S/PV.45 Security Council

1 propose to hold the next meeting of the Security Council next Tuesday, unless it should appear desirable ta postpone it in order to enable certain members to obtain all the necessary data. The meeting rose at 5.15 p.m. FORTY-FIFTH MEETING Held at Hunter College, New York, on ThursdaYJ 13 June 1946J at 10.30 a.m. President: Mr. A. PARODI (France). Australie, Mexique, bliques Etats-Unis Pre::ent: The representatives of the following countries: Australia, Brazil, China, Egypt, France, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United KiIlgdom, United States of America. 77. 77. Provisional agendc:4 (document 5/84) 1'. 2. 1. Adoption of the agenda. 2. The Spanish question. (a) Letter dated 8 April 1946 from the representative of Poland addressed to the Secretary-General (document 8/32) .1 (b) Letter dated 9 April 1946 from the representative of Polandaddressed to the Secretary-General (document S/34).z (c) Report of the Sub-Committee on the Spanish question appointed by the Security Council on 29 April 1946 (document S/75).3 (d) Factual findïngs concerning the Spanish situation (Supplementàry memorandum ta the report of the Sub-Committee) (document 8i76).3 (e) Letter dated 2 June 1946 from the representative of Brazil addressed ta the ( Chairman of the SUb-C()7~'1Ütteeon the Spanish question appoj·,.: ed by the Security Council on 29 Ap;. 'J. ~946 (document S/77).3 78. Adoption of the agenda 79. Continuation of the discussion on the 5panish questior,t 78. Mr. EVATT (Australia): In stating what 1 have to say, 1 am speaking on behalf of the 8ub- Je :See ûfficiai Records of the Security Council, {irst Year, FltSt Series, Supplement No. 2, Annex 3a. _ PJ;'emière nt'.xe Première édition Since the last meeting, on the initiative of the representative of the· United States ·of America, a modification has been· suggested in the second l'ecommendation of the Sub-Committee. Various proposals in relation to that modification have been considered. The five members of the Sub· Committee h.ave agreed that the text now sug· gested, which may, of course, itself be subject to some further modifications, should be included in the formal resolution to be placed before this Council. Therefore, .1 shall now, if 1 may, formally move the adoption of this resoJution, copies of which have been made by the Secretariat and 1 think should he in the possession of members of the Council. 1 shall read it in full: "Whereas the Sub-Committee on the Spanish question made the three folldwing recommenda· tions in paragraph 31 (a), (b), and (c) of its report to the Security Council: " '(a) The en,dorsement by the Security Council of the principles contained in the dec· laration by the Govemments of the United King- dom, the United States of America and France, dated 4 March 1946;1 " '(b) The transmitting by the Security Council tothe General Assembly of the.evidence and reports of this Sub-Committee, together with the recommendation that, unlessthe Franco regime is withdrawn and the other conditions of political freedom set out in the dedaration are, in the opinion of the General Assenibly, fully sat- isfied, a resolution be passed by the General Assembly recommeudïng that diplomatic rela· tions with the Franco·':t:egime be terminated forthwith by ..~ach Member of the United Nations; .. " ,(c) .!fhe taking of appropriate steps by the Secretary-General to communicate these recom- __.. m~ndations to all Members of the United Na· . tionsand an others.concemed'; .' "The Security Council resolves "Toadopt the.three recommendations of the Sub-Committee set i'crtb above, subject to the addition to recommenda.tion (b), after the words 'each Member of the United Nations',of the following· words: 'oraltematively such other action be· taken as the General Assembly deems . appropriate .·and e~ective under the .circum- stancesprevailing at the time'." The recommendations of the Sùb-Committee. ~th the modification now proposed: consist of .three,.elements: Fina1ly, the addition of the new words, cCor aIternatively such other action be taken as the General Assembly deems appropriate and effec- tive under the circumstanœs prevailing at the tilDe''. . bien générale donné les circonstances". The three recommendations as modified are submitted to the Security Council with the au- thority of the five members of the Sub-Commit- tee. 1 do not want to comment at any length upon the modification, but 1 thiIik 1 Should say this: that if this resolution is carried, positive action is recommended by the Security Council to the Assembly. tion Conseil membres de je résolution recommandera des plU$ . L'Assemblée remède du diplomatiques. Conseil générale mesure cace, du cette tion représentera de méthodes priées, aux les détaillée tent ceux-ci Sous-Comité résolution le réserver toutes les toutes des membres ment présenter de The result of the modification is to make the proposal before the Assembly more flexible. ne Assembly will not be confined to the first remedy - the specific remedy mentioned in the SUD- Comm:1.tteë's report, that is, the termination of diplomatie relations. It would, if thisrecom- mendation of the Security Council is adopted, he péï.lllitt~d tiJ take other action deèmed -by it as appropriate and effective at the time. In my -opinion, and 1 think fuis is the view of all members of the Sub-Committee, the adoption will represent no diminution of the powers of the Security Council, but will rea1ly represent an exercise by the Security Council of its power ta rc~:;,:mnend methods of adjustment or suitable procedures, and ta reier a matter to other organs of the United Nations wheneverthe cÏrcum- stances are thought fit by the Security Council. 1 will not enter, at fuis stage, into any further analysis of the general merits of the resolution, which 1 discussed at- our last meeting, but·on hehalf of the Sub-Committee of five members 1put this-forward, hoping that it will. bç. adopted bytheSecurity Council. 1 would reserve the right, ~ 1 May, ta reply at a later stage to any observa- tions which may he made by members of the Council, with a view to clearing up any diffic\ù- ties that might present themselves to anymembt.'r. 1 therefore forma1ly move the adoption of the resolution which 1 have presented.

1 thank the representative of Australia for the very My Gove1';'nment is in agreement with this basic thought. We had difficulty, however, with original language of paragraph 31 (b) of the Sub- Committee's report. We felt that it would inappropriate for the Council ta prejudge precise course of action which the General sembly should take. Mr. Evatt's proposed vision goes a long way towards overcoming this difficulty. 1 shall, therefore, vote in favour of 1 should make it clear, however, that in doing my Government is not, at this time, undertaking any commitment as to the position it will take in the General Assembly. AFm Pasha (Egypt): ConcernÎ.i·lg the present regime in Spain, our opinion of it and the cate...; gory into which it càn be c1assified were agreed upon first ~f all b San Francisco·, then again in Landon2, and finaUy here by this Council whenat its thirty-nirithmeeting it àdopted resolution to form a Sub-Committe on the Span-. ish question. On all those occasions we have, without any hesitation or. reservation, morally condemned . this regime; but if it must cha."lged, and we all hope it will be, let this happen at theprice of sacrificing any of the prin- ~iples consecrated by the Charter. 1 must, in this connection, as the representative of Egypt, take into special consideration principle of Article 2 of the Charter, the paiagraph of which reads: 1 See Documents of the United Nations Conference International Organization, volume 6, Commission G",::eral Provisions, pages 124-136. " ~ See Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly ing the first part of its tirst session; page 39. Lorsque l'attmltion le représentant tituer espagnole, a prononcé, lors de séance, When the Spanish question was brought to the attention of the Coundi by the Polish delegation, the Australian representative who proposed to farro a sub-committee on the Spanish question, proceeded to say during the thirty-fifth meeting: "Or, question de la restriction d'i.."ltervenîr dans une affaire qui relève essentiellement en résulte, pas gouvernement Gouvernement importance l'une'des précieuses garanties, d'ailleurs, pays, ment de veto. l "De qui relève Mais la compétence relève n'est pas immuable." "Now, at the out:~et, the question of domestic jurisdiction has been raised. We have one important limitation in this Council imposed by Article 2 of the Charter. It expressIy forbids us ta intervene in a matter which is essentially one of domestic jurisdiction." As a generaf me, it follows that we cannot make recommer:dations concerning the government of any cc:..mtry. Now the Australian Government places great stress on that limitation. It believes it is one of the most va1uable,one of the very few, safeguards for the protection of small nations. The large nations, the five permanent members, are of course safe- .guarded always by the right of veto. "Prima facie then, this question is one of domestic jurisdiction. But the line between what is of international concern and what is of domestic concern is not .âxèd. It is mutable." Je déclaration à mon soit devons dans problèmes tence moment nous nous serait 1do not hesitate to agree with every word mentioned by the representative Df Australia. In my .opinion, however, .although the line is not fixed, but is mutable, we must be careful not to indude in matters of international concern anything which would be really of a domestic nature. We are now founding traditionS and we mustavoid the creation of any precerlent which would cause us to become involved in situations from which it would be most difficult to disentangle ourselves. . At our thirty-fourth meeting, the Polish representative, as a <:ondusion to his statement concerning Spain, said: Au représentant sa déclaration "In the name of the Government of the Republic of Poland, 1 calI upon you to fulfil your duty and to adopt the following resolution: "Au de Pologne, et d'adopter "Declares that the existence and activities·of .the Franco regime in Spain ha~e led to inter- nation,al friction and eIidangered international pea,ce and security; "Déclare régime de Franco cord sécurité After further discussions, the Council resolved at its thirty-ninth meeting "to determine whether the situation in Spain has led to international friction and does endanger international peace and security, and if it so finds, then to determine what practical measures the United Nations may take". ln the same resolution, the Council decidéd to form a Sub-Committee, "to examine the state- ments made before the Security Council concern- ing Spain, to receive further statements and documents, and to conduct such inquiries as may deem necessary, and to report to the Security' Council ...". 1 wa..'" particularly happy to listen to the e10- quent speech by Mr. Evatt m presenting the report. It seems t9 me, however, that when the Sub-Committee made its recommendations . the Council, it went beyond its terms of ref~rence., In its conclusions, the Sub-Committee mentioned that the activities of the Franco regime do not Article 36, paragraph 1, of which mention is made by the Sub-Committee, cornes under Chapter VI dealing with the pacifie setdement of disputes and it mentions appropriate proced,. ures or methods of adjustment. 1 should add, hawever, that no Article of the Charter refers torecommendations to be made by the Council to the General Assembly, although Article 12 clearly mentions that recommendations may he made by the General Assembly to the Council. Ids naturaUy within the ,rights of the Council to take up the whole matter and to make its own final decisions; but 1should like to point out that if it chooses to do otherwise, and refers the matter ~t present constitute an existing threat to peace within the meaning of ATticle 39, but constitute a situation which is a potential menace to inter- national peace and security within the meaning of Article 34 of the Charter. The Sub-Committee went further; it made recommendations to the Council regarding what measures itshouldrecommend to the General Assembly for a<;loption. Among its recommenda- tions is the eventual termination of diplomatic relations with Spain. This is a measure actually stipulated by Article 41 with reference to matters dealt wlth in Article 39, whereas the Sub-Com- mittee cOIlllidered this same Article inapplicable. Les Comité fasciste découlem: Telle Comite. à la The Sub-Commïttee, in my opinion, aIso gave a fundamentally correct description of the political regime existing in Spain, in so far as the factual information put forward by the Sub-Committee is concerned, when it charac- terized the regime as dùe not to the conditions of the internal development of Spain but to interference from outside by the Axis countries. The Sub-Committeereceived a number of documents relating to the activities of Franco Spain during the W::u'. These documents con- firm the fact that Franco Spain acted during the war as the ally of Hitlerite Germany and Fascist Italy. This alliance went beyond the limits of purely political collaboration; Franco Spain was aIso the military ally of Germany. The official confirmation of this alliance was to be found, in particular, in the secret protocol signed by Hitlerite Germany and Fascist Spain on 12 February 1943. The text of this protocol and the secret corI'espondence relating to it. between Ribbentrop and Moltke, the German Ambassador in Madrid, are in the possession of the appropriate USSR authorities. CopieS of these documents Were transmitted by me to . the Sub-Committee. A number of documents relating ta the above-ment:i0ned secret protocol A fou.rni, fait régime politique existant en Espagne, térisant comme l'évolution l'intervention Le cernant dant l'Espagne la guerre lérienne débordé politique. militaire crée protocole secret signé et l'Espagne fasciste, de ce s'y réfère, deurallemand mains des fait documents. a également It will be seen that the Spanish fascists wanted not orny to obtain Gibraltar and French Mo- rocco, but aIso to tTample underfoot the inde- pendence of Portugal, which, as Kramer states, in the opinion of Spanish military circ1es, "has no right whatever to exist in the new Europe". It would be possible ta continue the quota- tions from official secret documents bearing' witness to the existence of a political and mili- tary alliance between Hitlerite Germany and· Franco Spain, and ta the existence of practical measures carried out by Franco for the complete entry of Spain into the war on the side of the Axis. But it is hardly necessary to dwell further on this indisputable thesis. If fascist Spain did not succeed in fully entering the war against the Allies, this is due to reasons o'Utside Franco's control, namely that the Red Arro}', and later the United Kingdom-United States armies, began to deal Germany such hard blows, one after another, before Franco could succeed putting into practice bis insidious designs garding complete entry into the war. 1 have a1ready had an opportunity of dr~';l1lg the attention of the members of the Seèurity de régulière, données mais même. quiste, journal des personnel de qu'a tions publiées journal du du Travail daté duquel cevaient leur dans comme service fasciste contre pas prendre curité, l'Espagne pendant publié cernant lemagne. Deuxièmes The close co-operation of German andSpan- ish military intelligence during the war is aIso weIl known. On this subject 1 sent copies ~f a state..'7lent by Lieutenant-General Guenther Krappe, the former German military attaché in Madrid, and Colonel Hans Renner, the former German military attaché in Tangier. Both are now prisoners of war and are in the USSR. This statement1 is of interest since it reveals both the existence and the degree of ~aboraient la Krappe, et à prisonniers de guerre en URSS. déclaration lation Première édition This is what General Bamler says: "Franco, by placing his connexions at the disposaI of Cana..-is, enabled him ta develop the work of the German Intelligence Service in Morocco. In this way, Franco becamean important Iink in the structure of the German Intelligence Service." Bamler goes on ta say: "As has al- ready been said in the above-mentioned state- ment, Canaris personally directed and cstablished connexions with his most împortant agents; in Sp~ they inc1uded General Martinez Afiido, the Minister of Internal Affairs and Police in the Government of Primo de Rivera, and Franco." In deaIing with his talks on this subject with Canaris, Bamler writes as follows in his state- ment: "In conversation about these matters, Canaris told me of bis regret at the death of Martfuez Affido, as he, did not consider Franco ta be an equivalent substitute." According to Canaris, Franco possessed neither military talent nor the talent of a statesman. In the circum- stances he was nevertheless the most suitable man for looking after German interests, as he has proved by his co-operation during a good many years that he could be relied upon. This statement, which was written, as 1 have al- ready pointed out, by one of the closest col· laborators of Admiral Canaris~ is also of great interest from the point of view of the actual connexions between Franco and the fascist- Hitler circ1es in Germany. Unfortunate1y, 1 was not able to place this document at the disposal of the Sub-Committee ' since 1 received it only yesterday, as 1 have ~eady stated. 1 nevertheless thought it neces- sary to inform the Security Coùncil of the exist- ence of this document, which, in, my opinion, is of undoubted interest ta the Council. General Bamler's statement, which 1 have mentioned and which is addressed to the USSR Government, beginswith a paragraph which ~ aIso· .of considerable interest. Bamler writes (1 quote oruy the fust paragraph of his state~ ment): "In the past few months fascist Spain has figured considerably in reports in the world Press. AlI the' progressive forces demand the removal of this regime as the offspring' and jusl'ifié, Première édition A first measure capable of contributing ef- fectively to a solution of the Spanish problem would be the rupture of diplomatie relations with Franco by all the Member States of the United Natiolls. The situation in Spain is such that it not only demands moral condemnation of the Franco regime but aIso calls for prac- tical action in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. Otherwise the Security Council will not carry out its tasks which are dictated by the existing ~tuation; it will re- semble a forum for discussing the question and not an organ of high authority, making decisions for the purpose of removing the menace to peace which has arisen. Lastly, 1 wish to dwell on the conclusions of the Sub-Committee, which aIso inc1ude pro- posaIs to the Security Council. While bringing forward a considerable array of facts confirm- hlg that the Franco regime is a menace to peace, the. Sub-Committee nevertheless has not dared to draw the right conclus~on fTOm all the ma- Such a conclusion is incorrect. It is due to a restrictive interpretation of Article 39. The Sub-Committee came to the conclusion that the situation in Spain constituted merely a potential threat to peace. In introducing the idea of a potentiaI threat to peace, the Sub- Committee renounced the precise sense of Ar- ticle 39. Such a conclusion may be the basis for an incorrect and dangerous doctrine, ca- pable of diminishing the significance of the relevant Articles of the Charter, in 50 far as the action of th~ Security Council on the strength of these Articles is concemed. The outcome is that a reaI threat to peace would exist onIy if fascist Spain took practicaI action of a military nature. But this would not be merely a threat to peace; it would be an act of aggression. . On the basie of the first conclusion, the Sub- Committee drew a second incorrect conclusion to the effect that the Security Council has not the right or, as the Sub-Committee' expresses it, the jurisdiction to take decisions regarding the severance of diplomatie relations·with Franco, that is, to act in conformity with Ar- ticle 41 of the Charter. In the Sub-Committee's conclusion there is another important, but incorrect proposaI. 1 refer to the Sub-Committee's recommendation not to take a decision in the Security Council regarding the severanœ of diplomatie relations with Franco, but to recommend the taking of such a decision by the GeneraI Assembly, having iJl mind, probably, the next session of the As- sembly. This proposaI has two drawbacks: d'une 'Le E~~agne pour virtuelle sens servir dangereuse, des autant tribuent véritable dans le tivement à cas, mais le sion de emploie rupture c'est-à-dire, de encore une proposition, importante mais inexacte. l'ai Comité de diplomatiques question semble-t-il, Cette First, it is by nature contradictory. On the one hand, the Sub-Committee considers that the Security Council has not the right, in the present case, to take a decision regarding the severance of relations with Franco, and lt does so on the basis of the previously mentioned incorrect assertion that the situation li Spain does not at present constitute a threat to peace. On the other hand, the Sub-Committee con- siders the severance of relations with Franco to be necessary, even with the reservations that are made in the last variant of the resolution proposed today, while recommending, however, that the severance should be effected by the General Assembly. The contradictory nature of this proposaI is obvious. part, sécurité de avec sion inexacte la moment de menace Sous-Comité, la aujourd'hui, .rompre tout décidée est Second1y, in asserting that the Security Coun- cil has not the right, in the present case, to take a decision regarding the severance of rela- tions with Franco, and in recommending that the Assembly should take such a decision,-the . Sub-Comlnittee seems, in regard to the present question, to confuse the ftL.'1ctions of the Security Council and the GeneraI Assembly. The Se- sécurité de avec rupture soit décidée à l'Assemblée, le Sous-Comité semble Conseil C'est d'attirer du que que quences 1 thought it necessary ta make this statement in arder ta draw the attention Qf my colleagues in the Security Couneil ta the serious nature of the question we are discussing and to the consequences and th~ effect which may he con- nected with +1,~ Couneil's decision on it. Mr. VAN KLEFFENS (Netherlands): We are going ta vote, 1 understand, Qn the Sub- Committee's recommendations as they are now drawn up. We are not going ta vote on the body of the report but on the part that precedes the recommendations. 1 -therefore think that it -may be better for me not ta CQmment Qn the report, but that does not necessarily mean that l "-gree with its presentation of the case in its entirety or with all its arguments and conclusions. l'anglais): vottJr dans appelés sur En ne mais sois l'affaire ments With regard ta the recommendations, 1 should like ta state frankly that l am not greatly in favour of them. 1 shall only men- tion one of many reasons, which is this: If the Couneil has bath the right ta act and good reasons for taking action, by all means let us take action now, or in September. To this extellt 1 am in agreement with what the representative of the USSR has just told us. But, if we take action, let us take action our- selves and not refer the matter ta another organ of the United Nations. merais visage que Si bonnes des septembre. que vient de mais, nous-mêmes organe It is this Couneil which has the primary responsibility for mat~ers such as these, under Article 24 of the Charter, and 1 think we should discharge that responsibility ourselves. But, if we· have no right ta act or no good grounds for taking action, by all means let us refrain from doing sa, If, nevertheless, the Assembly wants ta take up the matter, it is for the Assemb1.y ta decide. bilité occupent, Charte, acquitter Mais, raisons avons rien blée de At the same time, 1 Jully realize the impor- tance of an agreed decision and in arder that there may be unanimity of action, 1 shall not oppose the draft resolution as it now stands, but will reserve perfect freedom of appraisal for my Government, in every respect, if and when the matter cornes up before the General Assembly. point décision mesure pas mais mQn où générale. Tb~ PREsIDEN'r (translated trom Frenqh): 1 propose adjoumment of the meeting. 1 sug- gest that we meet tomoITow, Friday, 14 June at 3 p.m, maintenant demain,

The Security Council cou!d meet tomorrow afternoon at 3: 30 instead of 3 o'clock. The Atomic Energy Commission will certainly have finished it work at that rime, and we would !hen he able ta meet. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United ~gdom): 1 was goiug ta support the representative of the USSR. If there is no real objection,. 1 do hope we can put off the renewed discussion of this question for two or three days. 1 think it will he very difficult ta meet tomorrow, if we sit l'ailier late on the Atomic Energy Commission, which is quite possible. However, 1 am prepared ta hear any objections there may be ta that. 1 should prefer, if it were possible, ta adjourn until Monday. Ml'. EVATT (Australia): 1 support the representative of the United Kingdom.

My term of office as President expires tomorrow evening, and 1 do not know'whether 1 am in a position ta fix the date of the next meeting for Monclay. 1 shall therefore ask the next President of the Security Council whether he agrees to that date. Ml'. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico): 1 believe the President has the right ta decide that question now, and if the majority of the Sccurity Council agrees that that would he the best date for the consideration of the Spanish question, from the point of view of my Government, 1 have no objections. The PRESIDENT· (translated trom French): 1 gather that the majority of the Council favours ail adjoumment of the meeting until next Monday. In these circumstances, 1 propose that the meeting begin at 2: 30 p.m., on the understanding that it will be over by 5 p.m. 1 have sorne important engagements in the aftemoon. The next meeting is therefore arranged for Monday, 17 June at 2: 30 p.m.