S/PV.465 Security Council

As in previous meetings, we shall have simultaneous inter- pretation for the statements made by the parties con- :erned in the matter under consideration. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de I'espagnol): L'interpreta- tion simultanee sera utilisee comme precedemment pour la traduction des declarations des parties au differend en cours d'examen. When the meeting adjourned yesterday, the repre- sentative of Pakistan was making a statement to the -ouncil. I invite him to proceed with his remarks. Le representant du Pakistan n'avait pas termine son expose lors de la cloture de la seance precedente. Je l'invite done a continuer son expose. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan): I egret that my submission to the Council has become so Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) (tra- duit de Vanglais): Je regrette que mon expose au Con- President: M. C. BLANCO (Cuba). a) Lettre, en date du 5 decembre 1949, adressee au Secretaire general des Nations Unies par le President de la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'lnde et le Pakistan pour lui presenter le troisieme rapport provisoire de la Commission (S/1430, S/1430/Add.l, S/1430/Add.2 et S/ 1430/Add.3); b) Lettre, en date du 3 fevrier 1950, adressee au President du Conseil de securite par le general McNaughton, representant permanent du Canada aupres de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, pour accompagner son rapport sur la question Inde-Pakistan (S/1453). 2. Adoption de l'ordre du jour 3 . La question Inde-Pakistan (suite) Before I resume my submission to the Council I wish to say that yesterday afternoon [464th meeting] I was very naturally disturbed and somewhat distressed at hearing Sir Benegal N. Rau say that I had attributed to him, in the course of the first part of my submission to the Council at that meeting, certain things that he had not said. The Council will recall what I said at the conclusion of my submission yesterday afternoon, but apart from that, I have looked into the matter myself and have taken pains to study afresh what Sir Benegal N. Rau said in that connexion and what Mr. Setalvad had said earlier to which I also had made reference. I desire, with the permission of the President, in the course of the next three or four minutes to make a submission in that respect. Sir Benegal N. Rau had said [463rd meeting] "Another misconception which dies hard is that the whole trouble in Kashmir was the result of the Maha- raja's accession to India. It cannot be repeated too often that the very reverse was the case. Invaders from outside Kashmir began to pour into the Valley of Kashmir on 22 October 1947. This is a historical fact which can be easily proved from the records, and which no one, to my knowledge, has controverted. The Maharaja's letter containing the Instrument of Accession was written on 26 October 1947 ..." Sir Benegal N. Rau then quoted certain passages of the Maharaja's letter which made reference to this tribal incursion. And even that letter went on to say the following — the picture that was then sought to be presented to Lord Mountbatten was that the whole trouble started with the tribal incursion — in a section which was not contained in the quotation made by Sir Benegal N. Rau, and I quote just one sentence: "The people of my State, both the Muslims and non- Muslims, generally have taken no part at all". That was written on 26 October. In the same connexion, when Mr. Setalvad was addressing the Security Council on behalf of India on 23 January 1948 [234th meeting] he stated the follow- ing: "Thus came the invasion of Kashmir on 22 October 1947. It commenced by an attack at a place called Muzaffarabad in Kashmir. What is most important to remember is the fact that, until that raid commenced on 22 October 1947 — that is, the raid by the tribesmen — there had not been any killing by the Dogras. A point which has been repeatedly mentioned to the members is that Muslims were killed by the Dogras and it was because of the killing of the Muslims that Avant de reprendre le cours de mon expose au Conseil, je dois declarer qu'hier apres-midi [464eme seance], j'ai ete naturellement emu et quelque peu peine d'entendre Sir Benegal N. Rau declarer qu'au cours de la premiere partie de mon expose au Conseil je lui avais attribue certains declarations qu'il n'aurait pas faites. Le Conseil se souviendra de ce que j'ai declare hier apres-midi en terminant ma declaration. Par ailleurs, j'ai revu moi-meme les details de mon expose et j'ai pris la peine d'examiner a nouveau les declarations faites par Sir Benegal N. Rau a ce sujet, ainsi que ce qu'avait dit anterieurement M. Setalvad et auquel j'avais fait allusion. Avec la permission du President, j'aimerais, en trois ou quatre minutes, faire une decla- ration a ce sujet. Sir Benegal N. Rau a declare [463eme seance]: "Une autre conception erronee qui est profondement ancree consiste a croire que les desordres du Cache- mire sont le resultat du rattachement a l'lnde prononce par le Maharadjah. L'on ne saurait repeter trop sou- vent que c'est precisement le contraire qui s'est produit. La vague des envahisseurs du Cachemire a commence a deferler dans la vallee du Cachemire le 22 octobre 1947. C'est la un fait historique dont maintes preuves attestent Tauthenticite et que nul, a ma connaissance, n'a mis en doute. La lettre du Maharadjah contenant Tinstrument d'accession a ete ecrite le 26 octobre 1947 . ." Sir Benegal N. Rau a cite alors certains passages de la lettre du Maharadjah faisant allusion a cette incur- sion des tribus. L'on cherchait alors a representer a Lord Mountbatten que les desordres avaient eu comme point de depart Tincursion des tribus, et cette lettre allait jusqu'a pretendre, dans un passage non cite par Sir Benegal N. Rau, et dont je lirai une seule phrase, que: "la population de TEtat de Cachemire, musulmane et non musulmane, n'y avait pris en general aucune part." Ceci etait ecrit le 26 octobre. A ce propos, lorsque M. Setalvad s'est adresse au Conseil de securite au nom de TInde, le 23 Janvier 194? [234eme seance], il a declare ce qui suit: "C'est ainsi que s'est produite, le 22 octobre 1947, Tinvasion du Cachemire. Elle a debute par une attaque contre une localite du Cachemire appelee Muzaffarabad. Ce qu'il faut surtout se rappeler, c'est que jusqu'au 22 octobre 1947, date a laquelle cette invasion, c'est-a-dire Tincursion des tribus, a commence, les Dogras n'avaient commis aucune effusion de sang. Ce que Ion a constamment repete aux membres du Conseil cest que les Musulmans ont ete tues par les Dogras et que Although Sir Benegal N. Rau did not actually use the words used by Mr. Setalvad, he was referring to the same thing, that is, that it was a totally untrue picture of the actual events ta say that there had been any trouble inside the State worth the name, let us say, which could have incited the tribesmen or Pakistan nationals to go into the State to help their co-relig- ionists. It is true that Sir Benegal N. Rau did not llse the expression "nothing had happened" which l repeated on two or three occasions yesterday after- noon. But that is my own epitome of the argument put forward by Mr. Setalvad and sought to be repeated, so far as 1 could understand it, by Sir Benegal N. Rau, that is, that what led to the whole trouble in Kashmir were these incidents of 22 October, and that the trouble started with thel11. Our case has been this and 1 put it to the Security Council, as follows, in reply ta Mr. Setalvad in the next meeting of the Security Council on 24 J anuary 1948 [235th meeting]. "The real picture is that it is a movement of the people in Kashmir to get rid of Dogra tyranny broLlght about by the massacres to which l shall presently come, the existence of which has been altogether and cate- gorically denied by the representative of India before 22 October when the first raid took place. This move- ment is spreading. No doubt, there is sympathy among the tribesmen, and l have not denied the fact that there is sympathy aIl through Pakistan with the struggle. But the spearhead of the movel11ent, the people upon whom the brunt of it has fallen and who are mainly fighting, are the people of Kashmir themselves. If that were not so, the l110vement would have collapsed within three days. How is it continuing?" Thus, the real difference between the presentation made by the representative of India and the presenta- tion that l have sought to make is this: that weeks before 22 October, the persecution, massacre and extermination - to use the expression employed by the correspondent of The Times in his contribution of 10 October 1948 - had commenced: "Many of them had been killed and many of them had been compelled to leave their homes." In the words of Sheikh Abdullah himself, which l quoted yesterday, as reported in his Press statement in New Delhi on 21 October, the panic was created by the dispatch of the troops of the State to quell this movement, and thereupon the people of Poonch - those who had taken up arms - took their women and children across the border, across the River Jhelum to Pakistan, obtained arms, returned to the State, began their military campaign, and dis- persed the Maharaja's forces, and this freedom move- ment started. An that had happened before 21 Oetober. That was the point l was making. If 1 used any expression in describing the gist of this argument which actually was not employed by the representative of India, 1 would both apologize in respect of it, if he has any objection to it, and l would also expla}n that that was the presentation of my argument whrch l have now The next thing to remember with regard to them is that they are: entirely an infantry force with no artillery, no armour and no air force. Their strength was, at the time when the Commission arrived on the sub-continent, thirty-two battalions, although it might be remembered that a battalion of the Azad Kashmir force consists of 650 men as against the 840, of which an Indian or Pakistan battalion is composed. Even in respect of the military equipment that they do possess, an Azad battalion is much inferior in armament and equipment to a regular Indian or Pakistan battalion. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that even in 1947 and the early part of 1948, these Azad Kashmir forces had first routed the Maharaja's forces and had driven them away, and had next put up a more or less equal struggle against the Indian forces that had gone into Kashmir, and had for many months held on to their positions with very little loss in their fight against the Indian forces. This was the strength, the armament and the character of the Azad Kashmir forces. It is alleged, and the point sought to be made, is that during the period from August 1948 onwards, these forces have been augmented and strengthened and that, as the representative of India said "This was con- trary to the understanding that Pakistan would not use the period for consolidating its position or increasing its military potential." It becomes necessary, therefore, first to see whether there has been any change, and if so of what description, in respect of the Azad Kashmir forces. If there has been any change, when did it take place, and was it, if it took place, contrary to any understanding or undertaking? From the phraseology • the representative of India employed in regard to this understanding, it appears that he was referring to the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948 [S/1100, paragraph 75]1 in which, in part I which deals with the cease-fire order, the fol- II y a lieu de tenir compte ensuite du fait qu'ils constituent essentiellement des forces d'infanterie ne disposant ni d'artillerie, ni de materiel blinde, ni de forces aeriennes. Lors de Tarrivee de la commission dans la peninsule, leur nombre s'elevait a trente-deux bataillons, bien qu'il y ait lieu de noter qu'un bataillon des forces du Cachemire libre azad compte 650 hommes alors qu'un bataillon de TInde ou du Pakistan en compte 840. Du point de vue meme de Tequipement militaire qu'il possede, un bataillon azad dispose d'un armement et d'un equipement bien interieur a celui d'un bataillon regulier de TInde ou du Pakistan. Nean- moins, on doit se souvenir que, des 1947 et au debut de 1948, ces forces du Cachemire azad ont d'abord mis en deroute les forces du Maharadjah et les ont repous- sees, qu'elles ont ensuite mene une lutte plus ou moins egale contre les forces de TInde qui avaient penetre dans le Cachemire, et, pendant de nombreux mois, ont conserve leurs positions en ne subissant que des pertes legeres, au cours de leurs luttes contre les forces in- diennes. Tels etaient les effectifs, les armements et les caracteristiques des forces du Cachemire azad. On pretend, et on tente de demontrer, qu'au cours de la periode qui a debute en aout 1948, ces troupes ont ete accrues et renforcees et que, comme Ta declare le representant de TInde: "Ceci est contraire a Tengage- ment pris par le Pakistan de ne pas profiter de cette periode pour renforcer ses positions ou pour accroitre son potentiel militaire". C'est pourquoi il devient indis- pensable de determiner d'abord si une modification quelconque de la situation est intervenue en ce qui con- cerne les forces du Cachemire azad, et, dans Taffirma- tive, quelle en est la nature. S'il y a eu une modifica- tion quelconque, quand a-t-elle eu lieu et, dans ce cas egalement, etait-elle contraire a un accord ou un enga- gement quelconque? II semble ressortir des termes employes par le repre- sentant de TInde lorsqu'il a parte d'engagement, qu'il avait en vue la resolution de la commission en date du 13 aout 1948 [S/1100, paragraphe 75]1; dans la sec- tion B de la premiere partie, relative a Tordre de cesser 1 On trouvera le texte du premier rapport provisoire de la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'lnde et le Pakistan, documents S/1100, dans les Proces-verbaux officiels du Co de securite, troisieme annee, supplement de novembre 1948. The tirst thing to realize in respect of this is that these were the proposaIs which formed the resolution. This was what was proposed by the Commission ta each side. The Imderstanding or the undertaking would arise only on acceptance of these proposaIs. The next thing to note, which is of great importance, is that this is paragraph B under the cease-tire order. That is ta say, there is tirst to be a cease-fire: fighting must stop. After the fighting had ceased, each sicle \Vould be bound not to augment the military potential of the forces under its control. It is obvious that this was to apply once fighting had stopped. It would not be possible, when fighting was going on, to lay down, as it were, the conditions under which the fighting should take place, as if it were agame being conducted which must he played according to certain limitations that the Council had laid down. The Commission was huilding up a structure, step by step, for the cease-fire, for the truce" and in order to get to the plebiscite. Obviously, the tirst step was the cease-tire. That is dealt with in paragraph A, which is anterior ta pàra- graph Band says: "The Governments of India and Pakistan agree that their respective High Commands will issue separately and simultaneously a cease-fire order _ .." and so on. Once the cease-fire has taken place both sides are hound not to augment the military potential, which is logical and perfectly understandable. The third thing to understand is that it was not only Pakistan that was bound but India also. The representative of India argues on the basis that, after 13 August, Pakistan was guilty of the contravention of this direction or agreement or understanding laid clown in paragraph B by doing something to the Azad forces. We shall come ta what it was and to whether anything did or did not occur. What was the position? What was the understanding or obligation? Fighting was going on. Fighting did not stop until 1 January the following year, and 1 fail to understand what is the understanding to which Pakistan or for th~t matter, lndia, could have adhered during that penocl when the cease-fire had not yet been brought about. 1 am sure that it was not the contention of the representa- tive of India that, while the lndian forces went on attacking, the other side - AfJa.d Ka?hmir or Pakistan, whoever was fighting on the other slde ---: .should take no step to withstand the attack;s of these mlhtary force~. The fighting was actually g0ll1g on. Not only was 1t actually going on at that time, but during the Novem- ber Indian offensive India pushed these forces back and deprived them of quite substantial territory. This was during the period in N ovember 1948. N ow the 5 La première chose à noter à ce sujet est qu'il s'agit en l'occurrence de propositions dont l'ensemble forme la résolution en question. C'était là ce que la commis- sion proposait à chacune des deux parties en présence. Il ne pouvait être question d'entente ou d'engagements avant que ces propositions fussent acceptées. . II faut considérer ensuite - c'est là un point très Important - qu'il s'agit de la section B de la partie relative à l'ordre de cesser le feu. Cela revient à dire qu'il devait d'abord y avoir arrêt des hostilités: les combats devaient cesser. Après l'arrêt des hostilités chacune des' parties en présence serait tenue de ne pa~ atlgmenter le potentiel militaire des forces placées sous ses ordres. Il est évident que cette clause ne devait s'appliquer qu'une fois les combats arrêtés. Il n'aurait pas été possible, tant que duraient les hostilités, de poser, pour ainsi clire, les conditions dans lesquelles les combats devaient se poursuivre, comme s'il s'agissait d'un jeu qui dût être mené conformément à certaines règles restrictives fixées par le Conseil. La commission poursuivait méthodiquement une œuvre qui devait mener au plébiscite, en passant par la suspension d'ar- mes et la trêve. De toute évidence, la première mesure à prendre était l'ordre de cesser le feu. La section A - an~éri~ure à la section B - Y pourvoit en stipulant ce qUI Stllt: "Les Gouvernements de l'Inde et du Pakistan con- viennent que leurs hauts commandements respectifs donneront séparément et simultanément un ordre de suspension d'armes," etc. Une fois <les hostilités suspendues, les deux parties sont tenues de ne pas augmenter leur potentiel militaire, ce qui est logique et parfaitement compréhensible. Le troisième point qu'il faut bien comprendre, c'est que le Pakistan n'était pas seul à être tenu par cette clause, mais que l'Inde l'était aussi. Le représentant de l'Inde prétend qu'après le 13 août, le Pakistan s'est rendu coupable d'infraction aux dispositions, à l'accord aIl à l'engagement contenus dans la section 13, en pre- nant une mesure concernant les forces azad. Nous reviendrons sur la question et examinerons s'il s'est, en fait, passé quelque chose ou non. Quelle était la situa- tion? De quel engagement ou obligation s'agissait-il? Les combats continuaient. Les hostilités n'ont cessé, en effet, que le 1er janvier de l'année suivante, et je ne vois vraiment pas quel est l'engagement auquel le Pakistan, ou même l'Inde, d'ailleurs, aurait dû se con- former pendant la période qui a précédé la suspension d'armes effective. Je suis certain qu'il n'entrait pas dans l'idée du représentant de l'Inde de soutenir que, tandis que les forces de l'Inde continuaient leurs atta- ques, leurs adversaires, qu'il sagisse des forces du Cachemire azad ou des forces du Pakistan, n'auraient dû prendre aucune mesure pour résister à ces attaques. En fait, les hostilités se poursuivaient; non seulement elles se poursuivaient à cette époque, mais pendant l'offensive indienne de novembre, l'Inde a repoussé les That there was an Indian offensive in November 1948 cannot be denied. We made a complaint through the Commission to the Security Council that while the Commission was engaged upon settling the terms of an agreement, India had mounted an offensive in these areas, which it was pushing forward. We asked the Commission to bring this matter to the notice of the Security Council — which it did — and to take effective steps to see that the position did not deterio- rate any further. The letter is dated 19 November, and on 22 November it was forwarded by the Chairman of the Commission to the Security Council [S/1196, annex I]2. The text is as follows: "The Pakistan Government wishes to draw the attention of the Security Council to the developments in Kashmir which constitute definite violations by India of the undertaking given by both Governments in res- ponse to UNCIP's2* resolution" — which was accepted by both sides — "of 19 September 1948 [S/1100, para- graph 109]. This resolution appealed to both Govern- ments to use their best endeavours during the absence of the Commission to lessen the existing tension in this dispute so as further to prepare the ground for its peaceful final settlement. "The Government of Pakistan has scrupulously observed the undertaking given by it. On the other hand, India now appears determined to force a mili- tary decision in Kashmir. The Indian Army has recently been reinforced in the Jammu area by three infantry brigades, four militia battalions, one field artillery regiment, one medium artillery regiment. A Corps H.O. has been established in Naoshera control- ling three divisions of army and one air-borne division operating in the Riasi and Poonch Districts. In the Srinagar area, reinforcement of two additional infantry brigades plus three battalions and one regiment of field artillery have arrived. The Indian Air Force operating in Kashmir has also been considerably reinforced. "Last September the Indian Army made an attack- in brigade strength on Zojila Pass which was repulsed. In October an attack in brigade strength north from Jammu towards Uri was also held, while an attack by one brigade from Jhangar towards Kotli was held, fifteen miles north-west of Jhangar. The Indian Army has now started a major offensive by at least one divi- sion supported by armoufed cars from Rajauri towards Kotli and Mendhar and is continually moving up rein- forcements to Naoshera. Object undoubtedly is all-out offensive to obtain possession of Western Kashmir II est indeniable qu'il y a eu en novembre 1948 une offensive de TInde. Nous nous sommes plaints, par Tentremise de la commission, au Conseil de securite de ce que, tandis que la commission s'efforqait de mettre au point les conditions d'un accord, TInde avait monte dans ces regions une offensive qu'elle menait vigoureu- sement. Nous avons demande a la commission de por- ter cette affaire a la connaissance du Conseil de secu- rite, ce qu'elle a fait, et de prendre des mesures effi- caces en vue d'empecher la situation de s'envenimer davantage. Notre lettre est datee du 19 novembre et le President de la commission Ta transmise le 22 novembre au Conseil de securite, [S/1196, annexe I]2. En voici les termes: "Le Gouvernement du Pakistan tient a attirer l'at- tention du Conseil de securite sur les evenements sur- venus au Cachemire, lesquels constituent de la part de TInde, des violations caracterisees des engagements pris par les deux Gouvernements comme suite a la resolution de la Commission des Nations Unies pour TInde et le Pakistan, en date du 19 septembre 1948 [S/1100, paragraphe 109]", resolution qui a ete accep- tee par les deux parties. "Cette resolution invitait les deux Gouvernements a faire tous leurs efforts durant l'absence de la commission pour diminuer la tension existante et preparer ainsi le terrain en vue du regle- ment pacifique final de ce differend. "Le Gouvernement du Pakistan s'est scrupuleuse- ment conforme a Tengagement souscrit par lui. Par contre, TInde semble maintenant resolue a imposer une decision par la force des armes au Cachemire. L'annee indienne a recemment ete renforcee dans la region de Jammu, par trois brigades d'infanterie, qua- tre bataillons de la milice, un regiment d'artillerie de campagne et un regiment d'artillerie de moyen calibre. Un quartier general de corps d'armee, installe a Naos- hera, commande trois divisions de Tarmee et une divi- sion aeroportee operant dans les districts de Riasi et du Panch. Dans la region de Srinagar sont arrives des renforts composes de deux autres brigades d'infanterie ainsi que de trois bataillons et d'un regiment d'artillerie de campagne. Les forces aeriennes indiennes operant dans le Cachemire ont egalement ete considerablement renforcees. "En septembre dernier, des troupes indiennes, de Teffectif d'une brigade, ont lance contre le defile de Zojila une attaque qui a ete repoussee. En octobre, une attaque menee au nord de Jammu, en direction d'Uri, par des troupes de Teffectif d'une brigade, a ete egalement arretee, tandis qu'une attaque lancee de Jhangar en direction de Kotli, par une brigade, etait arretee a 15 milles au nord-ouest de Jhangar. L'arrnee indienne vient maintenant, avec des effectifs d'une divi- sion au moins, soutenus par des automobiles blindees, de lancer une grande offensive a partir de Rajauri en 2 On trouvera le texte du deuxieme rapport provisoire de la Commission des Nations Unies pour TInde et le Pakistan, document S/1196, dans les Procis-verbaux officiels du Constu de securite, quatrieme annee, supplement de Janvier 1949. "Heavy fighting is now in progress on this front and a renewed flow of refugees into West Pakistan has already begun as a result of this Indian Army offensive. The Indian Army has also renewed attack by at least one brigade over Zojila pass and has penetrated defences of Dras." •— These are the northern areas to which references are presently to be made. — "These attacks on both fronts are being supported by maxi- mum air action. It is quite clear that India's object is to secure a decision by military means immediately and so face the United Nations with a fait accompli. "Hitherto Azad forces, with minimum support by Pakistan Army acting in a purely defensive role, have managed to hold Indian aggression. Pakistan Air Force has so far not been employed in a combat role. The Pakistan Government cannot emphasize too strongly to the Security Council that unless immediate steps are taken by it to halt the Indian Army offensive, the Pakistan Government will have no option but to change its policy of using minimum regular forces in Kashmir and will have to undertake a counter-offensive with all available resources in an endeavour to prevent the overruning by the Indian Army of Poonch and Mirpur districts. This must inevitably lead to most bloody fighting between regular Pakistan and regular Indian forces which up till now the Pakistan Govern- ment has sincerely endeavoured to avoid. The situation is therefore fraught with possibilities of wide extension of armed conflict." It was requested that this letter should be trans- mitted to the Security Council. The Commission did so. Pausing here for a moment, I wish to draw attention to this. The undertaking which was required by the Commission from both sides, and to which the repre- sentative of India referred, would come into operation only after the cease-fire. That is obvious. The parties could not be asked not to augment their military poten- tial until fighting had stopped. In the meantime, the Commission, when leaving the sub-continent for Geneva and later for Paris, made an appeal to the two Governments that they should put forth their best endeavours during the absence of the Commission to lessen the existing tension in this dispute so as further to prepare the ground for its peaceful final settlement. This was accepted by both Governments but, in spite of that, India mounted this offensive. What was the reply of India with regard to this matter? In a tetter dated 28 November 1948, Sir Girja S. Bajpai replied to the letter of the Pakistan Gov- ernment in a fairly long communication [S/1196, annex 2] from which I quote from paragraph (3) : "Des combats violents se deroulent en ce moment sur ce front et, a la suite de cette offensive de Tarmee indienne, de nombreux refugies arrivent a nouveau dans Touest du Pakistan. L'armee indienne a egalement re- nouvele ses attaques sur le defile de Zojila avec des effectifs d'une brigade au moins et a penetre dans les defenses de Dras." — II s'agit des secteurs septen- trionaux dont il sera question tout a Theure. — "Ces attaques, menees sur deux fronts, sont appuyees par une action aussi puissante que possible de la part de Taviation. II est evident que TInde vise a s'assurer immediatement la decision par la force des armes et a mettre ainsi les Nations Unies devant le fait ac- compli. "Jusqu'a maintenant, des contingents azad, appuyes aussi peu que possible par Tarmee du Pakistan, qui se cantonne dans un role purement defensif, ont pu arreter Tagression indienne. L'aviation pakistanaise n'a pas encore participe aux combats. Le Gouvernement du Pakistan ne saurait signaler avec assez d'energie au Conseil de securite que, si celui-ci ne prend pas imme- diatement des mesures en vue d'arreter Toffensive de Tarmee indienne, le Gouvernement du Pakistan n'aura pas le choix: il devra renoncer a la politique consistant a engager au Cachemire un minimum de forces regu- lieres et sera dans Tobligation de contre-attaquer avec toutes les ressources dont il dispose, afin d'empecher Tarmee indienne d'envahir les districts du Panch et de Mirpur. Ces mesures provoqueront inevitablement des cambats des plus sanglants entre les forces regu- lieres du Pakistan et les forces regulieres de TInde, combats que, jusqu'a present, le Gouvernement du Pakistan s'est sincerement efforce d'eviter. La situa- tion est done lourde de Teventualite d'une extension importante du conflit arme." La commission a ete invitee, a Tepoque, a trans- mettre cette lettre au Conseil de securite, ce qu'elle a fait. Je m'arrete ici un moment, parce que je tiens a sou- ligner une fois de plus ce qui suit: Tengagement que la commission demandait aux deux parties de prendre et que le representant de TInde a rappele ne pouvait evidemment entrer en vigueur qu'apres la cessation des hostilites. On ne pouvait pas demander aux parties en presence de ne pas augmenter leur potentiel militaire avant Tarret des hostilites. Entre temps, la commission, au moment de quitter la peninsule pour Geneve et pour Paris, adressait un appel aux deux Gouvernements afin qu'ils fassent tous leurs efforts, pendant l'absence de la commission, pour diminuer la tension existante et preparer ainsi la voie a un reglement pacifique definitif. Cet appel a ete requ par les deux Gouvernements, mais, malgre cela, TInde a monte son offensive. Quelle etait la position prise par le Gouvernement de TInde dans cette affaire ? Dans le paragraphe 3 d'une longue lettre datee du 28 novembre 1949 [S/1196, annexe 2], Sir Girja S. Bajpai, repondant a une com- munication du Gouvernement du Pakistan, declarait: It was not denied that military operations were under- taken — and, indeed, that was a fact. What was denied was that there was any intention to undertake any major offensive; it was held that these were minor operations, and that this was their object. But what- ever their object, and whatever the magnitude of the operations, the starting of military operations in that manner was a contravention of the resolution of 19 September, which the Commission had asked both sides to accept and to which both sides had agreed. Nevertheless, the point is that while the Indian Army was doing that, while it was attacking both in the northern areas and in the western sector, a com- plaint was made that during that period the Azad Kashmir forces were being built up. Well, what were the Azad Kashmir forces supposed to do? Were they supposed to just go on retreating? If you are attacked, you not only have to build up; you have to take every military action that may be necessitated in order to hold the attack and, if possible, even to push back those who are attacking. The concrete result was that, on the western sector, as the result of this offensive, the Indian armed forces not only had already occupied Riasi, to which reference has been made in the letter, but they further occupied Mendhar, and in the northern areas they took the Zojila Pass, and later on they took Dras and Kargil and they were able to relieve Leh. A reference to the map will show that those are all now inside the cease- fire line on the Indian side; but at that time, when the Commission had left India and had made that appeal which the two Governments had accepted, those places were in the possession of the Azad forces. Those areas were taken away; they were taken away in the period of August, September, October and November. And yet, the Indian Government complains today that the Azad Kashmir forces were being built up, and it makes a grievance of that. What did the Indian Gov- ernment expect? Assuming that there was an under- taking not to augment, it applied to both sides. The Indian forces augmented, and they attacked, and they expected that the other side would do nothing. Well, is that what the undertaking amounted to, or is that what was expected? They attacked, and both in the western sector and in the northern sector they took away areas and towns from the Azad Kashmir forces. What was the strength of these forces? Some point was made by my learned friend from India, and there appears to be support for it on the basis of his quota- tions from the reports of the Commission, that the On ne niait pas que des operations militaires aient ete engagees, car c'etait la un fait. Ce que Ton niait, c'etait Tintention de lancer une grande offensive; on pretendait qu'il sagissait la d'operations de faible en- vergure, qui ne visaient que les objectifs indiques. Mais quels que fussent ces objectifs et quelle que fut Tampleur des operations engagees, le fait de les entre- prendre dans ces conditions constituait une atteinte a la resolution du 19 septembre que la commission avait demande aux deux parties d'accepter, et qu'elles avaient en fait acceptees. II n'en reste pas moins que, tandis que Tarmee indienne procedait a ces operations et qu'elle attaquait a la fois dans le secteur nord et dans le secteur ouest, le Gouvernement de TInde accusait le Pakistan de renforcer les contingents du Cachemire azad. Qu'at- tendait-on des forces du Cachemire azad? Esperait-on qu'elles se borneraient a battre en retraite? Lorsqu'on est attaque, il ne suffit pas de se renforcer, il faut ega- lement entreprendre toutes operations militaires suscep- tibles de parer a une attaque et, si possible, de repous- ser Tassaillant. Le resultat des operations fut le suivant: dans le secteur ouest, les forces indiennes, grace a cette offen- sive, ont occupe non seulement Riasi comme le men- tionne la lettre, mais aussi Mendhar; elles ont occupe egalement dans la region du nord, le col de Zojila puis, ulterieurement, Dras et Karjil et, finalement, ont pu degager Leh. En consultant la carte, on pourra cons- tater que tous ces points se trouvent maintenant du cote indien de la ligne de treve; or, a Tepoque ou la commission a quitte TInde et a adresse son appel aux deux Gouvernements, ces points se trouvaient occupes par des forces azad: ils leur ont ete enleves — enleves au cours des mois d'aout, septembre, octobre et novem- bre. Pourtant, le Gouvernement de TInde se plaint au- jourd'hui que les forces du Cachemire azad aient ete renforcees et il en fait grief au Pakistan. Qu'espe- rait done le Gouvernement de TInde? A supposer qu'il y ait eu engagement de ne pas augmenter les effectifs des forces armees, cet engagement devait etre observe par les deux parties. Les forces indiennes ont ete ren- forcees et sont passees a Tattaque; le Gouvernement de TInde pensait-il que, dans ces conditions, la partie adverse resterait passive? Etait-ce la le resultat auquel devait aboutir Tengagement pris, ou etait-ce la ce que Ton esperait ? Les forces indiennes sont passees a 1 at- taque et, dans le secteur ouest et dans le secteur nord, elles ont enleve des regions et des villes aux forces du Cachemire azad. Quel etait Teffectif de ces forces? Mon docte ami de TInde a invoque un argument qui semble etaye par les extraits qu'il a cites des rapports de la commission, a savoir que la commission ne connaissait pas exacte- On 31 August 1948, there was a meeting between the Commission and myself in Karachi when we were exploring and clarifying the different implications of the provisions in the resolution of 13 August 1948. I shall quote from the official minutes of that meeting, from the beginning of paragraph 9: "Mr. Korbel continued that the Commission had taken great pains to assure the military balance on both sides and the element of balance had been con- tinually at the back of the Commission's mind while drafting the resolution. He asked the Foreign Minister to take note of the fact that, even after the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army, the Azad forces would still muster thirty-five battalions of armed people who were not asked to disarm or to withdraw." That is the explanation; that is the assurance which the then Chairman of the Commission conveyed to me in explaining the Commission's proposals. The Pakistan Army would be asked to withdraw during the truce stage; and, on the other side, only the bulk of the Indian Army would be withdrawn. To meet the apprehension that under those circumstances the Azad Kashmir areas would be placed in danger, the Chair- man asked me to take note of the fact that, even after the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army, the Azad forces would still muster thirty-five battalions of armed people who were not asked to disarm or to withdraw. I am not for the moment stressing at what stage they were to be disarmed or disbanded, but I do draw atten- tion to the fact that the Commission's proposals were based upon an assumption, and as a matter of fact were urged upon us for our acceptance on that basis, to the effect that the Azad Kashmir battalions were thirty-five in number and were properly armed bat- talions. To contend now that the Commission was not aware of the strength of the Azad Kashmir forces does not hold water. That was their strength; at any rate, it was the strength upon the basis of which the Com- mission proceeded. Actually, the strength was thirty- two, and if the Commission did make a mistake in pro- . ceeding upon the basis of thirty-five because of some error of calculation, it was a mistake which goes against , the contention now sought to be made by the represen- . tative of India that they had minimized the strength , of the Azad Kashmir forces. It is not that the strength has subsequently been discovered to be greater; the esti- ; mated strength was thirty-five, but the actual strength ' was thirty-two. j The question now is, to turn to another part of the ; case, what happened in the spring, but before I deal ; with that I wish to add one word: it was on the above- mentioned basis that agreement was reached on the j clarifications of 23 and 25 December [S/1196, annexes ,,; 4 and 5]. Surely the Indian Government was fully j. aware of the strength of the Azad Kashmir battalions ..at that time. It knew, and had had experience of, their Le 31 aout 1948 s'est tenu a Karachi une seance de la commission a laquelle j'assistais. Au cours de cette seance nous avons examine et precise les differentes incidences des dispositions de la resolution du 13 aout 1948. Je cite le paragraphe 9 du proces-verbal officiel de la seance: "M. Korbel declare que la commission a fait de mul- tiples efforts pour assurer Tequilibre militaire des deux forces adverses et que les membres de la commission n'ont jamais perdu de vue cet element d'equilibre lors- qu'ils ont redige la resolution. II demande au Ministre des affaires etrangeres de prendre note du fait que, meme apres le retrait de Tarmee du Pakistan, les forces azad continueraient de compter trente-cinq batail- lons armes, auxquels on ne demanderait ni de deposer les armes, ni de se retirer." Telle est Texplication; telle est Tassurance que la personnalite qui presidait alors la commission m'a don- nee en commentant les propositions de la commission. L'armee du Pakistan serait invitee a se retirer au cours de la treve, et d'autre part, TInde ne retirerait que le gros de son armee. Pour apaiser la crainte que, dans ces conditions, les regions du Cachemire azad ne se trouvent ainsi placees dans une situation dangereuse, le President m'a demande de prendre note du fait que, meme apres le retrait des troupes du Pakistan, les forces azad continueraient a compter trente-cinq batail- lons armes, auxquels on ne demanderait ni de deposer les armes, ni de se retirer. Je ne rappellerai pas, pour le moment, a quel stade des operations ces forces devaient etre desarmees ou dispersees, mais j'attirerai l'attention sur le fait que les propositions de la commission partaient de Thypothese que les bataillons des forces du Cachemire azad etaient au nombre de trente-cinq et solidement equipees, et que c'est dans ces conditions que Ton nous a effectivement presses d'y donner notre approbation. Pretendre main- tenant que la commission ne connaissait pas Teffectif des forces du Cachemire azad est un argument qui ne resiste pas a l'examen. Je viens d'indiquer leur effectif ou, du moins, le chiffre dont la commission est partie pour elaborer ses propositions. En realite, leur effectif etait de trente-deux bataillons et si la commission a commis une inexactitude en partant du chiffre de trente-cinq, par suite d'une erreur de calcul, c'est une inexactitude qui va a Tencontre des affirmations du representant de TInde qui cherche maintenant a faire croire que la commission avait minimise Teffectif des forces du Cachemire azad. Du reste, la commission n'a pas decou- vert, ulterieurement, que Teffectif reel etait superieur; estime a trente-cinq bataillons, il etait en fait de trente- deux. Passons a un autre aspect de la question, et voyons maintenant ce qui s'est passe au printemps ; mais, avant d'aborder ce point, je voudrais ajouter un seul mot: c'est sur cette base que Ton etait parvenu a un accord apres les eclaircissements fournis les 23 et 25 decem- bre [S/1196, annexes 4 et 5]. Sans aucun doute, le Gouvernement de TInde savait parfaitement quel etait Teffectif des bataillons des forces du Cachemire azad a What happened was this. The Prime Minister of India had himself expressed to the Commission some apprehension that, once a cease-fire came into opera- tion, such a large force, if not completely controlled and under discipline, might constitute a danger. There- fore it was necessary that discipline and control should be stricter and that the organization of those forces should be on a regular military basis. Our proposals in that respect were made on 9 March 1949 to the Com- mission, and are reproduced in annex 10 to the third report of the Commission [S/1430/Add.l]. I quote from paragraph 11 of that annex: "The Pakistan Government has considered the rec- ommendations of this meeting and it informed the Com- mission on 8 February at a meeting in Karachi that it considered the following arrangements essential to enable it to discharge effectively its obligations under the resolutions of the Commission: " 1 . The relief of the Asad Kashmir forces now in the forward areas by Pakistan regular troops." This is the reorganization that was contemplated at that time. The second proposal was: "2. The temporary withdrawal from the forward area and concentration in the rear areas of Azad Kash- mir territory, of all Asad Kashmir forces to enable them to be reorganized and trained, under the super- vision of G.H.Q. Pakistan, into a disciplined force of infantry units with the necessary administrative and ancillary units." This was to bring them on to some regular basis as a controlled and disciplined force. The third proposal was: "3. The relief, on completion of this reorganization and training, of the Pakistan regular forces in the forward areas by the Asad Kashmir forces." Paragraph 12 goes on to say: "The Commission has also been informed that it is estimated that a period of some three months would be needed for the reorgani- zation and training of thg Azad Kashmir forces . . . " That was in March 1949. That is all that was con- templated and suggested in order to facilitate the carry- ing into effect of the relevant provisions of the resolu- tions of the Commission. There was nothing underhand going on at all; there was a meeting with the Commis- sion in February in Karachi, there was a meeting with the Commission in Delhi, and the Commission was then discussing measures which would be necessary now that a cease-fire had been arranged and would be put Voici ce qui s'est alors produit: si Ton en croit ses propres declarations a la commission, le Premier Ministre de TInde craignait que, lors de Tentree en vigueur de la suspension d'armes, une force aussi im- portante, si elle n'etait pas absolument controlee et sou- mise a une stricte discipline, ne puisse constituer un danger. II etait done necessaire que discipline et con- trole se fissent plus severes et que ces forces fussent organisees sur une base militaire. Nous avons fait, le 9 mars 1949, des propositions a cet egard a la Commis- sion ; elles figurent a Tannexe 10 du troisieme rapport de la Commission [S/1430/Add.l]. Je citerai le para- graphe 11 de Tannexe: "Le Gouvernement du Pakistan a examine les recom- mandations formulees au cours de cette reunion et a informe la commission le 8 fevrier, au cours d'une reu- nion tenue a Karachi, qu'il considere que les arrange- ments ci-apres sont indispensables pour lui permettre de s'acquitter d'une maniere satisfaisante des obliga- tions qui lui incombent aux termes des resolutions de la commission: " 1 . Releve des forces du Cachemire asad se trouvant actuellement dans la zone de Tavant, par des troupes regulieres du Pakistan." C'est la reorganisation qui etait envisagee a cette epoque. La seconde proposition etait la suivante: "2. Retrait temporaire de la zone de Tavant et con- centration a Tarriere du territoire du Cachemire asad de toutes les forces du Cachemire azad, afin qu'elles puissent etre reorganises et entrainees, sous la direc- tion du haut commandement du Pakistan, et transfor- mees en une troupe disciplined, composee d'unites d'in- fanterie, et de leur complement de services administra- tifs et auxiliaires." Cette disposition etait prevue afin de donner a ces forces une certaine apparence reguliere de troupe dis- ciplined et controlee. La troisieme proposition portait que: "3. Releve, lorsque cette organisation et cet en- trainement seront termines, des forces regulieres du Pakistan stationnees dans la zone de Tavant par les forces du Cachemire asad." Au paragraphe 12, on ajoute: "La commission a egalement ete informee qu'une periode d'environ trois mois etait jugee necessaire pour la reorganisation et Tentrainement des forces du Cachemire azad . . ." Cela se passait en mars 1949. C'est tout ce qui etait envisage et suggere pour faciliter la mise en ceuvre des dispositions des resolutions de la commission a cet effet. II n'y avait absolument aucune manoeuvre clan- destine ; la commission nous reunit en fevrier a Kara- chi, il y eut egalement une reunion a Delhi; la commis- sion discutait alors les mesures qui seraient necessaires, maintenant qu'on s'etait mis d'accord sur une suspen- sion d'armes qui allait entrer en vigueur, pour preparer " Is India right in contending that the resolution ^required that the Azad Kashmir forces should be dis- ^ banded and disarmed during the truce stage, or is t: Pakistan correct in contending that it has to take place L'lnde a-t-elle raison de pretendre que la resolution exigeait que les forces du Cachemire azad fussent desar- mees et licenciees au cours de la periode de treve, ou le Pakistan est-il fonde a affirmer que T operation doit etre effectuee au stade du plebiscite? Evidemment, sur ce point, le texte meme des resolutions constitue la meilleure des preuves. A ce sujet, je signalerai tout d'abord que la resolution du 13 aout 1948, qui traite de la suspension d'armes et de la treve, ne fait aucune allusion aux forces du Cachemire asad. Ce fait, en soi, est une preuve concluante que le desarmement et le licenciement des forces du Cachemire azad, tel qu'ils furent ulterieurement envisages, ne devaient pas etre effectues aux termes de cette resolution, c'est-a-dire qu'ils ne devaient pas etre effectues au cours de la periode de treve. On a constamment repete au Gou- vernement du Pakistan que rien n'avait ete prevu a ce sujet. during the plebiscite stage ? On that, of course, the very -best evidence is the language of the resolutions them- '•"- selves. In that respect, I would first submit that the ,;J resolution of 13 August 1948, which deals with the l\ cease-fire and the truce, makes no reference to the :iAzad forces whatsoever, and that in itself is conclusive : evidence,that the disbanding and disarming of the Azad rc Kashmir forces, such as was later contemplated, was not to take place under that resolution, that is to say, .. not during the truce stage. It was repeatedly explained "•. to the Pakistan Government that that was not intended. I have just drawn the attention of the Security Council to an assurance which was conveyed to me and which I was asked to note by Mr. Korbel, the then Chairman of the Commission, that even after the with- drawal of the Pakistan Army — and the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army would take place during the truce stage, of course — there would still be available, in the Asad Kashmir areas, thirty-five armed battalions of Asad Kashmir forces. J'ai attire tout a Theure l'attention du Conseil de securite sur une assurance qui me fut donnee, et dont M. Korbel, qui etait alors President de la commission, m'a prie de prendre note, assurance selon laquelle, meme apres le retrait des forces du Pakistan — et le retrait de Tarmee du Pakistan aurait naturellement lieu au cours de la periode de treve —• trente-cinq bataillons armes des forces du Cachemire asad resteraient encore disponibles dans les territoires du Cachemire azad. In the Commission's tetter of 19 September 1948, [S/1100, paragraph 108] sub-paragraph 2 (c) reads as follows: L'alinea c du paragraphe 2 de la lettre de la Com- mission du 19 septembre 1948 [S/1100, paragraphe 108] est redige en ces termes: "En outre, la commission reconnait qu'elle est tres desireuse de reduire le plus possible la duree de la treve et que la resolution n'envisage pas le desarme- ment ou le licenciement des forces du Cachemire azad." "Moreover, the Commission agrees that it will be anxious to reduce the truce period to a minimum and that the resolution does not contemplate the disarma- ment or disbanding of Azad Kashmir forces." The reference in that paragraph is to the resolution of 13 August 1948. La resolution mentionnee dans ce paragraphe est la resolution adoptee le 13 aout 1948. La citation suivante est extraite du compte rendu analytique de la conference reunissant des membres de la commission et des representants du Gouvernement de TInde, tenue le 17 aout 1948, c'est-a-dire quatre jours apres Tadoption de la resolution en question. Dans Tannexe 12 du rapport de la commission il est dit: I now quote from the summary record of the meet- ing of 17 August 1948, four days after the date of the resolution, between the Commission and the Govern- ment of India. In annex 12, of the Commission's report it is stated: "D'ailleurs, [selon la declaration du President] cer- taines troupes du Gouvernement de TInde demeure- ront dans le territoire et, d'autre part, seules les troupes azad continueront a occuper leurs positions actuelles." z "Moreover, he [the Chairman] pointed out that '., limited Government of India forces would remain and .[: that on the other side only the Azad forces would ,;. remain in their present positions." f On 17 August this was clearly conveyed to the Gov- ernment of India as the meaning of the Commission L'on a fait clairement entendre le 17 aout au Gou- vernement de TInde que le sens attache par la com- But let us go on to the resolution of 5 January 1949 [S/1196, paragraph 15]. I shall have to come back to the interval to show how the whole of this question arose and was dealt with, but let us see what the resolutions themselves provide. The resolution of 5 January 1949 was a resolution which extended part III of the resolution of 13 August, part III having dealt with the plebiscite. Sub-paragraph 4 (a) of the resolu- tion of 5 January 1949 reads as follows: "(a) After implementation of parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948, and when the Commission is satisfied that peaceful conditions have been restored in the State, the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator will determine, in consultation with the Government of India, the final disposal of Indian and State armed forces; such disposal to be with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite." That is the first part of paragraph 4. I am not saying that because it is mentioned first it must be completed before anything is done, but paragraph 4 has two parts and this is the first part. In this connexion I would draw the Security Council's attention particu- larly to the fact that the representative of India, on 7 February [463rd meeting], made a grievance of the fact that although the Commission had not proposed to touch these State armed forces on the Indian side, General McNaughton's proposal [S/1453] had brought the State armed forces also into the scheme. But these are clearly mentioned here, that after parts I and II have been implemented, the final disposal of Indian and State armed forces shall be carried out by the Com- mission and the Plebiscite Administrator as determined by them, such disposal to be with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite. The second part of that paragraph, sub-paragraph 4 (b), deals with the situation after the implementa- tion of parts I and II of the 13 August resolution and after it has dealt with the^inal disposal of the remain- ing armed forces of India and the State armed forces. This second part of the paragraph reads as follows : "As regards the territory referred to in part II, sec- tion A, paragraph 2 of the resolution of 13 August, final disposal of the armed forces in that territory will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the local authori- ties." Cependant, passons a la resolution du 5 Janvier 1949 [S/1196, paragraphe 15]. II me faudra revenir a Tintervalle de temps qui s'est ecoule entre Tadoption des deux resolutions pour montrer Torgine de la ques- tion toute entiere et la faqon dont on Ta traitee; mais examinons d'abord les dispositions des resolutions elles-memes. La resolution du 5 Janvier 1949 developpe la troisieme partie de la resolution du 13 aout, relative au plebiscite. L'alinea a du paragraphe 4 de la resolu- tion du 5 Janvier 1949 est redige en ces termes: "a) Lorsque les mesures prevues dans les premiere et deuxieme parties de la resolution adoptee par la commission le 13 aout 1948 auront ete executees, et lorsque la commission estimera que la paix et l'ordre public ont ete retablis dans TEtat, ladite commission et Tadministrateur du plebiscite fixeront, en consulta- tion avec le Gouvernement de TInde, les modalites du retrait definitif des forces armees de TInde et de TEtat de Jammu et Cachemire, apres avoir dument tenu compte des conditions necessaires a la securite de TEtat et a la liberte du plebiscite." Telle est la premiere partie du paragraphe 4. Je ne pretends pas que, parce que cette partie est la premiere, ce qu'elle prescrit doit etre realise avant que rien ait ete fait; je constate simplement que le paragraphe 4 est divise en deux parties dont voila la premiere. A cet egard, je voudrais attirer tout particulierement l'attention du Conseil sur le fait que le 7 fevrier, [463eme seance] le representant de TInde s'est plaint du fait que, bien que la commission n'ait pas envisage de toucher aux forces armees de TEtat, qui operent du cote indien, la proposition du general McNaughton [S/1453] ait fait rentrer ces forces dans le cadre du plan envisage. Cependant, il est clairement indique dans la resolution que, lorsque les mesures prevues dans les premiere et deuxieme parties de la resolution adoptee le 13 aout 1948 auront ete executees, les modalites du retrait definitif des forces armees de l'lnde et de TEtat — modalites fixees par la commission et Tadministra- teur du plebiscite — seront appliquees, compte tenu des conditions necessaires a la securite de TEtat et a la liberte du plebiscite. La deuxieme partie du paragraphe 4, c'est-a-dire Talinea b, traite de la situation qui resultera de Texecu- tion des mesures prevues dans les premiere et deuxieme parties de la resolution adoptee le 13 aout quand on aura regie le retrait definitif des forces armees de TInde et de TEtat occupant encore le territoire. Cette deu- xieme partie du paragraphe est ainsi redigee: "Le retrait definitif des forces armees cantonnea sur le territoire, dont il est question au paragraphe t de la section A de la deuxieme partie de la resolutioi du 13 aout, sera determine par la commission e Tadministrateur du plebiscite, agissant de concert avei les autorites locales." The Government of India had raised, it is true, the question of a large-scale disbanding and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces. But there was no question at that stage that they would be disbanded any earlier than the plebiscite stage, As late as 18 February 1949, after the acceptance of both these resolutions with that meaning and with those explanations, the correct position with regard to the Asad Kashl11ir forces was known to and accepted by the Government of India. There was no question. l would draw the attention of the Security Council to Sir Girja S. Bajpai's letter dated 18 February 1949 to the Commission, reproduced in annex 7 of the Commission's third report [S/1430/Add..1]. l draw particular attention to paragraph 3 of that letter: "The disarming of Azad forces is really a matter of chronology. First there must be a cease-fire and, after that, a truce, as envisaged in parts l and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August, 1948. After that, the condition precedent to arrangements for the holding of a plebiscite is the creation of conditions in which Kashmir nationals can return to the area now in the occupation of Asad Kashmir forces. So far as non- Muslims are concernec1, such a movement will not take place until large-scale disarming of these forces has been carried out." That is again quite clear. Sir Girja S. Bajpai himself illterprets these provisions as meaning that it is a mat- ter of chronology. First, there must be a cease-fire. Then, there must be a truce agreement. Then, during the truce, whatever withdrawals have to take place should take place. Then, he says, ancillary to the plebi- scite arrangements, you have to create conditions under which people who have migrated from certain areas should be able to return to them, and, he says, so far as the non-Muslim people who have migrated from the areas under the control of Azad Kashmir are concerned it cannat be expected that they will be able to return to those areas unless a large-scale disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces has taken But, later on, the Government of India began to change its position. In his letter of 10 March 1949 to the Commission, which is annex 11 to the Com- mission's third interim report, Sir Girja S. Bajpai states the following: "Pakistan forces must be withdrawn entirely from Jammu and Kashmir State territory and the disposal of the so-called Asad Kashmir forces during the period of the truce must be so arranged as to prepare the way for the ultimate disbanding and disarming of these forces." Here, again, although the position has been shifted, all that was asked for at that stage was that prepara- tions must be made for the disbanding and disarming of those forces at a later stage. The Commission perceived what was intended and replied to Sir Girja S. Bajpai on 14 March 1949. This reply appears as annex 12 to the report, and I quote the second sentence of paragraph 2: "In the course of the conversations last August the Commission explained to the Government of Pakistan that in its view a 'military balance' would exist in the State of Jammu and Kashmir during the truce period in the sense and to the extent that the resolution of 13 August did not call for the disarming or disbanding of the Asad Kashmir forces, which the Commission under- stood to number approximately thirty-five battalions." Now, when this question was raised with the Com- mission, that was the reply of the Commission to the Government of India. It said, "We have already ex- plained to the Government of Pakistan that, during the truce stage, after the other withdrawals had taken place, Asad Kashmir forces would remain, and their strength is approximately thirty-five battalions." The Council will note the progressive shifting of the position of the Government of India. On 18 February, it is a matter of chronology: "We realize that stages 1 and 2 of the resolution of 13 August have to be completed, and, then, in order to enable the population to return for the plebiscite stage, this has to be under- taken." On 10 March, "Preparations during the period of the truce must be so arranged as to prepare the way for the ultimate disbanding and disarming of these forces." To this, the Commission replies that that is not contemplated. Then, there is a letter from the Government of India to the Commission dated 28 March, which is set forth in annex 16, part 2 of the same report, in which it says that it adheres to the position that nothing should be done after the withdrawal of the Pakistan forces" which would enable the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops to be consolidated in any way during the period of the truce to the disadvantage of the State. Mais par la suite, le Gouvernement de TInde com- mence a modifier sa position. Dans la lettre qu'il a adressee le 10 mars 1949 a la commission, et qui est reproduite a Tannexe 11 du troisieme rapport pro- visoire de la commission, Sir Girja S. Bajpai dit ce qui suit: "Les forces du Pakistan doivent etre retirees en totalite du territoire de TEtat de Jammun et Cache- mire, et les dispositions concernant les forces du pre- tendu Cachemire azad pendant la duree de la treve doivent etre telles, qu'elles preparent la voie au licencie- ment et au desarmement definitifs de ces forces." Ici encore, bien que la position ait ete modifiee, tout ce que Ton demande a ce stade c'est que des preparatifs soient faits en vue du licenciement et du desarmement desdites forces au cours d'une phase ulterieure. La commission, ayant saisi Tintention du Gouverne- ment de TInde, repondit a Sir Girja S. Bajpai, le 14 mars 1949. Cette reponse constitue Tannexe 12 du rapport, dont je cite la deuxieme phrase du paragraphe 2: "Au cours des entretiens d'aout dernier, la com- mission a explique au Gouvernement du Pakistan qu'a ses yeux, il y aurait un certain "equilibre militaire" dans TEtat de Jammu et Cachemire pendant la periode de treve, en ce sens et pour autant que la resolution du 13 aout ne comportait pas le desarmement et la dispersion des forces du Cachemire asad qui, selon les indications dont la Commission dispose, comptent environ trente-cinq bataillons." Done, lorsque cette question a ete soulevee a la commission, voici quelle a ete sa reponse au Gouverne- ment de TInde: "Nous avons deja explique au Gou- vernement du Pakistan que, pendant la periode de treve, une fois effectue le retrait des autres troupes, il y aurait encore sur place les forces du Cachemire azad, qui comptent approximativement trente-cinq batail- lons." Le Conseil ne manquera pas de noter le changement progressif d'attitude du Gouvernement de TInde. Le 18 fevrier, c'est une question d'ordre chronologique: "Nous admettons que les premiere et deuxieme phases prevues par la resolution du 13 aout doivent etre reali- sees et qu'alors, pour permettre a la population de retourner dans ses foyers en vue de la phase du ple- biscite, telles mesures doivent etre entreprises." Le 10 mars: "Les dispositions prises pendant la duree de la treve doivent etre telles qu'elles preparent la voie au licenciement et au desarmement definitifs de ces forces. Sur ce point, la commission repond que ce n'est point la ce qui est envisage. Cest alors qu'intervient une lettre adressee a la commission le 28 mars, qui est reproduite a Tannexe 16, partie 2, du meme rapport, et dans laquelle le Gouvernement de TInde declare adopter le point de vue suivant lequel rien ne doit etre fait, apres le retrait des forces du Pakistan, "qui permette, pendant la periode de treve, aucun renforcement du territoire evacue par les troupes du Pakistan au detriment de Well, the position has shifted from "the disposal of these forces must be so arranged as to prepare the way for the ultimate disbanding and disarming of these forces", which was what was asked for on 10 March —• and to which the Commission declined to accede — to the position now taken, which is: "the Government of India adheres to this view and reaffirms its request that action should be taken to disband and disarm the so-called Asad Kashmir forces." When this was encountered, we wrote a letter on 14 April. This letter is not, I believe, to be found among the documents which have been presented to the Council by the Commission, but it is in the Com- mission's records. It is dated 14 April 1949, and is from Mr. M. A. Gurmani, Minister for Kashmir Affairs of the Government of Pakistan, to the Chair- man of the Commission. I quote from sub-paragraph 3 of paragraph 7, where we made this offer: "After the publication of the truce agreement, and as soon as the regular forces on both sides have begun to withdraw, discussions under clause 4 of the resolu- tion of 5 January 1949 regarding the final disposal of the Indian and State forces, on the one hand, and of the Asad forces, on the other, may be initiated. Any agreement reached as a result of these delibera- tions would not preclude the Plebiscite Administrator from taking any further action with regard to the Indian and State forces and the Asad Kashmir forces at a later date." We practically met the request of the Government of India made on 10 March 1948, that is to say, that after the publication of the truce agreement and as soon as the regular forces on both sides had begun to withdraw, then discussions might take place regarding the final disposal of the Indian and State forces on the one hand, and of the Azad Kashmir forces on the other. This is a fact which the documents would not disclose, but it is relevant in this connexion, and that is why I have drawn the attention of the Council to it. In its letter of 28 April forwarding its truce terms to the Government of India, the Commission stated, as set forth in annex 22, sub-paragraph 4 (a) of the Commission's third report: "The Government of India will understand that the Commission cannot deal at this stage with the question of disbanding and disarming the Azad Kashmir forces, since it does not fall within the purview of part II of the resolution of 13 August. Nevertheless the Com- mission appreciates the significance of the question and is anxious to consider it without delay. While the Commission cannot share the view of the Government of India that a reduction of its forces beyond the strength mentioned in your letter of 17 April 1949 must depend upon the actual disbanding and disarm- ing of the Azad Kashmir forces, it is convinced that an early study of the matter would hasten the prepara- tions for the plebiscite." Par consequent, la position a change. Le 10 mars, on demandait que "les dispositions concernant ces forces fussent telles qu'elles preparent la voie au licen- ciement et au desarmement definitifs de ces forces", solution a laquelle la commission refusa d'acquiescer. Puis on change d'attitude et Ton en vient a ceci: "Le Gouvernement de TInde s'en tient a son point de vue et reitere la demande qu'il a presentee selon laquelle il conviendrait de prendre des mesures pour dissoudre et desarmer les forces dites du Cachemire azad." En presence de cette exigence, nous ecrivimes notre lettre du 14 avril. Je crois que cette lettre ne se trouve pas parmi les documents qui ont ete presentes au Con- seil par la commission, mais elle figure dans les archives de la commission. Elle a ete adressee le 14 avril 1949 au President de la commission par M. M. A. Gurmani, Ministre du Pakistan pour les affaires du Cachemire. Je cite un passage de Talinea 3 du paragraphe 7, dans lequel nous faisons Toffre suivante: "Apres la publication de Taccord de treve, et aussi- tot que les forces regulieres des deux parties auront commence leur retrait, les discussions pourront com- mencer, conformement au paragraphe 4 de la resolu- tion du 5 Janvier 1949, pour le reglement definitif de la situation des forces de TInde et de notre Etat, d'une part, et des forces du Cachemire azad, d'autre part. Tout accord conclu a la suite de ces deliberations n'em- pechera pas Tadministrateur du plebiscite de prendre, par la suite, toutes autres mesures en ce qui concerne les forces de TInde et de TEtat de Cachemire et les forces du Cachemire azad." Nous avons, en somme, repondu a la demande for- mulee par le Gouvernement de TInde le 10 mars 1948, c'est-a-dire que, apres la publication de Taccord de treve et aussitot que les troupes regulieres des deux parties auront commence de se retirer, on pourra pro- ceder a des echanges de vues sur la question du retrait definitif des troupes de TInde et de TEtat d'une part, et des troupes du Cachemire azad de Tautre. C'est un fait que les documents ne font pas apparaitre, mais il eclaire un aspect de la question, et c'est pourquoi j'ai attire sur lui l'attention du Conseil. Dans la lettre qu'elle a envoyee au Gouvernement de TInde, le 28 avril, et qui contient les dispositions de la treve, la commission a declare, comme on le voit a Tannexe 22, alinea a du paragraphe 4, du troisieme rap- port de la Commission: "Le Gouvernement de TInde comprendra que la commission ne peut s'occuper a Theure actuelle de la question de la dispersion et du desarmement des forces du Cachemire azad, cette question sortant du cadre de la deuxieme partie de la resolution du 13 aout. La commission est cependant consciente de Timportance de la question et elle souhaite vivement Texaminer sans retard. Sans estimer, comme le Gouvernement de TInde, qu'une reduction des forces indiennes au-dessous des effectifs mentionnes dans votre lettre du 17 avril 1949, doive etre subordonnee au licenciement et au desarme- ment effectif des forces du Cachemire azad, elle est neanmoins persuadee qu'en etudiant cette question sans retard, on haterait les preparatifs du plebiscite." Then the resolution of 5 January 1949 was framed, based upon the agreement of the parties, and paragraph 4 therein deals with this matter, that is, with the final disposal of the remaining Indian forces and the armed forces of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, on one side, and the Azad Kashmir forces, on the other. The whole thing is perfectly clear. As I have said, it is true that up to 18 February the Government of India had understood the position to be as I have explained it. From 10 March, it began to shift its position and progressively to increase its demands until the demands became that the disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces should take place during the truce stage. Now who has been responsible for obstructing the further progress of the plebiscite, based on the recital of these facts? That is for the Security Council to determine. Has the Pakistan Government in any man- ner gone back upon what it has agreed to do? Or is the Government of India seeking to go back upon what it had agreed to do with regard to that stage? The next question that deserves the attention of the Council is that of the administration and defence of the northern areas. The northern areas were defined by the Commission in sub-paragraph (v) (a) of its letter dated 16 April 1949 to the Government of Pakis- tan [S/1430/Add.l, appendix 19] as "the area of the State north of the positions presently occupied by the Indian Army, with the exception of Gilgit Subdivision and Agency" The question of these areas was first raised with the Commission by the Prime Minister of India in his letter of 20 August 1948 [S/1100, paragraph 80]. With regard to this there appears to be some misconcep- tion in the minds of the Commission members them- selves, though in their final report they presented the situation as it stands. However, they appear to have been under the impression that the position with regard to the northern areas was somehow consolidated on our side of the cease-fire line between 13 August, the date of the first resolution, and 5 January, the date of the second resolution. That, in fact, is not so. Actually, on 20 August, the day on which the Prime Minister of India wrote his tetter to the Commission, the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Tout cela est parfaitement clair. Comme je Tai dit, il est exact que, jusqu'au 18 fevrier, le Gouvernement de TInde avait de la situation la conception que j'ai indiquee. A partir du 10 mars, le Gouvernement de TInde commenqa a changer de position et a augmenter progressivement ses exigences, pour en arriver a de- mander que le licenciement et le desarmement des troupes du Cachemire azad aient lieu au stade de la treve. En se fondant sur T expose de ces faits, de qui done peut-on dire qu'il porte la responsabilite d'avoir fait obstacle a la mise en oeuvre ulterieure du plebiscite? C'est au Conseil de securite qu'il appartient de trancher cette question. Le Gouvernement du Pakistan est-il en aucune faqon revenu sur les engagements qu'il avait accepte de remplir? Ou bien est-ce le Gouvernement de TInde qui s'efforce de revenir sur les engagements qu'il a pris en ce qui concerne ce stade? La question qui merite de retenir ensuite l'attention du Conseil est la question de Tadministration et de la defense des regions du nord. Les regions du nord sont definies par la commission a Talinea v a de la lettre en date du 16 avril 1949 qu'elle a adressee au Gouverne- ment du Pakistan [S/1430/Add.l, annexe 19] comme etant "la region du pays situee au nord des positions actuellement occupees par Tarmee indienne, a Texcep- tion de la circonscription et de Tagence de Gilgit". Le probleme de ces regions fut souleve pour la pre- miere fois a la commission par le Premier Ministre de TInde, dans sa lettre du 20 aout 1948 [S/1100, para- graphe 80]. A ce propos, certains membres de la com- mission semblent s'etre fait de la situation une con- ception erronee, bien que dans le rapport final ils aient presente la situation sous un jour reel. Toutefois, ils semblent avoir eu Timpression qu'en ce qui concerne les regions du nord, nous avons renforce notre position de notre cote de la ligne de demarcation entre le 13 aout, date de la premiere resolution, et le 5 Janvier, date de la seconde resolution. En fait, il n'en est rien. En realite, le 20 aout, date a laquelle le Premier Ministre de l'lnde a ecrit sa lettre a la commission, le Gouvernement de TEtat de Jammu et Cachemire n'avait As a matter of fact, the reply of Sir Girja S. Bajpai [S/1196, annex 2] in answer to my letter of 19 Novem- ber [S/1196, annex 1 ] drawing attention to this offen- sive, admits that, in both the western sector and in the northern sector, military operations — he does not admit that it was an offensive — were undertaken for this purpose and that that purpose was achieved. In his letter of 20 August 1948 [S/1100, paragraph 80] Pan- • dit Nehru mentions that they were "roving bands" i There is no question of "roving bands". The population, as the Commission has stated, is 100 per cent Muslim ; in those areas. They had risen in revolt against the authority of the Maharaja in the beginning. They ; excluded everyone who had any connexion with the , Maharaja in that area, and ever since then no one . has ever returned, except in those areas taken as a '. result of military action and in the areas on their side , of the cease-fire line. There is no question of the situa- I tion having undergone any change at all. No doubt there J is the question that, for purposes of security, there • are to be permitted to place garrisons on the extreme ,. northern frontier of the northern areas. The Commis- 1 sion said that that is a matter which can be taken into ' consideration at the time of the implementation of the 5 resolution. At any rate, that is a matter that was never ( brought to our attention until the documents released !' by the Commission were published. 1 In any case, from the point of view of security, which 'I is being stressed by India — security against whom ? — ? the cease-fire line had been drawn and both sides were " under obligation not to violate it. The cease-fire line i! now has been in operation in actual fact after the firing i had stopped for over thirteen months, and with the ex- i ception of a few minor incidents, nothing has happened En fait, Sir Girja S. Bajpai, dans la lettre qu'il a envoyee a la commission [S/1196, annexe 2], en re- ponse a ma lettre du 19 novembre, [S/1196, annexe 1], ou j'attirais l'attention de la commission sur cette offen- sive admet que des operations militaires — Sir Girja S. Bajpai n'admet pas qu'il se soit agi la d'une offen- sive — avaient ete entreprises a cet effet tant dans le secteur ouest que dans le secteur nord, et que leur objec- tif avait avait ete atteint. Dans sa lettre du 20 aout 1948 [S/1100, paragraphe 80], le Pandit Nehru mentionne Texistence de "bandes errantes". II ne s'agit nulle- ment de bandes errantes. Comme la commission Ta indique, la population de cette region est cent pour cent musulmane. Elle s'est soulevee contre l'autorite du Maharadjah des le debut. Elle a exclu de son sein tous ceux qui avaient des rapports quelconques avec le Maharadjah dans cette region et, depuis lors, aucun d'eux n'est revenu, sauf dans les regions occupees a la suite d'operations militaires et dans celles qui se trouvaient du cote indien de la ligne de demarcation. On ne saurait pretendre que la situation se soit modi- fied d'aucune faqon. Certes, il y a encore la question de savoir si, pour des raisons de securite, il convient de permettre a l'lnde de placer des garnisons a T extreme nord des frontieres de la region du nord. La commis- sion a dit que cette question pourrait etre examinee au moment de la mise en oeuvre de la resolution. Mais, quoi qu'il en soit, cette question n'a jamais ete soumise a notre attention jusqu'a ce que le document elabore par la commission ait ete publie. Dans tous les cas, si Ton se place du point de vue de la securite, question sur laquelle TInde insiste tant, contre qui faut-il done se proteger? Une ligne de de- marcation tracee au moment de la suspension d'armes a ete definie; les deux parties sont tenues de la respec- ter. Cette ligne de demarcation existe en fait, poste- rieusement a la cessation des hostilites, depuis plus de Now, there is a fundamental misconception at the basis of that apprehension or argument. In the first place, let me call attention to the assurance which we did convey, and that in itself will show why such an assurance can become effective. I have here a letter which I think has not been distributed. It is a letter dated 28 November 1948 from me to the Chairman of the Commission. It is not included in the documents released by the Commission, but it is available to the Council, it is with the Commission's documents. I shall now quote from the middle of paragraph 4 : "The Government of India has, however, pressed for the retention of Indian forces in Kashmir for purposes of defence as well as of internal security. The Pakistan Government believes that once a settlement has been reached with regard to the organization and conduct of a free and impartial plebiscite, there will be left no further risk of a threat to the security of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In any case, should such a threat unfortunately arise, the Pakistan Government will undertake to deal effectively with it within its own borders, even if this should necessitate use of its armed forces. This should dispel any fears that the Government of India might entertain on this count." That also gives the reason why such an assurance can now be made effective. What led to the incursion of the tribesmen originally ? In spite of the contrary assertions and allegations of the representative of India, I urge that what led to the original tribal incursions was the massacres that were taking place and the apprehensions that the Muslim population of the State would be dragooned into declaring its acceptance of the accession of the State to the Indian Dominion. That was the crux of the matter. That is why fighting was taking place. That is the view expressed by almost every member of the Security Council who spoke on this aspect of the matter during the discussions from January to April 1948 before the Security Council. Or cette crainte, cet argument, reposent sur une idee fausse. En premier lieu, permettez-moi d'attirer l'attention du Conseil sur les assurances que nous avons effectivement donnees, ce qui montrera deja pourquoi de telles assurances peuvent etre suivies d'un resultat pratique. J'ai en ma possession une lettre qui, je crois, n'a jamais ete distribute. Elle porte la date du 28 novembre 1949; je Tai envoyee au President de la commission. Cette lettre ne figure pas au nombre des documents publies par la commission, mais elle est a la disposition du Conseil et se trouve parmi les docu- ments de la commission. Je voudrais citer un passage qui se trouve au milieu du paragraphe 4. "Toutefois, le Gouvernement de TInde a insiste pour maintenir ses forces au Cachemire a des fins de de- fense et de securite interieure. Le Gouvernement du Pakistan estime que. lorsqu'un accord sera intervenu en ce qui concerne Torganisation et la conduite d'un plebiscite libre et impartial, rien ne risquera plus de menacer la securite de TEtat de Jammu et Cachemire. Dans tous les cas, si une telle menace apparaissait, le Gouvernement du Pakistan y ferait face de faqon effi- cace, a Tinterieur de ses frontieres, meme si cela ne- '•"sjitait Tintervention de ses forces armees. Ceci devrait ensS'iper toutes les craintes que le Gouvernement de TInde peut eprouver a ce sujet." Voila qui explique egalement pourquoi ces assurances du Gouvernement pakistanais peuvent maintenant etre efficaces. Qu'est-ce qui, a Torigine, a provoque les in- cursions des membres des tribus? En depit des argu- ments que le representant de TInde a invoques pour prouver le contraire, je soutiens que ces incursions ont ete provoquees a Torigine par les massacres qui avaient lieu alors et la crainte que la population musulmane de TEtat ne fut contrainte par la force d'accepter le rattachement de TEtat au Dominion de TInde. La etait le nceud de la question; la est la cause des hostili- tes. Tel est le point de vue exprime par presque tous les membres du Conseil de securite qui ont pris la parole sur cet aspect particulier de la question, au cours des discussions qui se sont deroulees, de Janvier a avril 1948, devant le Conseil de securite. Also, fighting has stopped; the tribesmen are out. At that time there was a sudden movement all through the tribal areas before anybody was aware of it, and that led to these incursions. Now the situation is quiet. If an agreement can be reached and if the various stages can begin to be put into operation, there is every reason to believe that no further trouble need be feared. But, as I have said, if further trouble should arise, it cannot be of a nature which cannot be dealt with within the frontiers of the Pakistan Government, and as the Gov- ernment of Pakistan has said, "We are willing for them to take that step; even if it should necessitate the use of our armed forces, we should be willing to use them." At that time, with all those factors, even with regard to our armed forces, what was our position? As I then said and as I repeat again, we could not have afforded to undertake, in those circumstances, first-class mili- tary operations against the tribal areas"; they were all up in arms; the whole area was afire. But even then, what was our military situation ? The partition had just taken place. The holocaust between East and West Punjab was going on. Attention was drawn to this in the discussion which took place in 1948. The greater parts of such armed forces as were available were occupied with the duty of maintaining law and order, and from the point of view of equipment, as the Security Council is aware because that was one of our complaints before the Security Council at that time, out of 165,000 tons of armaments and material which the Government of India was bound to deliver to us as the equipment of our armed forces, I believe that not more than 20,000 tons have yet been delivered; the greater part has not yet been delivered. But that is beside the point. The point I am making now is that up to that time only 13,000 tons had been delivered, and now about 23,000 or 25,000 tons so far has been delivered. That was the state of our equipment. In the meantime, of course, we have had to equip our armed forces as best we could ourselves, so that, from the point of view of the likeli- De plus, les hostilites ont pris fin; les membres des tribus se sont retires. A Tepoque, et avant meme que Ton ne s'en aperqut, un brusque mouvement a pris naissance dans la region des tribus, qui a eu pour resultat les incursions en question. Aujourd'hui, la situation est calme. S'il est possible d'arriver a un accord, et de commencer a mettre a execution les diverses phases du plan, il y a lieu de croire que tout danger de desordres disparaitra. Mais, comme je Tai deja dit, si de nouveaux incidents venaient a se pro- duire, ils ne pourraient etre tels que le Gouvernement pakistanais ne puisse y faire face a Tinterieur de ses frontieres, et, comme ce Gouvernement Ta affirme: "Nous consentons a ce qu'ils prennent une telle me- sure ; si elle devait entrainer Tintervention de nos forces armees, nous serions tout disposes a faire appel a ces dernieres." A Tepoque, compte tenu de tous ces facteurs, quelle etait notre situation du point de vue de nos forces armees? Je Tai dit alors; je le repete aujourd'hui: nous ne pouvions nous permettre, dans ces circonstances, d'entreprendre des operations militaires de grande envergure contre la region des tribus; les tribus s'etaient soulevees; toute la region etait embrasee. Encore une fois, quelle etait notre situation militaire? Le partage venait d'avoir lieu. La lutte meutriere se poursuivait entre le Pendjab oriental et le Pendjab occidental, comme cela a ete souligne dans une discussion en 1948. La plus grande partie des forces armees dont nous disposions etait occupee a assurer le respect de la loi et de Tordre public. Pour ce qui est de Tequipe- ment — comme le Conseil de securite le sait bien, puisque nous avons porte la question devant lui a Tepoque — sur les 165.000 tonnes d'armements et de materiel que le Gouvernement de TInde etait tenu de nous remettre pous equiper nos forces armees, il ne nous en avait pas donne, a ma connaissance, plus de 20.000; du reste, la plus grande partie de cet equipe- ment ne nous a pas encore ete remise. Mais cette affaire est hors de propos. Ce que je veux montrer maintenant, c'est que nous n'avions requ, a Tepoque, que 13.000 tonnes de materiel et que nous en avons requ aujourd'hui 23.000 ou 25.000. Tel etait Tetat dans We do not believe it will. If it did arise on that very, very small scale, we could adequately deal with it through our political arrangements, and if it could not be dealt with through political arrangements, then mili- tary action might become necessary. That should be enough to dispel any doubts in the minds of the Govern- ment of India on that score. As a matter of fact, the McNaughton proposals lay down that the arrangements made by the Government of Pakistan in this respect should be communicated to the military adviser; he should be advised of them so that he is satisfied that they are adequate. That should more than satisfy the Government of India on that score. That refers to the tribal incursions. As a matter of fact, if any tribal incursion took place at all, it would not take place in the northern areas. The northern areas have very high valleys, are very sparsely populated, and populated to the extent of 100 per cent by the Muslim population. What would the tribesmen wish to do there, even if they could easily get over those high passes? If the object was to get into the Valley, they could not come through the northern areas. The second question may be, although it has not been raised and we do not know what the point is, that India is anxious with regard to security against some major Power invading those areas. That has only to be mentioned for the Security Council to realize that if that contingency should again unfortunately arise, and Heaven forbid, it would not be a question of a few battalions here and there in those areas. In the first place, in any case, no sane commander would wish to bring his troops to those areas over those high ranges, some of them rising to over 25,000 feet and where even in the passes through the ranges, which rise to between 15,000 and 19,000 feet, not more than one mule or, at the widest places, two mules at the most, can pass. But if the contingency did arise, it would not be these few battalions of the Indian armed forces which would be able to do anything, and in that event the defence of the whole area starting from the Persian Gulf and extend- ing right up to the Karakoram would be the business of the Pakistan Government. That is a contingency for which it is idle to provide, and in any case it cannot be provided for by placing a few armed camps along these high ranges in the northern areas. The whole attempt is to obtain military occupation of an area of which the armed forces of India have never been in military occupation, to the extent of even one inch, at any time since this dispute began. Another argument sometimes put forward has been that the northern areas control the trade routes into Sinkiang. Broadly stated, the proposition is correct, Sinkiang being farther to the north. After all, the trade routes pass somewhere. But actual study of the geog- Nous ne croyons pas qu'une telle crise se produise. Si pourtant cette crise restreinte venait a se produire, nous pourrions y faire face avec succes grace aux dis- positions que nous avons prises sur le plan politique; si, cependant, cela ne suffisait pas, nous devrions peut- etre alors recourir a une intervention militaire. Cela devrait suffire a dissiper les doutes que le Gouverne- ment de TInde peut eprouver a ce sujet. En fait, les propositions du general McNaughton prevoient que les dispositions prises par le Gouvernement du Pakistan a ce sujet devraient etre communiquees au conseiller mili- taire; celui-ci devrait etre mis au courant de ces dis- positions afin de s'assurer qu'elles sont suffisantes. Le Gouvernement de TInde devrait done etre plus que satisfait en ce qui concerne ce point, c'est-a-dire en ce qui concerne les possibilites d'incursions par les mem- bres des tribus. En fait, si des incursions venaient a se produire, elles n'auraient pas lieu dans les regions du nord. En effet, ces regions ont des vallees tres elevees dont la population, tres clairsemee, est en totalite musulmane. Qu'iraient faire les membres des tribus en ces lieux, a supposer qu'ils puissent franchir aisement ces cols eleves? Si leur but etait de penetrer dans la Vallee, ils ne pourraient y arriver par les re- gions du nord. Une deuxieme question qui pourrait etre posee, mais qui ne Ta pas ete, nous ne savons pas pourquoi, est celle de Tinquietude que TInde eprouverait au sujet de sa securite en cas d'invasion de ces regions par une grande Puissance. II est inutile d'insister sur ce point; en effet, le Conseil de securite peut se rendre compte immediatement du fait que, si une telle invasion se produisait de nouveau — ce qu'a Dieu ne plaise — quelques bataillons eparpilles dans ces regions ne pour- raient absolument rien y changer. De toute faqon d'ailleurs, aucun chef militaire sense n'envisagerait, pour amener ses troupes dans ces regions, de traverser une chaine de montagnes dont certains sommets s'ele- vent a plus de 8.000 metres et dont les cols, qui attei- gnent 5.000 a 6.000 metres, sont si etroits qu'un mulet seul, ou au maximum deux, peuvent y cheminer de front. Cependant, si une agression se produisait, ce ne sont pas ces quelques bataillons de Tarmee indienne qui pourraient la repousser. Dans ce cas, la defense de toute la region, du golfe Persique au Karakoram incomberait au Pakistan. II est futile de vouloir se premunir contre cette eventualite; de toute faqon, on ne pourrait parer au danger en etablissant quelques camps militaires sur les sommets des regions du nord. II s'agit simplement d'une tentative en vue de realiser Toccupation militaire d'une region, dans laquelle depuis le debut du differend, les troupes de TInde n'ont jamais occupe un seul pouce de terrain. On invoque aussi Targument d'apres lequel les re- gions du nord controlent les voies commerciales qui conduisent au Sinkiang. Dans Tensemble, cette affirma- tion est exacte. En effet, le Sinkiang est situe au nord de cette region. Apres tout, il faut bien que les voies In paragraph 80 of the Commission's first report [S/1100] it is stated : "The Prime Minister of India submitted another letter dated 20 August" — to which I have already referred — "the contents of which, according to the statement of Sir Girja S. Bajpai, were not to be con- sidered as a condition to the acceptance of the Com- mission's resolution by the Government of India." That is the letter which raises the question of the northern areas. The Government of India raised the question but said, "We do not make it a condition". It merely brought it to the notice of the Commission. With regard to the argument that the Commission had gone so far as to say that under certain contingencies, when the Plebiscite Administrator of the Commission might determine that conditions so necessitated, certain Gov- ernment of India forces might be stationed in those areas, General McNaughton had excluded even that altogether. To begin with, it was, after all, dealing only with a contingency, and it is obvious that, in order to be rid of this matter over which the Government of India was raising difficulties, the Commission chose to re- serve it within its own hands. But the proper compari- son of General McNaughton's proposal is not what was being said during the truce conference between the Government of India and the Commission: the proper comparison is between the two resolutions of 13 Au- gust and 5 January, and the proposals of General McNaughton. But even apart from that, in its third report [S/1430] the Commission has clearly stated that any attempt to post Indian armed forces in these areas would restart the fighting. I repeat, "would restart the fighting". Is it the object of the Government of India to have the fighting restarted, or would the Se- curity Council be willing to lend its support to any proposal which could, in the view of the Commission — and the Commission was fully justified in taking that view — restart fighting in those areas? On lit dans le paragraphe 80 du premier rapport de la commission [S/1100] : "Le Premier Ministre de TInde a adresse le 20 aout une autre lettre — a laquelle j'ai deja fait allusion — dont le contenu, selon la decaration de Sir Girja S. Bajpai, ne devait pas etre considere comme une condi- tion apportee par le Gouvernement de TInde a l'accepta- tion de la resolution de la Commission." C'est cette lettre qui pose la question des regions du nord. Le Gouvernement de TInde a souleve la question; mais il a dit qu'il voulait simplement la porter a la connaissance de la commission sans en faire de- pendre le fait d'accepter la resolution. On a dit que la commission etait allee jusqu'a declarer que, dans certains cas, et si Tadministrateur du plebiscite deci- dait que la situation Texigeait, certains contingents de troupes indiennes pourraient tenir garnison dans ces regions; cependant, le general McNaughton «t comple- tement exclu cette eventualite meme. Apres tout, il s'agit simplement d'une hypothese, et il est evident qu'afin de regler rapidement cette ques- tion, au sujet de laquelle le Gouvernement de TInde a souleve des difficultes, la commission a voulu se reserver le droit d'agir comme elle Tentend. Toutefois, il convient de comparer la proposition du general Mc- Naughton non pas a ce qui a ete dit au cours des discussions relatives a la treve entre le Gouvernement de TInde et la commission, mais aux deux resolutions du 13 aout et du 5 Janvier. De toute faqon, d'ailleurs, la commission a declare categoriquement dans son troisieme rapport [S/1430] que toute tentative en vue d'introduire des troupes indiennes dans ces regions pro- voquerait la reprise des hostilites; je repete "provo- querait la reprise des hostilites". Le Gouvernement de TInde a-t-il Tintention de provoquer la reprise des hostilites ou le Conseil de securite est-il dispose a appuyer une proposition qui, de l'avis de la commission — et la commission etait parfaitement fondee a adopter cette opinion — provoquerait la reprise des hostilites? That is to say, the observance of law and order on its side of the cease-fire line. Paragraph 275 continues: "The situation in the northern area today is such that the posting of garrisons by the Indian Army at any noint beyond those which are now held by it would result in an extension of military activities by the Gov- ernment of India, although it need not necessarily imply an increase in the military potential which both Gov- ernments have agreed is not to take place on either side." That is the position. It is absolutely incorrect, as a matter of fact, to suggest that anything had been done or had happened with regard to the northern areas between 13 August and 5 January to the prejudice of the Government of India or of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. All that had happened was that, to the preju- dice of the Azad Kashmir side, certain territories had been taken away from it within these areas. In the remaining territories the Maharaja's authority had never been acknowledged since the first eruption of the population in revolt against him, and not an inch of ground had ever been occupied by the military forces of India. The whole problem is demilitarization. Actu- ally, this would not be demilitarization: it would not even be remilitarization: it would be new militarization in areas where there had been no militarization by the Government of India's forces. The cease-fire line hav- ing been drawn, its whole object is that neither side is to be permitted to cross it — neither its forces nor its officers — and this was clearly understood in those same minutes of the meeting held on 31 August 1948 between the Commission and myself in Karachi. The then Chairman of the Commission made this clear, as can be seen in the following quotation: "The Commission, continued Mr. Korbel, would as- sure the Pakistan Government that no Indian soldiers would tread on the evacuated territory." Then how is it possible for the Government of India to contend that there was contemplated, or now to demand, that its forces should be placed on trie other side of the cease-fire line in areas which they had never occupied, had never been permitted to enter, and never succeeded in enter- ing in spite of their offensives, of their fighting and of everything they could do? With regard to the cease-fire line, I shall quote from paragraph 276 of the Commission's third interim re- port: II s'agit du maintien de Tordre public, du cote de la ligne de demarcation occupe par TInde. On lit, dans le paragraphe 275: "A Theure actuelle, la situation dans la region nord est telle que, si Tarmee indienne installait des garnisons en un point quelconque situe au-dela des lignes qu'elle occupe actuellement, il en resulterait une extension des activites militaires du Gouvernement de TInde; toute- fois, cela n'impliquerait pas necessairement Taugmenta- tion du potentiel militaire qui, de Taccord des deux Gouvernements, ne doit se produire ni d'un cote ni de Tautre." Telle est la situation. II est absolument faux de dire qu'on a fait ou qu'il s'est produit, dans les regions septentrionales, entre le 13 aout et le 15 Janvier, quoi que ce soit qui fut de nature a porter prejudice au Gouvernement de TInde ou a TEtat de Jammu et Cachemire. Les evenements qui se sont produits ont au contraire ete prejudiciables au Cachemire azad, qui a perdu certains territoires situes dans ces regions. Dans les autres territoires, l'autorite du Maharadjah n'a plus ete reconnue depuis le debut de la revolte de la population; les troupes indiennes n'y ont jamais occupe un pouce de terrain. La question est tout entiere une question de demilitarisation. Or, ce que Ton demande, ce n'est pas la demilitarisation, ce n'est pas non plus la remilitarisation, c'est une nouvelle militarisation des regions qui n'ont jamais ete militarisees par les troupes du Gouvernement de TInde. L'etablissement da la ligne de demarcation au moment de la suspension d'armes a eu pour but d'assurer qu'aucune des parties ne fut autorisee a la faire franchir par ses troupes ou par ses officiers — point qui est nettement precise dans le meme proces-verbal de la reunion tenue a Karachi le 31 aout 1948 entre la commission et moi-meme. M. Korbel, President de la commission a cette epo- que, l'avait fait entendre, ce qui ressort clairement de la citation suivante: "La commission assure le Gouvernement du Pakis- tan qu'aucun soldat indien ne foulera le sol des terri- toires evacues." Dans ces conditions, comment le Gou- vernement de TInde peut-il pretendre que Ton envisa- geait Tenvoi de ses troupes de Tautre cote de la ligne de demarcation etablie lors de la suspension d'armes, et dans des regions qu'elles n'avaient jamais occupees, ou elles n'avaient jamais ete autorisees a penetrer et ou elles n'ont jamais reussi a penetrer, en depit d'une offensive et de combats acharnes? Comment peut-il aujourd'hui le demander? En ce qui concerne la ligne de demarcation, je citerai le paragraphe 276 du troisieme rapport pro- visoire de la commission: That, I submit, settles that matter. Certain questions were raised by my learned friend which have not so far been covered by the submission that I have made. They are rather miscellaneous — of course, he was perfectly justified in raising them — but I must make my submissions on them apart from what I have already said. My learned friend raised the question of the sov- ereignty and integrity of the State. He said that so long as those have not been secured, or were in jeopardy, or so long as conditions existed which were inconsistent with them, progress could not be made toward holding the plebiscite; I suppose that would be the argument. In that connexion, he drew attention to the fact that the Indian Government's reaction to the resolution of the Commission of 13 August 1948 was that it was prepared to accept certain parts of it only, subject to certain conditions. Those considerations were set out in Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's letter of 20 August 1948 to the Commission. I shall read the relevant por- tion of that letter, which is set out in paragraph 78 of the Commission's first interim report: "That paragraph, part II, section A, paragraph 3 of the resolution, should not be interpreted, or applied in practice, so as: "(a) To bring into question the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir Government over the portion of its territory evacuated by Pakistan troops; "(b) To afford any recognition of the so-called Azad Kashmir Government; or "(c) To enable this territory to be consolidated in any way during the period of truce to the disadvantage of the State." In connexion with the same paragraph, the clarifica- tions given to the Pakistan Government by the Com- mission included the following, which I quote from the Commission's letter of 3 September 1948, which appears in paragraph 90 of the Commission's first in- terim report: "In connexion with part II, section A, paragraph 3 of the resolution, the term 'evacuated territory' refers to those territories in the State of Jammu and Kashmir which are at present under the effective control of the Pakistan High Command, it being understood that the population of these territories will have freedom of legitimate political activity." The whole trouble was that the Commission was faced with this actual position that an impartial admi- Voila, je pense, qui regie la question. Mon eminent ami a souleve certaines questions aux- quelles Targumentation que j'ai presentee n'a encore offert aucune reponse. Ces questions sont de nature tres diverse —- naturellement, il avait parfaitement le droit de les soulever — mais je dois les considerer, et exprimer mon opinion a leur sujet, separement. Mon docte ami a souleve la question de la sou- verainete et de Tintegrite de TEtat. II a dit que, tant qu'elles n'auraient pas ete assurees, tant qu'elles de- meureraient compromises, ou tant qu'existerait une situation en parfaite contradiction avec ces principes, aucun progres ne pourrait etre realise en vue de la tenue d'un plebiscite; je crois que c'est la Targument qu'il a presente. A ce propos, il a attire notre attention sur le fait que, prenant connaissance de la resolution de la com- mission en date du 13 aout 1948, le Gouvernement de TInde a fait savoir qu'il n'etait dispose a accepter que certaines parties de cette resolution, et sous certaines conditions. Ces considerations etaient exposees dans la lettre que le Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru a adressee le 20 aout 1948 a la commission. Je lirai la partie pertinente de cette lettre, que reproduit le paragraphe 78 du pre- mier rapport provisoire de la Commission: "L'interpretation ou Tapplication pratique du para- graphe 3 de la section A de la deuxieme partie de la resolution: "a) Ne devra pas mettre en doute la souverainete du Gouvernement de Jammu et Cachemire sur la partie du territoire de cet Etat evacuee par les troupes du Pakistan; "b) Ne devra en aucune maniere constituer une reconnaissance du Gouvernement dit du "Cachemire azad"; "c) Ne devra, pendant la periode de treve, permettre aucun rattachement dudit territoire au detriment de TEtat." A propos du meme paragraphe, les precisions don- nees par la commission au Gouvernement du Pakistan portaient, entre autres points, sur le suivant: je cite la lettre de la commission en date du 3 septembre 1948, reproduite dans le paragraphe 90 du premier rapport provisoire de la Commission: "Dans le paragraphe 3 de la section A de la deuxieme partie de la resolution Texpression "territoire evacue" designe ceux des territoires de TEtat de Jammu et Cachemire qui se trouvent actuellement sous l'autorite effective du haut commandement du Pakistan, etant entendu que la population de ces territoires aura la possibilite de se livrer a une activite politique legitime." Ce qu'il y avait de genant dans cette affaire, c'etait que la commission devait faire face a cette realite que In that connexion, the Commission explained, in sub-paragraph 2 (a) of its letter of 19 September 1948, which is set forth in paragraph 108 — of the Commis- sion's first interim report: " . . . the existence of the Azad Kashmir movement has not been ignored by the Commission, consideration thereof appearing in part II, section A, paragraph 3, of its resolution of 13 August." The Commission was at pains to explain that it rec- ognized the existence of this movement and these au- thorities, except that it referred to them as "local au- thorities" As a matter of fact, it was repeatedly ex- plained to us. We were anxious not to create difficul- ties on technical points, and we said: "All right, as long as it is recognized in actual fact, it does not matter by what name the movement is called." Sir Benegal N. Ran, mv learned friend on the other side, drew the attention of the Council to the true pro- posals, where he said this principle had been recognized. He quoted from paragraph 3 of section A of the first proposals, which are set forth at the end of annex 17 of the Commission's third interim report, and in which the Commission said: "The territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local au- thorities under the surveillance of the Commission and without prejudice to the sovereignty of the State." I might draw the attention of the Council to the fact that in annex 21, where the final draft of the true terms appears, this matter is dealt with under the heading "General Provisions". What is stated there runs as fol- lows: "The territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission." The words that fol- low in annex 17 — "without prejudice to the sov- ereignty of the State" — do not appear in the corre- sponding provision in the final draft. But it is a fact that at another place in their proposals, in part III. sec- tion G of annex 21, the Commission says: "These terms are without prejudice to the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the State of Jammu and Kash- mir." A ce propos, la commission a explique dans Tali- nea o du paragraphe 2 de sa lettre du 19 septembre 1948, que reproduit le paragraphe 108 du premier rap- port provisoire de la Commission, que: ". . . la Com- mission a toujours tenu compte de Texistence du mouve- ment Cachemire azad puisqu'il y est fait allusion au paragraphe 3 de la section A de la deuxieme partie de sa resolution du 13 aout." La commission avait quelque difficulte a expliquer qu'elle reconnaissait Texistence de ce mouvement et de ces autorites; toutefois, elle les denommait "autorites locales". En fait, ceci nous fut explique a plusieurs reprises. Nous tenions a ne pas creer de difficultes d'ordre technique, et nous avons dit: "Tres bien, du moment que Texistence de fait du mouvement est reconnue, peu nous importe le nom sous lequel on le designe." Mon eminent ami qui soutient la cause adverse, Sir Benegal N. Rau, a attire l'attention du Conseil sur les propositions de treve, dans lesquelles, dit-il, ce principe a ete consacre. II a lu, dans le paragraphe 3 de la sec- tion A, le texte des premieres propositions, qui figurent a la fin de Tannexe 17 au troisieme rapport provisoire de la commission; la commission y dit que: "Le terri- toire evacue par les troupes du Pakistan sera adminis- tre par les autorites locales sous la surveillance de la Commission sans porter atteinte a la souverainete de TEtat." Je me permettrai d'attirer l'attention du Conseil sur le fait que, dans Tannexe 21, ou figure le texte defini- tif des conditions de treve, la question est trait.ee sous la rubrique "Dispositions generates". II y est dit que: "Le territoire evacue par les troupes du Pakistan sera administre par les autorites locales sous la surveillance de la Commission." Le membre de phrase qui suivait dans Tannexe 17: "sans porter atteinte a la souverai- nete de TEtat" ne figure pas dans la disposition cor- respondante du texte definitif. Mais il est de fait que, dans un autre passage du texte de ses propositions, a savoir dans la section G de la troisieme partie de Tannexe 21, la commission dit: "Les presentes con- ditions ne prejugent pas Tintegrite territoriale et la souverainete de TEtat de Jammu et Cachemire." "Part III, section G recognizes that the Commission cannot prejudge the sovereignty and integrity of the State as a whole. It should not be construed as envisag- ing the introduction into the area to be evacuated by Pakistan troops of civil or military officials of the Gov- ernment of Jammu and Kashmir or of the Govern- ment of India for the purpose of administration or con- trol. The Commission does not feel that the presence of this clause in the enclosed terms introduces a con- troversial subject, nor does it in any way affect the agreement already reached by both Governments in their acceptance of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948." It is therefore quite clear that the Commission was not giving countenance to any fresh doctrine. All that it was laying down was that the disposal of this ques- tion would be for the State of Jammu and Kashmir as a whole, and that the Commission itself was taking up no position with regard to sovereignty or such cog- nate matters one way or the other. It was not preju- dicing or prejudging the question in any way. It is in this connexion that the representative of India drew the attention of the Commission also to the reso- lution of 5 January, sub-paragraph 3 (b) of which lays down: "The Plebiscite Administrator shall derive from the State of Jammu and Kashmir the powers he con- siders necessary for organizing and conducting the plebiscite and for ensuring the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite." He asked: How could the Plebiscite Administrator derive his powers from the State of Jammu and Kashmir if the State of Jammu and Kash- mir had no authority over the northern areas? I shall presently explain to the Security Council what was meant by this clause, what was its genesis, and what was meant by the Commission, but if that argument were pressed to its logical conclusion, it would mean that the administration and military control of the Government of India should be restored not only in the northern areas, but throughout the whole of the ter- ritories occupied by Azad Kashmir. Otherwise, how was the Plebiscite Administrator going to derive au- thority in respect of those areas if the State of Jammu and Kashmir was not administering them and had no military control over them? That argument cannot stand at all. As a matter of fact, what happened was this. When the Commission adumbrated this, it was pointed out to its members that this clause might be misconstrued as meaning that the i State of Jammu and Kashmir should mean the Gov- ernment of Sheikh Abdullah, or whatever might take : its place and that unless they invested the Plebiscite I Administrator with specific powers, he would not have ; those powers at all. The Commission said that that was (not what was contemplated; all that was contemplated , was that he should be deemed to have derived his ' powers, as a matter of legal technicality, from the State , of Jammu and Kashmir. Not even the Government was "Dans la section G de la troisieme partie, la Com- mission reconnait qu'elle ne peut prejuger la souve- rainete et Tintegrite territoriale de TEtat dans son ensemble. II ne faudrait pas interpreter cette clause comme signifiant que Ton envisage d'envoyer, dans la region que les troupes du Pakistan doivent evacuer, du personnel civil et militaire du Gouvernement de TEtat de Jammu et Cachemire ou du Gouvernement de TInde aux fins d'administration ou de controle. La Commission ne pense pas que Tinsertion de cette clause dans les conditions de treve proposees en annexe a la presente communication y introduise une matiere con- troversee ni qu'elle modifie en quoi que ce soit Tac- cord auquel les deux Gouvernements ont abouti en acceptant la resolution de la Commission du 13 aout 1948." II est done nettement etabli que la commission n'en- tendait accrediter aucune doctrine nouvelle. Elle se bornait a specifier que la decision a prendre en la matiere appartenait a Tensemble de TEtat de Jammu et Cachemire et que la commission elle-meme ne se prononqait ni dans un sens, ni dans Tautre, sur la sou- verainete ou sur d'autres questions du meme ordre. Elle ne prejugeait la question d'aucune maniere. C'est a ce propos que le representant de TInde a egalement attire l'attention de la commission sur la resolution du 5 Janvier, dont Talinea b, au paragraphe 3, precise ce qui suit: "L'administrateur du plebiscite recevra de TEtat de Jammu et Cachemire les pouvoirs qu'il juge necessaires pour organiser et mener a bien le plebiscite ainsi que pour entourer celui-ci de toutes les garanties voulues de liberte et d'impartialite." Comment, a-t-il demande, Tadministrateur du plebiscite pourrait-il tenir ses pouvoirs de TEtat de Jammu et Cachemire, si les regions septentrionales echappent a l'autorite de cet Etat? Je vais expliquer au Conseil de securite ce que signifiait cette clause, quelle en a ete Torigine, et ce que voulait dire la commission; mais, si Ton voulait pousser Targument du representant de TInde jusqu'a sa conclusion logique, on en deduirait que Tadministra- tion et le controle militaire du Gouvernement de TInde devraient etre retablis, non seulement dans les regions septentrionales, mais dans la totalite des territoires occupes par les forces du Cachemire azad. Sinon, comment Tadministrateur du plebiscite pourra- t-il acquerir une autorite quelconque sur ces regions, si TEtat de Jammu et Cachemire ne les administre ni ne les controle militairement? Cet argument est denue de toute valeur. En fait, voici ce qui s'est passe. Lorsque la commission a esquisse ce plan, on a fait observer a ses membres que Ton pourrait mesinterpreter cette clause; on pourrait s'imaginer, en effet, que, par "Etat de Jammu et Cache- mire", il faut entendre le Gouvernement du cheik Abdullah ou l'autorite, quelle qu'elle soit, qui pour- rait se substituer a lui, et que, si la commission ne conferait pas a Tadministrateur du plebiscite des pou- voirs determines, il n'aurait aucun pouvoir. La com- mission a precise que ce n'etait pas la ce qu'elle envi- sageait; tout ce qu'elle envisageait, c'etait que Tadmi- nistrateur du plebiscite serait cense, pour donner a It was again pointed out that there were areas which were not under the military control or administrative control of either the State of Jammu and Kashmir or of the Government of India. Would any attempt be made to argue that authority should be derived from that State also? The reply was that the words "the State of Jammu and Kashmir" meant that he was deriv- ing authority from whosoever had authority in respect of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It was only a for- mality which was being complied with. To some extent, no doubt, it would soothe the feelings of the Govern- ment of India to know that the Azad Kashmir Gov- ernment was not being brought into the matter. I shall now proceed to substantiate that explanation of the Commission. In the summary record of the minutes of the meet- ing held on Thursday 2 December 1948 in Paris be- tween the Commission and myself3, a discussion on these points is reported. We said, in the first place, that if the Plebiscite Administrator were to derive his au- thority from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, he would have to submit his proposals to it, and it might say that the powers he sought were not necessary and might accordingly withhold them. The summary record states: "Mr. Ayub explained that as the Plebiscite Admin- istrator was empowered by the Government of the State to take certain measures, he might have to sub- mit his proposals for approval by the Government. Mr. Huddle (United States) felt that this question was a mere formality because the Plebiscite Administra- tor might be obliged to resort to certain powers which would be beyond the authority of the Government of the State." He might not be able to exercise even those powers. Again, there is the memorandum dated 25 December 1948 embodying the clarifications given by M. Lozano to the Government of Pakistan when he visited Ka- rachi before these proposals were accepted. This is contained in annex 5 of the Commission's second in- terim report [S/1196] : "Clause B.3 (b) : By the expression 'the Plebiscite Administrator shall derive from the State of Jammu and Kashmir the powers he considers necessary', is meant that the Plebiscite Administrator will be com- petent to exercise such powers as he considers neces- sary for organizing and conducting the plebiscite and for ensuring its freedom and impartiality, and he shall be deemed to have derived those powers from the au- thorities concerned. The organizing and conducting of the plebiscite will be the responsibility exclusively of the Plebiscite Administrator." That was the clarification. The Administrator was to be competent to exercise all the powers he considered necessary and he was to be deemed to have derived those powers from the authorities concerned. That is to say, whoever is exercising authority in whatever area, he will be deemed to be acting on the authority 'See document S/AC.12/SR.101. On a egalement fait observer que certaines regions n'etaient ni sous le controle militaire ou administratif de TEtat de Jammu et Cachemire, ni sous celui du Gouvernement de TInde. Allait-on faire mine de pre- tendre que les pouvoirs devraient etre conferes par cet Etat egalement? II a ete repondu que Texpression "Etat de Jammu et Cachemire" signifiait que Tadmi- nistrateur du plebiscite detiendrait ses pouvoirs de qui- conque exercerait son autorite sur TEtat de Jammu et Cachemire. II s'agissait d'une simple formalite. Dans une certaine mesure, evidemment, le Gouvernement de TInde serait satisfait de savoir qu'il n'etait pas question du Gouvernement du Cachemire asad. Je vais mainte- nant justifier cette explication de la commission. Le compte rendu analytique de la seance que la commission a tenue en ma presence, a Paris, le jeudi 2 decembre 19483, rapporte une discussion sur ces points. J'ai dit, tout d'abord, que, si Tadministrateur du plebiscite devait detenir ses pouvoirs de TEtat de Jammu et Cachemire, il devrait lui soumettre ses pro- positions et TEtat pourrait alors lui refuser les pou- voirs qu'il reclame, sous pretexte qu'ils ne sont pas necessaires. Je cite le compte rendu analytique en question: "M. Ayub explique que Tadministrateur du plebiscite, recevant du Gouvernement de TEtat le pouvoir de prendre certaines mesures, pourrait avoir a soumettre ses propositions a Tapprobation de ce Gouvernement. M. Huddle (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) estime qu'il s'agit la d'une simple formalite; en effet, Tadministrateur du plebiscite se verra peut-etre dans Tobligation d'exercer certains pouvoirs qui depasseront ceux du Gouver- nement de TEtat." II se peut d'ailleurs que Tadministrateur ne puisse meme pas exercer ces pouvoirs. J'attire l'attention du Conseil sur le memorandum du 25 decembre 1948, contenant les precisions que M. Lozano a donnees au Gouvernement du Pakistan, lors de sa visite a Karachi, avant l'acceptation desdites propositions. Je cite ce document, qui figure a Tannexe 5 au deuxieme rapport provisoire de la commission [S/1196]: "Clause B. 3 b: Les termes "Tadministrateur du plebiscite recevra de TEtat de Jammu et Cachemire les pouvoirs qu'il juge necessaires" signifient que Tadmi- nistrateur du plebiscite, d'une part, sera habilite a user de tous les pouvoirs qu'il juge necessaires pour orga- niser et mener a bien le plebiscite ainsi que pour entou- rer celui-ci de toutes les garanties voulues de liberte et d'impartialite et, d'autre part, sera cense tenir ces pouvoirs des autorites interessees. L'Organisation et la conduite du plebiscite releveront exclusivement de Tadministrateur du plebiscite." Voila en quoi consistaient les precisions donnees. L'administrateur devait etre habilite a user de tousjes pouvoirs qu'il jugerait necessaires et il devait etre cense tirer ces pouvoirs des autorites interessees. Autre- ment dit, quelle que soit l'autorite qui s'exerce sur une region quelconque, Tadministrateur sera cense agir en "Voir le document S/AC.12/SR. 101. This whole question of sovereignty and integrity is a purely technical question which the Security Coun- cil, from the very beginning, has set to one side. It will not go into it; it is not here to decide these techni- calities. It is a human problem, and the Security Coun- cil as the representative — or, I must say, in these matters, the custodian — of the conscience of the civi- lized world, must approach it in that spirit and see how it can resolve the question. In 1948 the Council did make certain recommendations. The Commission went out. After a good deal of difficulty, and after the Pakis- tan Government had to yield a great deal of ground in respect of what it considered necessary for the fairness of the plebiscite, these two resolutions were eventually agreed upon. Today the only question is, what do they mean? The parties have agreed to these things. As a matter of fact, neither side has said that it wants to back out. The Pakistan Government is prepared to carry out the obligations of the resolution of 13 August. The Govern- ment of India has not said it is not ready to carry them out. The question is, what do certain portions mean? It should be easy to resolve that. But the problem has to be approached from the proper standpoint. That opinion is reinforced by the very respected, charming Ambassador of India to Washington. She uttered this charge to the General Assembly of the United Nations Toute cette question de souverainete et d'integrite est d'ordre purement technique et elle a ete ecartee des le debut par le Conseil de securite, qui ne Texami- nera pas, car ce n'est pas son role de trancher ces questions techniques. II s'agit la d'un probleme hu- main, et c'est dans cet esprit que le Conseil de securite, en tant que representant, ou plutot, devrais-je dire dans ce cas, en tant que gardien de la conscience du monde civilise, doit Tetudier et voir comment il peut etre resolu. En 1948, le Conseil a fait un certain nom- bre de recommandations. La Commission est partie. Apres que bien des difficultes eurent ete surmontees et apres que le Gouvernement du Pakistan eut cede beaucoup de terrain dans le domaine de ce qu'il con- siderait comme indispensable pour assurer Timpartia- lite du plebiscite, deux resolutions ont fini par etre acceptees. La seule question qui se pose aujourd'hui est (le savoir ce qu'elles signifient. Les parties ont donne leur accord a ces resolutions. En fait, ni Tune ni Tautre n'a declare vouloir se dedire. Le Gouvernement du Pakistan est pret a remplir les obligations resultant de la resolution du 13 aout. Le Gouvernement de TInde n'a pas dit qu'il n'etait pas dispose a les executer. La question est de savoir quel est le sens de certaines clauses de ces resolutions. II devrait etre facile d'y repondre. Mais le probleme doit etre aborde sous Tangle qui convient. Cette opinion est confirmee par la tres honorable et charmante Am- bassadrice de TInde a Washington. Voici Tavertisse- "We are by our own acts gradually undermining the prestige of our Organization and taking away from the peoples of the world their only hope. This resolution recommended by the Fourth Committee for adoption by the General Assembly has already been hailed as a tacit acceptance of the position taken by the Union of South Africa and as indirect approval of its policy by this General Assembly. My delegation has often been charged with trying to influence the emotions of the General Assembly. Perhaps a slight emphasis on the emotions is necessary to prevent us from becom- ing completely enslaved by legalities. We are rapidly reducing the General Assembly and its Committees to the status of law courts where lawyers discuss pro- posals and conditions of issues exclusively from the legal angle. In such atmosphere there seems no place for any other consideration, though it should hardly be necessary for me to remind representatives that human problems have been solved only by a human approach and never through courts of law. The pursuit of such a policy spells disaster for the United Nations as an Organization that could implement the hopes and aspirations of mankind. I am content to leave this thought with this Assembly." Substitute Kashmir for South Africa in this passage, and I address the same appeal through Mrs. Pandit to the Security Council. But there is no foundation for these legal and tech- nical considerations. They have been taken care of, and, to the extent to which they have not been taken care of, they have been given up for the purposes of holding a plebiscite. The two resolutions are absolutely clear on these points. They are complete in themselves as setting up a scheme. Now the question is the imple- mentation of that scheme. Then we come to the final stages. With regard to in- tegrity, I might draw the attention of the Security Council to one matter which I have already to some extent stressed. If by "integrity" what is meant is that the whole of the State should be under one authority, then the Government of India has its choice. The Secu- rity Council contemplated that kind of integrity. It suggested an impartial, neutral administration for the whole of the State, as free from the appearance of partiality as human ingenuity could make it. Very good. India has that choice. In the resolution of 21 April 1948 [S/726] a coali- tion Government of the two sides of the political parties was suggested. That would also bring about that kind of integrity. The Government of India has its choice. If it is prepared, then we are prepared also. But if by "integrity," the Government of India means the mili- tary control of the whole of the State — obviously, Sheikh Abdullah's administrative control of the whole 'The quotation is from the verbatim record of the 164th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, document A/PV. 164. "Nous sommes en train, par nos propres actes, de saper peu a peu le prestige de notre Organisation et de retirer aux peuples du monde leur unique esperance. Cette resolution, que la Quatrieme Commission a recommande a l'Assemblee generale d'adopter, a deja ete saluee comme une acceptation tacite de la position prise par l'Union Sud-Africaine et comme une appro- bation indirecte de sa politique par l'Assemblee gene- rate. On a souvent reproche a ma delegation de vou- loir jnfluencer les sentiments de l'Assemblee generale. Peut-etre un discret appel aux sentiments est-il neces- saire pour nous empecher de devenir completement esclaves des formes juridiques. Nous sommes en train de reduire rapidement l'Assemblee generale et ses Commissions au rang de tribunaux ou des avocats dis- cutent de propositions et d'elements du litige exclusive- ment sous Tangle juridique. Dans une telle atmosphere, il semble n'y avoir aucune place pour d'autres conside- rations, et pourtant il est a peine necessaire que je rap- pelle aux representants que les problemes humains n'ont jamais ete resolus que sur le plan humain et non par voie judiciaire. La poursuite d'une telle politique laisse presager un echec desastreux des Nations Unies en tant qu'Organisation chargee de realiser les espoirs et les aspirations de Thumanite. II me suffit de soumet- tre ce point aux reflexions de l'Assemblee." Substituons le Cachemire a l'Union Sud-Africaine dans ce passage, et c'est le meme appel que j'adresse au Conseil de securite par le truchement de Mme Pandit. Quoi qu'il en soit, les considerations d'ordre juri- dique et technique sont elles-memes sans objet. II en a ete tenu compte et, dans la mesure ou Ton ne s'y est pas arrete, elles ont ete abandonnees au profit du principe d'un plebiscite. Les deux resolutions sont par- faitement claires sur ces points. Elles se suffisent a elles-memes en ce qu'elles fournissent un plan. La question qui se pose actuellement est celle de Impli- cation de ce plan. Nous en venons maintenant aux phases finales. En ce qui concerne Tintegrite, je voudrais attirer l'attention du Conseil de securite sur une question que j'ai deja soulignee jusqu'a un certain point. Si par integrite Ton entend que Tensemble de TEtat devrait etre place sous une seule autorite, alors il y a matiere a choisir pour le Gouvernement de TInde. C'est ce genre d'integrite que le Conseil de securite a envisage lorsqu'il a suggere de creer une administration neutre et impartiale pour Ten- semble de TEtat, aussi degagee de toute apparence de partialite que Tesprit humain peut le concevoir. Voila qui est parfait. L'lnde peut done choisir. Aux termes de la resolution du 21 avril 1948 [S/726], il a ete suggere que fut constitue un gouver- nement de coalition englobant les deux partis politi- ques. Cette solution aboutirait egalement a ce meme genre d'integrite. Le Gouvernement de TInde peut choisir. S'il est pret a accepter cette solution, il en est de meme pour nous. Mais, si par integrite le Gou- vernement de TInde entend le controle militaire de * Ce texte est une traduction du compte rendu stenographique de la 164eme seance pleniere de l'Assemblee generale, docu- ment A/PV.164. Let me make this clear. What does the Government of India mean by "integrity"? If it is as the Commis- sion understood it to mean — that nothing shall preju- dice the integrity of the State, that the plebiscite shall be held and the decision shall be binding with regard to the whole of the State — then nobody has gone back from that position. We insist on that position being maintained. When the Commission found itself at the end of its efforts to make progress with regard to the truce, as the Security Council is well aware, it made a proposal that the two sides should agree to submit to arbitration such differences as had arisen between them over the truce arrangements. That was reinforced by a very earnest appeal by President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee. We accepted; India declined. One does not know the exact grounds of India's refusal to go to arbitration over these matters. After all, it seems obvious to us that if I enter into an agreement with somebody else, and differences arise over the inter- pretation of the agreement, the only method of settling those differences is either by judicial determination of the meaning of the agreement, or by arbitration. But there have been indications, once or twice, that the Government of India could not accept arbitration, because the terms of the arbitration were indefinite. If that was so, surely those terms could have ben settled by the mediation of the Commission; they could be settled through the means of the Security Council. In any case, it appears that it is not difficult to state the points of difference, because they were stated the other day by the representative of India in his submission to the Council, and they have been replied to by me. It should be quite possible to determine what are the differences. This is the main difference: the demili- tarization of the northern areas, within which problem arise the questions of the stage of the disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces — if the Gov- ernment of India thinks that question arises — and of the synchronization of the withdrawal of the military forces. In any case, the significant point is that, with regard to demilitarization, which is the main question, the final disposal of the forces remaining on either side during the truce stage has to be carried out by the Plebiscite Administrator in any event, under para- graph 4 of the resolution of 5 January. If he is to do that, what risk is there for anybody in the suggestion that, at an anterior stage, he should arbitrate between the parties as to how far, in the truce period, demilitari- zation is to go ? The Plebiscite Administrator, a man of the standing, of the experience, of the reputation which he possesses — an Administrator agreed to between the parties — has to make the final disposal, so why can we not entrust him to determine what should hap- pen in between, or to determine what the parties had agreed to in between? Permettez-moi de preciser ce point. Qu'entend par "integrite" le Gouvernement de TInde? S'il donne a ce mot le meme sens que la commission, a savoir que rien ne doit porter atteinte a Tintegrite de TEtat, que le plebiscite doit avoir lieu et que son resultat doit etre valable pour Tensemble de TEtat, alors il est exact que personne ne s'est dedit. Nous insistons pour qu'on s'en tienne a cette maniere de voir. Lorsque la commission eut epuise tous ses efforts pour faire aboutir la treve, elle proposa — le Conseil de securite ne Tignore pas — que les deux parties consentent a soumettre a Tarbi- trage les differends qui s'etaient eleves entre eux a propos des accords de treve. Cette solution trouva un appui serieux dans un pressant appel du President Truman et du Premier Ministre Attlee. Nous avons accepte cette solution; TInde Ta declinee. On ne sait pas exactement pourquoi TInde a refuse de soumet- tre ces questions a Tarbitrage. Apres tout, il nous semble evident que, si un accord est signe avec qui que ce soit et si des differends surgissent a propos de l'interpretation de cet accord, la seule methode pour regler ces differends consiste dans une interpretation judiciaire des termes de Taccord ou dans un arbitrage. Toutefois, on a laisse entendre, a plusieurs reprises, que le Gouvernement de TInde ne saurait accepter un arbitrage, parce que les conditions de cet arbitrage etaient mai definies. S'il en etait ainsi, il aurait ete bien facile de fixer ces conditions par Tentremise de la commission, ou par Tntermediaire du Conseil de secu- rite. De toute maniere, il ne semble pas difficile d'ex- poser les points litigieux; le representant de TInde Ta fait Tautre jour, lorsqu'il s'est adresse au Conseil, et j'ai repondu a ce sujet. II devrait etre tres facile de determiner quels sont les sujets de friction. Le prin- cipal est le suivant: la demilitarisation de la region septentrionale, en relation avec laquelle se pose la ques- tion de savoir a quel moment les forces du Cachemire azad doivent etre licenciees et desarmees — si toutefois le Gouvernement de TInde pense que cette question se pose — ainsi que la question de la synchronisation du retrait des forces armees. Quoi qu'il en soit, en ce qui concerne la demilitarisation, qui est la question principale, la liquidation definitve des forces armees des deux camps restant encore sur le territoire pendant la periode de treve doit, de toute maniere, etre effec- tuee par Tadministrateur du plebiscite, en vertu du paragraphe 4 de la resolution du 5 Janvier; c'est la le point essentiel. Si Tadministrateur du plebiscite s'acquitte de cette tache, quel danger peut done pre- senter la proposition selon laquelle Tadministrateur du plebiscite devrait prealablement mettre les parties d'ac- cord sur le degre de demilitarisation pendant la treve? L'administrateur du plebiscite est un homme de valeur, d'une excellente reputation et il possede une grande experience; il a ete accepte comme administrates du plebiscite par les deux parties et il doit regler defini- tivement la question de la demilitarisation; pourquoi ne pourrions-nous pas le charger d'etablier ce qui doit intervenir dans Tintervalle ou de determiner sur quels points les parties se sont mises d'accord entre temps? Then, it has been said: "We cannot put the question of security under arbitration." But nobody suggests putting the question of security under arbitration. The question is: What was agreed upon ? The Commission had gone into all these questions — security, law and order, withdrawals, cease-fire, truce, everything — and built up that structure. The only question is: What does that mean? No one says that the question of secu- rity should be put to arbitration. As a matter of fact, the final disposal of the armed forces of India and of the State armed forces has to be determined, under sub- paragraph 4 (a) of the 5 January resolution with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite. In any case, however, any considerations of security which are dealt with by these resolutions can be raised before the arbitrator. But the position of the Government of India is: "This is what we say. These words ought to mean. . . Therefore, everybody must accept that that is what they do mean, and we cannot ask anybody else to determine this." Then, as I have said, the Commission found itself at the end of its resources and reported the matter back to the Security Council. The Security Council re- quested General McNaughton to get in touch with the parties and to see whether he could bring about a set- tlement. Well, General McNaughton has himself made a report on that matter to the Security Council [57 1453]. It is unnecessary for me to reiterate something of which the Council is fully aware. The General car- ried out his task. He has made two reports: one in- terim report, and one presented to the Security Council on 3 February. The proposals are before the Council. They are based on certain fundamentals: that is true. But those fundamentals have been agreed upon between the parties: that the future of the State, the question of the accession of the State to India or to Pakistan, should be determined through a free and impartial On a pretendu ensuite qu'on ne pouvait pas sou- mettre la question de securite a un arbitrage; or, personne ne suggere de soumettre la question de la securite a un arbitrage. Ce qui importe c'est de savoir ce qui a ete convenu. La commission a examine toutes ces questions: securite, respect de la loi et main- tien de Tordre, retrait des troupes, suspension d'ar- mes, treve, tout enfin, et elle a tire ses conclusions. II s'agit seulement de savoir ce que cela veut dire. Personne ne demande que la question de la securite soit soumise a un arbitrage. En fait, les termes du re- trait definitif des forces armees de TInde et de celles de TEtat doivent etre determines conformement au paragraphe 4, alinea a, de la resolution du 5 Janvier, en tenant dument compte de la securite de TEtat et de la liberte et de Timpartialite du plebiscite. De toute maniere, toutes les considerations de securite qui figurent dans ces resolutions peuvent etre invoquees devant le mediateur. Mais, de son cote, le Gouvernement de TInde adopte l'attitude suivante: "Nous disons ceci . . ce qui veut dire . . . Done, tout le monde doit accepter cette inter- pretation et nous ne pouvons demander a personne d'autre de se prononcer sur ce point." C'est alors, ainsi que je Tai dit, que la commission s'est trouvee a bout de ressources et a renvoye la question au Conseil de securite. Celui-ci a invite le general McNaughton a se mettre en rapport avec les parties et a rechercher les possibilites d'accord. Le general McNaughton a presente lui-meme un rapport au Conseil de securite [S/1453]. II est inutile que je rappelle ce que le Conseil connait fort bien. Le general McNaughton s'est acquitte de sa tache. II a redige deux rapports: un rapport provisoire et un rapport qu'il a presente au Conseil le 3 fevrier. Le Conseil est saisi des propositions qu'il a faites. Elles reposent sur certains elements fondamentaux, il est vrai, mais les parties se sont mises d'accord sur ces elements: lave- nir de TEtat, la question de savoir s'il doit etre rattache a TInde ou au Pakistan, doit etre decidee par un ple- biscite libre et impartial. Fort bien. Ensuite, le general The representative of India has submitted these pro- posals to meticulous examination and comparison. He chooses whatever he thinks goes in his favour anywhere in the resolutions, and correspondence and the clari- fications with the Commission, or in the truce proposals of the Commission, and, if that has been in any man- ner changed or modified in the McNaughton proposals, he says: "Well, this prejudices me." But he does not look at the other side of the question. After all, either the McNaughton proposals could be identical with what the Commission had done, in which case, his griev- ance, I presume, would be: "Not having agreed to the Commission's proposals, how can we agree to these; they are merely an attempt to repeat them"; or the McNaughton proposals could be different, in which case, in order to have a complete scheme of his own with regard to the questions that were in dispute, the Gen- eral's proposals would have to go beyond the Commis- sion's recommendations in some respects and fall short of those recommendations in some other respects. That is obvious, it is inescapable. Who could make any grievance out of the whole of that? What is the real prejudice that the representative of India complains of with regard to those proposals? His only prejudice is that his point of view, which was unacceptable to the Commission, has, by and large, been equally unaccept- able to General McNaughton. But General McNaugh- ton has made an effort with regard to the demilitari- zation in the Azad Kashmir territories, by bringing about demilitarization with respect to the Asad Kash- mir forces, not in one stage — the plebiscite stage — but divided between the truce stage and the plebiscite stage. In that respect, the proposals are different in one or two minor respects, too. The McNaughton proposals which were accepted by us were rejected by India. The matter has now come before the Security Council again, and it has been debated. The Security Council is now in full possession of what has happened so far. The question is, what is to be done? As I said in the opening part of my sub- mission to the Council, on the basis of all the criteria, or at least on that of the major portion of the criteria that the Government of India has to date suggested with regard to accession, Kashmir ought to accede to Pakistan if the choice was to be made by Kashmir Le representant de TInde a soumis ces propositions a un examen minutieux et il a fait des comparaisons tres poussees. II choisit tout ce qui lui parait etre en sa faveur dans les resolutions, la correspondance echan- gee avec la commission et les explications donnees par celle-ci, ou dans les propositions de treve de la commission; si ces elements ont ete modifies de quel- que maniere que ce soit dans les propositions du gene- ral McNaughton, le representant de TInde declare: "Ces changements me portent prejudice." Mais il n'exa- mine pas Tautre aspect de la question. Apres tout, ou bien les propositions du general McNaughton pouvaient etre identiques a celles que la commission avait formu- lees, et, dans ce cas, Tobjection du representant de TInde serait, je presume, la suivante: "N'ayant pas accepte les propositions de la commission, comment pourrions-nous accepter celles du general McNaughton, puisqu'elles ne sont en somme qu'une simple repetition des premieres?", ou bien, les propositions du general McNaughton pouvaient etre differentes, auquel cas, pour satisfaire le representant de TInde en lui presen- tant un projet absolument conforme a ses desirs en ce qui concerne les questions en litige, il eut fallu que les propositions du general allassent au-dela des recom- mandations de la commission sur certains points et res- tassent en deqa de ces recommandations sur d'autres points. Ceci est manifeste, indeniable. Qui pourrait trouver matiere a objection dans Tensemble des propositions faites? Quel grief reel le representant de l'lnde a-t-il a formuler au sujet de ces propositions? Son seul grief est que son point de vue, qui a ete juge inacceptable par la commission, a ete de meme juge inacceptable, dans ses grandes lignes, par le general McNaughton. Mais le general McNaughton a fait un effort en ce qui concerne la demilitarisation dans les territoires du Cachemire azad, en envisageant la demilitarisation des forces du Cachemire azad, non pas en une seule fois — c'est-a-dire au moment du plebiscite — mais en deux fois, c'est-a-dire pendant la duree de la treve et au moment des operations du plebiscite. Dans ce domaine, les propositions different sur un ou deux points d'importance secondaire. Les propositions du general McNaughton que nous avons acceptees ont ete rejetees par TInde. La ques- tion est venue de nouveau devant le Conseil de secu- rite et elle a ete mise en discussion. Le Conseil de securite est maintenant en possession de tous les ele- ments qui ont determine Involution de la situation jus- qu'a Theure presente. La question qui se pose est la suivante: que faut-il faire? Ainsi que je Tai souligne au debut de mon expose au Conseil, d'apres tous les criteres, ou tout au moins d'apres la plus grande partie des criteres que le Gouvernement de TInde a jusqu'a Here is a significant fact. In the Indian-occupied area of Kashmir there were roughly 2 million Muslims before this trouble started. Of those 2 million Muslims, 600,000 to 700,000 are already refugees in Pakistan. What does that indicate? That is not an argument; it is a hard, poignant fact, and it is the strongest piece of evidence to show in which direction the inhabitants consider safety for themselves, security for themselves, and opportunities for the development of their intellect and for their progress in life, to lie. As recently as January 1950 the following has hap- pened. I quote from the Civil and Military Gazette of Lahore, dated 30 January 1950. It is a piece of news originating from Rawalpindi on 29 January, which reads: "Apprehensive of revolt in the State forces, the Indian Army is following a steady policy of eliminating Mus- lim elements from the State forces in Indian-held Kash- mir, said Lieutenant-Colonel Manavar Khan, the officer commanding the Pioneer Company of Jammu and Kashmir State forces which crossed over into Pakistan territory on 22 January with a contingent of 500 men composed of officers, other ranks and their families." Then there is a long piece giving the whole history relating how it was brought about. Five hundred of them — and at as late a date as this. If those people were free to decide, is there any doubt as to which way they would decide? It is not merely a matter of which way they are going to decide, but it is a matter of where they know lie their safety, their security, their integrity, their honour, their development, and their intellectual and economic prosperity. Well then, that should have happened and it did not happen. We do not make a claim that, on that ground, Kashmir should accede to Pakistan. But it has been agreed that the whole matter shall be settled on the basis of a free and impartial plebiscite. Well, then, let the free and impartial plebiscite take place. At the 463rd meeting the representative of India said, in effect, "Oh, it is assumed that we have agreed to a free and impartial plebiscite," and then it is said, "Oh, let us try to narrow the difference as far as we can." He says that this is the wrong approach. He says, "I have said that this is an argument which at first sight seems good, but it is fundamentally unsound. India offered a plebiscite upon certain conditions which amount to this, that the S^ate might be restored to its normal conditions before the plebiscite is held. India stands by that offer subject to those conditions. Pakis- tan, on the other hand, appears to desire a plebiscite with the State in its present disrupted and abnormal condition. The two positions are fundamentally irre- concilable." Voici un fait significatif. Dans la region du Cache- mire occupee par TInde, il y avait environ 2 millions de Musulmans lorsque le differend s'est eleve. De ces 2 millions de Musulmans, 600.000 a 700.000 se sont deja refugies au Pakistan. Qu'est-ce que cela signifie? Ce n'est evidemment pas un argument; mais c'est un fait penible et poignant, qui montre de la faqon la plus formelle que la population du Cachemire sait ou trou- ver sa securite et les facilites necessaires pour son developpement intellectuel comme pour son progres. A une epoque aussi recente que le mois de Janvier 1950, Tevenement suivant s'est produit. Je cite un ex- trait de la Civil and Military Gazette de Lahore, en date du 30 Janvier 1950. II s'agit d'une nouvelle recue de Rawalpindi le 29 Janvier, et qui est ainsi conque: "Craignant une revolte dans les forces de TEtat, Tarmee indienne poursuit une politique systematique d'elimination a l'egard des elements musulmans des forces de TEtat, dans la region du Cachemire occupee par TInde, declare le lieutenant-colonel Manavar Khan, commandant de la Pioneer Company des forces de TEtat de Jammu et Cachemire, qui a conduit sur le territoire du Pakistan, le 22 Janvier, un contingent de 500 hommes, officers et soldats, avec leurs families." Cette nouvelle est suivie d'un long expose relatant dans quelles circonstances ces faits se sont produits. Cinq cents hommes et si recemment! Si ces populations etaient fibres de decider, pourrait-il y avoir quelques doutes sur la nature de leur decision ? II ne s'agit pas simplement de savoir dans quel sens elles se decideront, il s'agit egalement de savoir ou elles estiment pouvoir trouver securite, protection, honneur, possibilites de progres, prosperite economique et epanouissement cul- turel. Eh bien, ce qui aurait du se produire ne s'est pas produit. Nous ne pretendons pas, pour autant, que le Cachemire devrait acceder au Pakistan. On a decide, d'un commun accord, de regler le probleme en proce- dant a un plebiscite libre et impartial; eh bien, que ce plebiscite libre et impartial ait done lieu. A la 463eme seance, le representant de TInde a dit en substance: "On peut tenir pour etabli que nous avons decide de proceder a un plebiscite libre et impartial" mais quand on ajoute "essayons de reduire le plus possible les divergences qui nous separent", il affirme que cette faqon d'aborder la question est erronee et il declare: "Ainsi que je Tai dit, il s'agit la d'un argument qui, des Tabord, semble bon, mais qui est fondamentale- ment deraisonnable. L'lnde a propose un plebiscite sous certaines garanties ou conditions qui comportent essen- tiellement le retablissement d'une situation normale dans TEtat de Cachemire, avant que le plebiscite ait lieu. L'lnde maintient sa proposition, si ces conditions sont remplies. Par contre, le Pakistan semble desirer que le plebiscite ait lieu dans la situation troublee et anor- male dans laquelle se trouve actuellement TEtat de Cachemire. Les deux positions sont done fondamenta- lement opposees." But those are the conditions laid down there. As a matter of fact, before agreement was reached on the : resolution of 5 January 1949, Pakistan had itself put forward its own view of the matter which I will read to the Council, and which would show what our atti- L tude has been with regard to these matters. It is a " letter from me to the Chairman of the Commission dated 28 November 1948, and I have already drawn attention to one paragraph of that letter. However, it is worthwhile reading it out to the Security Council because it puts in a nutshell the whole position of the : Pakistan Government: Les conditions ont ete posees dans les resolutions. En fait, avant que la resolution du 5 Janvier 1949 ait ete acceptee de part et d'autre, le Pakistan avait lui- meme presente ses vues sur la question; et je vais lire une lettre adressee par moi au President de la commission le 28 novembre 1948, afin de montrer ce qu'a ete notre attitude a ce sujet; j'ai deja attire l'attention du Conseil sur Tun des paragraphes de cette lettre. Cependant, elle merite d'etre lue car elle re- sume toute l'attitude du Gouvernement du Pakistan: "At our meeting on 27 November 1948, you asked me to submit in writing the preliminary reactions of the Pakistan Government to the Commission's draft plebi- ; scite proposals of 20 November." "Au cours de la seance du 27 novembre 1948, vous m'avez demande d'exposer par ecrit les reactions eveil- lees chez le Gouvernement du Pakistan par les pro- positions de projet de plebiscite presentees par la com- mission le 20 novembre." After certain modifications these proposals became the resolution. "1. As I explained to the Commission, the Pakistan '. Government has authorized me to explore the ground with the Commission in order to obtain a fuller outline of its plan for a free and impartial plebiscite. My Government appreciates that the draft proposals are at this stage tentative in character, and are intended to furnish a basis for discussion. It wishes, however, to draw the attention of the Commission to certain impor- tant principles which should find a place in any plan designed to secure a free and impartial plebiscite. Je note en passant que ces propositions, apres quel- ques modifications, ont servi de base a la resolution. " 1 . Comme j'ai eu l'honneur de Texpliquer, le Gou- vernement du Pakistan m'a autorise a prendre contact avec la commission en vue d'obtenir des informations plus completes sur le projet de plebiscite libre et impar- tial qu'elle a prepare. Mon Gouvernement se rend compte que les propositions ont, au stade actuel, un caractere provisoire et sont destinees a servir de point de depart a la discussion. II desire neanmoins attirer l'attention de la commission sur certains principes essentiels qui devraient trouver place dans tout projet destine a garantir un plebiscite libre et impartial. "2. La Commission reconnaitra que, pour proceder a un plebiscite libre et impartial en vue de decider si TEtat doit acceder a TInde ou au Pakistan, tous les elements de la population de Jammu et Cachemire doi- vent pouvoir voter sans etre exposes a des pressions ou des influences quelconques et qu'aucun eles deux Dominions ne doit jouir de privileges particuliers par rapport a Tautre en ce qui concerne le plebiscite. "2. The Commission will agree that in order to achieve a free and impartial plebiscite to decide whether the State should accede to India or to Pakistan, all sections of the people of Jammu and Kashmir must be able to cast their vote without being subjected to any pressure or interference, and that neither of the two Dominions should enjoy any special advantage over the other in respect of the plebiscite. "3. L'armee, la police ou Tadministration civile peu- vent servir d'instruments de pression. Afin de supprimer ou de neutraliser ces sources de pression, il faut: "3. Pressure may be exercised through the Army, the police or the civil administration. In order to elimi- nate or neutralize these sources of pressure, the follow- ing measures are necessary: "i) Retirer toutes les troupes de Texterieur; "ii) S'assurer de la neutralite de Tadministration civile; "(i) Withdrawal of all outside troops; "(ii) Neutralization of the civil administration; "4. With regard to the necessity for the complete withdrawal of outside troops, it may be observed that when parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August have been complied with, Azad Kashmir forces would have ceased fighting, tribesmen would have left the State, and the Pakistan Army and the bulk of Indian forces would have withdrawn from the State in accordance with an agreed programme. At the end of the truce period, by which time law and order would have been restored in the State, the only outside troops in the State would be the Indian forces retained for internal security. The Government of India has, however, pressed for the retention of Indian forces in Kashmir for purposes of defence as well as of internal security." I have already read the rest of this paragraph so I shall omit that portion and continue: "The mere presence of Indian troops, even if they do nothing directly to influence the people of Kashmir in the matter of the plebiscite, would constitute intimi- dation and is further likely to be exploited by the party interested in securing the accession of the State to India. The freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite would thus be seriously jeopardized by the presence of Indian troops in the State during the plebiscite. "Secondly, it is essential that the civil administra- tion should be impartial, or should be neutralized on the accession of the State to India or to Pakistan." — That is to say, on the question of accession. — "It is recognized that it woulel not be practicable to achieve this at all levels of the administration. What is, however, necessary is that this should be carried out at least at the ministerial level, so that, in the words of Senator Austin, the administration would com- mand the confidence and respect of all people of the State, and would be a symbol to the people of both sides that the Government of the State was officially neutral on the issue of accession. The Security Council was convinced that this could best be realizeci through a coalition Government in which the major political parties shared equitably and fully. The Pakistan Gov- ernment is also of the same view, but would be pre- pared to entertain any equally effective alternative which the Commission may wish to suggest." At that time, of course, the alternative had not vet been suggested. The quotation continues: "Thirdly, it is obvious that the Plebiscite Adminis- trator should have the fullest powers to enable him to discharge his responsibility to ensure that the plebiscite is completely free and impartial. Having regard to his duties and responsibilities, the Plebiscite Administra- tor must be a man of international standing, in whose judgment, integrity and capacity everyone would have implicit confidence." "4. En ce qui concerne la necessite de retirer toutes les troupes de Texterieur, Ton peut faire observer que lorsque les mesures prevues dans les premiere et deuxie- me parties de la resolution adoptee par la commission le 13 aout auront ete executees, les forces du Cache- mire asad auront cesse de combattre, les hommes des tribus auront quitte TEtat et Tarmee du Pakistan et le gros des forces indiennes se seront retires de TEtat conformement a un programme accepte d'avance. A la fin de la periode de treve, lorsque Tordre aura ete retabli dans TEtat, les seules troupes exterieures qui se trouveront encore sur le territoire de TEtat seront les forces indiennes retenues pour des raisons de securite interieure. Le Gouvernement de TInde a, cependant insiste pour que les forces indiennes restent dans le Cachemire pour des raisons de defense en meme temps que de securite interieure." J'ai deja donne lecture du reste de ce paragraphe que je passerai done sous silence pour lire la suite: "La simple presence des troupes indiennes, meme si elles ne font rien pour influencer les populations du Cachemire dans la question du plebiscite, constituerait une intimidation; et, d'autre part, il est probable que la partie interessee chercherait a tirer parti de cette situation pour assurer le rattachement de TEtat a TInde. La liberte et Timpartialite du plebiscite seraient done gravement compromises par la presence de troupes indiennes dans TEtat pendant le plebiscite. "Deuxiemement, il importe que Tadministration civile soit impartiale ou qu'elle ne puisse avoir aucune in- fluence sur le rattachement de TEtat a TInde ou au Pakistan. — C'est-a-dire, sur la question du rattache- ment. — II faut admettre que cette condition ne peut pas etre remplie a tous les echelons de Tadministration. Toutefois, ce qui est necessaire c'est qu'elle soit remplie tout au moins au niveau ministeriel, afin que, pour reprendre les mots du senateur Austin, Tadministra- tion inspire respect et confiance a toute la population de TEtat et soit, pour la population des deux parties, le svmbole de la neutralite officielle du Gouvernement de TEtat sur la question du rattachement. Le Conseil de securite est convaincu que le meilleur moyen de garantir cette neutralite serait de constituer un gouvernement de coalition dans lequel les principaux partis politiques seraient assures d'une participation equitable et com- plete. Le Gouvernement du Pakistan partage le meme point de vue, mais il serait pret a examiner toute autre solution egalement efficace que la Commission pour- rait suggerer." A cette epoque, Tautre solution n'avait pas encore ete proposee. La citation continue ainsi: "Troisiemement, il est evident que Tadministrateur du plebiscite doit etre investi des pouvoirs les plus etendus et mis ainsi en mesure de s'acquitter de la mission qui lui incombe d'assurer la liberte et Timpar- tialite completes du plebiscite. Compte tenu de ses de- voirs et de ses responsabilites, Tadministrateur du ple- biscite doit etre un homme d'une valeur internationale reconnue, dont le jugement, Thonnetete et la competence entrainent la confiance implicite de tous." "It would not be possible to persuade such a man to undertake this high responsibility unless he is assured that he would have adequate powers to discharge it successfully. "Fourthly, it is necessary to ensure complete free- dom of legitimate political activity. Articles 11 to 14 of the Security Council resolution of 21 April, 1948, were designed to secure this objective, and were accepted by the representatives of India and Pakistan. As explained by Senator Austin, the Plebiscite Admin- istrator would have full authority to make these safe- guards effective." That is our position. To the extent to which this position has been modified by the two resolutions which have been accepted, we stand by the modification. The whole trouble at the moment is that there are differences between the parties, to put it minimally, with regard to ., the interpretation of certain matters to which they have agreed. The Security Council at this stage is faced with the task of finding a means of resolving those differ- ences. It can, if it so chooses, pronounce upon them itself and can recommend its decision to the two Gov- - ernments, saying, "This is what you have agreed upon - and we invite you or call upon you to carry it through." • General McNaughton has made an attempt. Although '' he has not tried to interpret the provisions of the reso- " lutions, he has attempted to put up a scheme which • would overcome those difficulties and enable the parties, and all concerned, to travel to the next stage in which, i after all this had been done, the plebiscite could be •<[ organized and carried through. If the Council finds 'c that these proposals are fair — and we submit that r they are eminently fair — then obviously the two t Governments should be called upon to carry them out. After all, the Security Council has to take a decision in the matter, and it must discharge its responsibility in the face of this problem, which has now continued for two and a half years, with all the apprehended consequences which have been brought repeatedly to the notice of the Security Council and to which ref- erence has been made again in the report of General McNaughton. After all, the world looks to the United Nations, at the moment, as the only means of its salva- tion in the face of the grave dangers that threaten humanity. Once the peace is broken on a large scale and the conflagration begins to spread, there is no one, statesman, soldier or scientist, who can predict what the ruin and the devastation may be. Civilization might perhaps then be left to flourish in the outlying and "II serait impossible de convaincre un tel homme d'assumer cette haute responsabilite si on ne pouvait lui donner Tassurance qu'il sera investi des pouvoirs necessaires pour accomplir sa mission avec succes. "Quatriemement, il est necessaire de garantir la liberte complete des activites politiques legitimes. Les articles 11 a 14 de la resolution du Conseil de securite en date du 21 avril 1948 ont ete conqus a cet effet et ils ont ete acceptes par les representants de TInde et du Pakistan. Comme Ta explique le senateur Austin, Tadministrateur du plebiscite aura toute l'autorite neces- saire pour rendre ces garanties efficaces." Voila quelle est notre position. Dans la mesure ou cette position a ete modifiee par les deux resolutions acceptees par les parties, le Pakistan admet ces modifica- tions. Toute la difficulte a Theure actuelle reside dans le fait qu'il existe certaines divergences de vues, pour employer un euphemisme, entre les parties en ce qui concerne l'interpretation a donner a certaines questions sur lesquelles elles s'etaient mises d'accord. Le Conseil de securite a maintenant pour tache de trouver un moyen d'eliminer ces divergences. II peut, s'il le veut, se pro- noncer lui-meme a ce sujet et recommander aux deux Gouvernements de se conformer a sa decision, en disant: "Voici ce que vous avez accepte d'un commun accord, et nous vous invitons ou requerons de le mettre a execution". Le general McNaughton a fait une tenta- tive. Bien qu'il n'ait pas cherche a interpreter les dispositions des resolutions, il s'est efforce d'elaborer un plan susceptible de surmonter les difficultes et de permettre aux parties et a tous les interesses de passer au stade suivant, c'est-a-dire au stade oil, tout ceci ayant ete fait, le plebiscite pourra etre organise et pourra avoir lieu. Si le Conseil de securite estime que ces propositions sont equitables —- et nous estimons qu'elles sont parfaitement equitables — il semble evi- dent que les deux Gouvernements devraient etre sommes de les mettre en oeuvre. Tout compte fait, le Conseil de securite doit se pro- noncer sur cette affaire et il doit prendre ses respon- sabilites en face de ce probleme qui se pose depuis deux ans et demi, avec toutes ses consequences redoutables, sur lesquelles l'attention du Conseil de securite a ete attiree a maintes reprises et qui ont ete rappelees dans le rapport du general McNaughton. N'oublions pas que Topinion publique mondiale voit, a Theure actuelle, dans l'Organisation des Nations Unies son unique espoir de salut devant les graves dangers qui menacent Thuma- nite. Une fois que la paix est gravement troublee et qu'un conflit commence a s'etendre, il n'est personne, homme d'Etat, soldat ou savant, qui puisse prevoir Timportance des ruines et de la devastation qui peu- vent en resulter. La civilisation pourrait peut-etre con- There is just one general matter to which, in the few minutes remaining before 6 o'clock, I might draw the Council's attention. In concluding, the day before yester- day, my learned and distinguished friend drew the attention of the Security Council to the fact that his Government is so keen with regard to the maintenance of peace that it has already made a proposal to the Government of Pakistan that both Governments should make a solemn declaration for the avoidance of war as a method for the settlement of any disputes between them. It was perhaps the intention of my learned friend to be understood as saying: "You see, we have no warlike intentions. If this position is not accepted by Pakistan, well, the responsibility must lie upon Pakis- tan". With regard to at least some of the problems — others have since arisen — which are, to say the least, agitating the peoples of the two Dominions and divid- ing their Governments, the elements are now before the Security Council. The Council is fully seized of the Kashmir affair. I have already referred to the dispute with regard to our canal waters and the matter of irrigation. Members of the Council may have read in the newspapers about the dispute which has arisen between India and Pakistan over devaluation: India devalued its currency, and we decided to maintain the international exchange rate of our currency, and India apparently has a grievance because we decided to do that. The consequence is that all trade between the two countries is now at a standstill. There are other differ- ences, for instance, with regard to evacue property and settlement of that dispute. They are all piling up because the question of Kashmir has not been settled. It is only with the settlement of the Kashmir problem that a movement will be made toward the settlement of the other problems. But the Government of India says: "All right, let us make a declaration that»we shall not go to war over any of these matters." India is in military occupation of the greater part of Kashmir, and it now says: "Let us decide that we shall not fight over it". All right, then what? What shall we do to settle this question? The Indian Prime Minister has said: "Well, hut that issue is before the Security Council; we can leave that apart". If that statement about leaving the question apart means anything at all, it can only mean that the Security Council is dealing with the matter and will II ne reste qu'une question generale sur laquelle je voudrais attirer l'attention du Conseil dans les quel- ques minutes dont nous disposons avant qu'il soit six heures. Dans sa conclusion d'avant-hier, mon eminent et distingue collegue a souligne, pour Testification du Conseil de securite, que son Gouvernement avait pousse le souci du maintien de la paix jusqu'a proposer au Gouvernement du Pakistan, comme methode de regle- ment de tout differend entre eux, que les deux Gou- vernements affirment solennellement leur desir d'eviter la guerre. Peut-etre mon eminent confrere voulait-il que Ton traduisit ainsi ses paroles: "Voyez, nous n'avons pas d'intentions belliqueuses. Si le Pakistan n'admet pas cette attitude, eh bien, ce sera lui le res- ponsable." Le Conseil de securite possede maintenant tous les elements de certaines au moins des questions — d'au- tres ont surgi depuis — qui, pour ne pas dire davan- tage, divisent les peuples des deux Dominions et oppo- sent leurs Gouvernements. Le Conseil est parfaitement au courant de Taffaire du Cachemire. J'ai deja fait allusion au differend relatif a nos canaux et aux ques- tions d'irrigation. Les membres du Conseil ont pu etre renseignes par les journaux sur le conflit qui s'est eieve entre TInde et le Pakistan a propos de la devalua- tion : TInde a devalue sa monnaie; nous avons decide de maintenir le taux international de notre change et TInde semble nous en faire grief. II en resulte que toutes les transactions commerciales entre les deux pays sont actuellement au point mort. Nous avons d'autres differends, par exemple celui qui concerne les biens des evacues et le reglement de ce litige. Tous ces differends s'accumulent parce que la question du Cachemire n'a pas ete tranchee. Seul le reglement de cette question permettra d'amorcer la solution des autres problemes. Or, le Gouvernement de TInde nous dit: "Eh bien, engageons-nous par une declaration a ne pas recounr a la guerre a l'occasion de ces litiges." L'lnde occupe militairement la plus grande partie du Cachemire et elle vient nous dire: "Decidons que nous ne nous bat- trons pas a ce sujet." Fort bien, mais alors qu'allons- nous faire? Le Premier Ministre de TInde a declare: "Cette question est pendante devant le Conseil de secu- rite ; nous n'avons done pas a nous en occuper." Une telle declaration ne peut avoir qu'un sens, c'est que le Conseil de securite examine la question, qu'il va la Our reply to the Indian offer was this, and I am quoting from the statement made by the Prime Minister of Pakistan in the Constituent Assembly on 18 Tanuary 1950: "Our High Commissioner pointed out to the Indian Secretary-General that the main disputes between India and Pakistan related to Jammu and Kashmir; Juna- gadh and the neighbouring States which have acceded to Pakistan; the canal waters; the evacue property; and the assets of Pakistan withheld by India. "Regarding Kashmir he suggested that both Gov- ernments should reaffirm their desire to implement as early as possible the UNCIP*" resolutions by having a free and impartial plebiscite in the spring of 1950, and should agree in advance to arbitrate any differences that have arisen or may arise in implementation of these resolutions." "Regarding Junagadh and its neighbouring States, the High Commissioner recalled that the UNCIP had been entrusted with the task of mediation and sug- gested, if its efforts did not succeed, that both Govern- ments should agree to abide by arbitration. "Our High Commissioner suggested that in the canal water issue, which is a juridical one, both Gov- ernments should agree in advance to refer the matter to decision by the International Court of Justice. "The settlement of the evacue property dispute, the High Commissioner stated, depended on the settlement of the canal water dispute and should therefore be reached first. The evacue property dispute should then be settled through negotiation and, if necessary, through mediation or, if that failed, through arbitration. "India, the High Commissioner added, had withheld various assets, including assets of the State Bank and sterling balances due to Pakistan under the payments agreement. Here too, if negotiations failed, both Gov- ernments should agree in advance to refer the matter to arbitration. "Our High Commissioner ended by saying that if the Indian Government accepted a solution on these lines, further negotiations could be undertaken to settle details of the procedure of mediation and arbitration and, when an agreement had been reached, a joint "United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. Nous avons repondu ce qui suit a la proposition de TInde, et je cite un extrait de la declaration faite, le 18 Janvier 1950, devant l'Assemblee constituante par le Premier Ministre du Pakistan: "Le Haut-Commissaire du Pakistan a fait remar- quer au Secretaire general de TInde que les princi- paux differends qui opposent TInde au Pakistan con- cernent TEtat de Jammu et Cachemire, le Junagadh et les Etats voisins qui ont accede au Pakistan, les canaux d'irrigation, les biens des evacues et les avoirs du Pakistan bloques par TInde. "En ce qui concerne le Cachemire, le Haut-Com- missaire a suggere que les deux Gouvernements reaf- firment leur intention de mettre en application, des que possible, les resolutions de la Commission des Nations Unies pour TInde et le Pakistan en organi- sant un plebisciste libre et impartial au cours du prin- temps de 1950; il a egalement suggere que les deux Gouvernements acceptent d'avance de soumettre a un arbitrage tous les differends qui se sont eleves ou qui pourraient s'elever au cours de la mise en ceuvre de ces resolutions. "En ce qui concerne le Junagadh et les Etats voi- sins, le Haut-Commissaire a rappele que la Commis- sion des Nations Unies pour TInde et le Pakistan a ete chargee de la mediation, et il a suggere que, si les efforts de la commission ne donnaient pas de resul- tat, les deux Gouvernements s'en remettraient a la decision d'un arbitre. "Le Haut-Commissaire du Pakistan a suggere qu'en ce qui concerne la question des canaux d'irrigation, question de caractere juridique, les deux Gouverne- ments se mettent d'accord au prealable pour soumettre le probleme a la Cour internationale de Justice. "Le Haut-Commissaire a declare que le reglement de la question des biens des evacues depend du regle- ment du differend relatif aux canaux, qui devrait done etre resolu le premier. La question des biens des eva- cues serait ensuite resolue par voie de negociations et, le cas echeant, par voie de mediation ou, en cas d'echec, en recourant a Tarbitrage. "Le Haut-Commissaire a ajoute que TInde bloquait certains avoirs, y compris des avoirs de la Banque d'Etat et des soldes de paiements en livres sterling dus au Pakistan en vertu de Taccord relatif aux paie- ments. Au cas ou les negociations n'aboutiraient pas, les deux Gouvernements devraient, comme precedem- ment, decider au prealable de soumettre la question a un arbitrage. "Le Haut-Commissaire du Pakistan a declare enfin que, si le Gouvernement de TInde acceptait une solu- tion s'inspirant de ces considerations, de nouvelles negociations pourraient etre entreprises afin de fixer les details de la procedure de mediation et d'arbitrage; "The Pakistan Government has now replied, sug- gesting that the only way to promote peace is to resolve the major disputes, since a joint declaration will carry conviction to none unless supported by evidence of some concrete action. For this purpose it had put for- ward concrete and precise suggestions outlined above regarding the procedure to be followed in their settle- ment. These proposals have not so far been accepted by the Government of India, though the Pakistan Gov- ernment has urged it to reconsider its view and to agree to binding formulas instead of mere declarations in general terms which are of doubtful value. "There the matter stands. The Indian Government's reply is awaited. Pakistan is always ready to examine any proposals from the Government of India regarding the precise methods which we have suggested for settling the various disputes. The Pakistan Government feels strongly that even if disputes cannot themselves be settled, at least the procedure for settling them should be laid down by agreement in precise terms so that both parties enter into firm commitments which would, in the course of time, definitely lead to the settle- ment of these disputes." That was our point of view. The Government of India has said that the question of Kashmir is now before the United Nations, and accordingly it should be kept apart. What does that mean? Do we bind our- selves to do what the United Nations tells us to do? That would be one way of settling this. But keeping it apart means keeping it alive, and what is the use of mak- ing these declarations while a major dispute goes on with a risk that any day .the fighting may flare up again ? There really is no evidence that India is prepared to compromise over these matters to any extent at all. The latest pronouncement of the Indian Prime Minister on this question appears in The Times of London of 7 "La reponse du Gouvernement de TInde n'est par- venue au Gouvernement du Pakistan qu'apres plusieurs semaines par suite d'un retard regrettable dans la transmission. Cette reponse contenait une contre-pro- position qui suggerait que les deux Gouvernements declarent qu'il condamnent le recours a la force comme moyen de regler les differends actuels ou futurs, et qui admettait que le reglement de tels differends de- vrait toujours etre recherche par voie de negociations de mediation ou d'arbitrage par Tentremise d'un orga- nisme special etabli d'un commun accord a cette fin ou par le renvoi, decide d'un commun accord, a un organisme international competent reconnu par les deux parties. "Le Gouvernement du Pakistan a repondu en faisant remarquer que le meilleur moyen de favoriser le main- tien de la paix serait de resoudre les principaux dif- ferends, etant donne qu'une declaration commune n'aura pas de poids, a moins qu'elle ne soit fondee sur des preuves montrant que des mesures concretes ont ete prises. C'est a cette fin que le Gouvernement du Pakistan a formule les propositions precises et con- cretes exposees ci-dessus en ce qui concerne la proce- dure a suivre pour regler ces differends. Ces propo- sitions n'ont pas encore ete acceptees par le Gouverne- ment de TInde, en depit du fait que le Gouvernement du Pakistan Ta invite a reviser sa position et a accep- ter des solutions en s'engageant a les appliquer, au lieu de se borner a formuler des declarations de caractere general d'une valeur douteuse. "La question en est la. Le Gouvernement du Pakis- tan attend la reponse du Gouvernement de TInde. II reste pret a examiner les propositions que pourrait pre- senter le Gouvernement de TInde en ce qui concerne les methodes precises qu'il a suggerees en vue du reglement des differends. Le Gouvernement du Pakis- tan est convaincu que, meme si les differends eux- memes ne peuvent etre resolus, on devrait tout au moins etablir en termes precis, par voie d'accord, la procedure a suivre pour les resoudre, afin que les deux parties prennent des engagements fermes qui ne sau- raient manquer, a la longue, d'aboutir au reglement de ces differends." Tel est le point de vue du Gouvernement du Pakistan. Le Gouvernement de TInde fait observer que la question du Cachemire est maintenant portee devant l'Organisation des Nations Unies et qu'il faut, par consequent, la laisser de cote. Que faut-il entendre par la? Devons-nous nous engager a faire ce que l'Or- ganisation des Nations Unies nous demande de faire? Ce serait une maniere de regler la question. Toute- fois, a supposer qu'on Tecarte pour le moment, elle n'en restera pas moins entiere; a quoi servirait alors de faire des declarations alors qu'un differend important reste sans solution et que persiste le danger constant d'une reprise des hostilites. II n'y a vraiment aucune preuve que TInde soit prete a transiger le moins du monde. La derniere declara- tion du Premier Ministre de TInde sur cette question a paru dans le journal The Times de Londres du 7 "Remarking that his patience was getting exhausted, Mr. Nehru referred with heat to the 'blatant and lying propaganda in the foreign Press' on the subject of Kashmir and also to the 'monstrous and scandalous propaganda of amazing falsehoods', in which, he said, the Government and Press of Pakistan were indulging. Although India had hitherto refrained from retaliation, it was common knowledge that the whole of the North West Frontier Province was a 'vast prison' and the whole of the tribal area was 'in a state of unrest' " The Prime Minister is trying to turn that against the Pakistan Government. Mr. Nehru added: "I am con- vinced that every step I have taken on Kashmir is correct, and I stake my reputation on that." That is the attitude today. And yet we are invited to make a declaration not to fight over these things. What happens then? India has already absorbed Junagadh, and has already absorbed Hyderabad, and is in military possession of the major portion of Kashmir. And now we are asked to make a declaration not to fight. Nice and sweet; it settles everything. Let us either settle the matter in advance of the declaration, or if it cannot be settled, let us at least agree upon the procedure for settlement and also for meeting any trouble that might arise during the procedure; and then let us declare that we shall not fight. That is all we plead before the Security Council with regard to Kash- mir. I apologize once more to the Security Council for having taken two whole meetings and a considerable portion of another in making these submissions. Al- though at times, perhaps, I may have said more than was necessary to clarify an issue, and may have spoken even in certain parts with a certain amount of vehe- mence, I wish to assure the Council and the representa- tive of India, that that emphasis was intended to be neither aggressive nor unfriendly. If I might venture to strike a personal note, those who have heard me speak on questions in Committees and in the General Assembly, are aware that I am unfortunately given to speaking with emphasis. I think it helps in clarifying issues. Perhaps I may be mistaken on this point. Never- theless, I apologize both to the Council and to the representative of India if anything I have said should either have jarred upon anybody around the table or should have wearied anyone. Finally, I thank the President and the members of the Security Council for the supreme patience and indulgence with which they have heard me.

The rep- resentative of India has asked for the floor in order to reply to specific points raised by the representative of "Apres avoir dit que sa patience s'epuisait, M. Nehru a denonce avec indignation "la propagande flagrante et mensongere menee dans la presse etrangere" sur cette question du Cachemire ainsi que la "monstrueuse et scandaleuse campagne de mensonges effrontes" a laquelle, d'apres lui, se livrent le Gouvernement et la presse du Pakistan. Bien que, jusqu'a present, TInde se soit gardee de riposter, chacun sait que toute la pro- vince frontiere du nord-ouest est "une vaste prison" et que toute la zone des tribus est "en etat de trouble" Le Premier Ministre essaie d'en rejeter la responsa- bilite sur le Gouvernement du Pakistan. M. Nehru a ajoute: "Je suis convaincu que toutes les mesures que j'ai prises a propos du Cachemire sont justes, j'en donne ma parole." Voila la situation actuelle. Cepen- dant Ton nous invite a declarer que nous ne combat- trons pas a ce sujet. Que se passe-t-il done? L'lnde, qui a deja absorbe le Junagadh ainsi que le Haiderabad, occupe militaire- ment la plus grande partie du Cachemire. Et mainte- nant Ton nous demande de nous engager a ne pas com- battre; fort bien, ceci resout tout le probleme. Mais regions la question avant de formuler la declaration ou, si cela est impossible, entendons-nous au moins sur la methode qui permettra de regler la question et, en meme temps, de parer aux difficultes qui pourraient se presenter pendant le reglement, et ensuite, declarons que nous ne combattrons pas. C'est la tout ce que nous demandons au Conseil de securite a propos du Cache- mire. Je m'excuse une fois de plus aupres du Conseil de securite de ce qu'il m'ait fallu deux seances entieres et une bonne partie d'une troisieme pour presenter cette plaidoirie. Si je me suis peut-etre parfois etendu plus qu'il n'etait necessaire pour elucider un point particu- lier, si j'ai meme parfois parle avec une certaine chaleur, je tiens a assurer aux membres du Conseil et, en par- ticulier, au representant de TInde, que cette insistance ne recouvrait pas des intentions hostiles ou inamicales. Si je puis me permettre de presenter une observation personnelle, je dirai que ceux qui m'ont entendu pren- dre la parole en commission et a l'Assemblee generale savent que j'ai malheureusement tendance a parler en termes energiques. A mon avis, cela aide a eclaircir les questions debattues, mais je puis me tromper sur ce point. En tout cas, je tiens a m'excuser aupres du Conseil et aupres du representant de TInde au cas ou quoi que ce soit dans mes paroles aurait froisse ou importune Tun de ceux qui sont assis autour de cette table. Enfin, je remercie le President et les mem- bres du Conseil de securite de la patience et de Tindul- gence extremes avec laquelle ils ont bien voulu m'en- tendre. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de I'espagnol): Le represen- tant de TInde a demande la parole afin de repondre a certaines observations formulees par le representant After our meeting tomorrow, I intend to allow the members of the Council at least a week in order that they may study the documentation and consult each other regarding any possible action which the Council should take in this dispute. Je suggere en outre au Conseil de ne plus sieger pendant une semaine au moins, a partir de la fin de la prochaine seance, afin que les representants puissent etudier les documents relatifs a la question et se con- suiter au sujet des dispositions que le Conseil devrait prendre en ce qui concerne le differend entre TInde et le Pakistan.