S/PV.486 Security Council

The situation at the beginning of today's meeting of the Couneil is as follows. There continues to be protracted discussion on the question of inviting representatives of the Korean people to the Security Couneil table. We have before us two proposaIs. One proposai is that submitted by the USSR delegation to invite rep- resentatives of the Korean people to attend the discus- sion of the Korean question. In reply to a question asked by the representative of Egypt [483rd meeting], the representative of the Soviet Union explained that the purpose of his proposal to invite the representatives of the Korean people was that the Security Couneil should agree to consider it necessary, in the course of the discussion of the Korean question, to invite and hear at its meetings representatives of the Korean peo- ple, that is, representatives of North and South Korea. This is the USSR delegation's first proposaI. There is another proposaI which, in substance, amounts to the fol1owing: that the permission granted the authorities of South Korea on 2S June [473"d meeting] to attend the meetings of the Security Couneil should extend also to the present meeting. At a previous [483rd] meeting the USSR delegation formally moved that this proposai, which reflects the position of a number of delegations, should also be put to the vote and that a vote should be taken on it 2. Adoption de l'orm-e du jour There is aIso a list of speakers who wish to express their views. There are two speakers on. this list so far. It is possible that there may be others who wish to speak. Our discussion is becoming protracted. In order, therefore, to expedite a deeision on this matter, the delegation of the USSR urges that the two pro- posaIs 1 .lave. Just explained should be put to the vote, and th~ aftef the vote the Security Coundl should proceea to consider the substance of the three draft resolutions now before it. One of these has been sub- mitted by the delegation of the United States [S/1653] and two have been submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union [5/1668 U1Jd S/1679]. The nrst draft resolution submitted by the USSR delegation deals with the question ni the peaceful set- tlement of the Korean question, and the second was submitted in connexion \Vith the telegram [S/1674] received from the' North Karean authorities-from the Government of the People's Democratie Republic of Korea-on the subject of the barbarous bombing attacks carried out by the United States Air Force against peaceful towns, population centres and the peaceful Korean population. As President 1 have tried briefly to explain the posi- tion in which the Security Couneil now finds itself at the beginning of the 486th meeting. The USSR delegation urges that the two proposais 1 have mentiond should he put to the vote and that the question should be decided by a vote, after which the Couneil might proceed to consider the substance of the three draft resolutions that have been submitted. 1f there are no comments, we might proceed to the vote, that ~s of course if the speakers on my list do not insist on taking the floor before the vote. They could state their views after the vote has been taken. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom): 1 wish to say that 1 do insist on speaking now for the reason that my remarks wî11 be directed ":oward explaining more fully than 1 have been able to do up to now the reasons why 1 do not approve of the procedure just suggested by the President, and dt) approve and prefer the procedure favoured by the great majority of the members of the Couneil.

We should perhaps deeide the question by takïng a vote. Inasmuch as a proposai has been made that we should proceed to a vote, it is my duty as President to submit the question for the Council's decision. The Sir Gladwyn JEBB (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais): Si j'insiste pour prendre maintenant la parole, c'est parce que je veux exposer d'une manière plus complète que je n'ai pu le faire jusqu'ici les raisons pour lesquelles je n'approuve pas la procédure que le Président vient de suggérer, et pour lesquelles j'approuve et préfère la procédure à laqueUe la grande majorité des membre, ":u Conseil est favorable. Le PRÉSIDENT (traduit du russe): Peut-être pour- rions-nous trancher la question par un vote. Puisque l'on a proposé de passer au vote, mon devoir, en qualité de Président, est de soumettre la question à la décision du Conseil. Si tout le monde prend la parole, la dis- Si la majorité du Conseil ne désire pas voter, alors nous allon;:, donner la parole au représentant du Royaume-Uni, nous ne nous prononcerons pas sur cette proposition et nous remettrons le vote à un stade ultérieur de la discussioh: j';:'",i.ime que ce sera là une procédure tout à fait normale. M. AUSTIN (Etats-Unis d'Amérique) (traduit de l'anglais): Est-ce qu'en agissant ainsi, c'est-à-dire en mettant la question aux voix avant de prendre une décision sur la motion d'ordre, le Président ne violerait pas la procédure des Nations Unies et du Conseil de sécurité? En procédant à ce vote, le Conseil lui-même ne se soumettrait-il pas à une décision injustifiable, à une violation de la loi, ce qui reviendrait à sanctionner une atteinte portée aux droits des membres du Con<ieil? Une motion d'ordre a été présentée. Si le Président veut bien prendre une décision à son sujet et ne pas se réfugier dans le rôle de représentant de l'Union so- viétique, le Conseil peut sauvegarder ses droits en contestant sa décision. C'est pourquoi je conteste cette décision. Mr. AUSTIN (United States): Would not such conduct by the President, that is, putting tms question ta a vote hefore deciding on the point of arder, trans- gress the -!aw of the United Nations and of the Se- curity Council? Would not the act of the Council itself in voting upon this he a submission ta an erroneous ruHng, a violation of the law, and amount ta a ..alver of the Council members' rights? A point of nrder has oeen made. If the President will stand on this as a ruling, and not slip away from it to the attitude of the Soviet Union representative, the Council can e~ve its rights bya challenge. To that purpose 1 now chal· lenge this ruling. Le PRÉSIDENT (traduit du russe) : Je prierai le repréu sentant des Etats-Vnis de préciser contre queUe "dé- cision" du Président est d~rigée sa cnntestation. La vérité, c'est qu'il n'y a pas de décision du Président. Il n'y a qu'une demande de la délégation de l'URSS tendant à ce que sa proposition soit mise aux voix. Le Président, en tant que responsable de la conduite des débats, acquiesçant à cette demande instante de la délégation de l'URSS, pose au Conseil la question suivante: le Conseil veut-il se prononcer par un vote sur cette proposition? Sans prendre de décision, le Président laisse au Conseil le soin de trancher cette question. Où voit-on là une décision présidentielle? Contre quoi est dirigée la contestation? Et voilà que le représentant de Etats-Unis nous suscite, une fois de plus, les mêmes difficultés. The PRESIDENT, (tralls1atcd tram Russùm) : 1 should like ta ask the United States representative to state precisely which ruling by the President he is challeng- ing. The point is that there is no ruling by the Presi- dent. There is only 'ihe USSR delegation's request that a vote shonld be taken on its proposaI. The President, being responsible for the conduct of the meeting and having regard ta the insistent request§ of the USSR delegation, put the following question to the Council: Does the Council wish to take a vote on this proposaI or does it not? As he has not given a ruling, he is leaving it to the Couneil ta decide this question. Where is the ruling which is being challenged? The same story is repeating itself with the United States representative. Mr. APSTIN (United States): Unless 1 entirely misunderstood, the ruling as stated here was this - 1 tried to write it down: "Unless the speakers wish to speak first, 1 will put to a vote the proposaI of the Soviet Union." That is a ruling, if 1 know what a ruling is, and it is to that that 1 take exception and ask that it be submitted to the Council, because it has the eHect of setting aside the regular order, that :s, the prior point of arder raised by the representative of China [483rd .meeting]. lt has the effect of denying the constitutional right of the representative of the Republic of Korea to sit at this table. Therefore, the first question which should be submitted to the Council -ta put it in the form in which 1 tried to put it yester- day afternoon: that those who are in favour of the representative of the Republic of Korea not being seated shouid raise their hands; thai, thërœfter, thos~ of the opposite opinion should raise their hands; and that, thereafter, those who abstain should raise their hands. That is the only legitimate question to be sub- mitted to the Couneil at this time. M. AUSTIN (Etats-Unis d'Amérique) (traduit de l'anglais) : Si je ne fais pas complètement erreur, une décision a été présentée sous la forme suivante - j'ai essayé de l'écrire: "A moins que les orateurs ne veuil- lent prendre d'abord la parole, je vais mettre aux voix la motion .de l'Union soviétique". Il y a là une décision, pour autant que je sache, et c'est contre cette décision que je m'élève, en demandant qu'elle soit soumise au Conseil, parce qu'elle a pour effet de nous détourner de l'ordre normal, c'est-à-dire d'écarter la première motion d'ordre que le représentant de la Chine a présentée [483ème séance]. Elle a pour effet de nier le droit juridique que le représentant de la République de Corée a d'être présent à cette table. C'est pourquoi la première question dont te Conseil doit être saisi, pour l'exprimer sous la forme que j'ai cherC!lé à lui clonner hier après-midi, est la suivante: que ceux qui sont d'avis dê ne pas inviter le repré- sentant de la Corée lèvent la main; que ceux qui sont d'un avis contraire lèvent ensuite la main; que ceux qui s'abstiennent lèvent ensuite la main. C'est la Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): Without any disrespect at all, 1 want to make clear in the simplest terms that it is the same old proposaI.

The proposaI of the United States. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): 1 have challenged the roling of the President several times because 1 find that severa! times he has violatoo the roles. This challenger 1 think, ought to he put to the Council. It should not merely be arbitrarily passed by.

The challenge cannot he accepted and put to the vote, as therc bas been no ruling. Only a roling can be chal- !~nged, that is, provided one bas been made. The Presi- dent did not make a ruling of the kind wmch the United States representative said he had made; there- fore there is no ruling. The President did not annou~ce his conclusion, and there can therefore he no challenge. How can there he a "challenge" if there is no ruling? If the discussion is becoming protracted, and the United States representative reverts to what we have already been talking about at the last three. meetings, it will he better to calI upon the representalive of the United Kingdom, who is first on the list of speakers for today's meeting. 1 caU upon the representative of the United King- dom. 1 presume that the representative of the United States does not challenge that decision of the Presi- dent. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais): Il n'est que trop vrai, je le crains, que le refus de notre Président d'admettre le représentant de la République de Corée et son insistance à inviter un représentant des autorités de la Corée du Nord soulève des questions de principe extrêmement impor- tantes, je dirai même essentielles; au cours du long débat dont cette question a fait !'-Jjet, nous avons déjà incidemment abordé quelqueJ-unes de ces ques- tions, mais non pas toutes. Peut-être le Président sur- mûntera-t-iI plus facilement la répugnance qu'il ~prouve à se conformer au règlement intérieur et, d'.,.meurs, à l'opinion de presque tous les membres du Conseil, si je lui demande instamment, ne serait-ce qu'en sa qualité 4 Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom) : It is, 1 fear, ooly too troe that the refusaI of our President to admit the representative of the Republic of Korea and bis insistence on inviting a representative of the North Korean authorities raise most important and, indeed, basic matters of principle, some of which, but not aIl, have already been aUuded ta in the long debate which we have now had on this subject. 1 do 110t think that this debate bas heen entirely wasted, because it is grad- ually bringing into evidence real differences which di~;dc us here. That is at !east my imp%'"ession. Per!'-~ps it may help to overcome the reluctance of our Presi- dent to abide by the roles of procedure - and, inci- dentaUy, by the views of almost every member of this M. AUSTIN (Etats-Unis d'Amérique) (traduit de l'anglais): De manière très respectueuse, je tiens à indiquer clairement, dans les termes les plus simples, que nous sommes, une fois de plus, en présence de la même proposition. Le PRÉSIDENT (traduit du russe) : Telle est la pro- position des Etats-Unis. M. AUSTIN (Etats-Unis d'Amérique) (traduit de l'atJglais) : J'ai contesté à plusieura reprises la décision du Président, parce que j'estime qu'il a, à diverses reprises, violé le règlement i.ltérieur. A mon avis, ce défi doit faire l'objet d'un vote. Il ne suffit pas de n'en tenir arbitrairement aucun compte. Le PRÉSIDENT (traduit du russe): La contestation n'est pas recevable et ne peut être mise aux vùixJ pour la raison qu'il n'y a pas eu de décision présiden- tielle. Il peut y avoir contestation d'une décision pré- sidentielle lorsqu'une telle décision a été formulée. Le Président n'a pas rendu de décision présidentielle de la nature de celle que le représentant des Etats- Unis dit qu'il a rendue: il n'y a donc pas de décision présidentielle. Le Président n'ayant pas statué, il ne peut y avoir de contestation. Comment peut-il y avoir une contestation s'il n'y a pas eu de décision prési- dentielle? Si le débat doit se prolonger et si le repré- sentant des Etats-Unis veut revenir sur ce qui a fait l'objet des débats de nos trois dernières séances, il vaut mieux donner la parole au représentant du Royaume-Uni, dont le nom figure en première place sur la liste des orateurs de la séance d'aujourd'hui.. Je donne la parole au représentant du Royaume-Uni. Je penst que le représentant des Etats-Unis ne con- testera'pas cette décision présidentielle. This would ali be very obvious were it not for the fact that the Soviet Union representativè, in bis desire ta impress public opinion with the rigÎltness ,)f bis cause, has omitted to draw attention to the fact that the Government of the Republic of Korea bas already been dec1ared the lawful govenllnent by the United Nations; that United Nations observers were stationed on its de facto northern frontier; and that, therefore, the whole State was, as it were, existing under the mant1e of this great international Organization. The Governmeht of the Korean Republic was, how- ever, attacked - and 1 sh:tll not here proceed to demonstrate that-. it was attacked or to counter Soviet propaganda to the effect that it ,.,-as Mr. Dulles and Mr. Muccio who attacked LÎ'J.e 1. ..rthern Koreans first -incidently l must apolozige for omitting to refer to Mr. Muccio previously, sinee c1early Mr. Muccio's pres- ence doubled the total number of the interventionist force-since that is so obviously absurd that it is bard to think that it can be swallowed even by the automata who listen to the Moscow radio. It was attacked, 1 say, by soldiers coming under the authority of a rival Korean government, not acceptable to the United Na- tions, and established at Pyongyang. It is quite true that the soldiers 1 refer to were Koreans, and therefore were, so to speak, blood brothers of the people whom they attacked; but to argue that this fact in itself con- stitutes a civil war, or thatit necessarily in itself puts bath sides on an equal footing, is patent nonsense. The President made what he thought were sorne very telling observations regarding the American Civil War, but they would only have been relevant if he had gone on to show that in 1861 either the northern states cr the southern had been recognized by an international organization, which he could not do for the simple reason that no international organization existed at that time. . Moreover, whatever the version of history eurrent 'in Moscow may now be - and 1 understatid it is rewritten from time to time so as to blot out uneom- fortable facts from any public memory -- the faet is that England, though it could have done so, did not intervene in the war between the states. Indeed, as is wel1 known, my fellow-eountrymen, and particularly the working c1ass, suffered great privations by not intervening. Quite apart from this, there is absolutely no reason to suppose that wars between people of the same race, 5 "Nothing contained in the present Charter shali authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters wmch are essentia1ly within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require tr"" Memhers to submit sucb matters to settlement und\.. :he present Charter; but this' principle shall not prejulUce the application of enforœment measures under Chapter VII." It will he seen that the last few words make it quite clear that the United Nations has full authority to intervene active1y in the internal affairs of any country if this is necessary for the pUl-pose of enforcing its decisions as regards the maintenance of internatioIUll peace and security. l do honestly hope that, for the reasons given, we shall hear no more of this "civil war" argument from the mouth of the Soviet Union spokes- man. It is equally true that, under the Charter, the Security Counci1 might he unlikely to make a recommendation or a decision under Article 39 in regard to another sucb incident as the present, since sucb action could and no doubt would he vetoed by the Soviet Union. But when the Security Council very properly decided that the Government of the Republic of Korea should he defended against a brutal attack, and decided on the appropriate measures to that effect, it did sa unani- mously, and no permanent member present at this table objected in the slightest degree, or even made any reservations. On the con~rary, they were all hor- rified at the outrag,e which had occurred, and the Councii machinery therefore worked smoothly and easily and in entire accord with the purposes and prin- ciples of the Charter. Nor can the fact that one of these permanent memhers represents a government not recognized by a minority of members of the Security Council affect the issue at aIl. This point can only be decided by a majority; and if this is disputed - as it is disputed - it is difficult to see how the Security Council can function. For how can it decide anything, except by a process of voting? Finally, it may also he said, and indeed is said by my Soviet Union colleague, that he himself was not present when the decision ta resist aggression was inade. Perhaps he now regrets the fact that he was not present. That may he. But to maintain that the Security Couneil must be powerless because one memher in a fit of pique simply boycotts it, is really to admit that Valid though 1 myself believe the theory of great power unity to he - in the sense that the United Nations can never work properly for so long as the great Powers are at loggerheads, and can therefore only proceed in the long ron on the basis of unanimity _ 1 cannot cnnceive that any rational being would admit that the theory ought to he abused in such a way as this, more especiaUy since all the great Powers, along with the sman ones, have entered into a solemn ohligation to :tbide by the purposes and princlples of the Charter. This indeed brings us to what is really the dûef trouble with the Soviet Union, and - as 1 know weil - bas been the chief trouble since the beginning of the United Nations. Most of the members of the Government of the Soviet Union now having been brought up from infancy on a doctrine of State infa!- libility, it seeras almost impossible for ~y of them ta believe that the Govemment could in any circum- stances he wrong, and indeed for any member of the Soviet Union not to believe that his Government is always, as it were, divinely inspired. Indeed under the peculiar, long:-outmoded determinisnc philosophy to which they subscrine, the roles of the Soviet Union are forced to maintain that everything works in ac- ccrdance with what the major Soviet Union prophets have foretold. If, therefore, sorne canonized professor declared 'in, say, 1848 that it was inevitable that at sorne stage the imperialist Powers would band t gcther to overcome any country in which socialism had beer. established, then - and of course hegging the question whether socialism is, in ":~ct, th~ kind of regime now established in the Soviet Union - sucb &!1 imperialist war becomes inevitable and therefore an obsession which haunts the minds Qf perh:.lps otherwise sane Soviet Union citizens, the great 'bulk of whom are fundamental!y of course as <Îecent and hoaourable a body of men as are to he found anywhere in the world. And yet, there is no reality in their nightmare. Ali that the non-eommunist Powers are in fact doing is to take steps to see that the repressive and old-fashioned philosophy to which 1 have referred is not impe.-sed by force on States which it does not suit and ""hïch have no desire to 'ive under it. Ali they would ask of the Soviet Uniot" Govemment is that they should not hecome the slave~ of their own theories - that, as the poet bas it, they ~hould "drain not to its dregs the um of bitter proph(cy". However, the draining of the um whicb has been proceeding now for l"1any years ensures that anyaction taken by any body or State which subscribes to the particular philosopny of the Soviet Union must, in the opinion of the Soviet Union, be right, provided only that such action is taken in accordance with the inter- pretation of the phiIôsophy which is prevalent at Moscow at the time. Thus, if such aState attacks ':l,nother one, that is not and indeed cannot he, accord- 7 At any rate, basing himself on this false premise, the representative of the Soviet Union is now engaged, as we have seen, in an effort to ensure that represen- tatives of the Republic of Korea and the North Korean authorities appear before this Council table at the same time. The point of this last manœuvre is simply to get an opportunity of arguing that both sides in Korea may to some extent be to blame, that the great thing in any case is to let Koreans settle the matter them- selves, and that consequently the ouly real solution is for the uforeign devils" to leave and so allow the communization of Korea to take place on well-estab- lished lînes. We aIl know what this means. It means the elimination of all those sufficiently intelligent to dispute anything that sorne Man-God May from time to time assert; the "liquidation"-as the pleasant phrase has it - of anyone who could be descrihed as helong- ing ta thè bourgeoisie; and the establishment of a cen- trally trained and largely non-indigenous bureaucracy who regard the transformation of sentient human beings into machines as the chief triumph, and indeed the main purpose, of what is agreeably refer!"ed ta, 1 understand, as "social engineering". Up to now it has always been pretended that countries which have undergone this terrible experience ha,:e undergone it by some process of law. On the face of It the constitutional forms have been preserved, whatever the grim realities below the surface. It has thus in- variably been proclaimed that the "people" have de- cided on their own destnlction and that 99.9 per cent have voted in favour of a regime under which usually at least 50 per cent have been condemned to slavery or death. But there is not even a pretence that the South Koreans voted for slavery; on the contrary, whatever the representative of the Soviet Union May assert, the fact is that they showed in their elections, which were observed by the United Nations, that they did not care for communism of the Soviet type in the least. They dared indeed to register, by a per- fectly free vote, that they were in favour of democracy. Not upside-down democracy, which is of course dicta- torship, but i'~l dlemocracy, blundering perhaps, in- efficient possibly, but nevertheless a regime under Quoi qu'i! en soit, se fondant sur ces fausses pré- misses, le représentant de l'URSS s'efforce à présent, ainsi que nous l'avons vu, de faire en sorte que les représentants de la République de Corée et les autorités de la Corée du Nord viennent en même temps devant ce Conseil. Le but de cette dernière manœuvre est simplement de lui permettre de soutenir que la respon· sabilité doit retomber dans une certaine mesure sur les deux parties aux prises en Corée, que l'essentiel dans tous les cas est de laisser les Coréens régler leurs affaires entre eux, et que, par conséquent, la seule façon de régler le problème est de faire partir "les diables étrangers" et de laisser se poursuivre la corn- munisation de la Corée selon les méthodes bien con- nues. Nous savons tous ce que cela signifie. Cela signi- fie l'élimination de tous ceux qui sont suffisamment intelligents pour contester ce que quelque Homme- Dieu pourrait de temps à autre affirnler; la "liquida- tion" - selon la plaisante expression - de toute per- sonne que l'on pourrait décrire comme appartenant à la bourgeoisie; et l'établissement d'une bureaucratie composée de fonctionnaires rompus à une discipline centralisée et pour la plupart étrangers au pays, pour qui le triomphe suprême est de réussir à transformer de sensibles êtres humains en machines, pour qui, en vérité, cette transfonnation est le principal objectif de ce à quoi l'on décerne, si je ne me trompe, le nom flatteur de "mécanique sociale". Jusqu'ici, on a toujours prétendu que les pays qui ont connu cette terrible expérience l'ont subie dans le cadre de la légalité. En fait, les formes constitution- nelles ont été respectées en apparence, quelles que soient les dures réalités sous-jacentes. C'est ainsi que l'on a invariablement proclamé que "les peuples" avaient pris eux-mêmes l'initiative de leur destruction et que 99,9 pour 100 avaient voté en faveur d'un régime sous lequel au moins 50 pour 100 de l'ensemble de la population avaient été condamnés à l'esclavage ou à la mort. Mais on ne peut même pas prétendre que les Coréens du Sud aient voté pour l'esclavage; au con- traire, quoi que puisse en dire le représentant de l'URSS, il n'en reste pas moins vrai qu'ils ont montré au cours de leurs élections, tenues en présence des ob- servateurs des Nations Unies, qu'ils n'aimaient pas le communisme, tout au moins celui du genre soviétique. A la vérité, ils ont osé se prononcer, par leur participa- tion à un scrutin parfaitement libre, en faveur de la démocratie, non pas une démocratie à rebours, qui Faced with this situation, the ntlers of North Korea decided that their bretbren in the South must he given a lesson. The existence of a free regime on their very doorstep was naturally anathema to them. They planned a crime which, in the circumstances, it is true, t.'Owd hardly have been carried out undetected, but wbich they thought they could get away with because the policeman's back was turned. However, the policeman. though perhaps somewhat off bis guard, was not in- different. Though jumped on, he blew h wbistle and a number of other policemen are now coming to bis aid. The argument that ali the policemen ought now to he called off, leaving the victim to the tender mercie.s of the attacker, is not one wbich is like1y to find much favour, if only for the fact that, if this were done, it would he all too likely that the incident would soon he repeated, and that Asia would once again he the scene of the crime. Yes, Asia would once aga.in he the scene of the crime. Here is the vast arena in wbich, repulsed in Europe, the dark forces of commtmÏst imperialism are DOW clearly i!oncentrating for the kil!. AIl the new emergent Asian States are affected by tbis, and they know it. There is no secret at all. In Burma, the com- mtmists are in arms agaiust the recognised Govern- ment. In Indonesia, as soon as it became dear that Hatta and Sukarno were cousolidating their authority, the communist Musa was sent to destroy them if he could. In Vietnam the emergent Governement bas had to wage active war ar,ainst the communists. The communist Hukbalahap is similarly in arms agaiust the Govemment of the PlLlippines. Even in India, the greatest of all the new Asian democracies, the com- munist resort to armed violence in Hyderabad was a deliberate attempt by an armed minority to assert its power. Yes, it is not for nothing that the great states- man Pandit Nehru said as lately as 22 June: "Com- munism is sheer pure terrorism and the communists in South East Asia are automatically weakening them- selves by' turning against natiof!alism. The strongest and growing urge in South East Asia is the nationalist urge, plus the urge for social justice." That is what he said on 22 June. Perhaps it is true that the western Powers bave not always heeded or sufficiently recognized this urge in the pasto But if anything is certain it is that com- munist imperialism, li It is allowed to get under way, will recognize it far less in the future. Here is a field, indeed, in which Western Europe and Asia seem to have much in common; and, whatever their relations in the past, they are likely both to he lost unless the] both realize the danger and concert ta meet it. Nor is it any use for the Soviet Union Govemment to try to make out that it is only the United States which is insisting on this, the proper and obvious course. Irrespective of race or creed, fifty-three of the free nations of the world are insisting on it toc. Though it may he the most powerful, the United States is not even the largest State which is insisting on sucb a course, and this for the simple reason that any persan who is capable of forming a rational view at aU and does not. bave his thought imposed upon hini by dictatorship, is convinced that conformity with the ,varions resolutions passed by this Council is a pre- requisite for the settlement which we aU hope will shortly he achieved. ln short, whatever solution is finally established, one thing comes necessarily first and that is, that the Ù'ivading forces in Korea should go back whence clley came. Then there might he a period during whîch some body representing the United Nations could establish contact with the North Korean authorities and report to the Security Council OntY then, 1 suggest, could we think of inviting representatives of the North Korean authorities to this table, with th~ object of enabling the United Nations to consider and carry out a scheme establishing a rea11y independent and democratic Korea, wmch of course it is in the interest of aU of us, including the Soviet Union Gov- emment, to achïeve. This is wbat 1 would call the Uni,ed Nations way- a way totally at variance with the solutions based on force which, unfortunately, at present seem ta he approved by the Soviet Union. It is in pursuing this way, which discards force except when it is necessary to meet aggression by force, that we can hope tn create a world community consisting of fïee nations, obedient only to law, which must in the final count he based on the will of a majority of the human race. Imperfect though the United Nations undoubtedly still is, slow though the progress towards the ideal must in- evitably he, wrang though it may he to precipitate changes too !!udden1y Ioonth consequent risk of chaos and the breakdown of society as sucb, still it is true that the United Nations provides the ooiy present basis for a possible world comml.'nity other than some œntrally controlled world despotism which must he at variance with all the pürposes and principles in- scribed in the Charter itself. Even if it is admitted-which personally 1 would not admit-that in theory the productive r~urces of the twentieth century would best he organized for the purposes of humanity by some centrally controlled bureaucracy ~~ the slave-like conditions which such a system wo~,üd inevitably impose upon about 99 per cent of the human race, those conditions wowd un- 10

On he- balf of the delegation of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIl.LIST REpUBLICS 1 consider it essential to bring light to bœr on the numerous distortions regarding the Korean question in the United Stat~ representative's speech of yesterday [485th meeting]. As regards the efforts of the United Kingdom rep- resentative, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, to play the part of a theorist and corqmentator on the world-wide historical, liberating, phiIbsophical, Marxist doctrine, these can he disregarded, first, because his comments are devoid of philosophica1 knowledge, and secondly, because he attempts to defend the theory of the inevitability of the continuanœ and perpetuation of Anglo-American imperialism over the peoples of Asia and the Far East, a theory which is outmoded and bas long )leen dis- carde<! by bistory and rejeeted by all freedom-Ioving peoples. This th~ry and this history are written in the Anglo-American style. Let us consign this theory to the British Museum. It neither can nor does find circulation anywhere. M~se:4m, elles n'ont et ne sauraient avoir cours ailleurs. The United Kingdom representative bas not said En ce qui concerne la question de Corée, le repre.:. anything new or original on the Korean question. He sentant du Royaume-Uni n'a rien dit de neuf ni bas painstakingly repeated what was said by his United d'original. Il a consdencieusement répété ce qu'avait States colleague yesterday. dit hier son collègue des Etats-Unis. . On the basis of re1iable data and irrefutable facts, Le Gouvernement de l'URSS, se fondant. sur des the Government of the USSR bas already given its données dignes de foi et des faits indéniables, a déjà appraisal of the aggressive acts which the United States fait connaître ce qu'il pensait de l'action agressive Govemment bas committed against the Korœn people. entrp.prise par le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis contre On the instructio~s of its Government, the USSR le peuple coréen. Suivant les instructions de son Gou- delegation in the Security Council bas shown and vernement, ladélégatien de l'UR-5S au Ctmseilde. proved on the basis of facts, and of a generally accepted curité, se fondant sur les faits et sur la définition international definition of aggression, that the United internationale communément reçue de l'agression, a mon,:, States Govemment bas perpetrated a gross act of tré et prouvé que le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis avait aggression against the Korean people and is an ag- commis une agression flagrante contre le peuple coréen gressor. et que c'était lui l'Rgresseur. . The Uni~d States representative was unable to deny Le représentant des Etats-Unis n'a été en mesure de any of these facts. We a11 know that when the Korean réfuter aucun de ces faits. On sait que, depuis le début question was first discussed in the Security Counci1 de l'examen de la que~ltion de Corée au Conseil de that discussion was based on a one-sided version of sécurité, la discussion porte sur une version unilatérale the beginning, development and substance of the events de l'origine, du développement et de la nature d~ in Korea whicl1 was received from Uni~ed States and événements de Corée, version uniquement puisée à. d~ Syngmau Rhee sources. This version is based only on sources américaines ou relevant de Syngmari Rhee. Le PRÉSIDENT (traduit du russe): En ma qualité de représentant de l'UNION DES RÉPUBLIQUES SOCIALIS- TES SOVIÉ7IQUES, j'estime indispensable d'apporter de la clarté dans cet amas de faits défonnés dont le repré- sentant des Etats-Unis a parsemé son discours d'hier [485ème séance]. 1 Pour ce qui est des efforts déployés par te reprt. sentant du Royaume-Uni, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, pour assumer le rôle d'un théoricien, d'm:t commentateur de la doctrine marxiste, doctrine historique:, libératrice et philosophique universelle, ils ne méritent pas de retenit l'attention: d'abord, p3Iœ que ses commentaires mon~ trent un manque total de culture philosophique et, en second lieu, parce que le commentateur s'est efforcé de défendre la théorie selon laquelle la domination sécu- laire de l'impérialisme anglo-américain sur les peuples de l'Asie et de l'Extrême-Orient doit inévitablement -se poursuivre et se perpétuer, alors que cette théorie est depuis longtemps périmée, que l'histoire l'a rejetée et que tous les peuples épris de liberté la repoussenb Ce solit là une théorie et une conception de l'histoire à l'anglo-américaine; il faut les reléguer au British The composition of the Commission is in no way a guarantee of its objectivity. The Commission's principal report rS/1518], to which the United States representative reterred, was signed by some member of the Kuomintang called Ssutu. Even the most simple- minded person can hardly be expected to believe in the impartiality of the representative of the Kuomintang group, who is in the service and pay of the United States Government. It is of no use for the representa- tives of the United States to strive to support their charges against the Govemment of ;the People's Demo- cratie Republic of Korea with these fabricated reports of the Commission dictated by MacArthur. The principal report of the Commission, to which the representative of the United States refers, is the telegram received by the United Nations Secretariat on 29 June, a communication which purports to deal witli the situation as of 24 June. The mere juxtaposition of these two dates shows that the report 'Yas concocted after the event - after the failure of the invasion of North Korea by the forces of Syngman Rhee-in arder to cover up that invasion and its orga."!Ïzers. The Commission's report affirms that the South Korean troops were drawn up in depth for purposes of defence. According, however, to the report s1Jb- rnitted to the Security Couneil by the Government of the United States [S/1626] , five divisions of South Korean troops were in action at the beginning of the fighting, and a sixth division was a little furtl:ier to the south and took part in the fighting on 26 June. In the same report it is stated that at the beginning of the confliet North Korea had three divisions and two brigades in the field, that is to say rather less than five divisions. The forces of Syngman Rhee were therefore not disposed in depth for defence, as the Commission's document incorrectly reports, but were concentrated directly on the frontier for the clear purpose of at- tacking North Korea. The assertion that the forces of Syngman Rhee lacked heavy equipment and particularly artillery is also not in accordance with facts. In addition to well- known United States official data to the eHeet that a large quantity of arms, includine- artillery, was supplied to the puppet regime in South Korea by the United States Government, reference may also be made to the faet that, according to the communiqué issued by the People's Army command, the following trophies were seized by units of that army in liberating the Ongjin Peninsula from the forces of Syngman Rhee: 500 heavy and light guns, over 2,500 rifles, and 140 auto- mobiles. In his attempt to confuse the facts, the United States representative is resorting to direct slander against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in stating that North Korea is being provided with Soviet arms. In the brief remarks which 1 made 'yesterday, 1 have a1ready replied to this slanderous statement. 1 said that the United States representative's assertion was a slander and in no way conformed to the facts, as North Korea hàs only the armaments sold to it by the Soviet Union when the USSR troops withdrew from that country. The representative of the United States is not the 'Cnly one .to make such slanderous 'statements. That famous warmonger, Mr. Churchill, and sorne of bis followers are aIso spreading similar slander by as- serting that the Soviet Union is providing North Korea with jet-propelled aircraft. These inventions of Mr. Churcbill's do not correspond to the facts, but are fabrications from beginning to end. The facts which 1 have aIready stated and the data which 1 still propose to cite make it perfectly clear that the artillery park of the North Korean forces consisted of the artillery and equipment so lavishly and geneI"Ously sent by the Government of the United States to its South Korean puppet, Syngman Rhee. The statement in the report of the United States Government that the United States Air Force com- meneed air operations on 28 June is also not in ac- cordanee with facto Those operations were eommenced considerably eartier. The People's Army Command in Pyongyang announced that United States aireraft were already bombing towns and villages in Korea on 26 June. These basic facts and deductions from the official documents furnished to the Security Council by the Government of the United States were placed at the disposaI of the State Department by the notorious United Nations Commission on "-'orea, which was headed in June by the member o. 'le Kuomintang. The references in the report of the United States Government to the reports of that Commission do not bear any kind of criticism. This is a clear and flagrant case of falsification. First the 'military authorities and official representatives of the United States in Korea and Japan provided the Commission with their faise Le représentant des Etats-Unis n'est pas le seul qui ait fait des déclarations calomnieuses en la matière. M. Churchill, ce fauteur de guerre bien connu, et cer- tains de ses partisans répandent eux aussi des calomnies du même ordre; ils affimlent que l'URSS fournirait à la Corée du Nord des avions à réaction. Ces allégations de M. Churchill ne corre~f'ondent pas à la réalité et sont inventées de toutes pièces. Des faits que j'ai indiqués précédemment et de ceux que je me propose de mentionner par la suite, il ressort très clairement que ce sont l'artillerie et les arme- ments que le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis a envoyés en si grande abondance et si généreusement au régime fantoche de Syngman Rhee qui constituaient les ré- serves d'artillerie des armées de la Corée du Nord. Lorsque le rapport du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis affirme que les forces aériennes de Etats-Unis ont en- trepris leurs opérations de guerre le 28 juin, cela ne correspond pas davantage à la réalité. Ces opérations ont commencé bien plus tôt. Le Commandement de l'ar- mée populaire, à Pyongyang, a annoncé que, dès le 26 juin, des appareils américains avaient bombardé des villes et des villages en Corée. Tels sont les faits essentiels et les conclusions des documents officiels qu'ont présentés au Conseil de sé- curité le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis et la trop célèbre Commission des Nations Unies pour la Corée, qui est au service du Département d'Etat et qui était présidée, en juin dernier, par un représentant du Kouomintang. Lorsque le rapport du Gouvernement des Etats- Unis se réfère aux communications de cette même Commission, cela ne résiste pas à la critique. Nous sommes en présence d'une falsification évidente et grossière. En premier lieu, le comman.dement et les représentants officiels des Etats-Unis en Corée et au On the basis of this unilateral, false and tendentious information, a number of illegal resolutions were adopted by a group of members of the Security Council without the participation of two of the Council's per- manent merilbers: the USSR and China. These resolu- tions were directed against the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea; and an at- tempt is now being made to pass them off as "resolu- tions of the Security Couneil" and by their means to justify United States aggression in Korea. In face of these indisputable facts, and in the light of the statements made by representatives of the Syng- man Rhee regime and official spokesmen of the United States, the whole account of the progress of events in Korea put forward by the United States delegation to the Security Couneil falls to pieces. In the statement of the Government of the USSR of 4 July, as set forth in document S/I603, and in the statement made by the USSR delegation to the Security Cauncil, numerous facts were adduced to show that the events in Korea arose out of a provocative attack by the forces of the South Korean authorities on the areas of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea lying to the north of the 38th parallel. In this connexion the representative of the United Kingdom atte..mpted by juggling with words to prove that Mr. Dulles and Mr. Muccio together could not have attacked North Korea. It is true that Mr. Dulles and Mr. Muccio together could not do that thernselves, but DulIes and Muceio could and did co-operate in proyoking an attack on North Korea by the puppet army of Syng- man Rhee with its 100,000 tr"Ops. Such are the facts. This very attaclc was the result of a premeditated plan carefully prepared by the United States military authorities and the South Korean puppet govemment of Syngman Rhee. This is confirmed in particular by the statement of the former Syngman Rhee Minister of Home Affairs, Kim Hyo Suk, who on 8 July said: "It is widely known that Syngman Rhee visited Japan in the spring of this year at MacArthur's re- quest. He there received instructions from MacArthur ta place his amlY at MacArthur's disposai for the dura- tion of the 'campaign against the North' and to carry out the joint training of officers of both the so-called 'national defence' armyand the Japanese army. Syng- man Rhee proceeded to comply with these instructions and was assured that, once the campaign against the North had begun, he would be supported by the United States Air Force and Navy, would receive an 'army of volunteers' from Japan, and would undoubtedly win the war. These facts are unknown to the Security Cauneil. The United States delegation made every effort to conceal these facte, and refused and still refuses to allow th6 representatives of the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea - or of "the North Korean authorities", as the United States repre-. sentative calls it - to place these facts before the Se- curity Couneil. Syngman Rhee's innumetable aggressive speeches against North Kore.a are aIso well known to aIl. For example, after a visit to Korea, Mr. Sullivan, a cor- respondent of the New York Times, wrote on 26 June last that almost all the talk of war emanated from South Korean leaders and in a number of cases Syng- man Rhee allowed it to be clearly understood that his army would attack as soon as Washington gave the word. Only a week before the provocative aw>~k of the South Korean troops on the frontier areas 0: +he People's Democratic Republic of Korea, Syngman Rhee said in the so-called National Assembly in Seou] in the presence of Mr. Dulles: "If we are unable to protect democracy in the cold war. we will he victorious Le 19 mai 1950, soit un mois avant le début des événements de Corée, M. Johnson, directeur de l'aide américaine à la Corée, a officiellement déclaré à la Commission des finances de la Chambre des représen- tants, que "100.000" - je répète: 100.000 - "soldats et officiers de l'armée de la Corée du Sud pourvus d'équipements américains et instruits par la Mission militaire des Etats-Unis, avaient terminé leurs prépara- tifs et pouvaient commencer la guerre à n'importe quel momènt". Je tiens à souligner ces derniers mots: "pou- vaient commencer la guerre à n'importe quel moment". La presse des Etats-Unis a indiqué plus d'une fois que les armées de la Corée du Sud étaient prêtes pour une attaque armée et que leur préparation militaire était tout à fait au point. C'est ainsi que, le 5 juin, le New York Herald-Tribune a publié une dépêche de Marguerite Higgins, sa correspondante à Séoul, qui faisait état d'une déclaration du général Roberts, chef de la Mission militaire en Corée; celui-ci, ayant st'us ses ordres plus de 500 instructeurs militaires américains, préparait intensément les armées de la Corée du Sud en vue de l'agression contre la Corée du Nord. Le géné- ral Roberts a déclaré: "Les contribuables américains ont en Corée une armée qui est un magnifique chien de garde, qui protège les fonds investis dans ce pays et qui constitue une force garantissant les meilleurs résultats aux moindres frais." Il s'agit évideD!lffient des investissements de fonds américains en Corée du Sud. Louant la façon dont les conseillers militaires améri- cains avaient préparé les troupes de la Corée du Sud, le général Roberts a déclaré: "La Mission militaire des Etats-Unis est la preuve vivante du fait que, en utili- sant d'une façon rationnelle et intensive les services de 500 soldats et officiers aguerris, on peut former une armée de 100.000 hommes qui se battront pour vous!' . Le général Roberts a ajouté qu'il y avait au moins treize ou quatorze officiers américains dans chaque division de la Corée du Sud. Ces officiers travaillaient avec les officiers de la Corée du Sud, se trouvaient avec eux.sur le front, le long du 38ème parrallèle, res- taient avec eux pendant les combats ainsi que pendant les périodes de repos. De ces aveux d'un général américain, qui était le représentant militaire officiel des Etats-Unis en Corée du Sud, il importe de retenir les faits suivants. Tout d'abord, l'armée des Coréens du Sud a été créée par les Etats-Unis pour protéger les investisse- ments américains en Corée du Sud, car il n'y a pas d'autres capitaux investis dans ce pays, pour servir de "chien de garde" aux maîtres américains de la Corée du Sud, dont les monopoles américains s'effor- cent de faire une colonie. Ensuite, l'armée de 100.000 hommes de la Corée du Sud se trouvait au début de juin sur le pied de guerre et entièrement prête à exécuter son attaque de pro- vocation contre la Corée du Nord. En fin, le chef de la Mission militaire des Etats- Unis, le général Roberts lui-même, dès le début de This fact is al50 confirmed by the depositions of captured South Korean officers. Staff Lieutenant Han So Han, of the 17th South Korean Regiment, who surrendered to units of the People's Army of the People's Democratie Republic of Korea, made the following assertions: "On 24 June this year, although it was Saturday, aU officiais were forbidden to visit the town' and in- structed to await orders. On the night of 24 June the land forces received a secret order to cross t~le 38th paralle1 at dawn and to COillllience military operations against North Korea. "Having commenced the surprise offensive, our unit, operating in the Ongjin area, penetrated the territory of North Korea to a depth of from one to two kilo- ~ mettes. Soon, however, we encountered resolute re- sistance from defence detachments of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea. Having advanced two kilometres into the territory of North Korea, we were compelled to faU back under the blows of the defence detachmentso Our communications proved to be severed and the hattalions of our regiment were connected only by radio, The h.JWS struck by the defence detachments were 50 strong that panic soon broke out, to which even officers succumbed. Before its dispatch to the . Ongjin area our 17th Regiment was regarded as the best regiment in the 'national defence' ai"my. It de- fended Seou!. This regiment was given the title of the 'Two r~ ger' detachment. The idea. was inculcat~d in us that to· occupy North Korea was a very sunple matter. And we relied on this. In reality,however, things tumed out to he very different". A11 these facts make is perfectly clear that the pro- vocative attack by the forces of the puppet regime of South Korea on the frontier areas of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea was prepared in advance and carried into effect on 25 June. This was how the internal conflict, the civil war between the two govemmental camps in Korea, began. After provoking this conflict, and seeing that the politi- cal regime of Syngman Rhee was collapsing, the United States Govemment resorted to open intervention in Korea. Such.are the irrefutahle facts, and the United States representative is not in a position to deny them. Whose forces in fact committed an act of aggression and invaded the territory of a forèign country? Did Korean forces invade· the territory of the United States, or did United States forces invade Korea? The whole world knows that United States forces invaded the territory of Korea, that they are trampling on the The whole world knows that Korean aircraft are not bombing the capital -::: the United St:P.tes, Washington, or the largest city of this country, New York, but ébat United States aircraft are subjecting to cruel and barbarous bombardment the largest centres of Korea - Pyongyang, Seoul and many other towns and inhabited places in that country. 1t is not Korean airmen who are firing upon the peaceful population, towns and inlmbited places of the United States, but United States airmen, complying with the orders of the war- mangers and aggressors, who are killing hundred.s and thousands of peaceful Korean people-women, children and old men - who are destroying and setting fire to Korean houses, factories, works, schools, hospitals, killing the sick who are there for treatment, while cynically boasting ta the whole world of the number of tons of explosives dropped on the peaceful towns and villages of Korea. We can give the United Kingdom representative the answer that, of course, it is not cowboys or farmers from Texas or workers from Chicago who are carrying out aggression against the Korean people, but the war- mangers and aggressors who put these cowboys and farmers into uniform and send them to remote, un- known Korea to kill Koreans and perish there them- selves. These generally-known facts cannot be concea1ed by any references to an illegal resol~tion,. ju~t as these re- solutions cannot be used to explam or Justify the bloody aggression of the United States Government agaiIlst the Korean people. Mr. Austin has attempted to speak here of the tragic fate of the Koreans. In the mouth of the United States representative such words are utter hypocrisy and false- hood. These are the crocodile tears of the ruling circ1es of the United States. The fate of the Korean people is of little interest or concern to them. As men of afiairs they are interested in "business", in the minerais and riches of Korea, in the cheap slave labour available in that country under the puppet colonial regime of Syngman Rhee, that faithful bondsman of the United States monopolists. 1t is also well known that the United States militarists are interested in Korea as a strategie base Or! the· mainland of Asia. Mr. Austin undertook a task far beyond his powers when he attempted to ~plain the history of the Korean question with the help of a borrowed crib. For the sake of establishing the truth, Mr. Austin should be reminded that in December 1945 the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the United States and file United Kingdom,· on the insistent sugr;estion of the USSR Government and its Foreign Mini6ter, Mr. V. M. Molotov, adopted the well-known historical decision on Korea. Later China also associated itself with this decision. This decision fully assured the restoration of Korea as· a unitary, independent and democratic State. Saon afterwards, however, the United States Gcvern- ·ment and its Command in South Korea began to ~wfully and in despite and vialation of war-time agreemE'nts and of Article 107 of the United Nations Qt.arter, referred the Korean question to the United Nations in 1947, thus breaking the Moscow Agreement of the three Foreign Ministers. Since then the Govemment of the United States has, with the collaboration of the Anglo-American bloc, forced through a number of iIlegal resolutions to suit its own convenience and the convenience of its South Korean puppets, in order, by means of these so-called "United Nations r~~olutions", to conceal the proprietary activities of United States monopolies in Korea. The Government of the United States and the Anglo- American bloc did not admit the representatives of North Korea, who were the representatives of tr3l1Y millions of the Korean people living north of the 38th paraIlel, ta the meetings of the General Assembly. Under caver of various iIlegal resolutions of the Gen- eraI Assembly forced through by.the Gove~ent.of the United States, and on the basts once agam of tn- formation derived from unilateral sources of the United States and the Syngman Rhee regime, the government circles of the United States, striving to convert the whole of Korea into its colonv. decided to provoke an armed conflict in Korea betWeen the govemmental camp of South Korea and the govemmental camp of North Korea, counting on an easy victory, wmch was promised it by the United StatE'.5 generals who had trained the Syngman Rhee forces in South Korea for that purpose. A sinister part in this whole business bas undoubt- ed1y been played by General MacArthur, who fancies himself an emperor and the vicar of God in the Far East and who apparently bas no intention of remming to the United States but is seeking a pretext to extend his stay in the Far East. When the hopes placed in the Syngman Rhee clique were shattered and the puppet regime itself began to fall, the Government of the United States hastened to assist that clique, and confronted the whole worId and the United Nations with the fait accompli of ag- gression by the Government of the United States against the Korean people. Such in hrief is the ttue history of the development of events in Korea, from the conference of the three Foreign Ministers in Moscow in Decemher 1945 to the present day. AlI these facts are known to the whole wcrId, and the United States representative will not succeed in conceaIing them by any subterfuges or dis- tortions. 1s it net clear that United States ruling circ1es are concemed with the fate, not of the Korean people, but of their own capital investments in Korea, for the pro- Le rôle sinistre dans toute cette affaire a été joué par Je général MacArthur, qui se croit empereur et lieutenant de Dieu en Extrême-Orient, qui n'a apparem- ment pas l'intention de revenir aux Etats-Unis et qui cherche un prétexte pour prolonger son séjour en Ex- trême-Orient. Quand les espoirs placés dans la clique de Syngman Rhee se sont effondrés et quand le régime fantoche a commencé lui-même à trembler, le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis s'est précipité à l'aide de cette clique, en mettant le moode entier et l'Organisation des Nations Unies devant le fait accompli d'une ae.aression du Gou- vernement des Etats-Unis contre le peuple coréen. Telle est, en quelques mots, J'histoire véritable des événements de Corée, depuis la réunton des trois Minis- tres des affaires étrangères, tenue à Moscou en décem- bre 1945, jusqu'à ce jour. TOUl! ces faits sont connus du monde entier; nul faux-fuyant, nulle déformation de la vérité par le représentant des Etats-Unis ne pourra les dissimuler. N'est-il pas évident que les cercles dirigeants des Etats-Unis s'inquiètent, non point du destin du peuple coréen, mais du sort des capitaux qu'ils ont placés en It is not surprising, then, that the army which Syng- man Rhee, obeying MacArthur's orders, muved against the People's Democratic Republic of Korea on 25 June, did not and could not stand a strenuous test in an encounter with the true Korean People's Army, which was faithfully serving its people and was inspired by the high ideal of a sacred war for liberty and national independence and the creation of a unitary, independent and democratic Korean State free from aIl foreign servitude and oppression. That is why this People's Army was able, within the first few days, not ooly to repulse the attacks of the enemy but also to launch a counter-attack and to destroy Syngman Rhee's so-ealled national army, which is nothing more thoo a hired watchdog of its United States masters in South Korea. This is the fundamental reason for the vict-:\ry of the Korean People's Army over the army of the watch- dogs of United States capital in Korea, created by United States generals under the false banner of a "Korean national army". The United States representative IS attempting to convince members of toe Security Council to the contrary. On reftll"ence to the facts, however, it be- cornes ob.vious that this legend, which bas been bastily concocted by the United States Government and by the United States military command aiter the failure of Syngman Rhee to effect the Iightning execution (Jf the "plan of campaign against the North", is -refuted by the very United States generals and politicians who created, armed and trained the army of Syngman Rhee for the attack on the People's Democratic Republic of Korea. Is it not clear that thase who embarked upon this unilateral course were necessarily playing ioto the bands of United States aggression in Korea, that they were in fact in the grip of United States ruling cirdes, who are attempting to force upen everyone their one-sided and false account of the events in progress in Korea? Is it not clear that the legend whic:h the United States delegation in the Security Connal bas been at sucb pains to circulate is designed for simpletons? Its abject 15 also obvions: having lost their watchdog in Korea as a result of the coUapse of the pseudo-national forces of Syngman Rhee, United States ruling circles are It was for this very purpose that the United States Government needed resolutlons, even iIIegai resolutions, of the Security Coum::il (jf the United Nations. The iIlegality of these resolutions i~ weil known. This can- not he denied by the representative of the United States, nor even by the Secretary-General, for these resolutions were adopted, not in conformity with the Charter, but in gross violation of the Charter. For this purpose the Government of the United States also required the United Nations Bag. It is attempting to eoneeal its aet of bloody aggression against th~ Korean people beneath the pale blue ftag of the United Nations. United States airmen are now throwing thousands of tons of bombs on the peaceful Korean population from United States Flying For- tresses, concealing themselves hehind the United Na- tions ftag, on which is portrayed the olive branch, the sacre<! symbol of pesee and friendship. What can he more disgusting and cynical than this pemicious and violent combination of the aggression of the United States claimants to world hegemony with the symbol of international peace and friendship? This is not only a most gross violation of the Charter; it is also a direct modcery of the Charter and of the most sacred of the purposes and tasks of the United Nations. By what right, in virtue of what norms of interni.'i- tional ]a~, are the ruling circles of the United States of America committing all these evil crimes against the peace-Iovin~! industriou! and talented pe0r.le of a country that ID andent times was called the 'Land of Morning Calm"? Neither the Govemment of the United States nor the ruling circles of that country have anI_ right to commit tms monstrous international crime. There is not and cannot he any justification in international law for this aggression. this act of international banditry. The acts of the United States Govemment towards the Korean fC:Ople faIl entire1y and completely within the defimtion of aggression widely accepted in in- ternational relations; they constitute a direct aet of aggression and the United States Government is the attacking party, the aggressor. The United States Government attempted to con- ceal and justify this aggression by means of the iUeçaI Securïty Coundl resolutions of 25 and 27 June. In ID- fonning the Govemments of Member States of the United Nations of these iIlegal resolutions, which were represented to he "Security Coundl resolutions", the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the United States Govemment were in effeet concea1ing the iJI~ity of these resolutions from Memhers of the Umted Nations and from world public opinion. They did not indicate that these resolutions had becn adopted in violation of the Charter, without the par- ticipation of two permanent membera of the Security CoUnci1, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ana China. In arder te recûfy matters, the United States C'est pourquoi toute cette manœ~VI"@ des Etats-Unis et ce nouveau projet de réoolution [S/1653] sont cousus de fil blanc: Ce projet de résolution tend à \ aggraver la guerre civile en Cor~, à condamner.illé- galement l'une des parties au conflit, et, c'est là son but essentiel, à couvrir et à justifier une extension ultérieure de l'agression des Etats-Unis contre le peuple coréen. Il est évident que la délégation de l'URSS ne peut manquer de s'élever de la façon la plus c;ltégonque contre des proposition~ de cette nature, qui tendent à prolonger et à étendre la guerre, et P. renforcer t'agres- sion des Etats-Unis contre le peuple coréen, sous le couvert de cette expression fallacieuse de "localisation du conflit", On the instruttions of the Government of the Union Pour sa part, la délégation de t'URSS, suivant les of Soviet Socialist Republics, the USSR delegation instructions qu'eUe a rec;;ues de son Gouvernement, a bas introduced r483rd meeting] a draft resolution présenté [483èt'Ii? séancel un projet de résolution [S/1668] proposing the immediate cessation of hostili- [S/1668] tendant à la cessation immédiate des hostili- ties in Korea and the withdrawal of foreign troops tés en Corée et au retrait de Corée des troupes étran- from Korea. The USSR delegation i5 also proposing gèt'es. EUe propose en outre que le Conseil de sécUrité that the Security Council should hear representatives of entende les représentants du peuple coréen, ceux du the Korean people, bath of the North Koreans and of Nord comme ceux du Sud, lors de t'examen de la pro- the South Koreans, in considering proposa!s for the position te.ant au règlement pacifique de la ~uestion peaceful settlement of the Korean question. The USSR de Corée..... délégation de l'URSS propose d étudier delegation is proposing that this question should he dis- cette question avec la participation de la République cussed with the participation of the Chinese People's populaire de Chine. qui est directement intéressée au Republic, which IS directIy concerned in the peaceful règlement pacifique de la question de Corée et à la settlement of the Korean question and in the main- sauvegarde de la paix et de la sécurité en Extrême- tenance of peace and security in the Far East. Orient. The obvious contrast between these two clearly con- Le simple rapprochement de ces deux propositions tradictory proposaTs - the Soviet Union proposa! and radicalement opposées, telle de l'URSS et celle des the United States proposaI - will show the peoples Etats-Unis, suffit à montrer aux peuples du monde of the world that the USSR Government is caUing entier que le Gouvernement de l'URSS invite le Con- l1pon the Security Council and the United Nations to seil de sécurité et t'Organisation des Nations Unies à foUow the road of peace and the peaceful settlement suivre la voie de la paix et du règlement pacifique de ta of the Korean question, while the United States Gov- question de Corée, alors que le Gouvernement des Etats- ernment is pushing the Security Couneil and the United Unis pousse le Conseil de sécurité et l'Organisation Nations farther and farther towards war and the des Nations Unies à s'engager toujours davantage sur increase of aggression in Korea. la voie de la guerre et à soutenir 1agression en Corée. ThL Council must make its choice between, on the Le Conseil de sécurité doit choisir: ou s'engager one band, taking a firm stand for peace, and, on the fermement dans la voie de la paix, ou continuer à other, cQntinuing to slip and sink deeper into the mire glisser et à s'enliser toujours plus dans la guerre, où of war, into which it is being dragged by the aggressor t'agresseur, c'est-à-dire les cercles dirigeants de.. Etats- - that is, the ruling circles of the United States. Unis, veut t'entrainer de toutes ses forees. The Soviet Union is prepared to take an active part L'URSS est prête à participer activement au règle- in the pescef"l settlement of the Korean question ment pacifique de la question de Corée pur t'entremise through the Security Council and to usè its influence du Conseil de sécurité et à utiliser son influence à for this worthy purPose. cette noble fin. . The course of tbe USSR delegation is clear, It Pour la délégation dè l'URSS, le chemin est tout stands firmly and unconditionally for pesee and the tracé: elle suit fermement et sans défaillance le chemin peacefui settlement of the Korean question, and calls de la paix et du règlement pacifique de la question de 23 Needless to say, the USSR delegation cannot but raise the most strenuous objection to proposaIs of this sort, which are designed to prolong and extend the war and to intensify United States àggression against the Korean people under cover of the fiction of "locali- zation of the conflict". . Speakiug now as PRESIDENT, 1 should like ta state that it has been suggested, in view of the lateness of .the hour, that we dispense with hearing the French translation today, and adjoum. If the French repre- sentative has no objection, we shall do so. Mr. CHAUVEL (France) (translated trom Fre'lch) : 1 have no objection to postponing the interpretation of this speech until the next meeting. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (U?lited Ki'lgdom): When will the Council meet again?

If th~re are no objections, we shall meet again at 3 p.m. 011 Monday, 14 August. As there are no objections, it is so decL':ed. The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m. ' clor~ dès maintenant la séance. S'il n'y a pas d'objec- tion de la ~ du représentant de la France, nous allons pouvoIr ajourner la séance. M. CHAUVEL (France): Je n'ai aucune objection à ce que la traduction de ce discours soit remise à la prochaine séance. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'an· glais) : Quand aura lieu notre prochaine séance? Le PRÉSIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Nous nous réu- nirons de nouveau le lundi 14 août à 15 heures, s'il n'y a pas d'objections. Puisqu'il n'y a pas d'objections, il en est ainsi décidé. La séance est levée à 18 h. 25.