S/PV.4394 Security Council

I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Germany and Sweden, in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council’s agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure.

I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the Permanent Observer of Switzerland, in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council’s agenda. In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council’s prior consultations, if I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation to the Permanent Observer of Switzerland to the United Nations to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote.

In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council’s prior consultations and in the absence of objection, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Ibrahima Fall, Assistant-Secretary- General for Political Affairs. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations. The Council will hear briefings from the Permanent Observer of Switzerland and the Permanent Representatives of Germany and Sweden. I would wish to remind Council members of the understanding reached in our prior consultations that the format of this morning’s meeting is not intended to set any general precedent. As there is no list of speakers for this meeting, I would invite Council members who wish to speak or to ask questions to so indicate to the Secretariat as from now. In accordance with the decision taken earlier in the meeting, I give the floor to the Permanent Observer of Switzerland to the United Nations.

First, I wish to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the Council presidency and I wish to thank you for convening today’s meeting and giving me the floor. Over the past decade, sanctions have become an important tool in the hands of the United Nations Security Council and the number of sanctions regimes has increased significantly. Switzerland, as a non- Member State of the United Nations, applies United Nations sanctions on an autonomous basis. It thus underlines its commitment to the promotion of international peace and security and its solidarity with the international community. My Government shares the concern that sanctions should be made more effective while minimizing the negative humanitarian impact on civilian populations, as well as the adverse economic effects on third States, that comprehensive sanctions regimes have. The concept of targeted sanctions addresses this concern. They are designed to focus on the individuals and groups responsible for the policies condemned by the international community, while ideally leaving other parts of the population and international trade relations unaffected. In this context, targeted financial sanctions are one of the issues that have received particular attention. As a major financial centre, Switzerland has significant expertise and know-how regarding financial transactions. In cooperation with the United Nations Secretariat, my Government organized a series of international expert meetings in Interlaken and New York to examine in an informal and technical setting the feasibility of targeted financial sanctions. This so- called Interlaken Process provided a forum for dialogue among representatives from national Governments and regional bodies, central bank authorities, the United Nations Secretariat, the private banking sector and academia. I wish to thank all those States and individual experts who participated actively in this process. Let me also express my thanks to the Secretary-General, who has encouraged this process, and to the members of the Secretariat, for both their participation and valuable support. The Interlaken process focused on the practical and technical aspects involved in designing effective financial sanctions and ensuring their successful implementation. The key results so far have been as follows: First, a better understanding of the specific technical requirements of targeted financial sanctions and the preconditions necessary for them to be effective. Secondly, language modules and definitions that can serve as building blocks for future Security Council resolutions. Such standardized language elements would enhance a more uniform drafting and implementation of resolutions in this area, as well as unambiguous interpretation. Thirdly, the identification of the basic legal and administrative requirements for national implementation of financial sanctions. This includes the development of elements for a national legal framework. Finally, discussions also addressed the need for the United Nations to develop greater capabilities for administering and monitoring financial sanctions, including the provision of guidance and technical assistance to help States implement sanctions on a consistent basis. With the aim of further developing and operationalizing the substantive work accomplished in the Interlaken process, the Swiss Government mandated a university institute, the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, to undertake additional research. The outcome, which we are presenting to the Security Council today, and which will be distributed to all Missions, is a handbook that reflects the results of the Interlaken process and the valuable contributions made by the participants. We hope it will prove useful to those responsible for drafting future resolutions imposing targeted financial sanctions and for implementing them here and in capitals. Let me add that, of course, one of the essential preconditions to making targeted financial sanctions more effective is to be able to define the target clearly. And that also implies the effective identification of the actual economic beneficiary of assets. This is a key element also for the fight against money laundering and for tracking and blocking more effectively financial flows used for terrorist acts, as demanded by Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). Switzerland, which has strict procedures for identifying not only bank customers, but also the actual economic beneficiaries of funds, has recently made concrete proposals in this regard in the Financial Action Task Force Against Money Laundering, a body established by the G-7. These proposals would leader to higher international standards by improving the effectiveness of know-your-customer rules. (spoke in French) Targeted financial sanctions are likely to be most effective when they are considered as part of a broader coordinated political and diplomatic strategy. Strategic choices regarding the types of sanctions to be imposed and their modalities depend on a thorough analysis of the vulnerabilities of the targeted country or actors, as well as on the political will necessary to enforce such measures and assess their effects. Targeted sanctions focusing on financial measures are not sufficient alone to force Governments or other actors to alter their behaviour and comply with their obligations, but they represent an important tool that can be used in combination with other measures. In this respect, we were glad to see the German Government continue these reflections with the Bonn- Berlin process, which explored other forms of targeted sanctions, and we welcome of the Swedish Government’s intention to cover new sanctions issues. In conclusion, the Interlaken process has shown that the conceptual, technical and practical elements required to make targeted financial sanctions effective are available. It is now primarily a matter of mustering the necessary political will at the international and national levels to translate this into reality.

I thank you, Sir, for convening this meeting. Like the previous speaker, the Permanent Observer of Switzerland, I am grateful for the opportunity to present the results of the so-called Bonn-Berlin process. Today’s session is another proof of the high importance attached to the question of sanctions by the Security Council. I am sure that we all share the same goals in this respect: minimizing the unintended effects of sanctions on the civilian population of the targeted country and on third countries. The results of both the Interlaken and the Bonn-Berlin processes are designed to help achieving these goals by introducing targeted or smart sanctions — in our case with respect to arms embargoes and travel bans. Let me briefly recall the history. In 1998, Germany declared its preparedness, in close coordination with the United Nations Secretariat, to continue the process initiated successfully by Switzerland. Building on the experience gained by our Swiss colleagues on financial sanctions, we decided to involve civil society from the outset. Thus, we asked the Bonn International Center for Conversion, an independent organization with considerable expertise in the field of sanctions, to organize a series of conferences, seminars and workshops on the issues of arms embargoes and travel bans. The participants were diplomats and United Nations personnel, as well as experts from academia, non-governmental organizations and the private sector. In hindsight, this proved to be the right mix to tackle a difficult task, namely, to support the sanctions makers in the Security Council with model drafting language for resolutions and checklists for their better implementation. The two types of sanctions — arms embargoes and travel restrictions — were obviously not selected at random. Rather, they were identified because they help to focus the unavoidable coercive element of any sanctions regime on those most responsible for a threat to peace and security. Dealing with both issues at the same time seemed sufficiently concrete and politically desirable. I would like to submit today a handbook containing the practical results of the Bonn-Berlin process. It will be sent to all United Nations Member States and sets out model Security Council resolutions on arms embargoes and travel-related sanctions, accompanied by an extensive commentary. It also reflects, in two other documents, national implementation of those types of sanctions. Finally, a last report makes suggestions for the monitoring and enforcement of arms embargoes. Let me stress here that the Bonn-Berlin process and the handbook before the Council were construed not as representing the official view of the German federal Government, but rather as the result of the careful deliberations and discussions of various experts from different backgrounds. At the same time, however, my Government widely agrees with the outcome of the process. We are convinced that the documentation before the Council can be very helpful in conceiving efficient sanctions regimes and in minimizing unintended negative impacts on civilian populations and third States. The primary aim of the United Nations is to maintain peace and security in the world. In order to maintain this goal, the Charter, in its Chapter VII, mandates the Security Council to impose certain coercive measures. The experience of recent years and months has shown that sanctions are and will remain an important tool of the Council in this context. All Member States are aware of the fact that imposing sanctions is a difficult step to take. All Council members, elected or non-elected, carry heavy responsibility in this regard. When the Council members decide to apply sanctions, they speak on behalf of the whole membership of the United Nations. Generally speaking, sanctions should not be a punishment; rather, they should lead to compliance with the United Nations Charter. Amongst the States Members of the United Nations, there is consensus that a sanctions regime should neither hit the innocent civilian population nor affect non-target nations. It should focus on those responsible for the threat to international peace and security. Through sanctions, these people should become aware that the community of nations does not tolerate behaviour hostile to international peace and security, acting across borders or at home. In order to achieve this aim, thorough deliberations and careful drafting of resolutions are of the utmost importance. I hope that members of the Council will agree that, in the past, not every sanctions regime has been successful in this regard. The only measure for success is a halt to unacceptable behaviour. Some sanctions have not led to compliance with the United Nations Charter; others have had disproportionately negative side effects on civilian populations and/or on third States and, in the worst cases, a combination of both. Even the most equilibrated and fine-tuned sanctions still depend on a prognosis of the aggressor’s behaviour. If a tool proves ineffective, it should be our obligation to reconsider and re-evaluate whether a change would serve better. A flexible response to continued outrageous misbehaviour is a sign not of resignation, but of a smarter use of the legal tools. My country is of the opinion that only targeted sanctions can achieve their goals. “Targeted” means concentrated on crucial issues, such as finances or arms, and focused on a specific group; it also means regular reconsideration of the sanctions regime and its consequences. The model resolutions included in the handbook that is before members should be regarded as a valuable point of reference that merits close consideration by the Council. We would hope that those texts will help Council members to draft or re- draft targeted sanctions to improve their efficiency. I cannot conclude without mentioning that even the most precise sanctions resolutions can fail if some Member States lack the political will to implement them. The recommendations set out in our documentation are aimed at achieving a better level of national implementation. But it remains a question of commitment and willingness on the part of every single Member State to lead coercive measures to success: to compliance with the United Nations Charter by the State concerned. Let me express my thanks to the Secretariat for its helpful role and its active participation. I would like also to thank the numerous Members of the United Nations that have participated in the process and enriched it. Finally, let me thank you again, Mr. President, for this opportunity to share the results of the Bonn-Berlin process with the Security Council.

I now have the pleasure of giving the floor to the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Mr. Hans Dahlgren.

This Security Council meeting on the use of sanctions is of direct relevance to the challenges that are on the minds of all of us these days. The search for effective tools in addressing threats to international peace and security is more urgent and more important than ever before. It can therefore only be right now to focus on the search for improved ways and means to deal with, and to contain, the sources of aggression and conflict. Sanctions represent an important part of the Security Council’s set of instruments for carrying out its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. If sanctions can be improved and be made more effective, it will also strengthen the authority of the Council. It will make it easier for this body not only to say what is right, but also to do what is right. The aim of sanctions, traditionally, has been to maximize their effects on the will, the capacity and the behaviour of decision makers — to the extent that they will change their behaviour — while minimizing the damage to others, such as innocent civilians. That is the theory. In practice, the story is often different. We have seen how Council decisions, even those with a substantial economic impact on the target, have led to little or no change in behaviour. We have seen too many sanctions being violated or circumvented. We have seen numerous side-effects, whereby vulnerable groups have been the hardest hit. It is no wonder that there is a sense of frustration here. I felt that frustration myself some years ago as Chairperson of the sanctions Committee on Sierra Leone. I remember standing there on the border between that country and Guinea and seeing how easy it was to break the oil embargo just by taking another road through the jungle. So one question has been whether one can make these sanctions more effective and at the same time more humane. And that question has in turn triggered the search for smart sanctions. That search has been taken a good bit further through the excellent initiatives of the Governments of Switzerland and of Germany. What Ambassador Staehelin and Ambassador Kastrup have just reported are, to our mind, important contributions to the improvement of financial sanctions, travel restrictions and arms embargoes. That goes both for the theory behind them and for their practical applications. Yet we have also learned through the activities in Interlaken, in Bonn and in Berlin that much more can be done to develop the concept and the practice of smart sanctions. And I am pleased to announce that the Government of Sweden is now ready to continue the important work already done by Switzerland and Germany. Through what we will call the Stockholm process, we will invite a broad range of Government representatives, non-governmental organizations, regional organizations, academics and, of course, United Nations actors to participate in the endeavour. This is a project that will be carried out for a period of one year, with a concluding seminar next autumn. One particular focus of that process will be on the implementation and monitoring of targeted sanctions, and on suggesting improvements, building on what has already been done in the processes so far. That includes the issue of how to achieve the more coherent and effective enactment of Security Council resolutions into national legislation. It includes how the United Nations and its Member States can better ensure truly effective monitoring of compliance and enforcement: there is much lacking there still. We will also look at how Member States can best be assisted in implementing sanctions regimes, and at what technical and financial support might be called for. Another theme will be more conceptual. If it were possible to find a clearer understanding within the international community of both the scope and the limitations of sanctions, then it might also be easier in practice to pursue a more effective sanctions policy. We shall look at how that might be done. My Government looks forward to an active interchange with other Member States and with other actors in this process. We hope that it can help us all to move on in the pursuit of making sanctions a more effective tool for the Security Council to use. It is to you, Mr. President, and to your 14 colleagues that we all look to make use of these tools, especially in the light of new and emerging threats. There is no better illustration of how well that can be done than the Council’s historic decision to adopt, by consensus, resolution 1373 (2001).

Before inviting members of the Council to put questions or make observations, I shall now give the floor to the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr. Ibrahima Fall, to give a briefing. Mr. Fall: Mandatory measures imposed under Article 41 in Chapter VII of the Charter are today, more than ever, an important tool available to the Security Council in seeking to maintain or restore international peace and security. However, concerns have been expressed over the negative effects that comprehensive sanctions regimes can have on civilian populations and on neighbouring and other affected States. Difficulties in implementing Article 50 of the Charter have also reinforced the need to consider possible improvement of the sanctions instrument. In his reports to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization and in his report on Africa, the Secretary- General has underlined the need for a mechanism that renders sanctions a less blunt and a more effective instrument. Efforts towards developing the concept of smart sanctions, which seek to pressure regimes rather than peoples and thus reduce humanitarian costs, are therefore to be welcomed. Sanctions need continued refining to strengthen their effectiveness and to ease any possible negative impact, thus consolidating support by the international community. Member States, intergovernmental and non- governmental organizations and academic experts, with substantive support from the Secretariat, have been making efforts to contribute to attaining that objective. It should be noted that the recent sanctions measures imposed by the Security Council have been targeted. The series of Interlaken expert seminars hosted by Switzerland in 1998 and 1999, with substantive support from the Secretariat, on targeting Security Council financial sanctions explored the basis for cooperation among Member States, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and experts in the field, as well as the design and application of targeted Security Council financial sanctions against decision- making elites. After having heard what the representative of Switzerland has just said, it is not necessary to come back to the outcome of the Interlaken expert seminar, except to note that the monitoring mechanism concerning the sanctions against UNITA is currently attempting to put some of the Interlaken recommendations into practice by tracing the financial transactions of UNITA. I am also hopeful that the knowledge gained at Interlaken can be successfully tapped and put to use within the context of the recently established Security Council Committee on Counter-Terrorism. The Bonn-Berlin process, which took place from 1999 to 2000, reviewed the successes and shortcomings of arms embargoes and travel bans. Here also, I will shorten my statement, after what the representative of Germany has just said about the results of the Bonn- Berlin process. Many of the suggestions made there and discussed in the Security Council Working Group on General Issues on Sanctions have subsequently contributed to the improvement of sanctions resolutions. Work, such as that which took place in Interlaken and Berlin, should continue on smart sanctions, and I would particularly like to welcome the fact that Sweden will be taking on this role of building on the previous work, this time in the context of expert seminars on, among other things, the monitoring and implementation of Security Council sanctions. Here also, I do not need to elaborate further after what the representative of Sweden had to say. If sanctions are to continue to be a useful tool at the Security Council’s disposal in the maintenance of international peace and security, a constructive dialogue on their implementation and monitoring must take place. Pragmatic solutions must be found to the difficulties of monitoring sanctions. This task is the primary responsibility of Member States, but many of them lack the capacity to monitor their implementation and require assistance in carrying out this responsibility. Such assistance could be provided to interested Member States by a duly augmented sanctions secretariat and by competent regional organizations. The Security Council can encourage State compliance by continuing to devote greater attention to mitigating the negative effects of sanctions measures on civilian populations and third States. Providing support and inducements for neighbouring States could also greatly enhance the potential effectiveness of sanctions. The Security Council might also consider taking steps to assist, upon request, Member States in developing greater legal authority and administrative capacity for implementing Council sanctions. Indeed, many Member States do not have the necessary legal and institutional capacity for implementing these measures. To assist them, the United Nations could develop examples of model legislation, as was done during the Interlaken process, that could enable interested Member States to make the necessary adjustments in their domestic laws and regulations to permit compliance with United Nations sanctions. The Security Council has addressed this issue of constructive dialogue and effective support through the establishment of expert panels and mechanisms, and some sanctions committees are looking into improving cooperation with regional and international organizations involved in the implementation of Security Council sanctions. A number of Member States advocate the establishment of a permanent sanctions monitoring mechanism to ensure better targeting and implementation of smart sanctions and to bring information on non-cooperation and non- compliance to the Council’s attention. This framework might allow more systematic follow-up for those who violate sanctions or who do not cooperate with sanctions committees, as well as provide a point of contact between the Security Council and other international and regional organizations dealing with sanctions, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and Interpol. What is needed most is better coordination between all parties involved in the implementation of sanctions regimes. Sanctions committees have recently been establishing strong cooperation with international and regional organizations such as ICAO and Interpol, that are involved in the implementation of Council sanctions regimes. The Chairmen of the Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone sanctions committees are also discussing ways of increasing cooperation among their committees with a view to holding a joint meeting. The Security Council might also make more frequent use of humanitarian assessments before the imposition of sanctions, and continue to monitor the humanitarian impact once sanctions have been imposed, as has recently been the case with Afghanistan and Liberia. The use of mandatory sanctions is, as pointed out by the Secretary-General, “a valuable tool available to the Security Council, permitting the United Nations to bring pressure to bear without recourse to the use of force”. The Secretary-General has also stressed the importance of continuing “efforts to integrate smarter, more targeted sanctions into an overall preventive strategy”. Targeted sanctions can have important deterrent and preventative roles, and I urge members to consider the use of sanctions in this context in the future. Security Council sanctions can also be seen as a calculated response by the international community to emerging breaches of international law. By way of conclusion, I feel it would be remiss of me not to reiterate that an enhanced substantive support to the various sanctions committees, and a more effective administration of sanctions regimes by the Secretariat, would require the commitment of adequate resources. Within the modest resources available, the Secretariat is doing its utmost to support the work of the sanctions committees. Developing more effective Security Council sanctions policies, however, will require specialized expertise and analytical capacity of staff supporting those Committees. Such technical expertise and enhanced analytical capacity would enable the Secretariat to manage a credible monitoring system in cooperation with Member States and regional organizations and to assess the effectiveness of the sanctions measures. Technical expertise is urgently needed in the Secretariat in such areas as military technology, illegal arms trafficking, illicit diamonds, customs regulations and investigations, and international finance and asset management. Greater availability of legal expertise is also needed. In short, making sanctions smarter will not be enough. We must also provide the necessary means, and the will, for them to succeed.

I thank Assistant Secretary- General Fall for his briefing.

Today’s debate is extremely important. I would first like to thank Ambassadors Jenö Staehelin and Dieter Kastrup for their statements. I also congratulate them on the quality, detail and thoroughness of the results achieved in the Interlaken and Bonn-Berlin processes. The way in which they were carried out was remarkable and exemplary on several counts. We would like, through State Secretary Hans Dahlgren, to thank Sweden for its readiness to continue this work. In the first place, this approach was remarkable because it was grounded in a willingness to cooperate and undertake a constructive exchange between members and non-members of the Security Council, on the one hand, and the United Nations and civil society, on the other. In fact, the booklet before us owes a great deal to the enlightened contribution of academics, researchers, private sector professionals, non- governmental organizations and research institutes. We warmly thank all of them. The processes took place in an exemplary way within the context of a targeted approach to sanctions. It should be recalled that sanctions are meaningless unless they are part of a comprehensive political strategy. We must never lose sight of their objectives. The better they are targeted, the greater the pressure exerted where needed, all the while reducing the risk of negative and undesired effects on innocent civilian populations and third States. The best possible implementation will ensure the maximum effect. When we are all committed to an unprecedented effort to combat terrorism, in a struggle that has, in particular, taken the form of economic sanctions against Osama bin Laden and his associates, no one can doubt that the results of the Interlaken process will make a valuable and immediately useful contribution. Moreover, what can be said of arms embargoes if not that their effective implementation is a matter of urgency, for if they were truly effective they would make it possible to end wars because of a lack of arms supplies. The booklet that has just been submitted to us is of excellent quality and has come at the right time. Allow me to take this opportunity to focus on two specific points that have emerged from the conclusions submitted to us — conclusions that, as the Council is aware, are of particular importance to the French delegation. First, the Security Council must conclude its normative work on sanctions and adopt the conclusions of the Working Group on General Issues on Sanctions as quickly as possible. That group has done excellent work under the chairmanship of Ambassador Chowdhury of Bangladesh. We have every confidence in the ability of Ambassador Richard Ryan to lead our work to success under his presidency. In addition, it seems to us that, as our friend Ibrahima Fall has just emphasized, the time has come to set up, under the authority and control of the Security Council and its sanctions committees, a unified, permanent instrument to monitor sanctions and the traffic in raw materials in armed conflicts. We need a unified instrument. Two years of experience with the various ad hoc panels of experts created by the Council to monitor sanctions against UNITA, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Afghanistan, or to inquire into the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, have demonstrated that the problems and the kinds of traffic are the same from one regional crisis to the next. The networks and those responsible for violating sanctions and illicit trafficking are frequently the same, and in each case the same causes produce the same effects. For example, the trafficker Victor Bout appears in every report. The panels of experts have worked in the same countries, with the same institutions, and have asked the same sorts of questions. Some experts have even had to modify their itineraries in order to avoid arriving at the same time, or just after, their colleagues from another panel. The membership of the various panels has been remarkably similar for a very simple reason: the Council and its sanctions committees always need the same kind of expertise which is lacking in the Secretariat. It is also the same expertise that we need to monitor sanctions and to control and investigate the role in armed conflicts of illicit trafficking in raw materials. This is why we systematically find in one committee after another an expert on diamonds, an expert on arms trafficking and yet another expert on financial networks. The mechanism that we propose would be an instrument available to both the Council and the sanctions committees under its authority. It would be entrusted with specific tasks and called on by the Council to draft separate reports on the various questions being examined. It would be a matter not of mixing everything up, but, on the contrary, of gaining the full benefit of the synergies that exist between the different subjects and crises, which, although not the same, are linked and interconnected, particularly on the African continent. A considerable amount of frequently overlapping data has been compiled by the various panels. It is time to use them and deal with them in a more cohesive way. In short, it is time for the Council to be more systematic and to set up an instrument that would avoid any duplication of panels with similar competencies. We would waste less energy, time and money. The second reason for setting up this new instrument is that we also need a permanent monitoring instrument. Particularly with regard to the sanctions against UNITA, experience has shown that it is imperative to ensure continuity of monitoring for as long as sanctions are in place. Otherwise, a disastrous political signal would be sent. That was our experience last week in our debate on UNITA and the requests made by the Government of Angola. Sanctions must, of course, be limited in duration, but they should be effectively implemented for as long as they are in place. To accomplish that, their implementation must be the subject of both monitoring and assistance. In that regard, creating a permanent and unified monitoring instrument would, as Mr. Fall emphasized, make it possible to establish long-term working relations with regional and technical organizations, such as the Organization of African Unity, the Economic Community of West African States, the Southern African Development Community, Interpol, the World Customs Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization, whose cooperation is indispensable in order to ensure respect for sanctions. France took note last week, in the course of our consultations on the extension of the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA, of the interest of the membership of the Council in our ideas and of the readiness of all to engage in a serious discussion, with a view to reaching consensus as speedily as possible on the issue. In this spirit, my delegation intends to submit an updated proposal and to call for discussions at the expert level, with a view to reaching a unanimous decision of the Council. We believe that a consensus-based approach is indispensable in dealing with this important issue.

We are very grateful to you, Mr. President, for convening this important meeting of the Security Council on a question to which we attach the utmost importance. We would like also to thank Assistant Secretary-General Ibrahima Fall for his very informative briefing. We are glad that the topic of general issues of sanctions is now being considered in an open format and is no longer relegated to the place it had occupied in the last several months — as a footnote to the Council’s monthly schedule of work. We hope that from now on the Council will be resuming its involvement in this important issue. I should like to thank the representatives of Germany, Sweden and Switzerland for their initiative in calling for this discussion and for the introduction of the “end results” booklets of the Bonn-Berlin and Interlaken processes in such a lucid and user-friendly form. I hope that the reports of the Security Council will one day become as analytical and useful as the booklets that were circulated today. These very important initiatives have become a significant part of a general process that has brought about visible improvements in Security Council policy in the area of sanctions in recent years. I hope that the Council will carefully consider the results of the Interlaken and Bonn-Berlin processes and apply them in its work. I said, “I hope”, Mr. President, because the Council’s record in this area is less than perfect. I cannot but express my deep regret at the prolonged foot-dragging in the consideration of the draft outcome of the Working Group on sanctions, which, among other things, contains specific references to the Interlaken and Bonn-Berlin processes. Whatever our individual and national attitudes towards the results achieved by the Group, we cannot simply disregard its work and the draft outcome presented by the Chairman. We realize that it is practically impossible to achieve full consensus on all issues related to the question of sanctions, and compromises had to be worked out among delegations. I believe that the results we have achieved thus far are the best we can do under the circumstances. Sooner or later, we should make our final decision on the report, and I think that it is high time for the Council to do so. I cannot say that my delegation is entirely happy with the provisions of the draft recommendations. Many of our proposals, unfortunately, were not reflected in the paper. The same can be said about many other delegations. While we realize that we cannot get everything we want, at the same time, we consider that it would be inappropriate and counterproductive to throw away what has been achieved during all these months of negotiations. Finally, I think that we cannot seriously consider sanctions-related issues without reviewing ways to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations in this area. The establishment within the United Nations of an office or unit to monitor targeted sanctions as well as the illicit exploitation and trafficking of high-value commodities in armed conflict should be considered an important part not only of the sanctions policy as such, but also of the Council’s conflict-prevention strategy in general.

I still have a large number of speakers on my list. With the concurrence of members of the Council, I shall suspend the meeting now. The Council will, of course, need to resume discussion of this item at a later date.