S/PV.525 Security Council

Before calling upon the next speaker, 1 should like to reply to the USSR representative, for he has criticized and even accused the President in his speech. suivant, soviétique; et In the first place, the Soviet Union representative pointed out that it was at the request of his delegation that this meeting was called in order to discuss the complaint of armed invasion of Taiwan (Formosa) and not to discuss the complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea. That is true. It was the United States delegation which asked for the inclusion of the second item on the agenda for this meeting because we did not finish discussing it at our last meeting. a qu'une plainte mose), sion la le à qu'à la nous seconde du regarde cette accepté c'est jour Secondly, the USSR representative says that his i,delegation has not accepted the wording for the second item as it appears in our provisional agenda. That is the affair of the USSR delegation, but it should admit that although it may not have accepted this wording, the President has not invented it. It is the wording that has been used in our agenda ever since we started to discuss the question of Korea. outre - j'aurais affaires de en Ministre deux ce le les exprimé Formose liés. En-Iaï étroit un ces The USSR representative also states - and this is his main argument - that 1 have misinterpreted the request ';f.l11ade by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Central ~~J?eople's Government of the People's Republic of China, Mr. Chou En-lai. According to him, 1 said when opening the meeting that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had requested that the two questions should be discussed ;rJogether.. That howeve: is not what ! said and M.r. MalIk can check thlS from the verbatlm report. 1 ~aId that the parties who were most directly concerned lU the subject had expressed the opinion that the two problems - Formosa and Korea - were closely related. ,In the cablegram from ML Chou En-lai, we find the following phrase: " ... and in view of the fact that the two questions are closely related...". That is an argument in favour of discussing the two questions together. After these remarks on a question of form, l should like to add a clarification on the substance of the problem. The Security Council has sent an invitation to the People's Republic of China under the provisions of rule 39 of the rules of procedure, and that rule does not provide for any restrictions. The particular document mentioned in the invitation to the Central People's Government - the document which the USSR representative refers to as the report of General MacArthur - has never become a separate item on our agenda. The question which is still on our agenda is the complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea. Now where will the proposaI just made by the USSR representative lead us? In practice, it will mean that the representative of the People's Republic of China will be prevented from taking part in any of the discussion on the question of Korea, whether the question remains in its present drafting or whether it appears in any other form. Besides, since no other wording appears in any document, it really cannot be considered at the moment. The USSR proposaI would in practice deprive us of the presence of the representative of the People's Republic of China during our discussion of the Korean question, and l very much doubt whether that would help the Council's work or lead to its successful completion. Consequently, l believe that the suggestion l made at the beginning of this meeting will enable us to overcome the difficulties which have arisen over questions of prestige and to hear the representative of the People's Republic of China on the two problems which concern it. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America) : My Government supports the provisional agenda and the suggestion of the President that the bracketed items (a) and (b ) be considered jointly. In fact, l am prepared to set forth my country's views, in light of the fact that my name appears first on the list of speakers who are to deal with the merits of this question, and l am prepared to discus~ aIl of the questions that are comprehended by these two headings. Tt occurs to me that this parliamentary question raised by the representative of the Soviet Union tends to confusion, irregularity and a lack of the order which we ought to have in a discussion of the merits of this matter, because the merits of this matter affect human life and the lives of many. Rule 39, under which these ladies and gentlemen have been invited to appear here, provides: présentes "The Security Council may invite members of the Secretariat or other persons" - and they come in that class of 'other persons' - "whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence." It is for the Security Council to decide what subject it will consider; it is not for the people who are invited here to decide, and their views and wishes, whether attempted to be presented by themselves or through somebody else, cannot have much weight with the Security Council in deciding how it will handle its problems. déterminer pas les quelqu'un beaucoup prendre questions normale, l'article This provisional agenda is drawn up in the normal way, according to the first paragraph of rule 7, which reads: "The provisional agenda for each meeting of the Security Council shall be drawn up by the Secretary- General and approved by the President of the Security Council." des sentant demande That is what was done in this case. The President followed the request of the representative of the Soviet Union in putting one of the items on the agenda, and he followed the request of the representative of the United States in putting another item on the agenda. le suspens de général désobligeantes question Conseil autre formément à l'article de Let me calI the Security Council's attention to the parliamentary situation. The pending question before the Council is that joint draft resolution [5/1894] relating to the MacArthur report, which has been somewhat vilified here in remarks upon a purely parliamentary question. That is the pending business and the Security Council has no other business before it. Therefore, logically, reasonably, and according to rule 10, the Sectfrity Council should proceed with the discussion of that subject. questions, de qu'il dépend déclaré qu'ils été It so happens that there are other subjects which are cornprehended by these two headings and which include this complaint of armed invasion of Taiwan, and the reasonableness of their being put in a bracket depends on the subject matter. Tt does not depend upon the fact that these witnesses have themselves stated that the entire subject matter should be considered under one ~eading, but that was what they had in mind at the tirne they sent this communication of Il November [S/1898], which appears to be signed by Mr. Chou En-lai, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. l quote the following from that communication: Later, the paper l have here was produced as a document of the Security Council and circulated, at the request of the USSR representative, as document S/1902 entitled "Letter dated 14 November 1950 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Secretary-General transmitting a statement by a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Chinese People's Republic dated 11 November 1950". l quote the letter: "1 enclose the text of a statement of the representative of the Foreign Office of the Chinese People's Republic dated 11 November last, concerning the so-called MacArthur special report and the declaration of the United States representative, Mr. Austin, made at the meeting of the Security Council, and would ask you to circulate this statement as a Security Council document." The statement referred to in the letter which l have quoted above is before the Council. Can the representatives find any signature to that document? It may be accidentai that there is none, but l feel bound, according to the decencies of my life and my habit of thought, to regard the statement as true, although it does not bear the signature of Chou En-lai or of any other representative of the Chinese communist regime. Until l know the contrary, l am bound to take Mr. Malik at his word and to assume that this is not his statement but that of the Chinese communist regime. However, it makes little difference to thli Security Council whether this statement was created by those who have come here to give information, or whether it was prepared by the Soviet Union. It makes no difference at all, in my opinion. Assuming as l do that this statement is actually what Mr. Malik said it was, although it is not signed, what do we find here? We find the most amazing admission: Let me calI the attention of. the Council to the language. l am not going to read all of document S/1902 but only those parts of it that refer directly to this admission. The first is as follows: "Filled with righteotls indignation, the Chinese people is voluntarily helping the Korean people to repulse United States aggression, and its acts are completely natural and just." There is another admission further along in the text, as follows: "To help Korea and repel United States aggression means to protect our own homes and our own country. It is, therefore, completely natural for the Chinese people to be ready to help Korea and offer resistance to United States aggression." That whole paragraph is filled with talk about this inspired adventure voluntarily undertaken by thousands of soldiers, fighting men. Again there is the following admission: "The Chinese people will never forget how the Korean people magnanimously gave the Chinese people voluntary assistance in its revolutionary struggle. The Korean people took part not only in the Chinese war of national liberation, but also in the northern march of the Chinese people in 1925 to 1927, in the agrarian revolutionary war of 1927 to 1937, and in the war against Japan from 1937 to 1945. Throughout the four stages of the Chinese people's revolution the Korean people always fought shoulder to shoulder with the Chinese people to overthrow imperialism and feudalism. Now that the bloodthirsty United States aggressors are exterminating Koreans, the Chinese are sharing their sufferings and, as must be perfectly obvious, cannot remain indifferent." Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): Point of order.

l am sorry l cannot allow the representative of the Soviet Union to interrupt a speech on a point of order. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): Is the gentleman denying this? l shall continue the reading of . this document. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): It is useless to quote the rules c!f procedure. W~ all know them. However, l have a pomt of order to raIse. Sir Gladwyn JEEE (United Kingdom) : l should like to support the President's suggestion that the agenda should be adopted as it appears in the document. As l understand it, the position is that the delegation of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China has arrived fully empowered, as far as l know, to discuss the Formosan item in accordance with the invitation which was extended to it on 29 September [506th meeting]. Therefore, that item must obviously figure on the present agenda. In view of this grave situation the Security Council, not unnaturally as is known, invited the representatives of the Central People's Government to be present during the discussion of what was in fact a new phenomenon, that is to say, intervention by Peking as revealed in the special report of the United Nations Unified Command [5/1884], and they were so invited on 8 November. As we know, the Central People's Government declined this invitation on the general grounds that it did not recognize the Unified Command, and could not therefore take cognizance, so to speak, of the special report. However, the fact is that the Security Council, l am sure, will undoubtedly wish to profit by the presence of the representatives of the Central People's Government to discuss this burning question which is, l need hardly say, of the greatest importance to the peace of the world. If this can be done by generalizing the item in question and not specifically limiting it to General MacArthur's special report, then l for one am perfectly prepared to agree, and that in spite of the fact that, as the members of the Council know, it was l who opposed the original Soviet Union suggestion [5/1889] that representatives of Peking should be invited to take part in the general discussion of the Korean item. l suppose it may be said that l induced the Security Council to limit the invitation in the manner which is now objected to by the Central People's Government itself. In saying this l wouId not wish it to be thought that the adoption of the agenda as suggested by the President should be taken as an admission that the representatives of the Central People's Government should have an automatic right to be present whenever any item concerning the complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea is discussed by us. It may be - l do nQt say it will not be, but it may be - that the Security Council would wish them ta be present on such occasions as this. But l think that whether it will in fact wish them to be present will, ta a considerable extent, depend ultimately on the attitude which they adopt as regards the aIl-important question of intervention. But having made this proviso, l have no doubt about supporting the proposaI which the President has made. After aIl, there is no doubt, l think, that what the Security Council wants to do, if it can, is not only to stop the war which is now raging in the Far East as a result of the unprovoked' aggression by the North Korean authorities, but also to prevent the outbreak of any further wars in the neighbourhood. The The President was correct in stating that the USSR delegation had proposed to convene today's meeting of the Security Council and had submitted the question of armed invasion of Taiwan (Formosa). What, then, is the reason for the second item, which the President and the United States delegation are combining with the first item? What grounds are there for combining these questions? The President can include any item in the agenda, it is his right to do so; any de1egation on the Security Council is entitled to include any question in the agenda, but why scheme in this way to combine two items in order to impose the discussion of MacArthur's special report on the representatives of the People's Republic of China? The President states that no such item is included in the agenda. But when the Council adopted the resolution of 8 November there was no such question. Nevertheless, the Council adopted the resolution and limited participation. l then stated that it was a matter for the Chinese Government to agree or not. l was in favour of inviting the representatives of the Central People's Government of China for full participation and not for limited participation. That is the position and that is why the matter is quite clear. The USSR delegation has proposed the inclusion of the item of armed invasion of Taiwan. Let us then discuss that question. J: Judging by the cablegrams from the Central ,People's Government of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese de1egation - that is to say the representative of that government - has been granted full powers for participating in the discussion of that question. He apparently has no such powers regarding MacArthur's special report, since Mr. Chou En-lai stated in his cablegram of Il November that his Government wouId not participate in the discussion of that report. This is quite clear. Consequently, in order not to complicate the question still further, l shall not now reply to any of the remarks of the United States representative. l shall reply to them in due course, but now l do not want ta waste any time on procedural discussion. l shall only tell him that shouting, hysteria and blackmail will neither win over nor frighten anyone. Consequently, let us give up any attempt at blackmail and let us quietly discuss the item placed on the Council's agenda. One cannot speak of love and friendship and threaten and shake one's fists at the same time. Yet that is precisely what the United States representative does when he speaks of his love and friendship for the Chinese people. Such statements cannot be taken seriously. Sir Benegal N. RAU (India) : 1 am not very clear as to the exact scope of sub-item (b) which appears on the agenda of the Counci!. Sub-item (b), as it is worded at present, reads: "Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea". From the introductory remarks made by the President, 1 am under the impression that in his view this wording would permit discussion any countercomplaint of armed intervention in Korea. Before, therefore, the matter is put to the vote, 1 should like a ruling from the President whether the wording of sub-item (b) is wide enough to permit discussion of any counter-complaint of armed intervention in Korea which the representative of the Peking Government might wish to bring forward.

1 should like to reply briefly to the question that has just been asked. In my opinion, the item on the agenda covers the whole problem of Korea, and any member of the Council or any representative of the countries concerned may express his views on the problem of Korea. Members of the Council have expressed very divergent views, and 1 think that any delegation that is invited here will also be entitled to express its particular point of view. In order to avoid speaking again, 1 shall say forthwith that, in his second speech, besides repeating his original arguments, the representative of the USSR made a new accusation, alleging that it was really the President's aim to force the delegation from the People's Republic of China to discuss General MacArthur's report. That is obviously a very malicious Interpretation of my actions, for the draft resolution which the USSR delegation submitted [5/1889] on the invitation to the representative of the People's Republic of China covered the whole problem of Korea and did not exclude the discussion of General MacArthur's report. Consequently, if we adopt the agenda as it is now formulated, we shall be in e~actly the same position as we would have been had we adopted the USSR draft resolution. The agenda covers the problem of Korea as a whole, just as did the USSR draft resolution. Thus there is no more pressure being brought to bear upon the delegation of the People's Republic of As for the procedure, we have a USSR amendment to the provisional agenda. The amendment is that item 2 should not comprise two paragraphs, but a single paragraph which would read: "Complaint of armed invasion of Taiwan (Formosa)". The Council will have to vote on this amendment. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated fram Russian): AlI of the President's arguments are based on the hypothesis that the USSR draft resolu~ion was adopted; but it was not adopted. The resolutlOn of 8 November [5/1892], which limits participation, was adopted in its place. Does the President's explanation mean that the resolution has been revoked and that it no longer exists? Can 1 interpret his explanation in this way?

ln the first plase, the President cannot suppress resolutions; secondly, the USSR delegation voted in favour of that resolution, and thirdly, it is the only delegation which has mentioned the resolution today. It is not mentioned in the provisional agenda 1 submitted. 1 propose that we should now vote on the agenda. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated fram Russian): 1 must apologize for speaking once again. The President and the members of the Council know that, having in mind the existence of that resolution on and its content, the Government of the People's Republic of China refused to participate in the discussion of the question which the President wishes to impose on it. The President is therefore right in saying that he cannot revoke the resolution; the resolution exists, and so does Mr. Chou En-lai's telegram of 11 November. That is the position and those are the facts. Why should we close our eyes to realities? The President asserts that the item is covered by sorne broad formula. But in the presence of the resolution, any member of the Seeurity Council can say to the Chinese representatives: "No, your participation must be confined to the resolution of 8 November, to participation in the discussion of MacArthur's report". 1 would therefore emphasize that we wouId be creating an abnormal situation if, in view of the existence of this resolution, we were to try to close our eyes to realities and, so to speak, extend the scope of the item, while leaving the limitative resolution in force. ln those circumstances, the participation of the representative of the People's Republic of China in these debates in a limited capacity would be contrary to

l think that everything is perfectly clear. l need only say that the decision to discuss points (a) and (b) of item 2 together will not mean that anyone is forced to speak on both points. If the Soviet Union representative does not wish to speak on point (b), or if the delegation which we have not yet seen does not wish to speak on that point, they are perfectly entit1ed to refrain from doing so and the Security Council cannot force them to speak on it. We shall now vote on the provisional agenda. Ml'. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated fram Russian): That was why l proposed that we should discuss one item only, and should then go on to the other. Ml'. AUSTIN (United States of America): l apologize for intervening again, but l think the discussion that has taken place here requires a short statement of our understanding of the situation. The resolution adopted by the Security Council on 8 November 1950 invited, in accordance with rule 39 of the rules of procedure, a representative of the Peking régime to be present during the discussion by the Security Council of the special report of the United Nations Command in Korea [5/1884]. l think this invitation is open to only one reasonable interpretation, namely, that the Peking régime has been invited, under ruIe 39, to be present while the Security Council discusses the subject matter of the special report. Of course, they sent us a cable on 11 November, saying that they would not respond to that invitation [5/1898]. But, after that, they made another statement [5;'1902] in which they did respond. Of course, they cannot come here with a written response and expect that nobody will question it and that everybody will accept it. If it chooses, the Security Council will discuss that matter and will compare what is said there with the other evidence in the possession of the Security Council. The subject matter of that special report is intervention by Chinese communist forces in Korea. The Soviet Union Government and the Peking régime may consider the Unified Command illegal and its report unworthy of consideration, but this cannot alter the fact of Chinese communist intervention, which is admitted by the Peking régime in the papers to which l have already called attention, nor can it Emit the right of the Security Council tlll discuss what has been cOrïect1y described by the representative of the United Kingdom as a "threat to international peace and security". The Council may discuss this subject in whatever manner and uncler whatever agenda item it wishes. That decision is up to the Council. The Peking representatives woulcl have the right to give information to the Council on any of these matters. They might change their minds. The s.u?sta?ce of his position amounts to limiting the pa~tIclpat1(~n of the representative of the People's Repubhc. of Ch~na. In spite of his original grandiloquent speech, ln WhlCh he attempted to create a different impressio~, he has now stated frankly that the purpose of the Umted States delegation is to limit the participation of the representative of the People's Republic of China in the discussion of the Korean problem only to MacArthur's special report. That was the very point stressed by the Soviet Union delegation, which considers that this would create an abnormal situation and that such a situation is inadmissible. It pointed out that that was the reason for the inclusion of the Korean item as a supplementary point (b) of the item on the question of Taiwan (Formosa). That is why the USSR delegation objects to such a combination; the discussion has made it clear that the real aim of the United States delegation is to force the representative of the People's Republic of China to participate in the discussion of MacArthur's report and ta confine this participation in accordance with the limitations laid down in the resolution of 8 November. At any rate that is how l understood the interpretation of the statement made by the United States representative. It is precisely in the light of all these considerations and in the light of the results of this procedural discussion, that the USSR delegation insists that the item of armed invasion of Taiwan should be the first item to be discussed and that it should be placed as the first item on the Council's agenda. Should any one wish to include other items, let them do so. It is the right of all members of the Security Council to include any item they like and to insist that it should be discussed. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom) : l agree with my Soviet Union colleague on one thing, and that is that these long discussions on procedure are not absolutely fruitless. Indeed there is sorne profit in them quite often because, if they do nothing else, they tend ta reveal the true purposes which may motivate the various representatives in the Security Council and any proposaI they may make. l think that one of the motives that has inspired my Soviet Union colleague in this matter and in this debate on procedure undoubtedly is to suggest that there is sorne plot against the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, sorne plot which would prevent its representatives, if they came to this table, from saying what is on their minds about the subjects which most concern them. That is entirely untrue. , L, ~.~. So now what do we do? Vve say, "All right, you do not want to come if the discussion is formally limited to that specifie point. Therefore, if you will come you will have complete liberty of saying anything you wish about the situation in Korea as a whole." That is the object of putting agenda sub-item 2 (b) in the form in which it is in the document. That is the only object. They will have complete liberty to say whatever they like on the whole subject of Korea. We, for our part - l think l speak for the majority of the members of the Security Councilare most concerned with what is the most important matter in the present circumstances, that is to say, the matter of intervention, and it is we, no doubt, who will tend to concentrate on that point. l see no reason why we should not do so. It is natural that we should. Therefore, l think that there is no need to de1ay any longer. What we have done in effect is to modify the original invitation that was made to the Peking Government. l imagine that the modified invitation will be in accordance with its desire, since what it has said repeatedly is that the general situation in Korea cannot be disassociated from the complaint of the armed invasion of Taiwan (Formosa). That is exactly what is proposed in the agenda, namely, that the two items should be considered together. l move that we not delay the matter any further, and that we put it to the vote. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The USSR delegation considers that, until the resolution of 8 November is rescinded, the position cannot change, irrespective of any statements which may have been made at this table. There are therefore no grounds for agreeing with the United Kingdom representative's statement that the position has changed. The resolution has not been rescinded and the situation remains the same.

The USSR amendment to the provisional agenda has already been drafted; l shall repeat it so that there shall be no misunderstanding and to make sure that l am interpreting it correctly. The amendment proposes to substitute for the two sub-items under item 2 a single item to read as follows: "Complaint of armed invasion of Taiwan (Formosa)". Sir Benegal N. RAU (India) : l am sorry to intervene at this stage. l do so only because l am not very clear as to where we stand. l should like to put a very simple

l have replied already once ta the question put by the Indian representative. l have said that l consider that all members of the Security Council or representatives of States invited ta attend our meeting are free ta state their respective views on an problems on the agenda. Since the item of Korea is on the agenda, the view which would be expressed under the heading "Complaint of armed aggression upon the Republic of Korea" would obviously come under that item, and we have heard that view stated often enough by a member of the Security Couneil sitting at this table. Does my reply satisfy the Indian representative? Sir Benegal N. RAU (India) : Yes, thank you.

We shan now proceed ta the vote on the USSR amendment which l have already read twice. l think that it is by now perfectly clear ta aIl the members of the Council.

As the USSR amendment was the only one before us, l consider the agenda as adopted. We shan now proceed to the second item on our agenda. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated jrom R~tssian): l protest and ask that this should be noted in the records of the meeting.

It will be noted. 3. (a) Complaint of armed invasion of Taiwan (Formosa) (b) Complaint of aggression upon the Repub- lic of Korea

In accordance with the Council's decision, l invite the representatives of the Central People's Government of the Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): l presume the President is referring ta the decision of 29 September 1950 [506th meeting].

Since the Soviet Union representative has mentioned that date, we might recall another one, that of 25 June, and in conformity with the decision taken on that date [473rd meeting], we shall invite the representatives of South Korea ta take their seats at the Council table. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Limb, representative of the Republic of Korea, took a place at the Security Council table.

l notice that the representative of the People's Republic of China is asking ta speak. On my list, which dates back several days, the United States representative is the first speaker, and l must calI on him ta speak. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): Mr. President ... Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): Point of arder.

Yes, but with the speaker's permission. During this month l have adhered ta the practice which has been followed by many Presidents, which is not ta caU on a speaker on a point of arder while a statement is being made. We are a political organ, and l think that every speaker must be given an opportunity ta state his views without being interrupted. l have refused ta calI on many representatives who wished ta make a point of arder during a speech. l believe that it has happened today for the first time ta the USSR representative. l have used the same method when the representative who is the second on my right interrupted the USSR representative himself. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): There is no such rule in the rules of procedure. l t is for the President ta decide whether he can let me speak on a point of arder or not, and l do not want ta have ta depend for this on any speaker. The President is reiponsible for the conduct of the meeting and l am asking him ta give me the fioor on a point of arder. It is not for the United States representative ta calI on me to speak. He is not the President. When he is in the Chair then he will give me the fioor. l am now asking the President ta give me the fioor. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America) : l had the fioor; l understood the President ta turn ta me and ask Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated fram Russian): It is very kind of the United States representative ta give me an opportunity to speak, but 1 suppose that the President agrees that 1 may express my views on this question. 1 shall not refer ta the substance of the question; the United States representative need not be afraid that 1 shall speak on the substance. 1 want to speak on the procedural question. What is the position? When it became known after the meeting of the First Committee on Friday, 24 November, that there would be no meeting of that Committee on Saturday, 25 November, 1 requested the President of the Security Council to call a meeting of the Council for Saturday morning or Saturday afternoon at 3 p.m. or, if it were physically impossible to convene a meeting for Saturday, to convene one on Monday at 3 p.m. 1 was acting at the request of the representative of the People's Republie of China because, when we met, he had asked that the Security Council should be convened without any delay and that the delegation of the People's Republie of China at the meeting should have an opportunity ta express its view on the question submitted by the Government of the People's Republic of China. It is the agreed praetice of the Security Couneil that when any State places an item on the Council's agenda, its representative is the first ta out1ine his position. First the accuser, and then the accused, should be heard. ln this case the accuser is the People's Republic of China, and the accused, the aggressor whose armed forces have invaded Taiwan, is the United States of America. Why then should the United States representative speak first? On what grounds? There have been and should be no such precedents. The President says that the United States representative's name has been on his !ist of speakers for a long time. He cauld not have been mcluded in the list before the representative of the People's Republic of China, for when the representative of the People's Republic of China submitted his request on the convening of this meeting, he intended to make his complaint first. This is the state of affairs. Thus, the representative . of the People's Republie of China should be the first 1 .- speaker on the list and he must be given a hearing. - The President's powers should not be used for the .... pUrpose of allowing the United States representative ta speak first on this question. It is essential to give L th' representativ, of the People', Repnbli, of China 21

l must make some remarks on the question raised by the USSR representative because he has attacked me once again. \Vhen doing so, he forgot rule 27 of the rules of procedure which states that "The President shaH calI upon representatives in the order in which they signify their desire to speak" The rule states nothing else ; similarly, the foHowing rules dealing with rapporteurs and points of order lay down no other principle than that of the order in which speakers ask for the fioor. Since the USSR representative has raised that question l shall relate events as they have occurred since Friday. On Friday the USSR representative warned me by telephone that the delegation of the People's Republic of China would like to see the Security Council meet on Saturday moming or afternoon, if possible. The USSR representative said that he, too, insisted that such a meeting should take place. Nothing else was mentioned during that conversation. Consequently, the delegation of the People's Republic of China did not inform me of its wish directly. Thinking, however, that this delegation might not be aware of aIl the technical facilities available in New York, personally instructed my secretary to try to contact that delegation by telephone. l wanted first of aH to have a confirmation of its wish that the Council should meet on the following day, and secondly to ask for its views on the procedure to be followed; in other words, wanted to ask the delegation more or less directly whether it wanted to be the first to speak. We were unable, however, to contact the delegation of the People's Republic of China on Friday evening; my secretary finaHy succeeded in contacting that delegation - and want to emphasize that it was not the delegation which sought us but we who traced it - on Saturday at 11 a.m., to wam it that other delegations had begun placing their names on the list of speakers and to ask directly whether it, too, wished to speak at the first meeting. In the meantine, l naturally had to get in touch with ather delegations to find out whether they were prepared to attend a meeting of the Council on Saturday. It was aIl the more necessary for me to do that since the USSR representative had said he insisted that a meeting should be convened on Satl1tday, though he had made no formaI reql1est to that effect under rule 2 of the rules of procedure. l asked him over the telephone whether he was making his reql1est for a meeting on Saturday under rule 2 and he replied: "No, l am not asking for a meeting under rule 2 of the rules of procedure; if it seems impossible, l am ready to agree that the Council should not meet until Monday". We must therefore choose between the request made later on Saturday, by the delegation of the People's Republic of China, ta be allowed ta speak first, and the provision of rule 27 which gives delegations the right to speak in the arder in which their names are inscribed on the list. l leave it ta the Council ta take a decision. [ shall not make a ruling since. there are obviously ~rguments on bath sides. l feel sure that the Council will find some way ta take a fair decision. It seems ta me that it is already late and, as the members of the Council know, we aIl have ta be at Manhattan at 7 o'clock this evening ta attend a reception given by the President of the General Assembly. l therefore suggest that we should adjourn the meeting now and meet again tomorrow, Tuesday 28 November, at 10.45 a.m. Since there are no objections, the meeting stands adjourned. The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m. Printed in Canada Priee: 25 (or equiva1ent in