de conjurer le Conseil de consulter la Cour internationale de Justice sur cette question de competence. n confirme par la que, fidele, 'lt1i nussi, aux traditions de son pays, berceau de la justice internationale, i1 s'inc1inerait devant I'avis de la Cour. Je n'ai aucune raison de dOllter que les autorites indonesiennes mettent leur point d'hohneur a s'y confonner egalement, justifiant ainsi l'espoir, que, fen suis convaincu, nous avons tous, de pouvoir, dans un avenir pl'Ochain, acctleillir aU sein de notre Organisation les Etats-Unis d'Indo· nesie dument constitues. On a fait allusion ici a la patience et a la reserve que le Conseil de sectlrite montre a. l'egard d'autres conflits annes, autrement meurtriers. On a ajoute qu'eHes contrastaient singu· The Government of 6e Netherlands is challenging the competence of the Council. It does not do so lightly. Eminent members of the Council have, as we have seen, admitted tlte legitimacy of the doubts felt by certain of their colleagues as to this competence. By disregarding these dOl1bts, the Council would, instead of strengthening its position, dea: a mortal blow to its own prestige, ir.asmuch as it would give the impression that it feared disavow:ll by an impartial court. An institution Sllclt as ours cannot lay itself open to a charge of acting arbitrarily or under the influence of poLtical opportunism. It would run such a risk if, while contemplatir:g. mea.sures presupposing 6e demonstration of its competence, it remained deaf to a request from a State that the qt1estion should be settled by a c:ourt in 8ccordance with the criteria of Law ar>.d justice, Quo:que je deplore plus qtle quincC<l1que la tOllrnure prise par les cvcnements, c'est adessein que j'ai evite de m'exprimer sur le fond de l'affaire, COffime sur les merites et demerites des positiolls prises de part et cl'autre. Mon Jut a et€: d'appeJer l'attention du Conseil sur 1es dangers inherents a la tendance que reve1ent certnins c1iscOllrs prononces ici. Ces dangers son: graves, non se:.tlement pOllr les petits Etats, mais encore pour l'avenir de notre Organisation. rai vOltlll montrer que cet avenir ne sauta;t etre assure en dehors du respect scrupuleux. de la C~arte. La Charte est un contrat que nons a:vons taus aceepte, mais qui comporte des limitations. Si nous souffriDns que, dans qllelque cas particllJ:er, il hit parte atteinte a ces limitations, oous ouvririons la porte aux pires abus et, tot ou tard, chacun de nOllS, surtout s'il n'est 'pas un,. granrle PUlssarrce, en sub:rait les dures consequences. Altho'..lgh I deplore as much as anyone the tnrn taken by events, r have deliberately avoided e:x:pressbg any views 0:1 the subs:ance of the matter or on the merits and den:erits of the respective attitudes of the parties concerned. My object has been to draw the Council's a~tention to the dangers inh~rent in the tendency shown by certain speeches made hc:re. These are grave dangers, not mere:y for the small Sta:es but still more for the future of our Organization. I have tried to show that this future can be assured only by scrupulous respect for the Cllarter. The Cha;·ter is a contract which we have all accepted, but which :las its limitations. If we allowed those lirr-itatiolls to b~ exeeeded in an)' individual case, we should open the door to worse abuses, and sooner or later each one of us, particularly lhose that arc not great Powers, would suffer the heavy consequences. M. AUAItEZ (Cuba) (traduit de l'e.rpag1lO1): La delegation de Cuba a l'honneur, avec les dtU~~ gations de la Chine, de la Norveg-e et des Etatsonis d' Amerique, de soumettre a l'ex;t.men du Consei: de securite un projet de resolution {S/1219] dont le but est d'arriver a. une solution jeste e-: durable dll differend qui separe la Republi!]l1p. d'Indonesie du RoyaU111e des P,,-ysbas, en tenant compte des droits fond2.l1lentatlx des deux parties. La delegation de Cuba a donne son adhesion a ee projet de resolution COiTIlTInn pal'ce que ce docUll1cnt conticnt tOllS les elements (sauf un, peut-etre) ~ui, it. son avis, doivent etre pris en consideration, cO:1formcmem aux prilleipes et aux buts de la Chmte des Kations Unies. Dam nctre intervention du 14 j3.'l1vier [400cme seanC{'] nouS avions clit qne j'on m: Mr. ALV,AREZ (Cuba) (translated from Spanisk): T:,e delegation of Cuba, together with the delegations of China, .Korway and the United States of America, has :he honour to submit a draft resolution [S/1219] for the consiGeration of the Security Council, with a view to re8ching a just and lasring solution of the dis;mte between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, while observing due respect for the fundamental rights of both par.ies. The delegation of Cuba s'.1ppor':.s this joint resolution because :n our opinion it embodies all the elements-with the possible exception of one -which must be taken into aceouut in accordanCe wi~h the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter. On 14 J~(1l1ary {400th meeting] We expressed the opinion that a purely academi: declaration t~erJ q:J'inddgent atlx g-rands, i1 reserve sa severite paul' les petits Etats, parce qu'il compte pOllvoir facilement vaincre Jeur resistance. Le Gouve:"!lement neerlandais conteste la competence du Consei!. I1 ne la conteste pas a la legcrc. Des mcmhres emine'lts du CO'lseit Ol1t reCOlllltl, nous I'avons vu, la legitimite des dot.:tes que certains de leurs eollegues eprouvent sur cette competence. S'il IJassait out~e, le Conseil, au lieu de s'affirmer allX yeux du monde, porte~ rait Ull coup fatal a son prestige en ce qu'il creerait l'impression qu'il era-int de se voir desavoller par une cour irnpartiale. Noire insti~ tution ne pet:.t se mettre dans le cas d'etre accusee d'agir arbitrairement ou sous I'empire de l'opportunismt: pulUqLte. Elle l"Uurrait ce risqllc si, tOllt ell envisageant des mCS'.1res prcsupposal:t la de.- monstration de sa competence, elle restait sourde a la demande cl'un Etat tendant a ee que certe question soit reglCe par line cour, seIon les cri~ teres dll droit et de la justice. 1iberati~n of the 1ndonesian political leaders and their full reinstatement as official representatives of the pwple of the Indonesian Republic; thirdly, the holding of free elections on a fixed da!e, to elect a sovereign constituent assembly, With a view to promulgating the constitution of the Re~ public of Indonesia and taking a decision regarding the integration of the United States of 1ndoriesia; and finally, the withdrawal of armed for~es from the territory of Indonesia by progressIve stages, in such a way that when the duly elected government of the United States of Indonesia assumes power there shaU be no foreign forces left in the territory, and the designation of a speci£c date by which this withdrawal is to be completed. 1n our opinion these points are covered satisfauorily in the joint resolution, except as regards the withdrawal of Netherlands armed forces. The CubtLn delegation was of the opinion that the progressive withdrawal of the armed forces was essential in order to guarantee the unhindered development of Indonesian civil authority and the freedom of thought and action of the Indonesia people. Moreover, we considered it imperative that law and order should be maintained throughout the territory of 1ndonesia and that the safety of the life and property of its inhabitants should be guaranteed. For these reasons we suggested that Netherlands armed forces should be maintained in such areas as the Committee of Good Offices should d~em necessary, but under the jurisdiction of its military observers. Further, we proposed fixed dates for the evacuation of the Netherlands forces. Paragraph 4 of the joint resolution contemplates a different solution of this question but while, possil)ly, it is more elaborate, it is, in our opinion, less effective. Although t~is solution does not fully satisfy us, we accept It as a compromise between divergent points of view. Now, can we feel sare that a resolution drafted in these terms wm bring about an effective and satisfactory solution 0 f the 1ndonesian question? We would h<lvC preferred that the contents and provisions of this draft resolution did not leave any doubt in Our mind. But whi.1e others may llave some doubt lest the parties to this dispute do Mt. fully cot~ply with the provisions of a rcsolutlOn emanatmg from the Security Council we ourselves feel no such doubt. It is incon~ ceivab1e that any Member of the United Nations should think of attempting to cvaue the application of a resolution of the Council, especially when so much good will has gone into its fashioning, when its text has been drawn up with such care .and loftiness of purpose that the spirit of concl1iation inspiring it stands out as a clear pledge of good faith, impartiality and justice. Mr. ]E:SSUP (United States of America): At the opening of this meeting, the President reminded us of the remarks he made at the con- A notre avis, la proposition commune repond de maniere satisfaisante a tOllS ces points, sal.lf a celui qni a trait au retrait des forces a.mees neerlandaises, La delegation de Cuba estimait que le retrait progressif des force.'!. armees etait indispensable pour garantir le libre developpement des organismes administratifs de I'Indonesie ainsi que la liberte de pensee et d'expression du peuple indonesien. Mais eIle estimait aussi qn'il etait indispensable de maintenir sur le territoire indonesien la legalite et l'ordre, et d'assurer la protection de la vie et des biens de ceux [jui y residellt. C'est pour ees raisons qu'elle avait propose que 1es forces armees neer· landaises fussent maintenues dans les 10calites DU la Commission de bons offices estimerait cl': maintien necessaire, ctant entendl1 que ces troupes releveraient des observateurs militaires pour l'evacuation des forces neerlandaises. Or, le paragraphe 4 de la resolution commune traite cette question d'une autre maniere; pwt-etre le fait-i1 de fa~on plus detail1ee, mals, a notre avis, cette redaction est moins effieaee. Rien qll'elle ne 1l0US donne pas entierement satisfaction, nous l'acccptons, car nous estimons qu'elle constitue un cornpromis entre les differents points de vue. Peut-on assurer qu'tme resolution redigee en ces termes constituera un moyen efficace et satis~ faisant ue resoudre le probleme indonesien? Nous aurions prHere que ses dispositions ne laissent aucun doute clans notre esprit. Certains st demandent si les parties voudront mettre en lfuvre integ)'alement les dispositions cl'nne reso111tiol1 emanant du Conseil de securite, mais Cl.'. prO· bleme ne nons preoccupe pas. 11 serait ineoneevable Cjue des Membres ue l'Organisation des Nations Unies puissent penser llTI seul instant ne pas se conformer aUne resolution du Conseil, surtout si l'on cOl'lsidere la banne volonte, le soin, la hatlteur de vues, l'esprit ell.'. collaboration avec lesque1s cette resolution a ete redigee, ce qui, a notre avis, constitue tine prenve evidente de sa bonne foi, de son impartialite et de son equite. M. ]ESSUP (Etats-Unis d'Ameriqlle) (tradjfit de l'anglais) : En ouvrant la seance, le President nous <l rappele les observations qu'il avait faites In my statement to the Council on 11 January [398th meeting], I expressed the views of my Government regarding what has happened in Indonesia. It is unnecessary to repeat those views today. In the same statement, I also expressed my Government's opinion that the time had come for the Council to take appropriate action de~ signed to help bring about a just and lasting settlement of the Indonesian dispute. We believe that, although the questions with which the Council is now confronted are incredibly complicated, the Council nevertheless has an obligation to find a balanced and a constructive answer to these questions. With this in mind, we have been consulting with various members of the Council over the past few days in an effort to arrive at a considered long-term approach to the problem. In the course of these consultations, as the representative of Cuba has pointed out, a determined effort has been made to wrestle with each of the essential elements in the problem before us. In our opinion, the consultations have resulted in a fundamentally sound answer to the situation with which the Council is confronted. We have joined with the representatives of China, Cuba and Norway in working out the text of a draft resolution which represents the considered views of alI 'of us regarding the most effective and productive way of dealing with the present situation in Indonesia. Each sponsoring delegation will, of course, state its own point of view, and we have already heard one of the sponsoring delegations do so. I have recognized, as I am sure all members of the Council will have recognized, that the representative of Cuba has well pointed out the fact that this joint resolution is the result of a joint negotiation and represents an attempt to meet many different points of view. I should like, for Ollr part, to elaborate on what we consider the major premises upon which this draft resolution is based, for we believe it is only on these premises that a real solution can be found. In the first place, we are convinced that there is no question but that the Council must continue to concern itself with the Indonesian question. My delegation is not able to accept the jurisdiction of the Council which has just been so eloquently stated by the representative of Belgium. We agree with the recent statement [400th meeting] of the representative of the United Kingdom that in the light of recent events we now have a situation in which the Security Council must feel compelled to make recommendations. As matters stand, I think the majority of the members of the Council will agree that we have an obligation to continue our efforUi to assist in arriving at a solution as a whole. The time has passed for a piecemeal approach. Dans la declaration que j'ai faite au Conseil le 11 janvier courant [398~me seanceJ. j'ai expose les vues de man Gotlvernement sur les evenements d'Indonesie. II est inl'ltile de les repeter aujourd'hui, D'alltre part. rai dit dans cette meme declaration qne, de l'avis de mon Gouvernement, le temps etait ven\! pour le Conseil de prendre des mesures appropriees afin d'aboutir a une solution jl1ste et dmable. Hieo que le Conseil soit saisi de g\lestions extremement compliquees, n011S estimons qu'il n'eo a p<JS moins l'obligation de leur donner tine solution equitable et constructive. C'est dans cet esprit que, pendant ces delniers jOllrs, n011S aVOllS procede a des consultations avec plusieurs memores du Conseil et que nous nOIlS sOlTImes efforces d'aboutir a une vision reflechie dll probJeme aiin de Iui donner une solution dl1rable. Le representant de Cuba a deja eu l'occasion de sOllligner que, au cours de ces consultations, nous avons fait un effort tres sincere pour comprendre dlacun des elements esseotiels dll probleme dont nons sommes saisis. AU$si nous semble-t-il que, grace aces pourparlers, nOllS avons n~ussi a trollver une solution qui oous parait foncierement juste et qui permettra de regler la situation a. laquelle le Conseil doit faire face. Nous nous sommes associes aux representnnts de la Chine, de Cuba et la Norvege pour elnborer 11n projet de resolution qui exprime les opinions reflechies de chactln d'entre nous sur la manicre la plus efficace et la plus feconde de faire face a la situation actuelle en Indonesie. Chacllne des delegations qui oot participe a la redaction de ce texte exposera naturellement son propre point de vue; rune d'entre eUes I'a d'ailteurs deja. fait. J'estime - et je suis sur que tous les membres du Conseil partageront man avis - que le representant de Cuba a fort justement presente cette resolution commune, resultat de pourparlers et d'efforts communs entrepris pour: concilier plusieurs points de vue differents. Je voudrais, pour ma part, exposer les principt;s fondamentaux dont _s'inspire le projet de resolution, car, a notre avis, c'est sur ces princ:ipes seulement que l'on peut fonder une solution veritable. Tout d'abord, il ne fait aucun doute pour oous que le Conseil doit continuer a s'occuper de l;a question indom~sienne_ Ma delegation ne saur:l1t accepter les vues quc le representant (le l.a Bdgique vient d'exposer si eloquemment sur la competence du Conseil. Nous somm~s d'.accor,d avec le representant du Royaume-Urtt qUt a declare recemment [400eme seance] que, il. l:1 suite des recents evenements, le Conseil se trollve devant une situation ou il doit se sentir oblige de £ormuler des recommandations. All point ou nous en sommes, je pense que la majorite des mcmbres du Conseil reconnaitra que naus avons le devoir de poursuivre nos efforts pour aider a regIer le probleme dans son ensembte. I1 n'cst plus temps d'envisager ce problt,me d'une maniere frag,mentaire. In the third place, we do not believe that the Secur~ty Council can place the seal of its approval on the results of the recent military action. We all know that the Dutch troops will have to be withdrawn if the ultimate goal of creating a sove.reign United States of Indonesia is to be achieved. VIe do not understand that the Nether· lands Government has any intention or desire to maintain its troops in occupation indefinitely. The problem before us is not whether the troops should be withdrawn; the real problem is the method and timing of withdrawal, worked out in such a way as not to create other and perhaps even greater difficulties. In solving a problem of this nature, we all recognize that there are local conditions which must be taken into account. Practical matters such as the maintenance of order and the supply and deliv-ery of food and other every-day necessities are vital to the success of an operation of this character. For example, as the records of the Committee of Good Offices will show, the problems of providing fer the well-being of local populations require long and tedious efforts. The destruction of a single railroad bridge, the burning of a single sugar refinery, can mean that the population of a particular area is cut off from vital sources of supply. There may be many communities whose daily supply of rice depends on access to areas from which, for all we know, they are now completely crit off. Where a local population might have to depend on delivery of grain by oxcart, a blown-(1p bridge can lead to the severest deprivation unless such factors are prov-ided for. We believe the only way they can be provided for is to approach the problem of withdrawal realistically and painstakingly. If we overlook such factors as these, we are simply not living up to our primary responsibilities. Accordingly, we recognize that these factors must be brought into balance after full We all recognize that in our draft resolution we have placed a heavy burden on the commission. We have not, on the other hand, sought to give it any power which the Security Council ca.nnot delegate. In the final analysis, the responsibility rests with the Council. We are convinced, hawever, that it is necessary to give our agency on the spot sufficient authority in the first instance to enable it ta meet the new situation there. In the fourth place, we consider that the negotiations should be assisted by an agency of the Security Council. Both parties have heretofore accepted such assistance; we assume they will continue to accept it. We believe, however, that eighteen months' experience has shown that a goal must be set for the consummation of nego· tiations: a protraction of them will not serve the interests of either party. As the reports of the Committee of Good Offices will show, most of the bOlsic issues have already been thoroughly explored. In some matters, there has been a large measure of agreement. It now remains to bridge the gap between these areas, and we believe that with the assistance of the commission, as described in the draft resolution, the gap can be bridged. The parties have been negotiatingintermittently over a period of three years. They have not yet arrived at an agreement on the political' issues between them. It is clear to all of us, however, tllat it is only through negotiation of these political issues that there can be a just'and durable settlement of the Indonesian question. Fortumtely, the negotiations which have taken place so far have produced some measure of agreement on the really fundamental issues. There are certain basic principles which have been inco1'porated in the Linggadjati and RenviUe Agreements which undoubtedly will fann a part of any final settlement. Both these instruments, for example, contemplate the creation and estab· 1ishment of a federal, sovereign and independent United States of Indonesia. Both contemplate the inclusion of the Republic as a State within the United States of Indonesia. Both contemplate a union in which the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of Indonesia will be equal partners. In addition to the measure of agreement reached in these instruments, the parties have also explored, as the reports of the Committee of Good Offices indicate, a considerable number of important iSSlteS regarding the interim period between the present and the time when the sovereignty is transferred. We believe that future negotiations should take advantuge af the fact that Nous reconnaissons tous que, dans notre pro· jet de resolution, IIOllS avons impose nne lourde tache a la commission. Nous n'avoIls, d'autre part, cherche a lui donner aucun pouvoir que le Conseil ne puisse deleguer. En derniere analyse, c'est au Canseil lui-meme qu'incombe toute la responsabilite. Mats nous sommes convaincus qu'il faut donner a notre commission operant sur place une antorite suffisante, en premiere instance, pour lui permettre de faire face a la nouvelle situati.on qui existe la-bas. En quatrieme lieu, nous estimons que les nego~ ciations devraient avoir lieu avec le concours d'un organe du Conseil de securite. Les deux parties ant jusqu'i present accepte eette aide; nous supposons qu'e1les l'accepteront, aussi i l'avenir. Mais MUS croyons que dix~huit mois d'experience ant montre qu'il faut fixer un objectif pour que ces negoeiations puissent aboutir; la prolongation de celles-d ne servirait 1es interets d'aucune des parties. Comme le montrent les rapports de la Commission de bons offices, la plupart des questions essentiel1es ont deja fait robjet d'un examen detaille. Sur quelque5 points, il y a eu, dans une large mesure, accord. 11 reste maintenant a eombler les fosses qui separent ces points, et nous sommes convaincus que, avec I'aide de la commission que prevoit le projet de resolution, le fosse peut etre camble.. Les parties sont en ponrparlers, de maniere intermittente, depuis pres de trois am. Elles ne sont pas encore arrive-es a un accord sur les questions politiques qui les separent. Mais it est evi· dent pour chacl1n d'entre nolts que senles des negotiations sur ces questions politiques peuvent contribuer a un reglement juste et durable de la question indonesienne. Fort hetlreusement, les negociations qui ont eu Ileu jusqu'a present ont abouti a 11n certain accord sur les questions vraiment fondamentales. Certains des principes fondamental1X qui ont ete incorpores dans les Accords de Linggadjati et du Renville feront sans aucun doute partle de t0ut reglement defi· nitif de la question. C'est ainsi que ces deux instrtllTIents envisagent la creation d'un Etat federal souverain qui recevrait le nom d'Etats-Unis d'Indonesie. Tous les deux pn~voient que la Republique, en tant que telle, sera incorporee aux Etats-Unis d'Indonesie. Tous les deux envi~n­ gent une union au sein de laquelle le Royaume des PayswBas et 1es Etats-Unis d'Indonesie jouiront de droits egaux. Outre l'accord qui fait l'objet de ces deux docu· ments, les parties ont etudie, comme l'indiquent les rapports de la Commission de bOllS offices, 1.111 grand nomure de questions importantes conc~rnant la periode de transition qui s'etend entre le moment actuel et le moment ou la souverainete sera transferee aux Etats-Unis d'Indonesie. Nons crayons que de nouvelIes negotiations devraient Finaity, I think we all realize that it is. essenti~ to any workable settlement in Indonesia that It s1)tmld be the result of agreement on the part of those concerned; we do not believe a po1it~cal settlement should or could be successfully Imposed by one of the parties, or for tha~ matter, through outside intervention. We consider that not only must a final settlement ~e negotiat:d, but that since a final settlement wIll necessanly affect the future of Indonesia as a whole, the negotiations must take into aCCollI,t the full interests of al1 parts of Indo~esi'l.. For this rea~on, we believe the representatives of non-Republlcan parts of Indonesia should have an opportunity to participate in the negotiations. The draft resolution as a whole is an effort to promote settlement, firstly, by seeking to establish conditions under which free and bona fide negotiations ca:1 take place; secondly, by allowing all concerned to reach whatevcr freely negotiated settlement they wish; thi rdly, by preserving certain basic points of agreement already reached; and, fourthly, by making certain provisions against the possibility of an impasse. Finally, the resolution provides a time schedule which, we believe, corresponds in all essentials to the achievement of the goals which both parties have again and again declared they desire to achieve. We believe that this joint resolu~ion meets the various elements in the problem before us which the majority of the members of the Security Council consider must be taken into account. We realize that there are some who would like to see certain elements dealt with in more detail; others would like to see them dealt with less elaborately. The tabling of this draft resolution moves the discussions in the Council into a stage of concrete examination of a text. A full exchange of views on the text should lead to a complete understanding of its intent. If other suggestions are made, my delegation will study them carefully and will be prepared to exchange views in regard to them. We also reserve 0111' right to discuss particular provisions of the draft resolution which has now been tabled if questions are raised regarding them. We hope that approach made in the joint drafting of this resolution will be recognized by all concerned as an earnest and conscientious attempt to help reach a solution in Indonesia. ...Ve hope also that, when the Council expresses its view through the adoption of a resolution, that resolution will command the full support and co-operation of both parties, without which this or any other attempt could not succeed. Mr. TSIANG (China): The core of the Indonesian problem is the transition of that area from colonial status to notional independence. The M. TSIANG (Chine) (traduit de lJanglais): Le nceud du probleme indonesien consiste aassUrer la transition de cette region de l'etat de co10- Both as a member of the Security Council and as a neighbour of Indonesia, where large nnmbers of my fellow countrymen live and work, my cOl1ntry-it goes without saying-desires above everything else a smooth and peaceful transition. This is the reason why my delegation has associated itself with the delegations of Cuba, Norway and the United States in preser.ting the draft resolution which is before the Council. Mais, tout en souhaitant que la transition de I'etat de co1onie a l'etat de nation independante s'eft'ectue d'llne maniere pacifiquc et sans hel1rts, les membres du Conseil de secl1rite doivcut se conformer aux principes de la Charte, et nOllS ne sallrions, pour des raisons d'opportunite, porter atteinte aux grands principes de l'Org,anisation des Nations Unies. Les partics au differend accepteront sans doute une partie des termes de cette resolution, alors qu'ils en rejetteront d'autres. En fait, meme les auteurs de ce texte ne sont pas. tOllS egalement satisfaits de certains points de la resolution. La resolution l'epresente le fruit d'Ull effort de cooperation. AU5si a-t-dle exige de ses a\1teurs, et exigera-t-e1le des deux parties nu differend, un esprit de conciliation et de comprcmis. Cependant, je suis convaincu que cette resolution, si elle est adoptee par le Conseil uc securitc et acceptee loyalement paries Pays-Bas, permettra de resoudre ce probleme si complique et si important et renforcera l'utilite et le prestige du Conseil. milc wc aim at a smooth and peaceful transition from colonial status to national independence, members of the Security Council are bound by the principles of the Charter, and we cannot serve expediency at the expense of the great principles for which the United Nations stands. The tenus of this draft resolution will be found to be in put satisfactory and in part uns<ltisfactory to both parties to the dispute. As a matter of fact, in regard to the same particulars, they are not even satisfactory to the same extent to all the sponsors of the draft resolution. The drnft resolution represents a co-operative effort Md, as stlch, it has required from the sponsors. and will require from the two parties to the dispute, a lal·ge measure of compromise and accommodation. I am satisfied, however, that the draft resoltltion, if passed by the Sl:curity Council and if accepted loyally by both the Netherlands and the RepUblic of Indonesia, WQuld flat only solve this very important and complicated problem, but in solving it would a1so strengthen the usefulne~s and the prestige of the Security Council. Since the representatives of Cuba and the United States have already made their statements on the terms of the draft resolution, I find it tmnecessary to try to cover the whole ground. I shall limit myself to those points of the draft resolution which in my opinion reqnire some elucidation and empha5is. Etant donne que les representants de Cuba et des Etats-Unis ont deja fait conna.itre Jellr opinion sur 1es termes du projet de resolution, j'estime inutile de passel' en revue tOllS les details de cette proposition. Je vais, par consequent, limiter mll declaration aux points du proiet de resolution qui, a mon sens, meritent d'e,tre ec1airci5 et soulignes. En premier hell, ce projet de resolution reitere la demancle formulee par le Consell de securite an sujet de la remise en liberte des chefs politiques de la Republique d'Indone~ie. Les autorites des Pays-Bas ont, jusqu'a present, manifeste quelque hesitation a mettre pleinement it execution cette partie des decisions prises par le Conseil a Paris, J'avoue que je n'ai jamais pu comprendre celte hesitation. Si on vent aboutir a un reglement ql1i soit le resultat de negotiations, it faut qLle les chefs responsables de la Republique d'Indonesie retrotlvent leur liberte de mouvement et d'action, condition indispensable pour leur permeltre de remplir le'.!rs obligations. Les autorites neerlan~ daises entendent-elles imposer <lllX Indonesiens leur propre plan de reglement? Desirent-elles se debarrasser de la Republique d'Indonesie en tant In the first place, this draft resolution reiterates the demand of the Security Council for the immediate release of the political leaders of the Republic of Indonesia. The authorities of the Netherlands have hitherto shown some hesitancy with regard to the full implementation of this part of the Council's decision in Paris. I must say frankly that I have never been able to understand this hesitatio:J. If we are to have a negotiated settlement, we must have the responsible high officials of the Republic of Indonesia restored to that freedom of movement and action which alone can enable them to discharge their duties. Do the Dutc.h authorities mean th1.t the:y wish to impcse thelr own scheme of settlement on the Indonesians? Do thty wish to get rid of the Republic of Indonesia as a political entity? If I were tc deduce In the second place, the draft resolution "calls upon the Government of the Netherlands to insure the immediate discontinuance of all military operations, calls tlj:-on the Government of the Republic simultaneously to order its armed .adherents to cease gue~ril1a warfare, and caUs upon hotl·. parties to co-operate in the restoration of peace and :he maintenance of law and order throughout the area affectecl". 1 have quoted this paragraph verbatim. It is a very important paragraph. So far as I know, no member of the Security Council has tried to justify the use of force in Indonesia. Military operations, even s1:ch as might be designated under the term 0: dealing with the "roving bands", must ;;tulJ. Al.the same time, the Republic should call off guerrilla warfare. The problem of Indonesia can be worked out only in .?.n atmosphere oj peace.. The use of force by one party necessarily involves the use of force by the other party. This chain reaction must be stopped once and for all. It is in the interests of bOlh lhal it should :'c so. In the third place, this resolufon calls for ear:y restoration of the civil administration of the Republic, beginning with the capital city. In the fourth place, this resolution calls for the withdrawal of :he NeH.erlands armed forces from Repu::>lican territory.' In regard to both the I-estoration of civil admir.istratior. and the withdrawal of the Netherlands Army, the resolntion pays special attention to the requirements of public security and pro~ tection of life and property. We are not present- 'ing 'to the Secuity Council a th,=oretical proposition without regard to local conditions. As to the actual conditions prevailing today, this resolution does not presume to pronounce judgment. We have heard speakers here point to a "possible vacuum" should the Netherlands forces be suddenly, simultane011s1y and totally withdrawn from all parts of Indonesian territory. I have also heard sta~ements to the effect that, before the recent outheak of hostilities, the Repub~ lie had aLways managed to afford cue protection to life and property. I think it is wise for the Sec:uity Council not to judge at this distance from the scene of action which contention is ,the more correct one. We leave the rate of restoration of civil adminimation and the rate of with- Ce paragraphe, que je viens de citer mot pour mot, est extremement important Pour autant que je sache, aucun des membres du COnseil de securite n'a tente de justifier l'emploi de la force ell Indonesie. 11 faut mettre fin aux operations militaires, meme a celles qui ant pour but avoue ce supprilller de~ "bandes errantes". En mCmc temps, la Repu1::lique devrait mettre fin aux operations de guerilla. Le probleme indonesien ne peut are resolu que clans une atmosphere de paix. L'emploi de la force par l'une des parties entraine necessairement l'emploi de la force par I'autre partie. Cette reaction en chaine doit s'arre~ ter llne fois pour tOlltes. n doh ell ctre aim; duns l'inten~.t des deux parties. En troisieme lieu, cette resolution recomrn.ande un 'prompt retablissement de l'adm~nistra­ tion civile de la Repnblique, et cela en commensant par la capitale. En quatrieme lieu, la resolution exige le retrait des forces armees neer:andaises du territoire republicain. En ce qui concerne le retablisseme1Jt de ]'administrat:on civile et le retrait des forces neerlanclaises, la resDlution insiste fort particulierement S'.1r les exigences de la securite pllbligue et sur la necessite de protegeI' la vie et les biens des habitants. NODs ne presentons pas au Conseil de securite une proposition theorique, ne tenant pas compte des conditions locales. Toutefois, les: auteurs de la resolution ne pretendent pas porter de jugement sur la situation e)(istant actuellemen( dans le pays. Certains orateurs ont affirme id qu'un retrait simultane, soudain cl total de tClutes les forces neerlandaises stationnees en terri:oire indonesier. pourrait laisser un "vide". D'autre part, j'ai entendu dire que, avant la recente ouverture des hastilites, la Republique avait toujottrs reussi a proteger la vie et les biens, des habitants. le pense que le Conseil de seeurite agirait sagement s'it s'abstenait de ponerun jugement, de si loin, sur l'ex~ctittlde de thacune de ces theses. Nous laissons a. nos repre- En cinquieme lieu, nous preeisons que l'etabIissement d'un gOllvernement federal provisoire, des elections permettant de designer [es representants au sein d'une assemblee constituante et le transfert de la souverainete par les Pays-Bas aux Etats-Unis d'Indonesie doivent faire l'objet de negociatiol1s entl'e les deux parties, avec 1'assistat1ce de nos representants. TeUes sont les trois grandes Hapes constructives qui doivent aboutir a la creation d'tme Illdonesie nouvelle et indepcndante. Cbacun cOlnprend les profonds espoirs que le peuple indonesien nourrit a l'egard de ces trois questions. Par sl:ite des delais intervenus dans le passe, nous avons juge important de suggerer des dates determinees, tout en faisant preuve d'une certaine sOL1plesse. Si nous ne fixiom pas de date, le peuple indonesien serait fOrt de'lU, et les chefs de la Republique eprouveraient alors de grandes difficultes a rallier leurs partisans i la cause de la moderation et de la patience. D'autre part, si nous ne prevoyions pas dc possibilites d'ajustement dans l'executiOll de cc programme notts pourriol1s, malgre nous, placer des obstaclc~ illsl1rmontables sur la voie des ncgociateurs, des administrateurs charges d'organiser des ell'ctions et des organes parlementaires qui. devront vote; de notlvelles lois en vue de la creation <le la nouvelle union. In the fifth place, we specify that the establish~ ment of an interim federal government, the election of representatives to a constituent assembly, and the transfer of sovereignty by the Nether~ lands to the United States of Indonesia should form the topics of a negotiation between the two parties, with the assistance of our representatives. These three acts are the great creative acts to bring about a new and independent Indonesia. Everybody has understood the great hopes which the people of Indonesia entertained on these three points. Because of delays in the past, we have thought it important to name target dates, providing at the same time for some meaSUre of elastidty. If we should fail to fix any date, we would grossly disappoint the Indonesian people. In that case, the leaders of the Republic would find it difficult to rally their followers to a course ?f moderation and patier.ce. On the other hand, !f we did not pl'Ovide some mode of adjustment In regard to the time-table, we might unwittingly place .insurmountable difficulties in the path of the negotlators, as also in the path of the administrators who will have to conduct the elections a~d in the path of the parliamentary bodies who wIn have to pass new legislation for the establish~ mellt of the new union. Since tbe Security Council began to deal with the IndDllesian question, new political entities ?3Ve ~pn1ng up in Indonesia. My understanding IS ~o the effect that the leaders in the new political uruts are not al1 of the same school of thought, Some favOllring the policies of the leaders of the Republic, while others favour a l.arger meaSllfe of federalism. Depuis que le COl1seil de securite a COlnmcnce l'examcn de la question indonesiennc, de noltvclles entites politigues ont surgi cn Indonesie. D'apres mes renseignell1ents, les chefs de ccs nOtlvelles unites politiques n'appartienncnt pas taus a la meme ecole. Certains d'entr~ eux sont en, faveur de la politigtte suivie par la Republique alors que d'autres sont favorables a un fe;jera~ lisme plus large. I.n an ai~r! memoirs which the RepUblican delegahon submitted to the Netherlands delegation Dans I'aide~memoire que la delegation de la Republique a presente a la deh§gation des Pays- Finally, this resolution provides for a commission vi the United Nations 1.0 assist the two parties in the negotiations which are to take place, as well as in the general implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council. ThroughOllt the last year, the Republic has wished for more active participation by the Committee of Good Offices in the negotiations in Indonesia, whereas the nuthorities of the Netherlands have always tried to limit the scope of our intervention as well as the efforts of our Committee of Good Offices. The present resolution takes a middle course. The new commission will act by a majority vote. It will have the power to make recommendations to the two parties as well as to the Security Council. In association with my colleagues from Cllba, Norway and the United States, I heartily commend this rl'sc1ution to the approval of the emire Council. I know that there remain questions, anxieties and doubts Oll the part of the two parties to the dispute. I can only say that if we get OVf'f the nf>-xt thrf>f> m,)nths in Indonesia we shall find the next three years much easier. In a constrtlctive task of this type, success at the beg:nning paves the way for future succe5S I am convinced that once the United States of Indonesia gets to work it will lmow how to act. Mr. VAN ROlJEN (Netherlands): Since the joint draft resolution contained before us in document S/1219 has been circulated only today, it is, ()f tC111rse, impossihl", for me to inform the Council as yet of the attitude et my Government in regard to this document, the text of which I have cabled to The Hague. It seems desirable, furt1H~rmore, that my Governmtnt ShOl:Jd, before taking any decision, have the bene_ fit of the txphmatians and comments which have been given, and which perhaps remain to be given, to the Council by the sponsors of the resohttion. I shall be glad to inform the Council of my Government's views regarding the draft resolution as soon as possible. Yet, while entirely resen'ing my own posttJOn and that of my Government with regard to (his draft resolution, there is one point in the doc:u~ ment before us upon which I should like to comment immediately, because I am afraid that, in itself, it cannot fail to lead to a certain misunderstanding and to arouse ill feeling in Indonesia. Enfin, cette resoltltion [lrevoit la creation cl'une cammiS:Jion des Nations Unies chargee d'aider 1es deux parties clans les negociations futures et, d'Wle maniere generale, dans la mise en application des resolutions du Conseil de· securite, Pendant tout le COllfS de l'annee precedente, la Republiqtte a souhaite ltne participation pIllS ac:tive de la Commission de bons offices dans les negociations qui se sont derou1ees en Indonesie, a10rs que les autol'ites neer1andaises ant constamment essaye de limiter la portee de l'interven~ tion du Conseil ainsi que celle des efforts de la Commissions de bons 'offices. La presente resolution prend un parti lUoycn. La nouvcllc co:n-- mission agira par \'oie de decisions prises a la majorite. Elle aura le pouvoir de faire des recot11- mandations aux deux parties ainsi qu'au Conseil de securite. Je desire m'associer a mes collegues de Cuba, de la Norvege et des Etats-Unis pour recommander cette resolution a l'approbation unanime du Consei!. Je sais qu'il reste de nombreuses questions a regler, qu'l1ne certaine anxiete subsistI', que chacune des deux parties au differend eprouve df's doutes. J~ dois me homer a dire que, si noLts franchissons les trois 1l1ois qui vont venit', les trois annees qui suivront seront beaucollp plus faciles. Dans une ceuvre cotlstnrctive de cette natllre, un succes obtenu au debut appelle de nouveaux succes. Quand les Etats-Unis d'lndonesie seront organises, ils sauront ce qu'ils ont afaire. M. VAN RorJEN (Pays-Bas) (traduit de l'anglais) ~ Etant donne que le texte du projet de resolution contenLI clans le document 5/1219 n'a ete_ distribl1e qu'al1jourd'hui, i1 m'est impossible d'informer des a pre5ent le Conseil de l'attitude adoptee par lUon Gouvernement 11 l'egard de Cl' document, dont j'ai communique le texte par cah1e a La Haye. De plus, il semble que, 'lvant de se prononcer, man Gotlvernemcnt <1evrait benencier des explications et des commen~ taires qui ont ete faurniS, ainsi que de ceux qlll, peut-etre, seront encore donnes au Conseil par les autel1rs de la resolution, Je serai tres hel1reL1X de faire connaitre au Conseil les Vl1es de !nDn Gouvernemcnt sur le projet de resolution aussitot que possible. Cependant, tout en reservant ma position et celle de mon Gouvernement aU sujet de ce texle, je voud~ais, des main.tenant, formuler quelques observatlOltS sur un pomt du document dont nous sommes saisis. En effet, je crain:; fort qu'i1 ne provoql1e des malcntendus et meme un cert:;,in malaise en Indonesie. Ii s'agit de la phrase qui This is all I have to say for the moment. Mr. MAUl<: (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has studied the draft resolution of the four Powers and wishes to make the foHowing observations with regard to its substance. By rejecting the USSR delegations' proposal [Sjl148] for immediate steps to put an end to the Netherlands Government's aggression against the Republic of Indonesia and to protect the legitimate interests of the Republic and its people, the Ang10-American majority in the Security Council has assumed full responsibility for any further developments in the Indonesian question. The Netherlands Government, confident of the support and encouragement of certain members of the Security Council, including in the first rank the United States and the United Kingdom, ignores the Council's resolutions and continues its aggression against the Republic. And here, meanwhile, the long drawn~out bargaining with the aggressor has been going on. In thecourse of this bargaining, both the aggressor and his pro· "tectors have made statements about so·called plans for the settlement of the Indonesian question. Now, the salient feature of these statements is that their substance is practically identi~ eal, which would go to prove prior agreement on the matter among their authors. The outcome of all this is the said draft resohltion, which fully satisfies the aggressor", is acceptable to his protectors and abettOis and ignores entirely the legitimate interests of the Indonesian Republic and its people. What is proposed in this draft resolution? It is alleged in the preamble thal the parties continue to adhere to the principles of the Renville Agreement. Yet the authors of the resolution them~ selves are quite aware that such assertions fall wide of the truth. Renewal of military action Je comprends aisement, et je suis certain que les federalistes le comprendront aussi, pourquoi les auteurs du projet de resolution ant mentionne les f6deralistes. Mais je crains fort que cette clause, dans sa redac:tion actuelle, ne provoque plut6t une impression douloureuse. En effet, elle semble indiquer qu'il s'agit en quelque sorte d'un geste de favcur et d'une conc:ession de la part du Conseil de securite qui dit que les federalistes "pourront ctre autorises" - je repete ces mats "pourront etre autorises" - "a prendre part aux negociations". Ces federalistes representent deux tiers de la population de l'Indonesie, soit pres de 45 millions d'Indonesiens. It me semble qn'ils seront parfaitement fondes a demander que, en tant _que representants de la plus grande partie des habitants de I'Indonesie, ils soient invites de droit, et non pas seu1ement" autorises a participer aux negociations". Cest tout ce que j'ai a dire pour le moment. M. MALIK (Union des Republiques sociali5tes sovietiques) (fraduil du russe): La delegation de I'URSS a etudi6 le projet de resolution des quatre delegations et vent faire la declaration suivante quant au fond de ce texte. Etant clonne qu'elles ont rejcte la proposition de la dHegation de l'URSS [5/1148] qui prevoyait des mesures immediates en vue de meUre fin a I'agression lancee par le Gouvernement neerlandais contre la Republique d'Indonesie et de proteger les interets legitimes de cette Republique et de son peuple, la majorite anglo-americaine au Conseit de securite a, par la merne, assume pleine et enti';re responsabilite de la fat;on dont la question indonesienne va evoluer dans l'avenir. Fort de l'appui et de la protection que lui accordent certains membres dn Conseil <ie sewrite et, en tont premier lieu, les Etats- Unis et le Royaume-Uni, le Gotlverncment neer- I<lndais poursuit son agression contrc la Repu~ blique et ne se soucie guere des resolutions du Consei!. Quant au Conseil, il s'est livre entre temps a un marchandage interminable avec l'agresseur. All cours de ce marchandage, l'agresseur aussi bien que <=eux qui le protegent ont fait des Mcbratiom sur ce qu'ils appellent des plans destines .i regter la question indonesienne. Toutes ces declarations ont ceci de particulier que leur contenn est presque identique, ce qui demontre de manit:l"e evidente qu'elles ont ~te concertees. Le resultat de tout cela a ele nn projet de resolution qui fait entierement l'affaire de l'agressenr, qui est acceptable a ses protecteurs et a ses complices et qui nt; tient aucun compte des interets legitimes de la Republique et du peuple d'Indonesie. Que propose done ce projet? II est dit dans ses considerations que les deux parties sont toujours fideles allX principes du Renville. Pourtant, les auteurs du projet de resolution euxmemes se rende.nt parfaitement compte que de telles ttffirmations ne correspondent p<lS a la Although the resolution recommends the release of the officials of the Government of the Indonesian Republic and. their return to ]ogjakarta, the functions and activities of the Government of the Republic are limited to the city of ]ogjakarta, while the release of the Republic's officials is recommended primarily so that they may order their armed adherents to cease guer- ' rilla warfare against the invader and thus make it easierfor the aggressor to annex the Repub· ]jcan territory occupied by him. . There can be no doubt that such proposals are favourable and acceptable to the aggressor only. Under the proposed resolutiOn the liberated Govemm.ent of t~e Indonesian Republic would exercIse Its functlOns, even in ]ogjakarta, under 'L'le Netherlands occupation regime. Obviotlsly, there can be no question of free and independent 3ct10n on the part of this Government. Such a proposal can only cover up aggression and delude bo~h. the Indonesian people and world public opinIon. In the same paragraph it is provided that the Netherlands authorities shall afford to the Goverrunent of the Republic of Indonesia such facilities as may reasonably be required by tha~ Gov:r~ment for its effective functioning. Thls proVISion makes the actions of the Government of the Republic still more dependent upon the Netherlands occupation authorities, Instead of demanding the immediate withdrawal of Nether!ands troops from the territory of the Repubhc and thus ensuring for its Government ful! soverei[!1ty, .freedom and independence of actlOn and restormg the Republic to its former status, the resolution first of a1l calls upon the Government of the Republic to order the cessation ?f all ,resistance to the aggressor and to remair. In JogJakarta under the supervision of the Neth- ~rlands atlthorities. That, in essence, is the meanmg. .of th: proposal concerning the release of po1Jtlcal pnsoners and the exercise of their functions within the boundaries of Jogjakarta. 1n these, circumstances, the posit;on of the ~overnmenl of the Indonesian RepubEc in Jog- Jak~~ta will be no whit different from the present p~sl~lOn of the Prime Minister and the five other mlnlsters of the Republic on the 1sland of Bangka. 1<1 question indonesienne, p1usieurs membres du Conseil de secl1rite, ainsi que 1es repn~sentants des pays interesses, ont aussi reconnu le fait incontestable que le Gouvernement neerlandais avait viole cet Accord. Comment peut-on, apres cela, affinner que le Gouvernement neerlandais continue a s'en tenir aux principes de l'Accord du Ren·viUe? Le projet de resolution prevoit, certes, que les personnalites officielIes faisant partie du Gouvernement de la Republique d'Indonesie doivent etre liberees et renvoyees a DjoKjakarta. Mais il stipule en meme temps que le Gouvernement republicain ne pourra exercer ses fonctions que clans la ville de Djokjakarta. Si donc On propose de 1iberer les personnalites officielles de la Repabliqlle, c'est avant tout pour Cju'elJes ordannent a leurs partisans armes de mettre fin aux operatoins de guerilla contre les intrus, ce qui permettrait a I'agresseur de conso1ider son emprise sur la pa1iie dLl territoire republica\n qu'il occ.upe, Des proposition de ce genre ne sont avanta· geuses et ne sont acceptables que pOur l'agresseur. Ce1a ne fait aucun doute. En dIet, cette resolution imp1ique que, IDeme a Djokjakarta, 1es membres du Gouvernement de la Republique, une fois qu'ils auront ete 1iberes, auront i exercer leurs fonctions en se conformant aux exigences d'un regime d'occtlpation neerlandais. 11 est bien evident que ce Gouvernement ne pourrait prendre :l.ucune decision libre et independante. Une telle proposition ne servirait qu'a couvrir I'agressiqn et ainduire en erreur, au moyen de grands mats, le pellple d'Indonesie et l'opinion publiql1e man· dia1e. L~ mhne paragraphe du projet de res9lution prevoit que 1es autorites ne~rlandalses devront donner au Gouvernement de la Repu· blique d'Indonesie toutes les facilites que cel~i-ei pauna raisonnab1ement exiger pOllr s'acqUltter efficacement de ses fonctions, Les alltorites d'ac· cupation neel"laarlaises re~oivent donc un moyen de plus de contr6ler l'aetivite du Gouvern~m.ent de la Republique. Au lieu d'exiger le retralt lrtlffiediat des forces neerlandaises dll territoire de la Repub1iqlle et d'assurer ainsi au Gouvernement republicain sa liberte d'action et ses droits souverains, au lieu de rcstaurer la situation que la Republique avait auparavant, on propose au Gouvernement nfpub1icain de donner tout d'abord ]Jordre de cesser toute resistance a l'agresseur et de s'installer ensuite a Diokiakarta, sous la sur~ veiliance des troupes neei-1a~daises d'occupation, afin d'y attend]'e les or,cires des autorites neer- 1andaises. Voilu aqtloi se reduit. dans son es~ence, la proposition relative a la liberation des detenus politiques et a 1eur retour en fonction dans les limites de Djokjakarta. Das ces conditions le Gouvernement de la Republique dJlndones{e se trouvel'ait a Djokjakarta dans Llne situation qui ne differerait'en rI.en de ceUe ou se trouvent en ce moment, le PrerUler Ministre d'Indonesie 'et cinq autres Min~streS republicains detenus a l'lle de Bangka. As to the proposal to set up a "United Nations Commission for Indonesia", this primarily involves only a change of name, as the commission is nothing more than a new name for the Committee of Good Offices, the composition of which would remain unchanged. Moreover, any extenw sion of the Committee's terms of reference would give the United States representative, who plays a leading part in that body, still greater opportunities to intervene in the domestic affairs of Indonesia. Experience shows that so far the purpose of such intervention has been not to protect the laww ful interest of the Republic and its people but to cover up the policy of Netherlands agogressors and to protect the interests of the American monopo· lies, which, as we know, ha.ve profitably invested hundreds of millions of dollars in Indonesia and work hand in glove with the Netherlands aggressors for the sl1ppression of the freedom and independence of the Indonesian Republic. Experience shows that the Committee of Good Offices has been nothing more than a screen behind which the Netherlands authorities prepared new acts of aggression against the Indonesia Republic. This same Committee of Good Offices, given a new title and wider powers, will again be nothing but a screen enabling the Nether· lands authorities to take advantage of the results of aggression by abolishing the Indonesian Repllblic altogether and by continuing their attempts to deprive the people of the Republic of their freedom and independence and to drive them back into colonial slavery. l'Ind(ln~sie", il ne s'agit l.i que d'un changement d'etiquette. On se propose simp1ement de desiw gner la Commission de bons offices pour 1'lndonesie sous le nom de Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Indonesie, sans en changer aucunement la composition. D'autre part, l'elargissement du mandat de la Commission permettrait au representant des Etats-Unis, qui joue a cette Commission le role principal, d'intervenir encore plus 1ibrement dans les affaires interieures de I'Indonesie. L'experience montre que, jusqu'a mall1tenant, cette intervention a eu pour but, non point de protegeI' les interets legitimes de la Republique et du peup1e d'Indonesie, mais de couvnr la politique des agresseurs neerlandais et de JCfendre les jnten~ts des monopo1es americains. On sait, en effet, que ces derniers ont investi des centaines de millions de dollars dans les riches entreprises d'Indonesie et agissent la main dans la main avec les agresseurs neerland<lis en vue d'ecraser l'independance et la liberte de la ReplIbligtle d'Indonesie. L'experience montre que les autorites neerlandaises ont profite de l'existence de la Commission de bons offices pOllr r.1ieux preparer 1es nouveaux ades d'agression qu'ils s'appretaient cl. commettre contre la Republique d'lndonesie. Cette Commission de bans offices, meme si on la baptisait aulrement, meme si on llli accordait un mandat plus lal-ge, resterait toujours un simple ecran a l'abri duquelles autorites neerlanw daises pourraient tirer le meilleur paIti de I'agression qu'elIes avaient commise en vue d'aneantir definitivement la Reptlbllque d'Indonesie. La Commission continuera a aider les l-Iollandais dans leurs efforts pour fruster le peup1e de la Republique de sa liberte et de son independance, et' pour lui imposer, de nOllveau, le :regime de servitude coloniale. Even this nebulous proposal, however, has a n:lmber of qualifying statements, the effect, of Wllich is tc deprive it of any practical meaning. Among the3e qualifications is the use of the word "progressively"-this word calls for quotation marks-and the statement that the proposed rneasures shall be "consistent ... with public security". There is even a solicitous provision for retaining Netherlands armed farces in any area of the Republic under the rretext that they may "assist in the maintenance of law and order". Thus we see that the draft resolution does not Jl!ovide fcr an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Netherlands treops from the territory of the Indonesian Republic. It leaves the question of their withdrawal to the disc,etion of t~e comm:ssion and to the discretion of the Netherlands occupation authorities themselves. Such a prcposal call therefore be considered only as an attempt to strengthen and legitimize the forcible occupation of the Republic's territory by 6e armed forces of the Netherlands. La delegation de ]'URSS considere qlle tOl1tes les trotl:Jes neerlandaises c.oivent etre retirees du territoire de la Republique d'Indonesie imme~ diatement et sans aucune conditicn ni aucune .excepticn, que cette evacuation ne saurait relever de la commission et encore mains des autorites neerlandaises, qui ont tente de justifier lem· agression cantre la Repllbliql1e d'Indonesie en invoquant la necessite de "mair:tenir l'ordre public". En ce qui concerne le maintien de l'ordre public sur le territoire de la Republique d'Indonesie, il doit etre asstl!e par le Gouver...ement de la Republiqlle lui-meme, et non par des occupants etrangers. L'experiencc Inontre que ce Gouvernement est carab1e d'etablir et de maintenir l'ordre et la securite sans l'intervention d'agresseurs etrallgers. Qu'on retire les forces neerl~­ daises eu territoire de la Republiql1e d'Indone';le, qu'on laissc au Gouv<:rnement de celle-ci pleme liberte et pleine sOl1verainete, et on verra, ;;ans aucun doute, que l'ordre et la legalite seront retablis et assures. A C~ propos, 11 y a lil:1I de :rde\'er unc decla.- ration du representant dll Royal1me-Uni [40011111& seafice] qui a tente de nous persnader que, le retrait des troupes neerlandaises pourrait aeer un "vide dangereux", etant donne gu'il n'y a pas, su:' le territoire de la RepttbJique, de forces suscepfbles de maintenir l'ordre. L'existellce et The USSR delegation hold that all Netherlands troops must be withdrawn frcm the territory of the Indonesian Republic immediately and without conditions or exceptions and 6at the question of tnis withdrawal cannot be left to the discretion cf the commission and still less to that of the J\Tetherlands mlthorities, whic:l have even tried to excltse their aggression against the Indonesian Republic by references te tile "maintenance of law and order". Law ani order in the terr.tory of the Indo· nesian Republic must be maintained not by the armed forces of foreign invaders, but by the Government of the Republic itself. ElCperience has shown that the Government af the Republic is capable of establishing and maintaining law and order without the intervention of foreign t:surpers. Ta~e away the Netherlanc.s troops from the temtory of the Indonesian Republic, ~nfer full freedom and sovereign rignts on its Govern':lent, and, beyond any doubt, law and order WIll be restored and maintained. In this connexion, attention must be drawn to t~e attempts of the United Kingdom representat:ve [400tA meeting) to introduce the :dea of a "dangerous vacuum" which in his opinion might be formed by the withdrawal of the Netherlands troops and to his assertion that there are no forces capable of maintaining order in the territorv of tIle Republic. Tile .existence and activity of gov- As to the wish expressed in the draft resolu~ tioD that free and democratic elections should be held in Indonesia and in the terirtory of the Republic, no such wish or proposal can have any real meaning unless the question of the withdrawal of the Netherlands troops from the territory of the Republic is settled beforehand; that wish is therefore entirely false and hYllocritical. If the Security Council were to decide that elections in the Republic should be carried out under the occupation regime, the only result would be to create false and harmful illusions. Thus an analysis of the substance of the draft resolution shows that its verbose pl1Taseology conceals the following purposes and intentions, which are unacceptable and contrary to the Nations Charter: first, to abolish the Indonesian Republic and to do away with its Government; and secondly, to make it easier for the aggressor to consolidate his shaky positon in the country he hliS invaded, Such u resolution can be (lescribed only as a blank refusal to protect the legitimate interests of the Republic which has fallen victim to militaryattack, Like all the peoples of the world, the Indonesian people cannot but regard the draft resolution suhmitted by four delegations, with the United States delegation in the lead, as the outcome of the policy of barter and agreement between the United States of America and the Netherlands aggressors-a policy which is designed to put an end to the free and independent existence of the Indonesian Republic and to deliver it to the tender mercies of the aggressor. There is no need to prove the ntdimentary fact that unless the Netherlands troops are withdrawn from the territory of the Indonesian Republic and the Republic itself is restored to its former status, the adoption of such a resolution by the Council would mean open approval of the Nether~ lands Government's aggre3sion against the Indonesian Republic. The PRESIDEN'r: Unless there are any further speakers, I propose to adjourn this meeting now, The draft resolution which we have before us in document 5/1219 is of such far.reaching importance that I am sure that the parties, as well as the members of the Security Council and others interested, win wish to have sufficient h~galite et I'ordre, a condition, bien entendu, que l~s Puissances colonialistes pratiquant une politique d'agression ne genent pas la libre existence de ces pays et n'attentent pas a lellr independance. Quant a la recommandation contenne dans le projet de resolution et tendant a l'organisation d'elections libres et democratiques en Indonesie et sur le territoire de la RepubJique, elle ne saurait avoir, meme si elle prenait la forme d'une proposition, aUCllne importance reelle tant que la question du retrait des trOllpes neerlandaises stationnees en territoire de la Republique n'aura pas Cte reglee. Cette recommandation constitue, par consequent, une simple hypocrisie. L'adoption par le Conseil de securite d'une resolution tendant a l'organisation d'elections dans la Republique, alors meme que celle-ci se trouve placee sous un regime d'occnpation, ne pourrait que donner naissance a des illusions faIlacieuses et dangereuses. Ainsi done, il suffit d'examiner quant nu fond le projet de resolution qui naus a ete presente pour se relldre compte que cette phraseologie redondante ne sert qu'a dissimuler des buts et des intentions inadmissibles et incompatibles avec la Chute des Nations Unies: en premier lieu, on vise a supprimer la Reptlblique d'Indonesie et a. liquider son GOllvernement, et, en second lieu, on cherche a aider l'agresseur a consolider sa position vacillante clans le pays dont il s'est empare. Ce projet constitlle bel et bien un refus detiben~ de proteger les illterc~ts legitimes de la Republique devenue victime d'une agression a main armee. Ii est certain que le pel1ple d'Indonesie et les peuples dl1 monde entier considereront le texte presente par quatre delegations et, en premier lieu, par la delegation des Etats-Unis, comme contenant des propositions inspirees par une politique de marchandage et d'entente entre les Etats- Unis d'Amerique et les agresseurs neerlandais, par une politique visant a mettre fin a ]'independance de la Republique d'lndonesie et a Evrer cette derniere aux represailles de l'agresseur. Le fait est trap evident pour qu'il y ait besoin de le demontrer: en adoptant une resolution de ce genre, sans que les troupes neerlandaises soient retirees du territoire de la Republique d'Indonesie et sans que le statut interieur de la Republique ait ete retabli, le Conseil de securite sanctjonner~it ouvertement l'agression commise par le Gouvernement neerlandais contre la Repu~ blique d'Indonesie. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): A moins que d'autres orateurs ne veuillent prendre la parole, je me propose de lever la seance. Le projet de resolution dont nous sommes saisis et qui figure au document 5/1219 revet Une importance telle que les parties en cause, Ies membres du Conseil et Ies autres pays interesses desi- The meeting rose at 6.5 p.m. La seance est levee d 18 h. 05.