S/PV.534 Security Council

As the represcntative of lndia ohserved in the opening part of his statement to the Coun<:il on 1 1\1arch r533rd meeting], the question of K.ashmir has been before the Security Council on several occasions already. UnfortU1;ately, very little progress has been made tm,vards lts peaceful seulement. 2: On this occasion, the task that Sir Benegal Rau set 1umself was comparatively easy. The concItlsion that he sought to press upon the attention of the Council Was that .the ,Council n~ed do no more than accept Sir Owen Dlxon s suggestlün that the matter now be left to discussion and settlement between the parties themselves. ~n other words, the objective he set himself - a part of lt, at least - was that the Security Council 2. cette amener il Dixon question clles-mêmes. assigné 3. As l have said, his task was easy. AH that was necessary for him to do was to put forward certain considerations which would show that a peaceful settlement was difficult, at least through the efforts of the SeCtlrity Council, and that therefore the problem should be left to look after itself. 4. Of course, the danger there is that a problem left ta loole after itself may run wild, and when it rt1ns wild no one can predict where it might run and what it l11ight bring in its walee. S. My tasle is a litUe more difficult. My task is to try to convince the Security COlmcil that the situation is of such gravity that it requircs earnest, vigorous and speedy action if it is to be prevented from breaking out in a manner that might mIe out peaceful settlement. My tasle further is ta inc1icate to what extent the efforts hitherto made have been successful, where they have got stuck, and what is needed ta speed the matter toward a peaceful settlement. 6. The whole· argument of my esteemed friend, the rcpresentative of India, rested on the absolute1y untenahle assumption that India is in lawful occupation of Kashmir. His argument, such as it was, and all its implications and insinuations, revolved around that assull1ption. The stark fact is that India's occupation of Kashmir was brollght about as the result of a conspiracy between the Hinc1u Ruler of Kashmir and the rIindu leaders of India, the victims of that conspiracy being the people of Kashmir. This conspiracy was hatched dnring the spring and sum11ler of 1947 when some of the most prominent rIindu leaders visited Kashmir and persuaded the Maharaja to accept their point of view. l sha11 reinforce this part of my submission to the Conncil by quoting a statement hy Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz, a Kashmiri leader who, because he could not see eye to eye witha good many of the policies of the Maharaja, and later with the view of the Maharaja over accessioll, had ta spend a fairly long period in gaol. He has since heen released. The quotatiolls that l propose to make at this stage and later have been published in a pamphlet called Tho Truth abou.t Kashmir by the Kashmir Democratic Union of Delhi. He states: "From the outside Congress leaders approached the Maharaja and, in the name of Hinduism and ancient Indian culture, appealed to him ta decide to accede ta India. One after the other many Congress stalwarts, including Acharya KripaJani, the then Rashtrapati, visitecl Kashmir with that mission. The highest among the11l, Mahatma Gandhi, also visited Kashrnir. "The Mahatma stayed in Srinagar for a few days, when he had long interviews with the Maharaja, as well as with nationalist leaders and officiaIs. Imrnediately after the Mahatma left the State, drastic 7. That is a Hindu leader speaking, and he is speaking from lndia. ont Cjll'il - au de chement S. The IVlaharaja entered lIpon that comse hecanse he weil knew that the vast majority of his people - and it is weIl kno\Vn that the 1\luslims constitute an over-all nmjority of SOllle 71:( per cent of the population of the State of Jamlllu amI Kashmir - were anxious that the State should accedc tn Pakistan, and were bitterly oppose<1 tn accession to India. 9. Shortly after the terrihIe slaughters in India, which accompaniecl partition, the :vlaharaju set upon a course of action where-hy, in the worels of the special correspondent of The TiIll1'S of London ]Juhlished in its issue of 10 Octoher 1t)-IS, "in the remaining Dngra area, 237,000 i'vrllslilllS \\'cre systcmaticallv extet'lllinated, 11111ess the)' esC<tpl:t\ tl; l'akistan' along the border, hy all the forct's I,f the Dogra State headec1 hr the Maharaja in pel'Sllll and aided Ily Hindns and Sikhs", The Iv1aharaja wa::; enCl111raged to do that by what hac! already happened in anothcr State which, 50 far as the composition of its population was concerned, was in similar straits. la, In the case of Kapnrtlmht, once of the Punjah States contiguuus tn i\ lllslim majority areas in the Punjah, where the population was 63 per cent :Mllslim, not one Muslim was lcft in the COl1!"se of a few wel'ks. They \Vere ail either massacred or clriven nut of the State hy force. That is ho", the pOjlnlatinn composition ?f the State \Vas CClnvertecl [rolll a majority of 1\1llsliml, 1I1to il totality of mm-fil llslilllS. Thcre \Vas no reason why, if the Maharaja of Kashmir was similarly minded, he coule! not achieve the same end, and tll\ls clear the \Vay for accession to Inc!ia. Il. \Vhen this hecal11e clear, agitation started in the State and large-scOlie l'l'pression was undertaken. l shall cJuate again from Prem Nath Bazaz, who says: "Restlessness was universa1. In Punch, wherc thotlsanc1s of clcmohilized Muslim veterans live. an open armec1 rebellion broke out against the Mahamja and his ac1ministration. The rebcl1ion spread rapidly ta the acljoining area of Mirpur, where war veterans also lived in large nl1mbers. Instead of realizing 12. 'l'hat is the testimony of a Kashmiri, a I-Iindu Kashmiri. He then proceec1s a little later with the iollowing statel1lent: "\Vith the consultation of Congress 1eaders"- and this means leaders of the Inelian National Cong-ress -- "the Maharaja 110W appointed a notorious anti-Pakistani as his Prime Minister. Only four hours after he took charge, JVIr. Merher Chand .!Vlahajan, the new Prime IvIinister, made, in a press conference, injudieiolls anel irrcsponsible statements, in ntter disrei{arcl of public opinion, condemning Pakistan and ail those who supported Kashmir's accession to that dominion. The resnlt was more disturbances in the valley and chaos in Punch and the adjoining areas. While widespread clisturbances were takiilg place inside the State, Muslims outside could not keep silent. lITany responsible Pakistani leaders warned the Maharaja not ta take the contemplated ruinons step whieh it \Vas quite evident he \Vas detenninecl ta take. The Premier of the Northwest Frontier Province, whu is a Kaslul1iri by descent, implored and advised the l\Iaklraja to he farsightecl. Even the ru1ers of the froutier district, such as the Rajahs of Hunza and Nagar, warned him of the disastrous consequences that his action woulcl hring about. Hundrccls of teleg-rams poured illto the Royal Palace from ail over ~he ,State, .from lea~lers great and smal1, from organlzatlons. bIg and httle, from institutions important ancl ll111mportant, unanimously prayinohim tn look aheacl hefore jumping. But ail this fell bon deaf ears." 13. l'hat being the state of affairs in Kasll1nir where the Huler at the head of his Dogra forces undertook in per:~()n to quell and crush this mQvement for liberation, wl11ch had spontaneo\\sly started in the State, was it to hc' \\'(JIIdere~1 at that t!lC sympathy ancl the sentiments uf, the Mushm populatIOn of Pakistan should be deeply stlrrecl and aroused? 1·[, . On previ?us occasions the same thing had happel1ed. DUrJng the 1930's, when a liberation movemC11t, or a m{wcm.ent for constitutional freedom, had heen . nndertaken 111 I~ash111ir, as many as 30,000 l\[ushllls from the Pl1npb had gone to gaol in their 15. l neec1 11ot, here and at this stage, go over again the kinc1 of tyrnll11Y that the J\{l1s1ims of the State hac1 sufferecl for an c;-:act hlllHlrerl vears uncler the domination of the clynasty of this pal:ticular Maharaja. 16. The people of Punch, having startecl this liberation movemcnt, \Vere able, \Vithin a very few clays, to l'ont the Maharaja's forces. Anc1 his forces being scattererl, the Maharaja \Vas compelled tn 1eave his capital of Srinagar. It \Vas in that state of affairs, when his authority over the greater part of the State of Kashmir har! been set asic1e and his armecl forces hac1 been scatterec1, and he him~~elf had been fnrced to fiel' from the capital of Kashmir to Jal11mu, the capital of Tammu Province, tl1at he \\'rote tl1at letter to Lord t10untbatten, thcn \'iceroy of Inc1ia, which is cbimecl as the legal title of Tnc1ia t;1 the occupation of Kashmir. 17. l have said that the whole of this business \Vas a conspiracy. l have dra\\'n attention to what happenec1 hetween pro111inent Congress leaders and the Maharaja. The sequel of l'vents speaks cloquently as to ",hat mnst have happencd hehind the scenes lH:'tween the JVI'aharaja and the Govcrnl11ent of l'ndia. I-Tcre are t",o significant faets. The first i5 that this Idter ",as ",ritten from Jammu on 26 Octo1Jer. l'Il(' reply is c1ater! 27 Octoher, fromLord JVrollnthatten. There is nothing very SUl'- prising in that. But ",Imt is surprisinf.; is that a large nnmber of airhorne trnops h~ld alrt>ac1y ocenpied portions of the State on the 11l0rninrr of 27 Oetober. Those members of the Conneil who m'~y claim experience in these matters, will he ahle ta juclge how much preparation must have preceded an operation of that ki\1(1. The Maharaja asks for military assistance on 26 October. The next mornimr, as a resn1t of ail-horne operations over high ranges" of monntains, portions of the State had been occupied hv Indian armecl forces. And it is pretended - and the Security Couneil is sought to be persuaded to helieve - that ail this had happenecl as a l'esult of the Maharaja's appeal for armecl assistance in order to Quell what are described as clisturbances in the State. There could be no more e!oc!uent proof of the fact that the whole thing was engllleerec1 as the result of a cOl1spiracy. 18. The second significant factor, in this connexion, is the position of Shcikh Ahdulla. Shcikh Ahdulla was a political leader in Kashmir whose 1101itical views were in sympathy ancl support of the Indian National Congress. He had long acter! as the ag'l'nt of the 1\1(1ian National Con~ress in Kaslunir. At the ti111e when a~i~ation in the State started av,ainst the Maharaja's desH!,n ta accec1e to India. Sheikh Abdnl1a was in gaol under a 10n17 sentence of iI11pri50nment on a charge of treas~n ag'alllst the Maharaja. 1 have on previons occasIOns concedec1 that it \Vas an hOnotlrahle kincl of Ît:ca;ceration that he was suffering. But here is the slgmficance. At the heil;ht of this af?,'itation against the Maharaja, Sheikh Abc1nlla was released. His release \Vas not part of a general gaol dclivery of ])o]itical offenders, because the Maharaja suddenly bethought "Sheikh Abdulla was then in gaol as a result of his ut1successful 'Quit Kashmir' ae!venture. The trene! .of public opinion outside made him worried and restless. He "vmte a letter ta a frienc1 in Jammu, which WOlS published in the Corigress press, praying ta the Maharaja that he should neither remain indepenc1ent nor join Pakistan, but should declare the State's accession to 1ndia forthwith. Sheikh Abdulla offeree! the 11nequivocal support of his National Conference to sl1ch a c1eclaration." 19. The release was followee! by liberty ta Sheikh Abc1ulla ta carry on his efforts in support of the State's accession ta Inclia. l sha11 quote again from Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz: "Sheikh Abdulla was not only released, he was also encouraged and subsiclized by the Maharaja's Government to holel public meetings and processions. Orders banning processions anclmeetings were, however, strictly applied in the case of a11 other political parties which refusec1 to support the Maharaja's new policy." 20. There is a significant aspect of this matter. Bere is this man; he is l10t persona grata with the Maharaja. In fact, having been sentenced to a long term of imprisonment because he had demanded that the Maharaja quit Kashmir, he is not only released but he becomes a particular favourite. In the letter that the Maharaja wrote to Lord MOllntbatten asking for assistance, there occurs thi,~ very significant sentence as an inducement to the Government of India to offel' military aicl: "1 may also inform Yom Excellency's Govern- ;11ent. that it is 111y intention at once ta set up an 11ltenm government and to ask Sheikh Abdulla to carry the responsibilities in this emergency with my Prime Minister." 21. How -did the Maharaja know this would come as a we1come gesture ta Lord Mountbatten and to his government unless the matter had already been arranged between the two, that is, between the Government of India and the Maharaja, that military aid wO;1J.d be forthcoming ta Sheikh Abdulla, whose p~ht1cs, as l have sa~d, had for long been in accord wlth those a f the Incltan National Congress, who was . a personal friend of the Prime l\1inister of India, and who, when he was being tried for treason against the Maharaja, before the partition, sought to be defendecl by the Prime Minister of India to be? Pandit Nehru then rushed to Srinagar on the plea that he wantecl to defend his friencl against the charge of treason brought agaim;t \1im, lfnder the Maharaja's orders, he was put "1 note with satisfaction that l'our Higlll1ess has decicled to invite Shcikh Abclnlla to fmm an interim goverl11nent to work \Vith J'our Primc l\Iinister." 22. 1 suhmit that t[1('se an' sigl1ilicallt facts, that the whole thing had 1Jeell settled as part uf a scheme to suppress the liberation 11l0Vell]('llt in Kashmir ancl to over-ntle those who might wi:;h to mise their voice in favour of the State's accession to Pakistan. 13y this promise which the lVlaharaja cOll\"l'yed to Lord l\lot1nthatten, Sheikh Ahdulla lJbtainec1 his quid l'ra quo. vVhile this \Vas going on, It1dian troops har! arrived ami the 1110VC111cnt continuel!. In the ml'antime, threc davs before the l\laharaja ",rote his lette l', the tribal inClirsion had taken place and the struggle, reilliorced hy this, went on. Eventuallv the ,'h'(/(I Kashmir Government was organized. 'l'Ile A~:(/d Kashlllir forces were organized ancl withstnod .-;uccess[u[ly the ollslanght ni the Tndian Armv. In thesc circumstanccs, it is nnt surprising that tïle represcntative o[ India has chosl'n to malign thesc brave fighters ior the freet!mn of Kashmir anll thei r govclï1l1wnt as snilversivc forces and authorities. But suhversive of \Vho1l1? Of the l\laharajas? Of a centnry-Iong' opprcssion? This, irom thc representative of aState whieh arter a long uut! honol\rable struggle hall ouly a fe\\' months previonsly snccecded in winning and estahlishing its lI\\'ll independence, is sOlllcwhat ironie. \Vhat \Vas Sheikh Abdnl1a doing in the meanti1l1e arter he had eOine into power? 23. Prcm N ath Bazaz, in the course of that statcmcnt ta which 1 have already drawn attention, COn1l11cnts on the faet that Nehru, the Primc lVfinister of India, had saicl that Ahdulla and his party \l'ne not pnt in power in Kashmir from the air. Ile analyses that statcl11ent in cletail and gives cngent reasons' tu show that they were put in power from the air. Ile conc1udes thi's aspect of the matter thns: "In view of thcse solid facts, it is cl<.:arly wrong to state that the N ationalists were givl'n pow<.:r because they \Vere the 11105t represcntative political body of the State's people. The truth is that they \vere put thcre frol11 the air." 25. He clJnv~l1ient1y forgot :!~e o~le ftc\~~e w~l;~~tl{~ slJlelv rcsjJol1sl!Jle for the eXIstence ~, (S (;(JVt:nll11~·llt. That factor is the occl1patlon of t le . tate 11)' a 1111ge Inr1ian Army. ",I,'llt "C') II'Jllg' as tens of thousanc1s of Inc1ian ) .~ '. 1 cl e' of snldiers arc statiunecl in l'very poo (an corn t 1\.','I."·JJ1'11I'I' tu back the Abdlllla Governmel.lt, the usnh- " 1 J t anl)cr! pcople of Kashmir cannot (0 aayt llDg 0 pu out that governl1lent." l 'h;\t is tu S;\y, bis ~OVerl1l11l'nt is hc,ing maintained, in u 1 t t be 111a111 power 1>y Ill(lüI's mi1itary forces, am 1 canno < 1 ~ taiuee! that it is a government based upon popu al assent. zr). As carly as Oeto1>er, 1947, the Pakistan Gove~nment macle relJcatetl efforts to r.each a settJement wlth J 1 1 f Kash the GOl'crnment of Inclia W lere1l1 t le peop co. " - mir couId settle their future through a plebISCIte. ,'arions suggestions were made. which h.ave been, detailc:rl !Jciore the Security Coul1cll at prs~lOUS meet1l1gs and to whieh l necel not here revl'rt. l hey were not acceptalJlc to Tnr!ia. 1l1dia put forwarel counter-proposaIs on which 1. shaH commen~ presently, They were w:ceptahle to Pakistan anc!, dllnn~ the last ~hree years :Lml a haH, Pakistan, the Secunty CouncJ! ~nd the Uniter! Natiol1s Commission on India and PakIstan - and latel\' some of the Prime Ministers o.f the C?m- 1l1(J11wealih coulltries - have been engagec1 111 the effort to persuade India to carry out what it had offerecl .to do and \\"hat it hacl subsequentl)', through the Con111l1ssion's resolntiolls of 13 August 1948 ancl 5 .Tanuary 1949 IS/1l0(}, S/1196j, agreed to cl? AIl these efforts have so far heen without any apprectable result. 27. India goes on affirming over and over again !ts rea(liness - indeed, its anxiety - to honour aII Its cOl11Ulitmel1ts, to carry into effeet all that it has agreed to do, But, wheu it Comes to the doing of it, noboc1y who has sa far hael to deal with the matter can achieve uny success, Failure aiter failure has be~n reported. 28. The latest of these declarations of willingness and readiuess to carry out a\1 that Inelia has l111clertaken was lllade by Sir Bl'negal Rau in a speech before the SC'cnrity COllncil on the first of this month [533rd II/I'Ctill11 j. The eurliest was contained in the telegram (lf the Prime IVIinister of India to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, clated 8 November 1947. It has been fjuotcc1 Iii cxtl'll.l"O and l'an be found in the records of the SeclIrity Council. I shall therefore not read ont the whnJe of it hut shaH clraw attention to paragraphs 10 and 11. One of the points that the Prime Ministcr of India 1\'ilS trying to tlIeet in this telegTal11 \Vas the objcctiotl raiser! on behalf of Pakistan that a plebiscite carried out \l'hile a good portion of the State \Vas in the occupation of Inclian military forces, an<l while an Indian nominec was at the hl'ad of the Kashmir administration, couid giYC no confidence ta anybocly at aIl. "It will thns be seen that our proposaIs, which wc have repeatedly statecl, are: "1) That the Government of Pakistan shoulcl publicly unclertake ta do its utmost ta campel the raiders ta withclraw 1rom Kaslunir. "2) That the Government of India shonlcl repeat its clec1aration that it will withclraw its troops ft.om Kashmir sail as soon as the raiders have withdrawn ancI law and arder are restorcc1. "3) That the Governmcnts of Tndia anel Pakistan shoulcI malœ a joint recluest tD the United Nations ta uncIertake a plebiscite in Kashmir at the earliest possible clate." Z9. Stopping here for a moment, l might cIraw thc attention of the Council to the raet that the raiders havc withdrawn hom Kashmir; that thcy withclrew long ago, after agreement \Vas reachecl bctween the two governments on the resolntions of the Commission of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, Indian troops are still in occnpation of Kashmir, and no practical prospect has yet appearecl of a plebiscite being unc\ertaken by the United Nations in oreler ta determine the CJuestion of the accession of the State to India or ta ]:>akistan. 30. Paragraph Il of that telegram runs as follows: "The above conclusions relate onl)' to Kashmir, but it is esscntial, in arder to restore good l'dations between the two Dominions, that there shoulcl he acceptance of the princip1e that, where thc l\uler of aState cloes not be1ong' ta thc conll11tmity ta which the majority of his subjects be1ong, ancl wherc the State has not accedecl to that Dominion whose majority col11t11unity is the same as the Statc's, the question whether the State !las ilnally accedecl to one or the other Dominion shoulel he ascertained by reference to the will of the people." 31. l stress this in arder to draw the attention of the Security COllncil to the fact that, as early as 8 Novemher 1947, India's position wa" that, in "the cir- CU1l1stances set out in paragraph Il, no accession can tak~ place -:-- at any rate, it cannot be reeognizecluutll the WIll of the people has been ascertainec1. 32.. That \Vas the principle on the basis of which Pakistan was willing that the question of the accession of the State t.o India or ta Pakistan might be decicled, As I have sald, every effort that has since been macle from any quarter ta carry out what was there explicitly uudertaken has so far brought no result. 3~.. Tn~li~, instead of coming to the United Nations \VIth a JOl~lt request that the plebiscite be hcld under the atlth~nty of the United Nations, lodged a cOl1lplaint that. ~akJ~t~n was assist~ng those who were challenging IndJa ~ mllltary occupatIOn of Kashmir. The Secllrity Councll heard Inclia's complaint and Pakistan's rcply and.came ta the conclusion that the only just and clemocrabc solution in Kaslu11ir was a ·free and impartial 34. As to the conditions of the. plebiscite, ev~ryone who spoke in the Security CottllcIl.gave expre~sl?n to what, in his opinion, would constttute the. mtmm.ul11 conditions which alone could guarantee a fair at;d Impartial plebiscite. But ~he matter was set out 111 the fewest possible words 111 the st~tement of .the representative of France [235th meetmg], ta whlch l draw attention: "Personal1y, l would suggest three conditions"- in connexion with the plebiscite - : "1) The withdrawal of foreign troops from the State of Kashmir; "2) The return of the inhabitants, irr~spective of their race - Hindu or Moslem - to thelr places of origin in that State; "3) The establishment of a free administrat!on which would not exert pressure on the populatIOn and wouId give absolute guarantees of a free vote." 35. Similar views were expressed by the majority of the members of the Security Counci!. These views were crystallized in a draft resolution which was brought before the Council by its President on 6 February 1948 [5/667]. This draft resolution was accepted by Pakistan and was rejected by India - thus, at that very early date, setting the pattern for the many subsequent occasions on which proposaIs for carrying ont a free and impartial plebiscite, proposals made by cl11inent and impartial authorities, have been accepted by Pakistan and rejected by India. 36. .\-Yhile the Security Council was continuing its efforts to bring about a solution by means of a free and impartial plebiscite, India was making a deterl11ined bid to conquer the rest of the State, in spite of the Security Council resolution [5/651] of 17 January 1948 [229tll meeting] which "Calis Hpon both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan to take il11l11ediately ail measures within their power (inc1uding public appcals to their people) calculated to improve the situation, and to refrain from making any statement and from doing or causing to be done or pennitting any acts which might aggravate the situation." 37. In spite of this appeal, India was going forward rapidly in orcier to achieve not a peaceful settlement of the problem, but a military settlement through its armec1 forces. It poured troops iuto Kashmir in an effort to cruch the liberation movement and to encirc1e Pakistan. At the same time - that is to say, during April 1948, which synchronizes with these events- India tried, in another field, to do mortal injury to Pakistan by withholding the waters of common rivers from Pakistan and thus putting the whole agricultural economy of V/est Pakistan into jeopardy. 38. On 21 April 1948, the Security Council eventually adopted a resolution [5/726J -no longer the resolu~ 39. The representative of India has referred to a recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan made about this time, and he has quoted an extract from it, which is torn ont of its context, in an attempt ta show that the abject of the entry of Pakistan troops into Azad Kashmir areas which had already been liberated from the Maharajah's authority was to render more effective assistance to the tribesmen. l shonld like to read the whole passage from which that extract was taken, so that the Council 111ay see the whole pictnre, as it then emerged, of the military situation in its proper setting. This is from an appraisal sub111itted by Sir Douglas Gracey, the then Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan forces, to the Pakistan Government. l quote the sU111mary of his deductions: " (a) That a general offensive is being planned by the Inclian Army in the north and the south is a certainty. Theil' objectives are likely to be as follows: south: (i) Bhimbar-Mirpnr, (ii) Punch; north: Muzaffarabad-Kohala. "(b) Judging from what has happened in Rajaori, an advance by the Indian Anny in any of the above areas is al1110st certain to create a big refugee problem for Pakistan, which is already saturated. Refugees will be an extremely serious strain on the civil administration and a heavy drain on the country's economic and financial resources. From this point of view alone it is imperative that the Indian Army is prevented from gaining any of the above objectives. "(c) Occupation of Bhimbar and Mirpur will give India the strategie advantage of havingcrossed two major obstacles, i.e., the Rivers Ravi and Chenab, and of c0111ing right up to the Pakistan border, thereby sitting on our doorsteps, threatening the Jhelum Bridge which is so vital for us, and getting further opportunities for intrigue, etc. l t would also give them the control of the Mangla headworks, thus placing the irrigation in Jhelum and other districts at their mercy." (Those headworks are situated inside the boundary of the Kashmir State but belong ta Pakistan.) "(d) Occupation of Punch by the Inclian Army is certain to have a most serious effect on the morale ?f the many Punchis in the Pakistan Army, and this 111 turn will adverselyaffeet the morale of other troops. Desertions will undoubtedly increase and discipline will receive a big set-back. " (e ) The loss of Mnzaffarabad or Kohala will, broadly speaking, have the most far-reaching effect on the security of Pakistan. It would enable the Indian Army to secnre the rear gateway to Pakistan through which it can march in at any time it wishes "(f) Ail easy vietory of the Indiar; Army ~n any of the above-ll1entioned sectors, partIcularly 111 the NIIIzaffaral lad area, is almost certain to arouse. the anger of the triiJesmen against Pakistan ior its fal!ure to rcnder them more direct assistance, ancl llllght weil cause them ta tllrn against Pakistan." 40. That was the paragraph from which the repres~n­ tativc of India quotec1. This is the s.etting fr~Jln whlch his fl\lotation was taken. The apprmsal contll1ued: "[(cC01Jl1l1endatiolls: 7. If Pakistan is 110t to face another serious refllgee problem with abont 2,750,000 penple lIprootecl from their homes; if Incl.ia is not to be aJlowed ta sit on the c!oorsteps of Pal<lstan to the r<:'n.r and on the Hank at liberty to enter at its will and pleasl1re; if civiliun and l11ilitary morale. is not . to he affected to a dangerotls extent; ancl If subversive political forces are not to be encouraged and let 100se within Pakistan itself, it is imperative that the Indian Anny is nat allowed to aclvance beyond the general line U ri-Punch-Naoshera" [464th mccting ). ·n. The situation was this. As l have said, in spite of the appcal nf the Security Coul1cil conveyed ta both sicles in the resollltion of 17 January, in spite of the contillllil1g etïorts of the Security Council to find the basis of a peaceEul settlement and for the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite, India persisted in its efforts to bl'ing about a military solution, not only by occnpation of the whole of the State of Jammu and I(ashmir, hut bv the encirc1el11cnt of Pakistan. In those circllmstauces, 'Pakistan decided to sencl its troops in to ho/el certain defcnsive lines, and 1110rc than that at no stage did those troops attel11pt. As Tsaie! on the last occasion when l !lad the honour to adc1ress the SeCl1rity Cntlll~il r·lo4lh II/cetingJ, anybody responsible for the secunty of Pakistan who did not do at least that should 1lanirnpeachccl and executed. 42. This is what India has throughout clescribecl as Pakista~l's aggres~ioll. Another aspect of Paldstan's aggrcsslUll to whlch attention is sometimes drawIl is that the trihesmell sllcceeded in proceec1ing through Pakistan to, Kashmir and took a hane! in the struggle that \~a~ gOl11g ~1I1 there. In that connexion l would beg PCrll11SSlOn agalI1 to quate from Pandit Prem Nath ~la7.az, ';l1cl ~s l hav~ saiel before, the significant thing 105 that 1 ancItt Bazaz lS a I-filldu leader of Kashmir who has sutTcrec1 for his political views and who is now spealdng from India: 43. avril pour rité faire le 13 comme résolutions approuvées accord le d'armes accord tion Pakistan battants du biscite contrôle décider restant nécessaires plébiscite. 43. As a result of the resolution of 21 April 1948 r5/726], the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan, appointed by the Secllrity Council, went out to the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent and afterwards was successful in having its two resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 Janllary 1949 accepted by Illdia and Pakistan and endorsed by the Security Counci1. The main provisions of those two resolutions, which by their acceptance by the parties and their approval hy the Security Council became an international agreement, may he summarized as follows. First, that there should he a cease-fire, and a cease-fire line should he demarcated. Secondly, that there should be a truce agreement providing for the withdrawal of tribesmen and Pakistan llationals who bad gone ta tbe State for the pl11'pose of fighting', and for the withdrawal of the Pakistan troops and the bulk of the Indian troops from the State. Thirdly, that a plebiscite shonld be conducte.d .under the supervision and control of a Plebiscite Adml11.Istrator, who was empowered to determine the final dlsposal of the remaining forces in the State and who was vested with all the powers he consi~lered necessary ta ensure the freedom andimpartiality of the plebiscite. 44. qu'aux tion et mener étapes. l'ordre sion 44. Pausing. l:er~ fo~' a moment, it will be appreciated that the del11!lttanzatlOn of the State which has come t? be the main ~rt1X of the whole matter and the prin- Cipal obstacle 111 the. \Vay of progress beincr made towarc1s the organizing and holding of the pl~hiscite, was, under the scheme of those two resolutions to be 45. This was the measure of the clegree of clemilitarization ta takc place at the truce stage, but the rest was lo be achievecl c1uring \Vhat is known as the plebiscite stage. In the plebiscite stage, the PI~biscit~ Aclministrator woulcl have the power of the hnal dIsposaI of the remaining forces of bath sides, having clue reg~rd to the security of the State and the freedom and 1111- partiality of the plebiscite. 46. There has been a tendency on occasion to stress the fact that the only demilitarization visualized in those resolutions was the withdrawal of the Pakistan anned forces and the withclrawal of the bulk of the Indian army. But that was to be during the trnce stage; the rest was to be achievecl during the plebiscite stage. l shan refer to that later. vVhat woulcl be left after the truce stage? On the Azad Kashmir side, the Azad Kashmir forces - the Pakistan forces would be withdrawn; in the Indian-occupiecl portion of Kashmir, the remnants of the Inclian forces after the hulk hac! been withclrawn, the Kashmir State forces and the Kashmir State militia. Those three on the one side, and the Azad Kashmir forces on the other side, 'Nould be finally disposed of under the directions of the Plebiscite Administrator. 47. The representative of India has argued and has often implied that the disposai here mentioued in subparagraph 4 (a) of the resolution of 5 January 1949 is not a disposai but a mere disposition. But that it was ta be a disposai in the sense that the Plebiscite Administrator would have full authority ta disband, disarm and aiso settle dispositions with regard to the remainder, is clear from India's own insistence that the bulk of the Azad Kashmir forces must be disarmed and disbanded in the truce stage. 48. Those were ta remain intact during the truce stage. Their disposai, that is ta say their disbandment and the disarming of the greater part of them, could onIy be achieved by the Plebiscite Administrator under this power: According to the Indian view, when disposai apphes to the Azad Kashmir forces, it means rlisbandin~ and ~isanlling at least of the greater part, but when It apphes ta the renmants of the Inclian forces and to the State forces antl the State militia, it is to ~l1ean.merely disposition in barracks. That is obviously meqtutable. Nowhere was it contemplated that disposai wouIc! mean only disposition. The Plebiscite Admil1is~rator has full authority so to dispose, that is ta say, chsband or disarm, to station, to impose restrictions upon and to subject ta discipline those forces of either slde. - the Azad Kashmir forces or the remaining Indlan forces, State forces a,nd Sta,te militia - as he 49. This international agreement was designed to bring about one thing - a free and impartial plebiscite - so that the question of the accession of the State to India or Pakistan could be determined. Ail efforts that have been made since then by the Commission itself, by the Security Council or by other authorities at the request of the Security COlll1cil, have been directed towards achieving this end. Everybody has recognized that nobody could pretend that the poil could be free if any portion of the areas concerned were' occupied by the mi1itary forces of either side. Such experience as exists of plebiscites having been taken under international joint supervision reinforces this natural consideration. India is the one sole exception in that it continues to contend that a plebiscite could be held which could be claimed to be free and impartial while its forces occupy portions of the State - the most heavily populated portions of the State - and while those portions are being administered by a nominee of the Government of India who has repeatedly statecl that he is completely wedded to bringing about accession of the State to India. 50. Two things are essential in order to secure freedom of the polI. One necessity is complete clemilitarization of the State. The second is that the Administration must in some manner or other be completely neutralized so that, if it is left in power, it is left in no position to exercise any undue influence, to utter any tlueat, to persuade in any manner anybocly to vote in favour of accession to India when they would wish ta vote for Pakistan or ta persuade them to vote for accession to Pakistan when thev would wish to vote for accession to India. That was the agreement. 51. What has been the implementation? As l stated, the cease-fire became effective 1 January 1949, and subsequently a cease-fire line was demarcated in July 1949. The withdrawal of the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals who had gone inta the State for the purpose of fighting was to be part of the truce stage. No truce agreement has yet been arrived at. Nevertheless, the tribesmen have been perslladed to withdraw and the Pakistan volunteers also have withdrawn from the Azad Kashmir areas; so that part of the second part of the resolution has aJready been carried into effect. 52. But a deacllock has ensuecl over the second part of the second provision, tbat is, the provision relating to the withdrawal of Pakistan troops ancl the bulk of Inclian forces. It is this deadlock that has not allowed any progress to be made towards a peaceful settlement during the last two years. The deadlock is due ta the repeated refusaI of the Government of India to withdraw the bulk of its troops from Kashmir, as required by the resolution and the agreement. 53. It is true that repeatedly India goes on dec1aring its acceptance and affirmation of this obligation. But 5l This is the central prob\em which faces the Security Conncil. l wonlcl beg the indulgenc~ of the Council ta deal with it at some length. The Indlan techniqne has been to go on affirming. the acceptance of these obligations. Indeed, it can do !Ittle else. They ~re there in black and white, endorsed by the Secunty Counci1. Inc!ia refuses to carry them out. Tt either insists on sOllle new condition which cloes not apply and has not been acceptecl by the parties, l'aises in'elevant issues or puts impossible constrnctions upon the lano'ua"'c of the agreement, ancl in one manner or another ~ c~ntinues toC evade its obligations. 55. It woulcl suffice to give one example of this technique in some cletai!. As l have already atte~1ptec1 to 111ake clear, the disposai of the Azad Kasl~l:lI.r ~orces along with the State forces ancl the State ITII!ltm 1S the responsibility of the Plebiscite Administrator to be carriecl into effect dming the plebiscite stage. Dnring the trucc stage the Asad Kashmir forces are to be left intact. That is the agreement. This was fully known ta the Governl1lent of India ancl, ta start with, was fully accepted by it. 56. In the comse of its discussions with the Government of India in August 1948, the Commission pointecl out that, accorcling to the provisions of the Coml11ission's resolution whichwas not accepted until Decel11ber - at that time it was only in the stage of clarification _ "Jjll1itecl Governl1lent of l ndia forces would remain and, on the other sicle, only the Asad people wouldremain in their present positions".. l rcfer ta the first interim report of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, document 5/1100, dated 22 November 1948, annex 12. 1 57. This was the discussion between the Prime Minister of India and his advisers and the members of the Commission in an attempt to get a clarification of the resolution of 13 August 1948. In answer to the apprehension expressed by the Prime Minister of India that Pakistan, being much nearer to the cease-Ere line once it was establishecl, coulc1 commit aggression against Kashmir more easily than India could contravene the cease-fire, one of the members of the Commission repre- ' senting Czechoslovakia "replied that the Commission had heen guite aware of this danger, but it had tried to strike a military balance". "The Commission felt that if the two gavernl11ent,5 couId be brought together, this danger of a sl1dC!cn incursion wOl1ld be removed. Moreover, he l Sec ()jl/cial Records of the Seclirity Coullcil, Third Year, SlIppll'1I1ent fOI' Novcmbcr J948, j,l. l7, 58. Bere was a very clear understanding at the very outset that the Azad Kashmir forces would remain intact during the truce stage and that during that stage - or as a result of the truce agreement - what would happen would be that a smal1 portion of the Inclian forces would remain on the Indian-occupied sicle plus, of. course, the State forces and the State militia and, on the other side, there would be only the Azad forces. 59. In its discussions with the Pakistan Government also, the Commission took the same line, and in ils letter of 19 September 1948 addressed to me as Foreign Minister of Pakistan, it stated the fol1owing, and l quote from paragraph 108 of the first interim report of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan [5/11OOJ : "Moreover, the Commission agrees that it will be anXiotlS to reduce the trnce period to a minimum and that the resolution does not contemplate the disarmament or disbanding of Azad Kashmir forces." 60. 'At that time what subsequent1y became the resolution of 5 January 1949 had not yet been drafted. That is why this writer states that this resolution - that is to say, the resolution of 13 August 1948 which deals with the truce stage - "does not contemplate the disarmament or disbanding of A zad Kashmir forces". 61. In the discussions which the Prime Minister of India had with the Commission in December 1948, before accepting the Jannary 1949 resolution he himself referred to the fact that the Azad Kashmir forces "ran into tens of thousands". l refer to the second interim report of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, document S/1196, dated 10 January 1949 2, annex 4, aide-111émoire 1: "The Prime Minister" - that is to say, the Prime Minister of India - "drew attention to the fact that the Azad Kashmir forces which had been armed and equipped by Pakistan and were unc1er the operational command of Pakistan ran into tens of thousands." 62. Thus the Government of India was fully aware of ~he positionregarding the A.sad Kashmir forces before It acc~pted the international agreement, and the agreement Itself is clear beyond any suspicion of doubt with regard.to. what was intended. This position was not only \~ltllln the knowledge of India and acceptcd by il when It accepted the resolution, but i.ts representatives themse~ves stated subsequently in explanation of the resolutIon that these forces were not to be disbanded 63. This was explicitly recognized by the Government of India in the letter of Sir Girja Shanker Bajpai, dated 18 February 1949 and addressed to the Commission. 1 refer the third interim report of the Commission dated 9 December 1949 3, the text of which is contained in document S/1430, annex 7. Paragraph 3 of this letter states: "The disarming of Asad forces is reany a matter of chronology. First, there must be a cease-fire and, after that, a truce as envisaged in parts 1 and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948. After that, the condition precedent to arrangements for the holding of a plebiscite is the creation of conditions in which Kashmir nationals can return to the area now in the occupation of Asad Kashmir forces. So far as non-Muslims are concerned, such a movement will not take place until large-scale disanning of these forces has been carded out." 64. India itself clearly accepted the position that it was after the truce stage that large-scale disanning and disbanding of the Asad forces was to talce place. The position is again set out very clearly in a letter which the Commission wrote to the Government of India on 14 March 1949. 1 refer to the Commission's third interim report, annex 12. In paragraph 2 the Commission states: "In the course of the conversations last August the Commission explained to the Government of Paldstan that in its view a 'military balance' would exist in the State of Jammu and Kashmir during the truce period in the sense and to the extent that the resolution of 13 August did not cali for the disarming or disbanding of the Asad Kashmir forces which the Commission understood to number approximately thirty-five battalions." 65. Nothing could be dearer than that. Notwithstanding these clear and explicit understandings of the position and the acceptance of it, the Government of India went baclc on its pledged word, and in contravention of the resolutions of August 1948 and January 1949, macle the withdrawal of the bulle of its forces conditional. It said that the withdrawal of its forces in the truce stage would depend upon the disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces which was not to take place in the truce stage at an, b~1t only in a subsequent plebiscite stage. The Commission, after re-· peated efforts, came to the conclusion, as set forth in paragraph 245 of its third interim report, that: '~. : .India .is not pr~pared .to withdmw such part of ltS forces 111 Kashmlr as 111lght be characterized as th~ 'bulle', whether measured quantitatively or qualitatrvely, unless agreement with Pakistan on the 66. Here there was no question of interpretation. The wording of the resolution was perfectly clear. It had been clearly interpreted both to the Government of India and to the Govern111ent of Pakistan by the Commission itseH. As the language was clear, no question of interpretation arose and the interpretation had been accepted by both parties. Yet, the disbanding and disarming 01 the bulk of the Azad Kashmir forces, which was not to take place until the plebiscite stage, was made by India a prior condition to carrying out its oblig'ation in the truce stage and to entering into a tmce agreement. 1 67. The Commission did not know how to resolve this difficulty. Its position eventua11y was that both sides had accepted the agreement, and that question had arisen as to its meaning. According ta us, there certainly was no such question, but India said that there was. Therefore, the Commission said that a question had arisen with regard ta the 111eaning of what the parties had agreed to do. The C0111l11ission's own interpretation was clear, but Inclia would not accept that. In this circulTIstance the Commission said that the only way to resolve the difference was to invite someone in whom the parties had confidence and who woulr1 be completely impartial, to arbitrate this point. 68. Inasmuch as the parties had already accepted Admirai Nimitz as the Plebiscite Administrator, and as he in any event had the power of the final disposai of the remaining forces on both sides, the Commission suggested that the parties should accept Admiral Nimitz to arbitrate on this difference which was blocking further progress in the settlement. This suggestion of the Commission was reinforced by earnest appeals by President Truman and Prime Minister Atlee. Pakistan accepted it, India rejected it. Its representatives saiel: "No, we will not go to arbitration." Here was an impasse. 'V/hat would anyone suggest should happen in those cÎrcumstances? Two sides to a dispute enter into a solemn international agreement as to how the dispute is to be resolved. In the course of attempted progress toward the settlement of the dispute, a question arises, flimsy and unfounded according to us, but, nevertheless, let us say, according to India, a serious question of the interpretation of the document. The Commission, which was the author of the agreement and the body which persuaded the parties to accept the agreement, gave its interpretation. India would not accept it. The Commission then proposed asking an impartial and trustworthy person to resolve the difference. India said: "No, we sha11 not go to arbitration." vVhat is the position? Pakistan must accept what India says the agreement means, although clearly the agreement does not mean that. That is the spidt in which India goes on claiming that it has never disclaimed its obligations, it is aU times ready, willing and eager to give the fuUest effect to whatever it has agreed to. This device was simply to say: "vVe have not agreed to do this." The Commission says that it has 69. The Commission could do no more, and it reported the matter back to the Security COl1ncil. The Security Council requested its President, General MacNaughton, to get in touth with the parties to try to resolve the deadlock that had arisen. General Mac- Naughton, impressed with the fact that India's refusaI ta withdraw the bulk of its forces had been made in connexion with the A/zad Kashmir forces, tried to meet the Indian objection by suggesting the withdrawal and disbandment of forces on both sides, including the Azad Kashmir forces and the State army and militia. That is ta say, illstead of the scheme in the resolutions that disarmament should take place in two stages, during the truce stage and then during the plebiscite stage, General MacNaughton tried to erect a scheme under which the whole thing would take place as part of one operation, including the Pakistan Army and the A::wd .Kashmir forces on one side, and aIl of the Indian Army and the State forces and the State militia on the other. The Government of India flatly rejected General MacNaughton's proposaIs mainly on the grollnd that he had suggested the c1isbandment of State armed forces. Pakistan accepted. 70. Now was this objection valid? The c1isbandment of the State armed forces was clearly again part of the resolution acceptec1 by Inc1ia and Pakistan. Sllb-paragraph 4 Ca) of the resollition of 5 Janllary 1949 reads: "After implementation of parts l and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948, and when the Commission is satisfiec1 that peaceful conditions had been restored in the State, the Commission and the Plebiscite Ac1ministrator will c1etermine, in consultation with the Government of Inc1ia, the final disposaI of Inc1ian and State armed forces, such disposaI ta be with c1ue regarc1 to the security of the State and the freec10m of the plebiscite." 71. It was first arguec1 that Inc1ia coulc1 not accept any scheme of demi1itarization which did not deal with the A.zad Kashmir forces. I-Iere is a scheme put forward which deals with everything. India then says it will not accept that scheme mainly on the ground that it deals with everything. 72. Another favourite device to which the Government of Illc1ia often has recourse is to accuse Pakistan of aggression. l have to a large extent already dealt with this contention. The Pakistan Army 1l10ved in defence of Pakistan's o\\'n vital interest to holc1 certain defensive positions, this movement having taken place in May 1948. As a matter of fact, my learned anc1 distinguished friend even supplied the date in his speech: 73. After India refused to accept General Mac- Nanghton's proposaIs [5/1453], the Security Council appoiJ~ted Sir Owen Dixon as United Nations representatJve [4~lst 1'I/.eeting] to try to bring about an agreement \VIth regard to demilitarization on the basis of General MacNaughton's proposaIs. Sir Owen Dixon arranged a meeting of the two Prime Ministers with him.self in Delhi in July 1950. The Prime Minister of Incha, at an early stage of the meeting, again advanced the contention that Pakistan was an aggressor and shou.1d be declared such. Finding that no progress was poss~ble llnless he could do something to put this red hernng ?ut of the way, Sir Owen Dixon made certain observatlon.s, as will present1y be seen from the languag-e apphed by him, as it were, for argument's sake. l shall draw the attention of the Security Council to ~~le sta.tement of Sir Owen Dixon in this connexion, as IL co.nt1l1ues to be contended throughout that he hranded ~~I(Jstan an aggr~ssor in th!s controversy. In parabraphs 21-23 of hlS report, SIr Owen Dixon said: .! "1 therefare proposed that the first step in demilitarizatian should consist in the withclrawal of the Pakistan regular forces commencing on a named clay. After a significant number of days from the named day, then other operations on each side of the cease fire line shoulcl take place and as far as practicable, concurrently. What number of days should be fixed as significant was a matter of detail far them ta settle. "The Prime Minister of Paldstai1 expressed strongly his dissent from the third of the three positions 1 took up, that is to say the third of the positions stated above. But he expressed his readiness to accept, in compliance with my request, the proposition that as a first step in demilitarization the withdrawal of the regular forces of the Pakistan Army shollld begin on a specified day and that a significant number of days should elapse before the commencement of any operation lnvolving forces on the Indian side of the cease-fire lîne." 74. The whole matter is perfectly clear. Sir Owen Dixon found that this matter of aggression was being brought up time and again before the Security Council and before other authorities, and was now being insisted upon being raised before him. He said that the COlmeil had not clecided on this. Obviously he meant that he had no authority to deeide here either. He said: "1 have 110t been commissioned to carry out a judicial investigation of this matter." In fact he said: "1 have not carried out any such investigation, but for purposes of getting on to demilitarization, 1 am prepared ta make this assumption; and on the basis of that assumption l proposed that the Pakistan Army should start moving first, and that after a significant number of days had passed after the first movement had started, then latel' on the r1emilitarization should be synchronized." There 75. The Prime Minister of Pakistan took serious objection to this third position that he should make any s11ch assull1ption, but he said: "For the purpose of facilitating the demilitarization, we are prepared to accept what you propose." 76. l have quoted this extract ta show the Security Council how unfounded is the deduction which my learned and distinguished friend has tried ta draw from these observations of Sir Owen Dixon. Still another excuse which India constantly put forward for its failure to carry out its obligations, is its professed fear for the security of the State. Its apprehensions are alleged to arise from fear of an attack by Pakistan or by tribesmen. Pakistan has repeatedly given assurances. It has expressed its readiness - l believe at least before General MacNaughton - ta give a guarantee that Pakistan would be prepared ta take necessary and adequate action, even military action, if needed, ta stop any incursion of tribesmen into the State. But India says: "What about an attack by Pakistan forces?" 77. In the first place, a guarantee and an assurance of that kind ta the United Nations should be enough. But in the second place, look at the problem. Pakistan is eager ta obtain a settlement of this question through a fair and impartial plebiscite. vVould it be the first ta destroy every chance of that settlement being arrived at by mounting an invasion of the State after the ceasefire had taken place and the truce had been settled? Would it not completely put itself out of consideration forever in this dispute if it took action of that ldnd? Would any reasonable govermnent lend itself ta an action or a policy of that kind? Nevertheless, India continues ta express apprehensions on that score. 78. But apart from disregarding the assurances of the Pakistan Government, and apart from clisregarding what is perfectly patent in the situation itself, India forgets that the matter of the security of the State has been dealt with in the resolution itself. 79. Even in his speech of 1 March, my learned friend stated that what has been described or continuously described by other people as India's intransigence is "no more than an insistence on pledges already given to India, particularly on questions relating ta the secnrity of Kashmir". 80. He went on ta argue later that it was not necessary to go into the conditions of a fair and impartial plebiscite since the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan took care of that. But he conveniently overlooked the fact that the security of the State is also taken care of by those very resolutions l have read out, and sub-paragraph 4 (a) of the resolution of 5 January 1949 invests the Plebiscite Administrator with power ta carry out the final , disposaI of all the forces remaining in the State, with 81. "Vhen the Commonwealth Ministers met in London in January of this year - and they also discussed the Kashmir question - the Prime Minister of India again put forward the security of the State as his excuse for its refusaI to withdraw Indian forces from the State. Since the Commonwealth Prime Ministers recognized that no frce plebiscite coulel be held in the presence of Indiall troops, they tried to meet the Indian Prime Minister's apprehensions, however grounclless they tl1emselves thought them to be, by offering, at their own expense, Commonwealth forces for purposes of the plebiscite. 82. This generous offer was again accepted by Pakistan, but was rejected by India. Again, they made an alternative proposaI. They said: "Ali right, let the small force needed be provided jointly by India and Pakistan." Pakistan accepted it and India rejected it. They then made a third proposaI. They said: "Let the Plebiscite Administrator raise a local force from all elements of the population of Kashmir for that purpose." Pakistan accepted; India rejected. 83. Everybody who has tried to deal with this situation comes up against that difficulty, that India goes on raising excuse after excuse for not doing what is set forth perfectly c1early in its language and in its implications, and what was clearly accepted by India as binding, and which we continue to affirm is binding upon it. 84. ·This is the manner in which Sir Owen Dixon sums up the situation [5/1791, para. 52]: "In the end l became convinced that India's agreement would never be obtained to demilitarization in any such form, or to provisions governing the period of the plebiscite of any such character, as would in my opinion permit the plebiscite being conduded in conditions sufficiently guarding against intimidation and other fonl1s of influence and abuse by which the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite might be imperilled." 85. Why does India go on insisting on these things which make demi1itarization and, therefore, the holding of the plebiscite impossible? For the obvious reason that India's hold over Kashmir is only through its military forces. India does not want to let go and India knows that if a fair and impartial plebiscite were held, the plebiscite would go heavily against India. Therefore, it . 86. My learned and distingllished frieml has painted an idyllic picture of conditiollS in IllClia, of Inclia's secularism, its regard for 111inorities, and the manner in which administration in Kash111ir is carried on by il Cabinet of seven in \Vhich five are lVIl1slims. But tl1ese are wholly in"elevant considerations tn the (lt1Cstion the Secnrity Council has under consideration, namely, the holding of a free plebiscite. Tf wc assume that ail this is true and that conditions in IllClia are Ideal, then ,vhat fo11ows? Either Kashmir must accede tn Indiaand is that the conclusion to he drawn? - Dr if a plebiscite is to bc held, it 11111st be helcl while the greater part of Kashmir Dr the Illost dense]y populated portions of Kashmir are held hv Inclian militarv forces and the administration is carried on hv a nonlinec ancl creature of Inclia. Does that folio\\' frnm these conditions in India, even if sttch conditions exist? And c10es 1l1V learnecl friend, hy implication, mcan that they cio I1I~t exist in Pakistan? Are We now to emhark on an investigation of these factors in orcier to determine whether or not the plehiscite is to he held or, if it is to he helcl, under what conditions it is to he helcl? These are wholly irrelevant considerations. 1 will 110t therefOl-e refer to the numerons disahilities, politicnl, economic, cultural and social, from \Vhich IVIuslims in India continue to suffer. Nor need l cleal with the wholly unfOlll1cled insinuations about conclitions in Pakistan, which the representative of India has song-ht to make through the l110uth of the Kasll111ir National Conference. l will also not dwell on the abject misery and terror in which the people in Indian-occnpied Kashmir are living, except perhaps again ta quote an eminent Hindu Kashmiri, Prem N ath Bazaz. He saiel: "Pandit N ehrn said thc present govertlment in Kashmir stands because of its own strength. VI/hat ar~ the signs of their strength? A11 paper;; and periodlc~ls which do not agree with Sheikh Ahdn1la, partlcltlarly in the matter of accession, and are critical of the views and cloing-s of the N ationalists, have been suppressecl. A1l parties other than the National Conference, be they communal or non-communal, which 0PI?Ose the present régime even peacefnlly and constitutlOnal1y, are not allowec1 ta hold meetings. . ".T:here is no free platform - in fact, no institubqü .t~ vit~dicate the people's rights or ventilate the gl1.bhc s gnevances. 87. In fact, the truth is that every State that imposes its rule by force upon another is able ta find some Quislings and parade its support by these Quislings as proof tint it rules by popular consent. 88. Sir Benegal Rau has invited the testimony of tourists ta conditions in the beautiful Kashmir Valley. l might perhaps be permitted ta quote the opinion of one who went to the Valley of Kashmir not as a tourist but as a United Nations representative. l quote from Sir Owen Dixon's report [5/1791} para. 88] : "1 had formed the opinion that it was not easy to exc1ude the danger that the inhabitants of the Valley of Kashmir would vote under fear or apprehension of consequences and other improper influences. They are nat high-spirited people of an independent or resolute temper. For the most part they are illitel·ate. There were large numbers of regular soldiers of the Indian Army as weil as of the State Militia and police, and more often than not they were under arms. The State Government was exercising wide powers of arbitrary arrest. These are not matter3 that the Kashmiris inhabitiug the Valley could be expected to disregarc1 in choosing between voting as the Government of Kashmir asked them and voting for accession to Pakistan." 89. Lest there be any misunderstanding with regard to the character and qualities of the people inhahiting the different parts of the State of ] aml11u and Kashmir, l might explain that this refers to the Valley, as Sir Owen Dixon has mac1e clear, and not to Punch, where the liberation movement startecl and the greater part of which is under the administration of the Azad Kashmir Govermnent. 90. The Kashmir Democratic Union, which is presided over by Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz, to whom l have alreacly referrec1 several timcs,· stressed the fact, in its resolution adopted on 26 February of this year, that the people of Jammu and Kashmir had during three and a haH years suffered incredible hardships in every sphere of life under the "authoritarian, unrepresentative and unwanted ALdl111a Government", and urgecl the Security Council ta ensure the speedy holding of a free and impartial plebiscite under United Nations auspices. ~:'Jl ' ~92. l think that first l might c1ear the ground. ~t i5 "well known that, although every factor on the bas1s of i (~i(\vhich the question of accession should be determined el ~ population, cultural and religious bonds, the ilow of trade, the economic situation, communications, the geo- -'graphical position, strategie considerations-points itisistently in the direction of the accession of Kashmir ~o Pakistan, nevertheless we have not asked for the 4.i;,~çcession of Kashmir to Pakistan on those grounds. We have agreed, and we have been insistent, that the Il'; question should be settled through the freely expressed ":wishes of the people of the State. But that these matters do come into the picture is admitted by everybody who is concerned with the conditions. It was the basic faet undcrlying the partition of Illdia itself, and, whenever a question has arisen with regard to the accession of a State with a majority of non-Muslim population, India itself has always stressed that fact. India takes objection to it and clemurs against it only when the same principle i5 sought to he applied to Kashmir. " au 93. As the Security Council is well aware, tbere were two States, Junagadh and Hyderahad, which had a majority of non-Muslim people and a Muslim Ruler. Junagadh acceded to Pakistan. Hyderabad - a country with 17 million peop1e, vast territories, flourishing economic conditions - desired to remain illc\ependent. vVe shall see what happened with regard to each of these States. graphe 94. vVhen the Government of India came to know that the Ruler of Junagadh cOlltemplated accession to Pakistan, the Prime Minister of Illdia sent a telegram to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, clatec1 12 September 1947, in the course of which he said, in paragraph 4: "The population of Junagadh, according to the 1941 census, is 671,000, of which no less thall. 543,000, or 80 per cent, are Hindus. This large majority of the population of the State has made it clear to the Ruler of Junagadh in no uncertain terms that they are opposed to Junagadh acceding to the Dominion of Pakistan and that they wish that the State should aceecle to the Dominion of Inclia." _.•.. 'He went on, in paragraph 5, as follows: Au "The Dominion of India would be prepared to accept any clemocratic test in respect of the accession of the Junagadh State to either of the two Dominions. It would accordingly be willing to abide by a verdict of its people in this matter, ascertained under .i joint supervision" - and this is important - "of the Dominion of India and Junagadh." .' 95. Pakistan, to which Junagadh was proposing at that date to accede, was not to come into the pictme at ail. Only India and Junagadh were mentioned. 95. rattaché, et 97. This was followed, on 22 September, hl' a telegram from the Governor-General of India to the Governor-General of Pakistan, which stated: "The Pakistan Government has unilaterally proceec1ed to an action in which, it was made plain, the Government of India could never and does not acquiesce. Acceptance of accession to Pakistan cannot but he regarded bl' the Government of India as an encroachment on Indian sovereigntl' and inconsistent with the friendll' relations that should exist between the t'NO Dominions." 98. That is worthl' of note. This was long before the Events in Kashmir, which took place in October, more than a month after the date of the second telegram and nearly six weeks after the date of the first telegram. And here is the principle: that the acceptance of accession, bl' a Dominion, of a State the majoritl' of whose people are opposed to that accession is "an encroachment on the sovereignty and territorl''' of the other Dominion and is "inconsistent with the friendly relations that should exist hetween the two Domii1ions". Substitute Kashmir for Jt1l1agadh and read, nudatis mutandis, the principle which the Government of India itself is urging should be accepted. 99. The telegram goes on: "This action of Pakistan is considered by the Government of India to be a dear attempt to cause disruption in the integrity of India bl' extending the influence and boundaries of the Dominion of Pakistan in utter violation of the principles on which partition was agreed upon and effected." 100; What were those principles? The partition of Indta was agreed upon and effected on the principle that contiguous maioritl' Muslîm areas would constitute Pakistan, and contigllous majority non-Muslîm areas would constitute India. That "vas the principle. And that is what the Governor-General of India was stressing: "You have accepted the accession of Tunag-adh, the mai oritl' of whose population i5 non-Mltslim. 1?his is contrary to the principle upon which the partition of India took place. Therefore, l'our action i5 in utter violation of the principles of the partition and is a dear attempt to cause disrnption in the integrity of India." 101. \Vhy does not India's action in respect of Kashmir amount to a disruption of the integTitv of Pakistan? \~Tl~y is it 110t in. ~ttter violation of tl1e principles upon whtch the partttlon was accepted? Because India 102. It liaS been saicl, on one occasion: "But, you see, in the case of J1111agadh, the Diwan" - the Prime Minister - "invitec1 the Government of India ta take over the administration." Under what circumstances did the Diwan extend that invitation, if any such invitation was extenc1ecl? The Govermnent of Inclia set up withill its own boundaries, or at least permittecl to be set up, with its connivance, a Government of Junagadh. That Government of Junagadh, at the very least with the connivallce of the Government of India, from outsic1e Junagadh, that is to say, from Inc1ian tenitory, contilluec! to .cr~ate clisorc1er and disruption inside Junagadh! l~ntI1 ,It brought about a state of complete chaos Wlth111 ] unagadh. The Indian Army then marchec! in - as the Government of India says, on the invitation of the Prime Minister - to maintain law and orcier. 103. It is a]oint worthy of note that in Kashmir the Mahamja ha a stand-still agreement with Pakistan. 104. He hac! no stand-still agreement with India, India hac! no business with Kashmir, and no kinc! of invitation couIc! have been extended to India. In the circumstances that l have related, an offer by the Maharaja to accede to India was, in terms used by Indi.a itsclf, an attempt ta disrupt the integrity of Pal<Jstan by extcnding the influence anc! boundaries of t~1e Dominion of India in utter violation of the prin- ClpIes upon which partition was agreed upon in the first place. 105. The telegram goes on to say: "In the circümstances l hope it will be possible to prevail upon the Government of Pakistan ta reconsirler its position, otherwise the responsibility and the consequences must, l am compellec! to inform YOU, rest squarely on the shoulclers of the Pakistan Governl11ent." 106. Then this curious oHer is again repeated: "The Government of India is, however, preparee! to accept the verdict of the people of Junagaclh in the matter of accession, the plebiscite being carried out 1l11c1er the joint supervision of the Indian and Junagadh Governments." 1q7. \Vhen it is a question of the accession of aState w~th a majority of fIindus in its population, a plebiscite must be carried out t1nder the joint auspices of the Government of that State and the Government of India. Th~t. is the IJrinciple, so that the l)eople may be in a posItion freely to express their wishes. When the majority of the population is Muslim and a plebiscite is 108. What happened in Hyderabad? Hyderabad wanted to re1l1ain indepenclent; it was prepared to do everything by treaty that Inc\ia wanted it to do by accession. Eventually, it ,vas even prepared to hold a plebiscite in arder to determine whet~er the peol~le ?f Hyderabad wantee! to accede to Indla or. remal11 111 treaty relations with it. India refused to accept. any of these ofiers, 1l1arched its troops in and occuplee! the State - it is still in occupation of the State - ancl that problern is alsa before the Security Council. 109. Jllnagaclh's accession to Pakistan is cha~lenged by India, The Hyderabad Ruler is denied the nght to rel11ain independent, but the Maharaja of Kashmir, in cÎrcumstances when his mie bad !Jeen repucliated in the clearest possible manner by the majority of his sllbjects and when he had, by Iris own ruthless persecution of his own people, forfeited the right to continue ta rule, signed an instrument of accession in a conspiracy which, as l have already briefly imlicated, is regardecl by India as c01l1pleting the legal requirements and converting Kashmir into a llnit of the Indian Federation. lt is this wholly invalid transaction which is nsed as the c10ak for Indian aggression in Kashmir. 110. There are other areas also in which Indian aggression has been at work, but l do not refer to them here. The stark truth of the situation, in brief, is that in South Asia today Indian aggression 18 on the march. 1t has used various devices to camouflage itself. Sometimes, as in Jllnagac!h, it operates in the name of Indian integrity. It was hard pnt to it to find any excuse for what it called "police action" in Hyderabad, when in fact as everyone knows it was nothing less than military invasion on a large scale. In Kashmir it takes on the colour of a spnrious legality, and in other areas it has even nsed and continues ta use the sacred name of democracy. 111. The elephant is an animal which is very tlseflll ane! which is also revered in India. As a matter of fact its forward half is even regarded in Indian mythology as a goc1, but there is a very significant proverb \Vith regard ta the elephant which completely illustrates the position that India continues to adopt with regard ta its obligation to carry out what it undertook to do. The proverb says: "The elephant has one set of teeth for show and another set for eating." The resolutions of August 1948 anc! Janllary 1949 of the Commission are the ivary tusks for show. Inclia has acceptec! those resolutions. The real business of masticating and digesting Kashmir is being carried on in another manner. For that purpose the Government of India has another scheme which it is carrying out step by step. The scheme was first p~t forward by the Indian representative to the PreSIdent of the Security Council in Janual"y 1948, more than three years ago, when the Secmity Conneil, hearing the case for the first time, ~i l11.tO effect. It WIll not carry 111to effect Its oblIgatIOns iünder the international agreement; it is going fOl'ward ~ with its own scheme step by step. u!'d · 112. M. selon du mettre de vernement ment autonomes En l'autonomie mire l'Inde présume ~ 112. In presenting the scheme to Mr. van Langeni: hove, Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar maintained the ~ elaborate pretence that the decision whether 01' not to fL give effect to it rested with the autonomous Maharaja's fGovernment, and that the Government of India could ~ not impose any decision on that government. The ~'11:1anner in which the Goyernment of India during the i' last three years has liquidated those autonomous princely states is by now well-known to the world. The represeni.tative of India, in repeating his predecessor's obser- ~ vations about the autonomy of the Maharaja's Gov- ~ern111ent in Kashmir and the limitations of the GOY- Jiernment of India in dealing with it, is presuming a i. little tao much upon the credulity of the world. · 113. nement Cachemire titution l'Union l'Inde Cachemire. laquelle ainsi constitue jamais sous procéder si tan, tituante et, une 113. In pnrsuance of this scheme, the Government of India has included the State of Jammu and Kashmir in part B of the first scedule of the Constitution of India as one of the units of the Indian Union, and has provided in artic1e 370 of the Constitution for a constituent assembly to be e1ected in Kashmir. The ·constituent assembly which is now being elected in I<asllluir is thus the result of a long thought out scheme, ,:and is a clear indication that the Government of India ;had never any intention of proceeding with a free :plebiscite under United Nations auspices, for if snch a plebiscite is to be held at an early date to decide ·,vhether Kashmir should accede to Inclia or to Pakistan, there should be no necessity for holding elections to a ·constituent assembly to determine Kashmir's consti- :tl.ltion, there should be no necessity even to determine :I<:ashmir's constitution. \114. The real intention of the Government of Inclia ,in these matters has already been given out by the Prime ·JVlinister of India as reported in The Statesman of ;:30 October 1950. The representative of India assurecl he Security Council the other day that it was not 1"l.tended that the constituent assembly should determine he question of the accession of the State and that t1 any case it would not stand in the way of the SeCllrt.y Council. Let us see what the illustrious Prime inister of Inclia has said on that point, as recently as 114. l'Inde Ministre par de l'assurance cher blée gênerait tingué l have no donbt the people of Kashmir are duly grateful to him. for those sentiments, The report went on: "He expressed <llllaZement at Uniteel Nations de1ay in coming to a decision regarding Kashmir." This is a sentiment of which l have no doubt the Security Council wil! take due note. "Referring to the resolution passed yesterday by the .All- Tammu-Kashmir National Conference proposing tlic setting np of a constituent assembly based on adult franchise for determining the future shape ancl evolution of the State, Pandit Nehru we1comed the proposaI and said it would further strengthen the National Conference in the elections and would also enable it to know the people's wishes. It was possihle, he said, that some countries might object to the holding of elections on the plea that the Kashlllir Cluestion l'las before the United Nations and still rcmained undecicled, hut that wonld he a wrong approach, as the people in Kashmir couId not stop a11 their activity and just adopt an unhelpful attitude of wait and sec." 115. That makes it quite clear what the obj eet of the assembly is. It is that the assembly should be able to c1etermine the futme shape and evolution of the State. But the matter is not left there; later on the Prime Minister is reported as having said: "India never accepted the two-nation theory even w!lcn the country ,l'las partitioned. Today also it will never agree to It. IvIoreover, India and Kashmir have cleveloped closer ties. Kashmir is part of am heart. Naturally these sentiments will affect the attitude of the people of Kashmir towards India althol1gh u1tima~ely the people of Kashmil', throl1g1~ an elected constituent assembly, will ratify the formaI accession of the State to Inelia." ,116. !t will he for the Security Council to determine (J'Il wluch statement to place reliance, that of the Prime Mtn,;:ter who says that is the object of the assembly, ~)r tlht'.t of the representative of India who says that 15 not t'\'he ohject of the assembly. ' "There is nothing which can prevent the constituent assembly from pronouncing its opinion on that question." 118. - 118. This is what Sheikh Abdulla says, and l am qnoting from the New Yor!? Times of 25 February 1951: "Sheikh Abdulla announced today his Kashmir National Conference party would go ahead with plans for electing a constituent assembly in September. This body will then decide whether Kashmir will accede ta India or Pakistan on the basis that the assemhly consists of elected representatives of a majority of the people. In the view of Sheikh Abdulla's finn controlwhich Sir Owen Dixon, former United Nations mediator, in his report likened to that of a police State - there is little doubt of the outcome." 119. Nevertheless, the representative of India stated to the Security Council that, "so far as the Government of India is concerned, the constituent assembly is not intencled to prejudice thee issues beIore the Security Council or to come in its way". l have no doubt, aIter what l have quoted from the speeches of the Prime Minister of India and from the Prime Minister of the State of Kashmir appointed by the Government of India - though nominally by the Maharaja - some clarification of the position becomes necessary as to what the basis is on which one is to deal with this question. It is obvious, however, that those on the spot know best what they intend to do because the)' are doing it. Both oI them, Sheikh Abdulla and the Prime Minister of India, declared that the constituent assembly will determine the question of accession of the State to India or to Pakistan. 119. au considère pas Conseil certain, Ministre Cachemire bien est base Toutefois, sont de Abdullah tous question Pakistan.

In view of the late hour and in view of the fact that l understand the representative of Pakistan still has a considerable statement to make on this matter, l would suggest, if the representàtive of Pakistan would be prepared to continue his statement at the Council's next meeting, that the Council adjourn until tomorrow at 3 p.m. 120, raison le assez rai, suivre Conseil, 15 SALES AGENTS fOR UNITED DEPOSITAIRES DES PUBLICATIONS FINLANDE ARGENTINA - ARGENTINE FINLAN? - K'rJakauppa Edl!ori., Sud.merlc~na S.A., Calle ~~~~eeHel~~~ki. 1 Alsma 500, Buenos Aires., AUSTRALIA - AUSTRALIE. . ~~~FCE A Pedone H. A. Goddard (Pty.l, Ltd., 255a George p' o~s ., Street, Sydney, N.S.W. arlS. GRECE BELGIUM - BELGIQUE ~RE~ChE ;;dakls " Agence et Messageries de la Presse S.A., ~'e ~I~~e de I{ 14-22 rue. du Persil, Bruxelles. na \E ALA ~i-~5 SB~~~~v~r~ogdolphe_Max, ~~~bau~ & Ciao Bruxelles. num. 28, 2 do Plso, BOLlVIA - BOLIVIE HAlTI Librer!a Cientlfica y Literarla, Avenida Max Bouchereau, 16 de Julio 216, Casilla 972, La Paz velle!' Boite postale BRAZIL - BRESIL Prince. Llvraria Agir, Ru. Mexico 98·B, Calxa HONDURAS Postal 3291, Rio de Janeiro. librerla Panamerlcana, CANADA - CANAOA, Fuente, Tegucigalpa. The Rymon Pre", 2g9 Queen Street ICELAND - ISLANDE West Toronto. 80kaverzlun Slgfusar CEYLON - CE'fLAN , Austurstreti lB, The Associated Newspapers of Ceyton, INDIA - INDE Ltd., Lake House, Colombo. Oxford Book & CHILE - CHILI House, New Delhi. Llbrer!. Ivens, Calle Moneda 822, INOONESIA -INDONESIE Santiago. JaJasan Pembangunan, CHINA - CHINE 84, Djakarta. The Commercial Press, Ltd., 211 Honan IRAQ - IRAK Raad, Shanghai. Mackenzle's Bookshop, COLOMBIA - COLOMBIE Statloners, Baghdad. Llbrerla Latina Ltda., ApartadoAéreo IRAN 40Jl, Bogot;\. Ketab-Khaneh COSTA RICA - COSTA·RICA Avenue, Teheran. Trejos Hermanos, Apartado 1313, San IRELAND - IRLANDE José. Hlbernlan General CUBA cial BuildIngs, Dame la Casa Belga, René de Smedt, O'Reilly ISRAEL 455, La Habàna. Leo Blumsteln, CZECHOSLOVAKIA - 35 Allenby Road, TCHECOSLOVAQUIE lTALY -ITALIE Ceskoslovensky Splsollatel Narodn! 7'Flda Colibri S.A., Via 9, Praha 1. LEBANON _ LIBAN DENMARK - DANEMARK librairie universelle, Einar Munksgaard, N~rregade 6, LIBERIA K~benhavn. J. Momolu Kamara, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC - Streets, Monrovia. . REPUBLIQUE DOMINICAINE LUXEMBOURG llbrer!a Domlnlcana, ~alle Mercedes No. librairie J. Schummer, 49, Apartado 656, Ciudad TruJillo. Luxembourg. ECUADOR:- EQUATEU~ MEXICO _ MEXIQUE Mulioz Hermanos y CI'., Plaza dei Editorial Hermes, Teatro,. Quito. cal 41, Mexico, EGYPT - EGYPTE· NETHERLANDS librairie "La Renaissance d'Egypte," N.V. Martinus 9 SH. Adly Pasha, Cairo. 9, 's-Gravenhage. EL SALVADOR - SAI.VADOR NEW ZEALAND"": Manuel Navas y Ciao "La Casa dei L1bro NOUVELLE.ZELANDE Barato" la Avenida sur num. 37, San United Nations Salvador. land, G.P.O. 1011, ETHIOPIA - ETHIOPIE NICARAGUA Agence Ethiopienne de PublicIté, Box 8, Or. Ramiro R.mlrez Addls·Abeba. Publlcacion.., Managua, Unl/ed Nllllon. pub/lclllion. can furlher be obllllned Irom lhe follo""ng bookseller.: GERMANY - ALLEMAGNE AUSTRIA - AUTRICHE Buchhandlung Elwert & Meum, Haupt-' B. Wüllerstorff, strasse, 101, Berlln·Schëneberg. Salzburg. W. E. Saarbach, Frankenstrasse, 14, Këln·Junkersdorf. JAPAN - JAPON Alexander Horn, Spicgelgasse, 9, Maruzen Co., Ltd., Wiesbaden. Nlhonbashi, Tokyo Order. and inquirle,lrom countrles wh". sales agenls hve not yet boan appoiated may bo ,.nt to: Sales and CîrciJiatlon Seclion, United Nation., New York. U.S.A.; or Sales Section, Unlted Nation, Office, Pelais des Nations, Geneva, Swit.erland. -=--:-----:;---;-::---:-------------:-----------------=-- Priee: 30 (or equivalent