S/PV.532 Security Council

Before we consider the agenda, l should like to express on behalf of al! the members of the Council our appreciation of the skilful, expeditious and courteons manner in which the retiring President, Ml'. Antonio Quevedo, the representative of Ecuador, has performed his duties. l hope that he will accept my words as the expression of the esteem and gratitude of us aH. 1. l'examen terprète au tant compétente, acquitté mes toute Adoption of the agenda India·Pakistan question At the invitation of the President, Sir M ohammad Zafrulla Khan, representative of Pakistan, look· a place at the Security Council table. 2. Sir Gladwyn JEEB (United Kingdom): The Xndia-Pakistan question has now been before the Council for more than three years, and l am sure that l shall be expressing the feelings of the two gov- ernments and of members of the Council when l say 2. l'angla'is): Inde-Pakistan j'en des 3. The aspect of the dispute between India and Paki- stan with which we are at present particularly concerneel is, of course, that which relates ta the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It will be recalled that, on 14 March 1950, the Council adopted a resolu- tian [S/1469] which calleel on the two governments ta prepare a programme for the demi1itarization of the State based on proposais formulated by General McNaughton as President of the Council some months previously [S/ 1453]. The resolution also appointed a United Nations representative for India and Pakistan to assist them in this task and to place before them any suggestions which, in his opinion, were likely to contribute to a solution of the dispute_ Members will have read with great interest the report subsequently submitted by Sir Owen Dixon 1 who, in his capacity as United Nations representative, spent a number of months in the sub-continent in negotiation with the 4. l think l shall be speaking for the Couneil as a whole in expressing my warm admiration for the great ability and energy with which Sir Owen dis- charged his mission, and for the lucid and comprehensive report which he has submitted to us. Sir Owen has made the fullest use of the tenus of reference which the Council gave him and has, by formulating and disCllss- ing with the parties a whole range of proposaIs for settling the dispute, thrown a great deal of new light on the problel11, and provided the Council with much valuable material for its consideration of what the next step towards a solution should be. The dOCllment is indeed a most l11asterly analysis, and l should like to draw the Council's attention to the remarks which l made as President at our sü3rd meeting and to repeat l11Y goverllment's appreciation for Sir Owen's l110st valuable services and its regret that his duties as a J udge of the High Court of Australia should make it necessary for him to relinquish his appointment as United Nations Representative. l am sure that members of the Council will wish associate themselves with this. 5. On only one major recommendation did my gov- ernment differ from Sir Owen Dixon. Sir Owen in fact concluded that in all the circumstances it would be best henceforward to leave the problem of the disposaI of Jammu and Kashmir to the parties themselves to settle, the Security Council holding itself aloof, unless indeed hostilities should unfortunately recur. Sir Owen Dixon is a wise man and there will undoubtedly be some who would accept this advice. Certainly, if adopted, it would place l11Y country in a less immediately embarrassing and invidious position. But after full reflection His Majesty's Government could not agree that it should now, as it were, wash its hands of the problem. The reasons for this conclusion l shall now shortly state. 5, mon Sir préférable, parties l'Etat sécurité en connu que même médiat, moins Majesté, pas raisons suivantes. 6. rend tiens question. les pour Owen fois tiels. levées nements, premier nements à-dire lettre verneur 6. The history of the negotiations for a settlement of the Kashmir dispute is a long one, and l do not intend to take up time in recapitulating it. The three reports of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan 2 and Sir Owen Dixon's report, which l have just mentioned, contain a full and clear exposition of it. It is important, however, that we should keep constantly in mind certain fundamental considerations. Complex as are the detailed issuesraised during the course of the negotiations with the two governments, these fundamental considerations are really quite simple. The first of course is that both governments are agreed that the future disposition of the State, which is the question of accession - and here l quote from the letter dated 27 October 1947 from the Governor-General of India to the Maharaja of Kashmir - "should troisième S/1100; document No Add.3. "1 would invite the attention of the members of the Security Canncil to the high-principled statement characteristie of the Government of India under its present leadership. In accepting the accession they refused to take advantage of the immediate peril in which the State found itself and infonued the Ruler that the accession should finally be settled by a plebi- scite as soon as peace had been restored. They have subsequently made it quite clear that they are agreab1e to the plebiscite being conducted if necessary tll1der international auspices... Tt was clear to my government - as indeed it was clear to everybody else - that peace in Kashmir could never be restored or 1l1aintained without the support of the people... On the question of accession, the Government of India has always enunciated the policy that in the cases of dispute the people of the State concerned should make the decision." 7. He went on to say: "We desire 0111y to see peace restored in Kashmir and to ensure that the people of Kashmir are left free to decide in an orderly and peace[ul manner the future of their State." 8. This fundamental principle, then, has been accepted by both governments and endorsed by the Security C0L111cil from the earliest stages of the dispute. The difficulties which we have encountered have ail con- cerned the translation of that principle into a detailed scheme to give effect to it. However, even on matters of cletail there has been a substantial measure of agree- ment between the two parties. The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, which was constitu- ted by the Con11ci1 in January 1948 [5/654J, prepared two resolutions which the two governments both ac- cepted. These resolutions dated 13 August 1948 [5/1100] and 5 January 1949[5/1196J, have since been regarded by the Council as providing the basis on which the settlement of the dispute should be sought and it is, therefore, worthwhile to consider for a moment what their main provisions are. 9. The Commission, when it arrived in the sub-con- tinent in July 1948, was faced with new and serious clevelopments in the situation by the entry of Pakistan military forces into the western part of Kashmir and the existence of hostilities between the Indian and Pakistan ar111ies. Its first concern, therefore, was to bring 'about a cease-tire and to provicle for the orc1erlv withdrawal of military forces on both sides of the cease-fire Ene to enable pl'eparations for a United Nations plebiscite to beg·in. The resolution of 13 August 1948 conccntrates on these two objectives. As a result of the Commission's skill and perseverance and of the wise statesmanship shown by the leaders of the two governments, a cease-flre was proclaimed to have effect from 1 January 1949, and agreement was shortly afterwards reached for the appointment of a United Nations observer force to demarcate the cease- tire line and prevent incidents between the forces on both sides. That serious incidents have been avoided is a tribute to the two governments and their military commanclers, and also to the United Nations observers who are still performing their duties with admirable judgment and efficiency. l should like at this point to pay tribute to Brigadier Angle, Canadian head of the observer forces in Kashmir, who was killed in an air- plane accident in the sub-continent on 17 July last year, and to his two United States colleagues who died with him. AIl who came into contact with his work in this capacity had the highest regard for him. objectifs. membres chefs feu un teurs ligne entre des des aussi qui efficace ici des a ainsi la l'œuvre de en 10. le obtenu pas a 1949, Nations fixe s'exercerll Unies. parties malgré Sir s'est ché mon nouvel gouvernements dre l'ensemble 10. Unfortunately the Commission for India and Pakistan was not able to follow up its success in ob- taining a cease-fire with a solution of the next problem, namely, that of demilitarization. It did, however, pro- duce its second resolution, that of 5 January 1949, which provided for the appointment of a United Nations Plebiscite Administrator and defined in SOlUe detail the form which United Nations supervision over the plebiscite should take. The acceptance by the parties of these resolutions therefore has providec\ a wide area of agreement, and in spite of the difficulty which General McNaughton and Sir Owen Dixon subse- quently met in settling the matters of detail that have so far prevented these two resolutions from being put into full effect, my government is not without hope that a further determined effort by the Council, with the assistance of the two governments, will discover a way of resolving them and of effecting a settlement of the whole Kashmir problem. 11. gouvernements d'un la vue dantes. règlement prolongation pays qui de optimiste possible 11. l do not feel, indeed, that l can emphasize too lnuch the fact that both governments are agreed on the essential elements of a settlement and that al! that is now required is goodwill on both sides to resolve out- standing points of c1etai1. Given the far-reaching bene- :fits which a settlement would bring and the all too obvious dangers of the continuance of the dispute, not only to the two countries themselves, but to aIl those other countries elsewhere in the world which value human liberty and the democratic way of life, l trust l am not being too sanguine in expressing the hope that a final settlement of the dispute can now quickly be achieved. 12. This at any rate isthe spirit in which my govern- D'lent has approached this problem. Since Sir Owen Dixon's report was received by the Council, my gov- ernment has devoted much thought and effort in con- sultation with the two parties towards overcoming the deadlock and opening the way to its solution. During the recent meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London there were, as the Council knows, a number of informai and private discussions between various of the Prime Ministers about Kashmir, and certain new 12. nement a ment parties, solution lors du Londres, officieux 13. As a result of their careful examination of Sir Owen Dixon's report and of the discussions which they have held with the parties and with other govern- ments, my govern11lent and the Government of the United States have prepared a draft resolution for the consideration of the Council. This has been circulated as document 5/2017. l wish ta emphasize from the outset that the submission of this draft resolution is not illtended in any way to prej udge the Council's deliber- ations or the views which the Indian and Pakistan representatives will no doubt put forward. It seemed to my government, however, that it might be helpful for the Council to have a draft before it as a basis for discussion, and that the most convenient way in which the United Kingdom and the United States Govern- ments could put before the Council the results of their deliberations on this problem wouId be in the form of such a draft resolution. '14. l now turn to the actual terms of this draft reso- lution. l should perhaps first emphasize that although it takes into full aCC0111lt mallY discussions which my delegation has had with both parties, it has not in allY sense been prepared in consultation with them, still less agreed with them. Indeed l fear that it will be found to contain certain provisions with which one side or the other may not find itseH entirely in sym- pathy. l would only urge them to give the most careful consideration. ta it and ta accept it as constituting what we believe ta be the only approach likely to resolve the differences which have been preventing the holding of the plebiscite that we are al! sa a11Xious to secure. 15. Before l draw my colleagues' attention ta the c1etailed provisions of the resolution, l must first refer ta the letter of 14 December 1950 ta the President of the Security Council from the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan [S/1942]. Members will no doubt themselves have seen reports of what is cal!ed the "Ali JatUmu and Kashmir Na- tional Conference" resolution to which this letter refers, and will have wondered how far it could be reconciled with the agreement already enshrined in the two Kashmir Commission resolutions which, as l have already mentioned, provide of course for settlement of the future accession of the State by a fair and impartial plebiscite conducted l1nder the auspices ai the United Nations. l feel bound to sayon behalr of my delegation that for our part we find it difficult ta reconcile the Kashmir National Conference resolution with this agreed fonu of settlement and my government has felt some anxiety lest the Kashmir State authorities should embarlc on some kind of independent action which would be a challenge as we felt ta the authority of the Secutity Couneil and of the United Nations. However, l feel sure that when we hear, as we shortly shall, the explanation which my colleague, the representative from India will no doubt give us, wc shaH be reassured that there' is no intention on the part either of his government or of the Kashl1;ir State Gove~nm.ent to adopt measures which would m any way prejUdIce the agreements already reached and the cOl11l11i~ments already entered into by the Governments of Indla and Pakistan or which woulel conflict with the meaSures already ~dopted by the Security Council. senté même. 16. Therefore, l shall not dwell on the third and fifth paragraphs of the preamble of the draft resollltion sub- mitted by my United States colleague and myself. These paragraphs, read with the statement which l hope Sir Benegal Rau will eventllally make, will, l am sure, be a reassurance to the Pakistan Foreign Minister and will place on record quite categorically that no reference ta the people of Kashmir regarding the future accession of the State made otherwise than under the auspices and with the full consent of the United Nations can be regarded as constituting a settlement acceptable to this Council. 17. The final paragraph of the preamble points to the two immediate and major differences requiring solu- tion, namely, as we ail know, demilitariza.tiol1 of the State and the c1egree of United Nations supervision over the conduct of the plebiscite. Study of Sir Owen Dixon's report will show in detail the reasons why he was unable to resolve the differences between the parties on these two points. Our draft resolution does not itself seek to define a solution of them. 18. In paragraph 4, however, it sets out four elements which we hope may contribute towards a solution. We sincerely believe that the possibility that a neutral force might be made available to safeguard the security of the State during the plebiscite pe;iod should, if there is a minimum of goodwill on both sides, overcome many of the difficulties which have so far stooc1 in the way of demilitarization. l hope that the representatives of the two parties will be able to give the Council assurances that snch a neutral force would not be rejected by their governments if the United Nations representative should decide that it oHers the only solution to the problem of c1emilitarization. Whatever difficulties may have been feIt by either of the parties in the past, l hope that there will 110W be a ready acceptance of the principle thut the best guarantee of a fair expression of the wishes of the people of Kashmir is the removal or disbandmcnt of the military forces of an interested parties and their replacement by United Nations forces which can have no interest to sway the vote either way. As a principle this seems ta us at least to be 50 axio111u- tic that we can hardly believe that it will not be accepted by the Coul1cil and by those immediately con- cernee!. For if it is not acceptec1, it can only mean that the contestant denies the whole conception of settle- ment by plebiscite, which after a1l has already been ac~epted without reservation. Can anyone in fact main- ta~n t~at the two c1assic examples of successful plebi- scites 111 recent years - the Saar and Upper Silesia- 19. As l have said the resolution does not itse1f set out a c1etailed solution, but instructs the United Nations representative in consultation with the pai·ties to e~ect the demilitarization of the State and to present detaJ1ed pLans for carrying out the plebiscite. The Council will, l hope, agree that the United Nations representative sl10uld be given some assurance that on outstanding points of difficulty a meallS of obtaining an author- itative decision will be available to him. It is for this reason that provision has been made in paragraph 7 for reference of any such points to an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators appointed by the International Court of Justice. 20. The Council will, of course, be aware of a pre- vious occasion when the Government of India was unable to accept the Kashmir Commission's proposaI for arbitration on such points. My government has, of course, given anxious thought to the considerations which prompted the Government of India to rejeet this previous proposaI. But the hope is that, in view of the repeated failure to resolve these differences on points of detail and of the faet that the general principle of settlement by plebiscite has already been fully accepted by both governments, they will now feel able to accept arbitration on any points of difference which the United Nations representative, after further consultation with them, is unable to resolve. 21. l do not wish to weary the Council with tao much detail at this stage. My colleagues will no doubt wish for time to examine the drait resolution and l - and l am sure my United States colleague also - will be very ready to elucidate any points in our proposais which may be put fcirward in later meetings of the Council. l should, however, draw the Council's atten- tion to the provisions of sub-paragraph (iii) of para- graph 4- of the draft resolution since this deals with a principle which has not hitherto been incorporated in any formaI resolution. It is one, however, which mem- bers of the Council have, l am sure, long had in mind. 22. Whichever party the majority vote in the plebi- . scite may favour, there seem certain to be some areas with an overwhehl1ing proportion of inhabitants in favour of the party with a minority of votes throughout the State. Where, after careful consideration of geo- graphical and economic factors, it seems that any of those areas should he separated from the State as a whole and inc1uded in the territory of whichever of the two parties loses the plebiscite, the intention of this sub- paragraph is that such adjustment. should be made. There are several points which need emphasis. The first is that no adjustment should be made which wouId result III the formation of an enclave. Then it is our intention that no area should be taken out of the State if by sa doing the economic interest of the State as a 23. Such are the main features of the draft resolution now before the Security Council. It is, l can assure the members of the Couucil, the fruit of the most mature consideration not only by the United States Govem- ment and His Majesty's Govermnent but by certain other governments as well. It is submitted in al! ear- nestness and good faith and, l should add, in a spirit of hope and not of despair. When one considers that any attempt ta settle this vexed question by force would be so immeasurably more disastrous to both sides than any possible solution in accordance with the means now suggested; when one further reRects that even a con- tinuance of the present tension, with all its economic and political effects, would also be far more damaging to bath sides than any possible disadvantages which the decision of the people of Jammu and Kashmir could produce; and when finally one contemplates the condi- tion of the world in which this at one time fratricidal struggle is now being conducted, then one can scarcely believe that an agreed solution is impossible of achieve- ment by reasonable hUl11an beings. It is in this mood that we present our resolution to the Security Council and to the representatives of the two great nations concerned, not seeking to impose, but only anxious to serve.

In speaking of the draft resolution submitted to the Secnrity Council today by the United Kingdom and the United States, l wish, at the outset, ta call the attention of the Council ta the statement made by Sir Owen Dixon in his report submitted to the President of the Council on 15 September last. l think that this statement, which sa well inc1icates Sir Owen's attitude in his negotiations, should be borne in mind by the Council toelay. He said: "It was obvious to me that in myattempt ta sett1e the dispute l must be governed by the course that had been taken by the Security Council and the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and agreed upon by the parties. It l11ight be true 25. Sir Owen's statement, in my opinion, sets the tone for our deliberations on the Kashmir question. It is the foundation for the resolution submitted today for the Council's consideration. 26. The item before us opens up for the Security Council the continuance of its function of bringing about, by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, the adjustment or settlement of an international dispute. l believe it is e1ear that the Council can effectively do this and that, in this case, it has proceeded on the basis that it is the agreement of the parties on which a lasting political settlement must be built. 27. A very important affirmative e1ement in this case, which has been singular1y lacking in others immediately concerning us, is the fact that the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India have indicated in the c1earest terms that there exists on the part of both governments the will to settle the Kashmir case peacefully and to examine solutions carefully. Also, the area of disagreement has been narrowed. Thus the Security Council comes to this case with this affirmative attitude of the parties, and l think al! would agree that the Council can best exercise its functions by narrowing further the area of disagreement. That is the premise on which the draft resolution before the Council is based. 28. There are two main questions which my government believes are the primary business of the Council in its continued consideration of the Kashmir problem. The first is an action, which has been described by the representative of the United Kingdom, which the authorities in the Indian-controlled area of Kashmir are undertaking in order to determine the future shape and affiliation of the State. The second is the matter of bringing about a final solution of the case in accordance with principle of peaceful settlement. The first issue is presented in the preamble of the draft resolution and the second is dealt with in the operative paragraphs. 29. The l11embers of the Security Council were advised. throngh a letter addressed ta the President of the Council by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of Pakistan, Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan, on 14 December 1950, of a resolution of the An 30. The resolution proposed the convening of a constituent assel11bly to determine the future form of government of the entire State, including the area,s under Pakistan control, and to determine the question of the State's affiliations. More recent Press reports from Kashl11ir and India have described how the implementation of this resolution has begun. According to these reports, electoral rolls in Indian-occupied areas of Kashmir are expected to be completed by March of this year, and e1ections may be held in June or July. Although the Pakistan-held parts of Kashmir would not participate in the vote, the decisions of the Constituent Assembly will be held applicable to all parts of the State including the Pakistan-controlled areas. It is our impression that the proclamation which ordered the carrying into effect of these steps implementing the 28 October Kashmir National Conference resolution was approved by the Governmcnt of India. 30. assemblée qu'aurait compris associations presse sent cette que pées mars dérouler Cachemire ciperaient constituante l'ensemble susmentionnées. nement la mise de la nationale 31. When the Governments of India and Pakistan accepted in writing the principles fortnulated in the 5 January 1949 resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, both governments agreed that the question of accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir would be decided through the democraticmethod of a free and impartial plebiscite under United Nations auspices. l emphasize "free and impartial" as well as "United Nations auspices" because it seems clear that these phrases support each other in a guarantee to the world and to each party that the plebiscite would be so fair that objective and dispassionate observers could not criticize it in any way. Equallyimportant to the idea of a free and impartial plebiscite is the guarantee to the Governments of India and Pakistan that each will have its interest protected by a plebiscite under United Nations auspices, so that the outcome will not he he1d unfair and the result of coercion or intimidation. 31. tan résolution des l'un de moyen libre Je "sous qu'elles au que objectifs d'aucune plébiscite Gouvernements l'assurance que Unies prétendre mesures 32. The United States Government firmly believes that there can be no real and lasting settlement of the Kashmir dispute which is not acceptable to both parties. Any attempt to decide the issue without the consent of both parties would only leave a constant and explosive irritant in the relations between these two governments, an irritant which would effectively prevent the bringing about of peace and security in South Asia. Our friendship for the Governments and peoples of Pakistan and India has led us a1ways to stand ready ta extend whatever aid and service we can in contributing to their friendly and peaceful relationship. The Prime Minister of India on 2 November 1947, in a radio broadcast, stated that the future of Kashmir 32. conviction 'du essayant des constante empêcher sécnrité d'amitié peuples été contribuer pacifiques l'Inde 33. Moreover, in the light of the commitment of the Government of India, as expressed in its acceptance of the 5 January 1949 resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, it is c1ear that sueh a plebiscite can he held only undcr United Nations auspices, if it is to provide the gnarantees of fairness and impartiality expressed in the Commission's resolutian. My govemment is in full agreement with the view expressed by the United Kingd0111 representative that the action proposed by the Kashmir National Conference wouId not bring about such a fair and impartial plebiscite. 34. The draft resolution presented by the United Kingdom and the United States at this meeting proposes that a dec1aration to this effect be adopted by the Security Council. We also share the view of the representative of the United Kingdom that the Council cannat accept or approve of a plebiscite conducted without the approval or supervision of the Council or its representatives. Our friendship for the Governments and peoples of India and Pakistan should not deter us from expressing oUl-selves on this point. l was impressed by the sober anxiety which Sir Gladwyn Tebb voiced on this matter, and with hi111 I believe that if the Security Council hears an explanation wc shall find onrselves reassured that what is intended does not prejudice the parties' prior cOlTImitments. l should like in particular to associate myself with the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom, from which l quote: " ... no reference to the wishes of the people of Kashmir regarding the future accession of the State made otherwise than under the auspices and with the full consent of the United N <ltions can be regarded as constituting a settlement acceptable to this Couneil". 35. Turning to the operative part of the drait resolution which we have introduced with the United Kingdom, it proposes the appointment of a United Nations rcpresentative ta effect the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of demilitarization proposaIs made previously by Sir Owen Dixon, with such modifications as the United Nations representative deems advisable; and ta present to the parties and obtain their agreement on detailed principles for carrying out the plebiscite. In order to explain the reasons for this proposaI, I think it advisable to review briefly the history of negotiations in this case. 36. The Kashmir dispute was brought before the Security Couneil on 1 January 1948, more than three years aga. Since then the Security Council has made three separate attempts to aid the parties in reaching a reasonable solution of the dispute. There have been a numher of diplomatic approaches by the United Kingdom, and by the United States as weIl, supplementing these United Nations efforts. On 20 January 1948, the points même auparavant, 37. Both parties agreed that the question of accession of the State to lndia or Pakistan should be decided by a State-wide plebiscite under United Nations auspices. This agreement between the parties was formalized in the resolution of 5 January 1949 of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. The Commission was unable, however, to bring about demilitarization and the holding of a plebiscite. In December 1949, the Security Council requested its President of that month, General McNaughton of Canada, to consult with the parties in order to help them find a mutually satisfactory basis for dealing with the Kashmir dispute. General McNaughton reported on 3 February 1950 [S/ 1453] that he had not been successful; that while the Pakistan Government had accepted his proposaIs in substance, the Government of India dicl not agree on the same important issues concerning which the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan had previously reported its inability to obtain Indian acceptance of the Commission's various proposaIs. 38. nommer me pouvant ce], Nations de négocier. et res plébiscite 38. In view of General McNaughton's failure, the Council then decided on 14 March 1950 [470th meeting] to appoint a United Nations representative to take the place of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and to aid the parties to worle out a demilitarization programme, as we11 as to offer any suggestions which might contribute to the solution of the Kashmir dispute. Sir Owen Dixon was appointed United Nations representative on 12 April 1950 [471st meeting]. He spent from May until the end of August in investigation and negotiations on the sub-continent. Sir Owen presented various proposaIs to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan regarding the measures necessary to make it possible to hold a State-wide plebiscite to determine the future of Kashmir. 39. Having been unsuccessful in obtaining the agreement of the Government of India to his demilitarization proposaIs and his suggestions for conditions which, in his opinion, wouId assure a fair and impartial Statewide plebiscite, the United Nations representative then ascertained the reactions of the two Prime Ministers to va.rious pl~ns alternative to that of an over-all plebisCIte. Whlle the Government of India appeared interested in certain of these suggestions, the Govern- 39. nement et avis, général le l'avis solutions ral. pour ment l'engagement sort plébiscite impasse. négociations nement me~t, of Pak!stan contended that they contravened Indla s commttment to determine the future of the St.ate as a whole by a State-wide plebiscite. Despite tius apparent impasse, Sir Owen continued his negotiati?ns in August, and persuaded the Government of Paktstan to agree to discuss possible alternative settlen;ents without abandoning their adherence to the princlple of a State-wide plebiscite, provided that the Govemment of I!1dia would agree to accept a plan to be drafted by SIr Owen containing conditions for a fair bil,it~s plebISCIte 40. Since Sir Owen filed the report with the Security Council in September, the Council has not met ta consider the Kashmir dispute. However, in London in January of this year, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, as has already been mentioned by the United Kingdom representative, attempted, l understand, ta make some progress toward a solution of this issue. 41: This redtal of earnest but unavailing efforts ta lmng about a final solution of the Kashmir dispute may seem at first hearing ta present a picture which offers little hope of eventual solution for this perplexing issue, sa disruptive ta the peace and security of the world. On the contrary, upon refiection, 1 think we may draw renewed faith that we can advance toward a final and lasting peaceful settlement of the Kashmir question. When the dispute was first laid before the Security Council in January 1948, an undeclared war was raging in Kashmir and threatening ta spread beyond its borders. Thanks ta the efforts of the Security Council and its representatives, the fighting was stopped. The parties exhibited a mast co-operative attitude in agreeing ta the cessation of hostilities, and themselves worked out the cease-fire line. Moreover, throughout the continuing negotiations, the Prime Ministers of bath countries have steadily reiterated their earnest clesire ta settle by peaceful means this dispute as well as a11 other existing disagreements between them. 1n a statement on 30 September 1950, the Prime Minister Of India affirmed that "India has always been prepared ta agree for the duration of the plebiscite, and for a suitable period preceding it, ta the appointment of United Nations representatives enjoying powers wlùch. .. would be sufficient ta ensure that every national of Jammu and Kashmir casts his vote freely and without fear". On 16 January 1951, the Indian Premier declared that "India has repeatedly offered ta work out with the United Nations reasonable safeguards ta enable the people of Kashmir ta express their will, and is always ready ta do sa". 42. Likewise, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan of Pakistan, in a statement ta the Pakistan Parliament on 5 October 1950, said, "We want ta live on the friendliest terms possible with India. We want ta settle aIl our disputes peacefully". In the published correspondence between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes between the two countries, the Prime Minister of Pakistan is quoted in a letter dated 27 November 1950, as saying ta Mr. Nehru, "1 have also declared over and over again that Pakistan wants peaceful settlement of 43. The United States Government believes that the quoted utterances of the Prime Ministers of these two great countries indicate most c1early not only that there exists on the part of both governments the will to settle the Kashmir dispute peaceably and to examine solutions carefully, but also that the area of disagreement has been narrowed. The Security Council can best exercise its functions to narrow further this area of disagreement by effecting demilitarization of Kashmir as a prerequisite to conducting a plebiscite. The previous negotiations in this dispute have pointed up the area of disagreement as involving, primarily: first, the procedure for and the extent of demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir preparatory to holding a plebiscite; and secondly, the degree of control it would be necessary to exercise over the {unctions of government in the State in order to ensure a fair and impartial plebiscite. The draft resolution sponsored by the United Kingdom and the United States proposes to deal with these two principal issues. 44. It provides for the appointment of a United Nations representative to succeed to the post resigned by Sir Owen Dixon, but with amplified and strengthened terms of reference. The United Natio'ns representative would have two principal tasks. He wouId effect the demilitarization of the State on the basis of the demilitarization proposaIs which had previously been presented by Sir Owen Dixon, with such modifications as he himself deems advisable. He would present to the parties, and obtain their agreement on, 8. detailed plan for carrying out a plebiscite in the State in order to give effect to their solemn commitment that the future of the State is to be decided by a free and impartial plebiscite conducted tll1der United Nations auspices. The resolution of 14 March 1950 placed the burden of preparing and executing the demilitarization programme upon the parties themselves, assisted by the United Nations representative. There was no refe~ence in .th~t resolution to the working out of a detalled plebIscIte plan. The present draft resolution proposes. that ~he United Nations representative, after con.sult~tlOn wIth the two governments in regard to thelr dlfferences, himself effect the demilitarization of the State and assume the initiative in presenting to the two .governments and obtaining their agreement to a detal1ed plan for the plebiscite. 45. TI:e United Nations representative is authorized to take 1l1to account four considerations which, although they are definitely not exclusive of any others, we 46. First is the report of Sir Owen which describes his most careful and objective attempt to present proposais which would meet the principal objections of the parties to both demilitarization and the general form of a plebiscite. As the most recent attempt by a Security Council representative to help the parties in settling this dispute, it contains valuable information which undoubtedly will aid the new United Nations representative. 47. Secondly, there is the possibility that, for purposes of maintaining order and guaranteeing the State From external aggression during the period of demilitarization and the holding of the plebiscite, forces might be provided from States Members of the United Nations or raised locally. 48. Third Iy, there is the possibility that, although a State-wide plebiscite would decide the accession of Kashmir on the basis of majority vote, the losing party might, subsequent to the plebiscite, be assigned those local areas in which such party had obtained the overwhelming majority local vote. The qualification to this suggestion is, of course, that due account must be taken of geographic and economic considerations which would vitally affect both sides. 49. Fourthly, there is the possibility that, while affirming the principle that there must be United Nations supervision over the functions of government in the State during the demilitarization and plebiscite periods, it may be appropriate to have different degrees of such supervision for different areas of the State. 59· Th<: draft resolution has one more major provi- OOlOn desIgned to strengthen the hand of the United Nations. representative in his negotiations, and to aid the partIes to reach a full and lasting settlement of this complex problem. This provision caBs upon the parties to accept arbitration upon the points of difference remaining unresolved despite the efforts of the United Nations represe~tative. The United Kingdom, as was made clear by SIr Gladwyn Jebb's statement this afternoon, and the United States believe it necessary that still another Charter device for peaceful settlement should be provided whereby unresolved issues can be settled ohjective1y. In this way the parties and the United Natio~s ~epreselltativemay be assured that the Security Councll 1S firmly resolvecl that an possible means for pcaceful settlement to bring about· a full solution of the. Kashmir. d.ispute should be offered the parties. l beltev~ that Ii 1S the dutY of the Council to cali to the attentIOn of both go,:ernment.s their obligation under the Charter of the Umted Nattons to seek a solution by a1l manner of peaceful means, inc1uding arbitration. 52. In concluding my remarks, l wish to emphasize my deep concern that the Security Council should give prompt consideration to this drait resolution. The situation on the sub-continent, in which the Kashmir dispute provides a constant irritant prejudicing friendly relations between the parties and injuring their economic well-being, demands that the Security Council press forward suggestions which it believes may help the parties towards a reasonable and acceptable determination of this dispute. l sincerely believe that this draft resolution offers good possibilities for successfully channeling the Council's activities in the direction of practical aid to the parties. The time and the situation demand this aid, and require that it be given without thought of criticizing either of the parties or attempting to sit in judgment upon them. 52. pour résolution. sous-continent, une amicales être présente pour nable ment de aux le tiques

We have just heard two very interesting and useful statements by the representatives of the two States which submitted the draft resolution circulated at the beginning of the meeting. It seems to me that it would be good for all of us to ref1ect, at least for several days, on the views which have just been advanced before debating the draft resolution. l should therefore like to propose that we meet again on Tuesday next, 27 February. If there are no objections, l shaH take it that the Council agrees. 53. exposés sentants projet début intérêts dérations gager que Si Conseil

Could the next meeting be put off to a rather later date, such as 1 or 2 March? That would give us time to receive the instructions we are awaiting after we have studied the clraft resolution just submitted ta us. 54. remettre tardive, permettrait, soumis,

Does any member of the Council wish to speak on this point? It has been proposed that we should meet again on 1 or 2 March. Unless 1 hear any opinion to the contrary, l sha11 consider this proposaI approved by the Council. 55. t-il faite Si cette 56. notre à du représentant 56. I suggest that we should decicle that our next meeting will be heId at 3 p.m. on Thursday, 1 March. This, of course, is subject to the agreement of the President for March, who will no longer be the representative of France. 57. Sir Benegal N. RAU (India): According to the alphabetical order of the conntries concerned, l believe it will be India's turn to preside in March. l should like to study the exact implication of mIe 20 of our rules of procedure, and 1 shaH have to make up my mind whether, even as regards fixing the date, l shaH exercise my fnnctions as the President, becanse, as aH the members know, India is one of the countries intimately connected with the present dispute. 57. glais): c'est sera je notre j'exercerai qui séance. ne ressés 59. Sir Rcnegal N. RAU (lnclia): l have no objection.

If there is ulJunimous consent ta the meeting on 1 March, l suppose that inc1ucles al! potential presidents of the Council.

The Council has therefore sa decided. It is understood that it wil1meet again on Thursclay,l March, the question of the Presidency being lcft ta the discretion of the representative of Inclia. The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m. l'rintcd in Canada P~ice: 20. cents (or cqll1valent III other