S/PV.403 Security Council

As usual, interpretation will he consecutive for members of the Security Cou,ncil and simultaneous for all other speakers. It will be recalled that at our last [4021!d] meeting 11 draft resolution was submitted jointly by the representatives of China, Cuba, Norway and the United States of America, the text of which is contained in document 5/1219. Since that meeting. a cablegram [S/1222] dated 23 January has been received from the Prime Minister of India and Chairman of the New Delhi Conference on Indonesia, addressed to the President of the Security Cottncil and transmitting a resolution adopted by that Conference concerning the Indonesian question. That cablegram is contained in document S/1222. In acknowledging the communication from the Prime Minister of India, I have informed him that that communication will be brought to the attention of the Security Cmmcil. Since our last meeting, a report bas also been received from the Committee of Good Offices, dated 2~ )anua.ry a,nd transmitting ,an analysis of the military slttmtlOn. That report IS contained in document S/1223. Cctte recommandation fait I'objet du cinquieme paragraphe de la resoh,tion de l'Assemblee g~ne­ rale, en date du 19 novernbre 1948. J'avais l'intention de demander I'accord d~s membres du Conseil de securite pour translllettrt cette lettre au President de la Commission des armements de type classique, et de prier la Commission de poursuivre 'l'etude mentionnee dans la resolution de l'AssembU~e generale. Cependant, j'ai ete in forme que, de l'avis de la delegation de I'URSS, it fattdrait, avant d'agir, donner aux membres du Conseille temps de refJe- ,chir a ceUe qLtestion. Donc, si je comprends bien, la delegation de l'URSS <Jesire voir ajourner de ql,elqt1es jours l'examen de cc point. Si tel est le cas, et si les membres du Conseil de secl1- rite n'y voient pas d'inconvenient, je propose d'adopter I'ordre dn jour, etant entendu que nous passerons immediatement a ]'examen du point 3, c'est-a.-dire la question indonesienne. S'il n'y a pas rl'objection, je dedarerai que l'ordre clu jour est adopte avec cette reserve. 3. Suite de la discussion sur la question indonesienne Sllr l'invitation du President, M. Haod, repre- sentant de l'Aflstralie; M. van LangenfJove, repre- self/an.t de la Belgique; M. U So Nyun, repri- senfGllt de la Birnwnie; Sir BeJlegal Rama R(Iit. representant de l'Inde; M. van Roijell, reprcsentan! des Pays-Bus; M. Ingles, repres~H­ tant des Philippines, et M. Palar, representant dr la Repftblique d'Indonesie, prenlumt place cl; la table du Conse'il. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais); Comme d'habitude, les discours des membres un Canseil de securite feront l'objet d'une interpretation consecutive, et ceux des autres repnfsentants d'une interpretation simultanee. Les membres du Conseil se rappcllent qu'au coms de notre derniere reunion [402~me-seancel, un projet de resolution, qui fait l'objet du docu- ment 5/1219, a ete presente ell commun parIes representants de la Chine, de Cuba, de la Nor- vege et des Etats-Unis, Depnis, le President du Conseil de securite a rec;u Ul! Premier Ministre de l'Tnde, agissant en sa qualite de President de la Conference de New-Delhi sur l'!lldonesie, un teJegramme [5/1222J date du 23 jallvier trans' mettant une n!:soltttion qui a ete adoptee par cette conference au sujet de la question indonesienne. Ce telegramme fait l'objet du document 5/1222. Lorsque j'ai accuse reception de Cl'. t<Hegramme, j'n.1 informe le Premi",r Ministre de ]'Inde que cette communication serait soumise a l'attentiotl du Conseil de securite. D'autrt part, depuis notre derniere reunion, la Commission de bons offices nous a fait parvenir un rapport donnant une analyse dela situation militaire. Cl'. rapport fait l'objet du document Sj1223. We shall now continue our discussion of the draft resolution submitted jointly by the repre- sentatives of China, Cuba, Norway and the United States. Sir Benef.al Rama RAu (Indi<l) : Before Idea! with the draft resolution submitted jointly by the representatives of Ch~na, Cuba, Norway <Ind the United States of America, I should like to offer just one observation with regard to the statement of the representative of Belgium who at the last [402OOJ meeting, repeated the familiar arguments: in support of the contention that this is a purely domestic affair. After an exhausting world war, we have emerged into a new age in which all the countries of the world have been brought very close to one another. I am astonished that in these times anybody could urge that the Indonesian question was a domestic issue, when it has produced the gravest repercussions throughout the world, and, has forced 19 different countries in Asia and in the Pacific to meet at very short notice and to pass a unanimous resolation indicating the gravity of the situation, and the possibilities of a menace to world peace. If the Security Council refused to intervene in such a matter, I would say, to borrow the language of the representath:e of Belgillll1, there "would be the end of the COllll- dJ's prestige and authority". If his next-door neighbour started manufacturing and experiment- ing with high explOSIves, I wonder whether the representative of Belgium would regard it as a matter of purely domestic concern. I shall nOw deal with the draft resolution [5/1219J submitted by the four Powers at tl1e last meeting. Since it was submitted, we have received, ill the form of a constructive, states- manlike and sober resolution, the views of the nineteen nations which assembled in New Delhi. Of course, as a representative of Inc1ia, I must urge the Security Council to give careful con- sideration to the New Delhi resolutlon and to modify the resolution of the four Powers so as to bring it, as far as it is practicable to do so, into conformity with the New Delhi resolution. The points of difference are not many, and I would li!<e to indicate a few rllodifications which _seem to me to be absolutely essential if the fou r- Power scheme is to be m<lde workable. I et de modifier le proj et des quatre puiss:mc.es, de maniere a le renclre, dans la mesure du pos- sible, c.onforme a la resolution de New-Delhi. Les divergences entre ces deux textes ne sont pas nombreuses et je vouclrais indiqtler quelques modifications qui me semblent absolllment indis- pensables si l'on vellt que le projet des quatr(! Puissances pl1isse produire des effets. Certains principes importants enol1ces dans le document cle travail original qui a ete distribuc par le representant des Etats-Vnis ant ete mo~ (Hfies dans le but e,,·klent d'arriver it nn accord entre les membres uu Cmiseil de securite et, je presume, de le rendre anssi acceptn!>le que possible au Gotlvernement des Pays-Bas. Au catlI'S de nos precedentes discussions, 1'on a TIle original working paper, which was circu~ lated by the representative of the Vnited States, has been modified, it will be: observed, in impor- tant principles, olwiously with the object of get~ ting a measure of agreement among the members of the Secllrity Council, and also, I presume, of makingit as acceptable as possible to the'Nether· lands Government.· Iri o'ur previous discussions Sir Benegal Rama RAU (lode) (tradm't de l'a"ltglais): Avant de parle;" dLl projet de n~"oll1­ tiol} presente en commun par les representnnts de la Chine, de Cuba, de la Norvege et des Etats- Unls, je desire hire llOe observation concemant La uec!nration du representant cle la Bclgique qni. au conrs de notre derniere rennioa r402cme seance], a repete cles argnments llien connus pour tenter de prouver que la question qui nous occupe est une affaire purement interieure. - Apres nne guerre mondiale devastatriee, DOUS sommes entres clans une nOllvelie epoque; tous les pays du monde sont devenus voisins les uns des autres. Je suis surpris qll'il se trallve, de nos jams, quelqu'un pour pretendre que la ques- tion indonesienne est un probleme d'ordre inte"- rieur, alors qu'elIe a eu des repercussions extre~ mement graves dans le monde entier et qu'elle a force 19 pays de l'Asie et de la region du Pacifique a se n~'.l.Oir d'urgence et a adopter a l'unanimite une resolution soulignant la gravite de la situation et I'existence d'ul1e lllenace pour la paix du monde. Si le Conseil de secl1rile 1'ef11- sait d'intervenir dans t.1ne affaire de cette impor- tance, je clirais, pour employer l'expression du representant de la BelgiqtlE qLle "e'en 5erait fini du prestige et de l'autorite dn Conseil". Si son yoisin immec1iat se mettait a fabriquer des explosifs puissants et it se livrer avec eltx a des Experiences, je me c1c111ande si le repre- selltant de la Belgiql1e eOllsidererait cela conune une afla\\·e pnrement intel'ieure. Je passe maintenant au projet de resolution presente par les quatre Puissances aLt coms de la derniere seance [5/1219]. Depllis qu'il nous a ete soumis l'on nous a COll101Unique une resolution qui expose d'une maniere constructive, sage et realiste, les vues des clix-lleufs nations qui se sont rassemblees it New~Delhi. En ma qualite de representant de !'Iude, je dois natmel- lement demander au COI1seil de securite d'exa- miner avec attention la rCSOI'.ltion de New-Delhi \Vc must not ignore the fact that the Nether· lands Government has in the past defied the reso- lutions of the Secltrity Coullcil, or, at any rate, failed tu carry them out. As the reports of the Committee of Good Offices clearly Indicate, there has been no co-operation and goodwill hitherto on the part af the Netherlands, and we cannot assume, with any degree of certainty, that they will be forthcoming in the fLlture. It is in the light-perhaps I should say, the gloom- of this black record that we shall have to consider whether the draft resolution of the four Powers creates the conclitons for a lasting settlement within a reasonably short time. The first point to which I wish to draw the attention of the Security Cotmcil is the pro- vision for tlle withdrawal of troops. The original Paris draft resolution [S/1142J demanded an immediate \vithdrawal of the troops to the 17 December line. It was urged that any such with- drawal would create a vacuum and might result in serious disorder and loss of life. I therefore suggested that the withdrawal operation should take place in stages and under conditions to be pre.scribed by the new Commission, but that the operation should be completed not later tharr 1 March 1949. J should like to draw the attention of the mem~ bers of the Security Council who are impressed by the argument about the possibilities of disA order as a result of the withdrawal, to the report of the Committee of Good Offices dated 24 Janu- ary 1949 [5/1223]. With the President's per- mission, I shall read out a few extracts from this report: "9. As a result of the Netherlands Army occupation and the consequent guerrilla activities, law and order within the. former Republican-con- trolled territories have, in general, not been estab. lished. Until now, in fact, serious disorders have been created. "10. There is evidence to show that there is economic confusion in territory formerly con· trolled by the Republic ... "12. A large amotmt of damage has resulted from looting, vandalism, and the Republican 'scorched-earth' policy. "] 3. . .. it can be stated that, because of the 'scorched-earth' policy and guerrilla tactics adopted by the Repllblic after 19 December 1948: "(a) The establishment of 1<lwand order has not yet been implemented in the former Repllbji~ can-controlled territories; "Cb) In many areas the Netherlands Army has not sufficient troops on the ground to combat immediately the tactics adopted by the Republic; Nous ne devons pas ignorer le fait que, clans le passe, le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas n'a pas tenu compte des resolutions du Conseil de see.u- rite ou, tout au mains, ne les a pas executees. Comme l'indiquent clairement les rapports de la Commission de bons offices, les Pays··Bas n'ont pas, jusqu'i present, fait preuve d'esprit de coope~ tatlon et de bonne volonte, et nons ne pouvons ftre certains que, i l'avenir, ils en feront prettve. C'est a la 1umiere de Cette triste experience et - qu'on me pennette de le dire, c'est le mot d'obscurite qui conviendrait mieux - que nous devrons determiner si le projet de resolution des quatre Pttissances permet de Creel', dans un delai raisonnable, des conditions qui rendraient POSA sibJe un reglement durable. Le premier point sur 1eqllel je voudrais attirer l'attention du Consei1 de Stkmite est la dispo- sition concernant le retrait des troupes. Le projet de resolution original adopte a Paris [S/1142J demande le retniit immeJiat des troupes sur 1es positions qu'elles occupaient au 17 decembre 1948. On a pretendu qU'lIn tel retra!t cr6erait un vide et pourrait prOVOquer de serieux desor- dres et des pertes de vies humaines. C'est pour- quoi j'avais propose que le retrait £Ut effectLu~. par etapes et rlans des conditions qui seraifllt determinees par la notlvelle CommLssion - etant entendu toutefois que ce retrait serait termine le ler m:J.rs 1949, all plus tard. Je voudrais attirer l'attention des membres du Conseil de securite qui sont sensibles it. l'argu- ment selon leque1 le retmit pourrait aboutir it. des desordres, sur le rapport de la Commission de bons offices en uate du 24 janvier 1949 [5/1223]. Si le President le penl1et, je lirai qud- ques passages de ce rapport: "9. Du fait de l'occupation neerlandaise et de j'activite qu'elle a provoquee de b part des gue~ rillas, il n'a pas ete possible de faire regner I'ordre public dans les territoires ou les repu- blicains exer~aicnt auparavant leur autorite. En effet, iL s'est produit jusqu'a present de graves desorclres. "10. 11 y a temoignage d'une confusion 6co- 110miql1e dans le territoire anterieurement contr61e par les republicains ... "12. Les actes de pillage et de vandalisme, ainsi que la tactique de la "terre brGlee" app1iCJ.~ee par les repl1bI-icains, ont cause de gros degats. "13.... il ressort , .. qUe, dtt fait d~ la poli- tique de la "terre brGlee" et des methodes tacti- ques des guerillas app1iquees par les republicains apres le 19 clecembre 1948: "a) L'ordre pLlblic n'a pu encore etre etabE dans les territoires anterieurement controles par les republicains; "b) Dans de nombrctlses regions l'arrr:ee neer- landaise ne dispose pas d'assez de troupes en campagne pour pareI' immediatement ala tac.tique ndoptee par les reptlblicains; "(d) The situation is not yet stable enough for tile initiation at present of a completely authoritative civil administration." Finally, the report states: "14. To be completely effective, a cessation of hostilities necessarily must be agreed upon by both parties." This is a story quite different from that pre~ sented to us by the representative of the Nether~ lands. We are considering- this resolution in the cool and placid atmosphere of the Security Council chamber, but it has to be implemented with the full co-operation of both parties in the heat and turmoil of gnerrilla warfare in Indo- nesia. Under the draft resolution of the four Powers, the Go\'ernment of the Republic has been called upon to order its armed <tdherents to cease guer- rilla warfare and to co"operate in the restoration of peace and the maintenance of law and order throughout the area affected. I urge the Security Connci! to consider whether, under the conditions created by the Netherlands aggression, it is pos- sible for the newly released Republican leaders- I am, of course, assuming th:'l.t tlley will be re~ leased-to induce their followers who are carry- ing on guerrilla warfal'e with a considerable measure of success, to cease guerrilla activity, until and unless the Netherlands troops are with~ drawll from the area formerly occupied by the Republican Government, or, at any rate, removed t? points to be determined by the new Commis- Sion. The Council is imposing upon the newly re- leased leaders an almost impossible task, and there is a danger that their failttre to fulnl it may be regarded as a refusal by the Republican Government to carry out the resolution of the Security Council. I therefore attach very J.-':reat importance to the withdrawal of troops before a specified date, say 15 lI'Iarch next, as an essential preliminary to tile creation of conditions which will make the working of this scheme possible. The second point r ''IIish to emphasize in this connexion is the importance of at least four or live months of settled government, if the plebis- cite is to be held in a "free and democratic atmos~ phere". It is obvious that the presence of Nether- lands troops at places where they are not wanted will act as an irritant and as an incentive to breaches of law and order. The third point to which I wish to draw the attention of the Security Council is the provision of economic and other resources for the success- ful functioning of the RepllblicaJ1 Government. The draft resolution states thllt "The recommen· dations of tile Commissioll may include provision for the economic well·being of the population of the areas involved in such transfers." "d) La situation n'est pas encore assez stable pour instaurer maintenant une administration civile en mesure cl'exereer une autorite tolale." Le rapport dit enfin: "14. Pour etre absolument effectif, un arret des hostilites devrll.it necessairement etre accepte par les deux parties." Voila qui differe entierement de Ce qui nous a ett!: dit par le representant des Pays-Bas. Nous examinons Cl" projet de resolution drrus I'ambiance detachee et plaeide de la salle dll Conseil de securite, mais nos decisiolls devront etre appli- quees en Indollf~sie avec I'entiere cooperation des deux parties, dans l'atrnosphere de violence et de desordre qui accompagne une guerilla, Aux termes du projet de resolution des quatre Puissances, le Gouvernement de la Republique a ete invite adonnet" a ses partisansannes l'ordre de cesser leurs <lp.hations de guerillas et de cooperer au retablissement de la paix, ainsi qu'au mailltien de l'ordre et de la legalite dans toute la region. le prie le Consei! de securite de re£le· chir a la question suivante: clans les conditions creees par l'agression neerlandaise, les dirigeants republicains liberes - je presume bien entendu qu'ils seront liberes - pourront-ils amener leurs adherents, qui poursuivent des operations de gue- rillas avec 1.10 succes conSiderable, a cesser toute activite avant qlle les Pays-Bas n'aient retire leurs troupes des regions precedemment oecupees par le GOl1vernement republicain ou du moins avant que ees troupes n'aient ete. n:tirees sur les positions devant etre clcterminees par la nou- vclle Commission? Le Conseil impose aux chefs recemment libe~ res utle tache qui est presque impossible a accom- plir; s'ils echol1aient, leur attitude risquerait cl'etre interpretee comme un refus, de la part du Gouvernement republicain, d'executer la reso- lution uu Conseil de securite. C'est p011rquoi j'attache une tres grande importance it Cl" que le retrait des troupes soit effectue avant tine cer- taine date, par exemple le 15 mars procllain. Ce serait une condition indispensable pour que le projet puisse avair un caractere pratique. Le second point que je voudrais souligner a ce propos est qu'un gouvernement stable devra avoir fonctionne au moins quatre ou cinq mois au moment de l'organisation des elections, si I'on "eut qu'elles aient lieu dans "une atmosphere 1ibre et democratique". Il est evident que la pre- sence de troupes neerlandaises dans les endroits ou elles ne sont pas desirees irritera les habitants et les incitera a porter atteinte a l'ordre et it la Mgalite. Le troisieme point sur lequel je voudrais attirer ['attention du Conseil de stcurite est que, pour bien fonctionner, le Gouvernement republicain aura besoin ele ressources economiques et alltres. Le projet de resolution stipule que: "La Commis- sion pourrll. inclure dans ses recommandations des dispositions visant a assurer, sur le plan eco- nomique ... le bien-etre de la population des regions interessees." I should, therefore, wish the Council to intro- duce a clause in the draft resolution instructing the Commission to recommend what economic resources should be provided for the proper func- tioning of the new Republican Govemment. We should also, I think, make it clear that all trade restrictions with foreign countries or between the various islands in the East lndies sllould be abolished, except Such as are agreed to by the Netherlands Government and the Republican Government in the interests of the economies of these islands. I shculd like to draw attention also to an important clause in the New Delhi resolution [5/1222], and that is the fixing of 1 January ]950 as the date by which complete sovereignty should be transferred to the new Government. The four~Power draft resolution indicates 1 July 1950 as the targf!t date, but the date has been made rather elastic. by the further provision under which, ". . if no agreement is reached by one month prior to" this date "the Commission, , , shall immediately report ..." If there is to he -a proviso of this sort, I do not see why the date should not be advanced to 1 January 1950. As I emphasized in my last speech [401st meeting], the fixirlg of an early date has considerable psy~ chological value, and I do nut think that the reso- lution should provide any incentive to undue postponement of decisions. As the members of the Security Council know, the date originally fixed in the Linggadjati Agreementl was 1 Janu- ary ]949. I .should also like t~e Security Council to con- sider why it should be necessary for the Com~ mission to report one rnonth before the date. If there are insuperable diffictt]ties in the way of the working of the scheme, surely the Commis- sion should report as soon as possible and not wait until the last Inoment. There is another point in the New Delhi reso- lution to' which I should like to draw attention, namely, the request to the Security Council to report to the General Assembly "the measures taken or recommended by the COtmcil for a soltltion of the Indclnesian oroblem and the action taken by the parties concerned to give effect to these measures", 1 See Th" PoUtical Evl'1!u in the Republic of Jmialluia, Netherland5 lnfonnatioll Burean, New York) page ~4. 1 Voir The Political Evellt.s ill the Repl,bl'c of Imlo- nesi'l, Bunau c!'infonnatiun des Pays~Bas, New_York, page 34. I have drawn attention to points required to make the four-Power scheme wnl'kable. Admit- tedly, it is a c:ompromisc and, like all compro- mises, it is bound to be unsatisfactory in some respects from the point of view of both parties. Like all schemes based on compromise, it can work only if there is g,oodwill on both sides and if there is <t genuine de~ire to overcome obstacles. I ciD not tllere fore propose to indulge in any destructive criticism on the four-Power scheme today. The issue is too grave for a purely nega- tive attitude. I should, however, like to draw attention to one feature of our discussions here. At every stage the Security Council has hlld opportunities of ascertaining the views ot the Netherlands Government through its representa- tives, and the draft resolution itself has obvious- ly been formulated in mild terms witll a view to making it <ts acceptable as possible to the Nether- lands Government. On the other hand, the prin- ciple Indonesian Republican leaders are stlll in confinement and have been Cl1t off from their followers for over a month. Although we have had the benefit of the views of tbe representative of Indonesia, we have had no opportunities of ascertaining the views of the principal leaders on whom will rest the responsibility for carry- ing out the resolution and for creating the con- ditions essential for successful negotiations. Both the New Delhi and the four-Power reso- lutions have been drafted without a 1:now1edge of the views of the pdncip.:d Republican leaders and it is obvious tbat the resolution adopted must be acceptable to both sides if we are to achieve the expressed objectives and desires of both parties. The implementation of the resolution reql1ires the active co-operation of both sides; otherwise we shall be setting an impossible task for the Commission. May I finally make an appeal to the Nether· lands Government? I do so witb all sincerity, for I have always had a great respect and admir- ation for the Dutch, for their love of freedom and for their democratic outlook. Asia has become politically conscious, and imperialism of the type prevalent in the nine~ teenth century cannot possibly survive in the new age into which we have emerged since the Second World War. The United States of America led the way in the Philippines. The United Kingdom has granted indepenc1ence to India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon and is rapidly shedding its imperialistic outlook. These countries have won theil' independence without a revolution and with- out a civil war. I can say definitely, as far as my country is concerned, that this gesture of the United Kingdom Government has killed the anti-British feeling engendered during the stmggle for independence for over half a cen- J'ai signa1e des conditions qui. doivent etre rem- plies pour que le projet des quatre Puissances ait une va1eur pratique. Ce projet, it faut le recon- naitre, est un compromis, et, camme taus 1es compromis, il doit iorcement laisser a desireI', a certains egarcls, du point de vue de chacune des deux parties en presence. Comme taus 1es plans resultant d'Ul\ compl'Omis, il ne peut etre app1iqlte que si les deux parties font preuve de bonne volonte et d'ul\ desir sincere de surmonter les obstades. Je me garderai donc de me livrer aujourcl'hui a tine critiqtte destructive du plan des quatre Puissances. La question est trap grave JXlur qu'on adopte a son egard une attitude pure~ rnent negative. Je tiens cependant a attirer l'at- tention sur un aspect particulier de nos discus- sions. A tout moment, le Conseil de securite a ete en mesure cle s'assurer des vues du Gouvernel11ent des Pays-Bas, par I'intermediaire des represen- tants de ce demier, et on a, de toute evidence, redige le projet de resolution 111i~merne en termes moderes, en vue de le rendre aussi acceptable que possible au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas. D'autre part, les principaux dirigeants de -la Republique d'Indonesie sont toujours internes et voila plus d'un mois qu'ils sont coupes de leurs partiS:lns. Si nous avons pu entendre le point de vue du representant de l'Indonesie, nous n'avons, par contre, jamais eu I'occasion de nous assurer des vues des prineipnux dit'igeants de la Republique, qui doivent assumer la rcsponsabilite de mettre la resolution en application et de ereer les condi- tions indispensables pour que les negociations soient courcnnees de succes. La resolution adoptee a New-Delhi et le projet de resolution praposc par les Quatre Puissances ont ete rediges dans l'ignorance des vues des principaux clirigeants repub1icains; or, il est evi- dent que la resolution qui sera adoptee dait pou- I'oir etre acceptee par les deux parties, si notlS voulons atieindre les objectifs et realiser ies desirs declares des deux parties. La mise en ceu- ",re de la resolution exige la cooperation active des deux parties; autrement, nous assignerions i la Commission une tache impossible aexecuter. Puis-je, pour finir, adresser un appel au Gou- vernement des Pays-Bas? Je Ic fais en toute sincerite, car j'ai toujours eu beaucoup de respect et d'admiration pour les Hollandais, leur amour de la liberte et de la democratic. La conscience politique de l'Asie s'est eveillee et l'imperia1isme te1 qu'il a existe au caurs du dix-neuvieme siecle n'a aucune chance de sur- vivre dans l'ere nO\lvdle dans laqu.elle' nous sommes entres apres la cleuxieme guerre mon- dia1e. Les Etats-Unis d'Amerique nous ont, aux Philippines, montre G.. voie. Quant au Royaume- Uni, il a acco!d~ l'independance cl. l'Inde, au Pakistan et a Ceylan. et il depouille rapidement ses conceptions imperialistes, Tous ces pays sont devellus independants sans revolution ni guerre civile. Je peux dire nettement que, en ce qui concerne man pays, ce geste du Gouvernement du Royaume·Uni a redtlit a neant les sentiments antibritanniques engendres pendant la lutte pour The Indonesian forces, instead of oi'fcring re- sistance-which would perhaps have been futile against troops with far superior equipment-have re-organized themselves into guerrilla bands. As reports of the Committee of Good Offices shaw, there has been considerable guerrilla activity 011 a wide scale and the guerrillas have had a con- siderable measure of success. The representative of the Indonesian Republic is quite confident abollt the ultimate success of guerrilla warfare. But it will mean enormous bloodshed on both sides. Even if by any chance the Netherlands forces win, there arc other weapons, perhaps more potent, such as non-eo-operation and pas- sive resistance, which have been made widely known by our great leader, tJle Inte Mallablla Gandhi, and which have baffled even tile mighty British Empire. I should like the Netherlands GoveTIlment seriously to consider whether it has any chance of success when the Indonesians have behind them the sympathy and full support of 19 Asian and Pacific countries and of the American Gov- ernment and public opinion, which has expressed itself in very strong language against the Dutch aggression. Tlle leader of the Indonesian Re- public confessed to me almost pathetically the other day that he had a sincere affection for tile Dutch, and I understand tllat this feeling is shared by 1110st of the Repllblican leaders. Under these circumstances the path of peace and co-operation is not only morally the rig,ht course but, from the political and ecal10mic point of view, the wisest and most advantageous for the Netherlands. I do hope that the Netherlands will accept this draft resolution awi carry it out in the spirit in which the Security Council has offered it, and thus attempt to wipe out all the hatred and re- sentment engendered during two years of futile and fruitless negotiations, Mr. Mar;: (Norway): I have asked to speak because I think the time has come to say a little about the background, the motives and also the intentions of the draft resolution [5/1219] which my delegation sponsors together with the delega- tions of China, Cuba and the United States of America. Au lieu d'opposer une resistance, qui aurait peut-etre ete vaine contre des troupes clisposant d'un equipement bien snperieur, les forces indo- nesi.ennes se sont organisees en; gnoupes lie guerilla. Comme le montrent les rapports de la Commission de bons offices, J'activite de guerilla est intense, s'exerce sur nne grandc echelle, et aboutit a des succes considerables. Le represen- tant de la Republique indonesienne ne dOllte pas du succes final des operations de guerilla. Mais cela signifie qu'il y aura des deux cotes d'enormes effusions de sang. Meme si, par extraordinaire, les forces neerlandaises l'emportent, il exisie d'autres armes, plus pt1issantes peut-etre, teUes que la non-cooperation et la resistance passive, qu'a fait connaitre partout notre grand chef de£unt, le Mahatma Gandhi, et qui ont decon- certe meme le puissant Empire britannique. J'aimerais que le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas se demandat serieusement s'il a la moindl'e chance de sllcces, alors qm, les Indoncsiens ant pour eux la sympathie et J'appui sans reserve de 19 pays d'Asie et du Pacifique, du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis et de l'opinion publique ameri~ caine, (jlll a netri, en tel'll1eS tres durs, I'agres- sion neerlandaise. Le chef de 'la delegation indo- nesienne m'a presque pathetiquernent avone ]'autre jour qu'il eprouvait pour les Neerlan{\ais une affection sincere et je crois savoir qlle ce :>entiment est paliage par la plttpart des dirigeants republicains. Dans ces conditions, la voie de la paix: et de la cooperation est non settlement la bonne voie du point de vue moral, mais enCore, des points de vue politique et ecanomique, la voie la plus sage et la plus avantageuse pour les Pays-Bas. J'espe:re tres since.ement que les Pays~Bas accepteront ce pl'ojet de resolution, l'applique- ront dans l'esprit clans lequel le Conseil de sectl~ rite 1'a propose et qu'iJs s'efforceront ainsi d'ef- facer tcute la haine et tmlt le ressentiment engen- dres au cours de deux annees de vaines nego- ciatiolls. M. MOE (Norvege) (trarlltit de l'anglais): Si j'ai demande la parole, c'est parce que je pense que le moment est venu de dire quelques mots de l'origine, des motifs et <lUSS; des intentions du projet de resolution qlle ma delegation prop?sc, conjointement avec 1es delegatio115 de la Chme, de Cuba et des Etats-Unis d'AnH~rique [5/1219]. In trying to find a solution, it is natural that we have been more concerned about the future than the past. Our aim has been to find a way that leads to positive results more than to try to fix responsibilities. It is otlr sincere hope that the parties will look upon the proposed solution in the same spirit, and that they will not let recriminations or con- siderations of prestige prevent them from co- operating wholeheartedly in the steps outlined in the draft resolution. We are fully aware that the solution pro- posed in the draft resolution is a compl'Omise. It has to be, because there are two parties to the conflict in Indonesia. I dare say that the atlthors of this draft resolution have carefully taken into consideration the rights and duties and the justi- fied claims of both parties. The parties them- selves are certainly aware of the fact that, if they are interested in a peaceful solution, each has to make some concessions to the other side. The intention of this draft resolution is to show the way not only to a peaceful solution, but to a peaceful solution that lays the basis for a lasting peace in Indonesia. Without such a lasting peace the NetherJands will have to main- tain a large army in Indonesia for years to come, and the future United States of Indonesia will not be able to develop itself economically, socially and politically as it desires. This is also one of the motives of the draft resolution. In accordance with the principles of the Charter, we have tried to find a soltltion based on conciliatioll; not a resohttion which would immediately have called for enforcement meas- ures. We did not consider such a resolution to be the proper contribution for the Security Council to make to the solution of this conflict. Instead, we have tried to find a common ground where one reasonably can expect the parties to meet. This should be so much the easier, because it is really only on the measures to be taken during the interim period that the parties disagree. The parties are in full agreement on the establishment of a federal, independent and sovereign United States of Indonesia at the earliest possible date. In view of this agreement, my delegation rejects En cherchant une solution, nous nous somlnes, bien entendu, preoccupes de l'avenir plus que du passe. Nous avons eu pour but de trouver une voie permettant d'aboutir a des resultats positifs, plutot que d'essayer ~e sitller les responsabilites. Nous esperons sinc'ereinent que les parties en presence voudront bien considerer dans le meme esprit la solution proposee et qu'elles ne per- mettront pas ades recriminations ou it. des consi- derations de prestige de 'les empecher de cooperer sans reserve aux mesures indiquees dans le projet de resolution. Nous savons parfaitement que la solution que propose ce projet de resolution est un compromis. C'est fatal, puisqu'il y a deux parties au conflit d'Indonesie. J'ose dire que les auteurs de ce pro- jet de resolution ont soigneusement pese les droits et les devoirs, ainsi que les aspirations legitimes des deux parties. Les parties elles- memes doivent certainement se rendre compte que, si eUes veulent une solution pacifique, cha- cune d'elles doit faire certaines concessions a l'autre. Ce projet de resolution se propose de montrer la voie, non seulement vers une solution pacifique, mais vers une solution pacifiql1e qui jette les bases cl'une paix durable en Indom~sie. Fatlte d'une telle paix dnrable, les Pays-Bas devront main- tenir pendant des annees des contingents armes importants en Indonesie; quant aux futnrs Etats- Unis d'Indonfsie, il ne pourront se dfvelopper economiquement, sociaJement et politiquement, comme ils le desirent. Void encore un des motifs qui sont it. l'origine du projet de resolution: conformement aux prin- tipes de la Charte, nous avons essaye de trouver tine solution basee sm la conciliation, et non de preparer une resolution qui eut immediatement exige des mesures d'execution. Ce dernier genre de resolution ne nous paraissait pas, en effet, constituer une contribution convenable de la part du Conseil de securite a la solution de ce conflit. Nous avons, atl contraire, essaye de trouver ce qui potlrrait constituer un terrain d'entente pour les deux: parties. CeIa devrait etre d'autant plus facile que les parties ne sont n~enement en desaccord que sur les mesures a prendre pendant la periode de transition. Ellcs sont absoltl11lent cl'accord pour que soient crees, le plus tot possible, des Etats- Unis d'Indonesie a caractere federal, independant et souverain. En raison de cet accord, ma clele- This has been cha:acterized by the Foreigp. Minister of :he Netherlands, Mr. Stikker-i£ the newspaper reports are correct-as indicating "... a basic mistrust of our proclaimed inte:l~ tions, of our most formal pledges". May I be permitted to point out that this is not so? To tne contrary, although the Security Council might have some misgivings after what happened on 19 December, the draft reso111tion before us is based on trust in the formal pledges made by the Netherlands Government at Lil1g~ gadjati, on the Rettville, and now in connexion with the present situation in Indonesia. But that is not the point. The point is that not the Security Council, but the Republic, has a basic mistrust of the intentions of the Nether- lands Government. 1 do not intend to disccss here whether or not this mistrttst is well founded. I simply say that this is an undeniable het, a:ld that" :hat is why the United Nations, the Security Council and the proposed United Nations com~ mission for Indonesia have come into the picture. If the United Nations could not act as a trustee of the good intentions of the Netherlands Govem- ment towards the other party in this situation, I am afraid there would not be co-operation and peace, but continued mistntst and a never-ending struggle and warfare. In the same way, it is the intention of t'lis draft resolution to say to the Netherlands Gov- ernment that the United Nations will act as a trnstee of the intentions of the Republic. I understand that one of the, main underlying reasons why the Netherlands is critical of the proposed solution is that it is c:onvinced that tfie Republic cannot be trusted. As in the case of the Republic's mistrust of the Netherlands Gov~ ernment, I co not Want to discuss whether or not the mistrust of the Republic felt by the Netherlands is well founded. But it is a fact. That is why the Security Council should act as the trustee of the agreement or agreements which will be arrived at. tran~ition. Au fond, il n'y a !:,llere de difference profonde entre, d'une part, le plan que propose ce projet de resolution, et, d'autre part, le plan accepte par la Republique d'Indonesie sur le Renville [5/649, annexes VlII et XIII], et ce1ui que le GOl.lvernement neerlandais vient d'etablir et de presenter all COl'1seil 1400iml,e senlla J. rai dit qu'il n'y a guere de difference profondc. 11 y en a une, ceper.dant, sur un point tres important: selon le pro:et de resolution, l'Organisation des Nations Unies, le Conseil de securite et la Com- mission des Nations Ul1ies pO'.1r J-"Indcnesie, qu'on se propose de creer, agiraient en medi1l;teul's pour la misf' ~n ITlWre de la .<lo1Lltion proposee. Or, s'i1 faut en croire 1es journaux, M. Stik- ker, Ministre des A'taires e:rangeres des Pays- Bas, aurait estime q'.1e cette clause nontre "une men.ance fondamentale a l'egard des intentions nettement proc1nmees et des promesses les plus solennelles des Pays-Bas". Ql1'il me salt permis de declarer que tel n'e~t pas le cas. Au contraire, hien que le Conseil de securite puisse avcir cert2..ines apprehensions apres 'Ies evenel1lents du 19 decembre, le projet de resolution dont nous sommes saisis est base sur la conJlance dans les promesses soiennel1es faites par le GOllvernell1er.t des p,tys-''B3.S it. propos de la situation telle qu'elle se presente en Indonesie, a Linggadjati, sur le RlJlIville, et ennn, a 'l'heure actuelle, ici·meme. Mais 1i n'est pas la question. La vraie question est que ce n'est pas le COl1scil de secmite, mais la Republique qui eprouve une mefiance fondamen~ tale ;i l'egard des intf'ntions Ott Gouvernement des Pays-Bas. I1 n'enl're pas dans roes intentions de discuter id du bien~fonde de celte mefiance. Te me bornerai a dire que c'est la un fait etabJi et qU'jj exp1iql1e l'entree en jeu de I'Organisation des Nations Unies, dl1 Consei1 de securite et de la commission des Nations Unies 10ur l'Indo~ nesie, dont on f'nvisagf' la creation. 'Si l'Organi~ sation des Nations Unies r.e pouvcit se porter garante des bonnes intentions du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas envers I'.autre partie ace differend, je trains qu'il n'y aumit ni cooperation ni paix, mais bien metiance prolongee et hostilites sans fin. C'est en raison de eet etat d'esprit que le projet de r~solUlio!l t:ntell(} ega1eme:1t assurer le Gouye1"~ nernent des Pays-3as qu~ l'Organisation des Nations Unies se partern garante des intentions de :a Republique. Je crois comprendre que si les Pays-Bns criti~ quent la solution proposee, c'est avant tout parce Qu'ils sont persuades que la Republique n'est pa~ digne de confiance. Pas plus que pour ce ljUl concerne la mefiance de la Republique a l'egard dll Gouvernement des Pays~Bas, je ne tiens it discuter du bien-follde de la mefiance des Pays- Bus a l'egard de la Republique. Mais il est incontestable qu'elle existe. Voila pOllrquoi le Conseil de securite de....rait se porter garant de l'execution de l'accord ou des accords aux(!nels on pourra aboutir. This is really not interference and it is not meant as interference. It is an effort by the Se- curity Council to be helpful in bringing about a peaceful adjustment, which both parties are under obligation to seek according to the Charter of the United Nations. All this naturally is based on the assumption that the Republic exists. I am forced to mention this because it is one of the basic elements of the draft resolution. On the other hand, it is said- in the same newspaper reports I mentioned before -that the Netherlands claims that the Republic of Indonesia no longer exists. I do not know if these reports are correct. I will only say that it would be impossible for the Security Council to accept this contention. At least, it would be impossible fOl' my country to acquiesce in the opinion that a State or a Govern- ment, even if it were only recognized de facto, ceases to exist as a consequence of military action. If that were the case, the Kingdom of Norway would have ceased to exist in 1940 when it was invaded and occupied by the German army. This explains why the draft resolution calls for the withdrawal of the Netherlands military forces, for the unconditional release of the prisoners, for their return to Jogjakarta and for the return of the civil administration to the Re- public. In this connexion I should like to say a few words about the withdrawal of the military forces of the Netherlands. The principle that the mili- tary forces should be withdrawn is in the draft resolution. The implementation of this principle, however, is left to the proposed United Nations commission. The main reason for this provision is the same as the main motive of the draft resolution as a whole: to seek a peaceful solution. And we are not sure that the immediate withdrawal of the Netherlands military' forces is in the hest interests of a peaceful sohJtion. The administration of the Republic has been disorganized as a result of the "police" action, its statesmen' are interned, its military forces driven back from the cities and places which are now occnpied. There has to be a transitional period in order that the Government of the Republic may, in an orderly way, take over the military administration. A necessary condition for the Republic's taking over the mili- tary administration is the re-establishment of the civil administration. Therefore, the draft reso- lution points out in sub-paragraph 4 (f) that Tout cela ne saurait, ni dans ta lettre, ni dans l'esprit, constittter une ingerence dans les affaires d'antrui. C'est ltn effort que fait le Conseil de secttrite pour contribner a un arrangement pad- fique, que les deux parties, aux termes de la Charte des Nations Unies, sont tenues de rechercher. Tout cela suppose cl'abord, bien entendu, que la Republique existe. Je suis tenu de le souligrier, parce que c'est la un des elements fondamentallx du projet de resolution. D'autre part, il paraitrait toujaurs ~ d'apres les renseignements de presse - que les Hollandais pretendent que la Repu- blique d'Indonesie a cesse d'exister. J'ignore si ces informations sont correctes. Je me bOrllerai a dire que le Conseil de securite ne saurait accepter une telle conclnsion. Mon pays, du moins, ne saurait adherer a l'opinion selon laquelle un Etat ou un Gouvernemenl, ne fut-il meme reconnu que de facto, cesserait d'exister a La suite d'une operqtion militaire. Si te! etait le cas, le Royaume de Norvege eut cesse d'exister en 1940, quand il a ete envahi et occupf par 1'ar- mee allemande. Cela explique pourquoi 'le projet de resolution prevoit le retrait des forces militaires neerlan- daises, la liberation sans condition des detenus, [eur retour a Djokjakarta et le retablissement de l'administration eivile de la Rcpublique. A ce propos, je voudrais dire quelques mots sur 'le retrait des forc~s militaires neerlandaises. Le projet de resolution mentionne le principe du retrait des forces militaires. La mise en reuvre de cc prillcipe est laissee cependallt a la com~ mission des Nations Unies dont la creation est envisagee. La principale raison d'une telle disposition coincide avec le principal motif du projet de resolution dans son ensemble, qui est de chercber une solution pacifique. Nous ne sommes pas abso- lument eertains que 'le retrait immediat des forces militaires neer'landhises servirait forcement la ,recherche cl'une solution pacifique. Par suite de ''l'action de police" qui a ete eritreprise, l'admi- nistration de la Republique a ete desorganisee, ses dirigeants ont ete internes, ·ses forces mi1i~ taires ont ete repoussees loin des villes et des localites qui sont maintenant sous occupation. Il faut nne periode de transition pour que le Gotlvernement de la Republique puisse reprendre en mains, d'une maniere ordonnee, l'adminis- lration militaire. POUI- qu'elle pttisse le faire, it est indispensable que I'administration civile soit This means that the Republic should take over civil administration even in those areas where it may still be necessary to retain Netherlands mili· tary forces for the maintenance of peace and order for as it is stated in the fifth paragraph of th~ pr~amble of the draft resolution, n:a.in• tenance of law and order is a necessary condition to the establishment of an independent United States 0 f Indonesia. I hope I have succeeded in making i~ clear ~at my delegation, like the other de1e!'Cltwtls which 11<lVe submitted this draft resolution, has been inspi.red by only one consi?erat.ion: to reach. a peaceful adjustment of t~le sltuatlDn l~ Ind~nesta. Because this is the motive and the mtentlOn of this resolution, J would make an appeal to the parties to make the necessary concessions in order that peace and not war may be the sign unde~ which an independent Indonesia is born. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt): T11e bnsk elements of the Indonesian question are, to an extent reflected in the draft resolutio;] now before us, w1~ich is jointly sponsored by the delegations of Cllina, Cuba, Norway and tbe United States. This draft resolution is, dearly enough, the result of long and detailed study. It expresses a de- tennined effort by its sponsors to help in attain~ ing what, in their view, would be a fairly good solution of at least the present phase of the Indonesian question, Carehll elCamination of the draft resolution will show whether it amply copes with the situa- tion, and whether it takes ful1y into consideration the rigllts and feelings of the Indonesian people. Upon st1ch examination, one cannot but notice the discrepancy~ven, upon some points, the contradiction-between its preamble and its oper- ative part, betwee.1. its premises and the con- clusions it draws from such premises. This may be. explained-but not at all justified-by the existence, on one hand, of a realization of the inequities of the situation, and on the other, of the desire by some to meet several unreasonable objections of the Netherlafids to measures called for by the Charter anci by the requirements of peace. As a consequence of this, a spirit of exces· sive leniency toward the Netherlands, of exag- gerated accommodation and of appeasement, haunts several parts of the draft resohltion. The Sectlrity Council is, however, quite aware of the fact that-and I am sorry to mention this -the record of the Netherlands Government in dealing with Indonesia and with the Council's decisions thereon is by no means satisfactory. I said "the Council'" decisions", These are not· mere recommendations by one or another of the organs of the United Nations. They are orders given by the Security Council [5/1150 and S/1164J. These orders have not been carried Mahmoud FAWZl Bey (Egypte) (tradJI,it de I'mlglais): Le projet de resolution dont 1I011S sommes saisis et qlli a ete propose conjointcmcnt par les delegations de la Chine, de Cuon, de la Norvege et des Etats-Unis, reflete, dans une cer~ taine mesure, tous les elements essentiels de la question indonesienne. I1 est, de toute evidence, le resultat d'une etude longue et detaillee. 11 cons· titue, de la part de cellX qui le proposent, un effort energique pour aider .iJ. atteindre ce que, de 1ettr point de vue, con~tituerait Lme assez bonne solution de la question d'Indonesie, all moins au stade ou e11e en est a J'hel1fe ilctuelle. En examinant attentivement ce projet de reso- lution, l'on pomra determiner s'il repond entie- rement a la sittlation et s'i1 tient pleinement compte des droits et des sentiments du pellple de I'Indonesie. Lorsqu'on procede a un tel exa- men, I'on ne peut pas ne pas noter les divergences - et meme, sur certains points, les contrndictions - qui existent entre le preambu1e de ce projet et son dispositif, entre les premisses et les conchl- sions qui en sont tirees. Cela pent s'expliquer - mais non se ,lllstifier _ par le fait, d\m cote, que I'on comprend toutes les injustices de la situation presente et, de l'autre, que certains desirent bire droit a diverses objections peu raisonnables que les Pays-Bas souJevent a l'oc· casion de mesures que pn~voit la Cha.rte et qui sont indispensables pour le maintien de la paix. Voila pourquoi certaines parties de ce projet de resolution temoignent d'un esprit de trop grande indulgence envers les Pays~Bas, d'un desir exces- sif de compromis et d'apaisement. Le Conseil de securite cependant sait fort bien, et je regrette d'avoir a le mentionner, que l'atti- tude du Gouve.rnement neerlandais apropos d.e la question d'Indonesie et des cte,cisions cl 11 Conse!' n'a jusqu'ici, nullement He satisfaisante. Je d\s "les decisions du Conseil", car it ne s'agit pas- en effet de simples recommandations emanant de tel ou td organe de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, rnais d'ordres donnes par le Conseil de securite [S/1150 et Sj1164J. Ces t:lfdres n'ont pa~ ete intcgralenl<':nt o1J::;erY~es" re!;t!;: tr~s en dessous des faits et constitue un ettphemisme rlein d'insouciance. Malheureusement, cette ten- dance apparait egalement dans differentes autreS parties du projet de resolution. Some consolation-a practically useless consola- tion. I fear-might be derived from noting' that the sponsors themselves are, to use the words of the representative of Cuba at our l;Jst [402nd] meeting, "not fully satisfied" with the draft reso~ lution. For his part the representative of Cuba would have liked. among other things. that the draft resolution should have contained a stronger stipulation as to the witlldrawal of the Nether- lands armed forces from the territory of the Republic of Indonesia. I entirely share this view, and I believe that it is also shared by almost everyone concerned witll the problem now before us ;md with the re-establishment, on a solid basis, of real peace in and amund Indonesia. The sponsors consider that-I am quoting from the fUlllth paragraph (If tht: preamble of the draft resolution-"- .. continued occupation of the territory of th~ Republic of Indonesia by the armed forces of the Netherlands is incompatible with the restoration of good relations between the parties and with the final achievement of a just and lasting settlement of the Indonesian dispute." Yet this essentiil} matter of the withdrawal of Netherlands forces is dealt with mther shyly in an illmost hidden corner of sub-paragraph 4 (t) of the draft resolution where it is mentioned that the proposed United Nations commission for Indonesia ". . shall, after consultation with the parties, recommend Wilich if any Netherlands forces sllall be retaineu temporarily in any area in order to assist in the maintenance of law and order". No mention is made [11e1'e, or anyWhere else in the draft resolution, of immediate and complete withdrawal of the Netherlands armed forces from all the territory of the Republic of Indonesia, a1- thuugh it is avowed, as I recalled before, "that cor.tinueu occupation Ol the territory of the Re- public of Indonesia by the armed forces of the Netherlands is incomp~.tible with the restoration of good relations between the parties and with the final achievement of a just and lasting settle- ment of the Indonesian dispute." Furthermore, sllCh continued occupation runs co\:nter to at least two of the main subiec.ts dealt with in the draft resolution, namely, the return of territory to the administration of the Govern- ment of the "Repuhlic of Indonesia, and the hold- ing of free elections. We all Imow what the occu- pation of a country's territory by foreign armed forces means: the interference, the abuses and the l1eavy shadow it casts upon its local adminis- tration. As for the elections, it would be only a product of over-optimism, of wishful thinking, to say tbat they can be really free while foreign On pourrait tirer quelqlle consolation - toute platonique nalheuteusement - du fait que les auteurs 1l1emes de ce projet ne sont pas, pour reprendre les JXl-roles prononcees a notre der- ntere seance [402Ihne] par le representant de Cuba, "entiereme.nt satisfaits" de leur propo- sition. Pour sa part, le rf'_prt>~ent~nt de Cuba aurait souhait~, entre autres chases, que le projet de rtsolution rontint une disposition beallcoup plus forte quant an retrait des forces armees neerlandaises dtt territoire de la Republique c1'1n- donesie. Je partage entierement ce point de vue et je pense Cjll'il est partage par taus ceux que' preoccupe 'le proble.me soumis i notre examen, par tous Cetlx qui desirent le rctahlissement d'nne' paix reelle et solide en Indonesie et autour de nndonesie. Les auteurs de la proposition estiment - je cit~ le quutrieme paragraphe du preambule d(! leur projet - que: "Le maintien d~s forces armees des Pays-Bas en occupation Stlr le terri- toire de la RepuhliquE indonesienne est incolJ1- patible avec le retablissement ele bonnes relations entre les parties et avec Ull reglement Gnal cqui- t<tble et durable du differeml innonesien." Cepel.1dant, le point essentie1 qn'0.st le retrait des forces neerlandaises et traite assez tilllide- 1llent dans un passage, qui p::tsse presque ina- pero:;u, du paragraplle 4, alinea f) du dispositif dll projet de resolution, Ol! it est dit que la commission de~ Nations Unies pour l'Indonesie qU'Oll se propose d'etablir ".. , indiquera, par voie de recomIn:l.ndation et apre3 avoir cOllsulte les parties, quelles forces necrbndaises devront etre temporairement mai.ntenues clans une region dannee en vue de contribuer au maintien de I'ordre public". Ni la, ni. a aucun atltre endro!t, le projet de resolution ne fait melltion dn retrait complet et inunediat des forces armees neerlandaises de tout le tertitoire de la Republique d'Indonesie, bien que, comrne je I'ai rappele auparavant, "le maintien des forces armees des P.1ys-Bas en occu- pation sur le territoire de la Republique d'Inda- nesie soit incolTIpatible avec le retablissement de bonnes relations entre les pnrties et avec un reglement [mal equitable et dnrable du differend d'Indollesie", D'autl"e part, ce maintien des forces d'OCCL~­ pation est contralte a'.! mains i deux des pril1CL- panx objectifs dont traite le projet de resolution. a savair le rftablissement de l'administration de la Republique d'Indonesie et l'orgo.nisution de libres elections. Nous savons tous ce que'signi- (le l'occupation du territoire d'un pays par des forces nrmees etrangeres, en tant qu'immixtions et abus, et quelle ombre epaisse cela jdle SUt" I'administrat;on locale. Quant <lUX elections, ce serait vraiment hire preuve de trop d'optimisme, ce serait prendre ses desirs pour des realitt~s que Tbe Egyptian delegation considers that this matter of the withdrawal of Netherlands armed forces from the territory of the Republic of Indonesia has not been amply dealt with in the draft resolution. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Council should order-not only recom- mend but order-the speedy and progressive with- drawal .from Republican territory of Netherlands forces, the presence of which is incompatible with the effective and free discharge of the functions a.nd powers of the interim government to be established by 15 March 1949. It has also to be borne in mind that the withdrawal of Netherlands troops is of no less importance for the conduct of the contemplated elections in an' atmosphere free from foreign military intervention. As a first step towards the ultimate withdrawal of Netherlands forces, the Residency of Jogja- l.<:arta-and not only the city of Jogjakarta itself -sholtld be handed back immediately to the Gov- ernment of the Republic of Indonesia. Objections to such withdrawal have been raised by the spokesmen of the Netherlands. We heard them speak, in this connexion, of reprisals, of disorders and of chaos. Upon listening attentively to these objections, we have been neither impressed nor convinced. vVhile perfection might not be attain- able, we have no hesitation in opting for the governance of the people of Indonesia by the people of Indonesia and for the occupation of Indonesian territory by Indonesian forces, as be- ing incomparably better than foreign rule and foreign occupation. We are also of thE' opinion that such economic measures mllst be taken llS are indispensable to the proper functioning of the Republican Governmcnt and the well-being of the population. In this regard the Netherlrmds authorities should refrain not only from exercis- ing political pressure but, equally, from e.'{erting economic pressure upon the Republican Govern~ ment and the people of Indonesia. A few minntes agp I called the Council's attention to the discrepancy one cannot help noticing between the premises and the conclusions iil t11e joint draft resolution before liS. A similllf discrepallcy is to bt noted between these con- clusions and statements made by several speakers, including the sponsors themselves. In this regard I and, I believe, a\1 members of the Council unhesitatingly subscribe to the statement made by the representative of the United States at our last [402nd] meeting that "tlle ... Council" cannot put "the seal of its ap- proval on the results of the recent military action". The same applies to the statement made <"It the same meeting, by the representative of China, who said that "The core of the Indonesian problem is the transition ... from colonilll status to national independence". The representative of Australia said on 20 ]an.uary to the New Delhi Conference on Indo- nesia : We still hope that the people and Government of the Netherlands will live tip to their noble traditions. that fruitful and free co-operation between them and the great nation of Indonesia will replace conflict and strife. We hope that the call to peace will be heeded and that good will and good counsel will prevail. Before concluding, I should like to sum up the views of the Egyptian delegation as to the joint draft resolution now before us. The Egyptian delegation considers that this draft resolution, although it goes in the proper ?ire~tion, is not ample. We hope, therefore, that It wd! be rendered more appropriate to the re- ql1irements and the seriousness of the situation with which it is supposed to deal. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom); The situation in Indonesia has occupied much of the time of the Security Council, as I remember it, since its first series of meetings held in London thl'ee years ago. I am Sllre that every member of the Council must be impressed with the necessity for now ensuring a final settlement. That should be the real and immediate aim of the Security Council, and it is more important than the analy- sis of past events and the fixing of blame on one side or the other. In the early stages, as I have reminded the Security Council [400th meeting], my Govern~ ment [13th meeting) expressed certain doubts as to the competence of the Cotlncil in this matter, but it was reluctant to obstruct on that ground the action 'wLich the Council felt it was necessary for it to take in fulfilment of its duty to preserve international peace and security. Matters unhappily developed in such a way that the Netherlands Government felt impelled last December to undertake action against the Nous esperons toujours que le peuple et le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas maintiendront leut inoubliable tradition, <]u'une cooperation fn1c~ ttletlse et libre entre eux et la gramle nation d'rndo- nesie remplacera le conflit et la lutte actuels. No'us esperolls que l'appel pOtH la paix sera entendu et que la bonne volonte et la sagesse prevfludront. Avant de conclure. je vOtldrais resumer It's vues de la delegation egyptienne apropos du pl'ojet de resolution qui nous est soumis. La c1Clegatioll egyptienne estime que ce projet de resolution, tont en constituant un pas dans la bonne direction, n'est pas d'une portee suffi~ saml1lent vaste. Notts esperons par consequent qu'il sera amcliore afin qn'il pllisse repondrc davantage <lUX besoins et au serieux de la situa~ ti.on a laquelle il s'applique. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (trad1tit de l'anglais): Si je me rappel1~ biw, depuis les premieres retmions qui se sont tentle~ a Londres il y a trois ans, le Conseil de securite a consacre beaucoup cle temps a la situation en Indonesie. Je snis silr que tous les memhres du Conseil sont persuades qu'it est necessnire de trouver maintenant un reglement fmal. Cdl'l doit constitl1er le but reel et immediat du Conseil de securite et est plus important que d'dnalysel' les evenements qui ont eu lieu ou que de blnmer te:11e ou telle partie. Tout au debut [Hem£.' sraltcel, comme je l'ai rappelle nu Conseil de securite [400ente seance]. 1110n Gouvernement Cl exprime certains doutes quant a. la competence du Conseil en cette matierc; cependant il ne voulait pas gener pour une telle raison l'aetion que le Conseil estimait devoir prendre en vertu du devoir qui lui incombe de preserver la paix et la securite internationales. 1I1alheureusement, les evenemcnts ont pris une tOtlrnUre telle que, en decembre dernier, le GOLI- vernement neerlandais a estime qu'il etait oblige Mon Gouvernement a eu l'occasion d'etl1dlcr le projet de resolution qui a ete sOllmis au COlUwil de securite pa':" les delegations de [a Chine, (le Cuba, de la Norvege et des Etats-Unis et il est pret a donner tont son appui u ce projet. J\1011 GOllvernement espe:re que cette resolution sel"a adoptee et ql1'elle a\lra I'assentimcnt des deux parties; il espere que, en r,aison de l'accOl'(\ gene- roll, Utl reglement satisfaisant et definitif ponrra etr<: obtenu. My Government has had the opportunity of studying the draft resol,ution whi~h has now been submitted to the Secunty CounCIl by the del~ga­ tions of China, Cuha, Norway and the Umted States, and it is prepared to give its support to that resolution. My Government hop.es that t~e resolution may be adopted and that 1t may Will the assent of 'both parties, so that general agree- ment may produce a final and satisfactory settle- ment We listened the other day [400th meeting] to a statement made by the representative ef the Netl1erlands, which, in spite of what was subse- quently said at this table, did, in my opinion, mark a considerable advance in respect of the position which the Netherlancls Government ~ad theretofore held. The Netherlands ['epresentatlve was able to indicate dates for the taking of suc- cessive steps in progress toward an ultimate settlement, and I think that the fixing of those d<l.tes constitutes an important element wd affords a basis for the resolutiou, I should like to think that we may be encouraged by, that fact to hope that the Nethel'1ands Gov..:rnment will be able to accept a resolution on these lines. Acceptance by both parties would offer a real prospect of a permanent solution of this problem which has already caused the Secnrity COllncil so many weeks and months of anxious thought and de A liberation. 'Since the draft resolution which is now before the Security Council was submitted, we have received a communication from the Chairman of the New Delhi Conference [S/U'22], enclosing certain proposals which were formulated by that Cor.ference. These proposals, I am sme, will command all the respect which they deserve. Special emphasis has been laid on some of them by two of the speakers, the representative of India and the representative of Egypt, However, 1 do not 'Jnderstand that at this stage they propose any particular amendments to the draft resolution based on the New Delhi proposals, and therefore I do not wish to go into those proposals now in detail. I would make only one generaL observation: that the framers of those proposals seem to bave had in their minds much of wllat was in the minds of those who first started drafting proposals bere for the Security Council. But the original ideas which were pro- duced here for submission to the Security Counci1 were subjected to a process of consultation as a result of which they did undergo a certain amount of modification. That resulted, of course, in what several representatives have referred to as a compromise, A compromise is sometimes re- L'autre jour [400~me s~ancC"], nous avrms entendu une declaration dl: representant ues Pays-Bas Cjlli, malgre ce qui a ete dit ensuite dalls ceUe salle, marque, a mon avis, un progrf$ consi- derable par rapport a la position (jue le GOllver- nement neerlandais avait adoptee }us'lue-1<l. Le representant des Pays-Bas a pll iJ,diqller de!> dates pour les mesures successivcs qui doivel1t mener a un reglement final et je pem;e que l'eta- blissement de ces delais constitue un factellr important et forme tll1e base de resolution. Te vouclrnis pOllvoir en eontlure que le Gouverrie- ment neerlandais acceptera un projet de resolution seiTIblable 11 celui qui est propose, Si les <lellx parties l"ncceptent, il existera des possibilil(\.~ n~elles de resoudre ce probleme <luquelle Cotlseil a consaere de longues semaines et de longs 1l1ois de reflexion inquietc et de discussions. DeplIis ql\e le projet de resolution qui se lrOllVC actuellement devant le Conseil de secl1rite nOI1S a ete soumis, nous aVOl1S re~lt de la part citl Pre:;i- dent de la Conference de New-Delhi une commu- nication [S/1222J contenant certaine.s pmpo" sitiolls qlli ont he formulees au cours de cetle conferente, Ces propositions, j'en sl1is si1r, seront acclleil1ies avec tout le respect qui leur est du, Deux oratellrs, le representnnt de l'Iude et le rerresentant de I'Egypte, ont insiste tout parti- culierement sur letlr il11port<Jnce. Cc:pendnnt je crois comprendre que, all stade actuel ils ne se pl'Oposent pas de deposer, en s'appuyant Sut' les propositions de New-Delhi, des al11endements atl projet de resolution des 'l'.latre et par consequent je ne vais pas discuter ces propositions en detail. ]e me contenterai d'une observation d'onlre general. Les allteurs de ces propositions semblent avoir ete, d;ms une grande mesure, guides par des considerations identiqtles a celles qui ant inspire les auteurs des premieres propositions soumises au Conseil de secnrite, Cep~ndant les premieres idees qui ont ete presentees ici pour etre examinees par le Conseil de sccmite ant ete soumises a un processlls cle consllltatior,s, a la suite duqnel eUes ant subi certaines modifica- For instance, there is one point that has ueen mentioned by both the representative of India and the representative of Egypt: the question of the withdrawal of troops. I suppose that we should all say that, in principle, armed forces of the Netherlands should be withdrawn. I think we are all agreed on that, but to go a stage further, as was the original idea, and to say that withdrawal must be complete by a given date which can be fixed and stated here and now, was found, I think, by several delegations, to be going a bit too far, to be unwise and possibly dangerolts. Therefore a formula was found which now appears in the draft resolution submitted by the four delegations, which I think guards against that danger and should afford a basis for satis~ factory settlement of that particular aspect of the question. A~ain, it has been said-and perha()s no one will deny it-that it is wrong to llOld elections ill a country under occupation of foreign troops. That, in pure principle, is undeniably true. On the other hand, it may be inconvenient or worse to hold elections in a tet'ritory where a greater or lesser degree of disorder reigns. Here again, I think that the draft resolution of the four sponsoring delegations does offer a good com~ promise. It might well be that nn further study we shall find points in the New Delhi proposals which are valuah1e and which we may be able to utilize to some extent in the revision of the draft resolution. But I do think that tiU1.t reso- lution is, as I have said, a good compromise. It may be capable of impravernent, like any other document, but it will not be improved by the insertion of anything that might l)e ideally perfect but is not practically possible, or of anything that will make it impossible of acceptance by one party or the other. Mr. TARASENKo (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (translated from Russia1t); Underly- ing the draft resolutiOn proposed by the four delegations, we find the same principles as those outlined by the Netherlands Government throug~l its representative at the meetings of the Security Council. It would be difficult to find any difference of principle between this draft resolution and the plan o£ the Netherlands Government. If there aTe any differences, they refer only to details. The basic purpose of both the draft resolution and the plan is to stille the Indonesian Repuhlic and to restore the old colonial order in Indonesia. There is nothing unexpected or surprising in that. The deiegation and the Government of the United States, who are the real at1thors of the draft resolution, have no greater interest than the Netherlands Government in I·estoring the Indo- nesian Republic. They are afril.id lest the exist- ence of the Republic might stimulate the develop- D'aut.re pat't, l'on a dit, et personne, je pense, ne le niera, qu'il ne faut pas organiser des elec- tions d\lllS un pays sous occupation militaire etrangere. En principe, c'est abso1ument inde~ niable. Mais, d'autre part, il peut etre peu com- mode - et peut-etre cette expression n'est pas assez energiqne -- d'organiser des elections dans un territoire all il existe plus ou moins de desordre. U. encore je pense que le projet de resolution des quatre offre un ban wlllpromis. I1 se peut qu'en continuallt a etudier la question, nOllS tt'ouverons dam les propositions de New- Delhi des POil1tS interessatlts et dont nOllS pOur- rons faire. dans lme certaine mesure usage en remaniant le projet de r6s01ution. Mais comme ie l'ai deja dit, ie pense que ce projet constitue un ban compromis. Comme taut autre doctlment, i1 peut Hre ameliore, mais ne saurait I'~tt'e par I'insertion de clauses qui seraicnt parfaites dans I'ordre abstrait, mais inapplicables dans l'ordre pratique ou de clauses qui en rendraient l'accep- tation impossible i ['une ou a l'autre des parties. M. TARASSENKO (Repl1blique socialiste sovi6- tique d'Ukraine) (tradu.it du f"usse) : A Lot base dl1 projet de resolution sOUInis par les quatre delegations, nous trouvons les principes memes que le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas a recemment exprimcs par l'entremise de son representant aux seances du Conseil de securHe. Entre ledit projet de resolution et le plan du Gouverneme11t ncer- landais, il serait diflicile de trouver la l1loindre difference de principe. DallS son essence, le projet de resolution, comme le plan du Gotwemement neerbndais, a pour but d'etouffer la Republique d'Inclonesie et de retablir le vieil ordre colonial. Il n'y a la rien d'inattendu ni cl'Honnant. La delegiltion ct le GouveTllement des Etats- Unis, qui sont les auteurs veritables de ce projet de resolution, n'ont pas pIns que le Gottvernement des Pays-Bas interet a retab1ir la Republique d'Indonesie. lIs craignent, en efIet, que I'exis- tence de la Republique ne favorise le deve1oppe- Vario'us compromises are being proposed, but a careful scrutiny of these proposals shows that, one and all, they would take place at the expense of the Indonesicm Republic, of the Indonesian people, and that nowhere do they call the Nether- lands aggressor to order, \'Vhatever the proposed compromise or settlement, it never adversely affects the Netherlands aggressor; only the Indo- nesian people and the Indones:an Republic are asked to make sacrifices. Let us take, for example, the matter of the evacuation from Republican territory of the armed forces and troops of the invader. Several members of the Anglo-American majority in the Security Council are con>trained, willy-nilly, to deal with the problem and not to avoid, at least in words, some condemnation and some demand that the Netherlands troops evacuate the Repub- lican territory they have invaded, However, they qnalify their agreement with a series of "buts", as for example, has been done today by Sir Alexander Cadogan, the representative of the United Kingdom.. Withdrawal of Netherlands troops would be premature, unwise, dangerous. In the final analysis, their acquiescence in such withdrawal boils down to allowing the invader to remain for a long time on conquered Reptlblican territory. It is clear that the draft resolution now before us is the logical outcome of such a situation and of such an attitude on the part of the majority of the members of the Security Council, led by the Anglo-American bloc. On pouvait etre certain, semble-t-il, que devant J'acte d'agression perp(hre par le Gouver- nement des Pays-Bas contre la Republique d'In- donesie, tons les membres du Conseil de securite s'inspirant des principes de la Charte, exigeraient qu'il soit mis fin aux agissements de l'agresseur et que les droits et les interets de la victime soient sauvegardes. Cela ne s'est pas produit. La plupart des membres du Conseil de securite, les delegations des Etats-Unis d'Amerique et du Royaume-Uni en tete, se sont opposes a ce que les droits legitimes de la Republique fussent res- peetes et ant pris le parti d'encourager l'agres- seut. Ils recommandent, certes, 1'adoption d'une serie de mesures visant a regler la question indo- nesienne, mais toutes ces mesures _ on 1'a re- marque an cours des interventions de plusieurs des representants au Conseil de securite - pre- sentent un caractere tres net d'injustice et de partialite en faveur de l'agresseur neerlandais. A tout propos, cette partialite se fait jour. On pose la question de la paix et de la reconciliation en Indonesie, mais de quelle maniere? Les forces lleerlandaises d'occnpation s'emparent de villes, massacrent la population pacifique, mettent le feu aux villages, ce qui pousse la population a fuir en masse vers les fon~ts et les mOlltagnes. Sur ce1a, on nous propose une conciliation qui vise non pas a reparer les torts causes par I'agres- seur neerlandais, mais aaccorder plus de conces- sions encore aI'agresseur; ce semt des propositions dont l'execution se ferait au..x: depens du peupJe indonesien, On propose divers compromis, mais si on les examine attentivement, on voit qu'ils s'opereraient eux <lussi aux frais de la Republique d'Indonesie, aux frais du peuple il1donesien, et non pour rap~ peler a l'ordre l'agresseur ne.erlandais. Aucun de ces compromis, aUCUll de ces reglements qu'on nOlls propose ne portent atteinte iJ. I'agresseur neerlandais. IIs ne demandent de sacrifices qu'a la population indonesienne, qu'a la Republique d'lndonesie. Prenons, par exemple, la question de I'evacua- tion du territoire de la Republique par les troupes, les forces 'armees de oJ'envahisseur. Nombre de membres de la majorite anglo-americaine du Conseil de securite sont, bon gre, mal gre, con~ traints de se pencher sur le probleme et ne peuvent eviter. en paroles tout au mains, de porter une condamnation et d'exiger qne les troupes neer~ landaises evacuent le territoire republicain qu'elles ont envahi. Cependant, i1s accompagnent leur acquiescemcnt d'une serie de "mais", comme l'a, par exemple, fait aujourd'hui Sir Alexander Ca- dogan, representant du Royaume-Uni. Le retr-ait des troupes neerlandaises semit premature, peu sage, clangereux. En fin de compte, si I'on acquiesce a ce retrait, cela se reduit a permettre a l'agresseur de demeurer pour longtemps sur le' territoire qu'il a arrache a la Republique. L'aboutissement logique d'une telle situation et d'une telle attitude de la majorite des membres' dn Conseil de securite, rnajorite dont le bloC" angl07americain est le chef de file, c'est precise- ment le projet de resolution que nous soumettent en ce moment les quatre delegations, In the first place, the provision which calls upon the Government of the Republic to order its anned supporters to stop guerrilla warfare is illegal and has the sole aim of protecting the invading aggressor. Guerrilla warfare against an invading foe has always been a legitimate means of defence for an invaded nation. It was con~ sidered so in the caSe of Spanish guerrilla forces striking at Napoleon's armies. It was considered so when the partisans of all occupied countries in Europe prosecllted the war against the Hitlerite aggressor ami th,IS helped in the defeat of Nazi Germany. The guerrilla warfare waged by the Indonesian people against the Netherlands aggres- sor which ha:> occupied the Indonesian Republic, is the same legitimate fight. Why should the Anglo~American majority deny to the people of Indonesia the right to expel invaders from their country by means of guerrilla warfare when such warfare is their only means of rielding themselves of the occtlpying force? In such circumstances, when the territory of the Republic is occupied by the Netherlands aggres- sor, any resolution of the Secmity Council which forbade guerrilla warfare against the Nether- lands forces of occupation would be illegal anel unjust. It could not be binding upon either the Government of the Republic 01· the Indonesian people. The adoption of a resolution of that kind could only strengthen and prolong indefinitely the occupation of the Republic by the Nether- lands armed forces. I should like, sc,condly, to refer to the provision of the draft resolution in which it is said that -"The Commission ... is authorized to observe on behalf of the United Nations the elections to be held throughotlt Indonesia." The sole aim of that provision is to distract the attention of the Security Council and of world public opinion from the situation now existing in the Republic ,of Indonesia. Instend of the immediate with- 'drawal of the invading troops which ocCUpy the territory of the Republic, instead of the restora- tion of the status quo ante, primary emphasts is given to general consideration about "elections", about what is calleel the "United States of Inclo- 'nesia", about "the transfer of sovereignty" and '50 forth. There call be no question of free eledions of any kind without the prior withdrawal of the Netherlands occupation forces. While OCCl1pa~ tion forces remain in Inelonesia, elections would be nothing more than .mothl'r farce, for they 'Would take place unclel' nn oCCllpation regime, in an 'atmosphere of deceit, bribery, and terror. Thirdly, the draft resolution refers to the creation of what is called a provisional govern- ·ment. This is essentially spurious. Who is to set up that government? Obviously it is to be set 'up by the ~~etherlands occupatjon forces and is ·to work under the occupation authorities. The members of that government would doubtless be chosen from among collaborationists and agents 'of the Netherlands Government. A government ,set up in such circumstances could not possibly Pourquoi done la majorite ariglo-.1mericaine refuse~t~elle au peuple indonesien le droit de chasser l'envahissenr de son territoire par des operations de guerilla, puisgue c'est h'1 le seuI moyen d'expttlser l'occupant? Dans la situation aetuelle, Ott I'agresseur neerlandais occupe le territoire de la Republique, toute resolution du Conseil de secllrite qui iuterdirait les operations de guerilla contl'e ['occupant neerlandais serait iIlegale et injuste. Elle ne sauraait donc lier ni le Gouvernement de la. Republiqne, ni le peuple indoncsien. L'adoption d'Ulle resolution de cette nature ne pourrait que renforcer et prolonger indefiniment I'occupation du territoire de la Repu- blique par 1es troupes necrlandaises. Je voudrais, en second lieu, parler de la dispo- sition du projet de resolution ou il est dit que "la Commission . . . est autorisee a exercel' au nom des Nations Unies, le contr6[e des elections qui se tienclront dans l'ensemble du territoire de l'Inclonesie." Cette disposition a pour seul but de detoul'l1er l'attclltioll du Canseil de secttri~e et de I'opinion pllbliql1e mondiale de la situation qui s'est etablie dnns la Republique d'Indonesie. Au lieu du retr",it tl11111ediat des troupes de l'enva'his- seur qui occtlpent le territoire de la Republique, du retablisscment dl! statl! quo ante, on met au premier plan des considerations generales sur l~s "elections", sur ce qu'on nOlnme les "Etats-Ums J'Indonesie", sur le "transfert de sOllverainete" etc. Si les troupes d'accllpation neerlandaises. ne se retirent pas, iI ne pent meme pas etre questlOn d'eleetions libres. En la' presence des trOllpes d'occupation les elections ne sa.uraient etre qu'LUle farc~ de plus, car dIes se dhouleraient sous un regime d'occupation, d",ns une atmo- sphere de ttomperie, de corruption et de tel,Tetlr. En troisiel11e lieu, le projet de resolution parle de la creation de ce qu'on nomme uri gouverne- 111ent provisoire. C'est la nne these entierement fnusse. Par qui doit etre institue ce Gouverne- ment? Il est evident qu'i1 serait cree par les forces d'occupation neerlandaises et devrait fonctionner 50US un regime d'occupation. On ne pcut dOl1ter que les membres d'l1n tel gouvernement ne soient dlOisis parmi 1es collaborateurs, les agents du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas. Daus ces condi- One of those letters reveals how the Nether- lands forces maintain "law and order". It is impossible to drive along the roads in the Tasik- malaja area, say the letter, because they are littered with decaying corpses of Indonesians who had been shot by the Dutch. The Dutch had set flame to aU the villages around Sumedang and had shot all the inhabitants. I shall quote from the letter: "I have personally taken part in mopping-up operations in a mountainous region. We did not find any so-called 'gangs' there, but, in revenge, we ·burned five villages to the ground. We suc- ceeded, however, in capturing two Indonesians, who were subjected to frightful torture by means of electrical devices. Wires are tied to their ears and hands and high-tension ClJrrent is turned on. It is a horrible sight." These letters reveal the monstrous fascist methods applied by the Netherlands command against the Indonesian population. Is it right to trust st!ch barbarians with the maintenance of law and order in the Indonesian Republic? The delegation of the Ulcrainian SSR con- siders that the draft resolution is disadvantageous and dangerous to the Indonesian people, for it is in full conformity with the interests of the aggressor and in fact justifies the occupation of the Indonesian Republic by armed forces. It is a defeatist draft. Instead of protecting the Indo- nesian people and defending them against the aggressor, the resolution calls upon the Indonesian people and the Indonesian Republic to surrender to the aggressor of whom they are the victims. Mr. INGLES (Philippines); In the name of Ambassador Carlos P. Romulo, who has gone on a trip to India to attend the Conference of Asian Nations at New Delhi, I wish to make a statement defining the position of the Philippine delegation on the draft resolution before this august body. The position of the Philippine delegation on the Indonesian question is a matter of record. It deserves emphatic reiteration when looked at in the perspective of recent developments in Asia and the Far East and in connexion with what we regard to be an honest and earnest attempt on the part of the sponsors of the resolution-China, Cuba, Norway and the United States~to seek a L'une de ces lettres expose la fa(,;on dont les troupes neerlandaises maintiennent l"'ordre pu- blic". Dans la region de Tasikmalaja, y lit-on, il est impossible de circuler en auto sur les routes, car on trouve en travers de la chaussee de nom- breux cadavres en decomposition; ce sont des Indonesiens fusilles par les Neerlandais. Les Neerlandais ont mis le feu a tous les villages situes autour de Sumedang et ant fusille la popu- lation. Je cite les termes de la lettre: "]'ai pris personnellement part aux operations de nettoyage dans les montagnes. Nous 11'Y avons pas trouve ce qu'on appelle des "bandes", mais en revanche nous avons brule ras cinq villages. Neanmoins, nous avons pu faire deux prisonniers qui ont ete soumis ad'affreuses tortures au moyen d'appareils electriques. On fixe les fils aux oreilles et aux mains et on y fait passer un courant a haute tension. C'est un spectacle epouvantable." Ces lettres montrent les stupMiantes methodes fascistes qtte le commandement neerlandais applique a la popUlation indonesienne. A-t-on le droit de confier a de tels barhares le maintien de l'ordre public clans la Republique d'Indo- nesie? La delegation de la RSS d'Ukraine estime que le projet de resoltttion qui nous est soumis est de£avorable et dangereux pour le peuple indone- sien, car il repond entierement aux interets de l'agresseur et justifie l'occupation par la force du territoire de la Republique d'Indonesie par les troupes neerlandaises. C'est un projet defai- tiste. Il potlsse le peuple et la Republique d'Indo- nesie a la capitulation au lieu de proteger la population indonesienne et de la de£endre contre l'agresseur dont elle est vietime. M. INGLES (Philippines) (traduit de l'anglais): Au nom de Son Excellence Carlos P. Romulo. Ambassadeur des Philippines, qui s'est rendu dans 1'Inde pour assister a la Conference ~es nations asiatiques a New-Delhi, je desire falre une declaration pour preciser la position de la delegation des Philippines au sujet dtl projet de resolution qui est soumis a votre haute assemblee. La position de la delegation des Philippines a propos de la question indonesienne est bien connue, mais il y a lieu de la souligner a nouveau, en 'faison des evenements qui viennent de se derouler en Asie et en Extreme·Orient et en rai- son de I'effort que les auteurs du projet de reso- lution, c'est-a-dire la Chine, Cuba, la Norvege et lesEtats-Unis, ont fait avec le plus grand Vle are glad to note from the statement made by the representative of the United States [402nd tneeting] that his delegatio!). is ready to exchange views with other delegations with respect to sug- gested ways of improving the text of the resolu~ tion. This indication of openness of mind on the part of the United States delegation should dispel the misapprehensions evident in certain quarters that the resoll1tion is being presented as the maxi- mum possible settlement and that, failing its acceptance, the Security Council would be faced with the dire altemative of adopting no resolu~ tion at all. For certainly, if any such inference were intended by the propenents of the resolution, there would be no occasion whatever for an exchange of views, UlllCh less for suggestions. • • A conference of 19 Asian and Pacific nations has just ended in New Delhi. The farNreaching implications of that historic gathering are easily tliscernible to those who have enough insight and circumspection to read the signs of the times. Those nineteen nations represent a substantial proportion of the membership of the United Nations; they embrace half the circumference of the globe and the greater rart of its population. The Conference, unanimously, has made speeifi:: recommendations to the Security Council regard~ ing a satisfactory solution of the N etherlands~ Indonesian dispute. We take just pride in the participation of the Philippines in that Conference. Needless to say, we make its acts and commitments otlr own, in common with the other p(\rticipating nations. At this junctLlfe. we desire to go 011 record be- fore the Sec~lrity Council as favol1ring, unequivo- cally and unreservedly, each and every reC(]111- mendation set fortb in the resolution addressed to this august body by the New Delhi Conference. The formula set forth therein is preuicated on the following explicit considerations [5/1222]: "1, That members of the Republican Govern- ment, other Republican leaders and all political prisoners ill Indonesia be immediately restored to complete freedom. "2. That the Republican Government be en- abled to function freely and to this end: "(i) The Residency of ]ogjakarta be handed back immediately to the Republic, and the Nether A New~Delni. TOllS cellx qui ont assez de clair- voyance et de sagesse pOl1r comprendre l'evolution de notre temps se rendeut parfaitement compte de ]'importance de c.ette reunion historique et de ses consequences probable;;. Les dix-neuf natiolls qui se sont reunies a New-Delhi constituent unc partie considerable des nations 11'Iembres de 1'Or- ganisation des Nations Unie~. Elles englobent plus de la moitie de la population du monde et 1eur territoire s'etenc1 sur la moitie du globe terrestre. Cette conH:rence a adresse a, l'unanimite au COllseil de securite des recomm<Jndations pre~ ci5es en vue d'arriver a ttue solution satisfaisa,llte du differend qui oppose les Pays-Bas a l'Indo- nesle. C'est avec fierte que nous soulignons que les Philippines ont pris une part active a eette confeN rence. Tont commele5 al\tres nations partici- pantes, nons nous considerons, cela va sans dire, COlTIrne lies par les decisions qu'elle a adoptees. A 1'heure actl1elle, nOllS vo Lldrions declarer devant le Conseil de securite que nous SOlltenons sans aucune reserve toutes les recomm<1ndatiolls ql1e contient la resolntion adressee a ceUe haute assemblee par la Conference de New-Delhi. La sohttion que propose cette resolution exige [Sj1222) , "1. Que Ieur entiere liberte soit immediatement rendtle aux membres clu Gotlvernement de la Republique, aux autres dirigeants republicains et a tous les prisonniers politiques en Indonesie; "2. Que le Gouvernement de la RepubJique soit mis en mesute d'excrcer librement ses fonc- tions et, a cette fin, "i) Que la Residence de Djokjakarta soit im- mediatement rendue a la Re[JUblique et que les "(H) Such areas of the islands of Java, Su- matra and Madura as were held by the Govern- ment of the Republic on 18 December 1948 be restored to the Republic not later than 15 March 1949; "(iii) Dutch forces be withdrawn "(a) Immediately from the Residency of Jog- jakarta and "(b) Progressively from the rest of the ~e­ publican territory mentioned in the preced'r;g paragraph such withdrawal to ,be effected ID stages and under conditions to be prescribed by the Committee of Good Offices or any other body to be appointed by the Security Council and to be completed not later than 15 March 1949; . "(iv) All restdetions imposed by the Nethe~­ lands authorities on the trade of the Repubhc be immediately removed; _"(v) Pending formation of the interim gov~ ernment referred to in paragraph 3, the Repub- lican Government be afforded all facilities for communication with the outside world. "3. That an interim government compQsed of representatives of the Republic and representa- tives of territories in Indonesia other than those under the authority of the Republic, commanding the confidence of the Indonesian people, -be formed not later than 15 March 1949, with the approval and assistance of the Committee of Good Offices or any other body that may be appointed by the Security CounciL Pending the result of deliberations of the constituent assembly referred to in paragraph 6 below, no new regional governments shall be formed or recognized. "4. That subject to provisions of paragraph 5, such interim government shall enjoy full powers of government, including control over its armed forces. To ensure this, all Dutch troops shall be withdrawn from the whole of Indonesia on a date to be determined by the Committee of Good Offices or any other body appointed by the Security Counci1. Pending such withdrawal, Dutch forces shall not be used for maintenance of law and order except at the request of the interim government and with the approval of the Com- mittee of Good Offices or any other body that may be appointed by the Security Council. "5. That the interim government shall have s-tlch freedom in external affairs as may be de- termined in consultation with the interim govern- ment and the Netherlands authorities by the Committee of Good Offices or any other body that may be appointed by the Security Council. "ii) Que les regions des iles de Java, Sl1ma- tra et Madottrn qui etaient placees le 18 decembre 1948 sous Vautorite du Gouvernement de la Repttblique fassent retour a la Republique ]1'; 15 mars 1949 au pIllS tard; "iii) Que les forces neerlandaises soient re- tin~es : "a) Sans delai de la Residence de Djokja- karta; "b) Progressivement dn reste du territoire republicain mentionne .i l'alinea ii), ce retrait devant s'effectuer par etapes et dans les conditions qui seront prescrites par la Commission de bans offices au par tout autre org-ane qL1C desigm:ra le Conseil de securite, et devant etre termine le 15 mars 1949 au plus tard; "Iv) Que toutes les restrictions imposees par les autorites neerlandaiscs aux echnnges eommer- eiaux de la Republique soient immediatement levees; "v) Qu'en attendant la constitution du Gou- vernement provisoire mentionne au paragraphe 3), le Gouvernement cle la Repnblique se voie aeeor- cler toute faciHte de communiquer avec le monde exterieur; "3. Qu'ttn gouvernement provisoire, compose des representants de la RePltblique ainsi que des representants des territoires de l'Indonesie ne relevant pas de l'autorite -de la Republique qui sont investis de la confiance du peuple indone- sien, soit constitl1t~ le 15 mars 1949 au plus tard, avec le conscntement et le concours de la Commis- sion de bons offices ou de tout autre organe que pourra designer le Conseil de securite. En ntten~ dant l'issue des deliberations de l'assemblce cons- tituante mentionnee au paragraphe 6 ci~apres, aucun gouvernement regional nouveau ne sern constitue ou reconnu. "4. Que, sons reserve des dispositions du para- graphe 5, ce gouvernement provisoire soit investi ele tous les pouvoirs clu gouvcrnement, notam-· ment du commandement des forces armees. A cet efiet, toutes les troupes neerlandaises 5eront retirees de l'cnsemble de l'Indonesie ii une date qui sera fixee par la Commission de bons offices ou par tout autre organe designe par le COllSeil de seeurite. En attendant qnc c:e retrait nit ete eflectue, les forces neerlandaises ne setont pas utilisees pour assurer le maintien de I'ordre public si ce n'est a la requete du Gotlvernement provi- soire et avec le consentement de la Commission _de bons offices ott de tont autre organe que pourra designer le Conseil de securite; "5. Qu'en c:e qui concerne ses relations avec -l'etranger, le gouvernement provisoire jouisse de sa liberte dans la mesure qui pOl1fl"a Hre deler- ,minee apres conwhation avec le gouvernement provisoire et les all!orites neerlrmdaises, par la ,Commission de bons offices ou tont autre organe . que poutra designer le Consei! de securite. '.'8. That the Committee of Good Offices or any other body appointed by the Secmity Council be given authority to secure applimtion of the foregoing recommendations under Stlpervision 0 f the Security Council, to which it shall report as frequently as necessary." The resolution of the New Delhi Conference is based on the same principles which ha,'e con- sistently guided 115 in our unremitting advocacy of a just solution of the Indonesian question. A comparison of the joint draft resolution before tl1e Sec.urity Coundl and the resolution adopted bv the Conference on Indonesia held in New Delhi shows that they have in view the same ft1lldamental objec.tive, namely, the transfer of sov.ereignty by th" Netherlands to a United States of Inr.onesia over the whole of Indonesia by 1950, to be effected after the restoration of the lawful authority of the Republic of Indonesia, the formation of an interim federal government, and the holding of hee and democratic elections for a constitutellt assembly to organize a United States of Indonesia. If we examine the premises on which both reso1LttiollS are based, we find that the ultimate authority rests in the SeCllrity Coundl to carry out the recommendations. Of cotlrSe, in the joint draft resolution emphasis is placed in the first instance on negotiations between the parties themselves with the assistance of tbe Committee of Good Offices, but in case of disagreement be- tween the parties, the joint draft resolution throws the full weight of responsibility for ca,ry- ing out its avowed objectives upon the Secl1rity Council. In the New Delhi resolution the Committee of Good Offices is given more authority, but at the same time, the Security Council does not thereby abdicate its power of supervision and control. Considering the marked disinclination of the Netherlands to enter into conversations such as thOse contemplated in the joint draft resolution, it is obviotls that the emphasis laid on further negotiations will have the practical effect of de- laying the achievement of a quick settlement. It must be remembered that cynical disregard of negotiations impelled the Netherlands, by its ~wn confession, to resume military operations agalOst the Indonesians. It is cloubted, therefore, whether the approach to the settlement of the Indonesia.n question adopted by the joint draft resolution ts the more practicable one, c:onsidering that even the joint draft resolution places ultimate reliance on more positive action by the Secllrity Council. "8. Que la Commission de bons offices, Oll tout autre organe designe par le Consei! de securite, soit habilitee a assurer l'application des recommandations ci-dessus, sous la surveillance du Conseil de securite auquel el1e fera rapport aussi souvent qu'jl sera necessaire." La resolution de la Conference de New-Delhi repose sur les principes qui nous ont toujours guides dans notre insistance a demander qu'une solution juste fut trouvee pour la question inclo- nesienne. Si 1'011 COmpare le projet de resolution commun soumis au Conseil de securite et la reso- lution adoptee par la Conference sur l'Indonesie qui s'est twue a New~De1hi, l'on s'apercevra que leur but iondamental est le meme. En effet, tous deux proposent que la souverainete sur I'ensemble de l'Indone.sie soit transferee des Pays-Bas aux Etats-Unis d'Indonesie, a la date de 1950, apres que l'ordre et l'autorite aUront ete retablis dans la Republique d'Jndonesie, qu'un gouvernement federal interimaire aura ete constitue et que de::; elections libres et democratiques auront ete orga- nisees pour etablir une assemhJee constitttante ayant pour tache d'organiser les Etats-Unis d'Indonesie. Si nous examinons les post\1lats sur lesquels reposent les deux documents, nous voyons que c'est le Conseil qui est l'autorite s'"tperieure pour ce qui est d'executer le::; dispositions des recom- mandations. Le projet de resolution commun de- mande, i1 est vrai, que tout d'abord, des negocia- tions soient engagees entre les pUliies elles-memes avec l'assistance de la Commission de bans offices. Cependant, en cas de desaccord entre 'les p<l.rties, iL remet an Conseil toute la responsabilite de la mise en ceuvre des objectifs qu'il expose. La resolution de New-Delhi donne davanmge d'autorit6 a la Commission de bons offices, mais celCl ne signifie point que le Consei! de secl1rite doive abandonner ses pouvoirs de sl1rveillClnce et de contr6le. Si 1'011 tien! compte de la matlvaise volonte tres nette dont 1es Pays-Bas font preuve lors- qu'on 1ellr dernande d'entamer des negociations dl1 genre de celles que propose le projet de reso- lotion commun, i1 devient clair que, si I'on insiste pour l'ollverture de nouvelles negodations, l'effet pratique de cette attilttde sera de retarder tout regletnent. L'on se rappellera que c'est leur reftl~ cynique d'entrer en negodations qui, de le111" propre aVetl, a pousse les Neel"landais a reprendn: les operations militaires contre les Indonesien' L'on pent se demander, par consequent, si 1;\ solution que propose le projet ue resolution COl" mhn est la pillS pratique, elant donne que ce projet lui-meme envisage en definitive comme plus efficace une action plue energique de. la part du Conseil de securite. We must llere state that we attach the utmost importance to the date of the transfer of sover- eignty. Such trn.nsfcr can be effected on 1 Jantl- ary 1950 without pr~judice to anyone, the Nether- lands itself having set the relinquishment of its sovereignty for the same date. If the sponsors have seen fit to rely On the judgment of the Netheriancls with respect to the other dates in the draft resolution's time schedule, they can cer- tainly place as much reliance on the date chosen by the Netherlands for the transfer of sover- eignty. That such date has also been chosen by the Indonesian Republican and the New Delhi Conference, is an added argument for its adop- tion. A tran.sfer of sovereignty earlier than that contemplated by the joint draft resolution is, by all pragmatic standards. desirable; and no con- sideration of mechanics, as shown by the concur- euce of approval of 1 January 1950 by the interested parties, argues against that end. In the matter of troop withdrawals, we sub- mit, with due respect, that the provisions of the New Delhi resolution are more adequate than those of the joint uraH resolution. It must be recalled that there has been a cle- tenruned voice among the members of this Council to the effect that the aggressors should not be allowed to profit from tbeir military action. If tlley were allowed to do. it would be tantamount to sanctioning the aggression and encouraging similar acts in the future. We therefore attacll great importance to the setting of a target date. What does the joint draft reso- lution provide regarding the withdrawal of Netherlands troops? Paragraph 2 calls upon the Netherlands to permit officials of the RepUb- lic to retum to Jogja}{arta so that they may, among other things, administer the affairs of their capital city. Yet nothing is said in this par.a~ graph about the withdrawal of Netherlands troops from the city. Paragraph 4, dealing with the duties of the proposed United Nations com~ mission for Indonesia, empowers the commission to assist in acbieving the quickest possible restora~ tion of the civil administration of the Republic, but such restoraton is not made <:oincident with the withdrawal of Netherlands troops, because the commission.. after consultation with the Quant au retrait des troupes, DOUS nom; per- mettons de faire rcmarquer que les dispositions de la resolution de New-Delhi s'appliquent mitux a la situation que celles c1u projet de resolutiOn cammttn. N'oublions pas que, au sein de ce Conseil i! a ete dit avec insistance que les agresseurs ne de- vrnient pas pouvoir tirer profit de l~urs actions militaires. Si on leur permettait de le hire, cela sijznifierait que l'on accepterait ]'agression et qLle l'on encouragerait de nouveal1X actes de ce genre. Aussi, attachons-nolls la plus g-rande -im~ portance a la fixation d'un delai Hmtle pour le retrait des troapes. Que prevoit done le projet de resolution COmll1Ull au sujet du retrait des troupes neerlandaises? Le paragraphe 2 du dispositLf invite les Pays-Bas a permettre aux fonction- mires de la Republiqne de retourner a Djokja- lwrta afin qu'ils puissent, entre al1tres, mlminlstrer lettr capitale. Cependant, ce paragraphe 11e men- tionne pas le retrait des troupes neerlandaises de Djokjakarta. Le par~gr_aphe 4, du dispositif qui traite des fonctions de la fllture commission des Nations Unies pour l'Indonesie, autorise la com- mission a preter toute l'aide et l'assistance pos- sibles POUT permettre la reconstitution la plus rapide de l'administration civile de la Repttblique. Cependant, il n'est pas prevu que cette reconsti- tution co'incidera avec le retra-it des troupe5 neer- Actually, the withdrawal of Netherlands troops is made contingent on the approval of the Nether- lands, since the Republic naturally can only acquiesce in the restontion of areas from which it has been forcibly evicted. My delegation had thought, and still thinks, that the withdrawal of Netherlands troops presents o:lly a problem of logistics. That the Republican forces will need as much time to take over the occupied areas as tlIe Nethedands will need to evacuate them, may be taken into consideration, but there has been introduced into the discussion another element, narndy, lilt: iI:l1nedi"le problem of law and order. The demand is now being- rnilde for guarantees to [if;: and property in the occupied aref.S as soon as th~y are evacuated by the Netherlands forces. The Republic has not failed in its ability to main:ain peace and or::Ier in its territOl)'. includ- ing the suppression of a commllnist !lprising, and .it is [lot seen how it <:an fail to protect life and property once it is restored to full civil control. sente~ qu'tin ;Jrobleme d'organisation. :""on peut cOl1siderer qu'il faudra. aux farces repllblicaines autant de tell~ps pour s'installer dans les regions occupees qu'aux Neerlandais pour les evacuer, mais un autre element, a savoir le prcbleme du maintien de l'ordre pt1.blic, a ete introduit dans la discussion. On demancle maintEonar.t que la protection des perSDn:1eS et des biens dans le, regions occupees soit assl1n~e apres I'evacuation p.1r les forces neerlnndaises. La Repnblique a ele capable de maintenir l'ordre public sur son terri- toire et a tnemc r6prime une rebellion commun1ste. L'on ne vOlt pas pou~quO[ e11e ne pourrait pas protcgcr les vies et les biens quand elle .1l1r<l r!t' nouveau plein controle sur l'administration civile. 'vVe recaU our Own experience when the Japa- llese forces were finally ousted from the Philip- pine!: by the United States army of liberation: how quickly our gue:Tilla farces, aided by the American tro:)ps and, in some cases, alone, took over the government in the areas evacuated by the retre:ttin5' enemy, and how soon thereafter the lawful ciyil Govemment, dispersed by three years of brutal Japanese military occupation, resumed its authority. There need be no concern fol' the protection of the people against guerrillas in a land wl1ere the people themselves ..re the guer:-illas. We note that the forces cf.Iled upon by the draft resolutior. to maintain law and order in the occupied areas are the ir.vaders bemselves, who breached the peace in the first place. They are the same forces which. accordillg to the repo:ts from the Committee of Good Offices of 14 January 1949 [5/1212] and 24 January 1949 [S/1223], have absolutely no control of areas outside the Fincipal towns and main roads and who, even in the towns they have occupied, do not have sufficient troops to maintair. law and order. NotlS avons eu une experience analcgue 10r5- Cltle l~s forces japonaises ont 6le nnalen:ent cba.<.- sees des Phili?pines peoC I'armee de liberation dc~ Etats-Unis. 1'\OUS a"o:ls vu avec quelle rapiditc nos forces de guerillas, soit avec l'nide des Ame- ricains, soit 5cules, ant assttme les fonctions de gOt1v~rnement dans le3 zones eVtlCUeeS par !'en.- nellli battant en retraite. Tres peu de temps apres, le Gouvernement legitillle, disperse par trois annees de bnttale oCC'.1pation militaire japonaisf, avait retrouve tOllte son <wtorite. 11 n'y a pas a Se preoccu[Jcr cle protcs-er la populatlon :ontre des guedlas dan, un pays OU les guerillas soot k penple lui-meme. Remarquons que les for~es auxquelles le projet de resolution conne le maln- tiell de l'orclre public clans les zones occupee.s sont Ies forces cl'invasion elles-memes, celies qUi, le:; premier('s, ont viole la paix. D'autre part, selon les rapports de la Commission de bons offices en date dLl 14 janvier 1949 [5/1212J d du 24 janvier 1949 -S/1223~) ces forces n'ollt abso:ument allClUle au:orite en dehors des grandes villes et des routes principales et, meme dans les localites qu'e:Ies occupent, elIes ne posseclent pas un nombre d'hommes suffisant pour assurer le maintien de l'ordre public. Ces rapports montrent clairement que ~ant que les forces neerlandaises, qui sout la ralson veritable du c1esordre, n'auront pas ete retirees, These reports show clearly that, unless and until the Netherlands forces, which are the very root-cause of disorder, are removed, it is im- possible to expect a return to peace and stability in the occupied areas. jJ se:'a impossible qt1e les regions occupees retrou~ vent la paix et la stabHite. Dans le Ciscours qu'il a :Jfol1once a l'appui du projet de resolution [4-Q2C11le seance], le representant des Etats-Unis a mentionue uo autre element, ;l savoir la necessite de m<.intenir un flot regulier de ravitaillement en prodl,its alimen- taires et en autres o')jetS de premiere necessi,::e. Ce probleme merite evidemment que I'on y rHlechisse, mais, au fond, c'est Ul1e questi:m qui se poserait devant toute autorite quelle qu'dle soit. 11 n'y a pas de raison de croire que seuls :es A further element was introduced by the repre- sentative of the United States in his speech [402nd meeting] sponsoring the resolution. That element is the necessity of maintaining- the supply and delivery of food and other everyday neces- sities. That, indeed, is a froblem worthy of serious consideration, but it is, at bottom, a prob~ lern which would face whoever was in authority. There is no :'eason to single out the Dutch as the only ones capable of ensuring the supply and Assnming that the Netherlands troops are not there to slay and that they will be withdrawn from Republican territory ,md, eventually, from the whole of Indonesia~whetlter as a result of negotiations between the parties or in obedience to a directive from the Security Cot1ncil~it IS important that those troops should be withdrall'Il from the Residency of Jogjakarta and, progres- s~vc1y, from the rest of Republican territory nntil the federal interim government, in pl'eLJaration for th~ election for the constituent f\.o;sell1hlv, s1J;l11 h.ave been established; that is, on 15 March 1949. There is, moreover, the intimale connexion be- tween the military problem anel the politic;ll prob- lem; that is, between the troop withdrawal and the political settlement envisaged in both reso- lutions. The representative of the United States postulated the principle that any settlement in Indones~a must be the result of free agreement by the parties concerned. However, we ml',st point out that, so long as the Netherlands troops are in RC[.>l1blican territory, there will always be tIle danger of suppression of Indonesian free expression, and a settlement, instead of being free, might in fact be an enforced one. We also believe it to be the. condition sine- qlla lIOn to the holding of clemocratic elections that an atmosphere of perfect freedom shotlld be re- stored in the art'as now Occ11[Jiecl by the Nether- lands. The presence of Netherlands troops would be an indubitable impairme11t to that freedom which we all seek. We also submit to the careful consideration of the Security Council the recommenclation con- tained in sub-paragraph 2 0) of the New Delhi resolution, to the effect that' the initial territory to be restored to t11e Republic be the Residency and not merely the, city of ]ogjakarta. Certainly, the freedom of achon of the Republican authori- ties in ~he administration of the City of ]ogja- karta Wll! be namper-ed if they cannot utilize the resources of the whole Residency nnd if thev hnve to depend for food sllpplies and other vit~l supplies on doles from the Netherlands iorces. We hold the view that the t'emoval of all trndc restrictions imposed by the Netherlands authori- ties on the Republic, as advocated by the New Delhi Conference, is a corollary to the manifest 'jntent of the resolntion to achieve a balance beR tween the primary responsibilities of the United Si l'on admet que les troupes ncerlanclaises ne doivent pas rester dans ee pays et qu'elles seron! rctin~es du territoire de la Repub1iC)ul'; et, 11na1e- meat, de tont le territoire de l'Indonesie, que cc :"oit a la suite de negociations entre les parties rm en execution d'une directive emunant uu Conseil <.le securite, il convient qne ces troupes .'oient retirccs du di:>trict de Djokjakarla et, llrogresslvement, du reste du territoire republi- .2ain, lwant qn'un gouvernement federal interi- :naire [lit ele constitlle er. vue de prcparcr le:> ~lcctioJ1s elcstinees it former une assemlMe cons- titwmte, c'est-a-dire avant le 15 mars 1949. 11 existe, d'antre part, un lien ctroit entre le nrob1eme militaire et le probleme poliliquc, c'est- ,'l-dire entre la question du retrrrit des troupes et le reglement politique dont trnitent 1C'~ deux docu- ments que j'ai nlentionnes. Le representant des Etats-Unis u'Amerique a pO!iC, en prindpe, que le reglement de la question indonesiennc doit reposer sur un accord 1ibrt'lHent cOllsenti des deux parties. Nous devons fa;re remarquer a cc propos que, tant que les troupes ncerhndaises se trouveront ell territoire re(lublicain, il sera tOl1- joms i (rnindre que les Indonesiens ne se Valent refuser la liberte d'expression et que le reglement qui intcrviendr;l, loin d'ctre libre, ne sait impose par la force. N" OL1S cstimotls egalement que le relabJisscment d'une atmosphere de liberte absolue dans les regions occnpees actnellcment par les Pafs-~as e.o,t line condition sine qU(l, '/1011 de l'orgallls;ltwn d'eleetions uemocratiqtles. II est evident que la presence eles troupes neerlandaises cOJ)~tituer;lit un empechement majeur au ret;lblissement de cclte liberte que nous recherchons tons. NOllS dcmandons egalement au Conseil de seclt- rite d'examil\cr avec grand soin la rccommnnda- tion .contenlle au parngraphe 2, a1inea p.remi~r d,u dispositif de la resolution de New-DelhI, qm ~re­ voit que le territoire qui doit tont d'abcrd e~re n~stitue a la Republique doit cOlnprenclre le diS- trict ele Djokjakarta, et non cettc ville scu\e. 11 est evident que les Rutorites republicai11es ne pourront aclministrer la ville de Djokjakart~.en pleine liberte si elles n'ont pas a leur disp.oSltlOn les ressotlfces clu district taut enticr et st, pour les produits alimentaires et pour les alttres objets de premiere necessite, elles doivent dependre de la bonne volonte des forces necrlan<.laises. Nous eslimons que la levee ele toutes les restric- tions commerciales imposees a la Republique par les autorites neerlandaises doit, comme le recom- ma!lde la Conference de New-Delhi, decou1er tout naturellement du desir qui a ete exprime de tenir compte egalement des responsabilites de La delegation des Philippines a toujours SOll- tenu que le bloCLIs economique impose nla Repu- bEque d'lndonesie par les Pays-Bas est en Con- tradiction avec l'article 6 de l'Accord du Rnwil/e [S/649, rmnexe XI] et qu'il doit etre leve. SOil Excellence M. Romtt!o a deja eu J'occasion d'ntti- rer l'aftention du Conseil de securite sur les souffrances et les privations que le blocus impose au peuple d'Indonesie. Il a declare [341eme seance] que ce blocus a empeche la reconstruc- tion et la remise en marche de l'economie indo- nesienne et a cause d'importantes disettes de produits de premiere necessite, y compris des medicaments et des produits alimentaires. The Philippine delegation has always main- tained that the Netherlands economic blockade against the Republic of Indonesia is contrary to article 6 of the Renville Agreement [S/649, ap- pendior X I] and should be lifted. Ambassador Romulo, on a previous accasion, drew the atten- tion of the Security Council to the suffering and privation inflicted by the blockade on the Indo- nesian people. He said [341s1 meeting] that this blockade has prevented the reconstruction and revival of Indonesian economy and resulted in severe shortages of vital supplies and equipment, including medicine and food. The position of the Philippine delegation on the removal of trade restrictions can be viewed in ils proper context when reference is made to the findings of the Committee of Good Offices contained in document 5/919. I quotc from the Committee's report: L'an pourra s'expliquer de mal1iere td:s nctle la position de la delegation des Philippines stir la levee des restrictions comme.ciales si 1'on consulte le rapport de la Commission de bons offices qui figure au document 5/919. J'en citerai I'extrait suivant: "According to the Committee's information all trade in the Republican areas, whereas commerce is fairly active in northern Sumatra and Java, Central Java; which COntains an overwhelming proportion of Republiciln population, has been practically cut off from seaborne trade and trade with other Republican areas. "D'apres les renseignements que possede.. la Commission sur le commerce dans les zones repubiicaines, alors que 1es echanges sont assez achEs dallS le nord de Sumatra et qu'ils le sont progressivemel':t moins dans le sud de Sumatra et dans ]'ouest de Java, le centre de Java, CJtli contient une majorite ecrasante de poptl1ation repl1blicaine, a ete ponr ainsi dh·e coupe de tout commerce d'autre-mer et de tOllS echanges avec les aatt'es zones republicaines ... "11 est evident que la fa~on lIlsuffisante dont a tte applique, jusqu'ici l'article 6 de la conven- tion d'armistice [5/649, at~t1.tJ_.;e XI], constitue tme raison immediate et importante des diffi~ Ctlltes economiques rencontrees dans les regions' republicaines. De l'avis de la Commission, il convient d'attacher a cet egard une extreme importance a la reglementation en matiere de commerce interieur et exterieur promulguee par- Ies autorites civiles et miUtah·es des Indes ll(~er­ landaises ... "... it is evident that an immediate and sub~ stantial reason for economic difficulties of Re- publican areas is inadequate implementation thus far of article 6 of the truce agreement [Sj649, apprmdior XI]. Most important in this connexion, in the Committee's opinion, are regulations gov- erning domestic and international trade pmmul- gated by Netherlands Indies civil and military authorities ... ItIl est avere que l'article 6 de la convention d'armistice a pour but d'assurer a ce commerce la liberte la plus grnnde possible." "... it is the clear intent of article 6 of the truce agreement that such trade shall be as free· as possible . . ." We consider inadequate, therefore, that part of sub-paragraph 4 (f) of the joint draft resolu- Nous considerons par consequent comme non satisfais:\nte la partie du paragraphe 4, alillE:;a f) du projet de resolution commun, qui prevoit ql1e la Commiss·lon pourra recommander des dispo- sitions visant au bien-etre des pop11'lations des regions devant etre restituees a ia RepubJique. t~on which provides that the proposed cammis~ SIGn may recommend measures for the economic well~being of the population of areas to be re- stored to the Republic. La Commission de bans offices a deja montn!i que le blocus a eu pour but de garrotter, au point de vue economique, la population de la Republique. Le Conseil de securite se doit de prendre, des maintenant, ell s'inspirant du rap- port de la Commission de bons offices, les deci- sions qui s'imposent, au lieu d'attendre de nou~ velles recommandations, pour redresser une situa- tion econornique qlli ne 'peut qu'empirer entre temps. The Committee of Good Offices has already shown that the blockade has operated to strangle the Republican population economically. This Council can do no less than act forthwith on this report of the Committee of Good Offices in- stead of waiting for further recommendations to remedy an eCOnomic situation which can only be expected to worsen in the meantime. Unless the blockade is lifted, through the taking of an effective measure to that effect such as a specific provision in the proposed settlement, the Netherlands will be in a position actively to seek the complete econol~ic destruction of the Rep1,lb- A moins qu'nne mesure efficace, du genre de la proposition concrete que nous suggerons d'in- clure dans ,le projet de reglement, ne soit prise pour la ]e"\'ee du blocus, les Pays-Bas pourraient prendre des mesure~ efficaces en vue de detruire . Then, while the Netherlands may havc been foiled in its game of dlluble political and eco- nomic squeeze on the first score, it WOI.1~d have succeeded on the latter, reducing the Republic to a condition of economic [Jenury and want and di~aster. \Ve likewise submit for the partictl]ar con- sideration of this Council, among the other recom- mendations of the New Delhi Conference. the :et]uiremcnt that, pendinlf, the formation of the mlcrim government, the Republican Government be afforded all facilities for communication with the outside world. It is desirable that the wall of silence laboriously built around the Republic by the Netherlands be tarn cown in order that the people who hilve lived in its dark confines all this time may be free to live wilt the rest of mankind. Tbc issues before the Council are c:ear-c'lt. Tllei 1" moral and bistoriC-a1 implications <Ire por- telllollS, awl tt·allscend all!" own time and circum- stances. Two issues overshadow all the rest. \iVill the exigencies of decadent colonialism prevail ovel· the hmdamental rights of the IndDnesians as human beings and as a people? Will an inter~ na~ion:1: dispute :is important as the N~ther1ands­ Jndoncsiiln problem be settled through the pro- cesses ordained by the United Nations Charter or through the arbitrament of a:'ms? We urge the Security Council to ponder these cftlcial questions in the perspectiye of massive events now unfolCing in Asia and the Far East.

In view of the lateness of the hour, I should like to ask the representative of the Republic of Indonesia, who is next on m)' 1i5t of speakers, wbether he wishes to proceed now or whether he WO~l1d prefer to speak at the beginning of our next meeting. Mr. PALAR (Indone3ia): I should prefer to make my st~t{'mr.nt :'It the next meeting.

In view of the reply of the representative of the Republic of IndonesiB, I propose that the Security Council sholtld now adjotltn and meet again on the Indonesl&n question at 11 o'clock on Thursday, 27 Januaryand continue into the aftemoon, if necessary. I would hope, at the beginning of that meding, to dis:cose of the second item on today's agenda, the letter from tlte Secretary-General, transmittinrr a report from the General Assembly. T wOttld hope that we might deal with this matter on the Jillt:s whicil I indicatcd tlt the opening of today's meeting. Mr. MALTK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (lralls{ateJ from Russian) ~ I should like to ask that tl1C discussion of the first question should be postponed for threc or four days. Not::> attirons atlssi tout p3-rtic~:ie:rentcnt1'<.ttentioo du Conseil, panni les autres recorrunandatiom de la Conference de New-Delhi, sur celle qui propose que, en attendant la formation d'·Jn gouvcmement interimaire, le Gouvernement de la Rept1Uique se vo:e accorder toutes facilites pour coffitn"Jniquer avec le reste du mon::le. Il est hau~ tement desir:ilble gue le mm de silence soignettsement edge par les Pays-Bas autour de la Repuhlique soit abattu, anr. que ceux qui ont vecu si lor.gtemps clans l'obscurite so:ent libres de comm[miqtl~r avec les autres hommes. Les questions qui se posent devant le Conseil de serurite sont extremement nettes. Leurs reperct1s.~ion_~ Sl1r le plan moral et sur le plan 11istorique sont prodigieuses, elles depassent le moment et les circonstances actuelIes. Deux points domi- :lent tous les autres. Les exigences du colonialisme en decadet:ce prev<luC:ront-elles sur les drcits primordiaux que les Indonesiens possMent en tant qu'etns humains et en tant que nation? ":"J11 ::Iifferend i:ltem<ltional cl'une import:uxe <l.ussi grande que le connit er.tre les Pays-Bas et l'Indonesie pourra-t-il etre reso1u pftr les moyens que prevoit la Charte des Nations Unies ou fattdra-t~i1 recourir a l'arbitr.ag~ des armcs? Nous clemandons instamment <l.U Conseil de securit6 d'exam:ner ('.cs questions de gravite extrbne a La Iumiere des grand ioses ev~nements qui se derou1ent actu.ellement en Asie et en Extreme-Orient. Le PREsIDENT (tradu.it de l'atlglais): Vu l'heure tardive, :e vOltdrais dema:1der au representa:1t de la Republiqlle d'Indonesie, qui est le premcer arate«r insrrit, s'il tienr a p.1rler des maintenant ou s'it prefererait :-:le prendre la parole qu'au debut de notre prochaine seance. M. PALAI!. (Indonesie) (1rad~~ii de tanglais) : Je prefererais bire ma declaration au cours de la prochaine 5eance. Le PRESIDENT (trc.duit de l'angla.is): Etant donne la reponse que :vient de nous faire le representant de la Hepublique ::l'Indonesie, je propose an Conseil de lever la seance sans plus tarder et de tenir Ulle autre reunion consacree a la questior; indonesienne le jeudi ~7 jatl;vier .a 11 1,eures. etant entendu que la dlScasSlOL se polttmivra ['apres-midi s'il y a lieu. J'{'spere que, au d~btlt ne cette seance, nons pourrons achever de tr<l.iter le point 2 de notre ordre du jour d'aujollrd'hl1i, .i sa.voir la lettre du Secretaire general transmettant un r<l.pport de l'As,emblee generale. J'espere que nous pourrons examiner Cl". sujet cormne je l'ai inclique au debut de :a sea:1ce d'aujourd'hui. M. MAUl( (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (trad1,it d1t r1o!ssej: Je youcr.ais dem<l.nder que l'examen de la premiere questton soit differe de trois a qttatre jour;:;. As there is no objection, it is agreed. The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m. En l'absence de toute objection, il en est ainsi decide. La seance est levee d 18 h. 25.