S/PV.4394Resumption1 Security Council

Miss Durrant (Jamaica): My delegation wishes to thank you, Mr. President, for organizing this meeting. We wish, in particular, to thank the Permanent Representative of Germany, Ambassador Kastrup, for presenting the report entitled Design and Implementation of Arms Embargoes and Travel and Aviation Related Sanctions. We would also like to thank the Permanent Observer of the Swiss Confederation, Ambassador Staehelin, for presenting the report entitled Targeted Financial Sanctions: A Manaalfor Design and Implementation. We were also pleased to welcome to the Council the State Secretary of Sweden, Ambassador Hans Dahlgren, and we wish to thank him for his Government's expressed willingness to continue both processes. In the same vein, we wish to express our appreciation to Assistant Secretary-General Ibrahima Fall for his timely suggestions for follow-up actions by the Council and the Secretariat. When the Council debated this matter in April of last year, my delegation pointed out that, if the Security Council is to maintain sanctions as a credible instrument, we must take concrete steps to ensure that we get sanctions right rather than impose flawed regimes that may be either ineffective or unenforceable. Indeed, over the past few years the international community has paid increasing attention to the issue of sanctions imposed by the Security Council. The commentary has often been negative, primarily because of the negative humanitarian effects of comprehensive sanctions on civilian populations. In part as a response to those criticisms, and also in recognition that comprehensive sanctions are no longer a tool acceptable to many of the members of the Council, there has been a shift by the Council in its approach to the design of sanctions to targeting measures at the individual or individuals responsible for the behaviour or policies condemned by the international community, and at those elites or groups who directly benefit from such behaviour or policies. Indeed, a broad consensus has emerged in support of sanctions that are designed to affect only those individuals whose behaviour we wish to change. Furthermore, the Council now recognizes the need to consider fully the possible negative impact of sanctions on the humanitarian condition of civilian populations and on the economies of third countries. We must now ensure that sanctions regimes have no such unintended effects. Recent sanctions on Ethiopia and Eritrea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Taliban regime of Afghanistan have all been targeted. In designing those sanctions the Council borrowed extensively from the preliminary work of the Bonn- Berlin and Interlaken processes, as well as from the work of its own Working Group on General Issues on Sanctions, which was established last April. Implementation and monitoring of those sanctions have also followed, to a large extent, the recommendations contained in these two reports. It is a testament to the value of the recommendations contained therein that even before they were finalized, the Council had already begun to pay heed to them. The two reports that are the results of the Bonn- Berlin and Interlaken processes provide us with a set of modalities to not only design but also to implement and monitor targeted sanctions covering most of the regimes on arms embargoes, travel and aviation-related sanctions, and financial sanctions. My delegation is pleased to have had the opportunity to participate in both meetings of the processes. We fully appreciate the efforts of the Governments of Germany and of the Swiss Confederation in providing the resources for these two important undertakings on targeted sanctions, and for spearheading a dialogue with civil society and academic experts. We believe that the manuals - if fully utilized by the Security Council, the Secretariat and Member States - will help to make the use of sanctions a more effective tool of the Council in enforcing its decisions. It will also allow for a more speedy and efficient response as the need arises. My delegation has also subscribed to the premise that for sanctions to be effective, they must be implemented within a prescribed time frame and be subject to close monitoring and periodic review in order to ensure their continued usefulness and validity, as well as to evaluate their impact on vulnerable populations and neighbouring States. However, while the Council has begun to design sanctions accordingly, their design, implementation and monitoring have not yet been streamlined. It is in this context that the results of the Interlaken and Bonn-Berlin processes can provide useful tools for the Security Council, if we use the guidelines provided in the manuals. We therefore hope that the procedures and recommendations - particularly those on arms embargoes, travel and aviation-related sanctions - will be carefully studied by all the sanctions committees, because arms embargoes are perhaps the most common measure used by the Security Council in seeking to maintain international peace and security. They are also one of the most frequently violated of sanctions regimes. As we have seen from past experiences, arms embargoes affect a number of actors in the financing, sale and trafficking in arms. In the same vein, we believe that the recommendations on financial sanctions could also be very usefully applied in the implementation resolution 1373 (2001). In order to derive maximum benefit from the recommendations, it is important for the Council to adopt a new and comprehensive approach, and to be consistent in its implementation and monitoring. It will be recalled that the Working Group established by the Council under the chairmanship of Ambassador Anwarul Chowdhury of Bangladesh to develop general recommendations on how to improve the effectiveness of United Nations sanctions was asked to examine a number of issues, including the working methods of sanctions committees and inter-committee coordination; the capacity of the United Nations Secretariat to effectively monitor the implementation of sanctions; coordination within the United Nations system and coordination with regional and other international organizations; the design of sanctions resolutions, including the conditions for the maintaining or lifting of sanctions; assessment reports and the ongoing evaluation of sanctions; monitoring and enforcement; the unintended impact of sanctions; humanitarian exemptions; targeted sanctions; and assisting Member States in implementing sanctions. The Working Group undertook an extensive review over a period of several months. Its work benefited from inputs by experts on all of the issues covered. However, the report of the Group has been before the Council for several months, but so far we have failed to take action on it. The observations and recommendations contained in the reports that came out of the Bonn-Berlin and Interlaken processes have again drawn the Council's attention to the imperative that the Council must streamline its work on the design, implementation and monitoring of sanctions. Our debate highlights the importance of the Council's acting on the Working Group's report and adopting, without delay, the recommendations contained therein. The Bonn-Berlin and Interlaken processes, taken together with the recommendations the Council now has before it, will provide the necessary tools to ensure better implementation of the Council's current and future sanctions measures. We must also build on the useful work done by the monitoring mechanisms and panels of experts. We also look forward to the follow- up to be carried out by the Government of Sweden to, inter alia, examine how to achieve more coherent and effective enactment of Security Council resolutions in national legislation. In conclusion, I wish to recall that - as we alluded to in our statement last April - in addition to reform and policy-making, improving the effectiveness of sanctions requires the enhancement of internal institutional mechanisms within the United Nations system, including the development of a more effective monitoring capacity within the Secretariat, adequate staffing, streamlining of procedures and the harmonization of the guidelines and working methods of the sanctions committees, visits by representatives of the sanctions committees, technical expertise and support, and improved cooperation with regional organizations, non-governmental organizations and international financial institutions. We believe that the Security Council must work with the General Assembly to ensure that the Secretariat receives the necessary budgetary support in order to assist the work of the Council's committees on sanctions. I wish to thank you again, Mr. President, for organizing this meeting and for allowing us to exchange views on this important matter, which assists the Council in carrying out its mandate for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Mr. Harrison (United Kingdom): May I begin by saying that my delegation is very grateful to the Governments of Germany and of Switzerland for their leadership and their initiative in taking forward the Bonn-Berlin and the Interlaken processes, and we are also grateful for what the Swedish Government is doing in taking forward the process from now on. We think that these processes have enabled experts and others, working in a very wide forum, to produce some very valuable results. We particularly welcome the guidance that has been produced on best practice in drafting United Nations sanctions resolutions and on drafting legislation to implement sanctions at the national level. What we will need to do now is to build on the valuable work that has already been done. We believe that the focus of that work should now shift to national implementation and enforcement of sanctions. In this context, we think that there may be useful lessons to be learned from the Group of Eight's Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF). This Task Force has produced guidelines on the actions that countries should take to trace funds and to scrutinize clients, and other ways to counteract money laundering. We wonder whether perhaps the next step in the Interlaken process could be to draw up similar guidelines for enforcing financial sanctions and for benchmarking the steps that countries have taken to enforce sanctions against those guidelines. The next logical step after that is the enforcement of sanctions. We agree that one way to improve enforcement would be to improve the United Nations capacity by creating a small, permanent monitoring unit, complemented by a roster of experts and by the Secretariat, which would be charged by the Security Council with monitoring and reporting on the effectiveness of sanctions regimes. My delegation looks forward to early progress on this idea. Finally, and speaking on behalf of the Chairman of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, I can say that my delegation will study what positive lessons can be drawn from the Bonn-Berlin and the Interlaken processes for the work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee established under resolution 1373 (2001). In particular f and this was a point that Assistant Secretary-General Fall made in our first discussion last Monday - there may be some relevance for the establishment of models for legislative and executive action for States to follow when they identify gaps in the structures they have established to implement resolution 1373 (2001).

Mr. Kolby (Norway): The recommendations that have emerged from the Interlaken and Bonn-Berlin processes on financial sanctions, arms embargoes and travel- and aviation-related sanctions are useful and provide valuable tools for the Security Council in its work. Norway supports these initiatives and recommendations to improve the effectiveness of sanctions. Targeted sanctions exercise pressure on the decision-makers and are designed to avoid negative consequences for the general population. Targeting individuals responsible for policies that threaten international peace and security would increase the effectiveness of sanctions. In designing sanctions, attention should be given to ruling elites, rebel movements and terrorists and the means of financing their actions. The objective should be to change or restrict their behaviour and to shield the civilian population from excessive suffering. The manual emerging from the Interlaken process will be a valuable tool in the efforts to employ standardized terms that conform to definitions used in the financial sector when imposing financial sanctions. Moreover, a system to enhance international cooperation to prevent illegal financial transactions should be developed. In this respect, resolution 1373 (2001), adopted recently, on threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, and the subsequent work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee provide us with a model for implementation which could be further explored for other sanctions regimes. With the manuals now put forward by the Swiss and German Governments, we have reached a milestone in regard to drafting model resolutions. We are grateful for the initiative taken by the Swiss and German Governments and for the support they have given. We must now focus on the implementation of these recommendations. We will, on our part, work to ensure that the models are reflected in future sanctions regimes or when amending existing regimes. Sanctions can be effective only if they are respected and properly implemented at the national level. The manuals give useful practical guidance related to the legal and administrative requirements for implementation. The effective implementation of targeted sanctions will be a major challenge in the time ahead. In our view, there is a huge potential for increased efficiency through more concerted efforts, both globally and regionally. Again, we would in this respect highlight the follow-up of resolution 1373 (2001) through the establishment of the Counter- Terrorism Committee. We would also like to underline the need for adequate technical and financial assistance to United Nations members in implementing provisions of the resolution. The proposal to establish a permanent unit for targeted sanctions is a welcome one and deserves further discussion in the Security Council. A sanctions unit could provide valuable support for the relevant sanctions committees in the fulfilment of their tasks. Furthermore, it would enable us to accumulate institutional experience drawn from the different sanctions regimes. Lastly, we would like to thank Sweden for its initiative to follow up the Interlaken and the Bonn- Berlin processes. Norway looks forward to working with Sweden and others to further enhance sanctions regimes in order for the United Nations to effectively exercise its responsibility for international peace and security while minimizing the suffering of the civilian population.

Mr. Koonjul (Mauritius): My delegation greatly appreciates the work carried out by the Government of Switzerland and the Government of Germany through the Interlaken process and the Bonn-Berlin process on the important subject of sanctions. We commend their efforts, contributions and suggestions for developing and enhancing targeted sanctions regimes which form part of the paraphernalia for exercising pressure on States that act in defiance of international law. Both reports are the fruit of extensive and intensive consultations and appear to have taken on board the views of a large number of players. The reports will be a useful guidance to members of the Security Council and the Secretariat in formulating future sanctions regimes. Since its inception, the United Nations has made use of sanctions for diverse purposes - to stop territorial aggression, restore democracy and the rule of law, promote human rights, fight terrorism and contain the proliferation of arms, among others. Until 1990, the United Nations hardly ever used sanctions to achieve the desired goals. It is only since the last decade of the twentieth century that sanctions have been frequently imposed. In the 1990s, the Security Council imposed sanctions in 12 instances, and some of them are still in effect. The question that needs to be asked is whether the sanctions regimes have really worked - whether they have achieved the desired results. In most cases, we find that they have not. Studies carried out on the success of sanctions regimes have revealed that the overall success rate has been paltry. If we were to probe deeply into the reasons for their failure, we would come to the following conclusions. First, the continuing defiance of and failure to observe sanctions gradually erodes their effectiveness. Secondly, there is an absence of clear objectives and targets in the sanctions regimes. Thirdly, extraneous interpretations of sanctions regimes are made by those desirous of giving wider meaning to sanctions. Fourthly, a large number of States lack the capacity - legal, administrative and financial - to enforce sanctions. Fifthly, the economic and humanitarian costs outweigh the benefits ofthe sanctions regimes. In order for a sanctions regime to be effective and enforceable, it is important that we set realistic and achievable benchmarks. Firstly, sanctions should be established and applied only in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. Hence, there is a need for more explicit, unambiguous and results- oriented resolutions. Secondly, sanctions cannot be imposed on a State in perpetuity, and must be clearly targeted. There must be a sunset clause, based on either results or time frame. Thirdly, sanctions should be imposed incrementally, with a gradual ratcheting up of the pressure. Fourthly, sanctions should be reviewed and assessed regularly by the Council. Fifthly, sanctions regimes should, at all costs, avoid collateral damage, especially to innocent civilians. It is no surprise that, throughout the history of sanctions regimes, very little heed has been paid to the effects of sanctions on the innocent civilians of the targeted State and on neighbouring States. It is imperative that such a negative impact be removed, or at least minimized. The only way to achieve that goal is to consider the imposition of targeted or smart sanctions regimes wherever appropriate, in the form of financial or arms embargoes or of travel and aviation- related sanctions. We believe that sanctions regimes can and must be crafted in ways that shield civilians from unnecessary harm. Indeed, the two processes address these concerns at great length. The standardization of language and terminology for use by the Security Council in all future sanctions regimes, as proposed in both booklets, is therefore most welcome. This would provide a pragmatic and realistic answer to the questions raised by many States and concerned parties about inconsistencies and inadequacies and about the punitive side of sanctions regimes. We agree with the introductory remarks in the booklet on targeted financial sanctions that smart, or targeted, sanctions apply to only a subset of the population. We echo the observation that no targeted sanctions can achieve the desired goals in isolation. They must be considered as part of a broader, coordinated political and diplomatic strategy. We should give serious thought to the proposals contained in the two reports before the Security Council today. The Interlaken and Berlin processes deserve our commendation for taking a realistic View. We hope that the Security Council will give due and deserved consideration to the proposed model resolution and guidelines for a future course of action. My delegation firmly believes that Security Council resolutions must be implemented by all Members of the United Nations. What we see most often is non-observance and even overt flouting of these resolutions by Member States. We are of the view that a committee entrusted with the responsibility of monitoring the implementation of all Security Council resolutions, including those relating to sanctions, would enhance the effectiveness of sanctions resolutions. The committee would report and make recommendations on how gradually to increase or decrease the pressure of sanctions on the basis of any development. We commend the decision of the Swedish Government to continue with its work on sanctions, and we hope that all efforts combined will result in the development of a fair and effective sanctions regime that will promote, in the most pragmatic and realizable way, the aims and objectives of the United Nations Charter.

Mr. Franco (Colombia) (spoke in Spanish): I would like to begin by expressing our gratitude to Ambassador Kastrup of Germany, Ambassador Staehelin of Switzerland and the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Mr. Hans Dahlgren. We would also like to thank the Assistant Secretary-General, Mr. Ibrahima Fall, for his introductory statement. Colombia would like raise five specific points. The first relates to the effectiveness of sanctions. The Bonn-Berlin process has prompted us to reflect on the key importance of this issue for the work of the Council, in three areas in particular, the first of which is the Security Council's image and the way in which it is perceived. If sanctions are not fair, if they do not have the proper basis and support the Council's work will be perceived as inappropriate and improper and its relevance will be questioned. Secondly, if sanctions are not effective, the image and the legitimacy of the Council will be compromised. Sanctions must work; in other words, they must produce the anticipated results. Thirdly, the Bonn-Berlin and Interlaken processes have prompted us to think about the need for the Security Council to communicate with other actors - not only with non-members of the Council but, in particular, with protagonists that are relevant to the implementation of such sanctions. I am referring specifically to banks and other financial organizations, private sector enterprises, academic institutions and civil society organizations that have a relevant role to play in the implementation and monitoring of sanctions. The second point that I would like to raise relates to the effects of sanctions. The challenge is to produce changes in the conduct of actors whose activities represent a threat to international peace and security. The difficulty for the Security Council, however, is how to produce that change in behaviour without affecting those who are not a threat to international peace and security - the civilians. Sanctions always have a negative effect, but they should have multiple positive impacts on international peace and security. The negative effect should be a factor that can be controlled and for which contingency measures can be put in place to provide appropriate compensation for the anticipated negative effect. The case of Liberia - a subject on which discussions have already begun in the sanctions Committee, and which we will continue to debate in the Security Council - provides a concrete example that prompts us to consider such consequences. I do not want discuss that case in detail at this time, but I would like to highlight it, because we will have an opportunity to consider the regional components of this issue: the role of other actors in ensuring a positive development of the regional situation, as well as the effects of sanctions - not just expected effects, but also unexpected inputs relating to humanitarian assistance for Liberia. The third point relates to the concept of smart sanctions. This is not a static concept; it is a dynamic concept. New technologies, new ideas, new political circumstances and new international challenges should make us think dynamically about this aspect. Therefore, the proposal to create a standing monitoring mechanism deserves study to see if it or is not compatible with the need for us to adjust ourselves to specific circumstances. In this context, we recognize the Stockholm process, since perhaps we can find, among the objectives described by Secretary of the State Dahlgren, an informal opportunity to discuss in depth the benefits and the difficulties of this mechanism before doing it in the Security Council. The fourth point relates to the implementation of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). With the implementation of Article 41 of the Charter, a new path with great challenges has opened. Resolution 1373 has not created sanctions, but its implementation and monitoring could lead the Council to undertake measures. In other words, we are creating a normative structure that will allow this organ to adopt decisions by means of smart sanctions. This could constitute an additional vein of reflection for the Stockholm process, as it involves substantively domestic legislative processes and steps and actions taken at that level to implement them. Finally, I will conclude by echoing what other members of the Council have said regarding the importance of adopting the conclusions of the Working Group on Sanctions.

Mr. Cunningham (United States): I would like to thank Swiss Ambassador Staehelin, German Ambassador Kastrup and Swedish State Secretary Dahlgren for their informative and very valuable briefings the other day and for the important work on sanctions in which their respective Governments have been engaged. This work is very useful to the Council and to the international community more broadly, and we commend them for making the effort. The United States wants to make sanctions a more effective policy tool. We have all accomplished a lot already in that regard in the last year or so, and as Ambassador Dahlgren noted the other day, present circumstances demand that we refine and further improve our use of multilateral sanctions to address threats to international peace and security. We all agree that sanctions must remain a viable policy option, and while we can make improvements, in point of fact, past sanctions regimes have been and continue to be effective, as noted in a number of studies that we have discussed in the Council and in various working groups over the past couple of months. They have been a vital policy instrument to modify the behaviour of a State or entity that poses a threat to international peace or that has committed an act of aggression. Sanctions provide us with an approach greater than persuasion, but less than the use of force, to employ the collective will of the international community. Of course, some countries will try to avoid compliance. There will always be violation of sanctions. That is to be expected, but that does not mean that the regime itself is ineffective. We have ample instances of where sanctions regimes have influenced behaviour. But, of course, we want to and we will continue to make improvements. American representatives actively participated in the Interlaken, Bonn and Berlin discussions, and we look forward to engaging in the Stockholm process when the Swedish Government hosts the next round of meetings to discuss sanctions verification and implementation. These discussions help support our work in the Council to reinforce sanctions as an effective policy tool, including through the increased use of better targeted sanctions, and to do our best to ensure that sanctions are both effective and humane. We want to do the best job possible to see that sanctions imposed by the Security Council pose the minimum risk to civilian populations. In that regard, I cannot help but observe that there is some irony underlying the Council's efforts to develop and impose effective sanctions. Despite our best attempts, what can we do when a dictatorial regime itself holds its own people hostage? What are we to think when a State or Government denies its own people food, medicine and shelter, items the international community is willing to provide to those most challenged? We see that situation, unfortunately, now in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. On Iraq, we endorsed a new approach to sanctions this past spring but have been blocked in our persistent attempts to improve the oil-for-food programme and the Iraq sanctions regime. This should be done, and we will continue to seek agreement on this most pressing issue. While the United States recognizes the importance of minimizing the humanitarian impact of sanctions, members of the international community must also reflect on the humanitarian impact of not imposing sanctions. Such a decision also has consequences. This is a heavy responsibility for Security Council members and one that we all should take most seriously. Much has already been done at this point to improve sanctions as a policy tool, both inside and outside the Council. We will continue to support efforts to improve the effectiveness of sanctions while minimizing their unintended consequences. We also will join with other interested parties in exploring how to make sanctions monitoring and implementation as effective and consistent as possible.

Mr. Ouane (Mali)(spoke in French): My delegation wishes to thank you, Mr. President, for having taken the initiative of convening this public meeting to consider general questions relating to sanctions. We thank Mr. Ibrahima Fall, Assistant Secretary-General, for his exhaustive, accurate and detailed introduction to the topic. We also thank the Swiss and German Governments for their important contributions to improving our sanctions regimes through the Interlaken process on financial sanctions and the Bonn-Berlin process on smart sanctions, particularly embargoes on weapons and travel. We thank the Swedish Government for its initiative to pursue the Interlaken process and the Bonn-Berlin process, and we welcome the participation of the Swedish Secretary of State in our debates. We hope that the results and specific recommendations emanating from these processes will be useful tools that will help the Council determine the best time to impose sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter. If sanctions are a useful tool that the Council can employ in specific circumstances, under the Charter, it is also true that because of their negative and undesired effects, they have become a source of legitimate concern for the international community. That is why the Council must develop sanctions regimes that are functional and cause the minimum of undesired secondary effects. In this connection, sanctions - the best coercive measure - must not be decided on before exhausting all other means of peaceful settlement of disputes envisaged by the Charter. We also believe that inasmuch as sanctions are provisional and temporary tools, they must include certain humanitarian exemptions, so that help can be given to the most vulnerable sectors of the population and to minimize their effects on the civilian population and on third States. Furthermore, we believe that the sanctions should be lifted as soon as the Security Council's requirements have been met, because this would enhance not only their legitimacy, but also their acceptance by the international community, whose will they should reflect. We welcome the new steps taken by the Council for the imposition of well targeted sanctions, with a time limit, aimed at changing the conduct of individuals or groups that are well identified. Studies of the decade of sanctions imposed by the United Nations have demonstrated that the sanctions have rarely achieved their goals, though they have caused untold suffering for civilian populations. A continuous evaluation of their socio-economic impact is therefore needed. Finally, my delegation regrets that, despite the outstanding work accomplished, it has not always been possible to reach consensus on the reports of the Council's Working Group on sanctions. My delegation gives its full support to the recommendations contained in the report proposing concrete measures for the Security Council to enhance the effectiveness of existing sanctions regimes, as well as a specific orientation for any future action.

Mr. Konuzin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are grateful to the representatives of Germany and Switzerland for introducing the studies that they had carried out within the context of the Bonn-Berlin and Interlaken processes. We are also grateful to the representative of Sweden for the willingness of his country to continue studying the application of sanctions. The issue of sanctions has taken up a great deal of the Security Council's work in the last decade. Sanctions constitute a powerful tool for bringing an impact to bear on people. Their effectiveness depends directly, however, on the correctness of the Council's assessment of the level of the threat to international peace and security. This is why the question of principles and the way in which they are applied deserves the most serious attention. Before resorting to an embargo regime, the Council must estimate any possible negative effect of the restrictive measures on the population, who are not directly politically responsible for the actions of official authorities, and any potential harm to the interests of third countries. This is why the introduction of sanctions is an extreme measure to be applied only where all other methods of bringing political impact to bear have been exhausted, and when the Security Council determines that there is a real threat to the international community. Sanctions must be introduced strictly in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter and the norms of international law. They must seek clearly stated objectives; they must be carefully targeted; they must be subject to regular review; and they must set forth clearly the conditions for lifting them. It is impermissible to introduce measures that have no set time period. We welcome the trend for the Council to take decisions with a prescribed time frame for sanctions. Examples of successful action by the Council in this connection are, we believe, the resolutions on sanctions against the Taliban and sanctions on Liberia. We will carefully study the booklets on focused sanctions. We are sure that these reports will be much in demand among many States within the United Nations and outside. We believe that the reports will help States in their work on the finer points of resolutions on the application of sanctions and will also be helpful with regard to existing practical regimes for implementing decisions at the national level. This latter issue will be of particular interest to States, because it falls within the competence and responsibility of States that have an obligation to report to the Security Council on measures that they have taken to comply with the sanctions.

Ms. Lee (Singapore): We join our colleagues in thanking the representatives of Switzerland and Germany for their presentations and for their very useful manuals on the Interlaken and Bonn-Berlin processes, which they distributed at our meeting on Monday. We applaud the laudable efforts of the Governments towards the improvement of financial sanctions, along with arms embargoes and travel bans. As time is short, Mr. President, we hope that you will let us make a targeted statement of three key points. First, in relation to the presentation by State Secretary Dahlgren of Sweden, we would like to express our sympathy for the frustration that he endured as Chairman of the sanctions Committee on Sierra Leone. As the Chair of the sanctions Committee on Liberia, we have experienced similar highs and lows. For example, as the Chair, we have had to facilitate the implementation of a travel ban list. Since this list was promulgated in June, we have experienced many of the difficulties discussed in the seminars and workshops organized under the two processes, in particular for the removal of targets from such lists. While we have noted the suggestion from the Bonn- Berlin process that this could be dealt with by empowering the sanctions Committees to keep such lists up to date, the reality is that United Nations sanctions Committees do not have the resources to do this, nor is there any institutional follow-up within the United Nations system to monitor the implementation of sanctions. Secondly, United Nations sanctions, if designed and implemented properly, can do much good. However, as Mali, Colombia, Jamaica, Mauritius and other delegations have highlighted, the image of United Nations sanctions has not been good. The United Nations and United Nations sanctions are often blamed for the economic woes of the targeted country. This may be due in part to the unintended side effects of the sanctions. However, in our view, much of the problem can be attributed to the less than effective implementation of United Nations sanctions to date. As such, while the United Nations may have won the Nobel Peace Prize jointly with the Secretary-General this year, the credibility of the United Nations in relation to the implementation of sanctions has eroded badly in the last 10 years. We must arrest this slide. Thirdly, as sanctions are one of the most important tools of the Security Council, the Council needs to ensure that its objectives are achieved without disproportionate humanitarian effects. As the United States has noted, this is to ensure that sanctions remain a viable policy tool. As such, we were pleased to learn that the Stockholm process, will focus on the implementation and monitoring of targeted sanctions. We would like to express our support in advance for the Stockholm process, in the hope that its work will result in more effective implementation of United Nations sanctions.

Mr. Jerandi (Tunisia) (spoke in French): Mr. President, we thank you for organizing this important meeting of the Council to deal with the question of sanctions imposed by the United Nations. It has enabled us to hear interesting statements by the Ambassador of Germany and the Observer of Switzerland on the outcome of the Bonn-Berlin and Interlaken processes, and to hear the State Secretary of Sweden. We thank them all very much. This meeting also offers members of the Council an opportunity to speak once again on the matter of sanctions. This gradual emergence of a debate in the Council on sanctions should be encouraged so that we can maintain an ongoing consideration of ways and means of making the sanctions tool a measured, sensible and effective way of maintaining international peace and security. As emerged from last year's Council debate and from numerous discussions in the General Assembly and other forums, outside the United Nations, this is a crucial moment for our Organization. We must take a new look at this tool of sanctions, put at its disposition by the Charter as a last resort after all methods for the pacific settlement of disputes provided for under Chapter VI of the Charter have been exhausted. United Nations practice, particularly during the last decade, has shown the need for a number of changes that, while enhancing the effectiveness of sanctions, would reduce their impact on civilian populations a which we have seen can be devastating - and protect the interests of neighbouring countries with major economic ties to the targeted countries. We feel that these three goals mean that the United Nations must take a new approach to sanctions, guided by the principle that sanctions should remain an integral part of an overall strategy for conflict settlement and prevention, with all its political, economic, social and human components, since sanctions clearly are not an end in themselves. Attention should be paid to setting a time-limit for sanctions. In short, an overall vision of the problems and their solutions is needed. To deal seriously with the humanitarian dimension, we must systematically review the impact of the sanctions contemplated - if they turn out to be necessary - before their imposition and then periodically during their application. We also have to make provisions for the necessary humanitarian exemptions - food, medical, religious and so on. As for the impact on third countries, my country has always highlighted the need to meet their concerns and deal with the economic problems they face because of the application of sanctions by the Security Council, in accordance with Article 50 of the Charter. We must seek ways to make this goal a reality, because the implementation of sanctions is the collective responsibility of the international community as a whole. My delegation strongly believes that the Council must seek to promote a new sanctions practice. To this end, the Council, which last year set up a working group to draw up recommendations on the general issues of sanctions, should not consider the report submitted by the Working Group after several months' work under the leadership of Ambassador Chowdhury, with a view to its adoption. The draft report is not entirely satisfactory, but it should be carefully studied and supported by the Council so that we can move towards its application. Despite its shortcomings, it provides for important changes with regard to various aspects of the matter.

Mr. Shen Guofang (China) (spoke in Chinese): First, Ijoin colleagues in thanking you, Mr. President, for arranging this important meeting. I also thank the representatives of Switzerland and Germany for their briefing. We believe that the Interlaken process and the Bonn-Berlin process are very beneficial to the Council's discussion on the question of sanctions. The briefing they have given us and the booklets they have distributed are also very helpful to our discussion. I also thank the State Secretary of Sweden for his statement. I am pleased that Sweden will organize relevant activities to continue the discussion on sanctions. China will actively participate in the Stockholm process, and hopes for its success. Sanctions are a mandatory tool bestowed by the Charter on the Council to fulfil its duty of maintaining international peace and security. Over the past 10 years the Council has resorted to sanctions more frequently, which has caused the international community increasing concern over the tremendous damage done to civilians by comprehensive sanctions. Making sanctions smarter and more clearly targeted, avoiding or reducing their humanitarian consequences, and effectively resolving the economic problems caused by sanctions to third countries: all these questions require careful and thorough consideration by the Council. The Chinese delegation has always stressed that sanctions are only a means, and not an end in themselves. Recently there has been much talk about the so-called exit strategy of peacekeeping operations. We also need an exit strategy for sanctions a that is, when deciding to impose a sanctions regime, the Council should consider and decide how to end the sanctions once the goal has been reached. There should be no more sanctions with no clear objective, no time limit and no well-defined conditions for lifting them. Last year the Council held an open debate on the question of sanctions and established a Working Group. Under the leadership of Ambassador Chowdhury of Bangladesh, the Working Group produced a draft report after in-depth consultations. The draft report is comprehensive and detailed, and contains positive and pragmatic recommendations. We hope that it will be adopted and implemented as soon as possible.

The President: Council members will recall my undertaking at the beginning of Ireland's presidency to explore the possibility of bringing to a conclusion the matter of the report of the Working Group on the general issues of sanctions. As Council members are aware, the Chairman's proposed outcome was circulated among Council members in February this year, but it has not yet been possible to agree on a final text. I consider it important to achieve agreement on this text. A very small number of differences still remain. While they relate to issues of some sensitivity, they are in my judgement by no means insurmountable. Over the past two weeks we have met with all the concerned parties on a number of occasions in order to obtain a clearer understanding of the outstanding points of contention and thereby to attempt to identify possible means of overcoming these few remaining obstacles. Those discussions are still ongoing. I would hope to report back soon to Council members on further developments. The Council has thus concluded the present stage ofits consideration of the item on its agenda. The meeting rose at 11.50 am.