S/PV.463 Security Council

Before adopting the provisional agenda, l wish, in accordance with established custom, to express our gratitude to Mr. Tsiang, President of the Security Council during January, for the way in which he directed the Council's worl<. It is unnecessary ta say that Mr. Tsiang once more exhibited his high gifts of statesmanship. Mr. TSIANG (China) : I asked permission to speak in arder to thank the President for his kind remarks in regard to my humble services as President of the Security Council during the month of January. 2. Adoption of the Agenda 3. The Illdia-Pakistan question (continued)

Document S/1453, which has just been distributed, should he added to the list of documents contailled in the provisional agenda. 1

If there is no objection from members of the Council, we shall use simultaneous interpretation for the statements of the parties concerned during this meeting in order to save time. There being no objection, it is so decided. Members will recall that at the [458th] meeting of 29 December 1949 the Council had before it a report on the Kashmir question, as well as the text of the proposals submitted by its President, General McNaughton, representative of Canada. The proposals were made in accordance with the instructions the Council had given General McNaughton on 17 December [457th meeting] to hold informal discussions with the representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan with the object of finding a mutually satisfactory basis for the solution of the question. At that meeting of 17 December the Council agreed to invite General McNaughton to inform the Council of his negotiations and to give it the benefit of his experience and knowledge in the matter. I have since received from General McNaughton a letter [S/1453] enclosing a detailed report of the latest developments since the meeting of 29 December 1949 and the correspondence exchanged between him and the representatives of the parties with respect to his proposals for demilitarization. In General McNaughton's opinion, and I wish to emphasize his statement, the demilitarization of Kashmir is an essential prerequisite for the solution of this dispute. General McNaughton has also told me that, after careful consideration, he has reached the conclusion that it is preferable to submit his report in writing instead of making an oral statement to the Council, because a large part of it consists of communications and notes, and consequently he considered it more convenient for the Council to have those documents before it. Moreover, he thought that his presence in the Council might embarrass members or representatives of the parties in making their observations. The report has been duly distributed [S/1453] and I propose to read it immediately. Finally, I think I am interpreting the feeling of the Council by placing on record our gratitude to General McNaughton for the excellent work he has done. His tireless and constant efforts to find an acceptable basis Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt): I should like to know whether we are to have simultaneous interpretation in connexion with the reading of the report of General McNaughton. That report consists of sixteen closely written pages, and it might be only fair to have that report, too, interpreted simultaneously.

I wish to inform the Egyptian representative that there will be simultaneous interpretation for the reading of the report. Sir Benegal N. RAU (India): I should like briefly to explain the position of my Government with respect to the proposals submitted by General McNaughton to the parties on 22 December 1949, and subsequently laid be- fore this Council. I hope that my criticism of the proposals will not be construed as a reflection on their distinguished and gal- lant author. For the benefit of the new members of the Security Council, I shall begin by inviting attention to a few salient facts which are too often ignored. It will be remembered that the present dispute started with a complaint by India [S/628] under Article 35 of the Charter. Let me summarize the complaint in the words of the Commission. I am reading from paragraph 119 of the majority report [S/1430]: "In the complaint India alleged that a situation existed which was likely to endanger the maintenance of inter- national peace and security. Such a situation existed, the Government of India said, owing to the aid which invaders, consisting of nationals of Pakistan and tribes- men from the territory immediately adjoining Pakistan on the north-west, were receiving from Pakistan for op- erations against the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This State, according to India, had acceded to the Dominion of India and was a part of India." Pakistan's reply is to be found in paragraph 3 of docu- ment I of annex 45 [S/1430/Add.l] to the Commission's report and in two paragraphs of document II, section C of the same annex. I hope that members of the Council will not mind my troubling them to refer to these documents as I go along, because I am very anxious that they should verify every single statement of fact which I make. I am now reading Pakistan's reply to India's charge from paragraph 3 of "While the particulars of Pakistan's case are set out in document III the Pakistan Government emphatically denies that it is giving aid and assistance to the so-called invaders or has committed any act of aggression against India. On the contrary, and solely with the object of maintaining friendly relations between the two Domin- ions, the Pakistan Government has continued to do all in its power to discourage the tribal movement by all means short of war. This has caused bitter resentment throughout the country, but despite a very serious risk of large-scale internal disturbances, the Pakistan Gov- ernment has not deviated from this policy. In circum- stances which will become clear from the recital of events set out in document III, it may be that a certain number of independent tribesmen and persons from Pak- istan are helping, as volunteers, the Azad Kashmir Gov- ernment in its struggle for liberty, but it is wrong to say that Pakistan territory is being used as a base of military operations. It is also incorrect that the Pakistan Gov- ernment is supplying military equipment, transport and supplies to the 'invaders' or that Pakistan officers are training, guiding and otherwise helping them." I continue to read now from two paragraphs of docu- ment II, section C, which form part of the same reply: "The Muslim population of the State have set up an Azad (Free) Kashmir Government, the forces of which are carrying on their fight for liberty. It is possible that these forces have been joined by a number of independ- ent tribesmen from the tribal areas beyond the North West Frontier Province and persons from Pakistan, in- cluding Muslim refugees from East Punjab, who are nationals of the Indian Union. "The allegations made by the Indian Government that the Pakistan Government is affording aid and assistance to the Azad Kashmir forces, or that these forces have bases in Pakistan territory, or that these forces are being trained by Pakistan officers, or are being supplied with arms or material by the Pakistan Government, are utterly unfounded." Briefly, therefore, Pakistan first conceded that tribes- men and persons from Pakistan might be helping the so- called Azad Kashmir Government; secondly, Pakistan emphatically denied that the Pakistan Government was giving any aid to those tribesmen and the other intruders ; thirdly, Pakistan described as "utterly unfounded" the allegation that the Pakistan Government was giving aid to the Azad Kashmir forces or that Pakistan officers were training them. This was the position throughout the discussions in the Security Council, and on this basis the Security Council adopted its resolution of 21 April 1948 [S/726] which is reproduced as annex 46 to the majority "The Government of Pakistan should undertake to use its best endeavours: "(a) To secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani na- tionals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting, and to prevent any intrusion into the State of such elements and any furnish- ing of material aid to those fighting in the State." Then comes the Government of India's part: "The Government of India should ... "(a) . . . put into operation in consultation with the Commission a plan for withdrawing their own forces from Jammu and Kashmir and reducing them progress- ively to the minimum strength required for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of law and order." Then it goes on to provide for a plebiscite: "The Government of India should undertake . . . that there will be established in Jammu and Kashmir a plebis- cite administration to hold a plebiscite as soon as possible on the question of the accession of the State to India or Pakistan." This resolution aimed, amongst other things, first, at the restoration of peace and order by the withdrawal, in the first instance, of the tribesmen and the Pakistan na- tionals that had entered the State for fighting, to be followed later by the reduction of the Indian armed forces that had been sent to repel them; and secondly, at the holding of a plebiscite on the question of the accession of the State to India or to Pakistan. What happened next ? According to the distinguished Foreign Minister of Pakistan himself, Pakistan troops moved into the State early in May. This is mentioned in paragraph 129 of the Commission's first interim re- port [S/1100] .* That is to say, Pakistan troops moved into the State within a fortnight of the above discussions in the Security Council, throughout which the Pakistan Government had denied giving any aid to the invaders or to the Azad Kashmir forces. 1 For the text of the first interim report of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, document S/1100, see Offi- cial Records of the Security Council, Third Year, Supplement for November 1948. In a letter addressed to the Security Council [S/659] the Pakistan Government agreed to comply with this re- quest. Nevertheless, as I have said, the Pakistan Gov- ernment sent troops into Kashmir without informing the Security Council. It was only on 8 July 1948, two months after the troops had entered the State, and after the arrival of the Commission on the Indian sub-conti- nent, that the Commission was officially notified by the Pakistan Government of the presence in the State of three brigades of regular Pakistan troops. All these facts have been mentioned in paragraphs 128 and 129 of the Commission's first interim report [S/1100] and in para- graph 128 of the Commission's present majority report. The Government of Pakistan alleged at one stage that this was a purely defensive move, but the Commission was definitely of the view [S/1100, annex 27] that "the presence of Pakistan troops in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, however, is a material change in the situation as considered by the Security Council in its resolution of 21 April 1948, which creates obstacles to the effective and immediate implementation of an unconditional cease- fire". I hope representatives will not forget who created this first obstacle to the plebiscite; not only was it the first obstacle, but it has been the direct cause of all the other obstacles that impede our progress today. Not only did the Pakistan Army invade the State, but it assumed command and direction of the Azad Kashmir forces: on 4 August 1948 the Foreign Minister of Pakis- tan stated to the Commission, "the Pakistan Army is at present responsible for the over-all command of the Azad Kashmir forces"; and on 9 August 1949 the High Com- mand of the Pakistan Army stated that the Azad Kashmir forces were operationally controlled by the Pakistan Army. This is mentioned in sub-paragraphs 1 (b) and (c) of the appendix to annex 27 of the Commission's first interim report [S/1100]. Thus, India's original complaint alleging aid by Pakistan, though at first denied by Pakistan [S/646], was now proved to be true or, at least, to have become true in an aggravated form; not only was there aid, but the Pakistan Army was actually inside the State giving aid and direction and, indeed, engaging in actual fighting. Nevertheless, nothing effective has yet been done about this complaint. The Pakistan Army is still within the State, and during the time it has been there, now nearly "The resolution of 13 August 1948 [S/1100, para- graph 75] recorded one major change in the situation as contemplated by the Security Council during its delibera- tions in the early part of that year, namely, the presence of Pakistan troops in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It did not, however, record a second element which has developed subsequently into a serious problem in the implementation of that resolution: The Azad (Free) Kashmir Movement, the fighting forces of which today number thirty-two well-equipped battalions." I shall next read paragraph 225 of the same report: "There is, indeed, no doubt that the Azad forces now have a strength which changes the military situation, and to that extent makes the withdrawal of forces, particu- larly those of India, a far more difficult matter to arrange within a structure which considers only the regular forces of the two armies. Although it might be a matter of dis- cussion whether the numerical strength of the Azad Kashmir forces has actually increased since August 1948, there is no question that those forces, which have since then been working in close co-operation with the Pakistan regular army and which have been trained and officered by that army, have increased their fighting strength. It is reasonable to suppose that if the Commission had been able to foresee that the cease-fire period would be pro- longed throughout the greater part of 1949 and that Pakistan would use that period to consolidate its position in the Azad territory, the Commission would have dealt with this question in part II of the resolution of 13 August." The minority report of the Czechoslovak delegation [S/1430/Add.3] is to the same effect. I am reading from the minority report: "The 'Azad forces' meanwhile grew by the spring of 1949 into thirty-two disciplined and fully armed bat- talions, which, according to an evaluation by the military adviser of the Commission, represent a 'formidable force'. Owing to this fact, which is at variance with part I, sec- tion B of the said resolution forbidding both parties any increasing of their military potential, the situation has materially undergone an absolute change." Thus it is clear that these forces, as they now exist, were built up by, or with the aid of, the Pakistan Army between August 1948 and the spring of 1949 contrary to the understanding that Pakistan would not use the period for consolidating its position or increasing its With regard to the penetration of the northern areas, the position is equally clear. Let me read from para- graph 272 of the Commission's majority report: "It seems, however, very doubtful whether the north- ern areas were in fact in the autumn of 1948 under the 'effective' control of the Pakistan High Command, in the sense that the Commission understood the term 'effective control'". I shall now read from paragraph 274 of the same re- port: "When it drafted the 13 August resolution the Com- mission did not consider the northern area in the same light as it did western Kashmir. However, by January 1949 Pakistan undeniably held military control over the northern areas; the area was administered by local au- thorities, not of the Jammu and Kashmir Government, with the assistance of Pakistan officials." In other words, Pakistan obtained military control of these areas between August 1948 and January 1949. The minority report is again to the same effect. I quote from it: "Moreover, the situation in the 'northern area' had meanwhile undergone a material change, in that the Pakistan Army, which was not bound by the resolution of 13 August 1948, conquered many strategically im- portant places during the interval before, by the resolu- tion of 5 January 1949, it was also sanctioned by the Government of Pakistan." It is thus abundantly clear that Pakistan penetrated and obtained control of these areas between August 1948 and January 1949; and Pakistan officials assisted in their administration through "local authorities", not of the Jammu and Kashmir Government. Once again, I request members of the Council to note who has created this third obstacle to the holding of the plebiscite. And yet, in this topsy-turvy world, it is India that is constantly accused of "stalling", of delaying the plebiscite and so forth. Strictly speaking, the Pakistan Army should have been completely withdrawn long ago, and the disruptive forces and authorities created by that army during its unlawful presence in the State should have been completely dis- solved, but so far nothing of the kind has been done. I shall have to remind the Council of this broad fact again and again, lest it should be forgotten or ignored in the mass of detail. "As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a mate- rial change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State." If this resolution had been accepted and carried out by Pakistan at once, some of the subsequent mischief would have been avoided, for the Pakistan Army would have had to be withdrawn while the Azad forces were still in an embryonic state, and the northern areas were not yet under the effective control of the Pakistan High Com- mand. But while India accepted the resolution with cer- tain clarifications on 20 August 1948, that is, within a week of its receipt, Pakistan made various reservations which amounted to rejection. The matter came before the Security Council in November 1948 [382nd meeting]. If, even at this late stage, the Council had secured the withdrawal of the Pakistan forces, the situation might have improved. The Council, however, merely desired the Commission to continue its efforts for a peaceful so- lution. On 11 December 1948, the Commission drew up proposals for a plebiscite [S/1196, annex3],2 supplemen- tary to the proposals of 13 August 1948. I should like to emphasize the word "supplementary". These proposals merely amplified those of 13 August and, indeed, the very first sentence of the supplementary proposals ran: "The Commission reaffirms its resolution of 13 August 1948". Therefore, all the clarifications given to India in connexion with that resolution still hold good. India accepted the supplementary proposals on 23 De- cember 1948 [S/1196, annex 4] on the basis of certain explanations and understandings. Those proposals sub- sequently became the Commission's resolution of 5 Janu- ary 1949 [S/1196, paragraph 15]; but I hope members will remember that India accepted them on 23 December 1948. Today, the position is that Pakistan which, throughout the discussions here in 1948, denied giving any aid either to the invaders or to the Azad Kashmir forces, is now itself not only an invader but is in actual occupation of nearly half the area of the State without any lawful au- thority from any source. This is naked aggression of which no one can approve, but there is no hint or sign of disapproval in the present proposals. Indeed, the very reverse is the case. By sanctioning the administration of the northern areas by the existing local authorities, these proposals, in effect, recognize and help to perpetu- ate the unlawful occupation of these areas by Pakistan. As I have already mentioned, the "existing local au- thorities"—I am quoting from the proposals—derive their powers not from the Government of Jammu and Kashmir but from Pakistan. They are, therefore, merely instruments of the Pakistan Government. If I may say so, there is a serious basic defect in these proposals. They spring from an assumed false analogy between the Pakistan Army and the Indian Army, as also between the Azad Kashmir forces and the Kashmir State forces. They completely ignore the legal and moral aspects of the question. The Indian Army went into the State at the request of the lawful Government of the State in order to repel an actual admitted invasion by tribes- men and Pakistan nationals. The request emanated not only from the Ruler of the State but also from the head of its Emergency Government, Sheikh Mohammad Ad- dullah, who has been in the van of the Kashmiri people's movement for freedom for nearly twenty years and who has suffered imprisonment nine times in the people's cause. The Pakistan Army, on the other hand, invaded the State without any lawful authority and without even notice to the Security Council, although the Pakistan Government had previously denied giving any aid to the invaders and had promised to apprise the Security Coun- cil of any material change that might occur in the situa- tion. As for the Azad Kashmir forces, they are no more than a limb of the Pakistan Army, built up for the most part by that army after its unlawful invasion of the State, and they can therefore in no way be put on the same level as the lawful forces of the Kashmir State. The proposals of the Commission of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, were accepted by India on certain assurances: 3. That the territory occupied by the Pakistan troops would not be consolidated to the disadvantage of the State. 4. That there would be a large-scale disarming and disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces. 5. That the question of the northern areas would re- ceive consideration in the implementation of the Com- mission's proposals. Let me explain exactly where these assurances are to be found. The first three will be found in the reply of the Chairman of the Commission of 25 August 1948 [S/1100, paragraph 79] to the Prime Minister of India's first letter of 20 August, paragraphs 3 and 4 [S/1100, paragraph 78]. The fourth assurance—namely, that relating to the disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces— will be found in paragraph 2 of the aide-memoire of the conversation between Mr. Lozano and the Prime Minis- ter of India on 22 December 1948 [S/1196, annex 4]. The fifth assurance—that relating to the northern areas —will be found in the reply of the Chairman of the Com- mission of 25 August 1948 to the Prime Minister of India's second letter of 20 August [S/1100, para- graph 80]. Let us see what has happened to these assurances. Under these proposals the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir State is eliminated, in fact, from the areas on the other side of the cease-fire line, in other words, from nearly one-half of the entire area of the State; secondly, the administration of these areas by "the existing local authorities", an expression interpreted in some quarters to mean the Azad Government authorities, is recognized; thirdly, the consolidation effected by Pakistan troops to the detriment of the State is allowed to remain; fourthly, the disarming and disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces is neutralized by similar disarming and disbanding of the State forces' and the State militia; fifthly, the claim made by the Government of India in respect of the northern areas is dismissed. Thus the net effect of the proposals is to eliminate or neutralize every one of the assurances relied upon by India. India's case is that, just as the entry of the Pakistan troops into Kashmir was wrong and an act of aggression, equally wrong and aggressive was their building up of the subversive Azad Kashmir forces and their occupation of a large part of the State. All these things must be completely undone before there can be a plebiscite. These unlawful activities of the Pakistan Army took place under the very nose of the Commission and in spite of the as- surances given to India by the Commission. To recog- There is another point which is apt to be overlooked or ignored in these discussions. According to the reso- lution of 5 January 1949 [5/1196, paragraph 15], the object of the plebiscite is to decide the question of ~cces­ sion-which necessarily inc1udes continued acceSSlOn- of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or to Pakis- tan. Now, accession does 110t mean dissolution: the ac- ceding State remains intact and fully sovereign in its own field even .after accession; it continues as a single unit. If, therefore, the plebiscite is to be held for the State a whole, if the State is to accede as a whole, it must not be disrupted beforehand. Indeed, sub-paragraph 3 (b) of the resolution of 5 January 1949 requires that the Plebiscite Administrator shall derive from the State Jammu and Kashmir the powers which he considers necessary for organizing and conducting the plebiscite and for ensuring its freedom and impartiality. How can he derive these powers from the State in the northern areas if the State is deprived of its authority in those areas beforehand? Ta disrupt the State in this way and to recognize various "existing local authorities" would be a contravention of the plain terms of the resolution. We attach the greatest importance to sub-paragraph (b), which was inserted in the resolution at India's in- stance, and which we regard as embodying the assurance that the State would have unquestioned sovereignty throughout its territory before the plebiscite was held. It is true that in accepting the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948, the Government of India made cer- tain concessions for the sake of peace; but these conces- sions were of a limited character, and they were confined to the so-called Azad Kashmir territory in the south- western district. That is no reason why similar or even more far-reaching concessions should now be proposed for the northern areas. This process has gone on long enough. When the case left the Security Council in April 1948, there were only two things standing between Kashmir and the plebiscite. The invaders had to with- draw and then the Indian Army was to be reduced. In May 1948 Pakistan created a new complication by send- ing in its army. As the price of withdrawing this army, which never should have been there, Pakistan obtained, under the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948, the concession that the evacuated territories-then con- fined to the south-western part of the State-would be administered by "local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission" subject to the sovereignty of the State. But Pakistan was not content. It did not accept the resolution until 25 December 1948 [5/1196, an- nex 5] . Meanwhile, it created another complication hy building up the Azad Kashmir forces. As the priee for the disbanding and disarming of these forces, it obtained ;a further concession in the resolution of 5 January 1949. "Vnder the McNaughton proposais it is now to receive India cannot possibly go on making these concessions and frittering away its position. It is urged that, for the sake of peace, India should acquiesce in them because, it is said, they are, after all, temporary and only a step towards the holding of the plebiscite. But it is incom- prehensible to us why pressure should always be brought to bear on India to acquiesce in wrong, and why, for a change, some pressure should not be brought to bear on the other side to acquiesce in the right on the same grounds. There is no local hostility or resistance to the lawful Government of the State in the northern areas, except such as proceeds from the Pakistan regular and irregular forces; and this is borne out by the fact, witnessed by United Nations observers, that the inhabitants of certain villages on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line have insisted on moving across to the Indian side. When these forces, including the Gilgit Scouts, the Chitralis and the Baltistan Scouts, are withdrawn, the responsibility for the administration of these areas should revert to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir, and for their de- fence, to the Government of India. I shall now proceed to analyse in some detail the Mc- Naughton proposals [S/1453] and shall compare them with the corresponding proposals made by the Commis- sion in April 1949. The proposals made by the Com- mission were not accepted either by India or by Pakistan —of course, for opposite reasons. It will be found that the present proposals are substantially the same as the Commission's proposals, minus certain parts which were intended to meet India's point of view, plus certain addi- tions favourable to Pakistan. Paragraph 1 of the McNaughton proposals is in gen- eral terms, and needs no comment except this: sub-para- graph 1(d) lays down that discussion of disputed past issues should be avoided. But in these proposals many of the past issues are decided against India, and we are asked to accept this position. We think such an approach cannot lead to any settlement because it ignores the ori- gin of the conflict, the subsequent developments and present conditions. The crucial paragraphs, dealing with demilitarization, Azad Kashmir forces and the northern areas, are paragraphs 2 and 3. Let me first read sub- paragraph 2 (b) and sub-paragraph 3 (a). Sub-para- graph 2 (b) reads as follows: Sub-paragraph 3 (a) reads as follows: "The Government of Pakistan should give uncondi- tional assurance to the Government of India that it will deal effectively within its own borders with any possi- bility of tribal incursion into Jammu and Kashmir to the end that, under no circumstances, will tribesmen be able unlawfully to enter the State of Jammu and Kashmir from or through the territory of Pakistan. The Govern- ment of Pakistan should undertake to keep the senior United Nations military observer informed and to satisfy him that the arrangements to this end are and continue to be adequate." I now request the members of the Council to turn to annex 17, [S/1430/Add.l] which contains letters dated 15 April 1949 from the Commission to both Governments. The letters are in almost identical terms, and to them were annexed the Commission's proposals for a truce agreement. I shall read the letter addressed to the Gov- ernment of Pakistan: "The Commission has considered the developments which have taken place since it last addressed itself for- mally to both Governments with regard to the implemen- tation of part II of its resolution of 13 August 1948. It has considered the viewpoints of both Governments and it has been studying the steps which have been and might be taken in connexion with the further implementation of the resolution of the Commission. "In the light of all the above factors, and in order to facilitate the restoration of peace in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the holding of an early plebiscite, the Commission has decided to urge formally upon both Governments agreement upon the proposals contained in the enclosed documents. "The Commission considers that these proposals rep- resent an adjustment of viewpoints within the frame- work of and consistent with the spirit of the commitments already entered into. It is also convinced that in accept- ing these proposals, both Governments will have taken a further important forward step toward the attainment of the objective which animates both of them, as well as the Commission: the prompt and peaceful solution of the problem of the State of Jammu and Kashmir through a free and impartial plebiscite. "The Commission requests that the Government of Pakistan signify its agreement on these proposals as soon as possible, and it hopes to be in possession of the agree- ment within three days, so that the Commission may then determine its future course of action." "The territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the sur- veillance of the Commission and without prejudice to the sovereignty of the State." Members of the Council will please note the words: "and without prejudice to the sovereignty of the State". Even more comprehensive is the phrase in paragraph 1 of section F of the same proposals, which states: "These provisions are without prejudice to the terri- torial integrity and the sovereignty of the State of Jammu and Kashmir." That same day, Pakistan asked for elucidation of this phrase. That request will be found in annex 18. The elucidation was given in annex 19, paragraph (i) as follows: "By this phrase, the Commission means that the ad- ministration of the area by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission would not bring into question the sovereignty of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as a whole. It has consistently been the view of the Commission, as well as of the Security Council, that, pending the determination of the will of the people as regards the accession of the State to India or Pakistan, neither body will recognize any new sovereignty in the State. To do so would constitute a prejudgment of the will of the people." I shall return to this point presently and show how, in spite of the consistent view of the Security Council and of the Commission, the reservation as to the terri- torial integrity, etc., of the State of Jammu and Kashmir has been omitted from the present proposals. Meanwhile, let me turn to another part of the pro- posals in annex 17. I shall read paragraph 3, section D, which relates to the northern areas: "The Commission will have observers stationed where it deems necessary. In the sparsely populated and moun- tainous region of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir in the north, observers will be stationed who, in the event that the defence of this territory becomes necessary, will so advise the Commission. The Commission, in this case, or at the request of the Government of India, may agree that the Government of India post garrisons at specified points of this area." To this, Pakistan objected, one of the objections being that Pakistan had given an assurance to deal effectively I hope that members will now read part I, section D of these final proposals. This contemplates that, if the United Nations observers should so advise, the Com- mission may request the Government of India to post garrisons at specified points. Even this small concession to the Indian point of view has now disappeared from the present proposals. Sub-paragraph 4 (b) of annex 22 shows that the Commission had put it in—qualified and diluted as it was—to meet the position of the Govern- ment of India. But Pakistan objected to it, as will be found from sub-paragraph 6 (c) and paragraph 7 of annex 49, and we find that it has now been omitted from the present proposals. Sub-paragraph 3 (a) of the pres- ent proposals rests content with Pakistan's assurances; it does not say what is to happen if the United Nations observer is not satisfied that the arrangements made by Pakistan are adequate. May I ask what arrangements Pakistan made to prevent the tribal incursions of Octo- ber 1947? In fact, members will remember that, in Pakistan's reply to India's complaint, Pakistan's posi- tion was that it had done everything in its power to dis- courage the tribal incursions. Nevertheless, they did occur. What is to happen if the situation recurs ? India can take no risks in this matter. But we are concerned here with something more than tribal incursions. If members will please turn to annex 24, they will find there a letter from the Pakistan Min- ister to the United Nations Commission. I shall read from the last sub-paragraph of paragraph 7: "Ever since May, 1948, when Pakistan troops entered Kashmir and over-all tactical control was taken over by G.H.Q. Pakistan, the Commandant Gilgit Scouts, a Pakistan Army Officer, has been exercising over-all tac- tical and administrative control of Gilgit Scouts, Baltistan Scouts and the local militias." . Now, let us see what happened during this period in June and July, 1948. I read, in paragraph 7 of the same annex, that a contingent of 400 so-called volunteers from Chitral go and besiege Skardu, while the Skardu forces Let me now return to the important point of the State's integrity and sovereignty. This was conceded—if the acknowledgment of a right can be called a concession— in the Commission's proposals of April 1949, set forth in part III, section G of annex 21. But Pakistan objected to it and, once again, it has been omitted from the pres- ent proposals, although there were repeated assurances given to India that the sovereignty of the State would not be questioned. Sub-paragraph 2 (b) of the present proposals merely provides for the continuation of the existing authorities, without any reservation of the sov- eignty of the State. I now come to sub-paragraph 2 (a) of the present proposals. These proposals relate to demilitarization. In effect, this paragraph brings together the demilitari- zation proposals contained in the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, but there are two important changes. At no time previously was it suggested that the Kashmir State forces should be disbanded or dis- armed. These have never been expanded, and the pro- posal to reduce or disband or disarm them is new. So, too, is the mention of the State militia, which is like an armed constabulary. The question of this militia had been raised with the Commission by Pakistan without success more than once. At least one reference to it can be found in annex 10, paragraph 22. That concession which Pakistan did not get from the Commission, is now made in the present proposals. In effect, therefore, in crucial respects the new pro- posals are the old proposals minus some of the small concessions previously made to India plus certain new concessions now made to Pakistan. Is it a matter of surprise that India has been unable to accept them as they stand ? We have, accordingly, proposed two main amend- ments, besides a few clarifying or consequential ones. These amendments have already been read out to the Council; they are reproduced in General McNaughton's report; and I do not think it is necessary for me to read them over to the Council once again. I should now like to attempt to remove certain per- sistent misconceptions which have prevented India's case from being properly appreciated. I should like to remind members of the Council that the conflict in Kashmir is not a Hindu-Muslim conflict at all: the truth is that a large section of the Muslims of Kashmir are themselves in favour of accession to India. For this choice there are solid grounds. They believe that their real problem is one that is common to all the people of Kashmir, irrespective of creed: the prob- lem of achieving economic and political freedom; and they think they can solve this problem best by remaining in India. Under the new Indian Constitution which has just come into operation, the people of Kashmir, if they decide to remain in India, will have a very large measure of autonomy. They will have complete freedom to make their own State Constitution and even to decide for them- selves what is to be the position of the present ruling dynasty. Autocracy is dead in every single State in India; there is a people's government in every one of them. Thus, their political freedom is assured in India. The measures necessary for the economic emancipation of the people of Kashmir, such as the abolition of ab- sentee landlordism, the grant of greater rights to the tiller of the soil, and so on, are in line with similar meas- ures adopted in various parts of India. By far the largest part of Kashmir's trade, whether import or export, has been with the areas now included in India. And so this large section of the Muslims of Kashmir believe that the economic progress of the people would also be best pro- moted by their remaining in India. After all, there are 35 million to 40 million Muslims in India, and India is a secular, democratic State with human rights and funda- mental freedoms for all its citizens guaranteed by the new Constitution. I should like to mention at this point that under the Indian Constitution which was in force between 15 August 1947 and 26 January 1950, all that was required for the accession of an Indian State to the Indian Do- minion was an instrument of accession executed by the Ruler, and accepted by the Governor-General. When, therefore, the Maharaja of Kashmir executed an instru- ment of accession in favour of India on 26 October 1947, and when the Governor-General of India, Lord Mount- batten, accepted it the next day, all the constitutional conditions for accession were complete. Nothing more was required under the Constitution. Nevertheless, India went out of its way and imposed upon itself the obligation that, as the accession took place at a time of grave disorder, the question should be settled by a refer- ence to the people as soon as law and order had been restored and the soil of Kashmir cleared of the invader. The obligation was entirely self-imposed. This is a fact which critics continually forget: if India did not want Another misconception which dies hard is that the whole trouble in Kashmir was the result of the Maha- raja's accession to India. It cannot be repeated too often that the very reverse was the case. Invaders from out- side Kashmir began to pour into the Valley of Kashmir on 22 October 1947. This is a historical fact which can be easily proved from the records, and which no one, to my knowledge, has controverted. The Maharaja's letter containing the Instrument of Accession was written on 26 October 1947, four days later. To refresh the memo- ries of the members of the Council, I shall read a few extracts from that letter.3 "Afridis, soldiers in plain clothes and desperadoes with modern weapons had been allowed to infiltrate into the State . . . The wild forces thus let loose on the State are marching on with the aim of capturing Srinagar, the summer capital of my Government, as a first step to over- running the whole State . . . With the conditions obtain- ing at present in my State and the great emergency of the situation as it exists, I have no option but to ask for help from the Indian Dominion. Naturally it cannot send the help asked for by me without my State acceding to the Dominion of India. I have accordingly decided to do so and I attach the Instrument of Accession for acceptance by your Government. The other alternative is to leave my State and my people to freebooters . . . If my State is to be saved, immediate assistance must be available at Srinagar." It is clear from these extracts that, far from the inva- sion being due to the accession, the accession was forced by the invasion. Nevertheless, one finds this fiction re- peated time and again. I notice that the majority report, in section V of the appendix, observes that the admission of representatives of Kashmir to the Constituent Assembly of India "was undesirable from the political point of view, since it was bound to increase tension between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir question". The Belgian delegation has been even more emphatic and has remarked that the mat- ter requires the serious attention of the Security Council. I should like in this connexion to state that the representa- tion of Indian States in the Constituent Assembly was decided on early in 1947 before India was even parti- tioned and before any question of accession arose. Every Indian State, whether it ultimately wished to accede or not, was then given representation according to its popu- lation on the basis of one representative for every million of the population. On this basis Kashmir was allotted four members, and Kashmir has been entitled to this rep- resentation ever since April 1947; it is not a new thing. ' For the full text of the letter, see 227th meeting. The question may be asked why the right of accession was not actually exercised until June 1949 and why the representatives of Kashmir did not come into the Assem- bly until then. One obvious reason is that the Constitu- ent Assembly did not start discussing the provisions of the Constitution in which Kashmir was interested until that stage. It has been made clear by the Prime Minister of India time and again that although Kashmir's acces- sion has been constitutionally complete ever since the acceptance of the Ruler's Instrument of Accession by the Governor-General in October 1947, nevertheless, the people will be free at the plebiscite either to continue the accession or to put an end to it. I have thought it neces- sary to explain this matter at some length because there appears to have been some misapprehension on this mat- ter in the minds of the members of the Commission. Another allegation, completely untrue but repeatedly made, is that India sent its army to Kashmir to help the Ruler against the people and is keeping the Indian Army there for the purpose of coercing the people of the State to vote in favour of India at the plebiscite. As I have already stated, if India desired to secure Kashmir with- out a plebiscite, it could easily have done so by not making the offer of a plebiscite at alh It is really fantastic to sug- gest that, in order to seize Kashmir, India first offers a plebiscite, which it was not bound to do, and then sends an army to influence the plebiscite. The real reason for the sending of the Indian Army is clear from what I have already read out from the Maha- "While the People's Government in Kashmir's capital was completing the new constitution, with such clauses as 'Freedom of conscience and of worship shall be guar- anteed for all citizens', across the border in Pakistan a thousand-year-old cry was raised: 'Islam is in danger!' "But when the fanatic Muslim tribesmen began stream- ing into Kashmir, it seemed as though it was Christianity that was in danger. The tribesmen quickly reached Baramula, a picturesque river town that commands the western slopes of Kashmir valley, and they selected the orchard of St. Joseph's Convent for a motor pool. The stories that began leaking out about the violating and shooting of the nuns of the Order of St. Francis sounded like old-fashioned atrocity tales. "I was in Pakistan when the invasion was beginning, and I did not find it easy to make my way to the scene of action. Pakistan officials explained on rather contra- dictory grounds their reluctance to let me cross into Kashmir. On the one hand 'there was nothing to photo- graph' ; on the other 'it was very dangerous for a woman; tribesmen abducted women!' "I managed to get as far as Abbottabad, the last out- post on the Pakistan side of Kashmir, when the nuns who survived the carnage were rescued, and I was suc- cessful in meeting them as they escaped over the border at dawn. The Mother Superior had been seriously wounded and was rushed to the hospital. The grave- faced sister from whom I got the details had been in the babies' ward on the convent grounds when the tribesmen began smashing up X-ray equipment, throwing medicine bottles to the ground, ripping the statuettes of saints out of the chapel, and shooting up the place generally. Two patients were killed; an Englishman and his wife who were vacationing at the mission were murdered; two nuns were shot. 'They didn't hurt my babies,' added the sister triumphantly. ' Simon and Schuster, New York, 1949. This account is corroborated by the story of another eye-witness, Father Shanks, reproduced in the Daily Ex- press of London, dated 11 November 1947. It gives me no pleasure to read these details, and I shall omit them. I do not for a moment suggest that this particular out- rage was approved by Pakistan. Indeed Pakistan must have deplored it as much as India; but that is just my point. Pakistan deplored it but did nothing to prevent it, whereas India not only deplored it but sent its army to prevent the recurrence of such incidents. The truth of this matter was accurately described in a letter by a British Colonel written from Pakistan on 2 November 1947, to a brother-officer in London: "This Kashmir show was I think unsafe, and in my opinion amounts to an unofficial war on Pakistan's side. . . . These tribesmen from the Frontier, who have poured up past here during the last fortnight, and are now fight- ing, killing, looting and burning in Kashmir—some thou- sands of them—did not arrive by themselves though. Quite obviously the whole business was well organized by a central hand for supply, for transport and for direc- tion. "A very dangerous machine has however been let loose, one which I doubt whether Pakistan can control gener- ally, and certainly cannot control locally. The wretched European residents of Kashmir, people on leave, in con- vents, etc., have not escaped the general fury which is going on a bare hundred miles from here." This explains why the Indian Army was sent to Kash- mir. It arrived at Srinagar on the morning of 27 Octo- ber, 1947. It will be remembered that the outrage at Baramula took place on the evening of 26 October. I do not think there is a single country represented in this Council that does not wish that the Indian Army had arrived a day earlier. It is a complete travesty of the facts to say that the Army was sent to Kashmir for pur- poses of aggression or that it is being kept there for purposes of coercion. I shall bring my observations to a close with two quo- tations: the first is from a telegram sent by the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of Pakistan on 12 December 1947, shortly before India decided to bring its complaint before this Council: Je terminerai mes observations sur deux citations: La premiere est extraite d'un telegramme envoye par le Premier Ministre de TInde au Premier Ministre du Pakistan le 12 decembre 1947, peu avant que TInde eut decide de porter la question devant le Conseil: "Depuis mon retour de Lahore, j'ai consacre mon attention au reglement de toutes les questions en suspens entre TInde et le Pakistan. mon desir d'aboutir a ce reglement, indispensable au bien-etre de TInde comme a celui du Pakistan . . . Le Cachemire est a Theure actuelle la cause principale de notre differend .. . Nous serions tres heureux de coope- rer au retablissement de la paix par la voie d'un regle- ment . . ." "Ever since my return from Lahore I have given the most earnest thought to the settlement of all outstanding matters in dispute between India and Pakistan. My colleagues share my desire for such a settlement which is essential for the well-being of both India and Pakis- tan ... The major cause of this conflict at present is Kash- mir . . . We would gladly co-operate in an attempt to re- store peace by settlement . . ." TInde. La deuxieme citation est extraite d'un discours que le President de la Republique indienne a prononce il y a quelques jours: This shows the spirit which animated India then. The second quotation is from the speech of the President of the Indian Republic made a few days ago: irrefutables de la geographie, obligent et TInde et le Pakistan a vivre amicalement dans la cooperation mu- tuelle. Mais la grave blessure causee par les recents evenements ne se cicatrisera pas de si tot. Mon Gou- vernement a pour politique de s'efforcer de faciliter ce processus de guerison. Poursuivant cette politique, mon Gouvernement a propose a celui du Pakistan que tous deux Gouvernements s'engagent, par une declaration solennelle, a eviter la guerre en tant que methode de reglement de tout differend qui pourrait les separer." "Our history and culture, as well as the unalterable facts of geography, compel both India and Pakistan to live in friendly co-operation with each other. But the grievous wound caused by recent events will take some time to heal. It is my Government's policy to endeavour to help in every way this process of healing. In pursu- ance of this policy my Government has proposed to the Government of Pakistan that both Governments should make a solemn declaration for the avoidance of war as a method for the settlement of any disputes between them." tuelle. This is the spirit which animates India even now. Cette observation termine mes declarations d'au- jourd'hui. Je crains d'avoir quelque peu abuse de la pa- tience du President et des membres du Conseil; mais on a expose de fagon si erronee la position de mon pays, en raison peut-etre de renseignements inexacts ou insuffi- sants a ce sujet, que j'ai cru necessaire, meme au risque This completes what I have to say at this stage. I fear that I have somewhat trespassed upon the patience of the President and the members of this Council, but there has been so much misrepresentation of my country, due perhaps to wrong or inadequate information on the sub- ject, that I have thought it necessary, even at the risk of One difficulty that I have experienced while listening to my learned and distinguished friend has been that he has chosen, no doubt very properly and wisely from his point of view, to impress upon the attention of the Council certain incidents, events, portions of proposals and agree- ments to substantiate his thesis. In most cases, however, the representations made by him, taken out of their con- text and based upon observations and certain reports, were not, as I hope to show, in themselves accurate as points of fact. Nevertheless, the proper appreciation of the whole problem, before the Council decides in what manner it is capable of resolution at the stage at which it has arrived, necessitates the appraising of those inci- dents and those factors against their proper background. It is true that during the winter and spring of 1948, when this matter first came before the Security Council, the discussions that then took place went into every aspect of the matter in detail, and it is fortunately not necessary to repeat all of them or even to refer to every one of them, even as a matter of background. But since then, more than half the membership of the Security Council has changed and there has been some change in the personnel even of the representatives of the permanent members. Again, there is no doubt—and one has had proof of the fact—that the distinguished gentlemen who carried the honour of representing their various countries on the Council have been most diligent in their study of this problem. Nevertheless, it is necessary that the outstand- ing events and factors against which the whole problem has to be viewed, and which form the context and the background of the incidents to which the attention of the Council has been invited, should be looked at in their proper setting and sequence. I shall, therefore, with the President's permission, proceed to place those factors before the Security Council, and white I am doing that I shall invite the particular attention of the Council to some of the incidents and factors to which reference has been made by Sir Benegal N. Rau, so that the Council can properly appreciate and appraise them against their background. At the end of my submission I shall make observations upon any factors commented upon by him which are not thus dealt with by me. The very first question that would assist the Council in appreciating and appraising the significance of the dispute over Kashmir between India and Pakistan would be an understanding of the considerations governing the As to the Indian States, we need not be detained very long by this aspect of their situation. They enjoyed various degrees and attributes of sovereignty before 15 August 1947. None of them was fully sovereign in the international sense, inasmuch as their foreign relations and some other aspects of sovereignty were managed by the suzerain power, that is to say, by the United King- dom. But that state of affairs came to an end on 15 August 1947, in pursuance of section 7 of the Indian Independence Act passed by the United Kingdom Parlia- ment. The Indian Independence Act provided a solution for the political and constitutional evolution of the whole of the sub-continent. To start with, the sub-continent was to be partitioned into contiguous majority areas of Muslims, and of course, consequently, into contiguous majority areas of non-Muslims. The former were to be constituted into an independent sovereign State to be known as Pakistan and the latter into another sovereign independent State which has since been known as India. I am afraid that in the international sphere that nomen- clature has caused confusion to some extent, but that cannot be helped. The Council by this time is familiar with the fact that what used to be India is today Pakistan and India. That left the question of the Indian States. As I have said, under section 7 of the Indian Independence Act, it was provided that the suzerainty of the British Crown over the Indian States would lapse on the due date, which is 15 August, and all treaties and agreements in force would cease to be operative. The Act itself made no further provision with regard to the future of the Indian States, but it had already been explained to the States and their Rulers in the summer of 1946, when the United Kingdom Cabinet Mission had visited India for the pur- pose of bringing about a settlement, that the void created consequent on the withdrawal of United Kingdom au- : thority from India would have to be filled either by the ; States entering into a federal relationship with the suc- ; cessor government or governments in British India, or ! failing this, entering into political arrangements with it But after the Act was passed, the then Viceroy of India, Lord Louis Mountbatten, told the Chamber of Princes on 25 July 1947 that there were certain geo- graphical compulsions which could not be ignored. He advised the Rulers of the Indian States, in arriving at a decision as to whether to accede to India or to Pakistan, to take into account considerations such as the geographi- cal location of their States, their economic and strategic factors and situations, and the wishes of their people. As I have said, no trouble arose with regard to the vast majority of the Indian States. Those that were con- tiguous to India and had a majority of non-Muslim popu- lation acceded to India, with the exception of Hyderabad. Those which were contiguous to Pakistan and had a majority of Muslims in their populations acceded to Pak- istan. We have the exception of Kashmir, the question of which is now before the Security Council. One Indian State which, although not contiguous to Pakistan by land, had access to Pakistan through a short sea trip—that is to say, Junagadh, which had a majority of non-Muslims in the population but a Muslim Ruler—acceded to Pak- istan. These are the main difficulties or problems which arose with regard to the accession of States, subject to certain minor or subsidiary matters in connexion with Junagadh, that is to say, Kashmir, Junagadh and Hyderabad. I might, in passing, mention one Indian State, Kapurthala, which had a majority of Muslims in its population with a non-Muslim Ruler. The total Muslim population of that State—those who were not massacred—was driven out of the State in order to facilitate its absorption into the Dominion of India. The States of Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir pre- sented a problem, and anyone desiring to understand India's stand and Pakistan's stand with regard to Kash- mir would do well to study the views and actions of the Government of India with regard to the related cases of Hyderabad and Junagadh also. It is particularly incum- bent upon the Security Council to do so, not only for the better appreciation and appraisal of the Kashmir case but also because the Hyderabad and Junagadh cases are matters of which the Council is seized. On 8 March 1948, addressing the Security Council at its 264th meeting, the then representative of India ex- plained India's position in respect of accession in these words: "No doubt the Ruler, as the Head of State, has to take action in respect of accession. When he and his people are in agreement as to the Dominion to which they should It was not a gratuitous offer on behalf of India, as has just been suggested by the representative of India, that the question of the accession of Kashmir to India or to Pakistan should be settled on the basis of a free and im- partial plebiscite. At the time when India made that reservation to the accession, or made that offer—one may •call it by whatever name he chooses—it had before it the problem of Junagadh, which had already acceded to Pak- istan on 15 September. Junagadh had entered into a stand-still agreement with Pakistan on 15 August, and had acceded to Pakistan on 15 September. And up to that point—I wish to emphasize this in respect to Juna- gadh—there had not been a single incident in Junagadh itself between the Ruler and his people. Nevertheless, there was that case, which India had already raised, as I shall presently show, in respect of which India wanted a plebiscite held. And in the background there was the problem of Hyderabad. It was in order to suit India's interest in respect of those States that this principle was •evolved and put forward. Let us accept that principle, but let us see how that principle was applied in practice to the three cases in dispute. In the case of Hyderabad, the Ruler was a Muslim; the majority of the people were non-Muslim. The Ruler, the Nizam, did not desire to accede either to India or to Pakistan. He desired to enter into special treaty rela- tions with the Government of India in order to preserve a fair measure of independence for his State. The Gov- ernment of India refused to accept that position and de- manded that the State should accede to India uncondi- tionally. The Nizam offered to hold a plebiscite under United Nations supervision in order to ascertain the wishes of the people of the State on the question of-es- tablishing a political relationship with India on the basis of accession or by means of a treaty. The Government of India rejected the offer. What it said was in effect this: "You accede first, and the plebiscite can then be held." When addressing the Security Council on the subject of Hyderabad on 19 May 1949 [425th meeting], I urged that that was at least an acceptance on behalf of India of the principle that it was for the people of the State to decide whether they wanted to remain independent or enter into accession with India. My learned friend, Sir Benegal N. Rau, desired to intervene when I said that, and naturally I yielded to him. He then explained that, al- though India had said that there should be a plebiscite, there was no intention of giving Hyderabad the choice of independence. The only choice to be offered to Hyder- abad was this: either to accede to India, or to accede to India. On that the plebiscite would be held. "The Government of India is firmly of the view that, whatever sovereign rights reverted to the States on the lapse of paramountcy, they vest in the people"—I repeat: "they vest in the people"; there is no question of the Ruler—"and conditions must be created in every State" —this was not a generous or a charitable offer in respect of Kashmir only—"for a free and unfettered exercise of these rights". In the next extract, the White Paper quotes the fol- lowing declaration made by Sardar Vallabhai Patel, the Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister of India, on 27 August 1947: "If, however, the Nizam's Government is still unable to decide its course in the only right direction in which it lies"—that is to say, to accede to India—"His Exalted Highness must agree to submit the issue to the judgment of his people and abide by the decision. We, on our side, will be content to accept whatever might be the result of such a referendum." The third extract from the White Paper is the fol- lowing : "When, therefore, the Nizam and his Government complain against the so-called denial of self-determina- tion, they mean, in fact, that a small clique should have unfettered power to dominate the masses." That is what India claimed: that a Muslim Ruler of a predominantly non-Muslim population should not have the right to determine the question of the accession of this State or the lack of accession, of keeping its independence. I shall repeat: "When, therefore, the Nizam and his Government complain against the so-called denial of self-determina- tion, they mean, in fact, that a small clique should have unfettered power to dominate the masses. "The Nizam's Government wishes to hold a plebiscite under the conditions in which a small militant group controls the destinies of the people and the Razakars"— that is to say, the volunteers, like the State Militia in Kashmir—"are left free to terrorize the people into sub- mission. A plebiscite without an interim government representative of and satisfactory to the majority popu- lation in Hyderabad will only be a fraud on the people." And that is the fraud that India has consistently tried to persuade the Security Council and the Commission to let it practise in Kashmir. ' Now when that could not be held, and the Nizam did ; not agree, what did India do? How far did it respect " the sovereignty of the Nizam and the integrity of his State? India marched its troops into Hyderabad, and .. they have been in military possession of the State in spite i of the fact that before the military forces of India marched J into Hyderabad, the case of Hyderabad, under the 1 Nizam's directions, had been brought before the Security I Council [S/1317] and was then pending before the Se- ; curity Council. India marched its troops in, they have ~ been in military possession, and it has since been an- " nounced that the Nizam has now acceded to India. Que fit TInde lorsque le Nizam refusa et qu'elle ne put obtenir ce qu'elle voulait pecta-t-elle la souverainete du Nizam et Tintegrite de son Etat? Elle fit penetrer ses troupes en Haiderabad et elle prit militairement possession du pays en depit du fait que, avant meme Tentree des troupes de TInde en Haiderabad, le cas de ce pays avait ete, sur les instruc- tions du Nizam, soumis au Conseil de securite devant lequel il etait encore pendant. entrer ses troupes sur le territoire et prit militairement possession du pays et, par la suite, il fut annonce que le Nizam avait decide de rattacher le Haiderabad a TInde. s That, in brief, was the Hyderabad case and those were the principles put into force by India in respect of Hyderabad. Tel est en resume le cas du Haiderabad et tels sont les principes qui ont preside a Taction de TInde a l'egard de ce pays. Junagadh, as I have said, entered into a stand-still agreement with Pakistan on 15 August, and acceded to Pakistan on 15 September 1947. The Government of India at once objected both to the stand-still agreement, when it took place, and later on to the accession, when it took place. Why did it object? As I have submitted, there had not been a single incident in Junagadh. And if it was for the Ruler to decide, the Ruler had decided. 'But the Government of India maintained most strenu- ously that Junagadh's accession to Pakistan was in utter violation of the principles on which the partition of the country had been agreed upon and effected. Now what 'is the meaning of India's objection that the accession of junagadh to Pakistan was in utter violation of the prin- ciples on which, the partition of the country had been agreed upon and effected ? It means that Junagadh had Le Junagadh, comme je Tai dit, conclut un accord de treve avec le Pakistan le 15 aout 1947 et se rattacha au Pakistan le 15 septembre suivant. Le Gouvernement de TInde a proteste immediatement contre Taccord de treve, lorsqu'il fut signe, et plus tard contre le rattachement, lorsqu'il eut lieu. Quelle etait la raison de ces protes- tations? Ainsi que je Tai declare, pas le moindre in- cident ne s'etait produit au Junagadh. Si c'est au Sou- verain qu'il appartenait de prendre la decision, cette de- cision avait ete prise. Mais le Gouvernement de TInde soutint obstinement que le rattachement du Junagadh au Pakistan constituait une violation flagrante des prin- cipes sur la base desquels le partage du pays avait ete convenu et realise. Quel est done le sens de Tobjection soulevee par TInde, a savoir que le rattachement du Junagadh au Pakistan constituait une violation flagrante des principes sur la base desquels le partage du pays avait ete convenu et realise que la majorite de la population du Junagadh etait com- posed de non-Musulmans. Le partage de TInde s'etait effectue sur la base du principe suivant lequel la ma- jeure partie des regions musulmanes devait revenir au Pakistan et la majeure partie des regions non mu- sulmanes a TInde: par consequent, le rattachement au Pakistan d'un Etat a majorite non musulmane cons- tituait une violation flagrante des principes sur la base desquels le partage avait ete convenu et realise. L'lnde affirma egalement que e'etait la un empietement sur sa souverainete et son territoire et une atteinte a son in- tegrite. (a majority population of non-Muslims. The partition Jaf India had taken place on the principle of a majority hi Muslim areas in Pakistan and a majority of non- 'Muslim areas in India, and therefore a State with a ma- jority non-Muslim population acceding to Pakistan was ,'n violation of the principles on which the partition had ! oeen agreed upon and effected. India also went on to Assert that it was an encroachment on Indian sovereignty blind territory, and that it represented an attempt to dis- turb the integrity of India. The Government of India insisted that on the basis of geographical, economic and military considerations, and on that of the fact that the majority of the people of the State were non-Muslims, Junagadh should have acceded to India, and that in any case the final decision with re- gard to this matter must lie with the people of the State. But what did India propose ? How was the decision, the final decision, the wish of the people of the State, to be ascertained? Under what conditions? India pro- posed that the question of accession should be settled either by negotiation, that is admitting India's claim to the accession of Junagadh, or by a plebiscite organized under the joint control of the State of Junagadh and the Government of India: the State of Junagadh and the Government of India—and the accession had been to Pakistan. If this was a fair offer, if this was a just offer, if this was an honest offer, why cannot Pakistan with equal justice, equal fairness and equal honesty contend that the ascertainment of the wishes of the people of Kashmir should be by means of a plebiscite held under the joint control of the State of Kashmir and the Government of Pakistan? If that was fair in regard to Junagadh, why is it not equally fair with regard to Kashmir? I shall, in this connexion, quote the Prime Minister of India. On 12 September 1947, long before there was any ques- tion of the accession of Kashmir, the date of which has been stated by the representative of India quite cor- rectly—whatever took place, whether it was accession or not, it was on 26 October—long before that, on 12 Sep- tember, the Prime Minister of India sent a telegram to the Prime Minister of Pakistan from which I quote: "The Dominion of India would be prepared to accept any democratic test in respect of the accession of the Why cannot this be applied to Kashmir? In Kash- mir, in the circumstances to which I shall come, the very fraud practised by the Ruler upon his people gives India all the rights—and they have been claimed on behalf of India before—which the representative of India has claimed today before the Security Council. Did not the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan, as I have said, before any incident had occurred and when there was no trouble whatsoever except protests from the Government of India, give corresponding, if not greater rights to Pakistan in respect of Junagadh ? But after the accession, on 22 September the Governor-General of India, in a telegram to the Governor-General of Pakistan said as follows—and I quote from that telegram: "As regards accession of Junagadh to Pakistan your attention is invited to our telegram addressed to the Prime Minister of Pakistan and delivered personally at Government House, Karachi, by Lord Ismay on 12 Sep- tember, explaining fully the Government of India's posi- tion regarding Junagadh. The Pakistan Government has neither acknowledged receipt of our message nor replied to this nor to previous dispatches on the subject. Instead, the Pakistan Government has unilaterally proceeded to action in which it was made plain the Government of India could never and does not acquiesce. Such accept- ance of accession by Pakistan cannot but be regarded by the Government of India as an encroachment on Indian sovereignty and territory and inconsistent with the friendly relations that should exist between the two Do- minions. This action of Pakistan is considered by the Government of India to be a clear attempt to cause dis- ruption in the integrity of India by extending the influ- ence and boundaries of the Dominion of Pakistan in , utter violation of the principles on which the partition ' was agreed upon and effected. "In these circumstances I hope that it will be possible * for you to prevail upon the Government of Pakistan to reconsider its attitude on the accession of Junagadh. But if the matter is not reconsidered, the responsibility of the consequences must, I am compelled to inform you, rest 'squarely on the shoulders of the Pakistan Government. Now, again, for a moment I shall re-read this portion substituting Kashmir for Junagadh and see how it sounds to the representative of India and to the Security Council. "The Government of India has unilaterally proceeded to action in which the Government of Pakistan could never and does not acquiesce. Such acceptance of acces- sion by India cannot but be regarded by the Government of Pakistan as an encroachment on Pakistan's sovereignty and territory and inconsistent with the friendly relations that should exist between the two Dominions. This ac- tion of India is considered by the Government of Pakis- tan to be a clear attempt to cause disruption in the in- tegrity of Pakistan by extending the influence and boundaries of the Dominion of India in utter violation of the principles on which the partition was agreed upon and effected." I shall not read the rest of it. In view of these telegrams which were exchanged in the month of September, before any of those incursions took place, and to which the representative of India has referred, the position of the Government of India was that a State with a non-Muslim majority among its peo- ple must accede to India. Consequently, then, a State with a majority of Muslim population should accede to Pakistan. Those were the principles that India was in- sisting upon, but then, if in spite of this, if in contraven- tion of this principle which applied to the very partition of India itself, one Dominion proposes to accept acces- sion on the part of a State the majority of the population of which does not correspond to the majority population of the Dominion itself, then the other Dominion would not acquiesce in such arrangement and would not recog- nize it. The consequences that flow from it will rest squarely on the shoulders of the Government that accepts the accession. In respect of Kashmir, India is in that position. It unilaterally accepted accession, although the representa- tive of India this afternoon called it a "tentative acces- sion". So it was, if it was anything at all. Also, Lord Mountbatten, the Governor-General, in accepting it, inti- mated to the Maharaja that the question of accession would be decided by the free expression of the will of the people. Although these factors themselves take away from that accession the legal character with which, since then, the Government of India had tried to invest it, nevertheless, how does the Government of India expect that Pakistan, so far as it is concerned, should treat the attempted accession of Kashmir to India any differently than India was prepared to treat the actual accession of Junagadh to Pakistan? Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) : If the President will permit me an extra two or three minutes to conclude this submission on Junagadh, I am quite will- ing that the Council should adjourn, as we shall have ar- rived at the end of one topic. It will not take more than two minutes for me to conclude this part. While these negotiations were still proceeding be- tween the two Governments, the Government of India marched its troops into Junagadh. As a matter of fact, even before it did that, a Provisional Government of Junagadh was set up in Indian territory. That is im- portant when the Council comes to assess the allegations that have been made of encouragement given to the peo- ple who were fighting for their liberty in Kashmir on behalf of Pakistan. A Provisional Government of Junagadh was set up in Indian territory and finally, on 9 November 1947, India marched its troops into Junagadh and forcibly annexed the State which had acceded to Pakistan. Subsequently a farcical plebiscite was held—India was in military oc- cupation of the State—and the State was formally incor- porated into the Indian Dominion. Pakistan's complaint with regard to Junagadh is still pending with the Secur- ity Council, and this plebiscite was held by India notwith- standing this pendency of the question of Junagadh, with which the Commission on India and Pakistan would proceed to occupy itself when directed by the Security Council to do so. With the President's permission I should like, as already intimated, to interrupt my statement at this point. 4. Representation in the Security Council Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) (translated from French) : Since we last discussed the question of Chinese repre- sentation in the Security Council [459th meeting] the Sec- retary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Trygve Lie, has received, on 20 January and 3 February, two fur- ther telegrams signed by Mr. Chou En-lai, Foreign Min- ister of the Central People's Government of China. Both telegrams deal with the question of Chinese rep- resentation in the Security Council. They emanate from a Government which half the members of the Security Council recognize as the legal government of China. I am therefore of the opinion that they should be circulated as official Security Council documents, and wish to make a formal proposal or rather a request to that effect. The PRESIDENT '(translated from Spanish) : As Presi- dent of the Council I cannot order the document to be officially distributed. The matter is not on the Council's Mr. TSIANG (China) : I thought that the President recognized the representative of Yugoslavia on a point of order. I submit that the representative of Yugoslavia made a proposal; he did not really raise a point of order. As a proposal, it cannot be considered by the Council, certainly not this afternoon, since it is not on the agenda which we adopted at the beginning of this meeting.

The Chair has given its decision, and unless the representative of Yugoslavia wishes to challenge i t . . . Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) (translated from French) : My request does not seem to me to call for a vote by the Council. According to the established practice of the Council and the General Assembly any delegation is, I believe, entitled to request the circulation of a document in official form, particularly if that document relates to an item which is still on the agenda. The Council has never decided to remove the question of China from its agenda. A decision has been taken, but that does not mean that the question of China is no longer on the agenda.

In reply, I can tell the representative of Yugoslavia that this matter was already decided by the Council and is not on the permanent agenda. Consequently, the Chair feels that it cannot officially distribute the documents in question. We shall meet again tomorrow at 3 p.m.