S/PV.458 Security Council

The representative of the Soviet Union has asked for the floor. I wish to say, however, that the Council has listened to the declaration he has made and also to the declaration made by the representative of the Ukrainian SSR,~l11d that, since the matter dealt with affected the representative of China, who sits at this table, I gave the representative of China, in accordance with the custom of the Coullcil, an opportunity to reply. The PC'::1ts which have been raised in this debate deal with a subject which is not on the provisional agenda proposed for today's meeting of the Council. The opportunity to make these declarations has been given in accDrdance with the long-standing custom of the Council that matters not on the agenda of a meeting may be brought to the attention of the Council, a practice which is similar to that followed in some of the parliaments 'of the world. That opportunity having been given, I now rule that the matter is closed.' M. MALIK. (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (trad1tit du russe) : Je n'entends pas enfreindre la decision que vient de prendre le President; j'en prends acte. La delegation de l'URSS estime inutile de relever la declaration irresponsable et les calomnies d'un monsieur qui ne represente personne. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian) : I have no intention of going against the President's ruling; I take note of it, as the USSR delegation does not deem it necessary to pay attention to the irresponsible statements and slanderous inventions of . a person who represents nobody in the Council. 3. Adoption of the agenda

The Council will recal1 that ai: our last two meetings it was agreed to employ simultaneous interpretation for all statements made by members of the Council and by other representati:res and to use consecutive interpretation only for procedural matters and when we came to a vote on any draft resolutions which might be submitted to the Council. I think that normally this is a very useful procedure which we have come to adopt. But the situation with which the Council is faced today is unfortunately not normal, and I think that in consequence some modification would be advisable. The difficulty is that, over the last few days, telegraph and telephone communication with the capitals of India and Pakistan have proved difficult and there have been delays in the transmission and receipt of important messages. The result is that, .' despite every endeavour by llU concerned, I have 110t been able to place myself in a position to distribute a report On these negotiations in advance of this meeting. The Security Council will recall that at .our 457th meeting; held on 17 December 1949 ~the representative of Norway introduced a pro~osa1 that "the President should meet informally ~with the two parties and examine with them the possibility of finding a mutually satisfactory basis for dealing with the Kashmir problem". This proposal was adopted by the.Council by a vote of 9 in favour, with 2 abstentions. I therefore. undertook to accept the responsibility assigned to me, and thereafter to call the Council tog-ether as soon as I had anything to report which might merit consideration. Pursuant to this decision of the Security Council, I have, since 17 December, held frequent meetings with the representatives of India and of Pakistan individually, in a very serious endeavour to find a basis for a solution of the Puisqu'il n'y a pasd'objection, je considere cette procedure comme adoptee. J'aimerais maintenant faire une breve declaration en tant que President etrendre compte de mes consultations avec 1es representants de l'Inde et du Pakistan. Le Conseil de securite se souviendra que, 10rs de la 457eme seance, tenue le .17 decembre 1949, 'le representant de la Norvege a propose que le President "ait des entretiens officieux avec ·les representants des deux parties et examine· avec eux la possibilite de rechercher, dans cette ques~ tion du· Cachemire, une base de discussion qui soit acceptable pour 1es deux parties". Le Conseil a adopte cette proposition par 9 voix, avec 2 abstentions. J'ai par consequertt accepte la responsabi1ite dont on me. chargeait, et je me suis engage a. convoquer ensuite le Conseil aussitot que j'aurais a. 1ui rendre compte de faitsmeritant d'ltre soumis a. son examen. Conformement a. la decision du Conseil de securite, j'ai, d~puis le 17 decembre, freqt.temment rencontre separement 1es representants de l'Inde et du Pakistan, et consacre tous mesef!orts' a. determiner 1es principes generaux d'une solution. de Au cours de mes rencontres avec les representants de l'Inde et du Pakistan, et a leur demande, j'ai entrepris de formuler une proposition destinee a etre presentee par ecrit aux parties interes'" sees, aux fins d'examen pa.r l-eurs gouvernemen~s respectifs. Les diverses clauses de cette proPOSltion ont ete soumises, au cours deleur redaction, a une discussion preliminaire prolongee et detaillee avec les parties interessees. J'ai presen.te la proposition aux representants des deux parbes le jeudi 2~ decembre, et copie en a ete distribuee aux membres du Conseil6• I have naturally had to stndy many aspects of J'ai naturellement dii ctudier de nom?~eux ~s: the problem, and, in my proposal, I have sought pects duprobleme, et, dans ma propOSition, J at to take as basic the practical task of bringing cherche aconsiderer comm~ fondamentale la reaabout conditions in which the plebiscite could be lisation pratique des conditions dans lesquelles t>n held. The proposal is based firmly on the prinpourrait ~ ~anise,r le plebisci~. ~a proposi!:ion.est ciple originally offered unilaterally by the Govft:rmement fondee sur le pnnclpe propose umlaernment of India in a far-seeing and statesman-: teralement a l'origine par le Gouvemement de like declaration and, since then, accepted and l'Inde, dans une -declaration temoignant de beaure-affirmed repeatedly by both parties: that the coup de clairvoyance et d'ttn grand sens politique futur~ of .the State of Jammu and Kash!Ilir vo.:i11 - p.rincipe q~i ~ ete depuis accepte. et re~irme.3- be decermmed by the freely expressed ~tll of ltS plusteurs repnses par les deux p,artles - a sav,?lr people. ~ have the1'efore e~deavoured, m so .far que l'~veni~ ~e l'Etat de J~~muet Cacherufe asposslble, to concentrate on developmg, j sera determme par la volonte hl}rement expnmee through the aP1?lication of ~ommon sense..and de sa population. Je me suis, par consequent, attaagret;ment, a~sls for. apractlcal a~d ~xpeditlous cM autant que possible aessayer d'etablir, en resolutlor. of thlS question by a plebiSCtte. I have c:ourant au hon sens et au'compromis, sur queUe intentionally: avoided attemptil!'g to analyse or base pratique on pourrait resouare rapidementla prnn04nc~ Judgm~nt on the nghts and wrongs question par un plebiscite. Inrentionnellement, j'ai tn the ~:ltsputed lssues, of the past few years'cvite de proceder a une analyse du differend ?U except. m so ~ar a~ these matters ~eed to be de porter un jugement sur le fond des confhts taken. In?O cnnsiderattons for thespecifif purpose qui se sont eleves au cours des annees preeedentes, of brmgmg about a settlement. In my Judgment, sauf dans le cas ou i1 faliait absolument tenir a legalistic .and historic~l approach to the matter compte de ces questions pour aboutir a un reglewould ~eqU1re the exammatlon. of a comple~ mass ment. A mon avis,aborder la question au point. of detatl, ~h~ relevance of whlch to arrangmg an de vue juridique et historique exigerait l'e~men ea~ly plebt.;cite seems at the least to be doubtful. d'uu ensemble complexe de details qui ne sem- It IS my. hope that the general method of approach blent pas presenter une grande utilite pour l'orgaby see1o.ng to concentrate on the development of nisation d'un plebiscite a .une ,date rapprochke. acceptable arr~gements. for th~ fut?re,. rather respere que les membresdu Conseil de securite th~n pronouncml? upon tssues ralsed m the past, adoptcrontcette methodc generale, qui consiste a wIll ~ommend •. Itself t'? the. members, of the I se preoccuper surtout ,depreparer la voie a des Secunty Counctl. Certaml~, It seems to me theaccot:'ds acceptables dans l'avenirplutot qu'a ..,e most hopef!!l course to ,>-ollow, .becaul;;e, to. a prononcer sur des problemes qui se sont poses large and, lmportant ~xtent, tills method, of dans le passe. Sansaucun doute, c'est la, une meappr?a~h d?es not re~ulre us to choose, between thode. ui me semble la plus appropriee, car, dans confhctmg mterpretatlons of what has happened. unegr~nde mesure, eUe n'exige pas de nous un choixentrc deuX interpretations opposees de l'his-, toire. Au cours de mes entretiens avec les1"epresentants des deux parties, il seconfirma que, en cc qui concerne l'etablissement des conditions dans lesquelles - pour reprendre les termes de la troisieme partie de lares~lut!QQ '.adoptee le 13 ,aout 1948 [5/1100] par-]a' COmmission des Nations Unies pour l'Indeet le Pakistan - "le statut futur de.l'Etat de, Jammuet Cachemire sera fixe In my meetings with the representatives of the two parties,it was confirmed that, in so far as the establishment of conditions under which, in the language of part IH of the resolution.of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 [5/1100 paragraph 75], ".. -. the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be,determined in accordance • Cefte proposltion a He djstribuee aux memibres' du Conseil comme document de' seance et n'a pas ete pu., bliee c-omme document du Conseil'desecurite. • The proposal was distributed to() memher.;; of the, 9>uncil as a conference room paper and was not pU'b- _ ; a Security Council document. In the meetings which followed, after travers~ ing the whole field of the problem I came to the view that the general plans advanced by our Commission in accordance with the Security Counci1'sdirections were appropriate to the situation. Thediffictilty, however, was that in onevery essential_ part or stage of these plans the necessary agreement by the Governments of India and Pakistan had _not been secured, and there was therefore a block in <:arrying these plans into, effect. The problem, therefore, was not one of formulating and putting forward a wholly new proposal, but rather of taking that part of the existing plan in conne.."'{ion with which difficulties had arisen and finding ways and means, here and now, of resolving these difficulties so that the matter might go forward with the minimum Ghange in organization or in procedtlre. "In thus attempting to isolate _the area where agreement was lacking, I reached the conclusion that it <:oncerned essentially the various stages of demilifarizatiop. which should take place during the period prior to the plt:biscite. In my meetings -with the parties, I c~me increasingly to believe that~ if ih(;: question of demilitarization prior to the' plebiscite could be treated as a unified whole, a- .basis.for agreelllent might well be developed. Accordingly, the proposal I have advanced is' designed to remove the blo~l~ by providing tJ:1e basis for an agreed programme ofdemilitarization, to. take place before the plebiscite' is held. I should like again to emphasize that the proposals I 1].ave.·submitted" relate specifically.to this period prior to' the plebiscite, and that they do pot purport in any way to ~up'ersedethe functions of .the Plebiscite Ad:tl1inistrator, as set forth in our Commission's resolution of 5.January 1949 [S/1196]. The powers therein,assigned to the Plebiscite Administrator would of course remain m 1ttll forcf.l :md effect. Inqeed, the. object -0£ my proposal is to advance the time wh~n the Plebiscite Administrato! will take up his duties in K?shmir and carry them through to a conclusion. Dtiring the coUrse of my discussions, the most detailed examination has been· given te. the questions of the Azad forces; the Northern Area, the security of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the maintenance of law and order, the necessity I for safeguarding the free expression of public opinion in the State, and to other similar important. points which have been the subject of long previous debate between the .two parties. The detailed examination of these points reinforced my view that the question of de11;1ilitarization .prior to the plebiscite must be considered· as· a whole and that, if the parties could agree on a programme of progressive .• demilitarization, the essential requirement •leading .to con4itions requisite toa free and impartial.plebiscite would have been established and the way,vould be open for the·. Plebiscite Administrate,r to discharge the functions which have already been entrusted to him. The provisions contained in my proposal do, in my judgment,-pr:ovide the basis:-4et'-a fair Au <:our5 des reunions qui ont suivi, apres avoir examine l'ensemble du probJeme, fen suis venu it la conclusion que les plans generaux proposes par notre Commission, conformement aux instructions au Conseil de securite, repondaiellt it la situation. Cependant, la difficulte reside dans le fait que, en ce qui concerne rune des parties prindpaJes de ces plans, l'accord necessaire des Gouvernements de l'Inde et du Pakistan n'a pas ete obtenu et que 1'0n a abouti it une impasse. Le probleme residedonc, non pas dans l'elaboration et la presentation d'une proposition entierement notlv~lle, mais plntot clans l'examen de cette partie des plans actuels quia suscite 1es difficultes; il faut, maintenant, it New-York, trouver le moyen de resoudre ces difficultes de fa<;on que 1'0n puisse progresser en operant-le moins de modifications possible, tant en matiete d'organisation qu'en matiere de procedure. Enm'effor<;ant d'1s01er ainsi les elements de desaccord, fai constate qu'ils portaient essentiellement sur les Clifferentes etapes de la demilitarisation it laquelle -on doit proceder avant le pI':'..;. ~iscite. Au cours de mes entretiens avec les parties interessees, j'en suis venu de plus en plus it penser que, si l'on traitait comme un tout la -questior! de la demilitarisation, on pourrait fori: bien tro~ver une base d'accord. C'est pourquoi la proposition que fai presentee tend it ecarter l'obstacle en four- ,nissant la base d'un programme acceptable de demilitarisation qui pourra etre applique avant le plebiscite. Je ti.ens it nouveau it souJignet que les piopositibns que f?-i soumises portent de fa<;on precise -SUT .la periode qui precede le plebiscite et qu'en aucune fac;on ~lles ne concernent les fonctions confiees it l'Administrateur du plebiscite, telles qu'eUes sont enoncees dans la resolution adoptee par la Commission le 5 janvier 1949 [S/1196]. Les pouvoirs ainsi conferes it l'Administrateurdu plebiscite ne subiront. pas la moindre atteinte:. En fait,l'objet de ma'proposition est d'avalicer la date it laquelle l'Administrateur du plebiscite entreprendra sa tache au Cachemire et la menera ala bonne fin. . Au cours de mes entretiens, on a etudie de la facson la plus detaillee les questions essentielles: for.ces arineesdu Cachemire. Azad, region septen- -trionale, maintien de l'ordre· dans l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire, necessite de proteger la liberte d'opinion clans cet Etat,et d'autres sujetsimportants qui avaientete-Ionguement deba.ttus auparavant· par les deux parties. L'examen detaiUe de ces points m'a confirme dans l'opinion que la question de la demilitarisation anterieure au ptebiscite dolt etreconsideree comme u.n tout et que, siles parties peuvent se mettre d'accord sur un programme de demilitarisation progressive, on aura satisfait a l'exigence essentielle,on parviendra plus aisement par la suite it etablit les conditions necessaires a un plebiscitelibreetimpartial, et on aura. permis it l'Administrateurl du plebiscite deremplir les fonctions qui lui ont d'ores et d6jaete confiees. Jecrois que les dispositions contenues dans ma -proposition fournissent l~ base d'un programme equitable de demilitarisa- -The task of drafting a proposal of this nature has not been an easy one, and I have had t.o call on the close and continued attention of the p::l.rties as well as of the staff which has helped me in this work Every word of this proposal has been examined with great care and discussed during ih~ drafting stage with the respective parties. Its provisions were repeatedly re-drafted in an effort to obtain the ma-x:imum degree of equity and acceptability to both sides. I am sure that the necessity for this procedure, time-consuming as it has been, will be apparent to members of the Security Council and I hope, therefore, that my colleagues will not think that .I have imposed und\lly on their patience. I had intended, with the fuU!tssent of the rep-resentatives of India and of Pakistan, that the procedure to be followed thereafter. w[mld be that, once definite comments or suggestions for amendment to my proposal had reached me from both India_ and from Pakistan, I would arrange for the simultaneous interchange of their comments. Each party would thus he in possession of the explicit views of the other side. I had then intended to see their representatives separ~ atelywith a view to endeavouring to narrow the differences, in so -far as might be pOdsible, in discussions· with them. Jt would be, I thought, by this process that agreements on matters of substaIice would be incorporated into the proposal. The text would also be subject to drafting changes which-might be required to ensure that the intent had been correctly reflected in its terms. Unfortunately, the ,difficulties of communication with the Sub-Continent, to which I have previously referred, have resulted in delay in the receipt of the texts.. of the two replies. One I received yesterday and the other only toclay. The process of interchange wiiI therefore not be completed antil later on today,· after this meeting. Mor·eover, I believ;e that in this present stage of negotiation it is certaitily advantageous· to give the parties adequate time for consideration· of . all aspects of each other's suggested amendments before requiring them to take up public positions from which it mi~htbedifficult to recede.. What is now required,I think, is th:;,t the parties should. proceed with their negotiations under whatever auspices they or the Council may desire. For· this pttrpose the proposal which has been put forward; :and the amendments which have been submitted, will serve as an appropriate basis from which, I hope, in due course agreement may be reached, . I believe that my·statement reflects accurately the. principles which· have .guided. me in the preparation of the proposals which T have submitted to the parties. I should like toeonclude b _ Rediger ·...ne proposition deee genre n'a pas ete une tache facile et j'ai du certainement faire appel a l'attention soutenue des parties interessees ainsi que du personnel qui m'a aide dalls ce tra\J'~il. Tous les termes de la proposition ont ete examines avec grand~oin, et ils ant fait l'objet de discussions avec les parties interessees, au coars de la mise au point. Les dispositions ont fait l'objet de plusieurs redactions successives afin de les rendre aussi justes et auss! acc:e.otables que possible pour les deu-x: parties. Je suis :ertain que les membres du Conseil de securite se l'endront compte que cette procedure etait necessaire, aussi . longue qu'elle ait pu etre, et j'espere que mes eollegues ne penserollt pas que j'ai abuse indiiment de lenr patience. rai fixe, en plein accord avec le,S repr~sen~ants del'Inde et dtl Pakistan, la procedure aSUlVre, apres la mise au point de ma proposition, a savoir que, des. r~ception des. cbservati0D;s fait;~. pa~ .l'Inde et le! Pakistan et des suggestions Vlsant a amel1der ladite proposition, on procederait a. un el:.l!ange simultane des observations· presentees. Chaque partie dev?it done etre ainsi aucourailt du point de vue de l'autre partie. Je me SUlS efforcede voir les-repl"esentants s~parement. pour cssayerd'amenuiser les divergences de vuesqans la mestire du possible par des. conversations avec eux. J'estimais, en effet, que, de cettefa<;oD., tout accord sur. des questions de fon.d se trouverait incorpore .dans ma proposition. Le texte ferait aussi l'objet des modifications de redaction necessaires pour en rendre·le sens.parfaitement clair. Malheureusement, les cHfficultesde communieation auxquelles j'ai fait allusion auparavant ont entraine un retard dans la reception des d~tIx.reponses. ren· ai re~uune hier et rautre~lujour­ d'hui seulement. L'echange de vues ne pourra par consequent .etre acheve ~ujoutd'hui, apres lapresente ,Seance. Je crois en outre que, au stade actuel des negociations,. il est certainement avantageux . de donner aux parties p.ssezd,e temps pour qu'elles . examinent .tous les. aspect,,; ..desamendements .. res~ pectifs qu'elles ont presente.s avant de leurdemander. de. prendre .publiquementune position qu'il leur serait peut-etre difficiled'abandonner. . ", Je pense que ce qu'il.faut aetueUelllent,c'est que les deux parties poursuivent leurs negociations sous les auspicesqu'elles peuvent souhaiter ouque le Conseilpeut desirer. De cette maniere,. la proposition et les amertdements qui ont etepresentes pourront utilement servir de. base de ..discussion, et je Veux esperer qu'on aboutiraen temps utile aun accord. Je crois que la declaration que je viens de faire expose avec exactitude les principes dont jenie suis inspire.dans la preparation des propositions que j'ai presentees aux parties. Jevoudraiscon- Mr. SUNDE (Norway) : Since it was my suggestion which led the Security Council to impose upon the President the arduous and delicate task of conciliation, I think it is also incumbent upon me to thank him for the untiring and seifless devotion with which he has proceeded with the discharge of his mandate. What I called the "short-cut" in terms of the history c~ the Kashmir dispute has turned out to be long indeed in terms of the sacrifices which it has entailed for the President. At the time when most people were enjoying a holiday, he went about his important task with complete disregard for his personal convenience and in a spirit of wholehearted devotion to the interests of the community of nations. His 3tatement today makes it dear to all of 'us that he has made every effort which was humanly possible in order to clarify the issues involved in the Kashmir dispute and that he has .succeeded in defining clearly the areas of disagreement. His proposal for a basis of agreement, in my opinion, cuts across those remaining areas .in a: fair and equitable manner. I shall not presume to embark upon a detailed evaluation of that proposal. It can, of course, not be judged entirely on its intrinsic value; the controlling consideration must be its effect upon the life and happiness of t..1}e population of the disputed area itself and upon the vital interests of the two .great nations of India and Pakistan. I do not have the knowledge of Jammu and Kashmir or of their tangled history which would make it possible for me to judge of the merits of the opposing claims to the territory. However, the very remoteness of my country from the area in question and the fact that my Government entertains equally friendly relations with both the parties to the dispute, make it possible for me to view the problems with no other interests in mind than those of justice and peace. Besides the establishment of the cease-fire line, the important fact which stands out greatly to the credit of the Commission and of the parties themselves is that the two Governments have clearly and unequivocally agreed that the future of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined by the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite. The only disagreements which remain concern the methods through which the necessary conditions for such a plebiscite could best be assured. To me it would seem tragic if disagreements in regard to these essentially procedural problems should block the settlement for which we are all hoping. This brings me naturally to the "asis of the agreement which has been suggested by the President and .which he has sO eloquently and so , 0nvhlcingly presented to us orally today. IHs proposal has the merit of brevity. Even a cursory perusal makes it clear, however, that M. SUNDE (Norvege) (tradtt-it de l'anglais): Puisque c'est cl la suite d'une suggestion que j'avais faite que le Conseil de securite a charge le President d'une tache ardue et delicate de conciliation, je crois qu'il m'appartient egalement de le remercier pour le devouement infatigable et desinteresse avec lequel il s'est acquitte de son mandat. Cc que j'appelais un "raccourci", en pensat't a tous les mea:ndres du differend du Cachemire, s'est revele une route particulierement sinueuse si 1'01'1 songe aux: sacrifices qu'il a imposes au President. Au moment ou la plupart des hommes se reposaient et jouissaient d'un conge, il a poursuivi l'accomplissement de son importa:nte mission sans tenir compte de ses convenances personnelles et dans un esprit de devouement absolu aux interets de la communatite des nations. It ressort clairement de la declaration qu'il vient de faire qu'il a entrepris tout ce qui etait humainement possible en vue d'elucider les questions qui se posent cl propos du differend du Cachemire et qu'il a reussi a determiner clairement les points de desaccord qui subsistent. A mon avis, sa proposition peut servir de base de discussion et reduire, de fa~on juste et equitable, ces causes de desaccord. Je ne me lancerai pas dans une evaluation .detaillee de cette propositicn. Elle ne peut evidemment etre jugee d'apres sa valeur intrinseque; la consideration dominante doit etre l'effet qu'elle peut avoir sur la vie et le bonheur de la population de la region en litige et sur les interets vitaux des deux grandes nations que sont l'Inde et le Pakistan. Je ne connais pas assez l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire, ni son histoire compliquee, pour me permettre de juger du bien-fonde des revendications opposees dont ce territoire fait l'objet. Toutefois, la distance considerable qui separe mon pays de la region en question et, aussi, le fait que mon gouvernement entretient des relations egalement amicales avec les deux parties au differend me permettent de considerer le probleme sans autre preoccupation que les interets de la justice et de la paix. • Outre l'e~:J.blissement d'une ligne de demarcation apres 1'arret des hostilites, le fait important a inscrire au credit de la Commission et des parties elIes-memes est que les deux gouvernements ont accepte clairement et sans equivoque de voir determiner l'avenir de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire par le moyen democratique d'un plebiscite libre et impartial. Le seul desaccord qui subsiste a trait aux methodes qui doivent permettre de realiser les conditions necessaires cl 1'organisation d'un tel plebiscite. It me semblerait tragique que des desaccords concemant ces problemes de pure procedure fassent obstacle au reglement que nous esperons tous. Ceci m'amene naturellement a I'essence meme de l'accord que le President a suggere et qu'i1 nous a presente oralement aujourd'hui de maniere si eloquente et si convaincante. Sa proposition possede le merite d'etre breve. On s'aper~oit toutefois des le premier coup d:reil.... I should like to beseech the parties with all the urgency at my command to take full account of the fact that this dispute between. the two countries is the vital concern of the world at large, and that they have undertaken tlle solemn obligation under the Charter of the United ~ations to settle international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace, security and justice are not endangered. In conclusion, I should like to suggest that the negotiations between the parties should be continued under the auspices of the President, General MeNaughton, who has already done so much to reconcile their points of view, and of whose insight into and knowledge of the matter full cognizance should be taken. It is my suggestion that the President's mediation iihould, if necessary, and if he is willing, continue after the expiration of his term as President. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): The discussion of this matter in the Security Council today, particularly in the absence of the replies from the two parties to the proposals which the President has made to them, is necessarily in a preliminary stage. However, in the hope that it may be useful to the Security Council, I am already in the position to indicate broadly the reaction of my Government to those proposals which the President has put to the parties and which are now before the. Security Council. As the members of the Council will be aware, the United Kingdom stands in a very special relationship to India and to Pakistan. vVe value very greatly the friendship which we enjoy with both countries, and we are anxious to do all in our power to assist the Governments of India and Pakistan to reach agreement in regard to Kashmir. It has been a matter for particular regret on our part that the dispute has for so long hindered the development of peaceful and fruitful co-operation between the two Governr.J.ents. The immense problems which face both of them eall for the'exertion of every ounce of their joint strength. Ainsi que les' membres du Conseille savent, le Royaume-Uni entretientavec l'Inde et le Pakistan des rapports d'une nature tres particuliere. Nous attachons un tres grand prix aux relations amicales que nous entretenons avec les' deux pays, et nons sommes tres desireux de faire tout ce que nous pouvons pour aider les Gouvernements de l'Inde et du Pakistan a aboutir a un accord con- .cernant le Cachemire. Nous avons particulierement regrette que le differend ait pendant si longtemps empecbe le developpement d'un cooperation pacifique et fructueuse entre les deux gouvernements. Les immensesproblemes qu'ils ont a resoudre necessitent l'utilisation a l'extreme de leurs ressources c011J.!11unes. ".PI:••117••O££I••• lUiItlllDiIIl.bUldlfa' ~!Il'IIiIIi'iIIlIIIIlIslIIIII'!iid' ........ Je voudrais inviter les parties, aussi instamment qu'il m'est possible, a tenir pleinement compte du fait que le differend entre l'Indei et le Pakistan presente un intef(~tvital pourl~mondeentier, et que ces deux pays ont souscrit a l'obligation solennelle gu'impose la Charte des Nations Unies de regler les differends intemationaux par des moyens pacifiques, de maniere a ne pas mettre en danger la justice, la paix et la securite internationales. En conclusion, je voudrais suggerer que les negociations entre les parties soient poursuivies sous les auspices du President, le general McNaughton, qui a deja tant accompli en vue de concHier les points de vue adverses et dont la connaissance approfondie de la question devrait etre pleinement mise a profit. Je suggere que la mediation du President se poursuive egalement, s'il y a lieu et s'il accepte, apres l'expiration de son mandat de President. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais) : La discussion de cette question au Conseil de securite, aujourd'hui, etant donne surtout le fait que les deux parties n'ont pas encore repondu aux propositions que leur a faites le President, demeure necessairement une discussion preliminaire. Toutefois, dans l'espoir que le .renseignement pourra etre utile au Conseil de secu;rite, je suis deja en mesure d'indiquer dans ses grandes lignes la reaction de mon gouvemement a l'egard des propositions que le President a soumises aux parties et dont le Conseil de securite est actuellement saisi. India and Pakistan broUshi: their dispute to the United Nations in this spirit, and it is in this spirit that we must apply ourselves to the task of arriving 'at a settlement which will be accepted by the peoples of India and of Pakistan, and of the whole worle, as just and right. .. , It is perhaps appropriate that the leader of, a delegation of another Commonwealth country should hav~ been entrusted by the Security Council with the task of endeavouring, by private negotiation, to arrive at some basis of settlement upon which the parties might agree. Our President has, I know, laboured night and day since the last meeting of the Security Council and has spared neither himself nor his staff. We all owe a very great debt of gratitude to him and his delegation. Such knowledge as I have had of the progress of his consultations with the parties has led me to admire his fair-mindedness and his anxiety to take due account of all points of view and of the special difficulties which beset the parties to the dispute. I knQW sufficient of his work to be able to say that his whole attitude has been completely objective, and I feel confifident that the representatives of India and Pakistan will agree with me that this is unquestionably the case. The third interim report of the Un:~ed Nations Commission for India and Pakistan [Sj1430, Sj1430jAdd.1, Sj1430jAdd.2, Sj1430/Add.3] drew particular attention to three matters which have hindered the Commission in its work. Two of these matters, namely, the disposal of the Azad forces and the withdrawal of troops from Jammu and Kashmir, can, in the view of my delegation, be linked together when we 'reflect upon ways and means of overcoming the impasse which has been reached. It seems to us that, viewed against the proper background, these matters are not of such a major character that a· solution is impossible. Both Governments are, after all, pledged to determine the final accession of Kashmir in accordance with the will of the people expressed through a free and impartial plebiscite. The prinCiples which are to govern the arrangements for the plebiscite have, moreover, been agreed by both parties and are set out in the United Nations Commission's resolution of 5 January 1949. Clearly, however, conditions for the plebiscite .cannot be established so lang as there is any reasonable ground for fear on the part of any of the inhabitants of Jammu and , C'est dans cet esprit que l'Inde et le Pakistan ont soumis lettr differend aux Nations Unies et c'est dans eet esprit egalement que nous devons nous efforcer d'aboutir a un reglement qui soit accepte comme juste et equitable par les peuples de l'Inde et du Pakistan, et aussi par le monde entier. I1 n'est peut-etre pas malseant que la tache de trouver une base d'accord entre les parties interessees au moyen de negociations officieuses ait ete confiee au chef de la delegation d'un autre pays du Commonwealth. Je n'ignore pas que le President a travaille jour et nuit depuis la derniere reunion du Conseil et qu'il n'a menage ni sa peine ni celle de son personnel. Nous devons lui en etre reconnaissants, a. lui et asa delegation. Ce . que je sais du progres des consultations auxqueUes i1 a procede avec les parties m'a amene a. admirer son impartialite et le soin scrupuleux qu'il a. pris de tenir compte de tous les points de vues, eomme des difficultes particulieres que rencontrent les parties au differend. Je connais assez le travail qu'i! a fait pour dire que son attitude a ete parfaitement objective, et, j'en suis sur, les representants de l'Inde et du Pakistan s'accorderont a. dire qu'it en est incontestablement ainsi. Le troisieme rapport provisoire de la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Inde et le Pakistan [Sj1430, S/1430jAdd.1, Sj1430jAdd.2 et SI 1430/Add.3] attirait particulierement l'attel1tioll sur trois questions qui avaient gene la Commission dans son travail. Ma delegation est d'avis que, en recherchant le moyen de sortir de l'impasse oit nous nous trouvons, deux de ces questions pourront etre discutees simultanement, a. savoir la maniere de disposer des forces du Cachemire Azad et le retrait des troupes indiennes et pakistanaises du Jammu et du Cachemire. I1nous semble que, lorsqu'on ne les considere pas isolement, ces questions ne paraissent pas avoir une importance teUe qu·it soitimpossible d'en trouver la solution. Apres tout, les deux parties se sont engagees a. re15ler l'avenir du Cachemire selon le vreu de sa population, librement exprime par un. plebiscite impartial. De plus, les deux parties se. sont a:ccordees sur les.principes auxquels les dispositions prises pour un plebiscite devront etre conformes. Ces principes sod eno!!.ces •dans la resolution adoptee le 5 janvier 1949 par la Commission des Nations Unies. Il est clair, neanmoinsi~ que les conditions necessaires pour qt,'un tel ple- .•.. -- In "egard to the question of the Northern Area, my Government is impressed by the statement in paragraph 273 of the Commission's report that "the entry of Indian forces into the area north of· th~) cease-fire line would almost inevitably lead to a renewal of.hostilities." It is, of course, the duty of the Security Council to eliminate such a contingency. It will be remembered that all members of the Commission except one felt that the Government of India ought, in the circumstances, to be willing to waive a claim which has, in any event, to be considered 'afresh in connexion with the preparation of conditions for the holding of a plebiscite. According to my information, the proposals which the President submitted to the two parties were prepared only after the closest consultation with them. They were designed to pay the utmost possible regard to the legitimate interests of the two parties to this dispute. I do not think anyone would wish to question the general considerations which are set out in paragraph 1 of the proposals. In paragraph 2 I note that it is laid down that the programI' .~ of progressive demilitarization shall be agrc:....:d between the parties. Having regard to the objectives which have been accepted publicly by both Governments, it seems to me impossible to quarrel with this paragraph. No doubt special considerations and interests might need to be taken into account in preparing the program, but given good will on the part of all concerned, I believe that it would be possible to achieve a result which would be equitable and acceptable. The remaining paragraphs of the proposal seem to my delegation to be equally appropriate, having regard to the circumstances in which we find ourselves, and the history of.this matter. I would, therefore, say to the parties that these proposals seem to me to correspond broadly to the views of well-disposed and impartial observers of the Kashmir scene. I know that both the Indian and Pakistan delegations have been reflecting upon them' with all seriousness, and that this matter calls for the display of great statesmanship on the part of the leaders of both countries. Let us, however, be under no illusion about the pt!rport of these proposals. What is under consideration is not a final solution of the Kashmir problem, but rather thene.."rt step in a prQces~ leading towards .the plebiscite which, as both· Sides are agreed, shall take place to decide the ultimate fate of Kashmir. The two Govern- Ma delegation estime que les autres paragraphes de la proposition sont egalement bien conc;us, etant donne les circonstances dans lesque11es nous nous trouvons et les antecedents. Je dirai done aux parties que ces propositions me semblent correspondre, dans l'ensemble, au point de vue de personnes bien disposeeset d'observateurs impartiaux des evenements qui se sont deroules en Cachemire. Je sais que les delegations de 1'1' ~leet du Pakistan les ont etudiees avecla plus grande attention et que les dirigeantsdes deux pays devrontfaire preuve d'uo grand sens politique pour regler la question. Mais n'ayons pas d'illusions sur la portee de ~es propositions. I1 ne s'agit pas de resoudrede£initivement le' problerne du Cachemire,mais plutot de franchir Une nouvelle etape sur la'voie qui mh1e. au plebiscite auquel les deux parties ont consenti! et qui doit trancher ~'avenir du Cachemire. Des suggestions In conclusion, I would extend to the President and to the delegations of India and Pakistan our good wishes in the anxious negotiations which are now proceeding. I have every confidence that it will be found possible to reach an understanding along the lines suggested by the President, which will enable progress to LIe made in this matter fairly and satisfactorily to all concerned. Mr. CHAUVEL (France) (translated from French): Although France was not one of the authors of the draft resolution which set up the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan [Sj654]. it participated, by its vote, in the establishment of that body and has never ceased to hope for the success of its mission. Ever since the Security Council began to con- . liider the matter, we have felt that two fundamental reasons make it expedient for a peaceful settlement of the problem to be reached as quickly as possible. The successful mediation of a complex question which is causing conflict between two States which have only recently attained their independence could not be a matter of indifference to the United Nations. The success of that mediation would constitute a promise· for humanity and an example for the other' Members of the United Nations. Finally, the geographical position of the two States concerned, the size of their populations, and the splendid·future which seems to lie before them, make the consequences. of a prolonged dispute particularly serious. - We must not shut our eyes to the fact that by reason of the period of history through which we are passing and because of the great responsibility their Governments assumed when the two nations acquired independence, these States are face:d with many problems. It would be regrettable If the question of Kashmir, which is one of those problems, were to be prolonged to the point of appearing practically insoluble, for we would then see India and Pakistan devoting a large part of their resources to preparing and carrying on a struggle which, because of their common history, would actually be fratricide. We would 'see the future of these States endangered, perhaps beyond recovery, and a magnificent promise disappearing in chaotic upheavals. The French delegation gladly associates itself with the tribute the representatives of Norway and of the United Kingdom have paid to the President for the devotion to duty he has shown in his conduct of this matter. It has been very favourably impressed by the practical and concrete nature of the proposals he has presented. It thinks that it is indeed by adhering to the facts of the case and by facing the practical objective to be reached, disregarding as far as possible the sentimental aspects of the problem, that progress can be achieved. ~'aboutir a un accord conforme, dans ses grandes lignt..:', a la proposition faite par le President, et qu'on pourra ainsi realiser des progres vers une solution equitable et satisfaisante pour tous les interesses. . . M. CHAUVEL (France): Bien que la France n'ait pas figure panni les auteurs du projet de resolution qui a cree la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Inde et le Pakistan [S/654]. elle s'est associee, par son vote, acette creation, et eIle 11'a cesse de formuler des vreux pour le succes de sa mission. Deux raisons essentielles, depuis que le Conseil de securite a commence l'exarnen de cette affaire, nous ont par'u militer en faveur d'un reglement pacifique aussi rapide que possible. Il ne pouvait etre indifferent, en efIet, pour les Nations Unies, de reussir une mediation dans une question complexe et mettant aux prises~deux Etats nouvellement nes a. l'independance. Le succes de cette mediation aurait une valeur de promesse pour l'humanite et d'exemple pour les autres Membres des Nations Unies. Enfin, l'emplacement meme des Etats en presence, l'importance de leur population, la grandeur de l'avenir auquel ils semblent destines rendaient particulierement serieuses les consequences d'un conflit prolonge. I1 ne faut pas nous dissimuler que ces Etats, en raison meme de la periode de l'histoire que nous traversons et de l'immense respansabilite que leurs gouvernements ont assumee en meme temps' que leurs pays ont accede a l'independance, ont a composer avec,de·nombreuses difficultes. I1 serait deplorable que la question du Cachemire, qui est une de ces difficultes, se prolongeat au' point de paraitre quasi insoluble, car on verrait alars l'Inde et le Pakistan consacrer une grande partie de leurs ressOur<:es ala preparation et a la prolongation d'une lutte qui, en raison de la communaute de leurhistoire, serait, a proprement parler, fratricide. On verrait l'avenir de ces deux Etats cornpromis peut-etre d'une falSon irremediable, et une magnifique promesse disparaitre dans le chaos des convulsions. - La delegation franc;aise s'associe bien yalontiers aux eloges fonnules par les representantSi de la Norvege et du-Royaume-Uni au sujet dudevol,ement dont le President a fait preuve dans la conduite de cette affaire. Elle a ete tres favorablement impressionnee par le caractere pratique et concretdes propositions qu'il a presentees. Elle estime, en effet, que c'est bien en se plalSant sur le terrain des faits et face a l'objectif pratique 11 atteindre, en faisant abstraction, aussi completement que possible, des aspects sentimentaux du '. p:robleme, que des progres peuvent etre accomplis,.J Mr. GROSS (United States of .(\merica) : It has been a source of great pleasure to my delegation to hear the many laudatory comments which have been made this afternoon concerning the President's efforts in this very complex and difficult matter. I should like to associate my Government whole-heartedly with the expressions of appreciation for the statesmanlike efforts in which the President has been engaged at the request of the Council. In view of the complexities of the problem and the depth of feeling of the parties most closely concerned, it should not cause us grave concern that these efforts, begun omy a few days ago, have not yet produced a complete meeting of minds. We are confident, however, that both parties are fully aware of the uniqut. opportunity which the President's participation offers to move forward towards a prompt resolution of their current difficulties. Because the President is both a statesman of the highest calibre at the service of the United Nations and a most distinguished representative of a sister State in that Commonwealth of Nations of which both parties are .members, his continued participation, we most earnestly believe, offers a suitable means by which the parties can carry out their Charter obligations' of seeking a peaceful settlement of their dispute. In view of the fact that these consultations are still in progress and are to continue, I shall not now comment upon details of the proposaJs which the President has submitted to the parties; and it would be understandable, I think, if the parties did not at this time feel free to comment upon the matter. However, my delegation has had an opportunity to study the proposalssince they have been made available to the members of the Council. I believe that they constitute a fair and reasonable approach to the problem, based upon a principle to which the President has already referred.and which has been accepted heretofore by both parties: that the future of the State of Iammu and Kashmir will be determined by the freely expressed.will of its people. ...... .._-..oIl_7 ............~ Enfin, n'ayant en vue que la pacification des esprits et la prosperite des Etats interesses, la delegation franc;aise adresse aux deux parties l'appelle plus serieux, le plus pressant, afin qU'eA pleine conscience de leurs responsabilites elle~ continuent a se preter, avec toute la bonne volonte et l'esprit de conciliation que 1'occasion comparte, a la recherche d'une solution aux difficultes qui les divisent et que, ce faisant, elles ne permettent pas a l'accessoire de leur masquer la vue de l'essentiel. M. GROSS (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais) : Ma delegation a pris grand plaisir a entendre les nombreux commentaires elogieux dont on a Ilalue, cet apres-midi, les efforts du President en cette difficile et complexe question. Je tiens a dire que mon gouvernement s'associe en toute sincerite aux felicitations fonnulees au sujet du grand sens politique qui a marque tous les efforts tentes par le President, ala requete du Conseil. En raison du caractere complexe du probleme et de la force des sentiments qui animent les deux paJ.1l:ies les plus directement interessees, nous ne devrions pas nous inquieter serieusement de ce que ces efforts, si recemment entrepris, n'aient pas encore abouti a un complet rapprochement des esprits. Nous sommes toutefois persuades que les deux parties sont pleinement conscientes de l'occasion unique qui1eur est offerte, par le concours' du President, d'arriver a une prompte solution de leurs difficultes presentes. Le President etant ala fois un homme d'Etat de la plusgrande valeur auservice des Nations Unies et i'eminent representant d'une nation sceur au sein de ce Commo11- wealth dont sont egalement membres les deux parties, nous crayons 1:res sincerement que les efforts suivis du President offrent un moyen propre apermettre aux deux parties de s'acquitter de 1'obligation, qui leur incombe aux termesde la Charte, de rechercher un reglement. paci£ique de leur differend. Etant _ne que les consultations sont aotuellement en cours et doivent se poursuivre, je' ne commenterai pas maintenant..dans le detail les propositions soumises par le President aux parties; et on le comprendra, je pense,puisque les parties elles-memes ne se croient pas a. l'heure aotuelle autorisees ale faire. Cependant, ma delegation a pu etudier ces propositions puisqu'elles ont ete communiquees aux membres du Conseil. Je crois qu'elles permettent d'aborder le probleme de fac;on impartiale etraisonnable en PClrtant du principe que le President a deja invoque et auquelles deux parties ont jusqu'ici donne leur accord, a savoirque le sort de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire doit etre determine par la volonte librement exprimee de son peuple. We can well imagine, of course, that the suggestions put forward by the President do not reflect the optimum originally desired by either party. We should have been surprised if either party has so regarded them. It would have been equally surprising to us, however, if either party had summarily rejected them, out of hand; and it is a source of real encouragement that, as is apparent from the President's report this afternoon, this has not been the case. While we feel that these proposals are reasonable, they do not,. of course, necessarily represent the only meri- .,torious solution which might commend itself to the prties. These specific proposals. would be expected, we should imagine, to give way to amendments or revisions put forward by the. partie3, if such amendments or revi~ions were consistent with the general approach of the proposals and offered greater prospects of producing a meeting of minds. It is our expectation that the parties will, under the able guidance of the President, continue their co~sultations along these lines, in' fulfilment of their obligations under Article 33 of the Charter to reach a satisfactory and peaceful solution of the current dispute. I understand it is the sense .of the Council's mandate of 17 Dec~mber to the President and the earnest desire of both parties that this should be done. It is our confident hope that, if this is the case, their efforts will, ~ successful. Mr. TSIANG (China) : In view of the fact that the final replies of the two parties concerned in the President's proposals are not available to the members of the Council at this moment, it would be out of place for me to go into the details of the problem. I know,however, from personal experience how strenuous the President's task must have been, since, in March and April of last year, I had the opportunity to take an active part in the. discussions on this very question. Because of that experience, I admire all the more both the impartiality and the statesmanlike qualities of the President's proposals. As he very,well stated in his speech at the beginning of this afternoon meeting, the problem is to bring about a really fair and impartial plebiscite. It would be totally, unprofitable~ if not embarra.ssing, to go into the history of' this problem. The President's proposalsi as I understand them, were· made with the s.ole objective of ensuring a fair and impartial 'plebiscite. Those' proposals .were not intended to prejudice the rights or claims of either party, cnd, in fact, a. study of them Naturellement, nous pouvons aisernent imaginer que les suggestions presentees par le President ne repondent pas a. tout ce que l'une et I'autre partie desiraient a l'origine. Nous aurions ete surpris que l'une ou l'autre des parties ait estime que ses vreuXi s'y trouvaient exauces. Nous audons toutefois ete tout'aussi surpris que l'une ou l'autre les ait rejetees sur-le-champ, sans autre forme de proces, et ce nous est un reel encouragement que de voir, d'apres ce que nous a dit le President cet apres-midi, qu'il n'en a pas ete ainsi. Nous estimons, certes, que ces propositions.sont raisonnables, mais, nature!lement, elles ne representent pasnecessairement la seule solution que les parties puissent juger acceptable. Nous pensons que, sans doute, ce que l'on attend de ces propositions specifiques, c'est qu'eIles incitent les parties cl presenter des amendements ou des projets de modification, a la condition que ces amendements et ces modifications ne s'ecartent pas des principes fJ'eneraux qui ont inspire les propositions -et oftrent de meilleures chances de rapprocher les esprits. Nous comptons que, sous la direction avisee du Preside.,t, les parties poursuivront leurs negociations et s'acquitteront ainsi ,de l'obligation, que leur fait l'Article 33 de la Charte, de rechercher une solution pacifique satisfaisante de leur differend actuel. Tel est, cl mon avis, le sens du mandat que le Conseil a donne, le 17 decembre, cl son President, et c'est aussi, je crois, le desir sincere des deux parties. S'jl en est bien ainsi, nous esperons fermement que Ces efforts seront couronnes de succes. M. TSIANG (Chine) (traditit de l'anglais) : Les membres du Conseil n'ayant pas actuellement connaissance de ce que seront les reponses de£initives des deux parties ,aux propositions du President, il ne convient certes pas que j'entre dans les .details du probleme. Je sais toutefois, par experience persoIDlelle, combien la tache ,du President a pu etre ardue puisque, en mars et avril derniers, j'ai eu l'occasion de prendre une part active aux debats sur ceHe ,meme question. J'admire d'a4- tant plus, de .ce fait, et l'impartialite, et le sens politique dont sont empreintes les propositions du President. Comme celui-ci l'a tres bien indique au debut de cette seance, le probleme consiste cl procedeI' a. un plebiscite ,dans des conditions d'equite et d'imr>artialite veritables: IlseTait sans aucun profit - voire embarra.ssant -:- de revertir sur les antecedents de la ques" tion., Les propositions du President, comme je les comprends, ant ete formulees a. settle fin d'assurer un plebiscite impartial et' equitable. Ces proposi-- tions 'ne visent nullement a. porter} atteinte aux droits ou aux revendications de l'tine ou l'autre My delegation would like to see the present procedure continued. If the President could undertake to pursue the discussions with the two parties, both during the remainder of his term as President and later, if necessary, it would be, it seems to my delegation, a great serviceto the cause of peace in the part of the world concerned. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian) : Without touching upon the sur-stance of the dispute between India and Pakistan or upon the nature of the President's proposalsJ which, quite obviously, can best be judged by the parties concerned, I should like to speak on some points of procedure. I would emphasize that the best course would be for the parties themselves to judge the nature of the President's proposalsJ since the position of those who assiduously praise those proposals, regardless of their nature and without taking the trouble to hear first, in the Security Council, the views of the parties interested in those proposals, is somewhat anomalous. The impression might be created that certain parties are trying to force those proposals upon certain others. The views of the parties to the dispute are not merely of secondary importance to the Security Council. As regards the procedural aspect of the issue, the .USSR delegation wishes to draw attention to points 4 and 5 of General McNaughton's proposals, which provide that the mediator shall be appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, while the plebiscite administrator in Kashmir shall be appointed and shall take up his duties in accordance with the resolution of the U::lited Nations Commission for India and Pakis- , tan of 5 January 1949. . The USSR delegation considers such a procedure to be inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, the rules of procedure and established practice. The question of Kashmir is before the Security Council; thereforeJ the letter and the spirit of the Charter demand 'that the Security Council, as the organ mainly responsible for. the maintenance of international peace and security, should itself appoint the appropriate subsidiary organs for mediation, arbitration, or the carrying out of any other measures for the settlement of a given dispute. The Security Council should not transfer or relegate those functions to any other organ of the United Nations, including the Secretary-General. Similarly, it is of course impossible to endorse Ori ne saurait, bien entendu, approuver la decithe decision adopted in this mattr by the United sion que la Commission des NationsUnies pour Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on l'Inde et le Pakistan a prise sur cette question le 5 January 1949. The Commission obviously ex- 5 janvier 1949. En decidant d'inviter le Secretaire ceeded its powers by deciding that the Secretarygeneral a designer un administrateur du plebis- General should appoint a plebiscite administrator. cite, cette'Comniission a nettemen'l: outrepasse ses Such action is within =the competence of the pouvoirs. Les decisions de ce genre relevent de la Security Council. The Commission's powers ar~ competencedu Conseil de securite;1a Conunission limited to the submission of r~commendations to n'est. qualifiee .que pourrecommander an Conseil !he Security Council; it cannot take the Council's telle ou telle proposition. EUe ne saurait sesubsti- P. re Ma delegation aimerait voir cette procedure poursuivie. Elle estime que, si le President pouvait continuer les discussions avec les deux parties, non seulement jusqu'a la fin de son mandat, mais encore, si la chose est necessaire, apresl'expiration dece mandat, ce serait un grand service rendu a la cause de la paix dans la partie du monde qui est id en jeu. M. MALIK (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (,tradttit du 1'usse): Je n'examinerai pas le differend indo-pakistanais quant au fond; je ne discuterai pas non plus les propositions du President, car les parties en cause sont naturelle.. ment mieux placees pour en apprecier la nature. Je voudrais plutot m'an'eter .a certaines questions de procedure. Je tiens a signaler tout particulierement que les parties en cause sont le mieux quali:- . fiees pour porterun jugement sur les propositions que vient de faire le President; en efIet, ceux qui loucnt avec tant g.'ardeur des propositions sans avoir pris la peine'd'eri etudier la nature et d'entendre au prealable l'opinion des representants des parties en .cause au Conseil de securite risquent de se mettre dans une situation plutot etrange. On risque de creer l'impression que certains cherchent a imposer ces propositions a d'autres. Cependant, 1'0pinion des parties au differend ne saurait etre consideree comme une question secondaire par le Consei! de securite. Quant a la question de procedure, la delegation de I'URSS attire l'attention du ConseiI sur les paragraphes 4 et 5 des propositions du general MeNaughton ou il est prevu que le mediateur sera designe par le Secretaire general des Nations Unies et que I'Administrateur charge d'organiser le plebiscite dans le Cachemire sera nomme' et exercera ses fonctions conformement a laresolution adoptee le 5 janvier 1949 par la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Inde et le Pakistan. La delegation de rURSS estime qu'une telle methode serait contraire, tant aux dispositions de la Chal'te des l\Tations Unies qu'a l'usage etabli et au reglement interieur; C'est au Conseil de secu"" :t:,ite qu'it appartient d'examiner la question du Cachemire, et c'est lui qui, selon l'esprit et la lettre de la Charte,.eslt tenu, en timt qu'organe principal responsable du mainuen de la paix et de la securite internationaies, de designer des organes subsidhires pour assurer 'la mediation, rarbitrage et la mise en reuvre de toute autre disposition propre a conduire au reglement des differends. Le.Conseil de securite ne peut transmettre ou deleguer ses fonctions a aucun autre organe de I'Organisation des Nations Unies, pas meme au Secretaire general. 4' the question in greater detail with the object of submitting any possible concrete proposals to the Council fQr examination. At the preceding meeting of' the Security Council, there was a definite departure from this generally accepted and established procedure. The President was entrusted 'with the holding of discussions with the parties, without so much as nearing their views. Experience shows that one faulty step often leads to another; the wrong course, once chosen, will be pursued. The meaning of the suggestion made today by the representative of Norway is that the present President of the Security Council, the Canadian representative, will be charged with carrying out the function of the President when he no longer will be President, in obvious disregard of the fact that after 1 January 1950 Canada will no longer be a member of the Security Council. The Norwegian representative has therefore suggested something for which there is no precedent: that the Security Council should empower the representative of a country which in a few days will retire from the Security Council to continue to exercise functions which no longer pertain to him, that is to say, functions which in this matter have heretofore been performed'-by the President of the Security Council. This would surely be an unprecedented situation. Indeed, the Council would be placing the Canadian representative in an embarrassing, not to say, delicate, position. Such a state of affairs would be an innovation, not provided for either in the Charter or in the rules of procedure, and inconsistent with the meth0ds of work of the Security Council. Until now the 'narter has recognized two.categories of n:1en, ;; of the Security Council: permanent and non-peruanent. The Norwegian representative is in fact asking the Council to establish a new and third kind of membership: an extended membe"'ship, as it were. He is actually suggesting that the powers of the Canadian repre-sentativeshould be extended beyond 1 January 1950, so as to permit him to handle the affairs of the Security Council not only after the expira- Bien entendu, le mediateur ou l'arbitre, de meme que l'Aministrateur du plebiscite, doivent etre acceptables pour les deux parties; en d'autres termes, ils doivent etre designes avec l'assentiment des parties interessees. Quant a la proposition que le representant de la Norvege a soumise aujourd'hui, .il est clair qu'elle fait surgir, eUe aussi, de graves difficultes touchant a la procedure. On sait que jusqu'a present, en examinant la question en discussion. c'est-a-dire le differelld entre l'Inde et le Pakistan qui porte sur l'Eta.ot de Jammu et Cachemire, on a employe la methode suivante: le Conseil de securite entendait tout d'abord les parties en cause, puis le President etudiait la situation de plus pres afin de presenter au Conseil des propositions aussi precises que possible. A sa derniere seance, le Conseil de securite a manifestement enfreint cette methode traditionneUement etablie. I1 a charge son President d'entrer en negociations avec les parties, sans meme avoir entendu l'opinion de ces dernieres. Comme le dit le proverbe: qui a bu boil·a. Ayant commis une infraction, on continue bien souvent a en commettre d'autres. Aux termes de la suggestion faite aujourd'hui par le representant de la Norvege, le President actuel du Conseil de securite, c'est-a-dire le representant dn Canada, sera charge d'exercer les fauctions de President pendant la periode qui suivra l'expiration de son manda!t. Ce faisant, on meconnait manifestement le fait que, a la date du ler janvier 1950, le Canada cessera de faire partie du Conseil de securite. Ainsi done, le representant de la Norvege fait une proposition sans precedent, en invitant le Conseil de securite a demanderau representant d'un pays qui, dans quelques jottrs, cessera d'en faire partie, de continuer a remplir des fonctions qu'il n'aura plus droit de remplir, et qui etaient jusqu'a present devolues an President du Conseil de securite. Ce serait la une situation sans precedent. Le Conseil placerait ainsi le representant du Canada dans une situation fort delicate, je dirai meme fort embarrassante. Ce serait la une nouveaute que ne prevoient ni la Charte ni le reglement interieur, nouveaute qui serait contraire aux methodes de travail etablies. La Charte ne connait jusqu'a present que deux categories de membres du Conseil de securite: les membres permanents et les membres non permanents. En fait, le representant de la N orvege propose actuellement au Conseil de creet une noUvelle_categorie,.ceUe des'membres du Conseil de securite "a mandat prolonge". En realite, ce representant propose de proroger les pouvoirs du representant du Canada au-dela dll ler janviet 1950 pour lui permettre de s'occuper des affaires Such are the brief remarks on procedure which the delegation of the Soviet Union wished to make at the present stage of the discussion. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de ranglais) : I1 n'y a plus d'orateurs· inserits sur ma liste. Quelqu'un desire-t-il encore prendre la parole?

I have no speaker on my list. Does anyone desire to address the Security Council at this time? Le Secretaire general adjoint me fait connaitre qu'it serait tres incommode et fort couteux que le Conseil de securite se reunisse le samedi 31 decembre. Par consequent, le seul moment ou nous puissions tenir une nouvelle seance, c'est l'apresmidi de la journee de demain, 30 decembre. Je voudrais savoir si quelqu'un desire que le Conseil de securite soit convoque a cette date, afin que nous puissions discuter de la question Inde-Pakistan. I am told by the Assistant Secretary-General that it would be a matter of considerable inconvenience and expense to hold a meeting of the Security Council on Saturday, 31 December. In consequence, the only day which is open to us to hold a further meeting is tomorrow afternoon, 30 December. I should like to ask now whether anyone wishes a meeting of the Security Council to be called for that time in order to discuss the India-Pakistan question. Comme personne n'a formute de propositioIl dans ce sens, j'ai l'intention de lever la seance; la prochaine reunion du Conseil aura lieu en 1950, sous 1~ presidence de son nouveau President et apres le renouvellement partiel de.ses membres. . En ce qui concerne les suggestions particulierement courtoises avancees .par un .certain nombre de mes collegues, je desire leur·exprimer personnellement ma tres vive reconnaissance pour la £a<;on si aimable dont ils ont appreeie les efforts que j'ai faits pour essayer de resoudre la question qui noUs occupe. Je voudrais que mes colll~gues soient convaincus qu'en aucune mamere je ne cherche a m'epargner les souds d'une tache que!- conque, mais je pense qu'ils ne m'en voudront pas si je declare que, avant d'entreprendreune mission du genre de celle a laquelle it a ete fait allusion, je dois etre sur qu'il est en fait indispensable que je m'en charge. J'estime que, s'it doit en etre ainsi, il importe avant tout, comme le representant del'URSS l'a indique, que la nature de la mission que le mediateur aura a. remplir entre les deux parties,dans une affaire d'une importance aU5si vitale, soit definie avec beaucoup de soin et dans tous les details par.le Conseil·de·securite, en plein accord avec les parties, et que la personne du mediateur soit egalement agreee par lesdites As no one has asked for such a meeting, I propose now to adjourn this one, and the Security Council will next meet in the newyeal' under its new PreSIdent and with its new membership. In connexion with the very courteous suggestions which have been put forward by a number of my colleagues, I wish to express my very great personal gratitude to them for the kind remarks they have made as regards the serviceS I have tried to render in this particular matter. I should like to assure my colleagues that under no circumstances do L seek to evade trouble or work, but I think they will forgive me if I say that before undertaking such a mission as has been indicated, I should satisfymysel£ that there is in fact a real necessity for me so to do. I feel that if this should be so, it would only be right and appropriate that, as the representative of the Soviet Union has indicated, the scope of the mediation between the two parties, in this vitally important matter, should be most carefully and most specifically.defined by the Security Council in full agreement with the parties, and that the parties should also .be in agreement as to the person who should undertake this duty. I again say that I do appreciate most sincerely the courtesy which has been given··to ... Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): I should like to be clear on one or two points. In the first place, I think the President has said that it is his intention, after the Security Council adjourns, to get in touch with the parties and to contin~le negotiations. If that should lead to any definitive result, good or bad, by 11-00n tomorrow, would it not be possible to summon the Security Council? I am sure that the members of the Security Coundl would be glad to place themselves at the President's disposal and to come to a meeting here, at short notice, tomorrow afternoon; Of course, the time is short and I quite realize that that may not be possible. But then again, I'should like to be, clear that even if it is not possible, the President'will still 'be able to carry on the negotiation until he arrives at some ·deflnite,point. That might not be, of course, <;l~ting the term of his presidency. We cannot meet anyway on Saturday, and Sunday is 1 Janu.,. ary. However, if circumstances allow, ,and the . President is able and willing te> continue discussions. with the parties, and reaches some result, we have toconsider how that could be presented to the Security Council. 'I wOIider whether itwould be possible, assuming that the Council ,agrees to it, that the President should appear before it. as Rapporteur .at ,its request. I quite see.the difficulties to which the representative of the Soviet Union has drawn oqr ,attention: they wete present to my mind. We must" be careful not to create a precedent, but, ,prgvided that' full emphasis WaS laid on the entirely exceptional nature ,of this. case, Iwonder whether "he would object to, invitiIlg General McNaughton inhis individual capacity, although he' woulClbe 'an ex-President, to come, if he _would, .-ag,'Rapporteur to present the case' to •the CouIlcil. Thatis,o£ course, also on the assumption that it would be agreeable-as I rather think itwould~to.the,twoparties., I should assume that '.the parties would" ,find it convenient,to ,have someindividual in whom they ,had .complete confidence who' would set out the results and state thecase' fo the Council. Of course, without the assent of the two parties, I quite see that it might be diffi.cultto arrange; but I do foresee that, withollt any Rapporteur to tell us, of the results of, the n(lgotiation, the Council, might be in.some difficulty -and 'that the proceedings" might -lack guidaneeand. a certain amount· of confusion might result. • ,I hope, therefore, that, if possible, the President Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'angDais) : Il y a un ou deux points sur It:squels je voudrais obtenir des ecIaircissements. Tout d'abord, j'ai cru comprendre qu'il etait dans les intentions du President d'entrer, des la fin de la seance, en contact avec les parties et de poursuivre les negociations. Si ces pourparlers aboutissent a un resultat definitif quel qu'il soit, bon ou m~ J.vais, d'id demain apres-midi; ne serait-it pas possible de 'convoquer le Conseil de securite pour cette date? Je suis $ur que les membres du Conseil se tiendront volontiers a la disposition du Presideqt pour se rendre a cette convocation, meme si eUe ne peut etre faite qu'au dernier moment Certes, il reste peu de temps, et je comprends parfaitement qu'on ne puisse escomp'ter tin resultat aussi rapide. Mais; dans ce cas, je voudrais avoir l'assurance que, meme si on n'aboutit pas d'ici demain aun resultat definitif, le President sera en mesure de poursuivre les negociations jusqu'au bout, et i1 est, sans doute, vraisemblable qu'il ne pourra pas y parvenir avant l'expiration de son mandat actue1; de toute fac;on, nous ne pouvonsnous reuni1' ni samedi, 11i dimanche let' janvier. Toutefois, si les circonstances '. se p:retent a la poursuite des pourparlers, si, le President est en mesure des'en occuper et consenta le faire, si, enfin, il aboutit a un resultat, il nous faut eti;~dier le moyen d'en informer le Conseil. Je voudrais savoir si le Conseil admettrait que le President se presente devant lui, a sa dematide, en qualite de Rapporteur. Je vois parfaitement les diffictiltes sur lesquelles le representant de l'URSS a attire notre attention. EUes ne m'ont pas echappe, et je n'ig'Ilore pas que nous devons prendre garde 'de ne pas,creer un precedent, mais, pourvu que soit nettement mis en evidence le caractere tout a fait e~ceptionne1 de l'affaire, je me demande si le Conseil verraitun inconvenient a inviter le general McNaughton a titre personnel, bien qu'ilsoit son ex-President,.a lui presenter le dossier en tant'que Rapporj:eur~ sous reserve. ha,. tu1'ellement, de son-cpnsentement personnel. Il ,faudrait encore que cette solution cOllvint aux deux parties interessees, mais j'incline a. croire qu'il en serait ainsi et que les parties apprecie" raient l'avantage de voir confier aune personna;' liteenlaquelle e1les ont la plus absolue eonfiance le soind'exposer les resultats desnegociations et de presenter I'affaire au Conseil. Certes, je me rends compte de la t8ifficulte qu'il y aurait cl regler c~ ,point :,sans I'agrement des parties, mais, d'un autre cote,je prevoisque, en l'absence d'un Rapporteur qui lui,expose les,resultats des negociations, .il se pourrait bien que le Conseil, se trouve dans l'embar1'as, que la conduite de ses debats en soufffe et-que la discussion aboutisse a une certaine confusiotl. Je souhaite donc que le President convoque le

In reply to the representative of the United Kingdom, I should like to assure him and my other'colleagues on the Council again that I do not in any sense seek to evade any proper responsibility. So long as this Council continues, my present mandate ir to participate v.rith the parties in the discussion or this problem, and I shall continue to do'that work. As regards the question of reporting the results of the work done under the terms of my mandate, I shall be glad to follow any procedure which the new Council may fmd convenient ,for placing such a report before them. I sh9Uld like to say again that the matter which faces us is one which far transcends any personal or individual consideration. It is very important that the procedural aspects of this issue should he in as complete harmony as possible with the wishes of the Security Council and the wishes of the parties. 1 believe, particularly as a J;esult of my recent experience, that, if we are proceed usefully, the matter should be formalized in some way or other by the new Council, which must be the master to which reports will be made by whoevt:;r has these delegated functions. I want again to assure the Council-and that assurance' extends 'to the new, Council-that, if my services should be required, I shall bend .every effort to make them available fully and under whatever terms may be prescribed. I should like to comment on the United Kingdom representative's suggestion that we might conditionally call a meeting of the Security Council for tomorrow afternoon. As' I explained in my' report to the,Council, it was only late today that we were in a position to prepare for duplication the proposals of the parties, and it is only when I return to my office'" in New York' after this meeting that I shaJl be in a position to carry_out in fact that simultaneous exchange which has been agreed upon. The consequence is that,between now and some Hme in the late morning of tomorrow, there will. be very little time for that careful CDnsideration and, discussion which these proposed amendments, will und0!lbtedly require. r must <therefore say to the',representative of Je ·dois donc, me se1llble-t-il,dire au representhe United Kingdom that I should not think it tant .duRoyaume-Uni qu'il est peu probable que very likely that we could make any useful report - nous puissions presenter un rapport utile aumoat that time. I would askhim if he would agree ment qu'il. suggere. Je voudraissavoir 8'il n'acthat we might let the matter stand as we havecepterait pas que nous suivions la procedure que suggested-namely, that, until the expirClitiOl,l of j'ai suggeree, a. savoir que, jusqu'a l'expiration de mymand.ate as President of this Council,'-my mon mandat de President du COllseiI de securite. services ar~ at the disposal of the two parties, to je mette mes services a. la disposition des deux ~elp themm any way ,!hich is bJ,Jen to~~; that parties p~ur les aider dans toute la mesure oil je ,we shall ~otstand onst!1ct formality or.symmetry le pourral,et que nous ne S()yOtls pas guides pat or anythmg else but s~all seek .convemence; a;td ,un esprit de formalismeexGessif, par le soucide ...the new CounCIl maY;lsh to arrange.for "nous conformer aun p~e~dent~~.~ar tonte autre Le PRESIDENT (traattit ae l'angkzis): En reponse au represtlntant du Royaume-Uni, je voudrais une fois de plus lui donner, ainsi qu'a. tous mes collegues du Conseil, l'assurance que je ne cherche ,a. ,eluder attcune responsabilite qui pourrait m'incomber. Tant que le present Conseil sera en fonction, je resterai investidu mandat de discuter le probleme du Cachemire avec les interesses, et Jecontinuerai a. m'acquitter de ma tache. En ce qui concerne la questiondu rapport que je dois faire, aux termes de mon mandat, sur le resultat des negociations, je serais heureux de suivre toute procedure que le, nouveau Cons,eH jugera appropriee pour la presentation dudit rapport, Nous sommes saisis, je le repete,d'une question qui depasse de loin toutes considerations d'ordre personnel ou individ.uel. I1 est essentie1 que la procedure a. suivre en cette matiere soit aussi pleinement conforme que possible audesir du Conseil de securite et a. celui des parties. Je crois, particulierement a. la suite de mon experience recente, que, si J'on veut faire ceuvre utile, c'est au nou:- veau Conseil qu'il appartiendra de regler ce point d'une maniere ou d'une autre, car c'est a. lui que doivent etre presentes les rapports par tonte personne chargee des fonctions de Rapporteur~ ,Je voudrais, 'une fois de plus, assurer au Conseil - etcette assurance s'etend au nouveau Conseil -.,-, que, si mes serviCes lui soritnecessaires, je. me mettrai entierement a sa disposition etqueje iTIe conformerai strictement aux termes du mandat qui pourra 1ll'etredonne. ' '. Je tiens a. faire une observation, sur la suggestion, faite par le representant du Royaume.-Uni, de fixer en: principe a demain apres..midi la prq- ,chaine seance du Conseil de securite. Comme je l'ai expIique dans ma,declaration au Conseil, ce n'est que tard aujourd'hui que nous avons pu mettre all: point; en vue de leur reproduction, les propositions des parties, et je ,ne' serai, en l:nesure d'effectuer fechange simultane de notes qui a ete prevu, qu'une fois de. reto,"rdans, tnonbureaude New-York, apres .la seance. Par consequent, entre le moment present et la fin de la matinee.de / demain, ily aura tres peu de temps pour proceeler a. r ~..amen eta la discussion approfondie< que les amendements proposes exigeront sans doute. If this is agreeable, I would propose that we should now adjourn. Mr. GROSS (United States of America): In view of the fact that this is an extremely im- portant matter and that the Council may not be meeting tomorrow, I should like to make a com- ment or two whkh may not be strictly necessary but which I think would be helpful-at least to my delegation-in order to clarify the position with regard to this matter. It seems clear from what has been said that there is no procedural decision of any nature being taken today as the result 01 any proposal put forward by any member. My delegation had not been aware that any proposal had been made by any delegation here and is therefore somewhat .. .. confused by some of the comments made by the representative of the Soviet Union with regard to what I believe he referred to as a proposal put forward by the representative of Norway. I do not make this comment to be in any way .captious. The matter of greatest importancel as I attempted to make clear in my earlier remarks in t.he debate this afternoon, is that the wishes of the parties should be given priority by, the Council and that no suggestions should be made which would put obstacles in the way of the selection by the parties of those meansl under Article 33 of the Charterl which seem to them most effective and most suitable to settle this dispute by peaceful methods. I <lm glad that the representative of the Soviet Union has agreed that the paramount .consideration is the wishes of the parties in this matter. Therefore, I take it that nothing that has been said here by any delegation or by the President, would beincon- sistent with a course dictated by the wishes of the parties with respect to such mediation or guidance or assistance as could be undertaken by him. It does not seem to us that fu"ly settlement has been made of any procedural issue here this after- noon. We do not think that we have foreclosed the possibility of raising at a subsequent time the question' whether the decision of 17 December does not constitute a valid basis for continuing authority. I do not assert that it does. I think that I am perfectly correct in saying that it has not been foreclosed. nor do I think that it has been the sense of the Council or of the President, if "1 may venture to interpret his remarks to make cert2in that I understood them, that the force of Article 33 of the Charter would preclude his or anyone's else acting, upon the request of the parties, if that is what is considered by them a suitable method of proce~ure. In closing, may I, on a somewhat different matter, e..xpress the cordial feelings of my dele- gation tn the members of the Council who are departing from membership at the close of this . . Si le Co:-.sejl est d'accord, je propose que la seance soit levee. M. GROSS (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (trMrt{it de l'anglais) : Etant donne la tres grande impor- tance de la question dont il s'agit, et puisqu'i1 se pourrait que le COllseil ne se reunisse pas demain. je voudrais faire quelques observations qui, si eUes ne sont pas indisper1sables, ne seront cepell- dant pas inutiles - tout au moins aux yeux de ma delegation - pour rendre claire la situation en ce i-j_ ~ concerne cette question. Des declarations qui ant ete faites, it semble evident qu'aucune decision, de quelque nature qu'e1i~ soit, n'a ete prise aujourd'hui a la suite d'une proposition quelccnque qu'aurait faite tel ou tel membre. Pour autant qu'elIe le sache, ma delegation pense qu'aucune delegation n'a fait de proposition formelle; e1le ne comprend done pas tres bien les observations du representant de l'URSS apropos d'une proposition qu'il attri- bl.1ait. je crois, au representant de la Norvege. Je ne dis pas cela par espl:: de chicane. Ainsi que j'ai essaye de le sottligner au cours de mon inter- vention de cet apres-midi, la question primordiale est que le Conseil tienne compte avant tout du desir des parties et qu'aurune proposition ne vienne empecher les parties de choisir les moyens qui, aux termes de l'Article 33 de la Charte, leur semblent etre les plus efficaces et les plus appro- pries pour regler leut' differend par des moyens pacifiques. Je constate avec satisfaction que le representant de I'URSS reconnait qu'il faut avant tout faire etat des desirs exprimes par les parties. Rien done, dans les declarations faites par le Pre- sident ou par les autres membres, ne saurait ctre considere comme incompatible avec la solution dictee par le desir des parties de voir nOtre Presi- dent actuel faire ceuvre de mediateur, de guide ou de conseilIer. Ma delegation pense qu'aucune decision de pro- cedure n'est intervenue ici cet apres-midi. Nous n'estimons pas que soit excIue la possibilite de soulever plus tard la question de savoir si la deci- sion du 17 decembre ne constitue pas une base valable pour la prolongation de la mission du ge- neral McNaughtoll. Je ne pretends pas qu'il en soit ainsi. Je ne crois pas me tromper, toutefoi~ en disant qu'une telle eventualite n'est pas exc1ue, et je ne crois pas non plus que le Conseil 50it d'avis que les dispositions de l'Article 33 de la Charte empechent le President ou toute autre personne de jouer un role actif a la requete des parties, au casou elles estiment que c'est la meil- lettre methode pOUf regler leur differend. Je crois d'aiIleurs que le President lui-memepartage cette opinion (si je puis me permettrf' d'interpreter ses remarquesafin de m'assurer que je les ai bien comprises) . En terminant, je voudrais, dans un autre ordre d'idees, exprimer les sentimentscordiaux que ma delegati0n eprouve aI'egard des membres du Con- seiI dont le mandat expire ala fin de ce mois, leur Le PRESIDENT (trluhtit de I'anglais) : Je vou- drais seulement, en ma qualit~ de President du Conseil de seccrite, remercier le representant des Etats-Unis qui a si c1airement resume la situation dans laquelle nous nous trouvons du point de vue de la procedure. 11 est evident qu'a la seance d'au- jourd'hui aucune decision de procedure n'a ete prise qui puissefaire obstacle a l'adoption de quelque mesure que ce soit en application de l'Ar- ticle 33· de la Charte ou meme de la motion de procedure en vertu de la.quelle j'accomplis mes fonctions. Je desire donner au representant des Etats-Unis l'assurance que c'est ainsi que j'inter- prete la situation dans laquelle nous nous trou- vons.

I should like to express my gratitude, as President, to the represent:l.tive of the United States, who has so well summarized the parliamentary position in which we find ourselves. Certainly there has been nothing done today by way of a procedural decision which would interfere in any way with any appropriate action under Article 33 of the Charter or indeed under the present procedural motion under which. I am carrying out my functions. I wish to assure him that that is my understanding of the position in 'which we stand. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) (traduit de I'anglcis) : Je me permets d'appuyer respectueusement tout ce qui a ete dit cet apresmidi par les differents membres du Conseil de securite lorsqu'ils ont felicite le President des efforts sinceres, desinteresses et soutenus qu'il a deployes pour s'acquitter de la tache dont le <'::onseil I'avait charge a sa s,Sance du 17 decembre. Nul plus que les membres de la deIegation du Pakistan n'apprecie ce que le President a deja fait et ce qu'il s'efforce d'accomplir,compte tenu de l'imp'8rtance et de l'urgence extl'emes du probleme dont le Conseilde securite est saisi, ainsi que des consequences desastreuses qui seraient a redouter si ce probleme n'etait pas resolu rapidement, equitablement et de maniere satisfaisante. En ce qui concerne les suggestions qui ont ete faites en vue de la continuation de ces efforts, nous serions tres heureux s'ils se poursuivaient dans les memes conditions que precedemment, et, a cette fin, nous continuerons a nous mettre a la disposition du President, comme nous 1'avons fait jusqu'ici, a toute heure du jour et de la nuit. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan): I trust I may be permitted respectfully to endorse all that has been said by the different members of the Security Council who have spoken this afternoon in appreciation of the President's sincere, selfless and sustained efforts to discharge the duty entrusted to him by the Security Council at its meeting of 17 December. Nobody is more deeply appreciative of what the President has done and is seeking to do than we 0 f the Pakistan delegation, having regard to the extreme importance and urgency of the problem of which the Security Council is seized and the disastrous consequences which may be apprehended unless that problem is speedily, justly and satisfactorily resolved. With regard to the suggestions which have been made as to the continuation of those efforts, we are perfectly happy that they should be continued on the basis on which they have hitherto proceeded and we shall for that purpose continue to place ourselves at the P.resident's disposal at all hours of the day and night as we have hitherto done. Il ne conviendrait pas que je formule une opinion sur les decisions de procedure du Conseil de securite ou sur la conduite que celui-ci devrait . suivre apres la fin du mois en cours, mais, si, en consentant a ce que le President poursuive apres le 31 decembre les efforts qu'il a deployes jusqu'ici, nous pouvons contribuer a resoudre le probleme de procedure qui s'est pose, nous n'hesitons pas it donner ce consentement sans la moindre reserve, et nous accueillerons avec satisfaction une teUe solution si eUe est approuvee par le Conseil je securite P.t si eUe rencontre 1'assentiment du President lui-meme. . If it is found necessary that there should be Si 1'on el>time necessaire que le Conseil de a meeting of the Security Council as it will be securite, tel qu'il sera compose le ler janvier, re-composed on 1 January, either to receive a tienne une seance, soit pour recevoir un rapport, report or to give its authority to any further soit pour prendre de nouvelles dispositions de procedu!I'al arrangements, may I respectfully procedure, je me permettrai tres respectueusement suggest, for the consideration of the President de signaler a l'attention du prochain President for next month, that it might be possible to call qu'il serait possible de convoquer le Conseil pour a meeting on 2 January, unless someinsurle 2 janvier, a moins qu'unobstac1e insurmontable mountable obstade should intervene. However, ne s'y oppose. C'est la, neanmbins, une 9.\lestion that again is a matter for the Security Council a trancher par le Conseil de securite ··et son and for the President to decide, having regard President, compte tenu de la necessite quipourrait to the necessity that might arise for holding a apparaitre de tenir une seance pour evit~r toute ...,I••··•••__r••__....'.·_liIIm...._...IIIII,__ · _ ........~_ It would be impertinent on my part to make any observations relating to the procedure of the Security Council or what course it ought to adopt beyond the end of this month; but if our consent to the continuation beyond 31 December of the efforts th~t the President has been making would make any contribution towards a solution of that procedural problem, we hereby most unreservedly give it and shall welcome any such course if it meets with the approval of the Security Council and if the President consents to it. If I understand correctly, the present position is this. The President will continue, for the rest of his term as President of the Security Council, the negotiations which he started. He will then report the result to the next Security Council in such a manner as that Council may decide. That is a course which is perfectly agreeable to us, and we shall certainly abide by any procedure which the next Security Council may adopt. In these matters we place ourselves unreservedly in the hands of the Council. I do not wish to comment at this stage on any . other proposals or any of the amendments because this is not the time, in my view, for any such comments. I can only hope that the President will succeed in. his efforts. So far as our good will and our ov..n wishes are concerned, I can assure him that they will be entirely on his side.

In reply to the representatives of Pakistan and India, I would only say that I continue to be entirely at their service ~n this matter as long as my mandate runs. As regards the suggestion that a meeting of the Security Council could ,be. called on 2 January, I have no doubt that the representative of China has taken note of that and will in due time take appropriate action. The meeting rose at 6.5 p.m. En ce qui concerne la situation nans laquelle nous noUS trouvons, eUe est, si je l'a' .lien comprise, la suivante. Le President poursuivra, jusqu'a l'expiration de son mandat de President du Conseil de securite, les negodations qu'il a entreprises. It fera ensuite rapport au prochain COllseil de securite sur les resultats qu'il aura obtenus, selon la procedure que celui-ci fixera. C'est la une solution qui nous convient padaitement, et nous nous conformerons certainement cl. toute procedure que le prochain Conseil de securite pourrait adopter. Pour ces questions, nous nous en remettons entierement au Conseil. Je ne desire pas, a ce stade du debat, faire de commentaires sur les autres propositions ou sur les amendements qui ont ete presentes, car, amon avis, ce n'est pas en ce moment qu'il convient d'en faire. Je puis seulement exprimer l'espoir que le President reussh'a dans ses efforts. Je tiens a lui donner l'assurance oue notre bonne volonte lui est entierement acquise et que nous formons des vceux pour le succes de son entreprise. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): En reponse aux observations des representants du Pakistan et de l'Inde, je voudrais seulement dire que je demeure entierement a leur service dans cette affaire, aussi longtemps que dure mon mandat. Quant a la suggestion d'apres laqueUe il serait possible de convoquer une reunion du Conseil de securite pour le 2 janvier, je ne doute pas que le representant de la Chine n'en ait pris note et qu'il ne prenne en temps opportun toutes dispositions utiles. . 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