S/PV.5 Security Council

I would ask that item 1 of, the agenda, the adoption of the provisional agenda, be adopted. Are there anyobservations? I would point out, in connexion with the agenda, that there is the letter that was received from the Iranian delega.tion by the President of the Secu- :r::ty Council dated 26 January 1946,8 wmch has been circulat::;d and which, it was' agreed at the last,,meeting~ should' b~: included in the. documents. Are ail in agree,ment vrith th{'; agenda bern.g adopted? J'he qgendiz was adop~ed. 23. Supplementary :i~!1tement by the Irl1lnian representative IhePREslDENT: Atthe third meetingof the ", Secuiity Council, in accordance with the procedure that 1 suggested, wmch was adoptedby the Council,' the representativeof Iran was. invited to the table toparticipate ln the discussion ..withont vote. The representative of Iran then • I "Ibid., 8tlppl~entNü. 1; Allnex 3. , sentativ(~ of Iran making those supplementary remarks; but May 1 indicate that ü that is grantedl , 1 feel also it should carry With it the right ofthe representative of the Union of ~oviet Socialist Republics to make such' reply as he May wish? Is itthe wish of the Council t1at the representative of Iran l'lhall have the opportunity of making a supplementary statement? Are there anyobservations? ~r. TAQIZADEH (Iran): 1 wish to confine The substance of the statement -of the Soviet representative was based on·two points: :first, that therehasbc::en negotiation between Iran and .the' Unionoif. Soviet Socialist Republics which 'wasconcluded or ended with au Cxpres;. sion of samfactionfrom Iran over· the result obtainèd;, ~cond,.that sinee there ~ béen nego- m~'Self to making on1y t'Wo remarks in ~eply to the statement made by the Soviet representative; .ID the last, session.'1 would reply to t40se points which are relevant to the substance of the mat- ter. 1 will not enter into any discussion with regard to. otherpoints and references. or allu- sionsta the change in the administr.:Ltion in Iran, as weIl as similar matters. ~ation b(;tweenthe twoparties, the. n.1atter coulcl notbebr:Dught to the Councilin accordance with ,~,< theproè(:dure provided in the Charter~ 1 must say that the Iranian delegationcontests both points,a:nd is of the opinion that the arguments ofthef5oviet· representative do. not show the gmunds. . . /lnthe1int pl~ce,thatis,relatiP.g ta thefirstEn Jl7jatter,as. thequestionisexplained fully' and ç1.early .in thèmemorandtIm .•which the .Iranian êl~egationpresep.ted tothe Security Qouncil, f)J.ehistciry of the IlOtes 1 exc.hanged between Iran ia.ndthe·Unic:mof·Soviet Soèi~istRepublics with ;'regàrc:l·.to.thel'ecent events is as follows: '. .''.' i· .Mter therebe1lionin Az~rbaijan;the Ir~an FGOvemment sent security. forces for reinforce- ~~~-~~L4~=,metl(ton_laJ~IoYeIllb.erand.communicated.in..avembre,. . Ilotetothe Soviet GovemmeIltfirst alist of a' gqodmany iuterferences in the internalaffairsof IJ:'an:.<[n:tP,esecond< piace the IrarJanGovern.. ·nientask'J\;. fol'. the.freedom ofa.ction andmove- mento[:ffiose Inuüal1 forces. sent ta Azerbaijan ~S~~ Official Reco'ld$,;."g1 the= Security Council, F.irst = Y~'First Series. Supplement No. 1; Annex 2B The Soviet Government replied on 26 Novem- ber and denied aIl those interferences which were enumerated in the !ranian note, but said explicitly that similar interferences vrould not take place. But the Soviet authorities refused to let the Iranian security forces proceed. The Iranian Government, in reply to this note of the Soviet Government, since the main and immedi- ate object was to secure that the Iranian security forces would proceed to Azerbaijan, stated that at this stage it did not want to go into the past interferences which the Soviet Glvernment de- nied. As the Soviet Government in its note said that there would not be any ;nterference,. the Iranian Government again insisted that the secu- rity forces going to Azerbaijan should be allowed to proceed. The t('.xt of this note is in Persian, and here it is before my eyes. 1 think 1 know the Persian language weIl enough to be able to say that in this note there is no trace of an expression of satisfaction either at the fact that the Soviet Government denied the interferenees in the past or at its rejeetion of the Iranian request for the seeurity forces to proeeed. It will be easy to put before the. Couneil these letters, whieh are in Persian, in order to have them examined by im- partial experts; and you havealready·seen the translations .in the memorandum which the Iranian delegation presented the other day to the Couneil. . But. apait from àll this, may we not hring to bear on this matter the eommon sense of the members of the Council? Is it at all possible or eoneeivable that a foreign J?ower woul.d write to another country, whïch complains, that all it has said is untrue and that the request to allow the seeurity forces to proeeed is rejected, and that . the aggrieved country then would tum round . and say, "Thank you"? The Soviet .Government considers this to bè negotia;tion, and that therej~ctionof the request and the·promise that interference would not take place in the future is a happy resolution of the so-called negotiation.•1 shouldIike to leave the judgment of this matter to ilie common seIise of the Council. As to the second point of· the Soviet repre- We have sought that negotiation. We went so far in that direction that the lranian Prime Minister and the Minister of For.eign Affairs offered to go to Moscow to negotiate, not only at the time of the conference of the Three Powers in Moscow, as was said by tlle Soviet representa- tive, but even before that time and also later in a note sent to the Soviet Embassy, and once again in a speech delÎ\!ered in the Iranian Parliament on 18 December, a copy of which was sent to the Soviet Embassy with a note on 21 December. The offer was repeated in a note dated 14 De- cember to the Soviet Embassy in Tehran. This expressIy said that the Iranian Government, before learning of the forthcoming conference of the Foreign Ministers in Moscow, proposed through the Ambassador in Moscow thf::t the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs should go to Moscow and get in contact withthe Soviet statesmen. But all this was of no avail; it was all ignored. In the end, no direct negotiations for the settle- ment of this dispute took place at all. The notes ,.of the Iranian Government requesting that its ~orces be allowed to enter this te..-ritory, and the notes of the Soviet Government rejecting this request cannot be called "direct negotiations" which have given results. • ' Therefore, if the Soviet l'epresenta~ve says that there has been no seeking of direct negotia- tions for a settlement of the matter, 1 say'that that is not true, because, as 1 have explained, we ,have sought direct negotiations with no avai1. But if he wants to say that the negotiations had already begun, and, those notes for the request and therejection are negotiations, even if one assumed 'that that is so, 1 say that there has been no result. Therefore, from whatever angle you look at the matter, you. will find that the ~e1imin~conroMnsre~me~bM~gthe matter beforethe COJlllcilare in order. ln conclusion, .1 should like to say thaï, 'now that this disputehascomebefore. the Council and has fot11ld a: place on its agenda, it cannot bedismissed and must not be dismissed. In no cirçumstancesmllStit go out of tJ;Ie.handsof the Conncil; ît mustbe pursued. , . If, ,as the Soviet represehtative: said .at the conclusion ofhis statement, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics isready for direct negotia- .tions' fo~ .the settlement ,of this· dispute, wewill Th~ Couneil sliould take this matter under its jurisdiction; negotiationS sùould proceed under its aegis. Progress should he reported to the Couneil from time to time, and results should be reported to it within a reasonable lapse of time. In this way, we are ready to get into direct negotiations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, but under no circumstances are we prepared to let the matter go out of the hands of the Couneil. 24. SupplfJmentary stctement by the SO'fliet representative Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): 1 care- fully followed the second statement made in the Security Council by Mr. Taqizad,eh, Head of the Iranian delegation, on behalf of the Iranian Government. 1 do not intend to follow the course taken by the representative of thl~ Iranian delegation, because that would meal1, in' the first place, repeating what has already been said (and repetition is not always the mother of learning, in spite of the well-known school proverb), and becau~ in the second place, that would mean marking time without any hope of making any progress. Nevertheless, 1 must dwell once again upon a number of most important points which wert: mentioned today by the representative of Iran. On the last occasion 1 raised two funda.'llental questions: Did any negotiations take place, and what were their results? Today the Iranian rep- resentative states t1'la.t, strictly speaking, there were negoti,ations but not direct negotiations. In that case 1 would ask~ ''\-'hat were those nego- tiations? "Not direct negotiations" means nego- tiations through the,intermediary of sorne other person, body or State. l, am not aware that during November' questions of interest to the Iranian Government and naturally of interest to the Soviet Government were considered through the. intermediary of any other bodies, persans or States. On the contrary, l can con,. firm, on the pasis of those same documents which were so copiously supplied to the Security Council by the Iranian'delegation, that these negotiations did take place between the Soviet Government' and the Iranian Governinent, and WithOllt intermediaries. But negotiations taking place· without intermeqiaries are in factdirect negotiations. 1 will not, however, dwell on this aspect of th.e matter, because in the long run it does not matter ·whether the negotiations weredirector indirect. The fact is that there were negotiations. The f~ct that ·these· negotiations took place. by means oi an exchange of not-èson the one hand, 1 referred to the note of 1 December. 1 am prepared to use oxJy the Iranian text, that is to say, the text submitted by the Iranian dele- gation. as an annex and distributed to the mem- bers of the Security Council. However, 1 can- nat disregard the facts, which speak for them- selves. Of course, one can raise a number of puzzling questions such as whether it is likely that the country concerned would say: "Your complaint ïs not just, but 1 thank you," as Mr. Taqizadeh said. But the fact remains that the nùte of 1 Decembe.l' "(and 1 am going to quote this text from the copy supplied by the Iranian delegation) makes the following statement: "In answer to the communication in which you reply that the charges made concerning the interference of Soviet officiais in our in- ternai affairs, in the Northem Provinces, are unfounded, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not wish at this time to give further explanations·in this matter and to throw more light on the antecedents of the case. It takes note with satisfaction of the purport of your statements to the effect that hencefOl'l-;h such incidents will not repeat themselves."-' 1 do not want to argue. 1 am prepared ta accept the Iranian text as it is. 1 do not want to argue about words, 1 do not want ta argue about philology, because heie we may put philology aside. The text which we received and translated, and which we checked for severa1. days by means of telegraphic correspondence through Mbscow with our Embassy in Iran, reads as follows in the pasSage in question: "The Ministry of Foreign Affah's expresses iti satisfactionwith the contents of your reply, in which you state that the interference of Soviet officiais in the internai affairs of the Northem Provinces of Iran is not in accord- ance with the facts, since the Ministry of For- eign Affaiz;s does not wish at this time to give more detailed explanations in this matter and throw full light on past· circumstances, and aIso on account of the fact that it is c1ear from your statements that the actions in ques- tion will not be repea.tedin the future. The Ministry of ·Foreign Affairs aIso expresses its l!atisfactionat your maternent thatthe Soviet officiais fully respect the provisions of the Tri- Partite Treaty and the Declarationof the three great Powers,the Allies of· Iran, signed and published in Tehran." "._-- S Sec Official R.corr!s of th. S~cuTity Couneil,. First Year, Pirst Series, Supplement No. 1; Annex 2B, appen-PremièreAnnée. .. dix A. page58.· 'lfi~lIsg····•••••••.••IîIII•••• mn 1 do not know whether the words written in the official document should be trusted or not. Whether the lranian text or our translation of that text is taken, one thing can be said. As a result of the cOITespondence and negotiations which took place during November between the Soviet Govt>..rnment and the Iranian Govern- ment, as a result of the study of the eJI.'Planations presented by the Soviet Government through its Embassy in Tehran to the Iranian Government in the note of 26 NovC-t"11ber 1945, the Iranian Government- evidently made up its mind as fol- lows: The Soviet Govemment states that the treaty will be respected by its officiais and repre- sentatives. It denies, it is true, thèse facŒ. but in view of the existence of this assurance thatthe incidents will not be repeated, there is no need to go furtner iuto the consideration of these petty disputes; we must close the subject and look to the future. And in this sense 1 maintain that the Iranian Government's answer of 1 December undoubtedly expressed satisfaction at the Soviet Government's note of 26 November. It was a realistic approach. It was not thèman- ner of approach of disputants who insist at any cost on arguing abstractly on the question of what is or is not the truth;it was a realistic approach. Very good; you say that there were no such incidents, and we say that there were. But we take note of the fact that the treaty is respected. We are prepared to let the matter rest there. Such a line- of argument is realistic, Such disœrnment provides justification for the state- ment that the Iranian Government's answer of 1 December bears traces of a satisfaction which tp,e representative of the Iranian dèlegation here has unfortunately failed to perceive. 1 ask the Security Council to remenlber that the Soviet Government, and the Soviet delega- tion, which expresses here the opinion.of the Soviet Government and acts upon its instruc- tions, puts the question precisely in the following way: Were there or were there not misunderstand- ings? We deny that there were.The Iranian Government denies our denial. Up to 1 Decem- ber, a certain balance.was struck and a haltwas called at that point. The Iranian Government, and 1 stress this, previously stated that it did not want to deal further' with this question and did not wish to revert to the antecedents of this bygone matter. This, of course, gave the Soviet Government every. reaSOl.1 to consjder that the Iranian Government was satisfied with the result. This can be judged from the note of 1 DeceI:Q.ber. . . pl~ce in this way? It would not be difficult to prove that the events in northem Iran have nothing to do with the prellence there of Soviet forces. These events were intemal Iranian mat- ters. And, as is known, the whole .essence of these events was tbat in northern Iran there was a question of national autollomy witlrin the liInits of the Iranian State, of the desires and aspirations of. the local Azerbaijan popula.tion, .desires which do not constitute anything unusual in. any democratic country. What have Soviet trooostodo with that? . 'rhe lranian ('.TOvernment states that it wished to bring in additional troops, but that the Soviet Government had opposed this. This is true. LI'l northem Iran are stationed one lnfantry regi- ment, two infantry brigades and two regiments of gendarmerie, a mast imposing police array. Are not these forces sufficient to testoœ order in that district? This is how the Soviet Government envisaged tbis question, and in its replies to the inquiries of the American and British Governments, through Mr. 'Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, the Soviet Government stated that these forces Were amply sufficient,· provided, of course, that the local Iranianauthorities did not provoke the local population by their actions. 'rhese brigades, regiments and gendarmerie were fully suffi.cient to restoreproperorder in the district if the Iranian authorities themselves were able and willing to,do so. ' Would not <the introduction of additionâl troops into the COUIltry put both sides in a difficult.position? Soviet troops are sta,tionedin northem Iran.in accordance with an agreement concluded between the Iranianand Soviet Gov- ernments.in ·1942.SoViettroops couidnot of cc:>urse permit amassaçre totake place before their eyesasa resultoftheprovocative actions of. the authorities. This was how.this· question was envisa~ed. 1.think that ~ wasa legitimate view of the question. Imâintain that in itsnotes· after 1 December the Irania,nQovemmentacldressed itself to the ,,' SovietGovermnent, notin respectof interference 'intheinternalaffairsof Iran,butwith aview ta takingadvantage of the Mc:>scowOonference It must be borne in mind that, a.t the Confer- ence of the three Foreign Ministers in Moscow, the Iranian question was not discussed. On about the last day before the Conference closed, on 26 Decèmber, it was definitely decided that the Iranian·question would not he' dis- cussed. If the representative of the Iranian Government desired ta be present in Moscow for the purpose of discussing the Iranian ques- tion, and this question was not discussed, there was no need for such a representative to attend. Perhaps the Iranian Government is displeased that Mf. Hakimi was not given an opportunity ta he present in Moscow? But the Hakimi Gov- erninent was following a line which supported a movement in Iran hostile ta the·Soviet Govern-. ment, wmch we mentioned in our notes and referred to in the Security COlmcil on 24 January. To be brief, 1 will dwdl on the last, the concluding statement of the representative of the· Iranian delegation. He stated that the !ranian delegation did not oppose direct nego- tiations between the Soviet Government and the I!'aJ1Î~n Government. This, of course, is àlso in accordallce with our wishes, as 1 stated on 24 January, as 1 declared at our thjrd meeting and as 1 am in a position to declare here and r:.ow. The Iranian delegation, however, imposes the condition that the Security Council should not let this matter go out of its hands, !hat it should, follow and keep a. check on the course of the negotiations and be informed of their result. If the position is that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in its actions, must be placed under .some .sort of special supervision1;>y the Security Council, 1 reject it as incompatible with the position of the. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. among the Powers of the.worM, as incompatible with its dignity as a member of the Security Council,. an.d às incompatible with the dignityof the United :Nations. 1 consider that if the Iranian Government is not in factengaged here at the pre$ent time in fencing with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,. but sêeks a wise and sound solution ofthis question, it is necessaryto agree to biIateral negotiations which, given good-will on the part of the Soviet and Iranian Governrnents, may remove the existing misunderstandings benveen· them. That .good intentiollson the part of t.ne Soviet Government are there, 1 can guarantee, and 1 think that there. is likewi§e no. reason for the Iranian Government to assume a••differentattitude. And there· is no justification for ta1ki.ng about any conditions, .especially since the •.•Security Council is in permanent existence as an active organ.of the United Nations which hasevery possibility,under the Charter,. of e:x:ercising at any. time the rights pertaining to itaccardingto. the Charter. n~y sentant que Mr. TAQIZADEH (Iran): In accordancewith yo'l.u' wishes, 1 will not go into the mattet. In reply to the different points raised by the Soviet delcgation,· 1 understand from the English and French. translations, wmch 1 have followed, that the Soviet representàtive said 1 admitted that there has been anegotiation; but 1 do not admit ever having said such a thing as that. . 1 said tlle Charter provided that the parties should seek negotiations,'should seek a solution .by negotiations, and we have soUght without avail and withoutresult. In anotherplace l said, only by supposition, that, evenif one assumed that negotiations had taken place, that does not mean anything since it has brought no result. Agam, the matter could be brought before the Security COURcil even if there had been any negotiation without result, butI never admittc;:d that there had been negotiaûon. 1 repeat again: Th.e a(;t of writing a note requestingsomeone t'G,allow our own troops ta go toour own ter:dtory for the purpose of pacification, .and the receipt of a reply saying thatthe question·of whether troops are needed there,or not needed there, is not for the Iranian Govermnent to decide, but that somebody eIse must see if that is necessary or not, and there and then.the refusaI of the request camiot,as 1 see it, be considered~'negotiation". Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated t'tom Russian): It seems ta me that the matter is quite·clear, and 1 do not wish to make any statement. 25. .General discussion The PRESIDENT: The matter is now open for discussion and for such proposaIs as the Qouncil may think proper~ Mr. B~VI1-r (United!{ingdom): This dispute between these two Governments.· has arisen in pursuance· of thecarrying out of a treaty ta whièh the United. Kingdom Government is a party, as well as the twoGovernments con- In fact, 1 ought to say, speaking fo),' my ("~v­ ernment,. that we felt .a sense of gratitude, at very dire moments when the war was at its .worst, that the Iranian Government' placed its territory, citizens and communications at the disposaI of the Allies. Our feeI:üg 18 very strong that if weentered' a territor'l ior the purpose of conducting the war against Gèrmany"and later against Japan, we have even a 6'Teater duty than the treaty lays down. This is to make sure not onlythat we preserve the integrity of the country .that placed its territory at our disposal, but that we hand it back intact, with" our forces gone and without interference \vith its sùverignty. Therefore, the question arises: Mas the sover- eignty of the Jranian Government beeni.'1.. fringed upon? This is where the.' evidence' is a little confiicting. Accoriling to the Iranian Gov- ernment,." as l'l'ead' the documents, .when tliis internal difficulty arose in Azerbaijan, a difficulty similar historically to that which happened.un- der the Govemment of Russia in the early part of 1914, the IraniaIl. Government proceeded~ 1 See Official RlJcords of the Security Council, First Year, First Series, Supplement No. 1; Annex2B, page 45~' . Now, on the admission of Ml'. Vyshinsky, by the authority of the High Command of Soviet Russia, the Iranian Govermnent was stopped. What is there ta negotiate about? Was it in fact stopped? If it was, then there was an infringe- ment of this treaty, and 1 do not think there is any answer ta that. The treaty is perfectly clear. And what is ta be th~ result of such nego- tiations? What is there ta decide? 1 have been·listening ta this discussion for all these days, and as 1 l'ead the daims made by the IraIùan Govermnent, it is that the Tri- Partite Treaty should be strictly observed, and that the security forces and officiaIs, as appointed by the Iranian Government, should be a110wed ta do thcir duty, as ordered by that Govermnent. l ,mould like to put it ta the Soviet representa- tive, if 1 may, in the friendliest fashion: Is that denied ta the I:rauian Govermnent? The treaty is clear. If my Government had done this and 1 was charged with it, 1 should not reg~d it as a question of dignity for the Council to inquire into it and tell me whether l ha.d done wrong or right. 1 do not regard it as a question of Lqe dignity of a State if the Security Council, charg~d with this matter, has it investi- gated and indeed makes a pronouncement as to whether you have or have not carried out your obligationunder the treaty. Persona11y, 1 bave no objections to discussions between the SO",iet Govermnent and the Iranian Government, b'.lt 1 must say to the Council that we, tao, are parties to the treaty. What is going to be. decided under this treaty? 1 understand that is the only thing under discussion, although in the statemènt of the Soviet Union there is reference to the danger to the Baku oillields. 1 cannot imagine the Iranian army or anybody eIse attacking the Soviet army and endangering the Baku oilfidds; 1 rea11y c~nnot. 1 think that is rather an exaggeration. Nor can 1 really ima- gine~he Soviet authorities being unable to main- tain sufficient protection against saboteurs or anything referred to in the Soviet statement. It goes rather deeper than that. We and the United States communicated with the Soviet Government, and we did regard the answer as not being conclusive or satisfactory. We want to promote peace, and there is orie thing 1 would like to say about this. You will, 1 am peL'fectly certain, Mr. President, pull me up if Iam going astray, but thi"J thing did look to us in thisCuUu- Jry like a war of nerves. It did rea11y look like . the prescription laid down in, and quotedby the 1 am quite willing for these discussions to take place, but as a party to the treaty 1 would ask the Soviet Government ta agree with us ta leave it on the agenda. It has been subject to public discussion here, and there is another reason, a very ~ound reason which would appl}' ta my country or to the United States if we were in a similar position. Oh'':,. are powerful countries; we are what is sometimes described as the "Big Three". 1 certainly a.1ll a good physîcal repre- sentative of the "Big Three". But we do represent power, and power does count in nl.;lgotiatiol13. There are armies in Iran. They are there by the kindness of Iran, to whom 1 am sure every Ally, havi..ng re&,ard to the vic- tory we have won and the transportation that it represented to us in our very darkest moments, must feel a sense of gratitude. Yet that smaU Power has to negotiate with an a..-my of 1 cannot tell how many thousands on its territory at th;s moment. But it daes seem ta me that for Iran to have to negotiate alone without, shall 1 say, the watchfulness, the sense of justice and the hold- ing of the balance of this new United Nations at its disposal, would be most unfortunate and would be misunderstood. Indeed, 1 personally take the view that if 1 were inthis position and it were my Government with the power, military and economic, that we represent, that was in conflict or dispute or disagr~ement with any small Power; 1 should welcome that small Power having at its elbow the assistance of a council of this character. 1 can only conclude by saying that 1 sincerely trust the matter is not in dispute. We stand for the integrity of Iran, without interlerence in her sovereignty; for the removal of troops from her terrÏtory as quickly as we can and the last man to go hy the date we have. agreed; for leaving ~er and her people to work out their political and economic salvation in their own -way; and for us, as great Powers, not to sit in judgment upon them as regards their internalaffairs. Therefore, if talks can proceed, and 1 hope tiley will, between the two Powers primarily concerned, 1 sincerely hope we shall not be put in the position of being asked at this stage to take the question off the agenda and so leave a small Power negotiating in what 1 should regard as the most ~dverse circumstances. Indeed, 1 should think my own dignity and everything else would he enhanced if 1 allowed her to have, Cann'Ot' the Council agree to permit the two parties to negotiate voluntarily and keep tlle Council informed until a mutually satisfactory solution !s found in accordance with justice? Mr. Wellington Koo (China): This is the first case brought before the Security Council wmch falls under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter relating to the pacifie settlement of disputes. For that reason alone, if for no other reasoD, it calIs for the greatest care on the part of the Councii in dealing with it. 1 have listened with great attention ta the statements made both todav and at the last meeting by the Iranian and' Soviet representa- tive::.. 1 also have stuwed with care the written state.."'tlents they conup.unicated to the Council. It appears very clear to dle Chïnese delegation that these statements, both written and oral, while 1.;:tIering from each other as regards the purport or significance of certain faets, or alleged facts, agree on one very important point. They both indicat~ a willingness to continue bilaterm negotiations with a view' to settlement. In the Iight of this manifest desire on the part of both the Soviet delt'.gatioD and the Iranian delegat)]l, it is the Opinili'l1 of the Chïnese delegation that the Council would be well advised to approve the course which both delegations have ex- pressed a very keen desire to follow. The Chïnese delegation sincel'dy hopes that their efforts to reach agreement through the process of friend1y negotiation' will,be attended with success. As :Mr. Vyshinsky hassaid so rightly, the Council has its powers under the Charter and therdore will naturally follo~ thoSt negotiations with interest and attention. It will be very natural aIso for the Council to desire to be kept informed of the progress and result of the negotiations. 1 might add that, as regards the suggestion made by. the Iranian representative for the Council to recommend the procedure of nego- "tiation, it is the view of the Chïnese delegation May 1 also add) in conclusion) that 1 was very much impressed by the assurance of goodwill on the part of the Soviet delegation to make every effort in orderthat the negotiations which will he entered into by the two delegations should he successful. 1) on bcllalf of the Chînese delegation, wish again to express our hope that those negotiatioDS will be successfuI) and also to associate ourselves with the views e1>:pressed by the representative of the United States that the Council might be kept infOlmed of the progress of the negotiations and of the result) which we hope,will he successful in the end. Mr. BIDAULT ~France) (translated Irom French): The matter brought liefore the Secu- city Councll br the Iranian Government is the' first case to be ~ubmitted to us. It thus assumes the nature of a precedent, and as such' .bas a very special imp·,)rtance for our later work and for the -future t.:f the Organization itse1f) an importance of which alI members of the Security . Council are) of course) fully aware, 1 am glad to note in the speeches of the represeutatives.both of Iran and \..f the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the sincere will for an amicable settlement) and the fact that both Govermnents are agreed in thinking that nego- tiations are possible. Going back to Article 33 of the Charter) 1 find that it says: "The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is l;~ely ta endanger the maintenance of intern~tional peace and security) shalI) first of allJ':. seek .a solution by negotiation ••." 1 am of the opinion, therefore) that the Council) while retaining the right to take the matter up again at any time in the event (wml:h 1 hope will not happen) of these nego- tiations failing) should take due note of this desire .wd should allow the parties to resume negotiations. The statements we have heard win not have been entire1y useless if, after having enabled the two parties to explain their relative positions, they have defined more clearly the points at issue and have provided the parties with the oppor- tunity to enter now upon negotiations with the support and approval of the Securlty Council. This procedure will lead to the re-establishment of good~ileighbourly relations in conformity with the goodwill expressed byboth parties. Mr. MODZÈLEWSKI (Poland) (translated (rom Ifrench): 1 could be satisfied with merely associating myse1f, in. the na.xna of Poland, with S The italicIJ are the speaker'i1. times~ even noble, whole armies were moved from one territory to another. Such movements were made the subject of special agreements between the nations concerned, but, as always happens in such cases, life goes on and presents us with new problenlS. We must seek a solution ta these proble..-ns in an atmosphere of mutüal trust and calmness. Discussion of the matter he- fore us today has perhaps been a little too heated, but 1 am happy ta note that at our last meeting and today the atmosphere has been better. . In faet, 1 have listened to the statements of both parties, and 1 wOuld like ta draw' the Security Council's attention above all to the conclusions of the twQ parties. As 1 see it, the conclusion of the Iranian represerttative is that ms Government is anxîous to maintain friend1y and good-neighbourly relations with the Union of Soviet SociaHst Republics. The conclusion of the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics clearly stated that his Gov- emment never refused to l:~gotiate with Iran, and that it is always ready ta discuss the matter. 1 think that the best way ta solve this problem is to leave the two parûes to discuss .and nego- tiate with each other. 1 would even go sa far as to add that intervention bl' a third party wou1d not yield the satisfactory results which we all wish for. Mr. VAN KLEFlmNS (Netherlands): 1 am entirely in agreement with the main points made by the speakers who have preceded me. There is only one point.in which 1 thought We might meet Mr. Vyshinsky's preoccupations a little more, perhaps, and that is this: 1 thought that perhapa for a matter of this kind it is not neces- sary that there should be periodic progress reports. 1 have allowed my pendl to run on the . paper as' 1 was listening, and 1 was wondering whether sQme resolution of this tenor wOuld meet the case: ' "The Security Council, having heard the statements by the repres~ntatives of Iran and of the Soviet Union in the course of its meet- ings (on such and such dates), and having ~aken cognizance of the documents presented by the Iranian and· Soviet de1egations and those referred to in the course of· the oral debates; .considering that both parti~ have

l should like ta say a few worels, not as the President of the Couneil, but in my capacity as the representative of Aus- TRALIA. The policy o.f Australia on aIl these matters is ta support the fullest discussion, consideration and investigation of aIl complaints made by Members of the United Nations under the Charter. The action taken by the Security Council in dealing with such matters will profoundly affect its standing in the eyes of the whole world. At our third meeting, several important steps were taken. The representative of Iran, which is net a member of the Council) was invited to take bis seat at the table and to make an oral statement supplementing the written communication sent to the Council by the Iranian delegation. The l'epresentative of the Soviet Govemment was invited to make an oral statement in reply. The adoption of this procedure at a public meeting of the Couneil is a matter of great importance, sInce it has been made clear to the world at large that the Council, as soon as its jurisdiction was invoked, took positive steps tu deal with the question in issue. It is now clear that both parties have declared \;beir willingness to negotiate. When, however, the jurisdiction of the Cauneil has been invoked, it is the view of the Australian Govermnent that the Council should remain seized of the matter, sa tllat it will be in a position to deal with it again at any time it deems appropriate. If, therefore, the Couneil agrees to defer further consideration of this matter pending negotia.. tions between the· parties, it is the view of my Government that the Cauncil should be kept informed of the progress of these negotiations, and in particular, of the nature of any settlement arrived at betweentheparties. An OPPOE'tunity will then be given for any member of the Council to raisesuch matters as he deems appropriate, and ta bring any proposaI before the Council for its consideration. In this way, the world at large will be kept fully in· formed of the results of the negotiations, and the Couneil, whose jurisdiction .hasbeen invoked, will .be· able to discuss what further action, if any, the Council itselfshould take in relation ta this question. For these reasons, l am of the opinion· that .the matter should be retained on the agenda of the Oouncil until a solution has been .found, which we trust will·he a.speedy and a satisfactory one ta aIl concerned. ,fois, ·pourtait .pleinement Ml'. VAN KLEFFENS (Netherlands): 1 hope to do away with precisely that difficulty by StipM ulating that there shall he a reasonable delay. 1 would ask the representative of the United Kingdom also ta observe that it says at the end of the resolution: without prejudice ta the Councll's right (1 have not the text before me) ta resunle consideration of L'ris matter, if it seems desirable and necessary.

Do 1 take it that that is included as part of the resolution? Mr. BEVIN (United Kingdom): 1 would be prepared to accept this resolution ü the Councll reserves the right ta call for periodic reports, if necessary. 1 do not want ta hurry the reports unduly; 1 want to give the parties a fair chance to negotiate. On the other hand, if we wait for the undefined period named in the terms "reasonable delay", it see.."llS to he left rather vague. 1 think the world would look upon it as if we had heard this case and then pushed it off, and 1 think that is rather a bad precedent ta establish. Since the parties have expressed their willingness to negotiate, let us agree ta ask them to be good enough to supply the Council with periodie reports, so that, in the event of delay or failure ta report, the Couneil could intervene. 1 understand that to he the Australian proposal and the proposal of the United States delegation. It is Ilot the resolution of the Netherlands repreM sentative.

18 the representative of the Netherlands pl'epared'ta consider having incorM porated in bis resolution a reference to periodic reports? Mr. VAN KLEFFENS (Netherlands): My fust preoccupation was to have a text which took into account all relevant considerations, and which at the same time would' be acceptable ta all of us. The resolution undoubtedly says that the Council, if the ,delay seems unreasonable, has the right.ta resume the consideration of the matter. It will have the right ta ask for a progM ress report if it deems fit to -do so at the time. It did not seem ta rnr necessary to say that expressly in the resolution.I am quite open toan)" amendment ta that text 'Which .any representative may desn-e topropose. That is for. the Couneil ta decide.

.It is desirable ta secure " . unaninûty if we possibly cano Are there any . otherspeakers? . Wc will adjourn for five minutes whlle the text is being prepared. There was a short adjournment.

1 ask for the te."tt of the draft resolution to he read. ceThe Security Council, ceHaving heard the statements by-- and by - in the course of its meetings of Jan- uary--,-; "And having taken cognizançe of the docu- ments presented by the--and-- deIega- tions and those referred ta in the course of the . oral debates; "Considering that both parties have af- firmed thcir readiness to seek a solution of the matter at issue by negotia,tion, "Expresses the Council's confidencethat the parties will reàch a just solution within a reasonable delay; CCRequests the parties ta inform the Coun- cil as soon as agreement has been reached, in order that the matter may then be taken off the agenda of the Council, without prejudice to its right ta resume the consideration of this matter, prior to such information being re- ceived, should the Council deem this nec- essary." Mr. BEVIN (United Kingdom): 1 would like the last two paragraphs struck out, and, at the end of the second paragraph, the insertion of the' fol- lowing text: "Consideringthat both parties have affirmed their readiness to seek a solution of the matter at issue by negotiation andthat such negotia- tions will be resumed immediately ••." Then, in place of the last two paragraph,s 1 woùld like to substitute: . "The·parties are requested to inform the 'Council of an:y result achieved. The Council in the meanwhile retains the right at any time to request information as to the progress of the .negotiations." Mr. STETTINIUS (Uriited,Statesof America): 1 am. favourably impressed by Mr. Bevin's sug- gestion, but 1 must add.that it must be under- stood that the item r<unains on our. continuing agenda. If that meanmgis contained in bis Mr. STETTINIUS (United States of America): The addition is entirely agreeable. Mr. VAN KLEFFENS (Netherlands): Since it seems to me that there is nothing in Mr. Bevin's text which is not in mine, and since there is nothing in mine which is not in Mr. Bevin's, 1 am quite ready, if the wording as proposed by Mr. Bevin and as amended by Mr. Stettinius meets with agreement, to withdraw the last two paragraphs of my original motion.

1 take it, then, that the representative of the Netherlands withdraws bis resolution in favour of Mr. Bevin's? Mr. VAN KLEFFENS (Netherlands): Yes, if there is general agreement.

Now the resolution before the chai:' is that one which is now proposed by the repre'3entative of the United Kingdom. J would ask that that resolution be read again to the Cûuncil. Mr.. JEBB (Executive Secretary):' 1 am not quite sure that 1 have got it right, but, as 1 understand it, it reads now as follows: "The Security Council, "Having ~eard the statements by--and by--in the course of its meetings of January--, and "Having taken cognizance of the documents presented by the-and-delegations and those referred to in the course of . the oral debates; "Considering that both parties have af.. firmed their ·readiness to seek a solutiQn of·the matter at issue by negotiation,·and that such negotiation will be resumed immediately"; and then 1 think it reads as follows: "Requests the parties to inform the Council ofany result achieved, and the Council in the meanwhile retains the right.at any rime to requestinformation as to the progress of the negotiations. In the meantime, the·matter remains on the agenda." Mr.Moi:>zELEWSKI (Poland) (translated trom Frimr;h): J t~ thatthe Security Council· is ..always .entitled, under the·· Charter, to in '. _. -. - - .. ,;,' "The Security Counci1 takes note that the parties are prepared to resolve this matter by bilateral negotiations. For fuis purpose, the parties shall be·free to take a11 steps which they may deem expedient. The two parties will in due course submit to the Security Counci1 a report on the outcome of these negûtiations." It is, of coursè, clearly understood that if at a reasonable time, the Security Council, which is in permanent session, has not received a report, it shall have the right to intervene. Mr. BEVIN (United Kingdom): l have looked at Article 35, under which this amendment is drafted, and as 1 reàd that Article it deals with a case that is to be brought before the Security Counci1. If we adopt the amendment now moved by the representative of Poland, it means that it has been beforeus and we have got ~d of it; wc have decided that we have finished with it and referred it ta bilateral negotiation, except for seeing that we get a report of the results achieved. But if no results are achieved, then 1 tbink we have ruled ourse1ves out under Article 35, and that is why 1· agree with the representative of the United States that wc have got to keep it on the agenda until we .know that the thing is disposed of, since it has been before the COlillCil once. It is a new case wmch is referred to under Article 35. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated [rom Russian): If Mr. Stettinius's proposaI, supported by Mr. Bevin,· to the effect that this question should remain on the agenda, is adopted, this will mean in fact tha:t theSecurity Council' will have adopted a recommendation in respect of the Soviet Union and Iran. BuLJ1le question of recommendations can only arise if there are grounds under Article ·37 of the Charter. Artide 37 states that the Security .Council may recommend such action as is contemplated in the present recorr.m1(::n.d~­ tion, but in one definite case only. Thisisa case where the continuance of a dispute may in fact endanger the maintenance of peace and security. It would follow that the existing state of affairs·in the re1ations between the Soviet Union and Iran is such that peace and securityare endangered. Only in such a case, and thellonly, can the Security Council adopt this recommendation, whîch impliesthis factin a veiled Î()rm by retaining this question on· the agenda of·the Security Council. t~k of the Seçurity Council and of the entire United Nations is to .c1ear theway for mutual understanding and collaboration under. the guidance of the great principles upon which the Charter of the United Nations is founded. l am decidedly against this question remain- , ing on .the agenda,of the Security.Council., It must he removedin view of the express agreement for a. friendly settlement, of .this qllestion. ·1 am convinced that we. shall achieve results. Should wefail to, achieve any' results, then any member of, the Security Council. can come into the Security Council'and say: "Giveus an. accountof what you have done to carry out the obligations which. you ,_ assumed .at the meeting of 30January 1946." Mr.BEVIN (United Kingdom): Let me .as- SuI'e Mr. Vyshinsky thatit isnot a question of distrustor.,anything ofthat kind. It is trying to keep to our Charter' that concerns, me. As" 1 understand it,the !ranian delegation referred thisprobleni tous under Article 35, and we are now referrïng itback for bilateral.negotiation. Therefore,it seems to me thattheCouncil, by 1 do not know what answer we should give if we said, "There has been a dispute, we have heard the parties, we have taken their ward that they will negotiate, and we have washed cur hands of it completely, except il}" getting a periodic report." Under Article 36, it seems ta me that we are in duty bound ta see this thing through. As 1 understand it, Ml'. VyshiaïSky accepts my resolution down to the ward "negotiations", but he does not accept the words, "the matter remains on the agenda." 1 think iliat if he looks at it in a reasonable way and without suspicion, he will see that Iegally we are really carrying out by these words, which were added to my resolution by Ml'. Stettinius, our duties under the Charter, and that if they arè discharged, then the question will go off the agenda. 1 sincerely hope that the thought will not accur ta Mr. Vyshinsky that we are putting forward a resolution of this character out of any distrust of either Government. We are trying to carfy out the obligations imposed upon us. Ml'. Wellington Koo (China}: P~rhaps at this stage you will allow me ta present the views of the Chinese Government on the point which is before the Council. 1.look upon the questit>n of leaving or not Ieaving this matter on the agenda merely as a formality, and 1 will explain why. So far as the Council is. concerned, i'i: has the power and indeed the responsibility to consider any question or situation which may affect friendly relations between .nations or affect. the maintenance of international peace and security. Therefore, whether or not this question is Ieft on the agenda does not in any wày affect the rights and duties of the Cr'Hlcil. With regard to the partic'-1ar question before us, 1 feel that.if the·proposaI that the question shouldbe Ieft on the Council's agenda could meet with generaI approval and promote.goodwill, then itshould be left on. the agenda. On the·other hand, if byinsistence on·tbis formality we might find it difficul~ to bring about generàl agreement, then 1·think the COüilCil would be weil advised to consider the point again. 1 regard the point as a pure formality, .hecause it all dependsonthe course of the· negotiationsand the results which will come out of thosenegotiations. If the negotiations resultin a mutually satisfactory settlement,. thenwhen thatresult is brought before the. Council the Councilwill welcome it, assuming that if is ~ 1 fully share the anxiety of some of my colleagues that there should be no misapprehensign in the pijblic mind that the Security Council, after hcaring important statements on an important question, might appear to be divesting itself of that question. But 1 think that with due explanation that misgiving should not arise. It seems to me that in the early part of the proceedings we had arrived at a very happy st?-ge",here 1?othparties expressed their earnest desire ta enter irito negotiations and, as 1 gathered, both parties were quite disposed to keep the Council informed of the progress of the negotiations. They also gave expression to as·· sU1ances of their goodwill and of their earnest desire ta reach a satisfactory conclusion. In view of this felicitous development 1, from the very beginning, have had doubts as ta the advisability or the necessity of adopting il'formal resolution, since many of the representatives have spoken and expressed themselves in the same vein; and indeed you yourself, Mr. President, made a statement which seemed ta give expression ta the general feeling of the members of the Security Council. 1 therefore would conclude by saying once . more that we certainly consider it very important to be able to reach a general understanding, and'that 1 look upon this question of whether it should continue on·the agenda as really a formality. Whether we leave it on the agenda 'or not will in nn way divest thl Council of its power, and still Jess of its duty to watch the progress of anysituation which may have any bearing on the friendly relations between countries, or on the maintenance of international peace and security. J.'he PRESlDF.NT: 1 should like ta ask the Cauncil whether .theCouncil feels that' this might be an appropriate' moment ta have an adjournment, ·and. wh~ther you ,vish to have an evening session. 1 would Iike to know the pleasure of the CouDcil about that.Would the Coundl wish to adjourn at this stage? drais moml~nt ment son intention. Le Conseil entend-il lever maintenant?

Is it the wish then of the Councll that we proceed? Does any other representative wish ta make anY remark? Mr. TAQIZADEH (Iran): It has bem said several times here that both parties agreed to enter into negotiations. 1 made it clear in my statement that we agreed ta negotiate and we wish ta negotiate, provided that the matter in dispute remains before the Councll. 1 cannot think that that is a formality. Even if it is a formality, if it is taken off the agenda we have had the experience always that that is ta the detriment of the small country. 1 cannot think there would he any harm to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics if the matter stays on the agenda, but there may be harm to us if it is taken off the agenda-and not only ta us, but aIso to you. The world would take it that the small nation's appeal is dismissed. Therefore, 1 would like to ask the Soviet representative to agree ta let it stayon the agenda, becausethere would be no harm in it, and 1 sincerely 'wish that we should come to an agreement and report back ta the Council what the conclusion is. Mr. MODZELEWSKI (Poland) .(translated /rom Ff'ench): If we start referring to the various .wticles of the Charter, as one speaker did a little while ago, we can find justification for anything. The Charter contains a wealth of provisions designed to meet many cases; it is easy to invoke such and such an Article to prove that one is right. 1 would like to draw the attention of the members of the Security Council ta the spirit in which our debates have taken place, and to voice the hope that this fine spirit, which was so clearly evident throughout two meetings, will find expression in the :resolütlon we are going to vote upon. In this respect, my proposai seems to me best calculated to obtain the support of all those voting. It states that we took note of the discussion, and 1 would stress the importance of the very fact that a debatc of this sort could take place in the Security Council. 1 think it will have a great influence on the negotiations which are going to take place. My draft resolution then goes on to say that the two parties should subInit a; report ta the Security Council on the outcome of their negotiations, this being an obligation imposed upon both parties. If, therefore,- the negotiations undertaken do not produce any satisfactory result, we shall be informed by these reports. Besides, we shall aIways he kept informed of the progress of the negotiations, and shall thus be in a position tointervene whenever the necessity should arisec par nous ponds Mr. VVSHINSKV (Union of Soviet Saclalist Republics) (translated jrom Russian): It Cleems to me in the first place that this ques....on is largely a hypothetical one, because 1 do not consider that this comparatively simple matter, which has in facto taken up so. much of the Security Council's time, is incapable of being settled by us. But H, unexpectedly, owing to other circumstances or to the interference of sorne hotheads, no results are achieved, then 1 can answer Mr. Bevin's question thus:ccyes, in accor.dance with the terms of the Charter." glais): mnçue; Mr. BEVIN (United Kingdom): The resolution then would read as follows-shall 1 read it? 'tThe Council, CCHaving heard the statements by the representatives of the Soviet Union and' Iran in the course of its meetings of 28 and 30 January,.and CCHaving taken cognizance of the documents presented by.the Soviet and iranian delegations and those referred to in the course of the oral debates; ccConsidering that both parties have affirmed their readiness to seek a solution of .the matter at issue by negotiation; and that b'Uch negotiations will be resumed in the near future, . "Requests the parties to inform the Council of any results achieved in such negotiations. The Council in the meanwhile retains the right at any time to request information on the progress of the negotiations."

Do 1 take it that the repre~ sentative of Poland wishes to proceed with his ~ considérer désire maintenir son amendement?- amendm~.lt? Mr. MODZELEWSKI (Poland) ~(translatedjrom French): Yes, and 1 would like to explain the reasonfor it. 1 would be prepared to accept the resolution submitted. by the United Kingdom representative subject to the omission of the words in the third paragraph: "and that such negotiations will be resumed in the near future". Thus,Mr. Bevin'sproposal and mine would not diverge, and in order to follow bis example in . a Cspirit of conCiliation, 1 would be prepared to wlthdraw mine. dI'ais cepter du au négociations chain". mienne exemple, prêt Ml'. STETTINIUS (United States of America): Sînce 1 think 1 was the only one who insisted on the words ~'l'emaining on the agenda") 1 wish to make my position clear at this t:iIPe fu. relation to Ml'. Bevin's recent proposaI. 1 am willing ta accept Ml'. Bevin's proposaI with the understanding that· this matter r('mains a continuing concern of the Couneil uutil a settlement is reached in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter. Ml'. MODZELEWSKI (Paland): (translated jram French): 1 see from the explanations 1 have just heard that a misunderstanding occurred because of my pOOl' English.· In these circumstances, 1 am ready ta withdraw my proposaI.

The proppsal now before thé: chair is that which is proposed by the representative of the United Kingdom. 1 will ask: Are there any objectio:l"'.s? If not, the resolution is adopted unanimous1y. The resolution was adobted unanimousl'l1. . ~ As proposed by Mr. Stettinius (United States of America), following a short discussion it was decided that the next meeting would he held on Friday, 1 February, at 3 p.m. The meeting rose at 7.16 p.rn. 5IX!H MEETING Held al Church House, Westminster, London, on Friday, 1 February 1946, at 3 p.m. President: Ml'. N. J. O. MARIN (Australia). Fresent: The representatives of the following countries: Australia, BraziI, China, Egypt, France, Mexico, Netherlands,Poland, Union of Soviet Sôcialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America. 26. Provisional agenda 1. Adoption of the agenda. 2. l.etter Irom the Acting Head of the Scvi~t delegation ta the President of the Security Council dated 21 January 1946.1 . 3. Letter from the Head of the Ukrainian SSR delegation ta the President of the Security Council dated 21 January 1946.2 4. Letter from the Head of the Yugoslav deIegation to the Executive Se..:retary (undated).S 27~Adoption of the agenda • Ibid•• Annex 4. • Ibid., Annex 5.