S/PV.502 Security Council

l understand that it was distributed today. That is ta say that representatives did, in faet, see it for the first time when they came into this meeting, but l should, perhaps, add that l was informed that it was to be distributed - 1 had thought that it would perhaps be a little earlier - in time for this meeting and that, therefore, 1. thought it right to place this matter on the agenda as the first substantive item. .\lr. .\IALIK (Union 01 Soviet Socialist Republics) (trmzslatcd trom Rzessiall) : This is a very Iengthy document, with ele\'en pages of cIosely printed single-spaced text. \'le need time to study it. Members of the Security Coullcil saw it for the first time when they arrived at this afternoon's meeting. It follows that this would not be a discussion but the merely formaI discharge of a task. The USSR delegation accordingly considers that, having regard to the lengthy nature of this report, delegations should be given time to study it and to take it up again at a subsequent meeting, as it is impossible to discuss a report of this kind without having reau it. To do so would be a purely formaI approach to our work. Accordingly, the USSR delegation does not consicler that there are any grounds for including this report in today's agenda.

l have placed the item nn the provisional agenda and it is for the Council to say whether it wishes it to stay there. l agree with Mr. Malik that, in the circumstances, it could not give rise to a debate. The only question is whether or not l'anglais) vendredi prévus du du l'instant, ou cision Si de rapport. tion déraisonnable. procéder dans r495ème le les à aucune l'ordre Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America) : This provisional agenda was circulated last Friday, 15 September, and thus confonns entirely with the provisions concerning notice. No unfair advantage is taken of anyone by the pre:;entation of the provisional agenda. That is the sole question before us. The parliamentary situation is simply whether or not we adopt the agenda. Now, the other question will arise, perhaps after sorne action has been taken under tbis agenda. If the agenda is adopted, l shaH ask for permission to speak in order to read this report ta the Security Council. This will not necesssitate a discussion of it at this meeting, and· we would not !.Je 50 tlnreasonable as ta expect it to be !i0 discussed. But we would expect the Security Couneil to be as .reasonable as it was once hefore [495th meeting], when we presented a report in this same manner [S/1758] , plaeing it on the table and reading it sa that everybody might have an opportunity ta consider it deliberately and fully !Jefore coming ta a discussion of it. As l say, there is not any legitimate objection that l can see ta this provisional agenda.

If the Security Council adopts the provisional agenda which is before it, what will happen when we get to the preeent item 2 is that the representative of the United States will read out the report from the Unified Command, but there will be no debate on it and we shaH pass ta item 3. In those drcumstances, does the Security Council wish to adopt the agenda? de est du du ne l'examen de viétiques) par ni fait ment le point 2 l'énoncé d'une des dant de la Unis de la guerre semble-t-il, les même place trouvé quer, pensable afin qu'il lui, quoi .Ml'. MALIK (Union of Soviet Soeialist Republics) (translated trom Russian) : The reasons put forward !Jy the United States representative are neither serious nor valid. The United States representative refers ta the fact that the provisional agenda, document S/Agenda/502, was eirculated on Saturday, but item Z of tbis document consists of only one phrase, the title of the item, namely, "Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea". Not a single member of the Security Council can have deduced from this title what aspect of this problem the Security Couneil meeting is to deal with at today's meeting. There can he no douht that the United States representative was kept informed and kne\\T that a report from General MacArthur on his war in Korea was ta !Je suhmittecl ta the Security Council. But apparently only Ml'. Austin knew this; it was not known ta aIl the members of the Security Couneil. ,This report was produced today just as the members of the Security Council were taking their seats at the conference table. This document appeared on the table. As l have already pointed OI\t, this report is yery long and we need time ta acquaint ourselves with It. Ml'. Austin may think that the members of the Security Council will be satisfied if he reads tbis document and then the members of the Security Council mechanically acquaint themselves with this report by ear and, also mechanically, vote on it. That would 3 In view of this, r consider that the Security Council is not ready to discuss this question as the document has not been circulated to the members of the Council in time and they have therefore not been able to acquaint· themselves with it. Const':quently, to inc1ude this question in the agenda and to discuss it would be premature. The USSR df:l(~gation considers it impossible to deal with this matter today, as ta do so would be to discuss it hastily and prematurely, thus taking note of the document without giving it due consideration. The USSR delegation asks that this document be translated into Russian. l must repeat that the USSR de1egation has no intention of noting or approving a document with which it il:; not familiar. It therefore opposes the inclusion of this matter on today's agenda. If the majority decides to place the item on the agenda and discusses it, the Soviet Union delegation will be unable to take part in the discussion of the document. If a proposaI is made to "take note of the document", the USSR delegation will vote against the proposaI, since it is unfamiliar with the document and has not studied the matter. Mr. CHAUVEL (France) (trallslated fram French) : l must admit that r do not quite understand the objection raised by the representative of the Soviet Union with respect to item 2 of the provisional agenda. As far as l am aware, we are not being asked to take a vote on this report. Moreover, we have not taken a vote on any of the successive reports suhmitted by t~e Unified Command At the moment, the question 1S merely whether or not the report before us is to he read today. A request has been made which appears to me ta be legitimate, for the Council has decided to take action in Korea. Speaking for myself, and r feel that some of my col1eagues will agree with me, r should very much like to be informed as soon as Now, the question is whether the report of the Unified Com1l1and should be sub1l1itted ta the Council today or not. It seems ta me that if the delegation of the United States wished to submit that report ta the Council today and any representative chose to make a statement on that report, it would be perfectly in arder, provided the Council gave an opportunity ta other representatives who might also wish to make a statement on the report but were not ready to do 50 today. 1 understand that it is the President's intention that if other representatives on the Council should wish to return to the report submitted today, an opportunity would be given to them. If that is the arrangement, 1 canot see how there c0l11d be any objection.

The position, 1 think, is fairly plain. Nobody is suggesting that the Council should vote on this item today: 1 myself would think that it would be preferable not to have a debate on the report aiter it has been read out by the United States representative, if only for the reason advanced by the representative of the Soviet Union that he cannat read it himself since it has not been translated. 1 should have thought, therefore, we might have got agreement on adopting the provisional agenda, on the assumption that item 2 would consist of a reading out of the report by the representative of the United States,after which we should pass to item 3. a Je seil Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated front Russian) : 1 should like to c1arify the nature of the lack of understanding to which the French representative has refen:ed. 1 cannot take note of a report which 1 have not read. If another representative is capable of doing 50, he is entitled ta do sa. When we began our discussion of this. question, the President said that the document had been submitted so that members of the Security Council could take note of it. He now says that it would be sufficîent for the United States representative to read out this document. The question naturally arises: For what purpose? To produce vibrations in the air or ta enable the Security Council ta hear .the report, study it, and take a decision? If General MacArthur submits his reports and the United States representative reads them out loud merely to produce vibrations in the air, that is one thing. If, however, he submits them to the Council for its information, so that members may study them and express their views, if any of them wish to do sa, that is a different story. If they are submitted so that they can be heard, studied and reacted to, then that means a viétiques) précisions de pas mesure déclaré, le rité que ce pourquoi que l'examine Arthur Etats-Unis c'est au les naissance ou rait This being so, l consider that it would be advisable not to discuss this question today, nor to hear the report read, but to give members of the Council an opportunity of studying it in. greater detail, so that the Council can take it up a(T~in at one of its forthcoming meetings, can give. United States representative an opportunity of reading out its contents, and can then have an exchange of views and reach definite decision. Moreover, it has hitherto been the practice of the Security Council that, whell a member asks the President to have a document produced in his own language, the request is always complied with. l refer in the present instance to my request for· the translation of this document into Russian. The French representative may not perhaps need ta have this document translated into French, but it is possible that our Spanish-speaking colleagues may express awish to have the report in Spanish. This means that some time will be needed ta translate th~s document and to make a closer study of it; after that it will be possible ta take it up again. Otherwise, if we act hastily and precipitately, without due discussion, merely because the United States representatîve wishes ta do 50, we shall give the impression that the question has been included for the specific purpose of diverting the Security Council's attention to this report and of impeding the discussion of item 3 of our provisional agenda regarding the armed invasion of the island of Taiwan. That impression may perhaps be created in some quarters, if those who are anxious that General MacArthur's report shall be read out here at all costs press their proposaI. Mr. QUEVEDO (Ecuador) (translated trom Span~ ish): Documents referring to matters, the consideration of which was not strictly within the agenda, have often been read in the Security Council. l think, for my part, that in the case of the reading of a document of such importance as the report of the Commander of the United Nations forces, there should not be the slightest objection to that document's being read in this CounciI. It is a problem of the greatest importance and one of keen interest to us because it relates to an action being carried out by this international Organization. l should therefore like to state that l sha11 vote in favour of the adoption of the agenda as it stands, but 1 should also wish to make one small remark referring ta what the President said in his last remarks. . l should thus like to ask the President that, when item 2 is discussed, if it is discttssed, any other delegation should also be permitted to state what it sees fit in connexion with this problem. à même. voulais dire. Mr. CHAUVEL (France) (translated trom French) : When 1 spoke of a vote a few moments aga, l did so because the representative of the USSR had previously referrecl ta it. There will he no vote, and that is aIl l wish ta sayon this point. With regard to the time during which the voice of the United States representative would fill the air should General MacArthur's report be read out, l merely wish to state that our colleague of the Soviet Union has spoken for some time today, and that that time would probably have sufficed for the reading of the report. FinaIly, l trust that the document will be distributed in the various languages spoken here, so that we may make a thorough study of h. In the meantime 1 should like to listen to a preliminary oral translation of the document here. représentant lecture je soviétique un lecture dans nous temps, verbale de Mr. AUSTIN (United States): The argument presented by the representative of the Soviet Union that there is no Russian text of the report is not a probaûve argument against reading 5t, bec2.use in fact this is one of the methods of providing a Russian text of the report, a Spanish text, and a French text at the earliest possible moment. It is a curious argument for the representative of the Soviet Union to rnake. l'anglais): soviétique du lecture moyens un la argument tant avançant, document rendu sécurité manderons lecture la Conseil en ! On 8 August 1950 [484th meeting] the representative of the Soviet Union stated as his reason for having a document read that that document was not available in a Russian text. l quote from the record of that meeting; Mr. Malik was presiding, and said: "1 shall ask the Assistant Secretary-General to read the second document, S/1676, which was received from the United Nations Conlmission on Korea, as there is no Russian text of this document." tiques) tant .des ne quoi en c'est joint tion: n'existait question; ment et Mr. MAL1K (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated tram Rttssia.1~) : The United States representative was given this quotation by his secretaries, \~ho either misunderstood it or faiIed to explain it to hlm. He was therefore somewhat misled. 1 made the statement to which he referred because 1 asked the As~istant Secretary-General to read out a document whtch contained information only, as l cannot read English and there was no Russian text. That is one matter, but it is an entirely different matter when a doc~ment is submitted to the Security Council for dis- ,.···slOn, and there is no Russian text 1 cmmot agrcc. with the French represcntath'e's <!S- ~crtions th..,t tu rake note 'Of a rcpvrt i5 not the s:unë as to \'ote uflOn il. 1 mu:.i reminù him that, up tu the pr~nt time, when the COUI1~il has takctl. note oi a document, that has ùcen conSlt1erccl. as takmg·a \'otc, If there are no oujL'1:tians, nole is talit:n oi the document without a \'ote I>eing taken, !Jut if o!JjcctiOl~S ~re raisèd to taking note of ::he docurnC::lt, the question is put t.a the \'ote al1ù the President is rcquirèd ta do 50, ln cither case, thcre is a vote, 1 consider tItat a document suchas General ~Iac­ Arthur's report is Ilot su!Jmittcù to the Security Council as a private letter. which is rcaù out to the members of the Council !Jy way of information, Imt as an official document transmittcù ta the Counc:il !Jv the United States Go\'ernrncnt, which the Counc:it I~ust discuss. But in order ta have a discussion, the report must be studied by mcmbcrs of the Security Counc:il' ouh' then will they he in a position to take Ilote .01 h, Taking note, appro\'al or rcjection requin's a .ole, l cannot thcrcfore agrcc with the French represc:ntative's Yiew that General 1IacArthur's report has becn submitlcc1 onl\' for the general in!'onnation of mcmbcrs of the Seéurit\, Counèil, that we shoulù not disctlss it at aU, but Siloulci mercty hear it mechanically, and pass on ta the ne.xt item without comment, The USSR dc!cgatioll C!ot's not intenù to aciopt such an approach ta a document of this sort. The USSR dclcgation ohjects to the hearing of this report today, its discussion, or the adoption of :my dccision upon it, for the re<lson that members of the Counc:il have not becn ahle to acquaint thc:mselves with its contents in good time. The PRESlUENT: ()ne thing that stands out dearly is that the: merc reading out of this !'eport h)" the representati\'(: of the Vnited States would do nothing to prevent members from studying it and reading it, and, indeed, it might he the only thing whic:h would induce them to studv anc1 read it. Thereforc. 1 mn sure that the great nlajority of l!l)' colleagues fee~ t~at in any case wc otlght to keep thlS on the agenda 111 ItS present place and that when we come to il. the United States representativc shoulù read out the report. 1 rnvself would still feel, in spite of the differcnt view of some of my colleagtles. that the proceetiings on this Will those in· i:z.;-ool" of :uJopting the provisional ~d1d2., in the Iigbt of wm.t 1 m'ie s:tid, please fâÏ..<e ~rb:mds? Does the rC'pr~t:tti\"e oi Eg}"Pt wish to e.."pwn fis ~ote? ~bhmoud F,wlza ~' f ~-pt): It is oot to er.pJain nI" 'rote tr.:lt 1 1o\ish 10 ~~. bt..lt to ask if we arc air«t in undersu.nding tbat we are going ta vote on the 2gen& as conî:lined in d~t SIAgtnda 50.2. zY.1 whcther it w:U I.e feft for us Ja~er on to c"losider the ordet' in \;"hich we sb:Ul take eventu:tlly the matters roctlinoo in the agenèa.. !Ilais, demandé bien ~l!fJ1!" ligur<.- (:usuite le.- The PRESlDE:>T: Xo, th:tt WOlS not my proposaI. My l'n.ütion l'mpo.sê. prm:isoire obsen-ations Si , un pro'~1 Wél5. tbat wc: sbouid Olciopt the pro\-ision:t1 ~a1<h as it is ncm', subject ta 111<: rc:marks which 1 b:t\"e made in rtg2rd to item 2, if the representati\"c of Egypt wouÏd wish ta suggest that the order shauicl IJe chwged, now is the lime ta :suggest it. in~rites . maintenant, ,Mahmoud FAWZI Ucy O::gypt}: 1 do not nccc!'J!'Jarily ;grec with the l'resident's statement tbat now is the time tli makc sug.~cstions in:onne.-cion with the order in whicb we are tl) taJ.:e the' 'a"<lrious !!'.2tter~ coiit4iIü<:d ln the Security Cvuncil's pro.isional agenda. for today, It is al!A-a~'s ol'ricmal, and 1 am sure that tI1is is the us-tl21 proccdttre in the Council, ior the Coundl, after 2dopting the agenda, ta change the order of the \"arious lltillers contained h. it if the Council considers tl1."1t it is œtter ta do so, !/lais Président èom'Ient dans tions Apri-.. lnujhur.. tueUe différents estime proposerai du Cependant, hi"n ptJssihk" l:nic'c; j'cspêr" (';tmction' jou., However. in def(-r~ce to the ...ishes oi the President. l shaH no~~. v.-ith his permission, suggest that item 4 of tf1e agenda, which appca.s in documcJ1t S!Agenda 502, he placoo as item 2. Howe\'er, if, as 1 can weIl understand, the Council should fceI tbat it is cnlilled 10 hcar the rc-p!)rt of the l:nited Nations Commaud in Korca ru; quickI}' as possible, l shalI not object ta that. In that case, 1 ooly hope t11<"tt, considering the nature of item 4. which is cluite urgent. it will be placcd as item 3 on the agenda. ° Mr. QI;E\"EUO (Ecuador) (Irtmslalec1 from Spall- Isil): l sÎlould like to he sure that 1 have correctly underslood the natu.e of the President's remark. If :\f. .le' Fn uniql1l'lI1"nt .\ rthur. fais:lIJt ('orée', aUiont 'I·,,·.;tioll afin 9 ~c vole for the agenda, are we vcting that, in relation to lhe item "Compiaint of aggrcssion upem th,' Republic of Korca", wc sl1."111 Iimit oursel'oes simply î!nd soIel}" to hcaring General MacArthur's report or ~oes any delegatioo hmte the right to make an ohscnoalion? l raise this question hecause it was m}' intention. rnereIy 50 tbat it tnight he placcd on rccord, to refer Mr. MENON (India): l do not know whether this is the appropriate stage to mention it, but, with regard to item 4, l should like to suggest a slight alteration. In accordance with the practice of the Security Council, l think the item should read "Complaint of the expulsion by Israel of thousands of Palestinian Arabs" and so on. In other words, .1 would suggest the addition of the words "Complaint of" before the words "The expulsion".

l think the first thing to decide, if l may say so, is the point raised by the representative of Egypt. He bas proposed, as l understand it, that the item which now appears on the provisional agenda as item 4 should be placed after item 2 and before the present item 3. That is a matter whieh, l thinl<, we might deeide very quickly and without debate - but l now see that the representative of the Soviet Union apparently has strong views on the subject. At any rate, having decided that matter one way or the other, l should then take a vote on the adoption of the agenda. Having taken a vote on the adoption of the agenda, l should then proceed to put to the vote the question of whether or not item 2 should be limited to a. reading out of the report by the representative of the United States or whether it would be in order for members, in effect, to debate that report while making statements subsequent to its being read out. l hope that is entirely c1ear. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian) ; A new question has been raised here - the order in which we shall consider the items which the President has inc1uded in our provisional agenda. It will be recalled that the las! [SOlsIJ meeting of the Security Coundl, which was held, if l am not mistaken, on 12 September, ended very late, at 7.20 p.m. Before the meeting ended the USSR delegation raised the question of proceeding to the third item on the agenda of this meeting, namely, armed invasion of Taiwan. It will be remembered that there were only two items on the agenda of the previous meeting of the Security Ceiuncil: "Complaint of bombing by air forces of the territory of China" and "C0111plaint of armed invasion of Taiwan (Formosa)". The item "Complaint of aggression against the Republic of China" dic! not appear on the agenda of the previous meeting of the Security Couneil. Nor did item 4 of the provisional agenda contained in document SIAgenda 502, an item which was submitted by the representative of Egypt. In accordance with the rules of procedure - it is rule 10 l have in mind - "Any item of the agenda of a meeting of the Security Couneil, consideration of which has not been completed at that meeting, shaH, unless the Security Couneil otherwise decides, automatically be included in the agenda of the next meeting." The USSR delegation accordingly considers that it would be right and in accordance with the rules of procedure for the Security Council to proceed to a consideration of this question, particularly as one of the first questions which the Security Council has to consider in discussing item 3 of its provisional agenda- "Complaint of armed invasion of Taiwan (Formosa)" - is that of inviting a representative of the People's H.epublic of China to meetings of the Security Couneil. The USSR delegation has already frequently had occasion to express its view on this question and at the previous meeting proposed that it should be discussed at the very beginning in order to reach a decision on it and to give a representative of the People's Republic of China an opportunity of arriving here in time for the discussion of this question. In view of these considerations, and despite the fact that we have already wasted much time on procedural discussions, l consider tl1at we should proceed to consider item 3 of the provisional agenda at today's meeting, namely, "Complaint of Armed Invasion of Taiwan (Formosa)" and should consider the question of inviting a representative of the People's Republic of China. ML TSlANG (China): l wish to raise a point of order. l understand that the President is about to put these questions to a vote. The President has proposed that the Council should first vote on whether item 4 should become item 3. l have no complaint with regard to that part of the President's ruling. However, the President then proposes that the Security Council should vote on the "adoption of the agenda". It is in regard to that part that l raise my point of order. It is now c1ear that the objection of the Soviet Union really amounts ~o the omission of item 2. It seems to me that the Presldent should put to the Council the question as to :""ho wants item 2 to be omitted. When those two questIOns are settled, then the provisional agenda shoulcl be put to the Security Council for the final vote. The PRESIDENT: May l just say, in regard to what the representative of the Soviet Union has said, that if he had not manifested such strong objection to the provisional agenda which l had suggested, we should by this time have had the report of General MacArthur read and we should be discussing the item which he wants to discuss. It is entirely his own fault that we have not got on to that. > t ! 1 ~ '" Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt): l would like ta cali the President's attention, and that of the representative of China and the other members of the Council, ta the fact that in my first remarks, in connexion with point 4 of our provisional agenda, l did not make a formai proposai; l made a mere suggestion. l did not ptlt anything in the form of a proposaI. There is, therefore, in this connexion, nothing ta be voted upon.

Unless l hear anything to the contrary, l shall now put the provisiollal agenda to the vote, on the assumption that we shall have a further vote on item 2 ta decide whether or not that item on our agenda will consist simply of the United States representative's reading out the report of General MacArthur. The Soviet Union representative seems determined that we should not get on ta item 3 of the agenda. Ml'. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated froln Rttssian) : l have the right to express my views on this matter and l am using that right. It seems ta me that since there is no objection to the inclusion of items 3 and 4 in the agenda, there is no need to put them to vote. Objection was raised to item 2 for the reasons stated by the USSR delegation. We need therefore take a vote only on whether to inciude item 2 in the agenda. As regards items 3 and 4, sinee they do not give rise to any objection, they should be inc1uded in the agenda. The order in which these items are ta be considered should be discussed after the provisional agenda has been adopted, as it would be a remarkable innovation if we were to discuss the arder of the consideration of items which had not been adopted in the agenda. So far there seems ta have been no such precedent.

As l understand it, we have a surprising situation in which there is a common front, consisting of the representative of China and the representative of the Soviet Union, in regard to the point whether we should now take a vote on the inclusion or exclusion of item 2 in our provisional agenda. l am perfectly prepared to put it that way if the Council would so desire, subject always ta our deciding after the vote has been taken how exact1y we wish to handle 301r. TSIAXG (China): The objection raised to the Cœocil'$ pro-risional agenda was that item 2. should ~ be indudéd. The demand is made for the exclusion c..:r omission of item 2. Therefore, in m)' judgment the ~ question to put ta the Couneil is: Win mose ;.00 are in fd....our of the omission of item 2 raise dJcir bands? tion au point l't'xdnsion ou mon ( ;;1 let"cr la main? The PJŒSlDEN:T: 1 do not Stt; what the great distine- Vcc Ï5. but if· it i5 preferable ta put the matter to Wc: .....ote in that manné!", then it will he put that wa)'. de le ainsi. elle le sera. ~lr. MALIK (Un:on of Soviet Socialist Repuù1ics) f,lTaJUiaJed [ram. R1tSM7J): Since this proposaI bas tem. submitted, tbere must he.a difference. This pro- ~ doubtJt:SS corZiins sorne hidden intentions. 50 liu. howe\·er. it bas ~ our custom to vote on the pnnisionaI .:lgClda. in the fonu in which it has been 311bmitted. The President submitted the pro\'isional ~ fOl approvaI•.and shouId therefore ask who is in farour of, who is against, and who is ~bstaining imm yoting on. the proposecl item or on the provi- 90naI agenda as a whoJe. This is the procedure we have followed so far, and ! presume will continue to follow in the future, without ;m-,' da'iation in this case for reasons unknown to ~ Security Council. tiques) proposition, proposition cachées. aux C'est devrait donc demander qui l'ote pour, qui s'abstient prel\'isoire et ne sécurité ignore. des exceptions à The P.RE51DEKT: l am a comparative novice on these knott}- points. but l am informed that recent precedent 5Dggest:s that it wouJd he preferable to put this ('fuesciro in the positiV'e forrn, that is: Who is in fayour of induding item 2 on the agenda? UnJess there is tte generaI impression that that procedure is wrong, ! propose to put it that way. l shouJd have thought tbe rcsult would he much the same. ti\'ement pense il forme d'avis de maintenir le point 2 que céder ] e pensais que le résultat serait le même. Mr. TSl."-SG (Chir.a.): Whether the form of the quertion I-,as or docs not have substantial meaning l do oot profess to know" But it does seern to me that there is a question of principle invoIved. If the Presiden: {If the Security Council should make a ruling, the dlallenge must he supportcd by se\"en votes in order tD oYCT-rule the President. This applies in like manner to the pmyisional agenda. The provisional agenda of prétends est me Président si appuyé Président concerne provisoire de de maintenir l'autorité de son quiconque J'appui tradition du elle notre tr~ Security Council is·a proposaI of the President 01 the Securit}' Couneil. It is the tm1l]ütion of. the Co~cil to respect and to upbold the autnmrity of the ~rtsl~ent, and therefore whoever questions the authorlty 01 the President must muster the support of seven '"otes•.That is the significance of this tradition in the Cou~Cll. 1 hope that during the President's tenn of :en~c~ that tradition will be maintained, ùecause that traditIon does have an importance in the institutional developrnent of this Organization. The President has acted correctly: he has submitted the provisional agenda for adoption. In the event of objections being raised, he puts the provisional agenda to the vote: that is, he asks who is .in favour and who against the provisional agenda. If l am not mistaken, this has always been our practice and should continue to be such in future. We are not concerned with the President's ruIing, but with the provisional agenda which must be adopted in accordance with the rules of procedure.

In order to reinforce the clearly wavering authority of the President, l do now take the opportunity of ruling that the vote on whether or not to include in our provisional agenda the existing item 2 will be cast in the positive form: namely: Will those who are in favour of including this item please raise their hands? If that ruling is not challenged, then l shall put this question in the positive form and ask representatives to vote on it: Who is in favour of the inclusion of the present item 2, "Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Karea", in our agenda? A vote was taken by show of hamds as follows: Tn favour: China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, France, India, Norway, United. Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern lreland, United States of America, y ugoslavia. Agai1lst: Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.

The next point which l think l am right in putting ta the Council is whether, having reached this decision, it wishes the proceedings on this item which we are going to take next to terminate when the representative of the United States has read out the report of the Unified Command, or whether it would prefer to allow comments by any member to be made on that report. l shaH put the question to the vote in this way: Will those in favour of Iimiting our proceedings on this item to the readingout of the report l'aise their hands? Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist RepubIics) (translated from Russian): Since we have gone on to the adoption of the agenda, we should finis;h with

The representative of the Soviet Union is formally correct, l hasten to admit. l had ventured to think that we could tacitly assume that the agenda, after two hours of vigorous debate, had now been adopted. EvidentIy that was wrong, sa l shall put ta the Council the question: Is the provisional agenda ta be adopted? Mr. MENON (India): l take it ~hat the Security Council has no objection ta amending item 4 as l suggested.

l should certainly have mentioned that, and l take it there is no objection ta item 4 reading "Complaint of the expulsion by Israel ...". There does seem ta be sorne objectio~. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt): l am sarry to disappoint the President, but l am not objecting ta this point. l wanted only ta say that when l did not submit a formaI proposaI in connexion with the order in which we should take point 4 on the agenda for today, this was limited strictly to today's agenda, and l am formally reserving the right of my delegatian to raise the matter of changing the arder when that point COr.:les on the provisional agenda of a future meeting of the Security Council.

l think, unless l am wrong, that the point made by the representative of Egypt is weIl understood and that it would be quite in arder at a later date for him to suggest a reversaI of this arder. 1 think that now, not having heard anything to the contrary, l can assume that the provisional agenda is adopted. In that case, the first substantive item on our agenda is: "Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea", and in accordance with previous decisions, 1 calI ta the table the representative of the Republic of Korea. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated tram Russian): During the procedural 15 This matter has already been postponed two or three tîmes; the USSR delegation considers that the time has come to decide this question without further delay.

Perhaps l am wrong, but, as l remember putting the question, it was in a positive sense: Did the Council wish to indude the present item 2 as item 2? The Council did .so decide. Consequent1y, in my view, the arder is now, to that extent, decided. If that is decided, then the next item is item 3 and, after that, item 4. Unless l hear any further objection, we shaH begin a discussion of item 2. .Mr. QUEVEDO (Ecuador) (translated trom Spanish) : If l am îlot mistaken, when the President was going to put to the vote what should he discussed under item 2, he was interrupted and the Council's attention was diverted ta other matters. l would therefore ask him to submit to the vote the proPQsaI which he has already formulated as ta how item 2 should be discussed, whether the discussion should be limited to the reading of General MacArthur's report, or whether any other statements connected with the complaint of aggression «pon the Republic of Korea may he made.

l was about to come to that question when the representative of the Soviet Union raised his point about the position of item 3 which, in my view, has been decided. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated trom Russian) : The USSR de1egation has suggested that the Council should first adopt the agenda and should then decide the order in which the items should be discussed. However, in submitting the question of the adoption of the agenda to the Security Council, the President did not dearly indicate that the order in which the agenda was adopted would be the one in which its items would be discussed. As l understand it, the order of the discussion of the items was to have been settled after the adoption of the agenda. The USSR delegation therefore suggests that item 3 should be discussed first.

l am very sorry but, in my view, 1 did make it quite dear that, when we adopted the agenda after our prolonged debate, we adopted the ,..i'der of the agenda - but only for today. 1 think Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Soeialist Republics) (tratfSlated front Russimt): The USSR delegation made its proposaI before the President's ruling was given and before the adoption of the agenda was put ta the vote, and it therefore insists on a vote being taken on its proposaI to discuss item 3 first. 1 ask that this question be put ta the vote regardless of the President's ruling, since it was made after 1 had submitted my proposaI.

1 am very sarry, but 1 do not agree. l think that the question was, in effect, settled before we took the vote and as we took the vote on the provisional agenda. Unless 1 hear anything ta the contrary, l am afraid that my ruling must stand. It is quite open to the mel11bers of the Council to reverse it if they so desire. But 1 liave no illusion at ail as ta the wish of the Councilor, at any rate, of ten members of the Councilwhich is to get on with the present agenda and the present arder. After we have wasted aU this time, perhaps the point which we should nowbegin ta discuss, namely, how ta handle item 2, is otiose. If we now hear the United States representative read the report, 1 think the moment will have come, in an hour or two, when the Council will have ta adjoum. J 1 4 3. Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea (continued) J Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): '1 claim the Haar ta read the report, according to the item on the agenda. This is the report of the United Nations Command operations in Korea for the period 16 to 31 August 1950, as set forth in document S/1796. It is prefaced by a note dated 17 September 1950 from the permanent representative of the United States of America, addressed ta the President of the Security Cauncil, transmitting the fourth report of the United Nations COl11l11and in Korea, in accordance with the Security Couneil resolution [S/1588] of 7 July 1950. The note states: "1 have the honoi:' ta refer ta paragraph 6 of the resolution of the Security Council of 7 July 1950, requesting the United States to provide the Security Couneil \Vith reports, as appropriate, on the course of action taken under the United Nations Commando In compliance with this resolution, there is enc10sed herewith, for circulation to the members of the Security Couneil, the 'Report of the United Nations Command J t J J1 1l "In the east coast sector, the North Korean 12th Division was driven back by attacks of the First Republic of Korea Corps which regained Pohang and Kigye on 18 August. By 26 August, the enemy 5th Division entered into action and together with the 12th Divifion renewed the attack, retook Kigye, and pushed United :\,ltions forces back ta a line two miles north of Pohang'. However, Kigye changed hands and was again retaken by the Republic of Korea Army on 29 August, but was lost to the North Koreans on 30 August. "Concurrently, the principal cnemy effort was di- rected against the Taegu salient during this period, and, by 28 August, had scored moderate gains along the northern part of the arc in the zone of action of the II Republic of Korea Corps. The enemy 1st and 13th Divisions forced the United Nations defenders back several thousand yards, taking Kumhwa in their most extensive advance. In repeated local attacks, the enemy 8th Division took Uihung on 27 August. The 2nd and 3rd North Korean Divisions near Waegwan were increasingly active, though no major effort is in evidence as yet. The net enemy gains, however, represented only a local effect of no decisive char- acter. Enemy long-ranged artillery emplaced west of the Kaktong River has shelled Taegu ineffectively on a number of occasions in nuisance firing. "Operations in this northern and eastern sector were primarily by Republic of Korea Army units, intermittently supported by United States units. The 6th, 8th, Capitol, 3rd and 1st Republic of Korea Divi- sions .have been in battle continuously since the war began against an enemy with. initial favorable odds "rn a wide bend of the river south of Tuksong the enemy lOth Division has held a bridgehead il?- an inactive state since mid-August. This penetration, estimated at one to two enemy regiments, was being effectively contained by the United Nations forces at the close of the period. "Farther south, near the confluence of the Nam and Naktong Rivers, attacks by the United States 24th Division and the Marines eliminated a major penetra- tion of the Naktong defense line on 18 August. Here the enemy 4th Di\'Ïsion was decisively defeated, lost its bridgehead and was thrown westward across the Naktong River, suffering very heavy iosses in both personnel and equipment. "At the southern end of the front in the Chinju- Haman corridor, the North Korean 6th Division, having been severely mauled in early August, cautiously restored contact with United Nations forces, begin- ning 16 August, along a north-south line about two miles west of Haman. By 19 August, this Division, augmented l.,y two regiments, probably of the 7th Division, initiated a series of sharp probing attacks which continued to engage the attention of United Nations defending forces, though they have netted the enemy small gains on the grollnd. One mountain, Sobuk..,San, has changed hands several times. Mean- while, the large volume of rear area troop and vehicular movements indicate that the enemy intends to main- tain strong pressure on this front, which represents the greatest threat ta the United Nations base at Pusan. Prisoners from the North Korean 6th Divi- sion report that two of the three organic regiments are composed of troops who previously served in the Chinese Communist Armies. "United Nations forces were augmented by the arrivaI of British Army combat units in Korea. "Naval operations: During the period of this report the United Nations naval forces have encountered only slight resistance by the enemy. Complete United Na- tions control of the seas continues, with guaranteed safe arrivaI in Korea of acIcIitional troops ancI supplies, and safe removal by sea of the sick and wounded. Naval patrol forces have met little interference, and a close patrol of the Korean. coast is being maintained. "Further augmentation of naval forces is continuing. New units arriving during the period of this report hav.e been mostly from the United States Navy. The ! ~ntlre naval organization is weIl integrated, function- mg smoothly, and coordinated efficiently with United Nations Army and Air Force units. "The United Nations naval force, now fortified by many smaIl e1ements whieh together constitute a well balanced navy, has attained such a degree of efficiency "Naval aireraft operating from ships and land bases are performing the battle tasks of reconnaiss(l.nce. sl>otting for artillery :md naval bombardment. strafing and dive bOtt1bing of both tactical and strategie targets. Shore bomuardmcnt of military targets, harassing fire, and dcstruction of coastal land communications are carried on continuously by surface craft. Limitcd amphibious landings and water lift of troo1's have bcen conducted, Raiders have been landed for special tasks. Islands in strategie locations have been seized. Carrier aircraft have simultaneously given direct sup- port to ground clements while striking strategie targets in North Koren. United States i\Iarines have partidpat- cd with traditional valor and great effectiveness in important land operations in the southwestern sectors. "As long as the enemy compels innocent cÏvilians to serve his purpose in front line areas, the problem of avoiding casualties to non-combatants is exceedingly difficult. Our naval bombardment forces. both surface and air, are exercising e\'ery precaution to avoid harming the civil population, and are employing every possible means to identify and destroy military targets only. "Air operations: Enemy air strength continued to diminish until near the end of the period when a few minor single plane raids were staged. However, twin- engined bombers have been sighted recently on enemy airfields in both North and South Korea, leading to the belief that his air force has been, strengthened by air- eraft from outside Korea which are prcpared to stage forward at an opportune time. "The eombined air forces of the United Nations daily are proclucing a superior effort in support of ground forces. From the early strikes on 29 June of the United States Far East Air Force's jet aircraft, in support of ground forces of the Republie of Korea, the compiete integration of the air and ground efforts bas been outstanding. The air units of Australia, of the Republic of Korea, of the United States Navy and Marines and of the British Navy have joined the United States Air Force in the effective tactical sup- port of ail ground forces. Answering the cali ot United States Army, Marine or Republic of Korea ground forces for air support may be aireraft from any of the United Nations forces in the air over Korea. "l'Ile enemy ~huns exposurc ùy day. concculing his supplies and resen:es in homes, in schools, and other puIJ)ic buildings. He drives his tanks and trucks tbrough waIIs of simple Ix:asant shelters that he might asoid c1ayIight detcction. "Enemy mO\'Clllem and attack hy night are being countered by evcr expanding operations of night in- trudcr nircraft. Thcsc planes, equipped with special devices, have successfully harasscd him by night, caus- ing considerable reduction to his operations. "The cnemy llla:.seci aems:. tItt· Xaktcmg River tram Taegu on 16 August was subjected to the heaviest tacti<;aI assault yet mountedwhen meài~m bomber aircraft deIiverec1 over 850 tons of bombs on the ag- gressor forces. Fighter-bomber aircraft roving the salicnt following tIlis strJkc' fmlllci ft'w targets remain- ing in the desolate area. "Evidence continues to he gathered showing the de- pletion of stocks of munitions and supplies in the com- bat zone. "The program of interdiction of the transportation system supporting North Korean forces has reduced cxtensiveIy the enemy's rcsupply potentiai and has hampercd his mo\'ement of reiniorcements. Countless bridges have been destroyed, the utility of the enemy's marshalling yards has 11t·(.·11 drastically rcùuccù, IImny of his railroad repair and maintenance facilities have becn climinated. The dliciency of the interdiction pr\)- gram is c1eady indicated by the quantifies of roHing stOCK imlllobile in yards and on slidin!{s. The ellemy employs evei'Y expedient to substitute for the destroyed bridges. His transportation is sulJjected ta attritidn by aH feasible means. ~t(Jcks de combat. moyens ont réapprovisionncmcllt mouvements bont de nUlIlhrc chemins l'efficacité du lcs cxpéc!ients moyem, toutes les façons. et Nnrd. jectifs marquahle lesqul'ls porlé!.nCe USillP.S les de tions la il 1\atiolls des moyens Jltlllgmllll, et "Pin point destruction of industrial andother mili- tary objectives in North Korea continues, gyaluation of photographs of these objectives after aHacks shows remarkable accuracy has been obtained in striking the selected targets which in every instance have becn of military significance. Targets have been great chem- icai cOll1plexe~, iron works, elec:tric power plants, tank assembly plants. deep-water docks, and other similar installations which enhance North Korean wa!' poten- tial. Ali continue subject to attack until United Na- tions forces ~!ttain their goals. "United Nations air forces have dealt severe blows !o war industries and transportation in Pyongyang, ln Hamchung and Hungnam. in VVonsan, Songjin, Chinnampo, Chongjin and Rashin. The North Koreal1 populace has becn warned by radio and by leaflets ta vacate thcir areas that contain miiitary.targets. They have becn urged 'to leave these cities and go to the country or to the moun~hls'. They h<l.ve been informed that,'military installations will he c1estroyed hy United inviL~c, qu'elle Elle & "n-..e ;tcc:us:ation d~ Unittd Nalicm :tirer.tit b~c ~~t;J.ckc& t~ ci)~m~ popu~ceh:u 00 buis of i3ct~i1y. "Forc1gn s~f'l'orl Jor Xc;rllt Kort'an j.'T(U: «.m· ,idcdng tbat me prc:.."tnt ;:aggrcuioo of the Xortb Korcan forcêS is brgdy Communist kd. tH;m~ :ami impired. it if. Olppropriate. to rel'icwexisting ~'idt1Ke af matcn:J1 Olnd tedmial 255i~e rtnda:c:d to North Korca. spccificaH:t. e-..i<krKe oi munitions 'Whkh the Sr~,kt Union bas prO">ided andis. nr"""l)fOi.-iding tothe Nonh Kor(3n forces. :as 'Wcil as ~'i<knce oi lr::zincd mi!itaI'J personnel ~'hich: tbê Chi1k:Sê Comrrnmist forces ha)'e fumished. "The t:'SSR-dominatio11 oi the oorthem: portion. of Korea J~;:., when Sr..id; Union or.cupation :luthorities arhitrarily interprdc:d tlJe .3Rth !,;u:lUd as a penmncnt delineation bét,.-een Iwo milita:,'! 7~5, Imtnedi...tél~ follo,.-ing tlle 5urrenda- of ]apai,e.llC forcc's in KoreÎ. i11 Sepumlber 1945, the So\'itt Cnio11 :wtborities llt:gan te organiJ;ê a ~orth Koran mî1ibrj' force unde;- the 1,'Uise of a national police r"ut: CJ' constalY.1brv, This force, now lcnown as North KOr(.'211 Pcoplés' Army, has from its inccption lJ«'f1 tmim'd, !>UiY..-r\'i5ol'ti :ut'd I(lgiatically supporttd hr the ~;ict Union. "The supply of munitions and equipment 10 Xorth Kar«:a prior 10 the withdraw:d of the So~'iet: Cnion forces in Decemœr 1948 is (t~I<'t"': ac~-'Juv:l(:dw..tllr: IÎW $o.. -irt (;nioo. authoriûes. Howc;c:r, the)' daim ûJât aH materid now l>eing tltili7-W by North Korean forces ..~ pro1:ided pdor 10 toot' witbdrawaJ. and dut there ~ lJeen no resupply iram USSR sources sioce lmt tnne. "Despite tbis Sovid: Union c~im. ho.,.,.~er, sirice the ootbrealc of the "ar. a ..ide yarirly of definiteJy identified SO"'iet Union equipmcnt: czptured fromthc North Koreans in battle btars the mar.ufacturing d2te of 1949 or 1950. OlwiousJ}', c!at(:c! matcrid couJd not Î1a'.e ÎJeêIl pro\'ided pdOf 10 Pecember 1948, !flCrehy further confirming the many reports receivcd b,r this Headquarters of So~'icl: Union deli'/ery of munitions to !\Drth Korean forces during J949 and J950, Physic:tl proof of such deJiw:des no'... ir,cJudts JO specifie items fully reported, induding photographs, as wel1 ;I5 the physicaI items, for-.....arde.d to appmpriate United States Army services, AmlJng forwarded definite!y id<.-ntified it(:ms were a Î .62mm l'P5H-H 5ub~machinc ~un; an aircraft radio receh'er type RSI.-{)1-1; 2 types of band grenades; and ammunition of varying types and calibres, In addition to these items, ~ fOrly-one piects of equipment, induding srnaJl arms, armored n:hicles. artiIJery. and ammt.Jnition bve been capture<! ..It m:l.y l~ posssi!Jlc that North l\.orca is m:muiac- turing SOUle: m:llerieJ. p."lrticu!arlj' SUla}! am15, Uowew:r. its industX)' is notcapable of pro\'iuing ile:t\'y tquiIr l1}(:llt snch as armaI'. tanks OI.nd :lrtiJJëX)', "Ta clate. then: II:lS bcen no confirrn:nion of dirtct or (1\"Crt qlinese Cummunist l>:lrticip:ltion in the Kort:an coumet; howc\"er. the}' ha\"e iumisht:d substanti;ù if not dl."CisÏ\,"e n~ilil.ar)' :tsSist:mce to North Korca. bj' reJeasing a \"ast pool ui combat-;;easoned troops of KOfe:Ul ethnk origin. which pro\'ided the means of é:.'\:p;lnsicn of the 1\orth KQrean AmI)', This iaa, oribill~lI)' cst:tblished b)' miscdb.nèOus infoIltlat!on c-.manating tram the ~lal1dlUria-Korea.araduriIlg the l~t four j'é3rs, .is now î~ll.r .co!lfirmed by numero~ pnsoncr-of-war tnterrogallOns smcc theoutlJttak 01 hostilitic.s in .KOrt':l, :\ suhst:mtia1 perccntage of :an pris- oncrs of war so far illterr(lgntt:l~ ha\-c rcct:Îvcd tmining in Manchuria or h.1.\c periormcd acti\'c service with the t11Încse CC1nmmnist :\ml)'; at Jeast h:df of the per- ~nncJ••1.1ld l>..rticularly those.ofiicers and non-<:ommis- sioned ofliccrs in the Xonh Korcan 5th, l.3th. and 15th Dh'isions and the ï061h Indcpcndcnt Unit, ha.\'ë particip••ted in tmining ur cUluhat OlctÎon with the Olinese Comnllluist :\rmy, The Olincse Conunllnist .t\rmj' rcturncd man}' of these Korcan troops to 1\ortIl Korea during the past j'car, ont ont comnltmistcs ,"crs la ulle IVèmc a\'Olient Corée u.t\pproximatcly l'lO,()(X) Kore<m troo1's have parti- cipatc:d in training and combat action with the Chlnese Communist forces in one of three categories: (1) the Kon.-an Voluntcer :\rmy, which was form~ irom Koreans .in Communist-held China and Manchuria during 194-5-1W6; (2) USSR-trained Kuruns, who "crc transfcrrcd irom l\orth Korca .md were integrated into the Korean Voluntccr Army or Chinese Commu- nist Arm)' to gain combat .experience; and (3) USSR- traine<! Koreans, who participated in training at Chia- mUSSlI, i\lanchuria. Ilr attcndcd the ol1iccrs' canùidate school at Lungchingtsun, Manchuna, During the <:ari)" part of 1947, the Korc..n Volunteer .r\nny was in- tcgratcd into the Chinesé Cllnununist :\nny in ~Ial1­ churia. A gre:tt nutnbcr of these troo1's have subse- quentl)' fought with the Chinese Communist Arm)' as far :.ollth as LlIichou Peninsula in the Hainan Island operation_ After the Communist conquest of Manchuria <1uring the fall of 1948, Korean troo1's bcgan fillerillg back into North Korc<l, An accelera- tion of this mO\'clllcnt !lct.'lIt1C apparcnt during the tarly )lart of 1950, and by the middlc of February 1950, Korean troops of the Chinese Commllnist 4th Field Arm)' had de1'artcd f rom South China for North Korea. At the time of the outhreak of hostilities in Korea, a probable aggregate of 40,00CI to 60,000 Ko- reans trained hy the Chinesc Communists had been refuse<! and integrated into the North Korean Army to expand the initial divisions and constabulary bri- gades to a current battlc .order of thirteen to fiftecn -~';:rociiiz.s: TralmcDt of United 1\ations prisoners ;aUn. h)"mem)~ iofÇ(:S, bas on occasion. bttn character- izcd bycxtrmlC: brutlIit)·. Positi.e e\;dence of rnur- dcring oI pcisor.cr$ lÔth bound bands has, le<! me îo iss:.e a ~-;uning to the CommandêI"-Ïn·Çhiei of the :-;onn K01"C2It ioI"Ces on Ibis subjt:ct. -TI1c nm iIb-unce oi tÏ1Ïs cnaI"ai."tcr ""aS <!isco.ered 10 lui}" 1950 ...hm L;nitèd Kations troops rdook 10st grouJ.!'d .and dÏ5co....er-èd dad Unitèd Statessoldiers with thër bands ticI. 1:dlind thcir backs, ob.ioush· kilIed ...lu1ec:aptü'cs, since ail had Dttn sbot: throÏ1gh the Oc.ad. Officia! iJ!-..otogr:q,hs oi Îuur of the.se numlered Unitèd. Slaks soidiersconstitute ...i5uaI prooi. -A :ICCODd 'W;l5. the: murdcr on the aitcrnooll oi i7 A~ 1950 oi th!.rty.-six United States SDldiers taIœn. pcÏSOOtt. Forty-<XJe United States soidiers. sen·· ing the United Nations t:ause;. had lJttn capturcd br an owaw:helming Communist iorce on the morning of 15 August. Immcdiatd)' aÏttt their capture each prisoner ..-as strippe({ ai all II1t2n5 oi identification and. och man's bands rial behind his back ,,;th tele- phone ".;re or sOoe laces takcn trom his boots. The mm .-cre heJd. prisoœrs for thirty-six hours witbout rc(xL At the end oi this time, the group of Americans were toid to stand up, whereupon they were sprayed by lire from indi\;duaI weapoos of 3.pproximately fiftttn to 5C:venteen Xorth Koreans. Aiter the men !lad iaIlcn ta the ground. they ","ere fired u]XJn once again to insure that aJl ","eu dead. After the ~orth Korea.n soldiers had Jeft the scene. five soldiers still aJÏ\-e .-ere able to make their W3.V" b3.ck to United :-;tatt: rines. AIl .ictiIT'1S in this maSsacre were mem- "...ers of the 151 Cax3.lry DÏ\·ision. United States Army. "PrisQ1lerS of war: In sharp contrast to the fore- going, l~ir. Frederick Bieri, International Red Cross .epresentative accredit<:d to the Unital Nations forces in Kora. reports that according to Korean standards, Republic of Korea. treatment of prisoraers of war \\"aS ·'perfet.1:" and that he had ne,'er previously knOVll'tl a case when prisoner of war guards irom their own persooaI supply had presented cigarettes and fntits to prisontts_ "O.tt2,<XX> prisoners of wa. were taken byUnited ~ations forces during the peri(}(i. This is many times the number that ha\'c been taken in previous periods. Enrmy desertions, thot:gh limÏted in scale, are increas- ing, apparmtIy as a direct r~-ult of United Nations guarantees of humane treatment. Curiously enough, sorne office. defeclees are highly Communist-traincd, a!!G: have serred in their units as ]XJlitical-cultural ·'rr.oraIe" offi~ers, suggesting that propaganda officers themselves are most susceptible to an effective presen- tation of accurate information. "Conditions in Korea: There exists a very high state of morale bath among the civiIian population in general and in the govermnent offices of the Republic of Korea. Although the area under control of the United Nations forces at the present time has a great number of refugees, these refugees are being assisted in every way possible to provide them shelter and other necessities of Iife. "A great amount of this assistance is coming from "oIunteer aid from such organizations as have been established since 25 June; for example: The Emer- gency Central Committee of the Korean Red Cross organized by Dr. Helen Kim, an eminent educator in Korea. This organization comprises volullteer work- ers who assist in the relocation of refugees and distri- bution of food and certain reHef supplies. In addi- tion to providing relief and assistance to refugees, this body provides assistance to miIitary casualties of the RepubIic of Korea Army by volunteer nursing aid, by procuring and roIling bandages and surgical dressings, and in sorne cases, assisting in the medical treatment of the casualties. "Another evidellce of high morale is the formation of a Patriotic League ta give alI-out assistance to the United Nations effort in Korea. This is agaill an organ- ization of volunteer workers who assist in volunteerÎllg needed labo!, and procuring equipment or indigenous supplies for use by United Nations forces. "Government offices are operating on a twenty-four hour basis, even at Cabinet and Ministerial levels to cope with every situation at any time. it may arise. "Other signs of high morale of the people of Korea are indicated by the numerous "welcome" signs in all of the various communities and the spontaneous contri- bution of refreshments to United Nations troops. In fact, in all walks of life and in all fields of endeavor there exists only the highest morale and the indomitable will to win. "Civilian Relief: In surveying the relief needs in Korea, it has been determined that the Republic of K~rea was able during its withdrawal to salvage suf- fictent food supplies to provide subsistence for indivi- duaIs in the urea under control of United Nations "The Anny Command in Koren. has submittecl an estimate of requirements for medical supplies and equipment, insecticides, chemicals for water purifica- tion serums, vaccines and anti-toxins. To alleviate possible suffering resulGng from procurement time lag, approximately 25 pel' cent of these requirements have been procured locally as an emergcncy measure, The remainder of the requirements has been forwarded through established channels to appropriate procure- ment coordinators. "At the present time, relief supplies are being delivered to Korea by military means and are being distributed in Korea by the Republic of Korea, Office of Supply. Through the Department of the Army, United Nations personnel of certain technical qualifi- cations have been requested who will operate under military command to assist the Repubiic of Korea in distribution and efficient utilization of relief supplies, and provide adequate liaison and coordination between the Republic of Korea and United Nations military forces on relief matters. "Subsistence supplies are becoming a problem of immediate concern which will require the whole-hearted assistance of aU Members of the United Nations. With the advent of climatic change, assistance will be required in providing adequate clothing and blankets for the civilian population of Korea. Urgently needed medical supplies are a cause of grave concern and 1 trust will be given immediate attention. Estimated requirements of food, clothing and medical and relief supplies are being continuously computed and for- warded to the Joint Army, ECA, State Coordinating Committee for procurement in accordance with estab- lished procedure. There is little doubt that the mem- bers of the United Nations will contribute as generously to the relief of the destitute peopl~ of Korea as they have to the military effort. "In conclusion: "1. United Nations strength to accomplish the United Nations mission in Korea is growing slowly but steadily. "2. British Army units have arrived in Korea. "3. The United Nations air force and naval air attacks on purely military targets are bringing im- portant results on the invader's ability and will to "S. Positive proof has been obtained that during 1949 and 1950 the Soviet Union has supplied the North Korean forces with munitions and the Chinese Communists have supplied trained manpower' "6. The North Koreans have in .some instances conducted savagely barbarous killings of captured United States soldiers. "7. Both the Republic of Korea Govemment and people are vaHantly and courageously supporting the muse to the extent of their capabilities. "8. Requirements for civilian relief assistance and supplies have so far been met by emergency measures but prompt action by Member States is needed to pro- vide food, warmth and medical sqpplies durÏng the coming winter. "9. The forces to be provided by Member States are urgently needed in Korea," The report which l have just read was signed by General MacArthur. There are sorne exhibits which accompany the reading of the report, and l shaH be glad to have the members of the Security Council examine them, either during the meeting or subsequent to the adjournment. They are available right here on the table, and their markings indicate their date and identification.

l suggest that they be passed round. Mr. Austin passed to the :members of the Council the exhibits referred to.

The time has now come when the Coancil normally should adjourn. 1t is 6.45 p.m. Nevertheless, it is for the Council ta say whether it desires to go on with the consideration of the item under discussion. If it does go on, the first and indeed the only speaker on my list is the representative of the Soviet Union. First, however, l 111ust know whether the Council desires ta continue. Ml'. QUEVEDO (Ecuador) (trallslated from Spanish) : As saon as discussion of the present item of the agenda began, l suggested that other delegations should also have the right to state their views with regard to the complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea. The President was about to put this to the vote when he was interrupted by the debate taking another direction. Later, when the matter was to be discussed again, the President declared that, in view of the time at which the reading of the report of the United Nations Çommand in Korea would begin, there would not be tlme for anything else today; which implied that today's debate would end with the reading of this document. l therefore proposel first, that the meeting be adjoumedi and next, in case this proposaI is not accepted, that a vote be taken on the nature of the debate on this question.

Rule 33 of our rules of procedure reads: "Any motion for the suspension or for the simple adjoumment of the meeting shaH be .decided without debate." As l understand it, the representative of Ecuador has proposed the adjoumment of the meeting. It should, therefore, in my view, be decided without debate. The representative of the Soviet Union, however, wishes to raise a point of order. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated froJn Russian): l consider that 1 should he given the floor to make a statement in view of the fact that the document which the United States representative has read contains a slander against my country. 1 demand the floor to make a statement, despite all the procedural manoeuvres to which the United States bloc has resorted with a view to preventing me from doing so. l regard it as irregular that the President, after stating that l was the first to ask for the floor, should then without any justification have called upon the representative of Ecuador. 1 ask for the floor to make a statement.

First of all, as l understand it, the representative of the Soviet Union said that we could not have a discussion on General MacArthur's report hecause he had not had time to read it and could not read it hecause it was not in Russian. Now, however, in spite of the fact he could not read it,he says it contains libels on his country and wants to make a statement on it. If he makes a statement on it, then other representatives will be able to make statements too. l do not say that is not possible if the Council so desires; of course it is. l have no wish to inhibit this body and prevent it from going on, but we must consider now, in the light of the information that the representative of the Soviet Union wishes to make a statement on the report, whether we do desire to go on and hear'it and perhaps other representatives as welI, or whether we wish, as has been suggested by the representative of Ecuador, to adjoum. Since our rules of procedure state that any proposaI for Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Soeialist Republics) (translated from Russian): It has been the practice in the Security Couneil never ta deprive the members of the Couneil of the right to furnish an explanation at the end of a meeting, regardless of whether or not the Couneil has deeided ta continue the meeting. l therefore ask to be allowed ta furnish an explanation. Mr. QUEVEDO (Ecuador) (translated from Spanish) : In submitting .a motion for adjournment it had not been my intention to prevent the representative of the Soviet Union from making the statement which he wishes to make, but l had asked that l should also he allowed ta speak on the question. l feel, however, that the Council should not give the impression that it is attempting to prevent a representative from expressing his views. l sha11 therefore withdraw my motion for adjournment and request that it should he put to a vote as soon as the representative of the Soviet Union has concluded his statement.

Speaking as President, l must say that l feel that is a fair thing to do. Unless l hear anything to the contrary, we sha11 hear the representative of the Soviet Union and then consider the possibility of adjournment. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): After the tragi-comedy improvised here hy the United States representative for obviously provocative reasons, and which included a display of weapons, nobody can have any doubt that the United States delegation has been creating at this meeting the diversion to which it has made us accustomed. The purpose of this diversion, accomplished by means of the protracted reading of General Mac Arthur's report on the bloody aggression of the United States agaillst the Korean people, is ta impede the discussion Qf the question of the armed invasion of Taiwan by United States forces, which is on our agenda, to impede the discussion of United States aggression against China, and ta impede the discussion of the invitation to arepresentative of the People's Republic of China to attend the meetings of the Security Council. This is not the first time that the United States delegation has had recourse ta such diversion. 1 will recall the Security Couneil's [480th) meeting on 1 August, under the USSR representative's Presidency; on 31 July [479th meeting), on the eve of the 1 August meeting, the United States delegation tabled a proposaI [S/1653), hy way of a diversion, in order ta prevent the consideration of the USSR proposaIs for. the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. TlllS, of course, is not the Security Council's usual way ?f ~onducting its work; it is a recourse to arbitrariness In mternational relations and in the practice of the Security CouneiI. "On 5 August 1950 the (~oVertllllellt ai the People's Democratic H.epublic of Korea, in protest against the crimes committed by the United States interventionists in Korea in breach of the mIes of international law and of human morals, called upon the Security Council to take steps for the immediate cessation of those criminal acts of the United States interventionists. However, the representatives of the Anglo-Ameriean bloc in the Security Council are striving ta prevent the discussion of the statement of the Government of the People's Democratie Republic of Korea, with the result that the Security Council has hitherto taken no steps towards the cessation of the fouI crimes of the United States armed forces in Korea. ...Meanwhile, enraged by their reverses at the front, the United States imperialists with redoubled brutality are annihilating the peaceful population and industry of Korea. During the period succeeding the date of the submission of the 11rst statement of the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea on this question, numerous fresh instances of. barbarous deeds by the Cnited States Air Force against the peaceful population of Korea have taken place: bombings, strafing and complete destruction of towns and villages where there have never been any military targets, deliberate firing upu." the peaceful population, and the systematic annihilation of the national property of Korea. "Dail)' from 7 August to ï September Cnited States bombers and dive~bombers have raided Pyongyang, dropped înnumerable bombs on. the residential sections of the city and machine-gunned them indiscriminately. In particular, on 7 August 51 B-29 bombers raided Pyongyang and in the space of six hours dropped 574 heay )' bombs (Jn the del1selypopulated southern "The United States Air Force has also heavily bombarded the city of Chongjin. On 19 August over 60 United States bombers bOll1bed the city, dropping upon it 1,012 bombs; as a result of that bOll1bardment, 2,626 houses were destroyed, 1,034 persons were killed and 2,347 were injured; and hospitals, the industrial technical college, the girls' high school and other schools, the people's theatre and many other cultural institutions and a large number of buildings occupied by Government institutions and public organizations were destroyed. Such bombardments take place repeatedly, as a result of which nine-tenths of the city of Chongjin, with a population of 120,000. has been destroyed. "United States aircraft, taking advantage of their overwhelming aerial superiority, have recently intensified their terror raiding, and strafe and bomb by day and night the peaceful population of the whole territory of Korea. The United States Air Force continues daily its barbarous strafing of roads, destroying peasants' carts, passenger buses and passengers cars having nothing to do with the transport of munitions of war, anù machine-gunning their passengers. On 27 August more than 10 United States dive-bombers fired on the main highway between Pyongyang and Anju (in Pyongan-namdo), burned uI) nine passenger cars, killing 3 passengers with machine-gun fire, and destroyed dozens of peasants' carts, killing o\'er 20 women and children who were riding in them. On 16 August United States bombers attacked a passenger bus going from Sunchon (in Pyongan-pukto) and destI'oyed it, and shot down \Vith their machine-guns a woman of 62 and her granddaughter of 16 who were unable to take cover. On 13 August United States bombers droppcd a bomb on a passenger steamer plying between the town of Chinnampo and H wanghae-do sinking it and killing 44 passengers and injuring 8 persons. On 20 August in the counties of Taedong, Sunchan, Chunghwa, Kangso, Yonggang, Songchon a~lc1 Kangdong (in Pyongan-namdo) 68 United States dIVe-bombers carried out a raid and, flying low over the village, machine-gunned and dropped bombs on peasants working in the fields or gathered in market place~ ;.as a result 33 peasants were killed and 54 persons l11Jured on that dav. A large number of instances are available of brutal fi.ring by United States aircraft on peasants working in the paddy fields. As a result of these shootings on 6 August in the county of Pongsa~ .(in Hwanghae-do) 6 persons were kilIed and 7 l11Jured. On 10 August in the district of Ando in "The UnE+ed States interventionists are systematically destroying the industry of Korea in an attempt to condemn the Korean people to unemployment, destitution and famine. The United States Air Force is methodically destraying the whole of the industry of Korea, dropping dozens and hundreds of bombs on factories and mills irrespective of theil" production. They have destroyed rice mills at Sariwon, Chongjin, Wonsan, Chinnampo, and the largest metallurgical works in the country at Kenjiko-Kyomipo (Hwanghaedo). They have destroyed sewing and knitting factories in Pyongyan.g, Sunan, Wonsan, and the largest chemical concern at Hungnam, which produces agricultural fertilizers for the whole country. They have destroyed soya and oil mills at Chinnampo, Wonsan, Pyongyang and Chongjin, and a non-ferrous metal mill at Chinnampo. They have destroyed, in Hungnam and Pyongyang, rubber boot factories making the principal form of footwear required by the civil population of Korea, and a recently constructed glass factory at Chinnampo. Twenty bombs were dropped on the rubber boot faetory atPyongyang and 15 persons were killed and 23 injured. On the metallurgical works at Kenjiko- Kyomipo (Hwanghae-do) 592 bombs were dropped; 73 persons were killed and 57 injured. On the chemical combine at Hungnam, 1,081 bombs were dropped; 120 persans were killed and 64 injured. On the nonferrous metal mill at Chinnampo 750 (?) bombs were dropped and 57 persons were killed and 75 injur.ed. AJready aU of the big industr:al plants and most of the medium ~md small industrial plants of Korea have been completely destroyed as a result of barbarous bombing by the United States Air Force, and the nation~û wealth has been annihilated to the value of mU- Hardi> of won. In order to hinder relief work and increase the number of victims among the peaceful population, a considerable number of delayed-action bombs are dropped which explode just as the population are coming out of their shelters after a raid and beginning to look for the killed and wounded among "Ali these ùarbarous misdeeds oi the Cnited States interventionists in Korea are a gross violation of the universal1y recognized rules af international law, and dearly display the cynical falsehood of Acheson's recent statemcnt that the attacks of the United States Air Force on Korea were directed exc1usively against military targets. The crimes of the l;nited States Air Force in Korea prove that the United States imperialists, in their aggressive \Var against the Korean people, do not sentple to use the mast foui and brutal means. "In communicating the foregoing facts, the Government of the People's Democratie H.epublic of Korea again insistently demands that urgent steps he taken immediately to put a stop to such crimes of the United States interventionists in Karea. l request you to bring this statement to the notice of ail memlJers uf the Security Couneil and of the United Nations, and also to inform me uf the steps to he taken in this matter." A further document has been n:ceived today, a cablegram from Mr. Pak En Hen, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the PC'ople's Democratie Republic of Korea, addressec.l to the Secretary-General. This document, S/l800, reads as follows: "Have honour inform you of following: "On 16 September 1YSU during a barharous raid by United States Air Force on town of Pyongyang United States airplanes selected the area of the central hospital of the town as one of the main targets of their attack. In spite of c1early visibie Red Cro~s emblems on roofs of hospital and on the cuurtyards by the hospital, the aircraft dropped 172 ùomhs on the hospital, 16 of which ::t the hospital. As a result of this harbarous bombardment Il persans were kiIled, 41 persans seriously injured, one huilding destroyed and other hospital buildings and annexes seriousl)" damaged. "On behalf of the (;overntllC'llt of the l'eople's Democratie Republic of Korea l reiterate my strong protest against the incessant deliherate bombardment of medical institutic.ns of the People's Democratie Repuhlic of Korea hy the United States Air Force, whiçh constitutes a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention and the generally accepted rules of international law. Request you ta communicate the above to aIl Members ?f the United Nations and of Security Council, ta take Immediate steps to put an end to similar criminal activities hy the United States aggressors in Korea, and to inform me of the measures taken in this matter." laire avec institutions cratique forces de admises l11unllluer ce l'nies Il' d(,s d('s Conseil général de Such are the documents which have reaehed the Sl'- curity Council exposing the fahrications General Mac- Arthur sends the Seeurity Couneil in sueh profusion, The correspondent des~ribes the incredible trials and sufferings of 300,ŒX) Koreans, woom the Americans have forced ioto a camp for refugees. "This camp", writes I;'avrcl t "is a l'lace wltere the terrible words of Dante: acquire their full mtaning. There are no words to express the suff~ring of the people there. There was Buchenwald, thcrc was Dachau, but what 1 have setn. cao. in no way he compilred with Buchenwald or Dachau. It is a veritable hell. l have seen people who get 110 food nOT cIothing. They are dying of hunger. Just once a week thc)' get a little grain. There is no physician in the camp. Famished, half-naked people lie on the ground, unable to raise their heads. '{And the Red Cross?" asks the correspondent. "Yes, 1 have seen a tent in the camp over wl1ich the Red Cross flag flew. But inside the tent 1 could find (Jnl) some soilec1 !incn ~lJ1,1 :! fcw cmpty lllccHcine bottles, and that was aIl.or Favrel descrihes the work of the "l11issioltaries" who reachee! the camp. The "missionaries" reported that there was nothing to cat and would be nothing to cat in the coming days. They made speeches cxhorting the people to forget their hunger, to dance and ta enjoy themselves. In the towns of Taegu and [Jusan, no one dares sa}' alouel the ward "cholera". At night, the inmates of the camp suffer indescrihably from the cold. Half-nakcd people sleel' Olt the harc ground. There is no wood for lighting nres. The camp is a blind alley without exit. 'l'hose who enter it must abandon aH hope. "1 am told", Favrel says, "that reports havc hecn sent to Tokyo, that a special United Nations rel'rcsentative has been instrueted to offer help to the refugees. 1 have been told that help is on the way. 1 wOl.l1c1 like to l>elieve it.'· The correspondent says that 1,500,000 people have heen sent ta South Korea hy the Americans, but that lIothing has been done to provide them with food, shelter, clothing, medical carc, fuel, etc. They are aH living underconditions worse than those of the Buchenwald Nazi concentration camp. That is the conclusion of his article. These are the faets regarding the sanguinary mis· deeds of the United States Command in Km'ca which no false reports from MacArthur can concea!. The report is being sûbmitted in order to distract attention From the hloodthirsty crimes which are heing committed in Korea, and in order to iead one to believe that these crimes are to he attributed to the United Nations. Meanwhile, according to a Reuter report of 12 Sep· tember, no less a person than the Prime Minister of As regards the exhibition just put on here by the l:nited States representative with his machine-gun, 1should Iike to repeat the statement which 1 made on 11 August [.J86t!J mcctillgJ: "In his attcmpt to confuse the iacts, the United States representative is resorting to direct slander against the Cnion of Soviet Socialist Republics, in stating that !\orth Korea is being provided with Soviet arms. In the brief remarks which 1 made yesterday 1 havc already replied to this slanderous statement. l..aid that the United States representative's assertion was slander and in no way conformed to the facts, as i\orth Korea has only the armaments sold to it by the Soviet Linion when the USSR troops withdrew from that country. "The representative of the United States is not the onl)' one to make such slanderous statements. That famous warmonger, Mr. Churchill, and sorne of his followers are also spreading similar slander by asserting that the Soviet Union is providing North Korea with jet-propelled :>.ircraft. These inventions of Mr. Churchill's do nut correspond to the facts, but are fabrications from beginning to end. "The facts which 1 have already stated . . . make it perfeetl)' c1ear that the artillery part of the North Korean forces consisted of the artillery and equipment 50 lavishly and generously sent by the Government of the United States to its South Korean puppet, Syngman Rhee." Even the Press in the United States has admitted that Syngman Rhee and the United States troops in Korea have already lost almost as much fighting equipment as was lost by the United States during the entire European eampaign. It is not surprising that the Korean army is weil equipped, as it has been able to equip itself from captured booty and, of course, Îrom arl11S sold by the USSR when it withdrew its troops from Korea in December 1948. As regards the machine-gun exhibit shown here by the United States representative, dozens of such guns can be found, and any kind of brand can be put on this weapon for purposes of provocation; but no one can he fooled by 1!lat. Such methods of provocation are meant for Sl, '~tons, but it scems to me that in our time simpletons are disappcaring. And so the comedy to which the United States representative treated us here shows that in order to distract attention from the bloody crimes which the United States imperialists are, committing against the Korean people, official Umted States representatives in the Security Council and the State Department, together with MacArthur, that well-known provocateur, will stop at nothing and The PRESIDE~T: Before we start the interpretation of the statement of the USSR representative, perhaps 1 could consult my colleagues on what to do now, hecause if we have the interpretation, it will indeed he late. If we are to raise the question of adjournment, it might 01150 he considered whether the interpretation into English and French could not perhaps hest be given Olt the beginning of our next meeting, whenever that is. 1 do not know how the Couneil fee1s about that, but it would he one means of avoiding our sitting here until approxirnate1y 8.15 p.m., which would he rather late. Mr. LACOSTE (France) (translatcd from Frellch) The French <leIegalion <loes not abject to such a postponerncnt. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian) : 1 think it would he advisable to have my speech interpreted into English but, if the French representative is agreeable, ta postpone the interpretation into French to the next meeîing.

My suggestion WOlS that bath interpretations he postponed until the next meeting, but it is rea1ly for the Couneil to state what it desires. 1 do not know if the representative of France wishes to support the suggestion that there should be an interpretation into English of Mr. Malik's speech now, and that the French interpretation should he postponed until the next meeting. Mr. LACOSTE (France) (translated from Fre1lch) 1 agree that bath interpretations should be postponed until the next meeting.

Is that what the Council would desire? 1 think that that is the wish of the Couneil. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Soeialist Republic:s) (translated from Russian) : 1 insist on putting to the vote my proposaI ta have the interpretation of m)' speech into English today.

The question is: Should the Couneil now have the English translation of the speech of the representative of the Soviet Union? A vote was take'n by show of hands as follows: ln favour: Union of Soviet Socialist Repliblics. Against: China, Cuba, Ecuadbr, France, Norway, United States of AmetÏca. Ab""aining: Egypt, inrlia, United Kingd()!n of Great Brham and Northern lreland, Yugoslavia. ~~----~--.....~ " '- If that is generally agreed, l think the Couneil may adjourn sine die. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Soeialist Republics) (trafulated frcnn- Russian): Of course, not for long. tiques) longtemps.

Yes, l think that that can be understood. With that understanding, the Couneil is adjoumed sine die. que tions,