S/PV.410 Security Council

I should like to say that the suggestion of the representative of the USSR has in fact been carried OUt. The letter from the Le PRESIDENT (tradl,it de l'culglais): Ce que delnllnde le representant de I'URSS a deja ete talt, me se:nble-t-il: k kttrc du repre.senlant de la Reptlhliquc (I'Indonesie a ete distribuee en taut que document offic:iel du CcnseiJ de securite cl tous les nH'mbres du Conseil ant pu en prendr~ collna.issance. Avant de danner la parole au represent:w.t du Canada, je tiens 8. dire que ma suggestion semble avoir c:lonne lieu a t1t1 rna!t;:ntemlu. Je sais fori bien que la situation en Indonesie reclame une etude approfondie de la part Ju Conscil. J'ai pro" pose que nous acceptions l.a recommacdation de l<l Commission, SelDS pl'ejuger aUCJJ11C deo: questions qui se posent et sans prejuger pour ['instant le droit de tout membre du Comeil de demander Cjue ces questions fassent l'objet d'Wle discussion particuliere. Je maintiens donc ma !>l.lggestiOll et je rlemal1de all Conseil de bien vouloir l'accepter en tenant compte des precisions que je 'liens cl'y apporler. repre~entative of the RepUblic of Illdunesia ha:; been circulated as an official document of the Security Council, and it has reacht:d all the members of the Council. Before I recognize the representative 0f Can<lda, I <ihould like to say that there ~ef'.ms to be some misunderstanding in regard to my suggestion. I am pedeclly aware of the fad that the situation in Indonesia requires the consideration of the member!; of the, CounciL I suggested that we accept the recommendation of the Com~ m:ssion without prejudice to any of the qlJcstions involved, and, for the moment, without prejudicing the right of any member of the Council to request a special discussion on the issues involved. I still urge members of the Council to acccpt my suggestion, with that distinct understanding in mind. Je propose done que le President avise la Commission que 1l011~ accedons a sa dcmande. The PRESlDENT: Unless I hear further objection, I shall communicate to the Commission that its recommendation to postpone the date to 1 March is accepted by us. Le PRESIDENT (tradu.it de l'anglais): Si per~ sonne' ne s'y oppose, je ferai savoir a la Co,mmission 411e le COllseil accepte sa recommendatlon tendant 8. ajourner au ler mars la remise de SOl1 rapport. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (trallslated from Russia.l~): Some of the speakers who have preceded me have tried to reduce the whole matter to the question of tIle Commission's report on the establishment of a temporary government in Indonesia; this however, is only one aspect of the matter. The 'second fundamental and decisive aspect of the question is the. immediate di.sconti~uance of all military operatIOns and the immediate and unconditional release of all the political leaders of lhe Indonesian Republic, as provided for in p<tragraphs 1 and 2 of the Security Council's resolution of 28 January [5/1234]. M. MAUl( (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): Celiains dcs orateurs qui m'ont precede ont tentc de ramenc:r , toute la question a cellc dll l'apport de la Commission re1atif a la creation d'ul1 Gouvernement provisoire en Indonesie, alors qtte ce n'en est la. qu'un settl aspect de" la situation. Le deuxieme aspect de la question, qui est essenticl et d~eisif, sel'apporte a la cessation immediate des operations ini1itaires et a la liberation immediate et : inconditionnelle des dirigcants politif],ues de la Republique d'Indonesie, C01l11l1e le prevoient les deux premiers paragraphes du dispositif de la resolution dl1 Conseil de secmite en date du 28 janvier [5/1234J. . Paragraph 1 "<;alls \lpOn the Government of the Netherlands to insure tile immediate discontinuance of all military operations". Paragraph 2 "calls upon the Government of the Netherlands to release immediately and unconditionally all political prisoners arrested by them since J7 December 1948 .. ," Sir Alexander Cadoga.l1 disregards these points; they are of no interest to him and he is not prepared to consider these matters, or to discuss the tbgrant viol:tllon of these provisions of the Security Council resolutiOn committed by the Netherlands Government. He said that he was not prepared to discuss such questions; he is, how~ ever, always, at every moment, prepared to speak ill defence of the Netherlands Government, which is guilty of' an act of ag-gression against the Indonesian Republic. This, of course, is entirely his Le pal'agl'<lphe premier "invite le Gouverncment des Pays-Bas a faire cesser immediatement toutcs .operations militait·cs". J Le paragraphe 2 "invite le GO[fVCrnement des PayscBas aremettrc immediatement et sans condition en Jiberte tous les prisonniers politiques arretes par 1nl ... depuis le 17 dec:embrc 1948". Sir Alexander Cac!og,m neglige c.es raragrapltes qui ne l'intcressent pas: il n'est pas dispose a. etudier ces questions, .it e.xaininer la violation flagrante que le GOllvernement des Pays-Bas a cOI11\11ise a l'egard de Lt resolution du Conseil de securite. Sir Alex:mder Cadogan declare qu'il n'esl pas disrlOse a ex;"nniner Cl'S questions; par C:Ol1tre, il est toujours et a tout moment pret a prendre la defcnse du Gouverne11lcnt des Pays- Bas qui s'est rendu coupable d'agression contre la IHpubliqlle d'Indonesie. C'est la, bien entendu, Althongh :lltlch time has Vasst:d-more than two weeks-the Sec:trity Council resolution on the immediate discontinuance of aU military operations ar.d the imrneciafe and unconditional release of political pri]oners !tas not yet bef'.n implemented j if the Council has any respect for its own decisions and if it really w;,~hes to protect the legitimate interests of the victims of aggres(;ion, it should find· out why its resolution has 1Jot been implemented and who is to blame, ra:her th;<.n r.onfining itself to a mere technical dedsior. on the postponement of the date for tile suhrni".\ion of the Commission's repor:. It is to this aspect of tlle question that the USSR deLegation wishes to draw the Council's at~ention. 4. Continuation of the discussion on tbe application of the Democratic People'.!! Repuhlic of Korea for admil:Hiioll to membership in t.he United Nations TIle PRESIDENT: The Security CO'.1ncil will now revert to its agenda, beginning with the French translation of the speech made by he representative of tr.e USSR at the last f409th 1 meeting, AIr. DE LA TOURNELLE (France) (tmnslated froil' Punch): In order to facili:ate and expedite the Council's work, as far as I am concerned, I shaJ not ask for the French translation which was not given l<:st llight. Mr. lvL'\LIR (Unior o~ Soviet Socialist Republies) (trmlSll1Jed fro",_ Ru,ssian); 1 nave already poi~ted out rmc~ that ] shall not press for an interpretation if there i~ a ntle in the Security CO".1ntil that the French interpretati::m is to be given only' for the bCl:etlt of the French represenlaLve, I have dways believed that French was one of the official and working langl1age.<; dml lhat all speeches had to be interpreted into the two working lang'Jages, If :his is not so, ] shall not insist on an int!'rpre:ation being given, Mr. DE LA TOUIHIE'LT.'R (France) (translated from Fr-e1Ich) : I am well aware of the fact that French i.", a wr:rking language alld I thank the representative ef the USSR for the concern he has shown on that point. I intervenedsolely for th(! purpose of facilitating ar.d expediting the Secu:-it'l Council's work. I know that in that matter -the representative of the USSR does !lot share my ~ollcern. I tOok care to add that, "as far as I ...m C011- r.erned" I was not asking for the trallslation, that is, I forn::ally reserved the rights of other representatives who might war:t it. Mr. M_....LIK ::Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (tra'lslclt"d ;rom Rf1ssifl-n): III tht r::l~e, ill order to facili:ate the Security Council's work, we might decide to have. interpretations only into English. Un dclai assez long -- plus de del1X: semainefl --:--,s'est dej~ ecoule de;l1Iis que le CC'llsdl de sC!:!lnte a adopte sa l-esolution prevoyant la cessation immediate des operatiDl1s militaires et la I:beration immediate et salJs condition d~s priSD:1niers politigues; or, Hn'y a toujours -pas ete conoe suite, Si le COllseil de securite a le respect de ses propres decisions, ~'il entend vraiment detencre les interet.s h~gitimes de la victillle de l'agression, il se dOlt de rechercher Les raisom pour I~sque]es sa resolution ;1'a p;;,s ere appliquee et de determine:' a qui en incombe It hute. I1 re sattrait se contcnter de prendre Ulle decision d'ordr~ purement formcl tendant R ajo\lrllel' k date a laquelle la Commission cloit lui cotlUimniquer son rapport. C'est predscmcllt .'iU;· eet aspect de la ql:eslion que la delegation de I'URSS tient it attirer l'attentian dn Conseil de securite. 4,. Suite de la discu8sion sur la deulallde d'admission 8: rOrganisation des Natiolls Unies presentee par la Republique populaire democratique de Coree Le Pn:fi:sfDBNT (tradltit de l'anglllis): L:. COllseil de seeurite va :nailltell<.nt reve1ir a son ordl'e dll jour, en eommen~nt pClr L'il1terpI'Ctatir);) en fnan~ais de l'inte~vention du representant de I'URSS ala demiCie seance [4D9bMOJ. M. DE LA TmIRN"RLLE (France): Pour ana part, et pour faciliter et hiter les tnv;mx du Com"il, je r,e soliciterai pas la tradl1c:ion f1"(1.n- <;aise qui n'avait pas e:e faite hier soir, M, MALIIC (Union des Ri:pt:bliques socialistes sovieriques) (traduit dtl nine): ]'ai d~ja d&la~e al1paravant que s'il etait de regie, au .Conseil de securite, de ne donner l'interpretat:orl des diSCOltrS ell fraJ1~ai-s qu'a l'intention dll re!wesentant de la France, je n'insisterais pas pm: q~l'i~ soit ::>roce:1e a ceUe interpretation. JU5CJ.l1'a present, ie pens3.is que le fran.;ais etait tine Ja:tgue officielle et tme langlle de travail et que tous les discours devaient etl'e t:adltit~ clans les deux lan~ues de travail. Toutefois, s'il nJen est pas ainsl, je II'insi~terai f\<'l~ pour qu'il soit prace-de al'interpretation, 111. DE LA TOURl'ELLE (France): Je sais fDrt bien que le fran~ais est ~llle langue de travail et je remercie le j"'epresentant de ['URSS (Iu sOltci dont il fait prellve it c.et cgarcl. Je n'ftais interventl que pow' faciliter et hater les travaux du Con~~i1 de sccurite, Je sais qUI", ~lOT ce po:nt, le l'epn~sentar.t de l'Jnion wvietique n'a pas le mCl1lc sonci q:.te moi. J'avais eu soin J'ajolltel' que jc 11e demafldai~ pas h1 tra<1'Jdioll "pour ma part", e'est-a-dire que je r~servajs formdlcmcnt les drcits dfS autres rcpreaentants qai pOl1vaient la desirer. M. MAUl( (Union des Republiques soclalistes sovietiQues) (lra&li[ dll r.ls.rc): Dafls ccens, ij faudrait petit-etre, ann de facJiter les travaux du Consetl de secutite, decider de n'avdr que des interp:-eJations en ang:ais. T~e PRESIDENT: The Sewrity Council will now turn to the item on the agenda, and 1 understand that the representative of the USSR has a point of order to raise, Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Repu1.Jlics) (translated from RU.Jsian) : I should like to ,submit the following draft resolution on the ques:iotl under discussion: "HaDing considered the application or the Gov- etnrl1el11 of the Democlatic PeoIJ1e's Republic of Korro for membership in the Uni~ed Nations, "Resolves to refer this application to the Com- mittee for the Admis&ion of New Menbet's." Mr. TARASENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Repl:blic) (tnmslated fran!. RUS.tWfl) : The dele- gation of the Ukrainian SSR cor.sioers that the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the only legitimate ano competent Government of Korea. The participation of over 77 per cent of the e1ecton:te of South Korea in the elections to the Korean Supreme People's Assembly proves that the Democratic People's Repcblic of Korea :s indeed a Sta~e which repre- sents the whole of Korea, the entire Korean people. Even thongh this state o~ affairs is not to the liking of the United States Govern:nent or the United States delegat:on, that cloes not in the least alter the situation; 1:0 marc, than the ,;ituatioij is cI-.ang~d by the fact that the United States of America, relying on a docile maj?rity in the General Assembly of the United NatlO11s, which fo:Iows its policy, ha;; carried through a resolution [195(W)] which, as is well known, ,approves the establishment, by the United Stays, III .Sot,th Korea, of a puppet Gov~:·nment, whlch enJoys no support whatever among the popu:ation of South Korea, TllUs, the popular will of the Korean people is expressed in the Government of the Democratic Peop:e's Republic of Korea, which Ims the sup- port and confidence of the population mt only of North but also of South Korea. This is the most fundamental and decisive factor which must be taken into account by the Security Council when dealing with the application of the D~mccratic People's Republic of Korea :01' ad- mission to membership in the United Nations. The Ukrainian delegation cons:ders that the argun:ents put forward by the United States representative, Mr. Anitin, It the Secmity Conn- Le PRfrsIDEN7 (traduit de Z'a,ngloS:s): Le Conseil de secnrite va maintenant examiner le point qui est a l'ordre du jour; je trois que le representant de l'URSS desire presenter une motion d'ordre. M. 1\IAL1K (Union des Republiqlte5 socialistes sovietiques) (traduit dlt ru.~,'e): Je voudrais soumettre au Consei1 le projet de resolution sui~ vact a propos de la question qui fait l'objet de notre examen: "Ayatlt examine la demande d'admission comme Mc:nbre de l'Org<lu,satiorl des Nations Uuies pre~ sentee par le GOllvcrncmellt ~e la Republique democratiquc pop'.llaire de COl'l'~e, "Decide de transmett:'c cette demnnde a son Coroite charge de I'admissiolt de nouveaux Membres." M. TARASSENKa (Republique soci.a~iste sovie- tique d'Uhaine) (tt'aduit d·u yusse): La dele- gation de la Repub1ique socialiste sovh~tique d'Ukraine estime que le ~eul GOllverncment legal et legitime de la Coree est cehti de la RepubliqtlC derr.ocratique pop'J1aire de Cot'l~e. En effet, plus de 77 pour 100 de tous les electeurs de la Con~e dn Sml om pris part aux elections a l'Assemblee nationale supreme de la COf(~e j cela. prouve q.ue la Republique dernocratique populalre est ,blen un 3:tat qui represente l'ensemb1e de la Coree et le pet\ple CJreCn tout entier. Cet etat de chos~s.a beae depla:re at' GouvernelTl~nt des. Etats-~ms et asa delegation, cela ne morhfie en flen la .sltua. tion. pas plus, d'aillcurs,que ne la t:lOd~fie ~a resolution [195 (If!)] que les Etats-Unls? Ame- rique appuyes p<lr la majorite ql1~ suit docllement leur 'politiCjue, ont reussi 'a fair.e adopter .par J'Assemultt:gtIlerale de l'OrgalUsatiOl1 des NatiOlls Unies; on sait que cette resolutiotl donne son approbation au Gouvernement fantoche que les Etats~Unis ont etabli en Coree <In Sud, bien qu'iJ ne beneficie l1ullement de I'appui de la population. Ainsi dOllC, c'est le GO(1vcl'uement de la. Repu- blique democratique populaire de Curee qui est l'cxpressioll de la volonte populaire clans ce pays et qui jouit de la confiance et de l'appui de la popdatiol1, dans le nord aussi bien ql~e da?s le sud de la Corec. C'est la le fadeur e%entlel et decisif que le Consei1 de securite doit prendre en consideration lors de l'examen de la demande d'admission a l'Organisation des Nations Unies presentee par la Republique Jemocratique popu- laire de Coree, Selon la delegation de la RSS d'Uhaine. les arguments que M. Austin, representant des Etats- Unis d'Amel'ique, a. inv0<lues contre l'admission R~p~blic had had recourse to the telegraph, that a teleg-rarn cou:t1 not be regarded as an appllca- tion, and that, in addition, one could not be sure whe~her the telegram had been signed by a Minis- ter or wbether it had, indeed, l.:eelJ signed at all, Rule 58 of the provisional rules of procedure of :he Security Council lays down that "Anv State which desires to become a Member of tl1~ United Nations sh"ll submit ~ll application to the Secretary-General." This rule, however, doe.~ not oblige the State submitting the application to use the postal services only, any more than it forbids the use of the telegra?h. The very fact that the United States representative resorts to SllC;l argLlmems shows the extent to which his thesis is neither serious nor convincing. 11 is infleed remarbblf' to sep. the extent to whic:l the United States re-:Jreser;tative fears a discussion of the politica: fact~rs which constitute the very fotmdation of this question, Why does he fe:lr it? Because he realizes full well that the Govern- me~t of the Democratic Peuple's Republic of KOI"ea enjoys the support of any overWhelming part of the pO::lUlation not only of North but also of South Korea. He is perfectly well informed on the feelings oi the whole Korean people towards the pup?et Gover:lment in South Korea, He knows perfectly well that if the United States occupation troOp3 left South Korea the puppet Government would not remain in power more than 21, holtrs. The United States rerresentative knO\VS, as does his Government how -the Korean people feel about the fact that an occupation regime is maintained in South Korea, while USSR occupatiO:l troops have long since left North Korea, formerly a part uf the USSR zone of occupatio:"!. Tt i-" becau~e he knows all this that the United States representative fears to tcmh on the politic.al substance of this question. I can see, however, no need for the other members of the Security Council to share his fears. The Security Council has nu right to neglect these decisive facts Jy imoking far-fetcht:d and casuistical arguments. In view oi what I bve said, the Ukrainian SSR delegat.:on must insist that the application of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for ."dll1ission to memoership in the United Nations shoL:1d be expedited, that is to say that, as it now stands, it should be referred to the Security Cotncil's Committee on the Admission of New Members. [4D9~me seance] de:; c~ni:iideraliOl:s relevant surtout du droit et de la procedure, tont en es<]uivant completement ]'examen des facteurs politiques, D'ailleurs, ces conside,ations juridiques rt clf'_ procedure ne relevaient que de l'tsprit admi- nistratif de fOTmalisme et de chicane le plus banal. Le representmt des Etats-Unis a notam- ment signale que le Gou,·el1lement ue la Repu- btique dtlnocratiquc popub.irc de Conie a pT\~sen­ Le :sa c1ell1andc d'admission par teJegramme, qll'un tlHegmmme ne constituait pas une demande d'ad- mission et qu'on ne savait d'ailleurs pas si ce te.legran:ll1e avait ete signe on non par le Ministre de3 Aff.nires etrangeres de la Repub:ique. Or, aux termes de l'article 58 du re;glement interieur provisoire rIu Conseil de securite, " Tout Etat qui desire deve1.ir ivlcmbrede l'Organisation [dcs N~tiol1s Unies] pre.<;ente une demande an Secretaire general". Cet article n'ex:ge pas que la dem<l:J<:le (j'admission soit adressee ?lr la poste, pas plus qu'il n'interclit de le'faire par :eJegramme, Le fait meme que le representant des Etats-Unis d'Amerique ail reours i des arguments de ce genre mOntre a que! point sa these manque de serieux et est pell convainrant. I1 est frappant de voir.a que1 point le represen- tant des Etats-Dnis d'Amerique redonte l'cxa- men des facteurs politic.ues qui constituent le fond ffihlle de ce probteme, PO'Jrquoi le rcdonte- t-il? Parce qu'il St rend parfaitement compte que le Gouvernemellt de la Republique democra- tique populai~e de Coree benefLcic de l'appui de la grande majorite de la populat:on. non seu:emen1 dans le nord mais anssi dans le sud de la Coree 11 connalt fort bien quels sont les sentiments de people cor~cn tont cnticr a l'eg:wrl dn GOl1ver- nCJ1lent fantoche de la Con~e du Sud. n sai~ tres bien que si les forces d'occupation des Etats- Cnis se retiraient de la Con~e du Sud, ce Gouver- nement ne se maintiendrtit pa~ plus de 24 heure~ a:'l pouvoir. Le rcrresentant ues Etats-Unis sait, tout aussi bien que son Gotlvernell1ent, queUe est l'attitude du peuple coreen a l'egard du re- gime <!'occupation qu'on maintio::nt en CGree d'l Suo, alors que les forces de I'tTRS5 ont evacue depuis longtemps deja la COf(~e dtl Nord q'Ji avait fait partie de leUl· zone d'OCCltpation. C'est parce qtt'i: connalt tous ccs faits que :e l·epresentattt des Etats-UlIis d'Ameriquc u peer GC toucher aux facteurs politiqucs qui constituent le fond meme de h question, Mais ;e ne yois pas pOllrqwj les autre.; menbres du Conseil de secu- rite devraient par:ageres craintes du represen- tant des Etats-Uds. Le COll3eil de securite n'a pas le droit de negliger ces fa:ts decisifs en invo- (juant des consideration" fallacieuses qui reievent de la casuistique. Pour ces raiso:1s, la delegation de la Repu~ blique socialiste sovietique d'Ukr-aille demande insltu'tmen! qu'il .soit donn~ suite a la candidature de la Republlqtle democratique popuJaire de Conie, c'est-a-dire que cette question, teHe qu'dle se presente acluellemel1t, soit soumise au Comite d'adm:ssion des nouveaux Membres, In view of these facts, should the Security COl\llcil give to the 'application of North Korea the same consideration as it has decided to give to the application of the Republic of Korea? If we showed no appreciation of the differences between Ille north and the south, our action wonld be politicany mischievous. On the one hand. I am afraid that the prestige of the Security COllllCil would be lowered in the eyes of the people of the world; on the other, we should throw our- selves open to the objection that we had purposely ignored the resolution of the General Assembly. Further, we should render the action of the United Nations inconsistent. In the opinion of my deleg,ation, the applica- tion of North Korea [5/1247] does not deserve any further consideration by this Council or its Committee. For this reason we shall vote against the resolution which has just been introduced by the representative of the USSR [5/1259]. Mr. MOE (Norway): I wish to make a few brief remarks, as my delegation sees some diffi- culties in the procedure proposed here. As to the stlhstance of the question of whether or not the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should be admitted to membership in the United Nations, the posilion of my delegation is clear. In our _opinion the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has shown that it is not willing and able to carry out the obligations in the Charter. We are, therefore, forced to vote against the reference of this application 10 the Committee on the Ad- mission of New Members. We shall do this though we do not like to make a decision of sub- stance in the form of a decision on procedure. There is another difficult question. Is this document [S/1247] that has been circulated by the Secretary-General an application, or is it not? I f it is considered an application, my dele- gation wOllld be in favour of referring it to the Committee on the Admission of New Members. We would be in favour of that procedure partly because we feel that the Security Council should not decicle on an application before it has been to the Committee on the Admission of New Mem- bers, and also because we Ihink that the Cammit- Con~e est dlvisee. Dans le nord e:st en vigueur un regime dont nous ignorons I'origine et la. nature et qui n'~ cesse de braver l'Organisation des Nntions Unies. Dans le sud, ou sont concentres les deux-tiers de la population coreenne, exi'ste lln Gouverlll::ment dont notre pl"Opre Commission atteste qu'i1 est fonde sui- la volonte valablement exprimee du peuple et qui a ete reconnu comme tel par la resoltttion [195 (II!)] de l'Assel11blee generale en date du 12 decembre 1948. Cela pose, le Conseil de securite cloit~il prendre en consideration la demande de la Coree septen- trionale, de la meme ff\<;on qu'il a decide de prendre en consideration celle de la Republique de Con~e? En ne faisant pas de distinction enil'e le nord et le sud, nous commettrions une erreur politique. D'une part, je crains que le prestige du Conseil de Seellrite ne se trollve alors diminue ::lUX yeux: des peuples du monde; cl'autre part, on pOllrrait nous reprocher d'avoir inlelltiollnel~ lemenl refuse de tenir compte de la resolution de I'Assem1J.lee generale. De plus, nons rendricJIls contradi.ctoire.s les decisions de l'Orgal1isation des Nations Unies. Ma Jtl6.gation est d'a~is que, la demandc pre- sentee par la Coree septentrionale [5/1247] ne merite pas de retenir plus longtemps l'attention du Conseil de secudte ou celle de son Comite. C'est pourqtloi notlS voterons contre la resolution que vient oe proposer le representant de I'URSS [S/1259]. M_ MOli: (Norvege) (traduit de l'anglais): I'aimerais formuler quelques breves observations, car, de I'avis de ma delegatiw, la procedure que 1'on nous propose presente quelql1es- difficultes. Sur le fond de la question de savoir s'il y a lieu, ou non, d'a'dmettre la Republique popu1aire d6mci- cratique de Coree au sein de l'Organisation des Nations Unie.s, la position de m:l deh~gation est mtte, A noire sens, la Republique populaire demo- cratiqne de Coree a prouve qu'elle n'etait ni capable de rempler les obligations de la Cl,arte, ni disposee a le faire. ,Nous nous trouvol1S, en consequence, dans I'obligation de voter conh'e le renvoi de cette demande atl Comite d'admission des nouveaux Membres, bien que nous n'aimions guere trancher une question de fond en prenant nne decision de procedure. I1 y a enCore une autre difficulte. Le docu- ment [5/1247] qui 1101'.S a ete distribue par le Secretaire general constitue-t-H, ou non, llne demande d'admission"i' Si on le considere comme tel,ma delegation serait d'rwis de le renvoyer au Comite d'admission des nOl1veaux membres. Si nous preconisons cette maniere de proceder, c'est en partie parce que nous estimons que le Consei! <le securite ne devrait pas statuer sur une demande ,want qu'elle ne soit passee devant le Comite c1'admissiOll des nouveaux Membres, et c'est aussi wa~ ralsed yesterday by t~e representative of the UnIted States. rvIy P0111t lS that if it is not an application, the ql1e~tioll of whether to send it to the Committee on the Admission of New Mem- Lers cannot even be discllssed. Therefore this see{l1s to me to be a very important point. I'must &1.y that I was a little astonished when the repre- sentative of the United States agreed to the President's construction of his -intervention, In his intervention, the representative of the United Slates also raised the point that the application C01.11d not be considered by the Security Council because it was contrary to the resolution of the General Assembly 011 the KOI-ean question. This is certainly a consideration that has con- siderable weight. Is the Security Council en- titled to act contrary to, or would it be wise for the Secl1rity Council to act contrary to, a recom- 111cndatio,1 of lhe General Assembly that was accepted by a very large ll1ajority? This raises another question. Is the Security C0l111c11 entitld to take into consideration con- ditions other t!l;lll those mentioned in Article 4 of the Charter, which are that a State ShOllld be peace-IoviJlg, that it should accept the obligations contained in the Charter, and- that it should be able and willing to carry out tllose obligations? I raisc this qucstion because there is a majority decision by the International Court of Justice which states that the conditions mentioned in Al'ticle 4 of the Chalter are the only ones to be taken into cOl1sideratiOll, The question before us is a very complicated one, and I do not wish to raise any deLate on these points, My delegation will Yote against the reference of the application of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the Committee of Adlllissiun of New Members. However, I do not want this vote to be misunderstood, ami I have Inade this statement in order that it might be qllite clcar that my delegation reserves its atti- tUlle on all of these questions and that, when the Sccllrity Council considers further applications for membership, this vote by the Norwegian dele- gation cannol he taken as a precedent. Mr. Al.\'AREZ (Cuba) (translated from Span- ish): On my Government's instructions I wish to state its stand on the Yote all the application being discussed by the Conneil. I shall refer simply and solely to a criterion which seems to us strictly procec!t1ra1, witbout procec(ling to consider other qllestions which would pro!ong the argument, An application for the admission of a new Member to the United Nations is being pre~ sented before the Security Council and it is n,ot, therefore, possible to avoid t}le proced:lr~ wh}ch the application to the Secl1nty ConnCl,l ImpiJes, In that connexion rule 58 of the Secllrtty COl11~­ cil's rtlle~ of procedure may be relevant. ~hl$ rde clearly says that"Any State which de:>lres to become a Member of the United Nations shall ~le, s.el~lble-t-l1 tres 11l1PO~ta~t. le dais avoller.que J al ete queltjne :pen stupefalt lorsque le represen- tant des Etats-Un:is a approtlVe la maniere dont le President interpretait SOI1 intervention. Au cow's de la meme intervention, le representant des ~lat~-Ynis a egal~ment affinne que le Conseil de secnnte Ile pOl1Valt pas prendre la de-mande en consideration, parce tjll'tlle ctait contraire :i la resolution de l'Asscmblee gener:r.le relative a la question de Cork C'est Ja, sans auClUl OOllte, un argu\l1ent d'tll1 poids considerable. Le Conseil de securite est-il en droit - et ce1a serait-i\ .age de sa part _ d'agir en contradiction avec 1me I'CCOlllmandati(lll de l'Assemblee genera1e, qui a cte approuvcc a une tres forte majorite? It se pose id une autre question. Le Conscil de securite a-t-i1 le droit de faire intencpir d'au- tres considerations que les conditions prevl1cs i l'Artic1e 4 de la Chttrte, asavoir qll'nll Etat tloit etre pacinql1e, accepter les obligations de la Chartc, etre capable de les rempJir et dispose :i le bire? Si jo.: sotlleve cette question, c'est que la Cour jnternationa!e de Justice a emis ;\ la majo- rite lln avis consultatif selon lequel les conditions prevl1es a l'Article 4 de la Charte sont les seules qU'il £ail1e prendre en consideration. La question dont le Conseit est saisi est tn':s cotnpliqwie, et je n'ai ~ l'intention de provo- ql1er un debat SUI' ces dlffe.l'~lit$' point~., M,a dc1,e- gatlon votel'a contre le renvoI all COITIlte cl acltnl~­ sion des nouveaux Memhrcs de la dcmande -pre- sentee par la Repu~liq~e ropll1~ire dcn;?cr~tiqu,e de Coree, TOl1tetOls, Je tlens a ce ql111 n Y nit aucun malentendu au ~ujet de ce vote 'et, si j'ai fait cettc dec1arati?~, c:est POll; qu'il soit bien entendu que ma delegation ne ~eng~e p.a~ pour l'avenir et que, lorsque le Cansell ,de 5~Cll,l'lte examinera de nouvelles del11andes d admiSSion, on n'invoquem pas ce yote. commc ,u~ precedent ele nature a lier la delegation norvcglennc. M. ALVAREZ (Cuba) (tradl:it ~e J,'espagno[): Man Gcuvernement m'a ch<trged tndlquer ~ll?lIe est sa position au sujet de la deman~e d admiSSIOn dont discllte actuel\ement le COllsell. Sans abor- der l'exa1l1en (\'autL'es q~stio?5 et afill de 1!-e, pas prolonger mOll interventIOn, ~e !nc borner~1 a ne parler que d'un argument, gl11, a notre aVIS, COll- cerne tlOiquemellt la procedure, C'est au Conseil de 5ccu~ite, gu'a ~te ~oumisc tme dem'ande d'admission a 1Organl~tlon des Nations Unies, It n'est donc pas poss1ble de ne pas suivre 1.."1 plLlcedurc pre~l\e en, cc ,o;s. Le reglement interieur du [onsell d~ .securtt~ COI~­ tiel1t un article _ I'article 58 - qUI l;eut s ~pph­ uer en l'occl1rcncc. En effet, cet, o.~tl~le declal.'e {art c1airement que "Tou.t Etat gut de,slre deveOlr 1Icmbre de l'Organisatlon dOlt presentcr llne YIahmoucl FAWZI Bey (Egypt): I scbrnit that the Security C0undl should be particularly grate~ ful to our colleEgue from Norway for the very lucid statement he has just made to us on the natule of the qt.:<:stion now before us, a qttestion which I might call the matter of the "receiva- hility" of the application for members11ip in the U:lited Nations which has bee~ presented by the so~cal1ed Democratic People's Republic of Korea. I must confess that I came hen with some dOllCts, which I still entertain, as to certain tech- nical a~d other phases of this question, doubts similar to those entertained and expressed by on colleague from Norway, and regarding which I reserve the futtte attitude of the Egyptian dele- gation in a manner similar to that of our colleague from Norway. This is a very delicate and comp1ica~ed matter, .althongll it might n6t seem so at the outset. F{)r ex.ample, is this application, or any similar ;;ppli- l':Rtion for membership presented by a GO'{ern- me:r.t, hy a State or by an entity s.imilar to the cne envisaged in Article 4 of the Charter? And shOl1ld the Security COllllcil, in one minute disw card an application without thoroughly g.oing into ft, either through the Committee on the Admission of New Members or, somehow, by constituting :tself into a committee and invest:ga:ing the: ma:ter thomughly to see whether this is a lawf',l Government and whether it is entitied to present such un application? All these are te6nical matters which, strictly speak:ng, we should have ~one into if we wunded to be one hundred per cent careful about details. However, I cannot fail to T,otke that we have, 011 the other hand, 0vel'weighing "nd ov~r-riclillgcan.qitlemtiom which compel me to be against our taking any positive ac~ion, whether procedural or otherwise, in con- nexion with this application. I do not tblk that thc Security Council 5honld refer the mat~er to the Committee on the Admis- sion of New Members, although it might be proper for the Council to form its opinion or ask for the opinion of the Com:nittee of Experts as to the point rai::;ed by the r<.:prcsentativc o~ Nor- way, whic:1. 1 call the "receivabiIity" of tl1e appli- c~tion. Belt this particular application which is now before the Security Council goes counter to too many things which overweigp. and over-ride the other pro.:edural ur ;;imilar considcrntions. To begin with, it goes against the resoll1tions of the General Assembly, the latest of w:tkh r195(JIIJl was adopted only two monthE ago. 'Then there are some other considerations which are particu- larly important, at least as far as the Egyptian Delegation is concerned. satt~fact:on. Nous estimons qu'il y a la un facteur Sllffisant pour que, sans entrer dans d'alltn:~ considerations, nous \'ations cantre l'admission de l'Etat qui a pose sa ca~didatl1rr! all rr.oyen clll docwnent qui nous est soumis. Mahmoud FAWZl Bey (Egypte) (t1'adllit dr: l'anglais) : Je tiens it dire que le Consei! de secu- dte dcvrait etrc purticuliercment r'l'(';(lnnaissant a notre col1egue de Korvege de s'etre prononce avec tant de clarte sur la. r.ature de la question dont nous sommes saisis, question que vous me permettrez d'appe1er celle de la "rccevabilite" de la candidature de la pretend~le Republique popll_ Wre de..'!locratique de Coree. Je dais avouer que, l"tI arrivant ici, j'o.v<lis, et j'ai toujours d'ai~leurs, des dOlltes sur certains aspects techniques et autres de la question, doutes analogues a ccux qu'a mallifestes tlotre co'li:fuc d<: Norvege et en raison desque1s ·je reserve pour l'avenir l'attitude de la delegation egyptienne, comme J'a fait, pOllr sa delegation, notle co11egtle de Norvege. C'est une question tre5- <1eticate et compliquee, bien Qc'elle ne le paraisse pas au premier abord. Ainsi il faut determiner si ceUe demande d'admi::;- sion, comrne d'a.illeurs tot1:e demande presentee pa.l un Gouvcrncrncnt, par un Etat otl par uoe eutite politique, est de celles que p:evoit l'Article 4 ele la Cha:te. 11 faut egalement se demnnder si le COllseil de securite doit rejeter immediatemcIlt une dCr.1ande sans l'avoir etudiee de ntaniere appro- fondie, soit par l'inturr.6d:a.ire clu Comiit d'ao- mission des nouvel1.UX Membres, soit en se constl- ttlant en quelqne sorte lui-meme en Comite et en procedant a un examen ;ninut:eu:c de la question, pour determiner s'il s'agit d'un Gouvernement legitime et si ce Got1verncmcnt est autorise a presenter une teUe demandc. Cc sont la des ques- tions tp~hnlques que, en rfalite, nous aurions dtl examiner si nous avior.s voltlu etre absolument stirs d'ayoir tenu compte de taus ll':s details. Cependant, je ne )?eux ignorer les consideranou8 dominantes et primordiales qui m'ohligent d'autl'e part 3 m'oppo;:f'r ;\ ce que nous donnions tlne suite queIconque a ceUe dernande, que ce soit par une decision de procedure ou par toute autre decision. J~ ne r.rois pas qu~ le ConseiI de securite doive rcnvover ceHe questioll au Co:nite d'a6nission des nouveattx Membres, et pourtant, le Conscil aumit peut-etre avan~ag~ i se faire une opinion, ou a demander l'avis du Comite, sur la question soulevee par le rr.prescntant de la Norvege, (lui a demande en SoIDme si certe demandc etait bien recevable. Mais la demande dont le Conseil est actuellement saisi est incompatible "vec un trap grand nombre de considerations primordiales, qui l'emportent sur touteR les autres considerations de procedure ou autres. En premier lieu, elle est incompatible avec les resolutions de l'Assembtee generale dont la derRiere 1195 (Ill)] a ete adoptee it y a deux :11o:s seulement. 11 ya encore d'autres consideration,,, particulierement impor- tantes, pour la deUigatio:l de l'Egypte tout al1 moins. I am not speaking of partition merely because I hate the ward. I do not want to go into another question, because I, as an Arab, might be a bit -or very-allergic to the word "partition", but that is not the point I am making om'"'. I am speaking of that state of things which, unfortu- nately, is now prevalent not only in Korea but in many other parts of the world and which state, most unfortunately, is likely to continue for some time. I am speaking of encroachment by the large on the small; I am speaking of spheres of influ- ence, of extending a large nation's arm over a small nation's territory. I think that not only as an Egyptian, and not only as a spokesman for Egypt here, but as a free man of the world, worrying about freedom, I should pronounce my· self against anything that would crystallize en- croachments on freedom. Before closing, I wish to say a word or two in connexion with pat'agraph 3 of the General Assembly's resolution of last year which spoke of the withdrawal by both sides [195(fU)]. Does anyone of us doubt that if such withdrawal is accomplished, and accomplished soon, it will be the best constmctive step toward the unification of Korea and the restorl'ltion of freedom for all its people? This is another part of the General Assembly's resolution ag:l.inst which the applica- tion' of the so-called Democratic People's Repub- lic of Korea goes. I therefore will vote against the Security Council referring this application for consideration and examination by the Com- mittee on the Admission of New Members. Mr. MALIl\" (Union of Soviet Socialist Reptlb- lies) (translatea from Russian): I shall be brief. r only wish to point out to the Security Council, as I have already done yesterday, that the Gov- ernment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a Government legally elected by the whole Korean people, tIle will and interests of which it represents. This Government is pursuing a policy of peace and friendly relations with all countries and peoples wishing to establish normal reTations with the Repubiic. The Demo~ cratic People's Republic of Korea is a free and independent sovereign State not subordinate to a foreign occupation regime, sLnce there are no foreign troops in North Korea. I fUlly agree with the Egyptian representative that occtlpation troops must be withdrawn from Korea forthwith, and that the presence of occu- pation troops on any territory~be it South Korea .or elsewhere-precludes the establisllment or Avant de terminer, }e voudrais dire quelques mots au sujet du paragraphe 3 de la resolution adoptee I'annee derniere [195 (IIln, qui prevoit le retrait des deux parties en cause. Nul ne doute id que cc rctrait, s'1I etait effectue, et sans dHai, constituerait le meilleur moyen d'assurer I'unifi- cation de la Coree et de rendre la lioerte a tout le peuple coreen. Voila. donc tme autre partie de la resolution de l'Assemblee generale avec laqueUe la demande cl'admission de la pretendue Repu- blique populaire democratique de Coree est incom- patible. C'est pourquoi je voterai contre le renvoi de cette demande au Comlt~ d'admission dell nouveaux Membres. M. MALIK (Union des Republiques sodalistes sovietiques) (traduit du r1tssc) ~ Je semi brei. Je voudrais simplement rappeler au COflseil de s~cu­ rite les consideratiolls que j'ai deja exposees hter: le Gouvernement de la Repubtique dcmocratique populaire de Coree a 6te 1c~gitimemet1t elu par I'ensemble du peupIe coreen dont 11 rnanifeste la volonte et dont il repn~sente les interets. Ce GOtt- vernement poursuit une politique de paix et entend entretenir des reb.tlOllS amicales avec taus les pays et taus les peuples desireux d'etablir des rapports normaux ayec la Republique. La Repu- blique Mmocratique populaire de Coree est un Etat souverain, libre et independant, qui n'est soumis a aucun regime d'occupation Hranger, etant donne qu'iI n'y e. pas de troupes etrangeres sur le territoire tie la Coree du Nord. Je sUtS entierement d'ac«:ord avec le repre~ sentant de l'Egypte, qui demande le rdrait imme- diat des tro~pes d'occupation du territoire de la Coree; en effet, la presence de troupes d'occu- pation, que ce soit sur le territoire de la Coree Korea~fully conforms to the provisions of Article 4 of the Charter and can consequently be admitted to membership in the United Nations. Its application is ill order; its desire to join the United Nations is legitimate and is not in any way incompatible with the rules of procedure; nor is it in any way contrary to the principles of the Charter, the objective of which is to defend the interests, liberty and independence of the peoples of the world and to maintain international peace and security. Furthermore, this application conforms fully with logic nnd common sense. This applicatioll, which bespeaks the desire of the people of free Korea, is incompatible only with the coloflial interests of the United States of America. The application of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and those interests are imleed incompatible; that is the only possible reason for the hesitation and doubts of some of the members of the Secmity Council. They are caught between Scylla am'l Charybdis, namely between, on the one hand, the lawful and legiti- mate desire of a free and independent State, of its Government and of its people to enter the family of the United Nations, and, on the other, the colonial interests of the United States of America, No wonder some representatives find it difficult to choose between the two. But truth and justice are on the side of the people of free Korea; the vote of the Anglo-American bloc in the Security Counci] cannot change that. La candicl.ature en guestion qni repond <lUX desirs du peuple de la Caree libre n'est contraire qtt'atlX interets colonial1x des Etats-Unis d'Ame~ riqne. 11 est exact, en effet, que la candidature de la Republique democratique popn1aire de Con~e est incompatible ,avec ces interets; cela seul explique les dOlltes et les hesitations de certains membres ciu Conseil de securite. lIs se trouvent places entre Charybde et Scylla: d'lln cote, iI y a le elesir l~.gitime et jnstifie d'un Etat Iibre·et independant, de son GO'clvernement et de son peuple, gl1i demandent a entrer dans la' famillc des Nations, ,Dnies; de 1,'aotre, il y a. les interets coloniaux des Etats~Unis d'Amerique. Pour cer- tains representants, le choix est difficilc, et cela se comprend. Mais le peuple libre (le la Coree a la verite et la justice pour ltti; le vote du bloc anglo- amerieair, au Conscil de securite, quel qu'il soit, ne &aurait rien y changer. Le gene'ral McNAUGHTON (Canada) (trad1tit de l'anglais): Je ne voudrais dire que guelqlles mots au sujet du projet de resobtion de l'URSS qtli figure au document 5'/1259. A mon avis, le Conseil de securite devrait s'en ten:Lr strictement aux termes de la resolution 195 (Ill) adopte~ par I'A~sembtee generale le 12 decembre 1948 poltr determiner queUe mestlrc iI doit prendre a cet egard. Anx termes de ceUe resolution, le GOl1vernement qlli a etccrce sous les auspices de le. Commission temporaire des Nations Unies en Coree est le selll gotlvemement legitime de cc pays; par consequcnt, le COl1seil de sccurite ne peut, amon avis, fain~ droit a une demande d'ad- mission presentee par un autre grOllpe de per- son11es de Cl'. meme pays, mellle si elles peuvcnt pretendre y avoir constitue '-In gouverne1l1eltt qui exerce l'autorite. General McNAumrToN (Canada): I only wish to make a very brief statement on the draft reso- lution which has been placed before tbis Council hy the representative of the USSR as contained in document S/1259. To my mind, the terms of the resolu.tion which was adopted by the General Assembly on .12 December 1948 [195(llI)l shOUld, ~e slne:l!,. regarded .by .this Security CounCil 111 determltlmg our aetlon 111 this matter. This resohttion establishes that the Government which came into existence under the auspices of the Uniled Nations Temporary Commission on Korea is the only law£1ll Government in that country,. and, .as a c?nseqttence, the Security COllOC!lIS not, 111 my View, properly in a position to, entertai~ an application from any other grollp at persons tu that country, even if they may make claim to exercise <It'.thority as a government. For this reason, I believe that the resolution which is sllhmitted to us by the represent:1tive of the USSR shotild not be accepted by this Security Council, ami I would say on behalf of the Cana- (\ian dele~ilti01: Lhat if it is put to the vote, I shall v?te agalllst It for the reason which I have gl\'en. C'est pOlll"quoi j'estime que le projet de n~so­ 111tioll propose par le representant de l'URSS ne c1evrait pas etre accepte par le Conseil de secul'ite et je declare au nom de la delegation du Canada que si ectte resolution est mise aux voix, je voterai contre, pour les raisons que jc viens d'indiquer. The PREStoENT: As there is no other speaker, I shall Imt the draft resolution of the USSR' [S/1259J to the vote. Le PRESTOENT (tradltit de I'onglais): Auctlll autre rnembre ne desirant prendre la parole, je mets <lUX: voix le projet de resolution presente par I'Union des Republiques sodalistes sovietiqt1cs [S/12591 . Il est proccde au vote Lt ·m.ain levee. Against: Canada, China, Cuba, Egypt, France, Norw<l.)', United Kingdom, United States c·f America. Abstaining .. Argentina, The draft N!UIlution was rejiJcted by 8 vote.. to 2, with one abstentl:on, Mr. MALTK (Union of Soviet Socialist Repnb- lies) (translrtted from Rus.-ian): J wish to m.ake a brief statement all behalf of the USSR dele- gation, By rejeding the USSR delegation's resolt1tion, the Anglo-Americ:.n bloc :n the Security Council has committed a new act of injustice against one of the oldest peoples of Asia, which hds recently freed itself horn 40 ye;Jrs of colonial slavery and which has every legitimate reason and right to be a:~cepted into the family of the United Nations. This people has created its own free and inde- pendent Democratic People's Repuhlic of Korea al'ld its own national Government. It has applied for admission to membership in the United Na- tions, Follcwing the lend of the Unit~(l Stales delegation, 11Owever, the Anglo-American bloc in tl~e Security Ccnncil has l'ejected the tppliea- tion of the legitimate Korean Government for the <.tdmissioll of the Democratic People's Reptlblic of Korea to membership in the United Nations. At th!"; same time, this bloc hilS resorted to illega! manoeuvres in an effort to drag into the United Nations the puppet Government set up against the will of ~he people lly the United States occu- pation authorities in Sout!,: Korea, That Was the second act of injustice. The first nct of injustice towards the Korean people and its Democratic People';; Republic wu:; committed under pressure from the Anglo-Ameri- can bloc at the General Assembly in Paris, wlen the representatives of this Rel~l1blic were den:cd admission to the Assembly and were dep;ived of the opportunity to st~te thl"ir opinioll, express their point of view, and give a true pictnre of the situation in Korea. The aim of the United Stales it: estanlishlng Ull illegal regime in South Korea is to obstruct the unification of tlle K()f('an ~eople, to prolong the partition of Kore[\. into a r:orthern and southern zone, 'and thus to create suitable con- ditions for the contimlec OCCllpiltirm of South Korea by the United States authorities and for l{eeping its inhabit<:.nts in a state of colonial serfdom. Then: iE 110 doubt that the peoples of Korea, :lIld, indeed, the peoples cf Asia, who seek free- dom and independer.ce despite alt ahsta....!es and opposition, wil1 condemn this colonial policy, Mr. AI.YAREZ (ellba) (translated front Span. t~h): I have heard the USSR representative re- peatedly i,;se tne expression "Anglo-American h.lock", As news of the Seeuri:y COLlncil's activi- tIes app~ars 111 the Press of the whole world, aml as the inhabitants of my country might be sur- Vo.lent contre: Canada, Chine, Cuba, Egypte, Jfranc~, Norvege, Rayaullle-Uni, Etats-Unis c:.'Ameriqne. S'abstiant: Argentine. Par 8 voi..: contre 2, avec une,lbste'ittion, le pro- jet de resolution c.!t rejcte. M. MALll( (Union des Republiques socialistes- SQvietiql1es) (tmdltit dli nlssc;: Je de:;ire faire une courtc dechration all nom de la delegation de l'URS." Rrj r/'"jetant :1" proiet de resolution presente [Jar :na uelegation. le bloc anglo- l3.l11ericain du Conseil de securite s'eEt rendu cou- pable d'ulle notlvel1e injustice a l'egard de 1"Jn des peuples les plus anciens de l'Asie, qui s'est libere recefilment <1'tue servitude coloniale vieille de 40 ans cl qui a tOU3 le::; druit,::; d'etre admis daus la £:twille des Nations Unies, Ce peuple a cree :a Republiqt1e c1emoctatiqt1e ;:lOplIlaire de CDn~e libre et il1depencl.ante, et a etabli un Gouvernement natio~laL Il a adresse sa dem,uuJe d'adlllission it l'Otganisntion des Na- :ions Unies. Ccpendant. le bloc: anglo-ameriO<lin du COl1seil de secl\rite, suivant la delegation des Etats-Uois d'Amerique, a repousse la dcmande !Jresentee par le Gouvcrnement legitime de COl'ee en vt:e de l'admissior. de la Republique democra- tique populairc de Coree dans l'Organisation des NaticflS Uoies. En meme temps, ce bloc s'est li"fe ades manceuvres illegales pour tenter d'introdu:re dans t'Organisation des Kations Unies le regime fantQche que les forces d'occt:pation des Etats- Uni::; d'AJllerique ant et:thli en Con~e dtl Slid, contrairerrent it la volonte du peuple careen. C'est la le cleuxicme acte d'injustice commis cantre la Coree. La preniel'e injustice a:'egard dlt ?euple coreen et de la Republiql1c dcmocratiqLle populaire <le. cc pays a ete commise a Pans, lors(]ue l'Asscmblee gene;alc, ~ous la pression au blDc anglo-americ;.in, a refuse £lUX representants de la Rept1blique d'€tre adrnis al'Assemblee, de se £:lire entendrc, d'e.xposer leurs VllC5 et de presenter un tableau veridique de la situation qui existe en Coree, En cl'eant en Caree dL: Sud un regim~ illegal, les TItats-Unis d'Amedque visent it empecher le pellplc coreen de renliser 50n \:nite et ar:erpetuer la division de :a Coree e~l deux parties, l'une au nord et l'autre all sud du pays; ils cherchent ainsi a creel' des conditions qui permettraient nux autorites americaines de con:inller l'occupation de la Cor~e du Sud et de maintcnir la. population de cc territoire sous 1111 re!:"ime d'esclava~e colonial. Le pet~ple de- la Coree qui, l11algre tOllS les obstacles et to;Jtes les enlnlVes, aspire avec tous les llulres peuples de l'Asie a la. liberte et al'inde- pcncancej satlfa :::ans aucun doutc <::ondamner cette politique coloniale. M, ALvAREz (Cuba) (traduit de l'eJpagltl]l): J'ai entendll le representant de I'Union des Repu- bliques socialistes sovietiques rncnticnner amaintcs reprises l'expression "bIDC anglo-a:nericain"; or, la press<: du llloncle entier puhie n!',~ informations sur res debats duo ConsdI de secudte, C'est pour- We have clearly explained the reasons for our vote and we further state we do not belong to a bloc of any kind. We do not know whether the USSR representative will feel that he has special reaso:Js for ref'eating the expression, but, in any case, we should be grateful if he would clarify it. The PRl.:SlDl':NT: In view of the lateness of the hour, I imagine that the members of the Security Council would prefer to defer c<lnsideration of item 3 of OUT agenda until onr next meeting, whicll is to be held tomorrow at 3 p.m. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'angltri;s); Comme il se fait tard, je suppose que les membres du Conseil de securite prefereront reporter I'examen du point 3 de l'ordre du jour ala prochaine seance qui doit avair lieu demain, a15 heures, La seance est levee a17 h. 40.