S/PV.43 Security Council

As President of the Security Council, 1 regret that the first communication made in the name of the Iranîan Govemment and sent from New York was apparently so worded that it did not contain any definite instructions from the Iranian Government and that the communication was concradicted very shortly afterwards. Mr. STETTINIUS (United States of America): May 1; :first of all, this morning, offer a warm welcome to our colleague Mr. Padilla Nervo of Mexico, with whom many of us at this table had a very satisfactory relationship in London last August and during this past winter. 1 am very happy he has joined us on the Council. l should like to. suggest that the Council again defer action on the Iranian matter. My Govemment does not feel that the Council has sufficient basis for taking definite action today. In view of the conflicting reports relating to the curr-ent troubled situation in Iran, and in view of the record of the USSR-Iranian difficulties and differences, my Govemment would 1 should Iike to pause a moment to read from the telegram submitted to us by the representative of Iran, in which it is stated that "The telegraphic reports are to the effect that no trace whatever. of USSR troops, equipment or means of transport was founœ' in certain localities "and that according to trustworthy local people, who were questioned in aU these places, USSR troops evacuateà Azerbaijan 6 May". 1 wish to point out that the statement has been made relative to only eight communities in the western partof Azerbaijan by trustworthy local people. In the view of my Govemmen~ that is not· conClusive evidence, not the fuiaI, definite, specific evidence that we felt was be submitted to the Council at the time that the COllUcil last deferred this Iranian matter. Moreover; we must bear in mind that the presence of USSR troops on Iranian territory hasbeen .only one of the s'ubjects which have been .a matter of dispute between the USSR and Iranian Govemments. For these reasons' my Govemment eamestly believes that the Security Council should postpone further consideration of the matter at this time. 1 wish to add that my Govemment, as weIl known, has followed .developments in the Ir~an matter with the greatest concem and has recentIy been giving careful consideration to requesting, upon its own initiative, an investigation by the Council of the situation in northem Iran in order to assist the Council to determine whether the continuance of the situation' there is Iikely to endanger international peace and security. 1 do not want to suggest at this time, however, that the Council take action along this line. 1 do wish to emphasize the feeling of my Goverilment that it is most,,desirable that the Council continue to remain seized of the Iranian matter, indicating thereby its cOlltinuing concem in this potentially dangerous and as yet unclarified situation. "See thirtieth meeting. 'See fortieth meeting. If the Teheran Government or its officiais are unable to exert authority in the province and are deprived of complete 'liberty of movement, it means, of course, that they have' been , taken to see and investigate only those places which the rebel authorities wished them to see. Therefore, 1 regard this report as being încomplete. 1 should Iike to put certain questions to eIucidate further the attitude of the Govern-' ment in Teheran. For instance, first, what proportion of "'the territory formerly occupied by USSR troops is represented by the places named in this latest report? Secondly, as 1 have already indicated, 1 should like to know whether this report satisfies the Government in Teheran that the evacuation of the USSR troops is complete. Thirdly, 1 should like to know what sieps the commission took to satisfy itself and to verify. the report that equipment and meaÎls of transport hadin effect been removed. Fourthly, was any investigation made into reports, which 1 am bound to say are very current, that USSR soldiers. have been left behind in Azerbaijan in civilian c1othes? That Particular point is not mentioned in the report which we now have before us. If 1 seem rather meticulous inmy examination of' tbis question and the report now presented, 1 would explain it by reference to qui, savoir si des solda:ts en dans d,ms me 1 think it.was on 15 April that the representative of Iran sent us a letter in which he explicitly stated that the Governmentoflran withdrew its complaint from the Security Council. 1 considerit very unfortunate that the proposaI submitted then by Mr. Bonnet, who was at that time the representative of France,that the question he closed in view of the fact that an agreement had been reach~d and the question withdrawn by the Gove1'IJlIlent of Iran, wasnot accepted;2, 1 shouldIike to remind the Council that at the time 1 warned it that the acceptance of a doctrine whereby once an agreementis reached aState is denied the right. towithdraw a cômplaint from ~he SecurityCouncilwas not oilly against the letter mc} spirit of the Charter, but was aIso a very· dangerollsdoctrine from the· politicaI point of view .because iitstead.of helping to clarify issues and toarrive at a· settlement, it created disagreement. 1 think that this statement of mine has been substantiated, since in 1 See tbirty-sixth meeting. du bien ment lettre Je non, stan~, or whether the letter which was presented on 20 May by the Iranian representative implies a change in the position expressed in his lette!' of 15 April declaring that the compWnt was withdrawn. Therefore 1 should like fust of aU to know whether or not there is any Iranian complaint befùre us. 1 quite agree with the regrets expressed by the Pl,'esident as to the contents of the Iranian representative's letter of 20 May, which contradicted statements sent to us two days or a clay later by the same represe.ntative in wmch he quotes the statement made by bis Prime, Minister. The latter's statement which we have in the letter now before us seems to me in fact ta close the question. The question as to whether the Iranian Government is able to send its agents to Azerbaijan or not is entirely an internaI matter. We read in the papers that there are alleged to be sorne conflicts between the provincial and the central Governments, but unless we have evidence to the contrary, these conflicts must be considered an internal affair of Iran. However, in the la'St letter we read that the commission of the centraI Government of Teheran was able to proceed to Azerbaijan and make inquiries in Tabriz and its suJ:)\~rbs, in Marand, Julfa, Khoy, Salmas, Maku, Riz- , .aiyeh and Mitanduab. 1 have looked at the map and in spite of what has been saidabout these places being in the western areas of Azerbaijari on1y,they cover the whole province, and as 1 see from the map which 1 will submit to the President, sorne are even in the easternmost ro;eas. Thus, in my est.imation, the report actually covers the whole province of souligné tant message que le un la me iranien est en mesure d'envGyef·des représentants en rieure. elltre ment contraire, irité"ieure que Téhér.an des Marand, zaiyeh bien en la d'ailleurs, taines orientales. porte avait Az~rbaijan, a point about which there had been sorne questi".,. ou de Je faire Ministre, l'origine, considérer l'affaire The letteror telegram from the Prime Minister of Iran closes with the statt:ment that USSR troops evacuated Azerbaijan on 6 May. 1 think that the only course open to us is to ~ccept thisstatèment made by .the Prime MinlSter of Iran, whose Government was the same Government which originally.brought the .complaint before us, and to consider the question closed. Ml". VAN KLEFFENS (Netherlands): It seems ta me that we are diScussing interests which l'anglais): very closely affect Iran. 1 rcad in the Charter touchent that "any Member of the United Nations which je is not a member of the Security Council may l'Organisation participate, without vote, in the discussion of de sécurité, any question brought before tp.e Security Counla cil whenever the latter ooIisiders that the interests 1seil of that Membel: are specially affected". It seems que You may recalI that the. fust complaint received from Iran was submitted ta the Council in Londonl and related to interference by USSR elements in the affairs of that country. This matter was deaIt with by the Couneil, which adopted a resolution2 agreed ta both by the Government submitting the complaint and by the Government which was the subject of the complaint, and the matter was left for further negotiation. The date of 2 March, before which the USSR troops should have been evacuated under the Treaty of 1942, was not observed, and the Couneil, when it met for the fust time here in New York, w~ seized of a dispute on this point. The dispute was twofold: first Iran complained of the non-evacuatic:a., and seconclly of interference. These two matters have been kept distinct ever since. You will recalI that when the Council requested the Government of the USSR ~o complete its evacuation before 6 May, the Iranian representative said that as he hoped the matter would be satisfactorily solved he would not at that time press the other sicle of the complaint, namely interference.3 In the letter of 20 May there is ample mention of interference. Does thi'! mean that the question of the interference by USSR au$orities in parts of Iran is before the Council again? 1 should like ta ask that question of the Iranian representative. If so, 1 think that the statementin bis letter of 20 May is vague~ It certainly does not enable me to form a good opinion as to what the interference amounts !o at the moment. 1 think the Council should' receive further elucidation on that point, and 1 therefore beg ta move that the :representative of Iran be requested ta resume bis seat at this table to· participate without vote in the discussion.

Does the proposaI just made by the Netherlands representative call for any comments? The proposaI wu adopted. 3 See thirtieth meeting. Mr. ALA (Iran): To my mind, the first complaint which was brought before the Council in London is still on the agenda of the Security Council. In the communication 1 made on 15 April, in which 1 gave an account of the various communications 1had received from my Government, 1 stated that, relying upon the definite promises which had been given by the USSR Ambassador in Teheran, the Prime Minister of Iran agreed to withdraw that complaint which he had in mind and which we aIl had in mind: the complaint concerning the evacuation of Iran. •militaires We had two complaints, as the representative of the Netherlands very c1early stated. The first one concerned interference in the internai affairs of Iran; that is to say, the fact that USSR officiais, agents and military authorities prevented the centra:! Government from sending its security farces te the nor~~ of Iran, te Azerbaija..'1, in order to restore order and put down any disturbances. That was a direct interference which was brought before the Security Council, and there were case'l of other interf(;rcnce which aIso took place. Then, as the representative of the Netherlands has so cIearly stated, the problems were referred by the Council to direct negotiations. Those direct negotiations took place in Moscow and failed to yield any results. They reached a stalemate. Meanwhile, the date for the evacuation of. Iran in accordance with the Treaty of 1942, 2 March, came and passed without the USSR troops being evacuated. Our Prime Minister, who was then in Moscow, as 1 told the Council at a previous meeting, protested and asked that the solemn pledges which had been given to Iran should be respected. Thus the discussions concerning the first matter which had been brought before the Council ended without any result having been obtained. TIlen came the question of the evacu<ition, which was the second matter, stressed in my letter of 18 March to the President of the Council, which mentioned at the same time the first question of interference since this had not ceased. Therefore, to my mind, that letter of 15 April concerned the question of the evacuation, on which definite and reiterated assurances had been given by the USSR Ambassador in Teheran to the Prime Minister, which prompted the latter to ask the Council to withdraw it from the agenda. . Then came 6 May, thecÏate on which the evacuation should have taken place. On that This telegram which the Prime Minister has now addressed to me, and which 1 have sent to the Council, is inconclusive. It does not clearly point out: that all the troops from the whole of Azerbaijan have been withdrawn. Now 1should like to refer to what the President said. He expressed regret that 1 addressed a letter on 20 May and then, immediately. after, addressed another letter which he says contradicted the first one. 1 must remind the President that was bound, by the time limit of 20 May which had been fixed by the Council, to submit a report by that date giving the information that was then at my disposai. 1 have truthfully represented the situation. 1 have not sought to hide anything. have put the r<:aI facts 'before the Council. 1 have always sought to tell the truth and 1 have based my statements on the latest official information which 1received from my Government. The next day 1 re!:eived another communication, and felt bound to communicate it to the Couneil. . Thatis wn.at 1 rlid, .~nd 1 thin1c 1 acted quite correctIy.

thank the representative of Iran for bis explanations. . e> Mr. LANGE (Poland): 1should like to join the representative of the Netherlands in putting a few questions to the representative of Iran. We have before us a letter from the representative'of Iran sent on 15 April, and it is with regard to this letter that 1should like to put my first question. The letter says that the Iranian Government has complete confidence in the word and pledge of the Government of the USSR and, for this reason, \vithdraws its complaint from the Security Council. 1 should very much appreciate an answer as to whether the Iranian Government has lost.this confidence in the pledge of the Government of the USSR and has actuaI evidençe that tneUSSRtr60psna.ve not been Withdrawn irôm the whole territory of Iran; and aIso as to whether the withdrawal of thecomplaint from the Security Council stands, or whetherwe have to understand the situation to be that the Government of Iran, having changed its mind, is presenting us again .with~a complaint. 1 .should very much appreciate a straight "Yes" or "No" answer. Secondly: Does the 90vernment of Iran agree with the statement which was inade in this Coun- èil. by the representative of the United States of America? 1 quote Mr. Byrnes, who said at the thirtieth meeting: "Mter aU, the withdrawal of troops without condition is the only sane method of.disposing of any question of interference in the government of Iran." Ordoes the Government ce dire confiance qu'il entre se Conseil tous les renseignements dont un que signalé quête, encore télégramme, indiquant diés laient Le que 6 catégoriquement l'Azerbaïdjan; il n'est pas concluant, On the question of the evacuation, 1 have placed aIl the facts that were at my disposal before the Council. At every step 1 have reported what was communicated to me by Tehera,n. On: 20 May.1 said that a commission of investigation had been sent, but thte results of the investigation had not yet come to hand. 1received a te1egram the next day which 1 then communicated to the Counci!. This stated that according to certain telegrams sentby the members of the commissicn investigations had been made hl various localit]es which were mentioned, and that on the testimOi\Y of tnIstworthy local people USSR troops had withdrawn on 6 May. Now, that te1egram does not tell me categoricaIly and definite1y that there has been a complete evacuation of the whole of Azerbaijan. It is, 1 must repeat, inconclusive. The Iranian- Government does not wish to doubt the word of the Government of the USSR, en but it has to be able to find out for itself in a satisma5s factory manner what the real conditions are, and nière frankly, the Iranian Government has no author- 1parler franc, le Gouvernement iranien ity in Azerbaijan. That north-western -province autorité of Iran, which forms an integral part of Iran, is nord-ouest not under the authority Li the Iranian Govempays, ment at the present time. The Council cannot Gouvernement ignore this, It has had aIl the facts before it. It l'ignorer. knows exactly what the situation is. The present exactement situation and our present difficulties stem from sont and are the consequence of the ptevious lnterrieures qui ference in our internal affairs. . As the Council will remember, a handiul of ,misguided men came into Azerbaijan and fomented a violent uprising against the central Government. At that time the USSR troops were aIl over the whole of the north of Iran, including AZerbaijan. Under tl. )rotectionohhese troops, these insurgents - 1 l.d.l1 only caIl them insurgents - were able to move about freely and ta d'individus égarés ont Gouvernement de l'URSS se nord baïdjan: insurgés - It was under the encouragement and protection of the USSR troops stationed in Azerbaijan that these insurgents were able ta assert themselves, and they are gaining strength all the time, and now we are faced with a hostile army within Iran which does not permit the regular army of Iran ta penetrate into Azerbaijan, an integral part of Iran. This army has been created under the auspices of the USSR forces and the USSR agents stationed in Azerbaijan. It has been drilled by them; it has been equipped by them; and from what 1 have heard its men even wear USSR uniforms. Does not that constitute interierence in the internal affairs of Iran? Therefore, 1say that we certainly want ta have the greatest confidence in our neighbour, the USSR, and no sane !ranian would dream of not wishing the friendliest relations with our nortii.ern neighbour, but we do want our independence, our integrity, and our sovereignty to be respected. 1cannot tell the Council now while 1am sittin.g at this table that interference in our internaI affairs in Azerbaijan has ceased because, as 1have tcId you, we have no authority in that region and .the Iranian Government is not able to send its own officiaIs there. It lias tried very hard to àrrive at an arrangement with representatives of Azerbaijan in Teheran. The Price Minister went to very great lengths, to the very limits of what is permitted, in order to satisfy their demands, but he found their demands so great that if he accepted them he would be consenting practically to the creation of an independent State. They wanted their own arroy, their own commanders, their own finances. He went as far as he could go, and then the ~egotiationsbroke down. Towards the end of the negotiations, the Ambassador of the USSR came in as a friendly mediator, but instead ofusing bis moral influence, as our Prime Minister expected, to persuade Mr. Pishavari.to agree to the seven points which the Prime Minister had laid down, and which were all hecould concede within the :limits'of the constitution and the laws of Iran, the Ambassador of the USSE. rather tried to urge Mr. Ghavam ta agree ta what the insurgents wanted. That, to my mind, is another interference in the internal affairs of Iran. 1 think the fust question was: Have we lost confidence? 1 have said, "No, we have not lost confidence." And we are cbntinuing to hope. The Prime Minister has the best will in the world and is very desirous to arrive at some satisfactory conclusion on aIl these points. But as regards the l'emoval of the item from the agenda, the matter of the evacuation which ought ta have taken place on 2 March, and then on 6 May - and 1 j Now, the second question having ta do with Ml'. Byrnes' statement. Ml'. LangewiIl remember that when the matter came up on 4 April and the resolution was passed 1 made my reservations concerning te"le at::itude of the Iranian Govemment. 1 said that as the Security Council was satisfied by the assurances which had been given by the Ambassador of the USSR that the troops would be withdrawn at the latest by 6 May, and that as this was an unconditional withdrawal, my Govcrnment wou.ld agree not ta press at that time the two matters in dispute which it had presented, that is, the question of the interference in internal affairs and the question of the withdrawal of tmops. 1 further stated that my Government was prepared tù wait until 6 May to see what would happen. 1 ~ade my reservations at that time. It is true that Ml'. Byrnes said that the question of evacuation was a fundamental matter, and it seemed and it was hoped that.with the evacuation there would be a cessation of interference. Unfortunate1y, that has not happened. la pelle problème formulé vernement mait bassadeur ditionnel, de l'URSS. ment sur l'examen des deux points litigieux, l'ingérence mon 6 mai pour voir réserves est damental de pas produit. " I mande si le à s'Ïn1miscer dans les affaires intérieures de l'Iran. Je naissance sance, à l'heure actuelle. pation - alliées certaine mais troupes troupes Britanniques intérieures ingérence l'Azerbaïdjan. On the third auestion as to whether the Government of the ÛSSR i~ the oruy Power interfering in the internal affairs of Iran, 1 must say in all frankness that 1 know of no interference from any other Power at this time. During the war, with the occupation - not the occupation, but the presence - of Allied forces in our territory, naturally there was interference in our internal affairs, but since the evacuation of Iran the United Kingdom'troops, and those of the United States as far as 1 know, never interfered in our internai affairs. The United Kingdom is not now interfering in our internaI affairs. 1 do not know of any interference except that to which 1 have just referred regarding the situation in Azerbaijan. ~ Then comes the fourth question: Are all these places in the western part of Azerbaijan? Reading these names, it seems to me that they are. They are not in the eastern part but more in the western part of Azerbaijan. And do they cover ail the important centres? The part that is mentioned would not cover even half of Azerbaijan, and the USSR troops were not ail stationed in the cities and towns. They were outside; they were encamped in the villages and not only in the main -centres. So 1 cannot say that this last telegram would imply that the whole of Azerbaijan had been visited or that the whole of that province had been evacuated. savoir situées baïdjan. oui; prennent-elles localités mentionnées qui baïdjan. cantonnaient campaient villages importantes. de baïdjan quête évacué. Mt. LANGE (Poland): 1 want -to thank the representative of Iran for his answers and would ask him to bear with me for a few minutes sa that Je répondu. Secondly, if 1 understood the representative of Iran correctIy, he says he is not quite sure whethèr USSR troops have withdrawn from the whole of Azerbaijan. The last words of the telegram from the Prime Minister which he trammitted ta us last evening say that, "USSR troops evacuated Azerbaijan on 6 May." What 1 want to know is, shall we believe the statement of the Prime Minister of Iran and accept it as true or not? Thirdly, 1 want to repeat a question to which 1 do not think 1 got quite a clear answer. Perhaps it WaB' my faultfoî P':Itting tao many questioIis at once. The question is this: Does the withdrawal of the complaint made in the letter from the representative of, Iran on 15 April 40ld or shall we interpret bis action now as presenting us with a.new complaint? The PRESIDENT (translated trom French): The representatîves of the United States and of' Australia have asked for the floor. Do they wish to speak immediately, or would'they rather wait until the representative of Iran has replied ta the questions put ta him? Mr. STETTINIUS (United States of America): 1 do not wish ta interrupt the exchange of views between the representative of Poland and the represent,ative of Iran. 1 should like tei make it clear, however, that having heard Mr. Ala's remarks, 1 believe more than .ever that it would be a mistake ta drop the case this morning, and 1 wouldcertain:ly suggesttharthecasebedeferred until a later meeting to be called by the President.

1 should like ta ask the representative 9f Australia the same question. Mr. HASLuCK (Austrilia): 1 merely wish to make one observation on the course that the questioning is takiug. Some of the questions, and 1 l'efer Iiot solely to those. of the representative of Poland butalso toprevious questions, seem to have been directed towards trying to establish whether. or not 'the Iranian Government· main..; tains acomplaint before this Cquneil. 1 want· to recaU to the minds of the inembersof thisCouncil that,.a1though ·the information on that point is Mr. ALA' (Iran): Regarding the first point raised by the representanve of Poland concerning the sending of the commission, he asked how it came about that a commission was sent if the Government .of Iran could not send representatives or officiaIs.to Azerbaijan. That·is v'eryeasy to explain. A commission is a temporary mission sent out presumably. with the approval of the people in Tabriz, and they also probably agreed on the persans composing the commission. & regards a telescope or even a microscope, Ida not know anything about that; but 1 know they went byair, and that they went in an aeroplane belong-. ing to the USSR. With reference ta the question of retaining the matter on the agenda of the Council, 1 was going to say exactly what the representative of Australia has Just remarked, namely that t4e retention of this point on the agenda was made by a decision of the.Council, and the Council asked us certain. questions which we have answered. We consider Now with regard to the question of the passage in the telegram. If it is read more carefully will be seenthat thè Prime Minister says, "The telegraphic reports are to the effect that no trace whatever of USSR troops, equipment or roeans of transport was found, and that according to trustworthy local people, who were questioned in all these places, USSR troops evacuated Azerbaijan on 6 May." It must be read in its entire content, not as a separate part of the text. Mr. PADILLA NERva (Mexico): 1 should like to avail myself of this opportunity, on the first occasion that 1 am here in this Council, ta express my thanks for the remarks made by my distinguished friend, the representative of the United States. 1 am very honoured and satisfied to be able to resume myJunctions in this Council and to give my full co-operation to the work of this Council in my own name and as a representative of Mexico. 1 should like ta suggest that this discussion be adjourned to give the Council time to examine several questions which, in my opinion, are very important, questions which could be considered as a. new development after the ,discussion we have heard and the remarks and questions that have been put to the representative of Iran. 1 beliève that there are two or three important aspects which should be considered by the members of the Council before a decision is reached on the substance of the matter. Should the present discussion be deferred to some specifie date and the Iranianquestion retainedon the agenda or should a decision on the substance of the matter be arrived at now? One of the questions we have to keep inmind is this: Is the COUJlcil Willing to retain the question on the agenda on the grounds that there is interference in the internaI affairs of Iran or on the grounds that the Counôl is not satisfied with the information furnished by the representative of Iran in l'esponse to the Council's request made at the fortieth meeting? Or is it the intention of the Council to retain the question on the agenda on both these grounds? 1 believe that we should aIso bear in mind that the information given to us may not be satisfactory, as the representative of Iranstated in his letter of 20 May when he said that "it is doubtful ~hat an adequate investigation can be conducted Another question on which 1 do not intend to . give any opinion at the moment, but which 1 me think should be considered by this Cou: .cil, is this. devrait If at a later stage the members of this Council are l'avenir, satisfied that no USSR troops are in any part of . ·certitude qu'il Iran, are we still going ta take into consideration en the other aspect of the problem, that is to say, aspect whether there is interference or a certain situaingérence tion in Iran that has developed as a consequence résulte of some direct interference made some time before? 1 believe the answers to these questions are very important, and therefore 1 propose that we should have some time to reHect on and study this situation, and that we should adjcum the discussion for the time being. haute pour situation le comme la J'avais gramme nous était ment solution de pris

Speaking not as President but as the representative of France, 1sliould like to submit a few observations. In coming here, 1 thought that the telegram we had received, which seemed to be in extremely clear language, was calculated to bring the Iraman question substantlally nearer ta a satisfactory solution. 1 would remind you that at a recent· discussion during the. foitieth meeting the Security Council took the following action: "The Security Council, "Having considered the statèment made by the Iranian Government in its preliminary report of 6 May, submitted in compliance with the resolutian of 4 April 1946, that it was not able as of 6 May to state whether the withdrawal of aIl USSR troops from the whole of Iran had been completed, "Resolves "T0 deler further proceedings on the Iranian mattler in order that the Government of Iran may have time in which ta ascertain through its vernement la l'URSS iranienne, This moming's discussion was intrJduœd by remarks made by the .representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, whofelt that in spite of everything it would be desirable to have further information. For that reason they are asking that the question should remain on the agenda. . In view of the Iranian Govemment's telegram, which, whilst not giving all the desirable information, contains at least .some substantial facts, 1 wonder if we could not agree on a compromise soll!tion, namely, ~o leave. the. question on .the agenda for a short time on' the understanding that if within a certain period (say eight or ten days) no information· has .been received which would conflict with that aIready in our possession, the question will automatically be dropped from the agenda. This is my proposal and 1 trust that the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom in particwar will he gooè enough to consider it. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): 1 should like to recallthat the matter immediately before the Council is the question of the evacuation of USSR troops from Iran, a matter on which.one day the Council will have to take a definite decision. lthink that one of the elements necessary toenable the Council to take a decision onthat point would be a dec1àration from the Govefiiiilent15f Irari. thatit is satisfied that·the evacuationis complete. . . 1 do not find that declaration in this telegram. There is nothing to show that the Govemment of Iran issatisfied as to that facto It gives ns information. It may beinteresting information. It may be. important ·information. But it is at secondhandand indeed even third-hand,and cornes f~om "trustworthy .local. people" through ·the membersof the' commission, and we have no expression of view on the part of tlle Government in Teheran as to the real situation now existing with regard to the withdrawaI of troops. 1 really do not think we can regard this as final. What 1 ask ~that we should adjourn the matter now·in the hope that we shalI get this aspect elucidated M. (traduit observations sentaat Le ment dresse à lui puisque c'est lui la cussion l'ajourner amples Mr. STET'üWUS (United States of America: · 1leave that entirely to the President's,discretion. M. (trflduit ment

1t · has been pointed out to me that in view of, the order in which the proposaIs were submitted, 1 should first invite discussion on t.h.e Mexican representative's proposal. I should like to ask him the same question, name1y, whether he is proposing adjournment to a spocific date or not. Le étant ont été faites,·je la Mexique. sentant d'un Mr. PADILLO NERva (Mexico): My idea was to adjourn the discussion of this question for one or two days to.study the aspects that I mentioned, and ta take a decision then as to whether the question sh6uld be kept on the agenda and, if so, for how long a time, whethel" sine die or until a given date. M. l'anglais): sion l'intervalle, aspects si nous maintenons si oui, pour combien de temps, une

Are there any comments on the proposaI as now expressed? Le proposition Mr. HASLUCK (Australia): '1 am wondering what would be the exact effect of an adjournment of only a day or two. Assuming we met tomorrow or on Friday, would we merely repeat the'CliscJ1Ssion which we have had today, or would we be in a position to ex~mine the rnerits of the case? It seems to me that the main reason which M. l'anglais) pratique Si nous nous réunissons demain ou vendredi, nous contenterons-nous s'est me~ure semble nous prendre pas pour vanité, ces· renseignements distinctive cours n'abandonnons ~as been advanced to date for deferring discus- ~lOn. and for not reaching a decision at this meefmg 18 that we are not in possession of information and that we need information before we can use~ully proceed. And without vainglory, I think 1nught saythat the call for information has been one of the characteristics of any remark any Australian representative has ever made at this 'Council. And we still stand by that position. Mr. LANGE (Poland): 1 agree with the representative of Australia that an adjournrnent of one or two days would l'eaUy serve no useful purpose. 1think the problemhas been. very dearly defined by the representative of the United Kingdom, who said that the question is simply to ascertain whether or not the USSR troops have left Iran. We have before' us statements from the representative of Iran which indude statements by the Prime Minist.;:r of that country. According to my interpretation of these statements the USSR troops have been withdrawn, because the only doubtful part was the province of Azerbaijan, and according to the last statement, signed by the Prime Minister, the USSR troops evac~ated Azerbaij~ on 6 May. 1 consider this as an autlloritative statement and 1 should object to calling it a second· or third-hand source of information. Mter aU, it is signed by the Prime Minister of Iran, the Head of the Governrnent. But since it seerns that sorne member:s of the Council are not quite convinced that these statements are sufficiently c1ear, 1think the simplest way out of the situation is to send te1egram to the Govennnent of Iran asking it if it is satisfied that USSR troops have been withdrawn? But 1 insist that we have to ask for a straight ''Yes" or "No" answer because otherwise we shaU again carry on in the same disorder we al~ in now. And 1 suggest that the President of , the Council be commissioned by us to formulate such a te1egram, and from ms eârlier appearances before this Council, 1 know he will do it with clarity and precisicn. .. Mi". VAN' KLFFFENS (Netherlands): 1 think the position of the Government of Iranis difficult enough as it is and that we should not make it· more difficult by askiug pointed que~":ons such as the onejust propqse.1 by th~ representative of Poland. May 1 prove that we adjourn the discussion of the Iranian question until a date in the near future, the Council.to be called together at the request ofapy member. ~" The PRESIDENT (translated tram French): We mustdefinitely reach a decision, and therefore 1 amgoing to ask the Council's views first on the question of the adjoumment and then on the question of sending a te1egram..As regards the

If the representative of the United States agrees se with the Netherlands representative's proposaI, 1 sentant propose to take a vote on an adjournment for a aux short period on the understanding that the Counchaine, cil will be convened at the request of any of its demande members. Mr. STETTINIUS (United States of America): 1support the motion of the representative of the ~Tetherlands. . du Mr. LANGE (Poland): 1 have one question: Does the acceptance of this motion ll:lply that J'ai we do not send a telegram to the Government of motion Iran and ask it to give us a clear answer as to de whether it is satisfied that the USSR troops are 'lui withdrawil or not? 1 think we should endeavour' est ta bring the matter to a close. ou efforcer Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): With regard to the idea of sending a telegram to the Government of Iran, 1 am indined to agree with what the representative of the Netherlands said, that perhaps it.is not necessary for us to put what may be embarrassing questions directly ta the Government of Iran, but 1 would observe that we would have the advantage of the presence at this tahle of the representative of Iran. 1 assume that he will report our proceedings to his Govemment and it willsee that at any rate one of the elements necessary for us to decide this question finally would be a plain declaration of its view as to whether the evacuation had been completed or not. If we adjourned, therefore, for a few days, we may weIl hope that in the course of that time we shalI get something definite, some- . thing further from the Government of Iran, and therefore 1 would support the proposaI. de représentant Go.uvernement sante. l'avantage de Gouvernement pourra qui serait complète Si nous nous ajournons pouvons espérer aurons mentaires conditions, tant

We shaII now vote on the Polish representative's proposaI that the Cq,l!'1l,lcilshould send a tel~gram .ta the Ir~mian Government.