S/PV.405 Security Council
▶ This meeting at a glance
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Speeches
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Countries
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Resolutions
Topics
UN Security Council discussions
UN membership and Cold War
General statements and positions
Security Council deliberations
TIt!! agemla was that of the 404th meeting [SIAgllllda 404].
4. Continuation of the discussion on the Indonesian question
At the £nvitaliol1 of the President, Mr, Hood, representatIve of Australia; Mr. Vatf Langenhove, representative of Belgium; U So Nyn, repre- sentative of Burma; Sir Benegal Romo Ratt, representative of India; Mr. van Roijw, repre- sentative of the Nethulands; Mr. It/g/es, repre- sentative of the Pkilippines: and Mr. Palar, repnsl!1ltative of the Republic of Indonesia, took their places at the SecuritY,COUlfCil table.
Speaking, as the representa~ .five of CANADA, I now wish to make a brief state~ ment on the joint draft resolution on the Indonesian question which has been submitted to the Security ·Council by the delegations of China, Cuba, Norway and the United States of America.
In the consideration of the Indonesian dispute by the Security Council, as in the case of other .disputes which have comelo this Council, the Canadian delegation has supported proposals which have sought to br:ng abo'lt a cessation of bostilities and the restoration of peace and order as essential preliminary conditions to a negoti~ ated sett1e:nent. In particular, it has been our "desire to see the fighting stopped in Indonesia and conditions established there which would enable negotiations to be resumed between the parties for a solution of their present difficulties. WJlat we seek is that these resumed negotiations should res:.lIt in the establishment, with the least .possible delay, of a democratic and independent government in Indonesia, in association with the Kingdom Df the Netherlands. We believe that .the joint draft resolution is Cirected to these objectives, and the Canadian delegation will therefore support it.-
_ With regard to the draft amendments which have been circulated by the sponsors [S/1230], these commend themselves to us as clarifications and improvements which should be adopted. In this connexion, I have some douhts concerning the real me<llling to be attributed to paragraph 4 Cl): of the draft resolution, and for the purA pose of clarification I shall myself propose an amendment wllen this paragraph is under consideration. Meanwhile, 1 would ask the Secretariat ta circulate my proposal [S/1232].
I need only add that the Canadian delegAtion fully recognizes that the effecti....eness of this or of any resolution in helping to reach a lasting settlement in Indonesia eepends upon its acceptance by bo~h parties and upon their co-operation in lalplementillg its terns. Before giving this draf: reso1'.1t10n our wpport, we have carefully examined it from the point of view of whether it offers a reasor.able and practicable basis for both parties to work toward tl:is lasting settlement. We believe that the resolution does pro~
Le PRESIDENT (tra-djlit de l'anglois) : Je desire rnaintenant faire, en tant que representart du CANADA, une breve declaration all sujet du projet de resolution commun relatif a la question indonesienne qui a ete soumis au Conseil de seCllrite par les delegaLons de la Chine, de Cuba, de la Norvege et des Etats-Unis d'Amerique.
A l'occasion de I'examen par le Conseil de securite du differend indonesien, comme ce fut le cas pourles autres clifferends dont le Conseii a ete saisi, la delegation du Canada a donne son appui aux propositions qui visaient a faire cesser les hostilites et a retablir la paix et l'ordre, Ces conditions etant considerees comme indispemables at: reglement de la question p.c,r voie de negotiations. Nous avons souhaite, en particulier, que le combat cesse en Indonesie, et qu'i} s'y etaJIisse des conditions l;ui permettent aux parties de reprendre les negociatioflS en vue de resoudre leurs difficultes actl1elles. Ce que nous vocdrions, c'est que ces nOl1velles negociations aboutissent al'etabEssement en Indonesie, dans le plus bref delai possible, d'un gouverncment dernocratiqt:e d independant, associe au Rnyaume d~s Pays-Bas. Nous pensons que ce sont les buts vises par le projet de resolution comrnun, et, par consequent, la delegation du Canada l'ap;miera..
En ce qui concerne les projets d'amendement~ dont les auteurs du projet de resolution nous ont donr.e communication [S/1230], ils ont a nos yeux le rnerite de rer.dre le texte p1u.'i clair et de l'ametiorer, et devraient etre adoptc.9. A cet egard, je ne vois pas tres bie:l que1 est le. veritable sens de l'alinea e) du par<lgraphe 4 du projet de resolt:tion, et, pour plus de precision, je proposerai :J.ussi un amendement a ce para~ graphe lorsque .:et alinea sera exami1H'~. En attendant, je demancerai au Secretariat de distribuer le texte de ma proposition [S/1232~.
]'ajO\lterai seulelllent que la delegation du Canada a pleille'l1t:nt conscience du fait que cette resolution ou tOllte alltre ne peut effectivement contrilmer a un reglemcnt durable de la question indonesie:me qui si elIe est acccptee par les deux: parties et si celles~ci cooperent it la mise en
~uvre de ses dispositions. Avant de donner notre appui a ce projet de resolution, nous J'avons examine attentive-ment «fin Ile ·lair s'J oITrait ou mm une )ase ralsonnable et pratique sur laquelle les deux parties puissent s'efforcer de regler la
Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (trallslated from FYelICh): I have followed very clo~ely the discussion to which the joint draft resolutlOn ~uo mitted by the delegations of China, Cub~, UnJ~ed States of America and Norway has gIven fiSC in the Secnrity Council.
I have been impressed by the prominent part which the Member States belonging to the continent of Asia have played in this debate; their speeches have echoed the. recent New Del.hi C;onference. Their illterventlOns have been inspired by trlJly generous feelings: an understandable and legitimate sympathy towtlrds the people of Indonesia. May I be permitted to point out in that".re'speet that though they may feel it more strongly than others, that sentiment is by no means peculiar to them but is undoubtedly shared by everyone at this table,
A second fact arises from the debate, The Security Council has seldom so clearly appeared what it in fact is: a political organ above all, rather than a juridical or quasi-juridical hody. Its members are moved above all by feelings such as I have just mentioned: sympathies arising from racial affinity, from similarity of position or from the e:<istence of coihmon prejudices, Some of them are also governed by ideological considerations or political opportunism. Moreover, the rules laid down by the Charter, which could be applicable in this case, have hardly been mentioned at all. There appears to be an almost complete lack of any anxiety to respect internationallaw, or, in any cas~, it has heen relegated to the background. For having drawn attention to it, the Belgian delegation has been treated with irony, if not actual severity, as though it were attempting to introduce irrelevant or out-moded considerations into the discussion.
That attitude is of course understandable and to a certain extent inevitable. The Governments which we are representing here are anxious to satisfy the tides of public opinion which Pllt them in office. But, though that tendency is understandable and cannot be entirely suppressed, it nevertheless presents dangers; :it is exposing the Security Council to the risk of taking precipitate or arbitrary decisions and of meeting with failures which impair its authority.
The Charter states specifically that it is in con· formity with the principles of justice and international law that the United Nations must maintain international peace and security. That is a fundamental rule which is only too easily forgotten; yet it is found at the very beginning of the Charter,
Now I should like to make a third point. The difficulties with which we are confronted in the Indonesian question do not concern the goal we are pursuing but the methods to be used for its attainment. Nobody disputes the fact that the aill1 is the emancipation and independence of the
M. \'A~ L.... XGE.s:WI\"); (Iklgi(IUC): J'~li ~1I1\"1 ayec tine profollde attClltioll le,; d{;bats lju'a snscites, all sein c1u COllScil de sceurilt:, I~' pwjet
COIllIl1UIl de rcwlutiol1 prc:,ente par Il':'; drJ;;.I.:<llIII/IS de la Chine, de Cuha, des Et.,ts-Vni~ ll'AI1l{:ri1ItlC et de la Norn:"·ge.
J'ai ctc frappe p<lr 1<1 part ill1portantc <ju'ont prises, clans ces dcbats, les EtatR :\Irmbrt''' qui appartiennent <1\1 continent a~iatiqlle et par l'echo de la rfcente Conference de New-Delhi que nom; avons cntendll d::ms lenrs discOllrs, I.£urs interventions sont illspirces par tin sentimwt ~ll1in<.'m ment genereux; Itne comprchelJsibl(~ et li'gilil11l" sympathie pour les peuples de l'fndone;;ie. Qu'il me soit pennis de constater, a cc prtlp()S, (Jue si ce sentiment existe chez CIlX :l un degre plus grand gue chez d'autres, il ne Icur <.~st nullement particulier et qu'il n'est sans doute p("rsnnne autour de cette table qui ne l'cpfOu\'c egalrrnent.
Uoe seconde constatation se dcgage du debal. Rarement le Conseil de. sccuritc est da"antage apparu tel qu'i1 es.t en fait, a savoir, non pas tin organe judiciaire 011 guasi judicia-ire, mai:-; nvant tont un orgnne politiquc. Scs memhrl's nllCisscllt, avant tout, a des sentiments tels que ceu=<: que je ',liens d'evoQuer: s),lIlJlatllie due a line parrnte de race, a une analngic de situation ou i de.~ prt:- ventions communes; certains obcis~ent Jlll';si :i. des consideratio:ls d'ordre iMologiques ()u c1'opp·ortunisme poJitique. Par contre, c'est ;\ peinc si les regles que la Ch."lrte formulc, et <jui pourrail'Tlt etre applicab1es cn l'espccc, furcnt cV()qu~-e$. J.a preoccupation de respecter k droit inttl'national semble a peu pn!s absente, Qll, ell tout C,lS, die est refoulee a l'arricrc-plan. L1 delegation belgej pOllr en avoir fait etat, a ctr. tr<lil{:C 'l\'(,~ ironic, sinon avec scvcritc, comme si die tentait de hire intervenir dans )[\ discussio!l des {'!cments qui y scraicnt etrangers nu des consideratioD3 surannees.
Certes, on peut comprendre cetlc tcmlance, ('t elle est, dans une certaine mcsure incvitahle. U!l Gouvernements que nOlts rcpresentnns ici ont le soud de donner s:1tisfaction aux courants de I'opinion publique dont ils soot \lne emanation, Mais, si cette tendanec est compn;hellsihlc et Ile saurait etre entieremcnt reprimee. ell~ n'en offrc pas mains des dangers; elle expoSe le Com:eil de secllrite au risque de prendre des decisions incollsiderees Otl arbitraires et de ....uhi[ de$ echecs qui compromettent son alltoritC.
La Cllarte dit expressrment que e'est cnn fnrmement aux: principes de la justice et du drnit international que les NJtioll~ t'nies dlJiYent poursuine le maintien de la pllix et dl' la :,;eturitc; c'est Ull regIe fondamentn1c. qu'oo n'a que trop tenclance a. oublier; elle est pourtant in:,;critc au fronton de la Chartc. Je voudrais faire a present tine trnisiellH: cons· tatation. Les cliffic1l1tes avec le;;qud~ nous sommes aux prises dans I'affaire d'Imlllllcsic ne portent pas sur le but poursuivi, mais sur les moyens a employer pour l'atteindre. Persrlnne ne conteste que le but soit l'emancipation et r'inde~
Hence, there is no disagreement with regard to the successive phases of the solution which should be found: the constitution of a provisional government, free elections, the setting up of a federal State, and the transfer of slJ'vereignty to that federal State. Not only is there no disagreement with regard to the different phases of the solution bllt there is hardly anyl with regard to their chronological order, eithe:,. Nor, in spite of the reservations which have been expressly maintained with regard to the competence of the Security Council, is there any objection regarding toe assistance which the Council would bring, by a suitable means, to the realization of the solution., If, then, there is such a wide area o~agree ment, what is the orig:n of the serious difficulties with whi6 we are confronted? In rr.y mind they arise ma:nly in connexion with the way in which the Council .o;hould intervene.
The sponsors of the joint draft resolution have indeed shown great moderation. Nevertheless, besides the essential elements to which I have referred, they have kept, in the te-xt, elements which in relation to the aim of tie resolution are secondary and which can but give rise to complications and difficulties. Some members would like to add new ones; some would wish to give the .resolution a. threatening cha~acter,
The Council has already had the experience of resolutions of a threatening character in con~ nexion with the Palest:ne question. It thought that it would command respect solety by the firmness of its words; in reality, however, the only result that it achieved in bat way was to draw attention to its powerlessness to implement its threats, thus impairing its prestige. The Council has been more cautious in dealing with. the question of Kashmir· and. that caution has recently resulted in success. There too, it had come up against obstacles ar.d had even encounte:,ed refusals. Nevertheless the United Nations Commission for India and Pakis~ tan did not deem it necessary to adopt a denunei~tory attitude. It acted witi: patience with discretion, and with diplomacy. ,\$ far as'I am concerned, it is my hope that the organ of the Sectlrity Council in Indonesia will take that Commission as its model and ,that it will understand above all that its functions are not those of a kind of public prosecutor.
The Council has to deal with extremely delicate .qllestions, which rouse the feelings of the pubhc and excite public opinion, though not
Mais si le terrain d'entente est si large, d'ou proviennent les serieuses difficultes auxquelles naus nou:> heurtons? Elles portent principalement, a mon avis, sur les l1lodalites de l'intervention du Conseil.
Ceries, les auteurs du projet commun de n~so~ lution ont accompli ttn effort de moderation. It n'empecne qu'ils ont maintenu dans !eur texte, a cote des elements essentiels auxquels j'ai fait allusion, des elements secondaires par rapport au but poursuivi et qui ne petlvent que causer des complications et des difficultes. Et certains membres voudraient enccre en ajouter de nouveaux; certains voudraient donner a la resolution un caractere comminatoire. Le Conseil a deja fait l'experience de reso1~ tions comminatoires dans }'affaire de Palestine; il a cru qu'il impressionnerait par nne fe:,mete purement verbale, En realite, le seul resultat qu'il ait atteint dans cette voie £ut de mettre en relief· son impuissance aexecuter ses menaces et d'affaiblir ainsi son prestige.
Le Consei! a montre plus de prudence dans une autre affaire, c.elle dt! Cachemire, etcette. prudence vient d'etre couronnee de succes. La aussi, il s'etait heurte i des obstacles; il s'etait meme heurte a des refus. La Commission des Nations Unies pOllr l'lnde e.t le Pakistan n'a pas cru pour cela devGir prendre un ton cornmina:oire. Elle a agi avec patience, avec prudence, avec diplomatie. Je souhaite, pour ma part, lJlle 1'organe du Conseil de securite en Indonesie la prenne comme mcdele et qL1'il se ga~de surtol1t de comprendre son role COlT.me celui d'une sorte d'accusateur public.
Les questions dont le Conseil a as'occuper sont infinimen: delicates. Elles mettent en jeu les sentiments publics: elles e.:>ccitent les opirjons
I am not as familiar with t:1e political situation in Inc;oncsia as with that of the Netherlanus, but, as a natiof'.a! of an adjacent COI1:1try, I know how parliamentary and democratic institutions function in the Netherlands. Mr. Palar knows that also and he knows it even better than do mQ!';t of us. These institutions have been rooted in the Netherlands, as in my own cour.try, for centuries. We belong to countries of a Jor.gstand:ng democracy.
May I ask members of the Co~mcil to think Over one f<lct. The policy of the Netherlands Government in Indonesia-and r am not at this moment considering to what extent it is good or bad-h:J.s not heen decided arbitrarily. It has the support of almost the whole of the Parliament. It does not therefore lie with the Govt::l"lllm:nt lo change that policy if those upon whose confidence it relies do not COnsider it expedient. That is as much a factor aT the question as are the aspirations of the people of Indonesia, If the Council wishes to accomplish a useful task, it cannot ignore that fact. Let it understand that its part is not to try and impose more or less arbitrary decisions, but to scek, with pcrsevcr,;;ncc and patience, solutions which will be truly constructive, taking into account all the factors of the question. Let it act with full consciollsness of its responsibilities, and, l~arr.ing from the lessons of the past, bear in n1ind both the happy and unhappy experiences wbich it has had recently.
My country :s no longer a member of the Security Council and my words may seem presumptuous, but 1 trust that the Council will Ltur with my frankness and will recog;nir.e my sincerity,
. Mr. VAN ROIJEN (Netherlands): This mornmg a document containing several important ame:Jdments [5/12301 was submitted to the Security Council. I have been tr)'i!~g to get in
~ntact witl1 my Government over tile telephone In the mtervnl between 1 ar:d 3 p,m., ir. order to obtain its opinion on those amendments, but I am sorry 10 sav that for technical reasons the
~ircuils being Otit of crder, I was not able t~ get mto communication with The Hngue. I should appreciate it very mtlch if I were able to make
~ny statement 011 the joint draft resoltlt:on which IS before the Security Council in the light of my Government's attitl1de to these new amendments. I should therefore be grateflll to the Security Conllcil if, after these amendments have been
s~nt la lllaJorite elt'S membres elu lUrl.<;cll. II lm~ porte, des !c,rs, f1u'i]s: se dcmafHlenl que! ,.,<:r'-l, ;i. cet egard, t'effet de lcurs rlccisi(Jn~.
La situation politique el1 Imlon~sjc m' Ill'est pas allssi falllilicre que c,elle (jui rcgn~ ~\;x ,I'a}'~~ Bas, lifais, ilppartenant a \111 p:IYS \·01$111, J" ~~IS comment fOllctionnent, aux l'ay:;·lbs, les insti~
t~tion;; parlemelltnires d dellwcratiqu~'.,. },1, l'nJar le sa.it egatement, et le sait rneme micux que la plllpart d'er.tre nOl1S. Ces institutions se sont i,nplantees inx P;l)'s-Has, CUlllmc duns lll()f) e·Ys, ecpnis des sieclcs. N ous S0I11111('S des pays de vlt'IIle democratic,
Te dcmandc aux lllembre." uu C{,]meil de rcfJechir a un [::lit: la politiquc clll (louvernemwt neerlandais en Indollesie - et je ne n'ux pas examiner en cc mOlllent rlans qlleUe lllt'SUrC dIe peut etre bonlle Oil 111;J.U\·aise - n'a pas et~ arrcte.e arbitraircmcnt. Ellc a l'applli de la qtHlSI UI1.alllmitt r.:u I'arlcment. Il ne [lepend (l"m~ ":'IS du Goun:rnemcnt de la l1lodifl~r, si CCllX donI la conftallcc h!i est ncces~aire n\'ll reconlla.i5~cnt pas l'opportLmite. Ce fait est \llle dl)nrl';;~ du llro~
~leme all meme titre qtle Jl..'~ aspimtinll~ des peuples de I'ImllJue.;ii..... Ll..' C()I1~eil, ~'il "ellt hire
ceuvr~ utile, ne petit l'igllnn:r, Qu'il compr('nne que son r6:e a'est pas de lenter d'irn[;n:-;er des decisions plus ou lIloins Mbitraires, nmi:; de rechercher, :lvec persc\'er;mce et avec patience, des solutions qui, tt'nant compte lk tnlJS les elements du problcmc, ~\(Iici\t vcrita1Jl{'ment COllStructives, Qu'it ngisse nvc.c 1>1 plciut' clllIsril'nce de scs respoilsabilitcs et que, S'll1lipi1'l\l1l des lelions du r<lsse, iI tiennc cnlllpte, ClI particl1lier, des experiences IwurellSl..'1i et nmlhc\lre\lse~ qll'it a bites recemmcnt,
Man pays u'est pillS I1\clllhrc du Cnnseil de secnrite, et mnn langagc l)(.'ut pnrailre preslImptuellX, mais j'ai cOllfiallce qU'OJ1 <:x<:u~~rn sa fr,:tnchisc et qu'on t"econnaitra ~a sincerile,
111. VAN ROl]l::Y (Paj"s-Hns) ({,aduit de i'anglais); Un doculiIcnt [5/1230] contcnant pi\!- sieurs alllcnd",ment::; importants n cte sotUllis ce matil1 <1l1 Conseil de stcllril&. Ann de c{Jtlnaitre l'opinioll de mOll GOllnrllt'nl('nt tt l'cgmd de ccs amendclllents, j ',11 eS::lnyc cl 'entr~1" ClI ("ultlmot UYl'C lui par teteph{HlC entre 13 l't 15 hl'llft'S, Jllais, pour des laisom technique, - :e~ hJ-!I1l'~ ,:lant en derangement - je ll'ai )1u avolf la ClIlllllluoication avec L'l Have. ;e sernis hC\It('\1X s'illll'hait possible de hire· mol ded<iratiul1 cnn('\'rn':ll~t le projcl de resolu tiotl nctt\el1erncnt liotlll1is au COIlseil de sccmite ell tCll<111t compte ue la pusLticJI\ vrise par mon GOllVCl"TlCmcnt ft l'cgard de ce:; II011\"l.'aUx. amcnd<;ments. Aussi s<Lurai-jc gre all COIlSe:! de seem'ite s'il pouvait ll1'aecorder "ingt-guatrc hcu-
The PlI.r;:SIDENT: Representatives on the Council will have heard the statement of the representative of the Netherlands e:"plaining the difficulty he jg in. Under rule 33, a motion for simple adjournment shall be decided without debate. In this cage, however, we are also governed by rule 38, which says that the vote can be taken only at the request of a representative on the Security Council itself. It seems to me, as President of the Council, that the proper procedure for us to follow in this instance would be'ta hear from their sponsors an explanation of the purport and scope of the various amendments which have been proposed, and the reasons for them. Following that explanation, it seems to me that it would be only reasonable to accord to the representative of the Netherlands the opportunity tb communicate to his Government not only the amendments but also the explanations which will have been given. After the presentation of those amendments, we might then postpone our further discussion and our vote upon them until tomorrow afternoon, which seems to allow an appropriate time. Unless there is any objection, I sball proceed with that course and call next upon the sponsors of the amendments to explain the various points at issue.
Mr. TSIANG (China): Since the delegations of China, Cuba, Norway tl.nd the United States of America introduced the joint draft resolution a week ago [402114 meeting], we have had a full and constructive deb<Lte in the Security Council. In addition, we have had the benefit of an important communication [5/1222J from the Prime Min(ster of India who, as chairman of the Conference held in New Delhi, sent us the ternts oLthe resolution passed by that Conference. The 5ponsors of the draft resolution have agreed to place before the Security Council some amendments, which are embodied in document 5/1230.
As is shown in this document, we are proposing to revise three paragraphs of the draft resolution. The nrst revision occurs in paragraph 2 and involves in fact two points. Whereas originaTly we say, after referring to the release of politica.l prisoners, "and to permit the officials of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia to return at or.ce to Jogjakarta", we should now like to chang~ that language to "and to facilitate the immediate return of officials of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia..." This change is a mattet of language and it is proposed in order to improve the style of the resolution. We think that the proposed new language is more con· sistent with the dignity of the persons involved.
The second change in this paragraph involves the passage in which we originally said that the officials of the Government of the Republic should resume their functions, "including ad-
Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'(tflgrais) : Les rnem· bres du Conseil ont entendu la declaration du representant des Pays-Bas qui nOllS a expose la difficulte devant laquelle il se trouve. Aux termes de I'article 33 du reglement interieur, il est statue sans debat sur une proposition touchant le simple ajournement de la seance. Cependant, dans le present cas, l'artic1e 38 s'applique egalement, qui parte que la mise aux voix ne peut avoir lieu que si un representant du Conseil de securite en hit la demande. I1 me semble, en tant que President du Conseil de securite, qtle la procedure gu'i! c:onviendrait de suivie dans ce cas seraitd'entendre les explications des auteurs des divers amendements proposes sur le sens et la portee de ceux-ci, et 1es raisons qui les ont incites a les presenter. Apres quoi, il me semble gu'il ne serait que juste d'accorder au representant des Pays-Bas la possibiEte de communiquer a son Gouvernement, non seulement la tenenr de ces amendements, mais egalement les exp1icatiolls qui auront ete fommes. Ces amendcments une fais presentes, 110US pourrions remettre leur discussion uTterieure et le vote a lenr sujet a. dcmain apres-midi, ce qui me parait laisser un delai raisonnable. Si aucune objection n'est presentee, je procederai rainsi, et j'inviterai maintenant les auteurs des amendements it. fournir des exp1ications sur les differents points dont i1 est question.
M. TSIANG (Chine) (traduit de l'anglais): Depuis que les delegations de la Chine, de Cuba, de la Norvege et des Etats-Unis d'Amerique ont presente, il y a huit jours [402 eme sem,ceL leur projet commun de resolution, une discussion approfondie, et qui a eu des resu ltats constructifs, s'est deroulee au Conseil de securite. Nous avons eu, de plus, l'avantage de recevoir une communication importante [S/1222] du Premier Ministre de l'Inde qui, en tant que president de la Conference qui s'est tenue a New-Delhi, nous a envoye le texte de la resolution adoptee par celte Confererice. Les auteurs du projet de resolution sont conventls de presenter an Conseil de securite que!- ques amcndemenls, qui figurent au document Sj1230. Comme on le voit dans ce document, nous nOllS; proposons de reviser trois paragraphes du projet de resolution. La premiere modification interesse le paragraphe 2 et porte, en fait, sur deux points. A10rs que, dans le texte original, nous dision~, apres avoir parle de la mise en Jiber'te des pnsormiers politiques: H ••• et a.laisser les fonctionnaires du Gouvernement de la Republique d'Indonesie retourner sans dela; it Djokjakarta", nous voudrions maintenant remplacer ce membre de phrase par: "... et it faci1iter le retour immediat it Djokjakarta des fonctionnaires du Gouvernement de la Republique d'Indonesie". It S'aglt d'une modification de forme qui vise a ameliorer le style de la resolution. Nous estimons que la nouvelle rMaction proposee s'accorde mieux avec la dignite des personnalites dont il est question.
La seconde modification proposee dans ce paragraphe porte sur le passage 0 U i1 est dit, dans le texte original, que les fonctionnaires du Gouvernement de la Republique reprendraient I'exer·
Represectatives on the Council will have noticec. that the resollltion passed by the New Delhi Conference used the phr;l.se "the residency of Jogjakarta". The sponsors of the resolution are not quite clear as to the exact meaning of that phrase and we ~.ere propose to use the phrase "the Jogjakarta area" which is defined so as to include the city of Jogjakarta and its immediate surroundings.
Next we propose a revision of paragraph 4 (d). There the idea is again related to what I call the manners of the :::esolut:on. Originally we said: "represent2.tives of suer. areas may be permitted to participate. , ." Since the phrase "may ue permitted" might be construed as not being in harmony with the dignity of the persons concerned, we propose to substitute the Fhrase: "and to invite representatives of such areas..." That change corresponds to the change in paragraph 2 which I h"ve just explained.
Then we also propose to revise paragraph 4 (t). In the middle of that paragraph in the original draft remlutior., it was provided that the "recommendatior.s of the Commission may include provision for the eco:lOmic well-being of the population of the areas involved". We propo~e to add to that sentel:ce this phrase "for the proper fU~lctioning of the administration".
In the long debate we have had here, various representatives have called our attention to the inadequacy of the original language in this economic :'I..Sf:ect. It was originally our intention that the restoration of the civil administration should be effective and that it should really fltnction. Wr>. rlirl not mean a restoration on paper. Of course, art effective administration would require certain economic measures, and this revision provices for that. Therefore, we propose to the Council that this particular sentence should inch.:de the additional phrase "as are required for the proper functioning of the adm~nistration".
I have explained in bri"ef the changes which we have placed before tr.e Council. In submitting these amendments to the Council on behalf of the sponsors, r recommend them because, in my opinion, :hey are both reasonable and useful.
The PRESIDE:''l': T1:e Council wilt observe that the Canadian delegation has now circulated a proposed amendment to paragraph 4 (8) of the joint resolution contained in document S/12l9. This proposed amendment is contained in ducument 5/1232. The intention of this ame:1dment is, as I hD-ve said, simply to clarify the wording
Les representants au Conseil de securite auront remarque que, clans la resolution adoptee par la COllfe:enee de New-Delhi, on a employe l'expression "Residence de Djokjakarta". Les autettrs de la. resolution ne sont pas tres surs du-sens exact, de cette expression, et nOllS proposons mainter.ant d'employer le tert:1e "region de Djokjakarta", qui doit s'entendre eomrr:e englobant 1a vilte de' Djokjakarta et ses environs immMiats.
Nous proposons ensuite tine revision de ['alinea d) du paragr~phe 4. :1 s'agi: encore id d'une, modif.cation de style. Le texte originalportait: roles represe:J.tants de ce~ regions pourront Stre autorlses a prendre part...." Les termes "pourront etre autorises" pcuvant etre :nterpretes comme ne s'accoidant pas avec la dignite des personnalites UUI,t il g'agit, nou:> proposons de remplacer le membre de phrase: en question par le suivant: "et a inviter :es representants de ces regions ..." Cette modification corre.spond a la modihation du paragraphe 2 que je viens d'exp:iquer.
Notls proposons ega1ement de reviser l'alinea f) du paragraphe 4. Au milieu de ce paragraphe, le texte original du projet de resolution portait que la commission pourrait "inclUl"e dans seg recommandations des clispositions visant, sur le plan economiql1e, au bien-etre de la popula:ion des regions interessees". ::rous proposcns de mo~ difi(Cr rette phrase et ele la completer camme suit; "La Comml3sion pourra :nclure, clans ses recommandations, des dispositions visant a assurer, sur le plan ec.onomique, les mesures requises pour le bon ionctionnement de l'administratiQ;l ainsl que le bien-etre de la popu:ation des regions interesse.es".
Au cours du long ctew~ qui ~'tst derou1c au sein du ConseD, plusieurs repn':sentants ont appel6 notre attention sur la :acune que presentait le texte original au point de vue economique. n etait, des l'abord, dans notre intention que l'adrninis· tration civile fut effectiYement rctabI:e et qu'elle fonctionn;1t reellement. Nous n'entendions pas que cc retablisserr.ent n'"it lieu que sllr le papier. Evidemment, pour qu'tllle administration soit efficace, certaines mesures eeonomiques sont r.ecessaires, et c'est a eette condition que repond la revision que nous proposons. Nom proposons done au Conseil que la phrase en question comporte: cette addition: "les meWlTes requises pour le bDn fondionnement de l'admilli~tr.atiOll .. ."
J'ai mahtenant explique brievement les modi.. fications que nous avons soumises au Consei1 de secllri,te. En presentant ces amen::lemenls au Conseil au nom des auteurs du projet de resoluticn original, je recmr.mancle leur adoption, car ils sont, scion moi, a la fris r!1.i.<;onnab1es et utiles.
Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'angla4s) : Les mem· bres dtt Consei! de securite remarqueront que la delegation du Canada. .a ma.inten<l.nt fail distribuer un projet d'a01e:lderp.ent a l'atinea e) du paragraphc 4 du projet de resolution CQ~tenll daDS le document 5/12] 9.. Ce projet d'amendement porte la cute 5/1232. Comme je l'ai dit, il vise simpJe-
My understanding of the intention of the sponsors was that the commission should be authorized to observe elections throughout the whole of Indonesia in so far as this is practicable, However, I believe I interpret the intentions of the sponsors correctly in stating that these recommendations should be confined to the areas in dispute between the Government of the Netherlands and the Government of the Republic of
~ndonesiii. In this connexion, I should like to draw the attention of the Council to the fourth of the six additional Renville principles [Sj649, appe1tdix VIJ1] agreed to by both parties in January 1948, The relevant portion of this article reads:
"Within a period of not less than six months nor more than one year from the signing of this agreement, a plebiscite will be held to determine whether the populations of the various territories of Java, Madura and Sumatra wish their terri~ tory to form part of the Republic of Indonesia or of another State within the United States of Indonesia..." In my judgment this is the clearest definition that we have of the areas in dispute between the two parties, and accordingly I propose that the joint draft resolution should be amended in such a manner that the authority of the commission to make recommendations is limited to these three islands, while it retains the authority to observe the elections throughout the whole of Indonesia,
if
, Mr. JESSUP (United States of America): I had had the intention of making a brief statement today. I was prepared to waive that state~ ment in order to conserve the time of the Council if it should have proved possible for us to pro~ ceed to a vote upon the draft resolution this afternoon. In view of the President's statement a few moments aRo in regard to the schedule of the Council, I take it that it is not contemplated that the Council will proceed to a vote today. I wish it could have been possible for us to vote now but, in the light of tlle general situation and th~ fact that we have now had a rather full discus- 'sion of this draft resolution, I assume that it will be possible for the Council to proceed to a vote upon the resolution with its amendments at our meeting tomorrow.
1 would also ask the President to consider whether it would be possible for us to meet tomorrow morning instead of tomorrow afternoon in c~se any of the statements which remain t~ be made in the discussion are of such length as to occupy a considerable period of the COl1ncil's meeting. As I have alreadJ' said, ,md now repeat, il is tile hope of mv delegation that the COl1ncil may be prepared t~ proceed to a vote at its meeting tomorrow.
M. JESSUP (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (trad1lit de l'anglais): J'avais eu l'intention de faire aujourd'hui une breve declaration, mais j'etais pret it y renoncer, afin de ne pas prendre sur le temps du Conseil, s'il avait ete possible d'en venir cet apres·midi au vote sur le pro jet de resolution. Etant donne la declaration que le President vient de faire, il y a quelques instants, au sujet de I'ordre des travaux du Conseil, je condus que 1'0n n'envisage pas que le Conseil passe au vote ('.ujourcl'hui meme. J'aurais aime qltC nous ayons pu en venir all vote aujourd'hui, mais, en raison de la :;ituation generale ct du fait que nous avons maintenant discute d'une fa'Yon assez approfondie ce rrojet de resolution, je presume que le Conseil sera en mesure de proceder effectivement all vote sur 1('. resolution et ses amendements a sa seance. de demain. Je voudrais demander egalement au President d'examiner la possibilite de noltS rettnir dcmain matin au lieu de demain arres-midi en prevision du cas ou certaincs des declarations qui doivent encore etre faites prendraient, en raison de leur longueur, lme assez grande partie de la seance. Comme je j'ai deja dit et le repete, ma deleg<1tion espere gue le Conseil pourra passer au vote a sa seance de demain.
I think it is clear to all--and this point has already been touched upon by others who have spoken on the point in the Council-that the objectives of that Conference at New Delhi and the objective of a majority of the members of the Sectlrity Council are the same. The States which were represented at New Delhi were fully aware of their position as Members of the United Nations. They devoted themselves to seeking to draft a statement of tlleir views which might prove to be of assistance to the SeCltrity Council which, [IS Pandit Nehnt recalls in this letter to the President of this Council [5/1222], under Article 24 of the Charter, acts on behalf of all the Members of the United Nations.
It is in the light of that background of the New Delhi Conference, which the spokesman of the Conference himself has explained, that we have studied the resolution and the comments upon it. 1 think it is clear that the representa~ tives of the nineteen Governments at New Delhi had in mind that the ultimate settlement of the Indonesian question would be arrived at when the Government of the Netherlands transfers sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia. It also appears obvious that, worldng back from this point, the Governments represented at the Conference considered that there were a number of measures which would have to be effected before that final step could be taken. Many of these measures are the very ones which the sponSOrs of the draft resolution now before the Security Council, after their own deliberations and consultations, also recognized, would have to be provided for in any practical approach to a solution.
There are, of course, some differences between the two resolutions. No two separate interna· tional groups could possibly have reached iclell: tieal conclusions. For example, the New Delhl resolution calls for the complete transfer of power over tlte whole of Indonesia. by 1 January 1950. The draft resolution subnH.tted by the four members of the Security Counctl calls for the transfer of soveignty to the Unitecl St~tes of Indonesia at the earliest possible date but In any case not later than 1 July 1950.
As other representatives of the sponsoring- Powers have frankly pointed Ollt, the pres~nt draft resolution is in some respects a compromIse. r am sure that everyone round this table would like to see the transfer of sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia accomplished at least by 1 January 1950. However, we took into con-
Je pense qu'il est parfaitement clair pour taus - ce point a deja ete aborde par les orateurs qui ont pris la parole ace sujet au sein du Conseil - que les objectifs de la Conference de New~ Delhi ct le but poursuiv: par la majorite des mem~ bres clu Conseil de securite sont identiques. Les Etats qui etaient representes ii New-Delhi avaient parfaitement con.science de lell!" qualite de Membres de l'Organisation cles Nations Unies. Its se sont appliques a exprimer leurs vues dans une declaration qui puisse etre utile atl Conseil de securite qui, ainsi que le Pandit Nehru le rappelle dans la Icttre qu'il a adressee au President du Conseil [S/1222], agit, con{onnement a 1'Arlicle 24 de h Charte, au nom de taus les Membres de l'Organisation des Nations Unies.
Ccst en tenant compte de ceUe preoccupation de la Conference de New-Delhi -- qui nous a ete exposee par le porte-paroles de la Conference - que nous' avons etudie la resolution et les cam· mentaires <1uxque!s elle a"\'ait donne lieu. nest clair, a nos yeux, que les representants des di~~ neufGol.lvernements reunis a. New-Delhi estlmaient que la question indonesienne serait defi.- nitivement reglee lorsque le GOllvernement des Pays-Bas transfererait la souverainete aux Etats~ Uoies d'Indonesie. It apparait egalement evident, si nous reprenons les chases en partant de ce point, 'lue les Gouvernements representes a cette Conference cstimaient qu'uo certain nombre. de mesures devraient e:tre prises avant que I'on plllSse passer a cette e'bpe finale. Ces mesures sont en grande partie cetJes~la memes que, apfl'.s leurs deliberations et consultations, les auteufS du projet de resolution actuellement soumis all Conseil de securite avaient egalement reconnnes comffie devant etre prises pour qu'on puisse s'attaqller d'une maniere pratique a la solution dlt problcme.
I1 y (J naturdlement quelques differences .entre les deux resolutions. Jamais deux grol11Jes lr:ternationaux n'auraicnt pu arriver a des concluslOns identiques. Par exemple, la resohltion de New- Delhi demande Cllle le transfert integral de J'autorite sur l'ensemble de l'Indonesie nit lieu avant le ler janvier 1950. Le projet de resolution sourr:i~ par les quatre membres du, Co.oseil de, s~cunte demande que la souver3inete SOlI transferee aux Etats.Unis d'Indonesie a la date la plus rappro· chee possible et, en tout cas, le 1er jllillet 1950 au plus tard. Ainsi que d'alltres repres~ntants ~es P~issa~ces qui sont les auteurs du proJe~ de reso~ut~on 10';t fait remarquer avec franchtse, celu:-cl repr:- sente, it certains egards, un compr?ml~. Je SlllS persuade que to.utes l~s personnes reume.s a~to~r de rette table almeralent que la sonveramete fut transferee aux Etats-Unis d'Indonesie au plus
Although such a stattite is envisaged in both the Linggadjati1 and RenvUlc [S/649, apPendices XII t:nd VIII] Ag:reements, ant although the principles itwill irlclude llave been the subject of discussions 'between the Netherlands and the Republicans 0:1 the one hand and 6e Netherlands and the :5"ederalists 011 the other, it is obv;otl~ that an instn:.mf'r.t of such fundame:r:tal significance for all Indonesia is one which can be appropeiately conduded only by elected representatives of all Indonesia.
Wc cor:sidcr that it is impossible at this st:l.gf to be certain that such final negotiations could he satisfactorily cOllsllmmated in a period. of three monfls: Ilamely, between 1 October 1949 and 1 Jantlary 1950. \-v'e feel sure that such negotiat:on could be satisfactorily accor.1plished within hine months. For this and for similar INSOllS, we selected the date of 1 July 1950 as the date t,y w::tich there is reasonable certainty tha: all the t:e<::essary preliminaries to an orderly transfer can be completed.
. Under the dnft reSOltltiDn, the t:'ansfer will take place by I January 1950, if the necessary arrallgements can be made by that time. We slum· th<,: hope which has, inc.eed.been expressed by the ~etherlands represer.tative at tbis table that it can take place by that date, but \ve recog- :lize thE possibility that more time will be required.
In :'ll1Citllf'.r area of major importance, it is clear that the objectives of the members of the Conierence at New Delhi and those who support the present draft before the Secllrity CO'meil are the same. Both the New Delhi resolution and the draft resolution ~efore us accept the principle of progressive withdrawal of Netherlands forces [rom Repub:ican areas. From our point of view this prir.ciple is based On the conviction that th~ Secllrity CO~lncil cannot at this distance decide on a speciijc date by which the withdrawals are to be completed, In a previous statemellt to the Council [402nd meeting], we have suggested some of the practical problems which will have to be faced. We be:ieve that our commission on
'See The Politic"l Evenr" i}~ Ihe Reftrtblic of {'tdDn~$;C, N...th~r1atld.l Tnfnrmatinn R,I-rfa.l:, NfW York, page 34.
Bien que ce statut soit ;Jrevu i la fois dans les Aecores de Linggaujati1 d du Renville [S/M9, allnexes XJJJ et VIllL et bien que If's principes dO:Jt i: doit s'inspirer aient fait l'objet de discU3sions entre leg Pays-Bas et les republicains, d'une parI, et les Pays-3as et les federalistes, d'alltre part, il est evident qu'un i:Jstnme:lt d'une portee fondamentale pour toute l'Indo:lesie comme l'est celui-ci ne saurait e:re legitimement condu que par des representants elus de toute l'IJldo~ nesie.
NCJ1:5 estimons qu'il est impossible, au ~ade actuel, d'avoir la certitude que des negociations fir.ales de Cl" genre puissent aboutir en l'espace de trois mois, c'est~a-clire eatre le lel· octobre lS49 et le ler janvier 1950. En revanche, nous sommes persuades ill,e ces negociations pourront al'uutir a un n~.surw.t satisb.is.'lnt <Lvant neuf mols. C'est l'une des raisons pour lesqtlelles nous avoils choisi la datl' du ler jllillet 1950 comRle etant cdIe pour laquelle on aura pu, selon toute vrais~mblance, prendrf' les mesures preliminaires indispens<.bles pour que le transfert de souverainete s'effectue dans I'ordre.
Aux termes du projet de resolution, ~e transfert aura lieu le ler janvier 1950 au plus tard, si les dispositions necessaires ont pr. etre prises pour cette date. No~s partageons l'espoir, deja exprime id par le representant des ])ays-Bns, ql1e:
Cl' transfert pourra avoir lieu avant cette date~ mais nons reconnaissons qu'il est possible qu'il demande plus ele terTlps.
. Apropos d'une autre question d'importance capitale, i1 est evident que reS buts vises, aussi bien par les ,nembres de la Conference de l\ew~Delhi que par cet:.x qui appllient le projet dont le: Conseil de securite est aetuellelllent saisi, sont iclelltiques. La reso1t:tion adoptee a New-Delhi et 1<: projet de resolution soumis ~l.l CO!1!'.('.il reconnaissent tous deux le prindpe de l'evacuation progressive du territoire republicair. par les troupe,; neerlancaises. En ce qui nous cone-erne, ce prineipe repose sur la conviction que le COllseil <le securite est incapable de determiner, a une telle distance, la date p:'ecise a laquel1e le retrait des :roupes doit s'Dchel'er. D:ms une precedente declaration bite au Conseil [402eme seance] ..
'Voir Political Events ill the Republic of Indonesia
~11h1ie par le Bureau d'information des PaYs~Bas, New~ York, page 34.
Dans la declaration qu'il a bite i l'avantderniere seance [403eme seanceJ :e representant de l'Inde a dit que le Conseil devrait examiner la question de savoir si les dirigcants rcpublicains qui viennent d'etre mis en liberte sont en mesure c'amener teurs partisans a ce5ser les operations de guerilla jusqu',i ce que, et a la condition que, les troupes neerlandaises se retirent de la region precederllment occupee par le Gouvernement republicain. (ette question a He egalement tra:tee ce . matin par le repn~sentant de la Republiquc cl'Indonesie, A cd egard, j'attire l'attention du Conseil de seCllri:e sur le parag-raphe 14 dll rapport de la Commission de bons office3 en date du 24 janvier ]949 [S(1223]. La Commission enonce, dans des termes qui ne laisserit place a aucune equi~ vogue, le prindpe dont se sont inspires, je le crois, les quat~ Gouver:lemeuts atlt~ur5 de la res<Jtution, en redigeant ie paragraphe prem:er de la reso';' lution commune. le voudrais vous -'citeI' quelques phrases dti paragraphe 14 du rapport: "14. Pour etre absolument effectif, un arret des hostilites devrait necessairement etre accepte par les deux partlf's_ Rtant donne que le Gouvernement republicam a ete mis dam I'impossibilite d'exercer ses fonctions, il n'existe, du cote rep!l~ blicain, aucune autorite qui soit en lllesure de mettre en ceuvre :a. resolu:ion du Conseil de seeurite donnant pour instructions aux deux: parties de "cesser les hostilites". Bien que les Pays-Bas aient ordorme a leurs troupf'.~ de "cesser les hostilites", celles-ci n'ont pas cesse et, dans les conditions actuelles, ne peuvent cesser."
The representative of India indicated in his statemtmt at the last [403rd] meeting that the Council should camider whether it will be possible for the newly released Republic:m leaders. to induce their JoIlowers to cease guerrilla activity until and on condition that Netherlands troops are withdrawn from tne area formerly occupied by the Republican Government. This illbject has been dealt with this morning by the representa~ tive of the Republic of Indonesia also, In this connexion, 1 invite the attention of the Secl1rity Council to paragraph 14 of the report of the Committee of Good Offices dated 24 January of this year [5/1223j. The Committee states in unequivocable language the principle llpon which the fOllr sponsoring Governments acted, I believe, in drafting paragraph 1 of the joint resolution. I wish to quote some sentences from paragraph 14 of the report:
"14.. To be completely enective, tI cessation of hostilities nccessari:y must be agreed upon by both parties. Since the Republican Government has been prevented from functioning, there is no authority on the Republican side to .implement the Security Council's resolution directing both parties to 'cease hmtilities'. Despite the Netherlands order to its troops to 'cease hostilities', such cessation has not been, and cannot be, attained in the present sitnation."
La Cocnmission, qui connait bien les cor.ditions locales, est perswLdee que, pour e(re efficace, une cessation des hostilites doit necessairement faire l'ob-jet d'un acco::,d entre les deux: parties, Nous en sommes egalement convaincus, et c'est pourquoi le paragraphe premier de la resolutilin commune parte que le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas doit cesser toutes operations mttitaires et que le Gouvernement de la Republique doit, en meme temps, donner ordre a ses partisans de mettre fin aux operations de guerilla. Tant que ces conditions ne seront pas remplies simultanement par les deux parties, les combats se poursuivront. Le
The Committee, with all its expedence on the spot, is convinced :hat a cessation of hostilities must necessarily be agreed upon by both p2rties if it is to be completely e:ffective. We also are convinced of this, and that is why paragraph 1 of the joint resolution states that the Government of the Netherlands must discontinue all military operations and that the Government of the Republic must order its armed adherents to cease guerilla warfare simultaneously. Unless and until these thing-s are done ;imultaneoll~lj' by both parties, fighting will go on. As the representative of China succinctly stated the other day
~u'on a\ITa admis le prineipe enonce dans les deux resolutions dont je parle, a savoir de laisser aux: representants qui se trouvent sur les lieux le soin ee determiner les modalites et la date du retrait,
11 est logique de ne pas lenr im"Joser une date fixee. Je voudrais toutefois attirer I'attention cu Conseil sur le fait que, aux termes du projet de resolution, la commission est chargee de preter son concours "en vue de retab:ir le plus tot possible l'administration civile de la Repu~lique" et, "a cette fin", de faire des recommandations relatives au retrait progressif des troupes. Ainsi, le projet de resolution commun indique d'une
mani~re ln~sclairea la commission que le Consei! cc securite desire que le retrait des troupes neer~ landaises s'effectue dans le plus bref ctelai qui soit compatible avec les r:ecessites de la securlte publiql1e et de la protection de la vie et des biens des habitants.
There is yet one other broad area in which I wish to note the striking similarity between the objectives or the New De:1hi resolution and those incorporated in the present draft resolution. I refer to the restoration of the economic viability of the Republic, a subject which has been touched upon by a number of speakers. As the representative of ,India, for example, observed at our last [403rd] meeting, the Republican Government would in all likelihood have few resources at its comll1tlnd with which to resume its functions. The representative of China has just called attention to an amendment in paragraph 4 (f) and has explained the reasons why the sponsors have suggested this amendment to take care of this problem more adequately in the joint draft reso- , lution.
- In speaking of the amendments to this dra~t; resolution which have been laid before us now, I have the authorization of the other three sponsoring Governments to say that the amendments which you, Mc. President, have suggested and which yOll have just exr;lained (S/1232J, can be accepted by the sponsoring Governments.
In concltlsion, I shoulc1 like to emphasize again, the fact which has been touched upon .. often in these debates, which, in this phase of the Indonesian qtlestion, have no", been goir.g on for o\-er a month, that seldom in a subject before the Security Council has there been such a broad
are~.of agreement among all interested States on the ullimale ubjeclives to be attained. Differences in detail should not obscure this broad measure of agreement. Anyone individu'al or anyone' Government would no doubt draft a resolution which would differ from both these texts before the Security Council. The Security Council, 1I0w- ' ever, representing all Members of the United Nations, necessarily acts through a consolidation' of various views. We hope that all members of the Council, cognizant of this fact, will agree that the dmft resolution before us, even though not incorporating all their own views, deserves their support because it represents a, conscienlious combined effort to contribute to a solution of the Indonesian question. We hope that, for the same reason, both partiess, neither of whom finds in the draft resolution all that it desires, will cooperate loyally in making it effective.
. ~r. PALlIR (~ndonesia); I have asked tu say i1 lew words WIth regard to the request of the representative of the Netherlands to have twentyfour hours to learn his Government's attitude on the amendments which have just been submitted,
I1 existe un autre domaine itpportant dans lequel je dois indiquer ia similitude frappante entre 1es buts que vise la resolution de New-Delhi et ceux qui sor,t exposes clans le projet de resolution actuel. Je veux parler du retablissernent de conditions economiques qui perrnettent it. la Republique de vivre, question q\li a deja ete mentionnee par un certain nombre d'orateurs. Ainsi que I'a indique le representant de l'Inde a I'avant~derniere seance [403eme seance}, le Gouvernement republicairi ne disposera vrai~emhlablement que tie pell de ressources au moment all i1 reprendra ses fonc';' tions. Le representant de la Chine vient d'attirer notre attention sur un amcndernent a I'alinea 4 f) ; il a donne les raisons qui ont conduit les auteurs de la resolution a proposer eet amendement qui est de~tine a comp1eter le projet de resolution commun i l'egard de cc probleme.
En ce qui coneerne les amendements 11 ce projet de resolution qui nous ont ete presenles, je suis autorise par les trois autres Gouverncments auteursde la resolution - et c'est en leur nom que je pa.rle - a declarer que les quatre Liouvemements auteurs de la resolution sont disposes a. accepter les amendements que le President a pro-. pose [5/1232] en nOllS donnant l'explication:
Pour condure, je voudrais mettre ce nouveau eri evidence le fait, auquel on a souvent fait allusion au cours des debats qui se ~oursuivent depuis plus d'un mois sur cette phase de la question indonesienne, qu'iI est rare, qu'a propos d'une question soumise au Conseil de securite, les Etats int6resses soient d'accord dans une si large rnesure sur les objectifs Ena1s aattcindre. Des divergence$ de detail ne doivent pas nous faire perdre de vue cet accord aussi ftendu. N'importe qui ou n'importe que! Gouvernement pourrait sans doute' rediger une resolution qui serait differente de chacun des deux textes en presence desqueis se trouve le Conseil de securite. Toutefois, elant danne que le Conseil de securite represente tous 1es Membres de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, ses decisions constitllent forc.ement un compromis entre les points de vue diffecents. Nous esperons que taus les inembres du Conseil, conscients de ce fait; recunnaitront que le pruj et de resolution qui nous est soumis, bien qu'il·ne representc pas entierement le point de vue personnel de chacun d'eux. merite nemmoins 1eur appui, parce qu'il'constitue un effort conscienciellx accompli en commun afin de contriLuer a la solLltiol1 de la question indonesienne. Pour la meme raison, nons esperons que les deux parties, dont ni l'une ni j'autre ne trouve dans le projet de resolution tout ce qu'elle desirerait y voir, coIIaboreront loyalement en vue de la rendre efficace.
M. PALAR (Indonesie) (Iraduit de l'ang{(lis): J'ai dem:mde la parole pOltr dire que1ques mots au sujet de la demande dll representant des Pays- Bas tel1d::mt a cbtenir un deIai de vingt-quatre heures pour connaitre l'attitude de son Gouver-. ncment a J'egard des amendements qui vienneitt d'etre presentes.
I <101 very sorry to have to say this.
The other day, Mr. var- Roijen accused some of the speakers here of using two weights and two measures. I am afraid that Mr. van Roijen is now, unconsciously, also using two weights and two measures.
Mr. MALIK (t:nion of Soviet Socialist Republics) (t-ranslaled from Ru.r.rian): I should like to put two qnestions to the authors of the draft resolution and of the amendments. To judge by document 5/1230, they have made a number of amendments to paragraph 2 of the joint draft resolution. These amendments introduce a new conception, re:erence being made not to the "city" of Jogjakarta but to tbe "i'.rea" of ]ogjakarta, which includes the city and its im~ mediate environs. WJ1at i5 meant by "its immedi~ date environs"? What radius does this imply? A radius of, say, five miles, or fifty' miles? Is this expression "immediate environs" sufficiently c1e[l.!'? I should like to ask tlle autnors of the tesolution tu throw some light on this question,
The secCfm! ql:estion which interests me is whether t~.is new version 0 f paragraph 2 is to be interpretec to mean that Netherlands fotces remaiil in the Jogj<Jknrta area or are to be withdrawn from tllat area immediately.
I should be glad if the authors of the resolution could explain this point.
With the assent of the repre· :;entativ(;' of Egypt, I shall ask the representative of. Cfuina to answer the questions which have just been put by the representative of the USSR.
Mr. TSIANG (China-) : The phrase "the Jogja~ karta area" evidently means more than the city of Jogjakarta. It includes tbe city and certain surronnding territory, V'lhether or not :hat certain territory should comprise a particular radius is left to the commission on the spot..
The second question concernecl the wi:harawal of troops. I should like to call the attention of the Security Council to the preamble of this resolution which says that "continued' occtlpatiotl of the territory of tLe Republic of rndones~a by the armed forces of the Nether-lands is incompatible with the restoration of good relations befween tile parties :lI~cl with the final achievement of a just and lasting settlement of the Indonesian dispute",
That is, the principle, The only exception to thatp-rinciple is st<l.ted in' paragraph 4 COwhich saysthat the commission "shall, after' consultation, with the parties recommend' wliich if any Nethelilaads forces shall be' retained', temporarily:
Je regrette d'avoir a mentionner ce fait.
L'autre jour, M. ,van Roijtn a accuse certains orateurs d'avoir deux poids e: deux mesures. Or, me semble-t-i:, M. va:l Roijen, sans donte inconsciemment, a, lui aussi, dell'lf p()inset deux mesures.
M. MALIK. (Union des RCjJtlbliques sociaii~tes sovie:ique5) (tmduit du rus.',e): Je voudrais poser , deux questiol:S aux aeteurs du projet de resolutioll' : et des amendements. A en juger par le docurr,en1. 5/1230, les wteurs de la re.oolution ont apporte quelques modific<i.tions au paragraphe 2 du projet de n2solution commun. Cette modification parte, en particu1ie~, Sur llne nouvelle notion. A la "viUe" de Ujokjakarta, on substitue :a "region" , de Djokjakarta, qui comprenc la ville de Djokja- ,karta et ses enviro:lS immediats. Que faut~i1 'entendre par "environs immecJiats"? Quel est le rayon de ces "environs"? Est-ce, par exemple, un rayon de cinq milles OtI de <:inquante milles? L'expression "environs immediats" constitue-t-elle une notion suffisamrr.ent c1aire? Je voudrais de~ manc'.er aux: auteurs du projet de resolution une explication a ce sujet.
L'autre question qui m'interesse est la suivante: D'apriis la nouvelle redaction du pa,agraphe 2, les troupes neerlanuaises doivent-el1es rester clans la region de Djokj.Jw.rm Olt doivent-elIes etre immediatement retirees de cdte region?
Je voudrais dern ar.der aux auteurs de la reso· lution d'apporfer des preeisions a ce sujet.
Le PRESIDENT (traduit d,: l'anglais) : Avec le consentfimenr du representtnt de l'Egypte, je demanderai au representant de la Chine de reponere <lUX qt1estior.~ que viellt de ltli poser le representant de l'URSS.
M. TSJA~G (Chine) (traduit de l'mfglais): I1 est evident qUi: l'~xpressir:m "region ne Djokjal{arta" signifie plus que la ,'ilIe de Elj.okjaKattii. proprement dite, Ce terme englobe la vl}le et une certaine region avoisinante. 11 appartJent a' la commission qui sera sur place de decidel· si celte regJon doit WOtt un rayon defini.
La deuxieme question a trait an rekait des troupes. Je tiens a att~re,r l'attention du, Con~ei1 d'e securite sur le conslderant de cette resolution qui ded<i.re que "le maintien des forces annees des Pays-Bas en occupation sur le territoire de la Republique indonesienne est ~l1compatible avec,le reta'Jtisseme:lt de bonnes relatiOns enlre les partles et avec un reglement final, equitable et durable dudi'fferend d ']ndol1t~sie". C'est le: prindpe. La seule,derogation a.ce principe' se trouve' ?i l'aJinea 4 f), qui prevOlt que la commission "indiquera, Je; cas echeunt, pal' voie
d~ ::,ecomm!t1dation, et, apres a.voir consulte' les parties)' queUes forces' neerlan'daises dev:ront' ette
May I add that in regard to the second part of the question which applies particularly to the Jogjakana area, document 5/1230 specifically puts in parentheses "outside of the Jogjakarta area".
Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): We can take it that no reply has been received to the second question.
MahmOllu FAWZI Bey (Egypt): The point raised a few moments ago by the representative of Indonesia is an important one. It is possible that the representative of the Netherlands has
t1p-to-the~mimlte information about this matter and he may wish to enlighten us. rn this coonexion, while hoping that he will give us, if at all possible, reassuring information, I think it would be desirable if he gave us at the same time, or as early as possible, some explanation or information on the matter dealt with in document 5/1231 circulated this afternoon.
Mr. VAN ROIJAN (Netherlands): On the ques~ tion referred to by the representative of the Republic of Indonesia ami also touched on this morning by the representative of Australia and this afternoon by the representative of Egyptthe question of a possible journey to Lake Success by one or more representatives of the RepUblic who are now in Indonesia-I am Sorry to say that r have not yet received any further information from my Government.
The PRRSroENT: The Security Council h<ls before it the joint draft resolution on the Indonesian question submitted by the representatives of China, Cuba, Norway and the United States [S/1219]. As the situation now stands, the amendments set out in documents 5/1230 and 5/1232 have been incorporated in the main draft resolution. Do any members of the Council or any of the other representatives at the table wish to speak further on that resolution as amended at this time?
Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt); r wish to re~ serve the right of my delegation to speak at the next meeting on the draft resolution as amended. Whatever I have to say wm, r think be very brief ;md will not take IIp much time. There may not be much harm, therefore, in deferring it notil tomorrow.
The COllncil hils heard the request of the representative of the Netherlands for an adjournment of the vote on this joint resolution for twenty-four hours. The Council has heard the comments made on this request oy the representative of the United States and by myself, and also by the representative of Indonesia. So far, I have no request from a member of the Coundl, under rule 38 of our
Qu'il me soit permis cl'ajouter, en reporise ala seconde partie de la question qui a trait tout particulierement a la region de Djokjakarta, que, dans le document 5/1230, les mots "hormis .la region de Djokjakarta" se trouvent entre paren· theses.
M. MALIK (Union des Republiques soeia1istes
sovit~tiques) (traduit d It russe): Cansiderons qu'il n'a pas the dOl1ue reponse a la demderne question.
Mahmaud FAwzr Bey (Egypte) (tradnit de l'allglais): La question SQulevee il y a quelques instants par le representant de t'Indonesie a son importance. Peut etre le representant des Pays- Bas est-ij en possession de renseignements de fraiche date au sujet de cette question qu'il vou~ drait nous communiqueI'. A cet egard, tout en esperant qu'il nous donnera, si possihle, des ren~ selgnements rassurants, je pense qu'il serait SOllhaitable qll'il nous fotlrnisse en meme temps - au, du moins le plus tot qu'il pourra - quelques explications et quelques renseignements sur la question dont traite le docmr.ent Sj1231, qui nous a ete distribue eet apres~midi.
M. VAN ROIJEN (Pays-Bas) (traduit de l'anglwis): En ce qui concerne la question soulevee par le representant de l'Indonesie et qu'ont abordee, ce matin, le representant de l'Australie, et, cet apres-midi, le representant de l'Egypte - a savoir la possibilite qu'un ou plusieurs representants de la Republique se trouyant actuellement en Indonesie viennent a Lake Success - j'aL le regret de devoir dire que je n'ai pas encore n~c;u d'aulres renseigne:nents de man Gouvernement.
Le PRESIDENT (troouit de l'anglais) : Les membres du Conseil de securite ont sous les yeux le projet de resolution commun relatif i la question indonesienne soumis par les representants de la Chine, de Cuba, de la Norvege et des Etats-Unis [S/1219]. A t'heure actuelle, les amendernents qui figurent dans les document 5/1230 et 5/1232 ont ete incorpores clans le projet de resolution principal. Les membres du Conse!1 Oll d'alltres representants id presents desirent-ils prendre la parole sur la resolution telle qu'elle est modifiee?
Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypte) (traduit de l'anglais): Je voudrais reserver le droit de ma delegation d'intervenir a la prochaine seance a propos du projet de resolution modifie. Mes observations seront, ie pense, tres breves et ne prendront pas beaucoup de temps. It n'y aura done pas grand inconvenient a ce que je 1es remettea demain.
Le PRESIDENT (tracbrt# de l'angla,is) : Les memhres du Conseil ont entendu la demande du representant des Pays-Bas tendant a ce que le vote sur la resolution commune soit ajol:rne pOUr yingt-quatre heurcs. Le Conseil a entendu les observations formulees apropos de cette demande, par le representant des Etats-Unis et par moimeme, llinsi que par le representant de l'Indonesie. Jusqu'apresent, aucun des membres du
Mr. TSIANG (China): While I think that we should not delay the conclusion of our considera. tion of this matter any more than is absolutely necessary. I would appreciate it if the President could call our Dext meeting for 3 p.m., because I have made personal arrangeme:Jts for the morning.
In view of the remarks of the fl'presentative of China, I propose that the Council should adjourn and meet again on the Indonesian question at 3 p.m. tomorrow.
The meeting rose at 5.18 p.m.
M. TSIANG (Chine) (traduit de l'anglQi.~): Je ne desire nullement retarder plus qu'il ne fact la conclusion de t'examen de cette qt1estion. Je
~er:li~ nr-J!nmoins heuTeux si le President convoquait notre prochaine seance demain a 15 heurcs, en raison des engagements que j'a! deja pris pour la matinee.
Le PRESIDENT (tradl~it de l'ar.glai.» : Eu egard aux observations du representant de la Chine, je me propose de lever la seance et de fixer la prochaine re'Jnion consacree a la question indonesienne a demain apres-midi l it 15 heure.s.
La seanct est levee d 17 h. 18.
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UN Project. “S/PV.405.” UN Project, https://un-project.org/meeting/S-PV-405/. Accessed .