S/PV.482 Security Council

At the end of yesterday's [481$t] meeting the representative of the United Kingdom asked for the floor on a point of crder. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom): 1 asked yesterday whether 1 could speak on a point of order which was connected with a point of historical accuracy. 1 can assure the members that 1 shall be very brief. The President, in his second speech yesterday, is recorded as ha\jng spoken as follows: "Up to the present, as all the members of the Security Couneil know, the agenda has always been approved by the President in accordance with the rules of procedure and submitted for adoption by the Security Couneil. Never in the history of the Security Couneil have any amendments been submitted to the proposed agenda, approved by the President and submitted for adoption by the Security Couneil." Then a little later he said: "But to submit an amendment to the agenda thus approved by the President, as the representative of the United States is trying to do in violation of the rules of procedure, is to usurp the rights of the President..." This indeed would have been an important point to have established if it could have heen established. Unfortunately, if he will consult the records of the 352nd meeting of the Security Council, held in this 1 1 1 Î dUY justification for the remarks made by the President yesterday, which 1 quoted a moment ago. Briefly, the point is surely this. If we follow the President's own suggestion, we shall be compeHed first of all to vote against his proposed items, which is exactly what he wants us to do and which therefore we should prefer not to have to do. We should have to vote against these items because of the obvious fact that if we voted for them - and this is quite irrespective of the merits of the two items - we should be admitting that the two items are in sorne way linked and also that both should have priority over the question of a complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea. In any case, we ha,-: now had a very protracted debate in which, as 1 quite admit, many members have followed the President's example in straying from the main point at issue, which is the agenda itself, but in the course of this debate it has become absolutely clear that what almost aIl the members of the Council want, as far as 1 can see, except the President, is that we should have a simple vote on the United States amendment to the provisional agenda which is before us now. If tbis is adopted, the "Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea" will he established as the first substantive item. Should the President then wish to put to a vote the. two items which he has proposed, 1 cannot imagine for a moment that there would be any objection. This, in fact, is the only solution of the agenda prohlem to which l, and 1 suspect the large majority of my colleagues, are prepared to agree, and until he is prepared, therefore, to allow the vote on the United States motion to take place in the first instance, 1 fear that the debate on the agenda is likely to go on for a considerable time.. This would be no doubt unfortunate in some ways, but it would, 1 think, be preferable to our consenting to a proeedural device which is being resorted to ooly for propaganda purposes. In spite of the United Kingdom representative's snggestion that to continue the discussion of this question would amount to propaganda, sorne of us feel that that representative's speech yesterday was overflowing with propaganda. A number of questions of substance wer~ dealt with in that speech as well as in other speeches. Representatives are evidently determined to state their views on these questions and to dea1 with the problems mentioned by the United Kingdom representative in his statement. That is the right of every representative in the Security Council, and I presume that we shall not deprive them of this right. Speaking as the representative of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REpUBLICS, l must point out that this is the third meeting which the Security Council has been obliged to spend on the consideration of the procedural question concerning the fo~ in which the Korean question should be inc1uded in the ag~nda. RÉPUBLIQUES que se procédure, d'insçrire Conseil de sécurité. qu'il y ce proposant servir délégation suivre renforcer Etats-Unis d'ampleur la In the course of the discussion, two diametrically I}pposed approaches to this question have become è...'pparent: one is that it should be discussed with a view to a peaceful st':ttlement, as the USSR delegation insists; the other, that it should he discussed with a view to continuing military operations in Korea, intensifying the United States Govermnent's armed intervention against the Korean people, and extending the scope of aggression and war. From the statements of the United States representative and the proposais contained in the draft resolution submitted by him [479th meeting], it is c1ear that the United States Government insists on the continuation and intensification of aggression and is making every attempt to prevent a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Having turned from a policy of preparing aggression ta direct acts of aggression, the United States Govemment is trying to involve the United Nations in its military adventure in Korea in order to expand and intensify the agg:-ession against the Korean people. dispositio~s a Gouvernement et tO\.'5 la sion des son encore peuple coréen. inébranlable considère instrument Nations pacifique de son a le Corée, tion nécessaires et cette propO$ition de The USSR Government is steadfastly and consistently following a policy of peace and regards the United Nations as an instrument of peace; it has therefore submitted to the Security Couneil of the United Nations a proposaI for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. On the instructions of its Government, the delegation of the Soviet Union placed an item on the peaceful set;tlement of the Korean question on the Security Council's agenda, at the same time asking the Security Council to discuss the matter without delay and to take the necessary steps for a peaceful settlement of the question. What was the reaction of the United States Government to the USSR proposai? ln order to prevet1t tM discussion of these two most importBnt «{uestions, the purpose of which is to restore and strengthen peace in Korea and to make it possible for the Security Couneil to return to its legal composition - sinee in the absence of China the Security Couttcil cannet he ~rded as functioning as a legal body and cannot take lawful decidons - the United States delegation in its draft resQlution suggests measures intended in fact to strengthen hostilities in Korea and to extend the United States Government's aggres- .sion up<)n the people of Korea. l1le United States representative ahd his United KinrJom coll'eague are ttying ta obscure the aggressive di&racœr of these pro~s by talking about the "localiatian of the conflict'. But thej' use this term ~ in arder ta mask the United States Govemment's desire tG intensify its aggression in Korea, to increase the supply of troops and arms, ~'iden the scope (if 1IIIlitary operations by involving the armed troops of other States in participation in the war against the Korean people, intensify the bal'barian terrorist raic:ls of United States air forces against peaceful Korean toWftS and vi&ges, increase the number of victims among the peaceful population of Korea and the number of premeditated murders. The sinister meaning of the terms c'b:a1ization of the conftict" and "pacification" is weil known from the history of Anglo- ~ ÎDlpt".ri.tïsm. By this cynical method the tJnited State3 delegation is trying to sabotage the consideration of the Korean question in the Security Q.wmcil. There is, tben:fore, a radical difference between the item wbich the USSR delegation bas submitted for the Seœrity Council's consideration and the United States dmgation's proposaI. The delegatiofi of the Soviet Union is proposing that the Couneil should consider the question of a peaceful settlement of the Konsn question. The very title of the item indicates the USSR Govenunent's desire for peace and for a peaœful settIement through the Security Council. ID pressing fur the inclusion of its draft resolution iD 'the CoaDcil's agenda and in atmnpting to give this dtaft the inacauate title of ,cComplaint of aggression upGIl the Repablic of Korea"', the United States delega6œ is atbeü1pting ta mask its aggression upon the ~ people, to mislead the United Nations and world ~on, to represent the origin and deve10pment of events in Korea on the basis of a one-sided United It has, however, been shown on the basis of irrefutable data and facts that the events taking place in Korea began on 25 June as a result of the provocative attack by the forces of the South Korean authorities on frontier areas of the Korean People's Democratie Republic. In the Soviet Union Government's reply, which was given by its Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, official statements and reliable facts were quoted to prove to the whole world that this attack was carried out in accordance with a prt.viously thought out and prepared plan uncler the direction and with the direct participation of United States military advisers, as weil as with the knowledge and agreement of highly placed officiaIs of the United States, namely, the United States SP.eretary of Defense, Mr. Johnson, the Chairman c;.f the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Bradley, and toe State Department adviser, Mr. Dulles. There is no need to quote these facts again. 1 shall confine myse1f to drawing the attention of members of the Security Couneil to a photograph published in the Americar; am" British Press on 2n ]i.lne, the day after the beginning of events in Korea. Here are thesc photographs, published in the American and British newspapers. In them we see none other than Mr. Dulles, offi~ial adviser to the United States State Department, and Mr. Muccio, United States Minister in South Korea, in a trench south of the 38th parallel, surrounded by United States military advisers and nfficers of the South Korean army of Syngman Rhee's puppet guvernment. Hardly anyone of the membe!"s of the Security Couneil will believe that Mr. Dulles and Mr. Muccio were there to pick violets. No, Mr. Dulles was occupied with matters more prosaic and more in line with his inclinations as a warmonger. Mr. Dulles was chOOcing on the preparedness of the South Korean troops ta attack North Korea. His subsequent statements in Seau! bear witness to the fact that he is ont; of the main incendiaries of war who are respon- Slole for provoking the events in Korea. This photo- É,rrn.ph proves that the United States Government's aggression hi Korea is the outcome of a long-prepared plan. Syngman Rhee's former Minister for InternaI Affairs, forty-eight former members of the so-ealled South Korean NationrJ Assembly and many officers of Syngman Rhee's army, in statements published in the Press, have confirme<! the fact that the attack against North Korea was previously prepared and ca.'TÎed out at dawn on 25 June in accordance with instructions issue<! by Syngman Rhee, who previously received orders from General Ml:tcArthur to prepare and impIement plans for a campaign against the north. After provoking an armed attack by their South Korean puppets on the frontier areas of the Korean People's Democratie Republic, the ruling circ1es of the United States have hastened ta take advantage of this 5 Aggression ~s pla.ce where one State attacks another. The USSR Government has taken this line in defining aggression since 1933, when the delegation of the Soviet Union put forward a. definition of aggressiôn in the Committee on Secu '~estions of the Conference for the reduction an\. limitation of armaments in Genev'a. This definition contains instructions for the guidance of international organs wmch MaY he caUed upon to determine the side guilty of atmck, the attaclcing side, in other words, the aggressor. As lS known, this dennition of aggression includes such acts as a declaration of war hy aState against another State; invasion of a tt:rritory by the umed fuR""e8 of another State evên without a declaration. of ~'ar; the invasion of the territory of one State by :he amred fùrces of another State and so forth. AttOrding to this <fennition no political, strategie oreconomic considerations ca.n justify aggression. Nor <;an the deniai tbal a territory whkh is at1aclœd bas the specific ~butes of sttltehood serve as a justifiœtion fOt' an attack. Nor ca.n a revolutionary or c::ounterre'VOlutionary movement, or a civil W'U', serve as a ~on, or the establishment or the maintenance of a particulat' political, èCOnomÏc or social oMer. This definition of aggression and of the attaclcing œuntry-the aggressorwas in substance approved in May 19..33 bya League of Nations Security Commit- U!e œmposed of the representatives of seventeen States. MOTeOveI", it should be specially noœd, and the Seœrity Cmtncil's attention should he drawn to the fact, that t'he aforementiooed Committee was composed of a mmibet' of Smtes DOW represented on the Security Cotmal, in partiœlar the USSR, the United States, tbe United Kingdom, France and Nonvay. Thus five :States wliieb. are now members of the Secmity Council adopted, through 1heir reptcsentatives, the intemational deèIan1tion referred to conœming the definition of ~on and the aggressor. Owing. however. to the di1a:toriness of certain States, the matter had not been conclnded by 1939, when the war began. From the standpoint of the standards and definitions of intematiuna1law set forth in the above definition, the mifitary ~ons of the United States Govemment ~ the Korean people are ad:S of direct anned aggTeS5Îon, :and the United States Goveunnent i5 the attackeror, in other words, the aggressor. United States armed forces bave invaded Kon:an teI:ritmy, ~chwithout a formal declaration of war. T1Je a1IDve-menrioned definition -qualifies sncb adÏon as ~ United S1ates land, sm and air fmœs are hnmhing Korean tel1îtory and attadring Korean vesse1s mld aircraft. Acemding to the above-mentioned cor~en opérations de le termes constituent en stratégiques défense aussi loin qtie possible afin, N'est-il fil l'agression Aux. indiquée, acte dit clairement qu'aucune coosidération stratégique d'agression. 1 The United States is trying to justify its 2ggression in Korea by so-called strategic considerations, by its desire to move its defence Hnes as far away as possible from its own oorders for the alleged purpose of safeguarding its national security. Is it not obvious that this explanation does not hold water and can in no way serve as a justification for United States aggression against the Korean people? According 10 the defutition of aggression referred io, wch acts constitute aggression. This definition clearly states that no considerations of a political, strategic or economic nature can serve as justification for an a.ttack, Thus if the action taken by the United States in KDrea is consideted in the light of the above definition of aggresS!9il,· it is clear beyond question t11at the United States GovmJment 1"z interfered in an internaI conflict in Korea between two groups in a single State and bas thereby undertaken an act of aggression üpOD the Korean people. As regards the war between the North and South KOl'eatl5, it is a civil war and thel'eiore does not come under the definition of aggresSiOll, sinee it i5 a war, not ijetweeu two States, but between two parts of the Korean people temporarily split 1nto two camps under !wo separate authorities. The confiict in Korea is thus an internaI conBict. Consequently ndes Idating to aggression are just as inapplicable to the North and South Koreans as the concept of aggression was inapplicable to the northem and southem states of America, when they were fightiing a civil War for the unification of their country. Wc know that the role of aggressor at that time was played by Great Britain, which attempted to intervene in that ciVIl war and to prevent the unification of the North and Sodh in the United States. Similarly, the United Kingdom tS now, together with the United States, ïnte1'Venlng in the civil war in Korea in the attempt to impede the unification of tbat country. A sin:nlar situation arises in China also where, as we know, the stiuggle between the Chiang Kai-shek group and the national liberation movement of the north has not been regarded as aggression, and foreign Powers have accord\ngly abstained from intervention in tbis domestic conflct, in this civil war. AU this goes to show that the only aggressors in KMea are those Powers whicb are maintaining their 1 forces on Korean territory and are intervening in the 1 As is known, the United Nations Charter aIso directIy prohibits intervention by the United Nations in the dumestic mairs of any State when the con1lict is an internai one between two groups within a single State and a single nation. Accordingly, the United Nations Charter provides for intervention by the Security Couneil only in events of an international rather than of an internaI nature. That is the essence of the Korean question and of the United States anned aggression against the Korean people. Thu.:; the peoples of the whole WCJdd and the United Nations are at present confronted with open armed aggression in Korea on the part of the United States Government and with attempts by ,the United States to involve the United Nations in that aggression. Preparing its long-planned aggression in Korea, the United States Government bas since January last blocked the normaI settlement of the question of China's .representation in the Security Couneil, as a result of which China, in the person of its only lawful representativethe representative of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China - is still unrepresented in the Security Couneil. This has aIso made it impossible for the representative of the Soviet Union to participate in the meetings of the Couneil. Taking advantage of the absence from the Security Couneil of those two permanent members - the USSR and China - and dictating its will in the Couneil to its military and political allies, the United States bas hurriedly forced upon the Couneil a series of illegal and indeed scandalous resolutions, designed on the one band to coyer up United States aggression in Korea and, on the other, to promote to the furthest possible extent the plans for war in Korea and the Far East by involving other States in this war. The local conflict within Korea, arising as a result of United States provocation, has been used by the ruling eircles of the United States not only as a pretm for military intervention in the internal affairs of Korea, but aiso as a screen for expanding its aggression over wide regions of Asia, from the shores of Korea and Japan to the Vietnam territory, and for interference in the internaI affairs of the Chinese, Vietnamese and Philippine peoples. Those facts are wel1 known and cannot he refuted by any of the biased and false versions and inventions, The Seeurity Counci1 must make its choice; either it must decide to continue and intensify the war by throwing in even greater quantities of men and mate..rial resources, or it must decisevely alter its course and follow the path of peaceful settlement to which it is being ca11ed by an the peace-loving peoples of the world headed by the Soviet Union under its outstanding leader and teacher, the great Stalin. United States ruling circles are dragging the Seeurity Council and the United Nations towards war. In their efforts to attain world domination they have long since embarked on the path of aggression. They have now gone over to direct acts of aggression, committing a gross act of aggression against the peace-loving people of Korea, and on a course of direct intervention in the internai affairs of Korea in the attempt ta prevent the Korean people, by armed intervention, from achieving its long-cherished dreams and aspirations for the creation of a free, united and independent Korean State. The Govemment of the Urited States, while involving its country in war ta an ever-increasing degrce, is striving to involve in war the governments of other countries, and in the first place the ruling circ1es of the colonial Powers-the United Kingdom and its Dominions, France, and the Netherlands-in an attempt to force them ta join in the armed aggression against the Korean people and to intensify aggression against the peoples of the other countries of Asia who are fighting for their freedom and national independence. True to its ~ce-Iovingpolicy, the USSR is appea1- ing to the Umted Nations and to the Seeurity Council, as the chief interventional organ for the maintenance of peace, to abstain from encournging and concealing United States aggression in Korea - as United States niling circles are strongly urging it to do - and to adhere strongly to the policy of the pacific settlement of the Korean question and the restoration and maintenance of peace. It goes without saying that the Security Counci1 cao fUliction fiormally and fulfil the noble mission entrusted to it - the maintenance of peace and pacific sett!ement - oo1y if it functions with its full lawful membership, in accordance with the requirements of the United Nations Charter, in other words, with the participation of the representatives of the Soviet Union and of the Chinese People's Republic. Only if all its five permanent members participate will the decisions it adopts be lawful, authoritative and inefutable from the standpoint of the United appel de chargé d'approuver en des résolument question maintien de la maintenir pacifique, ment Unies, l'Union de adoptées It has been amply demonstrated, from the adoption of such decisions in connexion with the United States aggression iu Korea, that this position is completely unassailable. The resolutions adopted in the Security Couneil under the dictate of the United States delegation and in violation of the United Nations Charter have no legal force. They were motivated hy the desire of the agressor to cloak and mask bis aggression and are in no way directed towards strengthening the cause of peace. The Security Couneil must fulfil the obligations laid upon it by the United Nations Charter to maintain peaee and to promote peaceful settlements. 1t can fulfil these obligations only if immediate steps are taken - without delay - for the settlement of the Korean question. The USSR delegation insists that the Security Counci1 should take this course, the course of peace and of a pacific settlement of the Korean question. This course 'alone will he fully in accordance with the United NatioTlS Charter and find full support in aIl the peace-lovh.g nations of the world. The delegation of the Soviet Union insists that the two items proposed by it should be included in the agenda of the Securïty Council. 1t opposes the inclusion in the agenda of the diversionary and aggressive proposais of the United States delegation, and will vote against those proposais. Sir Benegal N. RAu (India): The question before us is the adoption of the agenda. There are two items on the provisional agenda and there is a motion by the United States delegation to the effect that the item f01Îowing "Adoption of the agenda" in the agenda of this meeting should he "Complaint of aggression upon the Republk of Korea". This may mean that "Compiaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea" should be the only item for discussion on the agenda or it may mean that it should he the first item, the other two heing left as they are. Let me first of all explain the view.. of my delegation on the question of which items should he on the agenda and, later, on the question of priority. 1t will save confusion if we keep the two questions distinct. As regards the item proposed by the United States delegation, there can hardly he any controversy that it must be included, becatlse rt,te 10 of our provisional rules of procedure directs its automatic inclusiol1 un- 10 1 now come to the question of excluding the two items figuring on the provisional agenda. India's views on what l may briefly describe as the admission of "new" China have long been known. Since the Govemment of Iodia recognized the P~ple's Govemment of China on 30 December 1949, it bas been our endeavour to bring about the admission of its representatives to the various organs and agencies of the United Nations. The records of this Councl1 will show that India bas been consistently trying to resolve the deadIock over this issue from January 1ast, long before the Korean conflict began and independently of the Korean question. We have aU along attached great importance to this matter and, consistent with our past endeavours, we cannot agree to the exclusion of this item from the agenda. 1 now mm ta the other item, which relates to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. If 1 have understood the representative of the United States correctly, he is as anxious as any member of this Couneil that any proposaIs genuine1y promoting peace and seeurity in the area of conflict should be discussed here without delay. What he objects to is that they should he presented under a separate item j and what he suggests is that any such proposais should be discussed under the item he bas proposed, name1y "Complaint of aggression upon "(he Republic of Korea". There is no difference as to the substance of the matter but only as to its form. The efforts which India bas been making for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question are now a matter of public knowledge. Referring to the initiative taken by the Prime Minister of India in this regard about three weeks ago, the President of the Indian Republic, speaking in the Indian Parliament on 31 JuIy 1950, said: "This suggestion was not intended to condoue aggression or ta weaken the authority of the United Nations. It was meant to add to the strength and moral force of the Organization and to facilitate the early termination of a dangerous situation. Had it been acceptable to ail concemed, my Govemment would have active1y co-operated in bringing about a settlement through the agency of the United Nations and on the basis of the two resolutions of the Seeurity Council that it bas supported. It is my earnest hope that the Korean conftict will soon he ended and world peace assured through the unremitting efforts of all peace-loving nations. Peace remains the paramount need of mankind and its only hope of survival." Therefore my de1egation regards the peaceful and honourable settlement of the Korean conftict as the paramount need of_ the hour. To exclude any express mention of it from our agenda wouId create an impression that we regard the matter as being mere1y of subordin~(-~ or incidental importance. We should aVClld any s.",1' which can be construed, or even mis- Briefly, therefore, my delegation is in fa"our of adding the item proposed by the United States without excluding the other items. These heing the views of my delegation, it would be more convenient for us if the question of the adoption of the agenda were voted ~POfi item by item. As 1 have aIready said, 1 shaIl not dea1 with the question of priority amongst these items at this stage. It will he easier to deal with it aiter the Couneil has decided which of them arl\.to he included in the agenda and the form in which they are to he inclu<1ed. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt): 1 quite agree with the suggestion submitted by the representative of India at the end of his statement regarding the way we should vote on the question as to which items are to he included in our agenda and the order of the items in the agenda. Meanwhile, it is with no feeling of pride and in no mood of optimism that 1 point out that on 1 August [480th meeting] we established a record by exhausting a whole long meeting without doing even as little as adopting our agenda for the day. On 2 August [481st tJ&eeting] , we beat our own record by going through another long and tedious meeting without adopting the agenda. Today, we are about to repeat the sante performance. 1 hope that will not happen. 1 hope that, while thousands of people are being killed in Korea, we shall not continue to wrangle here over a matter of no real importance to world peace and security, namdy, the mere adoption of our agenda. AIthough 1 have spoken very little in this debate, l t~ke my part of the biame and oHer my apologies to aIl whom we fail properly to serve in accordance with our mandate, to a11 who are entitled to look up to and not down on the Security Couneil, to aIl who are entitled to look up to a Security Couneil much more inspiring and more adequate than the one whose unedifying performance the world halO beheld in the course of the last three days. 1 suggest the closure of the debate. The present debate should not continue any longer. 1 suggest that we procede to the vote. After that, we shall aIl have ample opportunity to express our points of view on the various questions whicll will he included in the agenda. 1 again suggest the closure of the debate.

A motion bas been made for closure of the debate. Are there any observations on this point? Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt): 1 wish to point out tbat 1 am Dot making a formaI proposaI. l am making a suggestion, and 1 hope that there will he no objection to il. 1 put it in this forro so as not to give anyone the impression that 1 wish to obstruct ample disles restent parce d'autres et les la péninsule. parce à l'exception nous leurs aiderait nous se rapport Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America) : 1 am in s)'mpathy with the purpose of the suggestion made by the representative of Egypt. 1 should certaioly fuwe remained silent had there not QCCUrred here a charge which was entirely improper and which was so virulent and startling in its substance, as well as in the use of it in violation of all the rules that govern the Security Council and in derogation of the rights of other members of this Council. 1 should have remained silent, but 1 cannot remain silent in the face of a repetition of those ancient charges to which we have listened for a period of years from the Soviet Union. Perhaps 1 might have accepted such statements merely as evidence of a certain type of peculiar character and given no attention to the matter of answering them were it not for the fact that this statement contained something more. This statement had a new kind of attack in it; this statement contained a new slander; this statement expressed a new threat and a new provocation. This was a statement against the United Nations and all the great moral principles for which it stands, and we cannot sit by here in silence and allow it to go unanswered. l have asked for the privilege of making a very brief statement at the earliest time that l could because other names were on the list of speakers before that statement had been made. An unfortunate people is suffering irreparable damage and loss at this moment. That great, ancient people is aIso suffering damage t1l&t is reparable, but it will take years to recover from the devastation wrought by the demon that has been turned loose on that peninsula. Not only are we interested in the preservation of that people, but we are there because we are interested in the great principles of the United Nations. We are interested in the security and freedom of individual nations, no matter how weak they may he. We are especial!y interested in Korea because it is a product of the principles of the United Nations as expressed by all the nations which are Members of this great voluntary association, excepting that Member which makes the charge we had to listen to today - a charge which was not a matter that was admissible under the question we are discussing, namely, the agenda, and whether a certain item is to he added to the agenda immediately after the f..rst item, entitled "Adoption of the agenda". While the sons of Members of this· Organization are over there ,""hting under the flags of their own countries and fi", .ing also under the blue and white banner of the United Nations, and while we in the Security Cauncil have introduced a draft resolution that would aid and help them to bring to an end the devastation that is going on there, what do we have interrupting this procedure? A speech by the President who makes use of his office to talk about a matter that is not in point and is out of order. 1 am not going to try ta prove at this time that the Republic of Korea was not the aggressor; that it did not attack the forces of North Korea; that the United States is not really the influence that unleashed the Korean war; that there is a United Nations Command in Korea; that we are trying to back and support it in the United Nations; and that fifty-three Members of the United Nations are interested in supporting our flag over there. We are tired, and 1 think the whole world is tired, of these obvious and shameless travesties of the realities with which we in this room are supposed to dea1. Surely the time for that sort of thing has passed, and sure1y the matters we are dea1ing with today are tOI) tragic and too real to he served by any preoccupation with propagandistic distortions which were properly referred to here yesterday [481st meeting] as "upsidedown" language. In any case, my Government sees no need and feels no desire to attempt today ta fill with any more words of its own the immense abyss which lies belween the statements of the representative of the USSR Government and the facts of this situation as they are known the wclfld over and as they were reported by the United Nations Commission. We doubt if the representative of the Soviet Union genuinely desires an examination by this Council uf the question of whose design and whose command brought about the unleashing of this new wave of tragedy and bloodshed which has overtaker the international community. Inadvertently he might expose the vi11ain. His propaganda statement, like many others that we have heard in ·the past, rests on a total and unabashed perversion of facts. This has been attested to by the United Nations Commission _on the spot and the voluntary support given to the action of the Council by fifty-three Member States. Now let us have regard for the truth and a proper use of the freedom of debate and of the exercise of the vote in an Organization that is supposed to be democratic. Let us have regard for a11 the other members of the Security Couneil who wish to advance to the transaction of our business, and have this motion presented for a vote. We do not stand on formality here. The motion that Is hefore this Council reads as foUows: UA motion by the United States representative that the item fo11owing 'Adoption of the agerl\da' in the agenda of this meeting should he 'Complaint of aggression upen the Republic of Korea'." public

1 ask the public to keep quiet. RÉPUBLIQUES à l'orateur Président égal\.oüent ces m'appartient sécurité. procéder de ces vise, n'ont le sentant il le gande" As representative of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 1 shan confine myself to a brief reply to the hysterical speech of the preceding speaker. 1 shan make this reply not because 1 am President - 1 should have made such a statement even if 1 had not been President, in the exercise of my right as a member of the Seeurity Council. 1 The statement of the preceding speaker was made for the purpose of blackmail. Yet l, as the representarive of the USSR, should like to advise the preceding speaker to blackmail those who will submit ta it. If the attempted blackmail was aimed at the Soviet Union and its representative, then it is futile. The United States representative has come to the wrong address. Screams and hysteria were never c,?nvincing arguments. Nor does the word "propaganda" mean anything. When the United States representative has no arguments, he uses the word "propaganda" and considers that by doing so he bas exhausted the subject. Experience shows that the word "propaganda" means nothing at an. The facts and arguments which 1 adduced in the statement 1 made in the exercise of my rights as a member of the Security Couneil, and not as President, have not been refuted by the "('nited States representative, notwithstanding his scrr.ams aT'd hysteria. de sécurité, et clameurs As PRESIDENT, 1 shan now proceed to the question of the vote. 1 now can upon the representative of France 011 the question of the vote. Mr. CHAUVEL (France) (translated tram French): 1 did not ask to speak specificany on the question of the vote. 1 should like ta explain the way in which 1 shall vote when the time cornes. Is that what the President meant?

1 have just been informed that the representative of France wished to speak on the question of the vote. If the French representative has something more to say, l have no grounds for depriving him of that right. Mr. CHÂUVEL (France) (translated tram French): 1 thank the President. 1 am sorry to take up the Council's time once more, but the speeches we have heard today - or at least sorne of them - compel me to give sorne further explanation of the French delegation's attitude to the provisional agenda pro~:f>Cl by the USSR de1egatien. As is known; the French Government wishes to reserve its position with regard to the problem of China's representation in the COU!1eil. It does not, however, wish to go as far as opposing further discussion on that subject by the Couneil. Moreover, as pour intérieur, de Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) (translated fram French) : 1 asked ta speak in arder to explain 10y vote. 1 think that, in accordance with our mIes of procedure, this is the time ta give such an explanation. This is what 1 have ta say. In accordance with my Government's general attitude on the Korean question, 1 shall abstain wben we come to vote upon questions which are inseparably linked with that of Korea. By that 1 am referring in particular ta the two following questions: the arder of priority of the items on the provisional agenda and the headings under which we should discuss the Korean question in days ta come. Naturally that does not mean that the Yugoslav Government bas in any way changed its opinion on the question of the admission of a representative of the People's Government of China. On the contrary, our attitude on that question has never varied since the month of January, that is ta say, since the time when Yugoslavia became a member of the Security Couneil. Our attitude has always been that the admission of the People's Republic of China to the Security Couneil and to aIl of the organs of the United Nations is essential for the future of our Organization and is consequently important for peace. Accordingly 1 shaIl vote in favour of retaining on the agenda for this meeting the item on the admission of the People's Republic of China to the Security Coundl. 1 repeat, 1 shaIl vote in favour of retaining that item. 1 Gouvernement m'abstiendrai qui pense priorité provisoires et les rubriques sous lesquelles nous devrons, pendant Gouvernement l'admission laire point a toujours été la même depuiSile mois de janvier - c'est-à-dire laquelle sécurité populaire les l'avenir quent, importante pour la paix. point de savoir de questions présente sur du de fin dent et ordre en sa qualité créée point situation séance de aucune du séance; on ne pouvait d'ailleurs en devait pas Accordingly the USSR representative, in assuming his presidential functions as from 1 August, submitted l'URSS, ayant assumé, for the Seeurity Council's approval a provisional de agenda composed of the following three items: 1. Adop- Conseil, aux 17

AIl members of the Security Couneil have now stated their position on the question under discussion. What is our present position? In accorâance with established practice. when there is a change of President, the date of the following meeting of the Security Council is fixed by the new President, who submits the provisional agenda of the meeting he r.as called in his capacity as President ta the Security Council for its approval. Owing ta circumstances of which everyone is aware, an unprecedented situation has arisen. 1 must draw the United Kingdom representative's attention ta this facto The situation is unprecedented because the representative of the Soviet Union was not present at the [479thl meeting on 31 July and no deeision was adopted either in respect of the following meeting of the Security Council or of the agenda. Indeed, no sucb decision could have been taken, inasmuch as the member who was to become the President for the month of August was not present at that meeting. The United States representative has recalled that at the preceding meeting, in the absence of the USSR representative who was to become President on 1 August, he had submitted a draft r:::solution. But that does not mean anything. He referred to ..ule 10 of the rules of procedure. But rule 10 does not provide that a question discussed at a preceding meeting must necessarily he considered first at the first meeting under the presidency of a new President. That heing the case, what is the posi~ tion now in the Council? The question is perfectly clear. The President proposed and circulated an agenda for the meeting consisting of three items. The representative of the United States then formally submitted bis motion. The President circulated his agenda on 31 July, whereas the United States representative formally submitted his motion at the meeting of the Couneil of 1 August. Ail that took place in the unprecedented circumstances, 10 which 1 have already referred, accompanying the transfer of the presidency from the representative of Norway te the representative of the USSR, who had not been present and could not have been present at the precediDg meeting. Accordingly the President considers that the followmg order of voting should he followed. The three questions should he voted on in the order in which iliey were submitted, that is, first, the item on the agenda presented by the Presidentrecognition of the representative of the People's Republic of China as the representative of China; secondly, the peaceful settlenlent of the Korean question and, thirdly, the item submitted by the representative of the United States - complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea. That is !he ruling of the President. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom): 1 must certain1y challenge the' President's ruling, and 1 should hope that at least six members will he found to support my cballenge. We could, of course, continue this deba.te for years, and there is no real reason for me, at this point, to rehearse once again why 1 and, 1 be1ieve, the great majority of the members of this Council believe that the proper procedure is to take the question of the complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea first, and then to vote on the two items proposed by the President. The only new lllgument 1 have heard advanced, which 1 did not altogether understand, against such a course is something to the effect that the President bimself was not present at the meeting of the Council which preceded the meeting at which he took the Omir. 1 am unable to understand how that really aifects the situation, wbich is that a majority of the Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt) : May 1 ask whether, in the light of the President's ruling, he intends that we sha11 vote on the priority of the items later on, after they have been accepted for inclusion in the agenda? l should like an answer to that question. l'anglais): décision prononcer du le ce sujet.

1 have no objection as President to a vote being taken on the question of priority after we have voted on a11 the items proposed for inclusion in the Security Council's agenda, if that is the wish of the Counci1. dent, de aux question de As representative of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, however, 1 sha11 insist on the questions submitted by me being included in the agenda and --- discussed in the order in which they were received, the first, tirst, and the second, second. As representative of the Soviet Union, 1 shaH object to the inclusion in the agenda of the item proposed by the United States, for the reasons l have stated. RÉPUBLIQUES d'insister soient l'ordre et l'URSS, jour raisons Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America) : 1 do not understand why we have ta go through a11 this circuitous business, when the parliamentary situation is perfectly plain. It is in writing. The pending motion be-- fore this Council is the one presented by the representative of the United States ta the effect _that the item fo11owing the words "Adoption of the agenda" in the agenda of this meeting shall be "Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea". What does the word "following" mean? What does "the item following that item" mean? It means it shall be the next one, does it not? That is what is before us, and aIl this manœuvring cannot get away from it. This is in writing. It is in our records many times, and we cannot evade il. We cannat dodge it. Ultimately, we étre going ta Le drawn ta the vote upon that item. We might just as wdl do it now. The time has arrived. l'anglais) ainsi procédure, règlement ment présentée après question contre mot immédiatement viendra question vres qui procès-verbaux. fin question ment?

l have a1ready pointed out that my rulinJ as President is as follows: we shall v(lf-e on the inclusion of all the items in the agenda ia the order in which they were received. After that we shaH decide the question of priority. If tms is challenged, we shaH take a vote on the ruling of the President. décision voterons ont du nous Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom) : l have challenged the President's ruling. A vote was taken by show of hands, as follows: ln fa~lour of overruling the President's decision: China, Cuba, Ecuador, France, Norway,. United King- Abstaining: Egypt, Yugoslavia.

The results of the vote are as follows: two in favour of the President's ruling, t'wo abstentions and the rest against. The ruling is rejected. 1 put to the vote the motion submitted by the United States delegation. The representative of the Secretariat will read the text of that motion. The ASSISTANT SEeRETARY-GENERAL IN CHARGE OF SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS: The text is as follows: "A motion by the United States representative that the item following 'Adoption of the agenda' in the agenda of this meeting should he 'Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea'." A vote 'Zoos taken by show ot hands, as tollows: In favour: China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Norway, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem Ireland, United States (f America. Against: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Abstaining: India, Yugoslavia.

The motion is adopted, with one vote against and two abstentions. We shall proceed ta take a vote on the remaining questions. 1 call upon the representative of India. Sir Benegal N. RAu (India): 1 should like briefly to explain the vote which 1 have just cast. My abstention was limited ta the question of priority. It was not meant ta apply to the inclusion of the item proposed by the United States.

We shaH now vote on item 2 of the provisional agenda. 1 caU upon the representative of the United Kingdom. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom): 1 want ta explain the vote wmch 1 am about to cast, now that we are proceeding to the vote on the two following items on the provisional agenda. The long, gratuitous, offensive and, indeed, irregular speech to which Mr. Malik treated us this aftemoon makes it completely clear that his Government is determined to maintain what is the reverse of the truth, namely, that the United States and not the North Korean authorities are the aggressors. No amount of photographs af Mr. Dulles in a trench - and 1 only wish there had been more trenches; no suggestion that he himself first rushed across the frontier; no repetition of arguments which a child could refute or, indeed, anybody who is not a "partisan of peace", that aggression cannot apply to wars between peoples of the same The PItESIDEN1' (translateà trom Russian): On a point of order, 1 must draw the attention of the representative of the United Kingdom to the fact that the genera1 debate bas œen concluded and that we have passed to the vote. If we start speaking again on the substance of the question, the discussion MaY take up three more meetings. The representatives of the United Kingdom and the Pnited States have opposed that very strongly. If the United Kingfiom representative touches upon the question of substance, some member~ will undoubtedly wish to reply to him. 1 should like to request the memhers of the Couneil to speak oo1y on matters connected with the voting and to explain their respective votes briefly. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom): 1 accept the President's ruling. 1 shaH be very bricf. Many people have departed from the point and 1 thought perhaps that 1 might also depart from the point a little myse1f. However, if the President objects, 1 shaH not do 80. On the two questions before us, to take the second point first, 1 think that even if it sbould be genera11y thought, as the representative of India evidently thinks, that some proposai for peacefully settling the conflict MaY he put forward by the Soviet Union delegation, it is cleaf, at any rate, to me now, and dear, 1 think! to everybody now, that sueh a proposai could perfectly well he put forward during the debate on the item which we have just adopted. In spite of tbis 1 confess that 1 haà origina1ly had it in mlDd to abstain on this particu1ar item. The speech of the President, ta which 1 shaH no longer refer directly and willch was given tms afternoon, convinced me to the contrary and 1 shall now, therefore, fee! compelled to vote against !t. As for item 2 on the President's proposed agenda, that is to say, the question concerning Chinese representation, although 1 now have no doubt, after what 1-.as been said of the motives of the USSR delegation in proposing that item, 1 myself shaH vote for its inclusion for the foUowing reasons, which 1 shall briefly give. 1 think that 1 said on 2 August [481st meeting] that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom regarded the question of Chinese representation as entirel}' distinct from that of Korea. The representative of the Soviet Union has argued that they are closely linked, but bis own arguments show that the only connexion between them is that the USSR is attemp'ting to use the one question as a means of repre~lltatlou, on this Ilgeuda for discussion at some later date. Cousequently, l sha!! vote for that it~. l'h~ PR~N't (~ial,tl frQHI Rtusian): Are there any further s~rs? Speüing as the representative of the UNJ',)N OF SQ\'lU SUC1ALl51' KEl'UBLlt:S, I shaH make c.mly il. bricl ~pl)·.l regret tbat the United Kingdom representath-e did not nmk-c ms remarks earlier. In reply lO the stateDlCllt he bas just made. 1 wish ta sa)' du1t the OlÙj' dC:iÎtl: of the USSR delegation. which proposed thc inclusiOll in the agenda of t1le item ou the recognition of the representative of the Central Peoplc's Governweut of the Peol;lle's Republic of Oùn!!. as the representath-e of Chma, is that the Charter should he mictly observeci, and that aU the members of the ~urit~· Council. and particularly its tive permanent mcmws. should he represemed iu the ~ecurity Couucil b)' their tlccrOOited and lawful representativcs. That h uot the ca..~ at prc~t. li ~ UlÙted KingdOlll rcpresentative feels that it is more cou,,'CUieut for lùm and for the United States represeutath-e to nlllk-e use of the Couneil when it dots uot bave its full and l~aall.:omplementin other ,~ wlhm it does not include the representative oi ~ People's Republic of Clùnathat is t1leir own affair. Spœking as P1uwDENT, 1 caU upon t1le Council to proœcd to ,,-ote on the proposai for the indusion în the agenda of the second itenl on the provisional agenda. entiùed ..Recognition of the represelltative of the Central Peoplc's Governmellt of the People's Repubfu: of China as the representative of Clùna". A Vlot.: iLW take8 by slaow of IlamAs, as follows: l .. fooow: India, Norway, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. United KingdoUl of Great Britain and Northe.m lreland, Yugoslavia. Ag.;ùasl: China. Cuba, Ecuador, France. United States of America. AbshlùàAg: Egypt. The P1u:sJ.DE.o."iT (translated jrom Russian): The re:sults of the vote are as follows: five in favour, five against, and one abstention. The item 15 not adopted since seven votes are required fOl" the adoption of a proposaI. We sball DOW proœed to the vote on the inclusion in the agenda of the third item of the provisional agenda, nam.ely. "Peaceful settlement of the Korean quesboo". A T.'Gte: !LW" takeu b)' shaw of IWMS, as foUows: 1.. fœ:ollT: Egypt. India. Union of Soviet Socialist Rq>ublics. inscrit voix contre. seule proposk "Plainte publique de The PUSIDENT (trans/al ~ frtmi Russian): The item :9 not included, since t: _re were three votes in favour of inclusion, one abstention and the rest against. As a result of the voting, the agenda comprises a single item, the one that WM moved by the delegation of the United States and which is entitled "CompJaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea".

Speaking as representative of the UNION OF SOViET So- CrALtST REPURt.ICS. 1 mUSL state that my deJegation considers this decision of the Security Council ilIegal. The decision is aimed at preventing the discussion bath of the question of a peacefuJ settlement of the Korean problem and of the question of the restoration of the Seeurity Council to its lawful composition, as stipulated in the Charter, that is. with the participation of the fully authorized and plenipoteritiary representatives of the live permanent members 0 f the Security Council, a state of affairs which does not at present exist. de LISTES considère est question l'examen dans tions représentants permanents défaut à Speakin~ as PRESIDENT, 1 wish ta point out that since it is late, we shaH have ta adjoum our meeting at this point. There now remains the question of the date of our next meeting. What are the Council's wishes and proposaIs on this subject? aux avancée, la des propose demain 4 août, Mr. SUNDE (Norway): 1 suggest that we shouid meet again tomorrow, 4 August, at 3 p.m.

Are there any objections? ln tbat case, the proposa! 1S adopted. The Security Council will meet tomorrow afternoon, 4 August at 3 p.m. La Conseil