S/PV.526 Security Council

When the [525th] meeting rose yesterday evening, the situation was as follows: two representatives had asked for the Hoor and a third had had his name included in the list of speakers later. l informed the Council that the first speaker on my list was the United States representative; the second was the representative of the People's Republic of China. In accordance with rule 27 of our rules of procedure, l called upon the first representative on my list, but the USSR representative objected and asserted that the representative of the People's Republic of China should have been called upon first to express his views before the Council. Of course, the Council has the right to choose the procedure that it intends to follow. If rule 27 of our rules of procedure were to be interpreted strictly, the first speaker should be the United States representative. N evertheless, it cannot be denied that it wouId be logical to allow the representative of the government which has submitted the complaint in sub-item 2 (a) of our agenda, a complaint which has not yet been submitted to the Council, to express his views first. l do not want to decide the matter by a presidential ruling. In order to avoid an interminable discussion of this procedural matter, l shall call upon members of the Council to indicate by a show of hands whether they consider that a special exception should be made in this case to rule 27 of ou1- rules of procedure and whether the representative of the party making the complaint, the representative of the PeopIe's Republic of China, should be allowed to speak first. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): l think that in this case arguments based on rule 27 of the rules of procedure do not correspond with the present state of affairs and are unfounded. That is fully in accordance with rule 27, since in requesting a meeting of the Security Council to discuss that question, and in stating that he requested the calling of that meeting in order to express his Government's views, the head of the delegation of the People's Republic of China signified his desire to speak. Thus, it is logical and fully in conformity with the rules of procedure to assume that the first representative who signified his desire to speak at this meeting of the Security Council was the head of the delegation of the People's Republic of China. Consequently, there are no grounds for the United States representative's intrusion in the list of speakers and his allegation that he should be the first speaker. What grounds are there for this? Did the representative of the People's Republic of China address his request for a meeting to the President of the Security Council in order to enable the United States representative to speak first at this meeting? yVas that the purpose of convening the meeting? If the United States representative intended to speak first on this question, he couId have taken the initiative and asked the President of the Security Council to convene a meeting at which he could have spoken as much as he liked, for an unlimited time. That is his right. But the situation is different. The Council was convened at the request of the USSR delegation, which took into account the request of the delegation of the People's Republic of China, and asked the President to convene the meeting because, owing to· circumstances known to us all, the delegation of the People's Republic of China could not ask for a meeting of the Security Council to be called. The meeting was called on the initiative of the delegation of the People's Republic of China, with the assistance of the USSR delegation, but not in order to give the United States representative an opportunity to speak first. He will be able to speak after the representative of the People's Republic of China has made his statement. The representative of the People's Republic of China is here as a representative of the accusing party. He accuses the United States of armed invasion of Taiwan, a Chinese island; of violation of the territorial integrity l should therefore like to state to the members of the Security Council that, if the United States representative insists on being included in the list of speakers and claims the right to speak first, his action will be purely arbitrary. It will be a flagrant violation of the mIes of procedure and of the accepted practice in our work. In aIl the history of the Security Council's work, the first speaker at any meeting of the Council has been the representative who requested the convening of the Council, the one on whose initiative the meeting had been convened. In this case, the meeting has been convened on the initiative of the People's Republic of China and its delegation. Thus, under rule 27, the delegation of the People's Republic of China is entitled to speak first because it was the first to signify its desire to speak and because the United States representative apparently signified a like wish later. Nevertheless, the President of the Security Council alleges that he received the United States delegation's request first and has relegated the request of the delegation of the People's Republic of China to second place. That is the situation. Yesterday the United States representative argued that he was prepared to discuss both questions and that he had a prepared speech. But any of us may have a prepared speech; that does not mean that we should all claim the right to speak first and should not give the delegation of the People's Republic of China, at whose initiative this meeting of the Security Council was convened, a chance to speak. This wouId not only be impolite, but inadmissible in the case of the delegation of the People's Republic of China, which is attending the Security Council for the first time. In view of all these considerations, the USSR delegation considers that it would be unjust for the United States delegation to insist on speaking first and for members of the Security Council to support this illegal request by the United States delegation. It is contrary to the mIes of procedure and the generally accepted practice of the Security Counc~l. These are the view5 of the USSR delegation on the matter.

The representative of the USSR is again attacking the President. l therefore feel obliged to make several remarks. With regard to the USSR representative's tactics, l have to make some factual observations which he cannot deny. 4 In the second place, rules 2 and 27 of the rules of procedure are concerned with two different questions. The first relates to the convening of meetings and the second to the inclusion of speakers in the list. In the third place, two members of the Council asked that the meeting should be convened, the USSR representative with regard to the question referred to in subitem (a), and the United States representative with regard to the question contained in sub-item (b). l made those remarks yesterday and thought that the USSR representative would take them into account. Today, however, he is stressing a new point, which he did not raise yesterday, to the effect that he had not only requested that the meeting should be called, but that on Friday evening 24 November he had also had the representative of the People's Republic of China listed as the first speaker, by telephone. l have before me the verbatim record of yesterday's meeting. The representative of the USSR did not say that. On the other hand, as l said yesterday, l remember our telephone conversation perfectly weIl. There was no reference to the list of speakers in it or to the inclusion of any name in that list. Moreover, even if such a question had been raised, is it the practice of the Security Council for one delegation to include another in the list of speakers? What would the USSR representative do, as President of the Council, if the delegation of France, of Egypt or of Ecuador, for instance, asked him to include Yugoslavia in the list of speakers? Would he not reply that Yugoslavia was quite capable of asking for its own name to be included? Personally, l shall never have my name included by , another delegation. l do not think that the representatives of the People's Republic of China themselves agree to this procedure of communicating with the President through the USSR delegation. They are the representatives of a sovereign State, and can have their country included in the list themselves. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated fram Russian): It wouId be wiser if in discussing this question we proceeded from the facts, and not on the basis of demagogic presuppositions. The President has referred to the question of sovereignty. Yes indeed, the Chinese People's Republic is a sovereign State; but who is preventing the Chinese Republic from taking its place here in the Security Council as a fully competent sovereign State, as is its right? The Anglo-American bloc! It is the Anglo-American bloc which has hitherto prevented the lawful representativeof the lawful Govf ernment of China from entering the Security Council l:" a fully comp,t,nt "p",,,ntativ<, and ha, kopt th, That is the situation; and we must proceed on the basis of the facts and not on that of demagogic presuppositions. As to the President's reference to the two sub-items on the agenda, there can be no doubt that the Chinese People's Republic has good grounds for laying charges against the United States in connexion with both the first and the second sub-items. The United States has committed an act of intervention in Korea - an armed aggression against the Korean people - and has also been guilty of armed aggression against China in Taiwan. In both cases the United States is an aggressor, an interventionist, aState guilty of interference in the affairs of other peoples and States. That is a second fact; but the President is closing his eyes to the realities of the situation. Those are the facts. The President says l claim to have placed the representative of the Chinese People's Republic on the list of speakers. l made no mention of this on the telephone and did not claim to have done so here. That is incorrect, and does not correspond with the facts. l informed the President by telephone that l insisted on a meeting of the Security Council being called at the request of the representative of the Chinese People's Republic, who wished to explain the position of the Government of the Chinese People's Republic to the Counci1. The rules of procedure make no mention of a list of speakers. Rule 27 of the rules of procedure, which l quoted, reads as follows: "The President shall call upon representatives in the order in which they signify their desire to speak." l do not know when the United States representative asked the President to call a meeting of the Security Council; the President did not mention the matter to me. l therefore have reason 1Jo conclude that l was the first to approach him and ask him to call a meeting of the Security Councilbefore the United States representative communicated with him - and was the first to inform him that the representative of the Chinese People's Republic wished to explain his views. That is in conformity with rule 27 of the rules of procedure. l did not ask for him to be placed on a list of speakers - which wouId have been absurdo To say "Call a meeting, give the representative of the Chinese People's In the circumstances, l can agree neither with the President's arguments nor with his attempts and those of the United States representative, flagrantly to violate the rules of procedure and the accepted practice of the Security Council by not a~owing the representative of the People's Republic of China, at whose request this meeting was convened, to make his statement first.

The USSR representative has just repeated the arguments he has already made, but this time he has done so in a tone which l shall refrain from discussing. l shall therefore not reply to him. Are there any other speakers who wish to discuss the same question? 1 cali on the representative of Egypt. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt): It is with great reluctance that l speak in this seemingly endless wrangle about a question of procedure about who is to speak first. We have already spent about an hour in trying to decide who shall speak first, with the result that nobody has spoken at aIl. l, for one, would be quite willing to vote for our continuing our meeting through the afternoon and, if necessary, through the evening so that everyone will have ample opportunity to speak. The President will recall, and l am sure the other members of the Council also will recall, that the usual practice of the Council, whether we like it or not, is to the effect that the members of the Council are first asked whether they want ta speak and, as long as sorne of them have something to say about the matter on the agenda, they are allowed to speak first, and then the other participants in the Council's debate are allowed to speak. That is the practice of the Security Council. If, for example, in connexion with the question of Czechoslovakia at the 268th meeting of the Security Council on 17 March 1948, the representative of Chile, who was not a member of the Council, spoke first, it appears quite obvious from the records of the Council that no other member of the Council wanted to speak after the adoption of the agenda. Accordingly, the representative of Chile spoke first. 1 should like ta add another observation with regard to a matter to which the President made sorne referl consider that the time has come to take a decision: to vote on the question of who will be the first speaker. l shall vote in favour of allowing the representative of the United States to speak first - for the reasons which l have just mentioned. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated fram R ussian): l had not intended to speak, but the Egyptian representative has put forward certain arguments which do not correspond with the realities. In fact, the question of armed invasion of Taiwan has already been discussed, [492nd and S03-S07th meetings] and the Egyptian representative is well aware that all the members of the Security Council who wished to speak on the question have already spoken. The United States representative has not only spoken, but has also read a long letter [5/1716] to the Security Counci1. The Egyptian representative heard that statement. Thus, members of the Security Council have already expressed all their views. The Egyptian representative and aU members of the Security Council will remember that a very precise resolution proposed by the representative of Ecuador was adopted on 29 September [S06th meeting]; that resolution proposed that the consideration of the question should be postponed and that a representative of the People's Republic of China should be invited. Why was he invited? Was it in order that he should come here and ask the President of the Security Council to call upon the United States representative first? Such a situation is absurdo Thus, the President's arguments are unfounded. In accordance with the resolution of 29 September, we invited the representative of the People's Republic of China in order to give him a hearing, because all the members of the Security Council, including the United States representative, had stated their views. That representative has expressed his views both orally and in writting. We should now enable the. representative whom we have invited to express his views. That would be logical and in conformity with the established practice of the Security Counci1. The reference to the case of Chile merely serves to confirm my argument. The Chilean representative, as the party who was invited, spoke first at that meeting. In accordance with this precedent, therefore, let us give the representative of the People's Republic of China the opportunity of speaking first. As regards the precedent relating to the question of Czechoslovakia, 1 wish to recall that the representative of Chile was recognized to speak only after no representative on the Council expressed a desire to speak. There was no objection whatever by any representative \ on the Council to having the representative of ChilI" speak at that time. Tchécoslovaquie, du qu'aucun festé à moment. ln point of fact, in checking the records of that meeting we find that most of the representatives on the Council, and in particular the representative of the USSR and the representative of the Ukrainian SSR, had stated everything they wished to state in connexion with the question to be put on the agenda under the guise of discussing whether or not to adopt the provisional agenda for that meeting. Practically aIl the representatives had said everything they wanted to say in that connexion. At that time there was no objection by any representative to having the representative of ChilI" recognized at that particular moment, nor did any representative express a desire to speak first. de ln addition to these arguments, which 1 trust are not at variance with the facts although the representative of the Soviet Union claims that they are, there is a practical e1ement which we might consider; that is, we can attempt to learn how long the representative of the United States and the other speaker wish to speak. This might facilitate matters, not in line with our precedents or with our rules of procedure, but just as a practical matter. ln my brief statement 1 had purposely refrained from formally asking for the closure of the debate on this procedural question, because 1 did not want to give the impression that 1 wanted to avoid an answer to my previous statement. However, 1 believe 1 am quite justified now in asking formally for the closure of the debate on this point, and that we proceed to a vote on it immediate1y. , The PRESI'DENT (translated from French) : We h!ve before us a proposaI to close the debate on this question of procedure, and 1 have no more speakers on my list. We shall therefore vote. We shall proceed as 1 suggested at the beginning of this morning's meeting. We shall vote on the question whether we should makI" an exception in this case to rule 27 of our rules of procedure, and whether we should ask the plaintiff with regard to sub-item (a) on our agenda, the representative of the People's Republic of China, to speak first. 1 calI upon the representative of the USSR, who wishes to speak on a point of order. t Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) ~ (translated from Russian): 1 shall vote for the proposaI, but not on the understanding that it constitutes l,

In order that the position should not be complicated further, l shall formulate the question in an absolutely neutral manner. Does the Council wish the representative of the People's Republic of China to speak first?

(translated from French): l call upon the representative of Ecuador, who wishes to explain his vote. Mr. QUEVEDO (Ecuador) (translated from Spanish) : The President told us at yesterday's meeting that the first person who had asked for the floor was the representative of the United States, and, in my opinion, the Council should keep to that order. Later, it was remarked that there was a certain logic in allowing the plaintiff to speak first. In the first place, l do not think that it is possible in the circumstances to say with any certainty who is the accuser and who the accused. There are two questions on the agenda which are under discussion. Secondly, even if there were either an accuser or an accused, the Council has proved its impartiality by inviting the representatives of the Peking Government; and whichever representative speaks first, all the parties concerned will have sufficient time and opportunity to state their points of view. In other words, although there can be no denying that in a formaI court of law the accuser should speak first, that does not apply here. The order in which the speakers take the floor will have no decisive effect, and will in no way influence the judgment formed by the Council as a whole on the situation under discussion. l do not think that, if the United States representative is allowed to speak firtt, the President will be deprived of the right conferred upon him by rule 27, or that any prejudice will be caused to any of the parties concerned. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): l should like to explain my vote.

The USSR representative has asked for the floor again. If

Yesterday, the USSR representative wished to prevent the People's Republic of China from being present here. Today, he seems to wish to prevent us from hearing the Chinese representative. .. tique laire voudrait 1 think that the statements which he made this morning will suffice as an explanation of his vote and my presidential ruling is not to call on him again. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): A point of order. 1 protest categorically against the President's arbitrary action in preventing a member of the Security Council from explaining his vote. That is the right of every member of the Security Counci1. The President has no right to deprive me of the opportunity of explaining my vote. 1 merely wish to state that the Anglo-American majority, which adopted this proposaI and which voted today as it did yesterday, has shown its hostility to the People's Republic of China and has proved that the Government of the People's Republic of China cannot expect an equitable discussion or a just decision on the complaint which it addressed to the Security Council, in view of the attitude of the Anglo-American bloc and i of its ally, the President.

The representative of Egypt has asked for the fioor. Does he wish to speak on a point of order? Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt) : It is on the point of order which the representative of the Soviet Union has just raised, and 1 claim the right to speak on it. 1 will speak very briefiy. Having been one of the eight members ot the :Security Council who voted in favour of the Council's most recent decision, namely, the one in favour of allowing the representative of the United States to speak first, and having listened to the latest intervention of the representative of the Soviet Union, 1 for one cannot leave unchallenged his including my country as making up a part of what he wanted to call the "Anglo- American bloc". This is likely to be repeated by one side or the other every time 1 happen to differ with one side or the other. 1 do not want this to be repeated and 1 will challenge it every time it is done. My country is not a member of any bloc. It is a member of the United Nations and wishes to remain so. While saying this, 1 hope that the manner of levelling accusations wholesale will no longer be considered as being the best way to handle the business of the Security Counci1. In the meantime, 1 should l p.erhaps be thankful to the representative of the Soviet Union for not having accused me - at least so far- That problem is this: will there be peace or war in the Far East? The world awaits anxiously the answer to this question. The Security Council will undoubtedly wish to hear the latest news from the United Nations front in Korea. Last week the forces of the United Nations opened a general attack designed to finish their assigned task of repulsing aggression and restoring international peace and security in the area. This attack has been repulsed in circumstances which make it clear that Chinese cornmunist armed forces totalling more than 200,000 men are now engaged in North Korea. They are supported by heavy reinforcements moving forward from behind the international boundary. It now appears doubtful that the war in Korea can be quickly concluded. It also appears clear beyond any doubt that what ail the free world hoped \Vas an intervention for limited purposes is in fact aggression, open and notorious. It will be recalled that yesterday l used that word, "aggression", and then withdrew it, saying that l would not use it - l wouId use only the word, "intervention", until the facts came to our knowledge which wouId justify the use of the word, "aggression". l now employ it here in this Council, and before ail the world, by direction of my Government. The consequences of these facts must be faced squarely by the people of the world, and more particularly, by this Council. Because such consequences are potentially so grave, l considered it essential to review the recent history of events in the Far East. This is particularly necessary in view of the presence here for the first time of a representative of the Peking regime. The statements from Pekin~ - that is, the written statements [S/1898, S/19021 to which we referred yesterday - bear a close family resemblance to the statements made here by representatives of the Soviet Union, and reveal the same lack of contact with reality. The recent history of Korea, as understood by the vast majority of governments and the vast bulk of peoples in the world, shows that, first the United States, and then the United Nations, have bent their efforts ever since the end of the war with Japan to establish a free and independent Korea. When the The General Assembly from 1947 onwards maintained a commission in Korea charged with the creation of an independent, democratic and unified government. That commission was denied access above the 38th parallel first by the Soviet Union as the occupying Power and then by the Soviet-installed North Korean regime. They even refused to accept and sign for communications from the United Nations Commission on Korea. South of the parallel, the Commission supervised two elections and certified the establishment of a democratic government - a government accepted by the General Assembly of the United Nations as the only valid and lawful government in Korea. This same United Nations Commission on Korea found on 24 June 1950 [5/1518] that the Army of the Republic of Korea "is organized entirely for detence and is in no conditi·on to carry out attacks on a large scale against forces of the north". The next day the forces of the north marched into the territory of the Republic. On the following day, the Commission declared [5/1507] that "judging from actual progress of operations northern regime is carrying out well-planned, concerted and full-scale invasion of South Korea". This was a unanimous finding by representatives of Australia, China, El Salvador, France, India, the Philippines and Turkey. Perhaps members of the Council have noticed that no representative of the United States was on that commis- SlOn. In the face of this breach of the peace, the Security Council immediately called upon the authorities Df North Korea to cease hostilities and to withdraw their armed forces [5/1501]. It also called upon "all Members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities". That is a quotation from the resolution of the Security Counci1. The North Korean authorities ignored this order and pressed their attack. On 27 June, the President of the United States, heeding the Security Council's call "to render every assistance to the United Nations", ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support. That same day, the Security Council [5/1511], noting that the authorities in North Korea had ignored its previous order and that "urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security", recommended that the Members "furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area". The multi-national effort in Korea now includes, among the forces either in operation or on the way there, ground troops from thirteen countries, naval forces from ten, combat air forces from four, and military transport from seven. Moreover, non-military supplies in substantial quantities have been contributed by twenty-six countries. Because of the sacrifices of the fighting men of many nations and the splendid support given the United Nations operations by the vast majority of Members, the attackers from the north were repulsed. The military campaign seemed last month to be nearing its conclusion. The free peoples of the United Nations fe1t that their hopes for Korea were about to be realized: that Korea should be free, unified and independent of outside influence from any great Power, on or off the continent, and that the people of Korea should be free to choose their own future and to control their own destinies. In anticipation of victory, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 376 CV) calling for the withdrawal of all United Nations forces as soon as order was restored to the country, and providing for relief and reconstruction to start the people of Korea, both north and south, well on the road to peace and prosperity. That prospect was suddenly beclouded by the entrance into Korea on a large scale of Chinese communist forces. Previous to that time, the regime at Peking had refrained from such open military support of the North Korean aggression. The regime had persistently strengthened the hand of the aggressor with moral encouragement. It had sent military supplies and equipment on a considerable scale. Most important, it had re1ieved approximately 140,000 combat troops of Korean origin from its own armies and had allowed the recruitment for the North Korean armies of Koreans living in Manchuria. But those things were then done covertly. Now the Peking regime openly sends its fighting units in large numbers across the border from Manchuria to join battle with the United Nations. These forces immediately attacked the United Nations forces. They were organized, equipped and supplied as fighting units. Their supply bases and reinforcement depots were protected by the Manchurian frontier - a frontier which the United Nations forces respected despite the serious disabilities which this practice laid upon their operations. , Did the Chinese communists go into Korea, as they allege in the paper to which l called attention yesterday, on a sentimental journey? In the circumstances, one asks our Vlsltors: Was the aggression really in the interest of the Chinese people, as has been proclaimed, or was it on behalf of the great Russian Power which has already taken so many benefits away from Manchuria at the expense of the Chinese people? Let us look at the recent history of Formosa. When the President of the United States ordered United States air and sea forces to support the troops of the Republic of Korea, he pointed out that the aggression upon the Republic of Korea endangered international peace and security, and that "in these circumstances, the occupation of Formosa by communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacifie area and to United States forces performing their necessary and lawful functions in that area". How plain it is to see that that was true. We see it clearly this morning. The President went on to say: "Accordingly, l have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action, l am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacifie, a peace . settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations." In a subsequent message to the Congress of the United States on 19 July 1950, the President pointed out that this action "was a matter of elementary security". He added: "In order that there may be no doubt in any quarter about our intentions regarding Formosa, l wish to state that the United States has no territorial ambitions whatever concerning that island, nor do we seek for ourselves any special position or privilege on Formosa. The present military neutralization of Formosa is without prejudice to political questions affecting that island. Our desire is that Formosa not become embroiled in hostilities disturbing to the peace of the Pacifie and that aU questions affecting Formosa be settled by peaceful means as envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations. With peace re-established, even the most complex political questions are susceptible of solution. In the presence of brutal and unprovoked aggression, how- That is the end of the quotation from the President's speech. These are the facts about Korea and Formosa as they are understood by my Government. It is quite dear from the statements so far made on behalf of the Chinese communist regime to which l alluded yesterday that it does not share this view of the facts. The USSR representative says that a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Peking stated on 11 November [5/1902]: "The real facts are that the United States of America has invaded Chinese territory, violated Chinese sovereignty and is threatening China's security." The statement went on to say: "Filled with righteous indignation, the Chinese people are voluntarily helping the Korean people to repulse aggression, and its acts are completely natural and just." The authorities at Peking have further charged the United States with aggression against Formosa, invasion of that island, and the imposition of a United States blockade. The United States is further charged with deliberate violations of Chinese territorial air and with the repeated bombing of Chinese towns and villages. Finally, the United States is charged with turning the United Nations into an instrument to conceal United States aggression - an instrument which, it is also charged, has been used illegally since two permanent members are alleged to have been absent from the Security Council when the decisions were taken to support the Republic of Korea and to establish the Unified Commando Obviously, there is a gaping void between the facts as seen by most of the world and the facts as claimed by the authorities of Peking. One of our hopes is that from these Security Council discussions will come sorne measure of agreement as to the facts, sorne understanding by the representatives of the Chinese communist regime of the aims and purpose of the United Nations. The fifty-three Members of the United Nations which have supported the Organization's action in Korea must be dismayed when they read and hear these unbridled and unjustified attacks lIpon the United Nations and its efforts to stop armed aggression in Korea and restore peace and security in the Far East. My Government is dismayed, and it deplores these attacks the mor~ because of the long and close friendship between the people of China and the people of the United States. The preservation of China's territorial and administrative entity has been a major tenet of American policy ever since relations were first established between the two Governments in 1844 by the Treaty of \iVang-Hea -more than 100 years ago. The American record of support to the Chinese Government against The purpose of the United States, during the last half century, to aid China in developing its independence, free from foreign control, and, particularly, in maintaining the stability of international relations in the Far East, has been demonstrated in the several alternating attempts of Russia and Japan to violate the integrity of China in Manchuria. Many examples couId be given of the continuity of American policy in this respect. For instance, in 1902, the United States circularized the Powers, protesting that Russian pressure against Manchuria and threats to Chinese control there were contrary to the Open Door Policy. Again in 1904 and 1905, during the Russo-Japanese War, the United States Secretary of State, John Hay, appealed to both belligerents to respect the neutrality and administrative entity of China and circularized the Powers in the interest of the integrity of China and the Open Door in the Orient. In the Root-Takahira Agreement of 1908, the United States agreed with Japan to uphold the Open Door in China and to support, by pacific means, the independence and integrity of China. In 1908, the United States Secretary of State, Elihu Root, circularized the Powers in an effort to strengthen the Open Door principle and to discourage Russian and Japanese commercial penetration into Manchuria at the expense of China's territorial integrity and political independence. In 1915, the United States opposed Japan's "twenty-one demands" and, in affirming its traditional policy towards China, stated that it couId not recognize any agreement that would impair the political and territorial integrity of China. The Open Door principle was reaffirmed again in 1917 by the Lansing- Ishii Agreement. At the Washington Conference of 1921-1922, the United. States assisted in bringing about a settlement of the Shantung controversy between China and Japan and took a leading role in the negotiations which led to the Nine-Power Treaty. Referring to Japanese aggression in Manchuria in 1932, the United States Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, informed the Japanese and Chines~ Governments that the United States Government dld not: " ... intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those two Governments, or agents All during the 1930's, the United States continued to manifest the gravest concern over Japanese aggression against China, and it was United States opposition to Japan's expansionism which led to Pearl Harbor. The record of American friendship for China during the war and post-war period is recent history. On two occasions in 1943 the United States obtained international acknowledgment of China's position as a great Power. This was first done in the Moscow Declaration of Four Nations on General Security on 30 October 1943. It was also done in the Cairo Declaration of 1 December 1943. It was done still again in 1945 at the San Francisco Conference where the United States insisted, over Soviet Union objections, that China be included as one of the great Powers in the organization of the peace by making it one of the sponsoring Powers of the United Nations and one of the permanent members of the Security Council. American friendship for China also was shown by the large quantities of economic aid given to China. From 1937 to V-J Day, the United States sent to China economic aid valued at $670 million. After the V-J Day, it sent an additional $1,009 million in ~con­ omic aid. In other words, during the past thirteen years the United States has sent aid to China at a rate considerably greater than a hundred million dollars a year. These figures do not include Lend- Lease and military aid. They include only assistance and commodities required for the reconstruction of the war-devastated economyof China. They were composed of such things as rice, cotton, petroleum, ships, emergency relief aid, industrial machinery, technical assistance and so forth. A joint United States-Chinese programme for rural reconstruction was entered upon in 1945 and continued for as long a periocl of time as possible in Szechuan and Chekiang Provinces; it still goes on in Taiwan. This was for the benefit principally of Chinese farmers. Need l say that such friendl)'" assistance meant much ta China and the Chinese people? And l am speaking of that vast number of Chinese people - 500 million of them. It is not towards them that l point when l speak of aggression: l refer to the Chinese communists when l speak of aggression. Let us maintain for ever that wonderful friendship which has existed, and still exists, between the people of the United States and the people of China. Ta the people of China, our assistance meant much. Millions of Chinese will not forget that they ate, worked, travelled and were clothed during the harsh years following the war largely because of United States assistance. The rice alone which we sent to China in 1948 and 1949 filled the rice bowls of 10 million Chinese. In view of China's vast problems, it cannot be questioned that much more was 'needed. But l submit that this attitude toward the Chinese people and their true interests contrasts favourably with the Barter Agreement concluded by the Soviet Union with local authorities in Manchuria last year, under which, despite critical food shortages in China, food was taken from the rice bowls of the Chinese and shipped to the Soviet Union. The traditional friendship of the United States for China also has proved itseH on a non-governmental level. Does this sound like a bloodthirsty aggressor? Can it be that any Chinese really is the author of that contumely, that false charge against the people of the United States? One-eighth of all the college graduates in China have received education at one or more of the thirteen colleges established by American Protestant missions. The names of these institutions and the benevolent character of their work are well known to the great masses of the Chinese people; l feel confident that it is well known to the Chinese communists. Sorne of those who were here had the benefit of education in sorne of those institutions. They include Yenching University, Peking; Cheeloo University, Tsinan. l want the members of the Council to notice now they are spread out over the Flowery Kingdom. The others are: West China University, Chengtu; Hua Chung University, Wuchang; University of Nanking; Ginling College, Nanking ; University of Shanghai; Hangchow University; Soochow University; St. John's United States medical work, which was begun in 1835, is today an integral part of China's daily life. United States medical missions have supported 203 hospitals, 82 nursing schools, and a number of other medical institutions such as schools for the training of midwives. United States contributions have been a major source of support for 320 orphanages maintained by the Catholic Church in China. ~i University, Shanghai; Fukien Christian University; Hwa Nan College Fuchow' Lingnan University l Canton. " , 19 At least 15,000 Chinese students have received their college degrees from American-supported institutions in China. Another 10,000 have received their college educations in the United States. Can it be that all those golden threads, that connect the Chinese people and the American people culturally have been sundered? Moreover, it is estimated that over 250,000 Chinese students have graduated from primary and middle schools maintained in China with American funds. Thousands upon thousands of Chinese and Americans share a community of experience and a compatibility that cannat be erased by evil propaganda. The American people treasure their relations with the people of China. They enjoyed, with the Chinese, the relinquishment by their Government of the extraterritorial rights of the United States in China under the treaty signed in Washington on 11 January 1943. The friendship of the American people for the Chinese people has weathered storms in the pasto It is the earnest hope of my Government that it will weather the storms of the present. l should like now ta put sorne questions ta the Chinese communist representative; first, a group of questions relating ta Korea, and secondly a group of questiall3 relating ta Formosa. With regard ta Korea, can the representative tell us how many Chinese communist troops have entered Korea and are there now? What is the organization of these troops? It is quite clear ta the United Nations forces that these troops are in fact organized inta units. The units have been identified and their numbers cited in the special report of the Unified Command ta the Security Council of 5 November [5/1884]. The news this morning makes it quite clear that Chinese communist forces in Korea are organized on an army, corps and divisional basis. Does the representative still maintain that these forces are composed only of volunteers? Will the representative tell the Security Council how long the Peking regime J1as been planning and preparing this aggression? It is apparent ta anyone that an operation of this kind is not organized in a few days or weeks. It must be true that these troops were trained and equipped as a disciplined fighting force over a long period and that their attack was carefully prepared. Was all this being done while the Peking radio was protesting the peaceful intentions of the Peking regime? Will he tell us whether the aircraft which have attacked from bases in Manchuria were also "volunteers" ? How could private Chinese citizens come into possession of jet planes? Can the representative tell us what was his Government's estimate of United Nations objectives which brought it to decide to commit this aggression? What led his Government to ignore and set aside the reiterated statements by the United Nations bodies and by my Government that there were no designs on Chinese territory or legitimate interests? If his Government was aware of these reassurances but did not believe them, what more could the Security Council conceivably do to reassure the Peking authorities that the United Nations does not, in fact, have any such evil designs? The representative is doubtless familiar with the draft resolution [S/1894] before the Council. This resolution reaffirms General Assembly resolution 376 (V) of 7 October, which declares that "United Nations forces should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the objectives of ... stability throughout Korea ... and ... the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in the sovereign State of Korea". The resolution also affirms that it is the policy of the United Nations to hold the Chinese frontier inviolate and fully to protect Chinese and Korean interests in the frontier zone. The draft resolution requests the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea "to cOfJ.sider urgently and to assist in the settlement of many problems relating to conditions on the Korean frontier in which States or authorities on the other side of the frontier have an interest". Can the representative tell us why his Government does not consider it preferable to rely upon the Commission for the peaceful settlement of any problems relating to the frontier, and why, instead of that, it has continued to resort to force? l should like to ask the representative: What are !>lis Government's interests relative to Korea? The United Nations has made it clear that once arder has been restored, all forces will be withdrawn from Korea. My ow!l Go:,ernment ~as .s~ated repea.tedly that it has no mtentlOn of mamtammg bases m ~: Korea and that its sole interest in Korea is the inter- , est shàred by fifty-three Members of the United Nal My next question with regard to Korea is not the least important. It is this: Will the authorities at Peking respond to the principal operative paragraph of the joint draft resolution before the Council? By the way, this draft resolution should be acted upon as promptly as is convenient. Note how simple it is for a peace-loving country to carry out what is stated therein. That paragraph reads as follows: "The 5ecurity Council ... "CaUs upon all States and authorities ... to refrain from assisting or encouraging the North Korean authorities, to prevent their nationals or individuals or units of their armed forces from giving assistance to North Korean forces, and to cause the immediate withdrawal of such nationals, individuals, or units which may presently be in Korea." Well, we have been told that the Soviet Union would vote against that draft resolution. If so, we understand that means a veto of the resolution. But, nevertheless, it represents the conscience of the people of the world. And does this Peking regime recognize the conscience of the people of the world as something to which it ought to give weight? But even if that draft resolution should be vetoed, there is another drait resolution which was not vetoed by the Soviet Union, just because the Soviet Union did not see fit to be present in the Security Council when it was passed. That resolution [5/1501] is dated 25 June 1950, and one paragraph therein has the same moral character as this paragraph in the pending draft resolution to which l have referred. The paragraph of the resolution passed on 25 June 1950 [5/1501] reads as follows: "CaUs upon all Members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolu- tion and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities." This is one sure way that would help to prevent a general war. • l repeat my question: Will the authorities at Peking heed this judgment of the United Nations, or will they defy the United Nations, thus further endangering international peace and security? The answer to this question may determine whether the Korean conflict will be brought to a speedy end, \Vith regard to the Chinese communist complaint of violations of the Chinese territorial air by United Nations aircraft [5/1722, 5/1743], l should like to remind the representative that when these complaints were first made the United States admitted the possi- bility that unfortunate mistakes might have occurred in the heat and confusion of modern aerial war [493rd meeting]. My Government went on to say that it stood ready to make payment to the Secretary-Gen- eral of the United Nations for appropriate transmis- sion to the injured party of compensation for such damages as might be adjudged fair and equitable as the result of an appropriate investigation. My Govern- ment even proposed a method of investigation which commended itself to a majority of the members of this Council [5/1752]: namely, the appointment of a com- mission to investigate the allegations on the spot. We pledged ourselves in advance to abide by the findings of this commission, which would have consisted of representatives of the Governments of India and of Sweden. The Soviet Union representative vetoed this proposaI [501st meeting]. Since then, the Chinese communists have intervened on a large scale in Korea and have caused great damage to the United Nations and to Korea. The Unified Command has nevertheless maintained in force its instructions strictly prohibiting United Nations aircraft from crossing the Korean frontier, and has taken every precaution to avoid any violation of Chinese territory. This continues to be the case de- spite the extensive use of Chinese territory as a base for both ground and air operations against the United Nations forces in Korea. With regard to Formosa, it is clear from the state- ments l have already cited that United States action in connexion with Formosa is not "blood-thirsty ag- gression", invasion, or blockade. l have already quoted statements by the President of the United States showing that the despatch of the Seventh Fleet to the Formosa Strait was designed to neutralize Formosa and to prevent the extension of the Korean conflict. The Government of China that is recognized by my Government and by a majority of the Members of the United Nations is in effective control of the island of Formosa. The representative of China stated in the Security Council on 25 August 1950 [490th meeting]: "1 need only one minute to make a statement, and that statement is contained in one sentence. There has been no United States aggression against the island of Taiwan (Formosa)." Again on 29 August, he said [492nd meeting] : "My Government knows of no aggression on the part of the United States. My Government ha~ no complaint to make. We have not heard even a whtsper of ademand on the part of the United States for any The President of the United States stated on 27 August: "The actual status of the island is that it is terri- tory taken from Japan by the victories of the Allied Forces in the Pacific. Like other such territories, its legal status cannot be fixed until there is international action to determine its future." Further to this, the Secretary of State of the United States wrote on 21 September to the Secretary-Gen- eral of the United Nations: "The Government of the United States has made it abundantly clear that the measures it has taken with respect to Formosa were without prejudice to the long- term political status of Formosa, and that the United States has no territorial ambitions and seeks no spe- cial position or privilege with respect to Formosa." In view of these facts, we should like to ask the Peking representative: What are the intentions of the regime he represents towards Formosa? Will that regime pledge itself to accept a peaceful settlement of the question, or does it intend to risk the grave dis- turbance of international peace and security by a war- like act? The United Nations objectives in the Far East, as everywhere in the world, are to maintain international peace and security. The United Nations way with disputes is to seek every means of settling them peace- fully, through mediation, conciliation, and agreement by negotiation. But the United Nations is not to be coerced. The United Nations has indicated by its action in Korea and by its adoption t:>f resolution 377 (V) "Uniting for peace" at this session of the General As- sembly, that it is determined to repuIse and prevent aggression. !ts forces are now fighting in Korea to achieve this objective. The United Nations has not hesitated in the past and does not hesitate now to give assurances of its peaceful intentions. But such assur- ances must be mutual if they are to be effective. Only if these deeds are forthcoming can China's neighbours and the people of the world feel assured that peace and security will prevail in the Far East.

l propose that the Council should adjourn now and hear the interpretation into French of the United States representative's statement at the beginning of this afternoon's meeting. l intend to calI that meeting for 3 p.m. Are there any objections? Does the Soviet Union representative object? Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated fram Russian): As the representative of the United States has prolonged the meeting, could we meet again a little later?

Does the Soviet Union representative propose another time? Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated fram Russian): l propose 3.30 or 4 p.m.

What do other members of the Council think? Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America) : What are we going to do with all that valuable time? H as the Council ever stopped to think that while we are wasting time here many young men are losing their lives over there? l think we should proceed as rapidly as convenient and that we should go on to the adoption of this draft resolution, or the action on it, as quickly as possible. The PRESIDENT (translated fram French) : Do other members of the Council support the request that this afternoon's meeting should be held later than 3 p.m.? As l hear no comments, l note that only one member of the Council has made that request. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated fram Russian): l am neither requesting nor insisting. l have merely stated the reasons why, in my view, the morning meeting was prolonged. l am not making any proposaI. The United States representative has said that people are dying in Korea. My answer is: Put an end to intervention and armed interference in the affairs of Korea and China, and no more people will die. The ruling circles of the United States, and they alone, are responsible for these deaths. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom): l propose that the Council should meet at 3.30 sharp instead of 3 o'clock, which means 3.15 anyway. Does the United Kingdom representative press his request? Sir Gladwyn JEEE (United Kingdom) : No, l do not insist.

1t is therefore agreed that the Council will resume its work at 3 p.m. Mr. AUSTI'N (United States of America): l give notice that l shall ask for an evening meeting. The meeting rose at 1.45 p.m.